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Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts Author(s): Jennifer L. Woolard, N. Dickon Reppucci, Richard E. Redding Source: Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 3, Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts (Jun., 1996), pp. 219-228 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1393973 Accessed: 20/05/2009 04:55 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Law and HumanBehavior,Vol.20, No. 3, 1996

Theoretical and MethodologicalIssues in Studying Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts Jennifer L. Woolard,1N. Dickon Reppucci,1and Richard E. Reddingl

children'scapacitiesin legalcontextsis an urgentpriorityfor psychology Understanding and the law. The distinctionbetweencapacityandperformanceis discussedin lightof two researchgoals: (a) identifyingchildren'scapacities relevantto law; and (b) identifyingthe circumstancesunder which theirperformancevaries. This discussion leadsto threefundamentalresearchissuesthatareexplored.First,in additionto general capacity,the effect of specific legal contextson performancerequiresinvestigation. Second, capacitiesresearchmust take a developmentalapproachusing appropriate, ecologicallyvalid targetand comparisonsamples. Third,legal standardsand their inherentdevelopmental assumptionsaboutchildren'scapacitiesmustbe operationalized and investigated both legal and psychologicalperspectives. from

In the past decade, society has identifiedchild maltreatmentand juvenileviolence as two of its most pressing social problems.The current response to alleviating these social problemsrelies in part on legal remediesbased on commonsense and politicallypopularvalue judgments.One way to promote the value of preventing abuse has been to allow, or even to encourage,young children'stestimonyagainst their alleged abusers to become a cornerstoneof prosecutionefforts. The values of protectingpublic safety and preventingcrime has resultedin more severe sanctions, includingautomatictransferto adult court, for increasingnumbersof ever youngerjuvenile delinquents.Both of these responsesare relatedto a fundamental dilemmaregardingchildrenand the law-What is the natureof children'scapacities in legal contexts?The issue of capacityis the centralscientificconcern.However, societal pressure to act on these issues created a momentumfor change that has outpaced any empiricaleffort to informlaw and policy. Although the law has long recognizedthat children are less "mature"and less "capable"than adults in many legally relevantdomains,it is unclear to what degree particularcapacitiesvarywith chronologicalage and levels of cognitiveand socioemotional development. Over a decade ago, psychologists (e.g., Melton, 1To whom correspondenceshould be addressedat Departmentof Psychology,Universityof Virginia, GilmerHall, Charlottesville,VA 22903. 219 41 of the AmericanPsychological Association 0147-7307/96/0600-0219$09.50/1 O 1996AmericanPsychology-Law Society/Division

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Koocher, & Saks, 1983; Weithorn,1984) called for researchon these issues, and some legal scholarshave explicitlygroundedtheir statutoryproposalsin empirical researchabout children'scapacities(e.g., Redding,1993).While some researchhas been completed (e.g., Ambuel & Rappaport,1991; Grisso, 1981; Scherer, 1991; Scherer & Reppucci, 1988; Weithorn& Campbell,1982), the foundationof empiricalknowledgeis fragile.The importanceof age effects on capacityremainsunresolved, and context and its interaction with chronological age must be investigated. The SupremeCourt'sdecisionin Stanfordv. Kentucky(1989), allowing16 year olds to face the death penalty,the laws that are now being enacted in manystates to allow juveniles age 14 or even youngerto be automaticallytransferredto adult court, and the fundamentalproceduralchanges in child testimonyagainstalleged abusers facilitatedby Craigv. Maryland(1990) have all made understandingchildren's capacities an urgent priorityrather than an interestingacademicexercise. The societal debate on juvenile violence and child maltreatmentcontinues,with little attentionto scientificinformationabout children'scapacities.Indeed, there is a historyof controversywithin the scientificcommunityover the extent of its participationin a varietyof policydebates.(See, e.g., Gardner,Scherer,& Tester,1989; Melton, 1990;and Scherer& Gardner,1990;regardingadolescents'competenceto consent to abortion;and Goodman,Levine, Melton, & Ogden, 1991; Goodman, Levine, & Melton, 1992; and Underwager& Wakefield,1992; regardingwhether child witnesses should be affordedspecial proceduralprotectionswhen testifying againsttheir alleged abuser.)Regardlessof one's viewpointon the role of advocacy, however,a scientificperspectiveon children'scapacitiescan providea criticalanalysis of the fundamentalassumptions,explicit and implicit,that shape the societal dialogue and structurethe legal response.This special issue of Law and Human Behaviorfocuses on children'scapacities,a timely and importantarea for collaboration between psychologistsand legal scholars. In the present article,we drawon cognitivedevelopmentresearchto discuss the importantdistinctionbetweencapacityand performance.Then we addressthree fundamentaltheoreticaland methodologicalconcernsthat capacityresearchmust addressin order to lay the groundworkfor a valuablescientificcontributionto the social discourse. CAPACITY VERSUSPERFORMANCE The focus on children'scapacitiesraises two researchgoals: (1) identifying children'scapabilitiesrelevantto law; and (2) identifyingthe circumstancesunder whichtheirperformancevaries.Cognitiveresearchdescribesthese goals as the competence-performancedistinction(Wood & Power, 1987). Although definitionsof competence and performancevary,generallycompetencerefers to the knowledge and abilities expressedunder ideal circumstances.Performanceincludesthe processing activitiesrequiredto demonstrateknowledge,as well as the interpersonal and contextualfactors affectingperformance.Because the law is concernedabout children'scapacitiesonly as they are demonstrated in a particularlegal context,le-

Children'sCapacities

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gaily relevantresearchnecessarilymust addressperformanceand how it may vary with age, psychosocialdevelopment,context, and task. Developmentaland cognitiveresearchhave demonstratedthat capacities,or competence, as measuredby a standardizedtest or laboratorytask, may outshine performance(Fischer & Pipp, 1984; Fischer & Silvern,1985; Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard,1995; Wood & Power, 1987). Indeed, much of the recent theorizingand testing of the competence-performancedistinctioncomes from research on children'scognitivedevelopment(e.g., Chandler& Chapman,1991).For example,children have a varietyof strategiesfromwhichthey drawin solvingcountingproblems (e.g., simple addition) (Siegler, 1991). The choice of strategydepends on which strategiesare available(their capacity),as well as the demandsof the task at hand (performanceconstraints).A five year old may retrievethe answerfrom memory when asked to solve a simple addition problemlike 2 + 3. The same child may use a count-on strategywhen adding a small numberto a largernumberlike 2 + 9 (e.g., "9, 10, 11"), or the child may count from one by holdingup fingersfor the numberson each hand and then count fingers.Childrencan use a varietyof strategies dependingon what type of problemthey are asked to solve. As they get older, they learn new strategiesand more frequentlychoose efficientstrategies.Thus, performancecan vary as the strategyrepertoireand learningexperienceschange over time. This cognitive developmentalresearch is designed to understandhow new strategiesare learned,selected, and used under a varietyof developmentalcircumstances and task constraints. Psycholegalresearch shares analogousgoals of understandingchildren'scapacities and performance,but for legally relevant constructsin a variety of legal contexts.The articlesin this special issue heraldthe trend towarda developmental, ecological, systems approachto psycholegalresearchon children'scapacities,particularlyin two substantiveareas. The first, children'scapacities as witnesses or participantsin legal proceedings,has an impressiveresearchhistory (for reviews, see Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995; Goodmanet al., 1992). It includeschildren'sability to participatein criminaltrials (e.g., as victimsor witnessesof crime;see Perry& Wrightsman,1991) and civil proceedings,particularlyfor family matters (e.g., as participantsin custodydeterminations;see Garrison,1991;Scott, Reppucci,& Aber, 1988). Special concernshave been raised about young children'smemoryand suggestibility(see Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995). The second area focuses on adolescent'scapacitiesto assume adult responsibilityfor decision makingor for criminalconduct.Duringthe past 15 years, several studies of adolescents'capacitiesto make informeddecisions,e.g., in understanding their Mirandarights (Grisso, 1981) and makingtreatmentdecisions (Kaser-Boyd, Adelman, & Taylor,1985; Weithor & Campbell,1982), have raised questions regarding more active participationin legal decision making (see Redding, 1993). Mostly,these studies have examinedadolescents'abilitiesto meet adult standards to make informeddecisions,particularlyfor medical treatment(e.g., abortion;see Ambuel & Rappaport, 1992; Lewis, 1980). Recently, the focus has expanded to examine developmentalconsiderationsin a wider varietyof legal contexts.For example, changesin juvenile and criminaljustice are now questioningtraditionalpre-

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sumptionsof adolescent immaturity(and correspondingincapacity)to choose to commitillegal acts, as well as to participatefullyin the resultantlegal proceedings. State-of-the-artresearch,and our emergingunderstandingof young children's and adolescents'capacities,raise new theoreticaland methodologicalissues. Three issues emerge as key topicsfor futureresearch.First,in additionto generalcapacity, the effect of specific legal contextson performancemust be investigated.Second, capacityresearchmust take a developmentalapproachusing appropriate,ecologicallyvalid targetand comparisonsamples.Third,legal standardsand their inherent developmentalassumptionsaboutchildren'scapacitiesmustbe operationalizedand investigatedfrom both legal and psychologicalperspectives.We explorethe capacity/performancedistinctionfor each of these three emergingresearchissues.

GLOBALVERSUSSITUATIONAL EFFECTS Legally relevant capacitiescan be identified either theoreticallyor through previousempiricalwork. Beyond the identification,however,the next step entails understandingthe conditions under which performancedeviates from capacity. Most of the phenomenaof interestsuch as memoryrecall,susceptibilityto suggestion and influence, and perceptionof risk in decision makingare developmental phenomenathat change with the legally relevantage period. Often, the pathways of change have been studied in other substantivearenas or as a general developmental phenomenon.For examplechildren'sabilityto recallpreviousevents in narrativeform has been studiedin a varietyof laboratorytasksin the field of cognitive development.This interest in understandingand documentingnormativedevelopment has often resulted in a focus on more global issues of development(e.g., understandingof adolescents'general cognitive abilities) rather than on contextspecificissues (e.g., understandingof an adolescent'scapacityto consultwith a lawyer about his or her defense). The studyof children'scapacitiesin legal environmentsis an intentionalfocus on a very specific and unusualset of situationsor contexts.Cognitive,socioemotional, or other situation-specificfactorsmayvaryin theirsalienceand impactacross legal contexts. Thus, a comprehensiveunderstandingof children'scapacities requires a dual approach.On the one hand, the general, global nature of relevant capacitiesand their developmentaltrajectoriesmust be understood.On the other hand, the capacitiesalso must be assessedand evaluatedin specificlegal contexts. This dual approach provides an understandingof the relationshipbetween the global nature of capacitiesand the situation-specificeffects on performance. One exampleof an emergingdevelopmentaland contextualparadigmis seen in new approachesto the study of adolescent decision-making(e.g., Scott, 1992; Scott et al., 1995) that questionthe legal relevanceof past researchon adolescents' competence to consent,which generallyhas found adolescentsto be as cognitively competent as adults. Scott and colleagues(1995) point out that past researchhas been primarilylaboratory-based and has failed to considerseveralhighlyimportant contextualand socioemotionalvariables(like the effects of peer and parentalpres-


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sure, and attitudestowardrisk) that may influenceadolescents'actualperformance in real life. Continuingthis approach,Steinbergand Cauffman(1996, this issue) conceptualize the psychosocialfactorsin adolescentdecisionmakingas dispositionsto behave under situational constraints,rather than definitive traits that consistently appear under a variety of circumstances.Both Scott et al. (1995) and Steinberg and Cauffman(1996) emphasizethat their hypothesesaboutjudgmentand decision making are primarilytheoreticaland await empiricalverification,because existing studies were not conducted in legally relevantsituations.For example, there is a lack of researchexaminingadolescents'riskychoices and their relationshipto violent behavior (e.g., "bad"judgmentor decision making).Grisso (1996, this issue) argues that this is in part due to the lack of research on the interpersonaland situationalcontextsin which such choices occur. Investigationof potentialsimilarities and/or differencesbetween adolescentsand adults occurringas a function of developmentcannot advancewithout researchon the relevantcontexts. Child witness researchhas done much to advanceour understandingof contextual influences on children'sperformance.As the articles in this issue demonstrate, the field has advanced to identifying the situational characteristicsthat constrainor enhance the reliabilityand consistencyof memory,recall,and accuracy of communication.Recent researchhas moved beyond documentingthe accuracy of children'snarrativeaccountsof experiencedevents to examinethe effects of age and context on other specific abilities.Gross and Hayne (1996, this issue) test children on a real-life experienceto identifythe practicalconditionsunderwhich eyewitness recognitionmemory is more accurate.Others have focused on the effect of courtroomtactics on children'saccuracyand reliability.Carter,Bottoms, and Levine (1996, this issue) integratedevelopmentaland contextualinfluencesby examining how two task demands,developmentallyinappropriatequestioningtechniques and the socioemotionalcontext of the interview,affect children'sreportsof a real-life event. Research of this type will also increase our understandingof how children's performancein particularlegal contextsmay be enhanced,i.e., so that performance more closely approximatescapacity,permittingchildren'sinvolvementto the extent their capacitieswill allow. This points to anotherimportantresearcharea that has been largelyneglected.Psycholegalresearchersneed to follow the trendin cognitive developmentresearchof investigatinghow practice,training,eliminatingage-inappropriateperformancedemands,and/or task simplificationmay enhance performance (see Fischer & Pipp, 1984; Siegler, 1991). Emergingresearch on children and adolescentsunderscoresthe importance of situationand context. Moreover,because the constructsof interest are ongoing developmentalprocesses,the interactionof context with developmentis crucial. DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHWITHAPPROPRIATECOMPARISONS Historically,the legal system has viewed children as immatureand lacking the same capacities as adults. In comparisonto adults, this focus on incapacities

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has cast childrenas less reliablewitnesses,less capable of makinginformeddecisions, and less deservingof punishmentfor illegal acts. For example, holding in Parhamv. J.R. (1979) that childrendo not have a constitutionalright to challenge their civil commitment,the SupremeCourt observedthat "Most children,even in adolescence,simplyare not able to make soundjudgments"(p. 603). Increasingly, however, the Court shows ambivalenceabout children'scapacities.For instance, the Court in 1988 found it unconstitutionalto execute juvenilesunder 16, saying that adolescents"are less matureand responsiblethan adults"(Thompsonv. Oklahoma, 1988, p. 833). Only one year later, in Stanfordv. Kentucky(1989), however, the Court upheld the death penaltyfor juveniles 16 and older, with the majority not even addressingthe issue of maturity. The study of children'scapacities in legal contexts raises the question, To whom should their capacitiesand performancesbe compared?Two potential answers emerge:"normal"samplesand adult samples.Dependingon whichcomparison sample is chosen, differencescould be attributedto the definingcharacteristics of the sample (e.g., the special characteristicsof delinquentsor hospitalizedchildren) or to age (e.g., the special characteristicsof youth or immaturity). Particularlywhen using institutionalizedsamplesor other specialpopulations, the importancefor policy-relevantwork of takingthe next step to understandnormal developmentcannot be underestimated(Zaslow & Takanishi,1993). Normal adolescentsare the appropriatecomparisongroup for samples that are facing, or are at risk of facing, a legal situationwith contextualconstraints. Understandingnormativepopulationsis criticalbecause the very capacities of interestinfluenceselection into the at-riskpopulation,resultingin an important selection bias. For example, cognitive and psychosocialinfluences on adolescent judgment may affect the decision-makingbehaviorthat brings them to the legal system.The portraitof developmentcreatedby the at-risksample does not reflect adolescentsas a population,but a particularsegmentof adolescents.Policyregarding adolescentsas a class may be more usefullyinformedby an understandingof the capacityand performanceof both groups-adolescents who are likely to enter the systemas well as adolescentsgenerally.Forexample,Mulveyand Peeples'(1996, this issue) study of the decision-makingcompetenceof childrenat risk for institutional placement includes a comparisonwith a communitysample of adolescents matched on age, ethnicity,gender, and familysocioeconomicstatus. In doing so, the investigatorsare able to delineatethe specificaspectsof competenceon which the two samples differ. Given the potential impact of developmentalphenomenaon children'sperformance,age is naturallya salient factor. If capacitiesare changing,performance cannot necessarilybe attributedto the child'sstable, unchangingcharacteristicsor individualtraits. Cross-sectionalresearchwithout older comparisongroups may mask the possibilitythat a child may "age out" of a particularbehavioror cognitive level. Thus, psycholegalresearchmust mirrorthe trend in developmentalresearch towardidentifyingdevelopmentalpathwaysor trajectoriesthat lead to the relevant behavior.Moffitt's(1993) identificationof two types of delinquentswith different developmentalpathwaysfor delinquentbehaviorultimatelymay have implications for the legal response to juvenile offenders.These types of offenders cannot be


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distinguishedby a cross-sectionalsample of same-agedadolescentdelinquents,because duringthe peak offendingyears,persistentoffendersand adolescence-limited offenders have similarprofiles. The identificationof trajectoriesand pathwaysruns counterto the legal tendency to identifybrightline distinctionsbased on age. The most common and encompassingrule is the age of adulthood,usually18 years, althoughit may varyfor some specific situationslike contraceptiveaccess and alcohol use. The legal status of adulthoodconfers a numberof rightsand responsibilitiesthat are withheldfrom juveniles. This categorizationsuggests a second useful comparisonsample in the study of children'scapacities-legal adults. For example, most studies examining adolescents'abilityto give informedconsent have comparedadolescent and adult performance,generallyfinding that 15-year-oldadolescentsof normalintelligence have capacitiessimilarto adults.However,these findingshave been challengedbecause of methodologicallimitationsof the studies, e.g., relativelysmall samples of middle-classwhite youth respondingto vignettesof variousbehaviorsin a laboratory setting. Moreover,commentatorshave suggested that adolescent decision making incorporatesadditionalconstructs,which, althoughinapplicableto adults, remain criticalfor an accurateportraitof adolescents'capacities(Grisso, 1996;Scott et al., 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman,1996). The assumptionthat adolescentsmay differ qualitativelyand quantitativelyfrom adults must be examinedempiricallywith appropriatesamples and situations.

DEVELOPMENTAL ASSUMPTIONSIN POLICYAND PRACTICE While the legal systemfocuses on individualcases, legal decisionstake place in a largersocial and organizationalcontext.Advancesin communityand developmental psychologyhave fostered the applicationof a systemsapproachto the study of psycholegal concepts (Roesch, 1988, 1995). Using a systems framework(e.g., Bronfenbrenner,1979), the legal system can be analyzedin terms of the assumptions about development("developmentalframeworks")that shape policyand practice regarding children's involvement. Assumptions include implicit or explicit developmentalframeworksfor understandingchildren'scapacities,and children's actual behavioror performancein legal settings. Some of the explicitassumptionsare the guidingphilosophiesthat are clearly stated but ill-defined,such as parenspatriaeor "best interestsof the child" (Reppucci & Crosby, 1993). Though these doctrinesserve as the foundationfor legal decisionmaking,their definitionand implicationsare unclear.The implicitassumptions can also guide the policies and practicesof children'sinvolvement.For example, the importanceof age in judicial perceptionsof children'sexpression of custodypreferencesindicatesthat judges may have a developmentalframeworkof children'scapacitiesand abilities(Scott et al., 1988). Crosby(1996) and Cashmore and Bussey(1996) take an importantstep towardidentifyingthe variationsin beliefs amongjudges, mental healthprofessionals,and attorneys.Age specificationsin statutes also may representimplicitdevelopmentalframeworks.


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The identificationof developmentalassumptionsis also useful in identifying the issues and forces underlyingtrends in the changinglegal roles of juveniles. Statutoryrestrictionson the age at whichjuvenile offenderscan and/ormust face adultlike punishment in criminal court may reflect developmentalframeworks. These legislativechanges are based in part on concernsfor public safety,but they also represent changingviews on how "adultlike"certainjuvenile offenders are. Grisso (1996) examinescurrentlegal trendstowardretributiveresponsesto violent juveniles,particularlythose who commithomicide.His approachmoves a step back from investigatingthe implementationof retributivepolicies to question the fundamentalpremisethat some juvenilesmerita retributiveresponse.He uses existing researchto examinepotentialchallengesto the increasein retributionand identifies a numberof areas in which furtherappliedresearchis criticallyneeded. The integrationof psychologicalresearchwith legal practicerequiresclarity in the operationalizationof legal policies and procedures.Developmentaldifferences and similaritiescan have implicationsfor legal constructssuch as competence (can children make legal decisions?),responsibility(do childrenchoose or cause their behavior?),and accountability(does wrongfulbehaviormerit punishment?). Clarityin operationalizinglegal standardsmay be difficultto achieve because the legal systemitself often is unclearregardingjuvenilestandards.For example,competency to stand trial is emergingas an importantlegal standardthat is being extended to juveniles (Grisso, Miller, & Saks, 1987). It is unclear whether the componentsof competencyfor adultsare appropriatefor juveniles(see, e.g., In re WA.E, 1990;Statev. Kaempf,1979) or if juvenilecompetency,because of ongoing developmentalprocesses,may have additionalcomponents.Likewise,transferstatute criteriaare often vague descriptionsof psychosocialconstructs.Termslike "amenabilityto treatment"and "emotionalmaturity"are two examplesof criteriathat rarelyhave been defined, much less empiricallyinvestigatedin legal contexts. CONCLUSION The legal basis for the juvenile court resides in the parenspatriaepower of the state as legal guardianof the communityand those citizenswho are not competent to care for themselves.Throughoutits history,the juvenilecourt has based its parenspatriae power on assumptionsabout children'scapacity,as has the law on allowingchildrento testify in court. Currently,the issue of children'scapacity has taken on increasedimportanceas society tries to combat child maltreatment andjuvenileviolence.Researchon children'scapacitiesis urgentlyneeded to inform the law about the conditionsunderwhichyoung childrencan testify (either in juvenile or adult court) againsttheir alleged abuserand on the circumstancesunder which a juvenile can be held to adult standardsof criminalresponsibility.This urgency cannot be overstated,given the acceleratingtrend towardtransferringeven young childrenfor trial and sentencingin adult court, based on assumptionsthat they have the capacityto be responsiblefor their conduct. It has been said that the law is "policyanalysiswithoutbenefit of data"(Saks, 1989,p. 1110), but contextuallyrelevantresearchon children'scapacitiesin specific

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legal contexts has the potential to help change this state of affairs.Even though the relationshipbetween psychologyand law may be a "highlyneurotic, conflictridden ambivalentaffair" (Bersoff, 1986, p. 155), developmental/community psychologists can have an impact on law and policy. Tb do this, however,they must conduct ecologicallyvalid researchdesigned to addressrelevantand specific legal questions and become familiarwith currentlegal issues and the policy questions that are likely to arise. Bersoff and Glass (1995) state the challengewell: Social scientistsplay on a legal ball field. Their work is evaluatedaccordingto the rules

the legal system lays down ....

But, it is hoped that social scientists will continue to

develop situation-specific,ecologicallyvalid, legally relevant,objectivedata that, despite resistance,will help the SupremeCourt,as well as otherswho makesocialpolicy,to arrive at empiricallyjustifieddecisionsthat matchthe real world.(p. 302)

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