To Be or Not to Be South Asian: Contemporary Indian American ...

To Be or Not to Be South Asian: Contemporary Indian American Politics Kurien, Prema A., 1963-

Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 6, Number 3, October 2003, pp. 261-288 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jaas.2004.0020

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jaas/summary/v006/6.3kurien.html

Access provided by Syracuse University (8 May 2013 15:01 GMT)

TO BE OR NOT TO BE SOUTH ASIAN

•

KURIEN

•

TO BE OR NOT TO BE SOUTH ASIAN: Contemporary Indian American Politics

prema kurien

INTRODUCTION

A

s ethnic groups have emerged in the public sphere to demand recognition and resources in Western multicultural societies, the process of “ethnogenesis,”1 in this case the transformation of immigrants into “ethnics,” has been a subject of much scholarly interest. The development of “new” ethnicities on the basis of coalitional alliances among immigrants from different backgrounds has received particular attention. These discussions usually have been framed by a variety of theoretical debates that tend to be cast in a binary fashion: is the ethnic formation due to the recognition of longstanding cultural similarities, or is it the outcome of cultural bonds that are forged in the diaspora; 2 is ethnic identity externally imposed, or is it voluntarily embraced; 3 does ethnic mobilization emerge as a reaction to discrimination and marginalization, or as a strategic response to gain resources.4 Since most of these mobilizations are targeted at the host polity, the role of the state in shaping patterns of ethnic formation remains a central focus of most of these debates.5 There are two major bodies of literature in this regard: one focused on new ethnic identifications formed by pan-ethnic coalitions based broadly on continent of origin, such as “Asian,” “Latino,” “African” or “black,” and “European” or “white,”6 and the other looking at the development of pan-ethnic coalitions based on religious affiliation.7 Both types JAAS OCTOBER

©

2003 • 261–288

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

261

262

•

JAAS

•

6:3

of literature examine how ethnic mobilization has involved an engagement with the wider society and the state in an effort to obtain recognition and resources. Curiously, however, there have been very few studies comparing the similarities and differences between the two types of mobilizations and the relationship between organizations and members from the same ethnic community that belong to the two types of organizations. Yet this is an important topic, since “public religions” might have overlapping or cross-cutting goals with pan-ethnic groups.8 For instance, in response to their burgeoning Mexican and Central American constituency, leaders of many Protestant and Catholic churches in Southern California increasingly have been involved in social activism for immigrant rights, a platform which is in synchrony with that of Latino coalitions in the region.9 On the other hand, Hindus and Sikhs in the U.K. have been trying to distance themselves from Muslim groups by demanding that they not be lumped together with them as “Asians.”10 Arun Kundnani for example, has reported that Hindu groups in Britain increasingly were mobilizing on the basis of an anti-Islamic platform and that the far-right British National Party had been able to convince a Sikh separatist group, the Shere-e-Punjab, to ally with them on the basis of a common hatred for Muslims.11 Such rises in tensions between the different religious groups has led to a significant weakening of the Asian coalition in that country. Thus, the impact of pan-continental and pan-religious organizations on the ethnic community and on the wider society depends in large part on whether the two types of organizations reinforce or subvert each other’s goals. This relationship can be of particular significance when the objective of both organizations is to influence national politics. My article will examine these debates by looking at two distinct and opposed ways in which Indian Americans are entering the public sphere in the U.S.: some groups gravitate toward and mobilize around a “South Asian” platform (which despite the label tend to be composed overwhelmingly of Indian Americans), while other groups reject this approach and mobilize instead on the basis of a pan-Hindu, or increasingly, an “Indic” identity. The term “Indic,” as it is used by these groups, refers to religious groups, cultures, and traditions that are “indigenous” to India—and thus theoretically includes groups such as Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs, but in


•

KURIEN

•

practice usually refers only to Hindus. Both South Asian and Hindu, or Indic, groups tend to be comprised largely of Indians from a Hindu background, and thus religious affiliation is not the primary distinguishing factor between the membership. Rather, at the heart of the difference between South Asian and Hindu organizations lie two different conceptions of “Indianness”—a secular, multi-religious, and multi-cultural vision of India versus a Hindu-centric one (There is a third group of Indian Americans—those who identify and are active as “Indians” or “Indian Americans”—but since most of these individuals share the ideology of one or another of the two types of organizations that I have mentioned, and many are also involved in them in some capacity, I do not focus on this category.) This article examines the differences in the strategies and goals of South Asian and Hindu organizations, and the impact that each type of organization has been having on the South Asian American community and on the American public sphere. This topic is particularly relevant in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the U.S. of September 11, 2001, since the events of 9/11 were a watershed for both South Asian and Hindu organizations, propelling them into activism and the American public sphere in very different ways. My argument is that the two types of organizations have been mobilizing in response to similar pressures in the American environment, but by using two different kinds of logic. This study also will demonstrate that the development of both types of groups was a complex process, depending on a combination of factors—and, therefore, that the binaries referred to at the beginning of this article tend to be too sharply distinguished. My findings draw on an eight-year study of religion, ethnicity, and politics among Indian Americans and a book in progress on the new forms, practices, and interpretations of Hinduism in the United States. As part of this research, I studied seven Hindu organizations in Southern California and New Jersey. Besides participating in the activities of the organizations, I also interviewed the leaders and many of the members. In addition, I conducted shorter studies of five more Hindu organizations in these two areas. I also have studied a Muslim Indian organization, an Indian Christian church, and a secular coalition of Indian American ac-

263

264

•

JAAS

•

6:3

tivists in Southern California. Besides this primary research, I have been following the activities of Indian Americans around the country by reading three Indian American newspapers (India West, India Post, and India Journal) and the international magazine, Hinduism Today, published from Hawaii. However, the primary source of data for this paper comes from an analysis of publications, web-sites, and discussions of Internet groups belonging to the two types of organizations, in addition to interviews I conducted with leaders and members of two Hindu umbrella organizations and three South Asian organizations. Since the South Asian coalition developed first in academia, there are now several journal articles, edited volumes, and anthologies by members of this group.12 Beginning in the year 2000, many Hindu Indian Americans have taken to the Internet in large numbers, forming discussion groups and writing copiously in global Indian E-zines (Internet magazines) like Sulekha.com and Rediff.com. I have been monitoring these E-zines and four such Internet discussion groups (Indian Civilization, Indictraditions, Hindu Reform, and Indian Diaspora). Both South Asian and Hindu organizations also maintain web-sites that provide details regarding their mission, projects, and achievements. Members of South Asian organizations characterize themselves as individuals and groups that are progressive (Some also use the term, “leftist.”), inclusive, and oriented toward social change, with a primary focus on domestic American issues. They argue that there are many cultural similarities between individuals of South Asian background, and that in the U.S. they also face common concerns and similar treatment as “brownskinned” individuals. In addition, they emphasize that there are growing subgroups of South Asian Americans—besides Pakistanis and Bangladeshis—such as Indian Muslims, Indian Christians, Sikhs, Bengalis, Indo-Caribbeans, and working-class Indians, all of whom feel alienated from the Hindu-centric vision of many of the Indian organizations and, therefore, favor a more inclusive South Asian American identity. 13 Members of South Asian organizations also tend to emphasize that they are forward-looking in their orientation, since their focus is primarily on the second and later generations, for whom sub-continental issues are in-


•

KURIEN

•

creasingly irrelevant. They contrast themselves with members of Hindu and Indian-identified groups whom they characterize as being conservative, oriented toward preserving the status quo (for instance, wanting to maintain the model minority image), and unable to divorce themselves from homeland politics and concerns. Members of Hindu, or Indic, groups, on the other hand, describe themselves as proud Hindus and patriotic Indians who are trying to build community solidarity and inculcate individual and collective pride on the basis of an identity and culture that is thousands of years old. They maintain that it is disadvantageous for India to be lumped together with the other countries in South Asia, since “India’s geographical size, economy and progress are far ahead of these countries.” They further argue that the cultural and political gulf between members of these countries is too vast to bridge. Thus, these groups contend that instead of trying to ignore these cleavages, Indian Americans ought to educate their children and the wider American society about the fundamental differences between the countries in South Asia. They characterize members of South Asian organizations as those who are anti-Hindu and anti-Indian, reflecting a “deracinated group” with very little knowledge about Indian history and culture that has bought into the “artificial” U.S. state department construct of a homogenous sub-continent.14 After providing a brief background to the research, I turn to examine some of the organizations that fall under the South Asian and HinduIndic categories, focusing particularly on those organizations whose goal is an engagement with the wider American public. I then turn to an examination of the reaction of these organizations to the events of September 11, 2001. In the final part of the paper, I present an analysis of the reasons for the differences in the approach and strategies of South Asian and Indic organizations.

BACKGROUND

TO THE

RESEARCH

Most adults of Indian ancestry in the U.S. today either are immigrants who arrived after the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act or are their children. It is now common to talk about two waves

265

266

•

JAAS

•

6:3

of post-1965 Indian immigrants to the United States. The first wave of Indians came under the “special skills” provision of the act and thus tended to be highly educated, fluent English-speakers from urban backgrounds who entered into professional and managerial careers. Immigrants who came as part of the second wave were relatives of the first-wave immigrants, sponsored under the “family reunification” provision of the 1965 act. Many in this group may not have had the same educational or professional status as the first wave. Beginning in the 1990s, there also has been a large influx of computer data programmers (on H-1B visas) and their families (Indians comprise the largest group of H-1B visa holders.) to meet the demands of the Information Technology boom in the United States.15 Another group that recently has increased tremendously has been those coming to the U.S. on student visas.16 According to the 2000 census, Asian Indians in the U.S. numbered almost 1.7 million, and they were also one of the fastest growing communities in the country with a growth rate of 105.87 percent between 1990 and 2000. They are now the third largest Asian group in the U.S. (outnumbered only by the Chinese and the Filipinos). The immigration patterns of Indians explain why they are among the wealthiest and most educated foreign-born groups in this country but also have a significant segment who are struggling financially (possibly those second-wave immigrants who have been forced into working-class jobs, and computer programmers laid off by the Dot.com collapse). The proportion of Indians in the U.S. living below the poverty line in 1990 was around 10 percent, and this figure is likely to have increased in the intervening period.17 There are no official figures on the religious distribution of Indian Americans. Hindus comprise more than 80 percent of the population in India,18 but it is likely that they constitute a much smaller proportion of Indians in the U.S. since Indian religious minorities, particularly Sikhs and Christians, are present in much larger numbers in the United States. Estimates of the proportion of Indian Americans from a Hindu background range from 45 to 65 per cent.19 Several scholars have argued that Hindu nationalism, or the Hindutva (Hinduness) movement, obtains more support among Hindus in the U.S. than in India since it resonates more in the diaspora, where Hindus are a


•

KURIEN

•

racial and religious minority.20 Hindutva-vadis (supporters of Hindutva) in the U.S. argue that the movement is particularly important in providing “a framework for maintaining an identity” in such situations.21 Hindu nationalism in India first emerged as a reaction to Western colonialism. In the post-colonial period, it achieved a resurgence beginning in the late 1980s. For Hindutva proponents, the Vedic age represents the essence of the Indian culture.22 Thus, Hindutva-vadis view Indian culture and civilization as Hindu, whose true nature and glory was sullied by the invasions of Muslims and the British, and by the post-colonial domination of “pseudo-secular” Indians. According to the Hindutva perspective, these historical wrongs can be righted only by a state that is openly and unashamedly Hindu. The concept of “indigenousness” is central to this contemporary Hindu nationalism, with Hindus defined as those whose religions are indigenous to India. Thus, this definition includes groups like the Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs, but excludes Indian Muslims and Christians, who often are described therefore as “foreigners” despite their presence in India for well over 1,200 years. The Hindutva movement is characterized by a marked hostility toward these two groups. Hindu nationalism also stresses the greatness of Hinduism and Hindu culture, the importance of Hindu unity, and the need to defend Hinduism and Hindus against discrimination and defamation. In the next section, we will see how these concerns inform the activities of Hindu American umbrella organizations. In the U.S., the term, “South Asian,” conventionally includes the seven countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. However, the number of South Asian Americans in the U.S. is difficult to estimate, since the race question in the census only allows for the “Asian Indian” or “other Asian” option for people from South Asia and because not all the South Asian countries are included in the “country of origin” figures published by the census bureau. After Indians, the three largest groups of South Asian Americans are Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Sri Lankans. Current estimates by South Asian organizations put the total number of South Asian Americans in the U.S. at 2.1 million. Since Indian Americans number 1.7 million, or 80 per cent, they overwhelmingly dominate this category, leading individuals from some of the other

267

268

•

JAAS

•

6:3

South Asian groups to complain that the term “South Asian” in the U.S. often has become interchangeable with “Indian.”23 Bangladeshi Americans tend to be largely from Muslim backgrounds, while Sri Lankan Americans are mainly Buddhist and Hindu, with a small proportion of Muslims and Christians.

THE TWO TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS SOUTH ASIAN GROUPS: South Asian organizations run the gamut from 1) cultural and social groups, such as campus-based associations, which unite on the basis of social and cultural similarities; to 2) women’s groups formed by South Asian women who were disillusioned with mainstream feminist groups and those focused on domestic violence issues, which were founded because the activists felt that there were cultural and legal needs unique to South Asian women who were victims of domestic abuse; to 3) gay and lesbian groups that were forged due to the common concerns of South Asian gays and lesbians and their experience of marginality within the larger gay community; to 4) professional groups like the Network of Indian Professionals (NETIP), which despite its name encourages a broader South Asian participation; to 5) trade groups like The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), whose goal is to foster entrepreneurship among South Asian Americans. These organizations primarily focus on providing services for the South Asian community, although in that capacity they sometimes advocate for their constituencies to policy-makers and the general public. Engagement with agencies or groups in the wider American society is more central to the mission of other South Asian organizations. These include 1) grassroots social justice organizations, like the South Asian Network (SAN) in Southern California, which focus on providing services, community education, and advocacy for South Asian Americans (particularly those in the lower income brackets) in the areas of health care, immigration, and civil rights; 2) labor organizations like the New York Taxi Worker’s Alliance, which advocates the cause of immigrant taxi drivers; and 3) the New York-based South Asian Journalists Association (SAJA), which is a resource center for journalists covering topics related


•

KURIEN

•

to South Asia and also has been lobbying to increase the numbers of South Asian Americans in major news organizations. In addition, there are also politically oriented organizations like the South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) and the Subcontinental Institute. The South Asian Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT), based in Washington, D.C., originally was formed in February 2000 as the Indian American Leadership Center and became a South Asian American organization in the following year to broaden its scope. The founding members of the organization and their current Board of Trustees include senior-level corporate executives from several Fortune 500 companies. They describe their mission as developing leadership and fostering civic engagement by South Asians in all sectors of American society.24 The organization focuses on domestic issues of concern to the South Asian community, such as immigration, discrimination, hate crimes, and civil rights, and its goal is to develop a unified voice to address these concerns. Its leaders claim that their target audience is the younger generation, and that one of their central goals is to provide guidance and support for this group. They say that they are not interested in getting involved in the geopolitics of South Asia and, therefore, as a rule do not address issues related to the sub-continent. The Subcontinental Institute, also based in Washington, D.C., was formed in 2002. Its goal is to provide a forum for the development of a South Asian American political identity that is inclusive and representative of the various perspectives that prevail within the community.25 To that end, instead of trying to avoid conflict like SAALT, they claim that they embrace it by trying to make sure that all voices get heard. Although focusing primarily on the same domestic issues that concern SAALT, the Subcontinental Institute differs from its counterpart in not avoiding foreign policy issues altogether. Its central activity, however, is the production and distribution of a journal, The Subcontinental, which is targeted primarily at politically active South Asians and policy-makers in Washington. Besides the need to be inclusive and to address the common concerns of the community in the U.S., Nirav Desai, the editor of The Subcontinental, indicated that there were two additional reasons that motivated the founders (all of Indian origin) to make the Institute a South Asian organization: 1) they realized that policy-makers often “wanted to

269

270

•

JAAS

•

6:3

talk about issues in terms of South Asia” and 2) they wanted to show that their loyalties were not split with another government.26 That being perceived as a patriotic American is an important motivation for politically active Indian Americans adopting a South Asian identity is a point that also is made by journalist Sarah Wildman. In an article on South Asianness she quotes Kris Kolluri, an Indian immigrant and senior policy adviser to then House Minority Leader Dick Gephart, as saying, “What you’re seeing is not only a movement to stand up for our civil rights but also a movement to ensure that the larger society knows that we are Americans.”27 HINDU AND “INDIC” GROUPS: There are several types of non-sectarian Hindu umbrella organizations in the United States. Some, like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad of America (VHPA) and the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS—the overseas counterpart of the Indian organization, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, RSS), are branches of Hindu nationalist organizations based in India. Others, like the Southern California-based Federation of Hindu Associations (FHA), are independent, regional, American organizations but still may be interlinked with the former in a variety of informal ways. The term, “Indic,” originally was used in linguistics and Indology to refer to the linguistic group from which Sanskrit and several other Indian languages originated, and to early Indian texts, but recently has been reappropriated and redefined by Hindus in the U.S. and U.K. as an academic term to denote the philosophy, science, culture, and spirituality of Vedic India. Even more broadly, it is employed to signify a cultural— some even would argue a civilizational—identity with “deep roots” in India.28 The first major Indic studies organization to be established in the U.S. was the Dharam Hinduja Indic Research Center (DHIRC) at Columbia University, formed in 1995 along with a similar institute at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom. The Hinduja center at Columbia came under a great deal of criticism, with critics charging that the term, “Indic,” was manufactured to disguise a Hindutva agenda under the garb of academic respectability.29 Under these attacks, the institute was moved out of Columbia University and finally was closed down. The


•

KURIEN

•

next Indic studies organization established in the U.S. was the Educational Council of Indic Traditions (ECIT), which was founded in 2000 under the auspices of the New Jersey-based Infinity Foundation. Several other Indic organizations followed, such as the Center for Indic Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, the Foundation for Indic Philosophy and Culture at the Claremont Colleges in California, and the Indic Culture and Traditions Seminars (ICATS) in Houston, all of which focused on the study and promotion of “Indic traditions,” primarily meaning the religious, philosophical, and scientific traditions of ancient India. Below, I turn to an examination of the ways in which these Hindu and Indic organizations have been entering the American public sphere. For some years now, groups of Hindu Americans have been challenging the portrayals of Hinduism and of India that are prevalent in the wider society and working to ensure that the religion is recognized as an important contributor to the American religious mosaic. Thus in their public presentations, the focus has been primarily on two issues: 1) enumerating the greatness of Hinduism: its antiquity, tolerance, pluralism, and nonviolence as well as its theological and scientific sophistication, and 2) contesting the negative American stereotypes of the religion, for instance that it is “polytheistic,” “idol-worshiping,” “caste-ridden,” and “misogynist.” Anti-defamation issues have been an important concern of Hindu American leaders. In 1997, the VHPA formed the organization, American Hindus Against Defamation (AHAD), whose goal was the defense of Hinduism against defamation, commercialization, and misuse. The success of AHAD was followed by the formation of several other anti-defamation groups around the country, including the Hindu International Council Against Defamation (HICAD) based in New Jersey. Portrayals of Hindus and of India in the American news are another important target of these anti-defamation groups. The portrayal of Hinduism within academia has been the focus of “Indic” groups such as the Infinity foundation. In 2000, when the Educational Council of Indic Traditions (ECIT) of the foundation and its associated Indictraditions Internet discussion group were founded, its mission was described in the following way:

271

272

•

JAAS

•

6:3

This Council . . will be involved in the process of conducting independent research to a) document the contributions by India to world civilization and to b) ascertain the degree to which Indic traditions and their contributions are accurately and adequately portrayed in contemporary American society. Preliminary findings indicate that Indic traditions, which include Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism and Jainism have been and continue to be misrepresented, stereotyped, or pigeon-holed both in academic institutions and by the mass media.30

The mission statement made clear that the term, “Indic,” excluded religions that were “imported” into India, such as Islam and Christianity, and in practice the focus of the foundation has been largely on Hindu traditions and culture. Although not an academic himself, Rajiv Malhotra, the President and founder of the Infinity foundation, has been an influential figure within Indic Studies in the United States. He was a prominent speaker at an International conference held at the Center for Indic Studies at Dartmouth in July 2002 and is a board member of the Foundation for Indic Philosophy and Culture at the Claremont Colleges in California. Other umbrella groups were focused on getting Hinduism publicly acknowledged as an American religion at the national level. Thus, in September 2000, Indian American lobby groups were able successfully to demand to have a Hindu priest open a session of Congress for the first time. A month later, President Clinton issued a proclamation from the White House wishing Indian Americans a Happy Diwali. Both of these events were reported with great pride in Indian American papers. For instance, the India Post characterized Clinton’s official Diwali greeting as “a symbolic gesture that speaks volumes to the fact that Indian culture is accepted as part of America’s overall fabric.”31 Recently, there have been attempts to have a Diwali stamp issued by the U.S. Postal Service. Hindu organizations like the Federation of Hindu Associations (FHA), based in Southern California, have been trying to influence American foreign and domestic policy by assiduously wooing politicians in an attempt to communicate their ideas regarding Indian society and politics and an Indian American identity. To achieve their goals, these Hindu organizations sometimes join forces with Indian American organizations that have a Hindu-centric focus. As part of their anti-Muslim agenda, the


•

KURIEN

•

FHA and groups like Hindu Unity, based in New York, also have allied with far-right Jewish and Christian groups.32

THE WATERSHED OF 9/11 In her article on the development of a South Asian identity, Sarah Wildman quotes Professor Madhulika Khandelwal as saying that the concept of South Asianness had “taken off ” in the post-9/11 period: “because to American bigots, Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs all look the same—brown—many victims are deciding they have a lot more in common than they had previously realized.”33 In general, South Asian groups around the country mobilized to present a united front against the hate crimes that followed in the aftermath of 9/11, and to challenge government policies like the special registration required of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries. One of the founders of the South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow (SAALT) told me that 9/11 had catapulted the organization into the public arena, since they had put out a “very authoritative report and video” on hate crimes two weeks later (something that they had been working on even before 9/11) “that spread like wide fire” through student, community, law enforcement and advocacy groups around the country.34 The organization also has taken up the cases of the families of South Asian victims of hate crimes, most recently of a Pakistani American who was shot and killed in Texas in the wake of 9/11, whose family was about to be deported. The South Asian Network (SAN) also was pushed to a greater degree of public activism in the wake of 9/11. The organization has been very active in protesting the post-9/11 racial profiling and arrests of South Asians. They met with INS officials to protest the Special Registration policy for men from Muslim countries and the large number of detentions of Southern California Muslims that took place as part of this policy.35 In addition, they united with other immigrant activist groups to organize two demonstrations in Southern California, the first to condemn the “racially discriminatory detentions and registration requirements” and the second to speak out against the Patriot Act and the upcoming Patriot Act Two of the U.S. government, which, they argued, violated the civil liberties of Americans.36

273

274

•

JAAS

•

6:3

In New York, the South Asian Journalists Association, SAJA, looked for South Asian victims of the bombings, published lists of the South Asian dead, and also got out names and stories about South Asians who were being attacked in the backlash. In addition, they held town hall meetings and teach-ins about Islam and about Afghanistan and Pakistan for weeks on end after 9/11.

HINDU GROUPS Hindus generally were overlooked in the several interfaith events that were organized in the wake of 9/11, and thus Hindu groups mobilized to bring Hinduism to the attention of the administration and policy-makers by pointing out that practitioners of the religion were an important part of American society who ought to be included in such interfaith activities. For instance, the umbrella group, Hindu International Council Against Defamation (HICAD), and several hundred individual Hindus sent a petition to George Bush entitled, “Why do you Exclude Hindus from Your Prayers,” a reference to the fact that Hindu leaders were not invited to be part of the national prayer service on September 16, 2001. Hindu Americans also challenged the post-September 11th attempt to enlarge the “JudeoChristian” tradition into an “Abrahamic” one (by including Muslims), since they feared that it would marginalize further non-Abrahamic religions like Hinduism. Finally, they mobilized to draw attention to the difference between Hinduism and Islam. In light of the September 11th backlash in the U.S., “a lot of Hindus suddenly have started realizing they better stand up and differentiate themselves from Muslims or Arabs,” journalist Sarah Wildman quotes Rajiv Malhotra, President of the Infinity Foundation, as saying.37 In the weeks immediately following 9/11, he was invited to several American universities as a Hindu representative, to speak about the unfolding events. In his talks at American University and Princeton University, he went on the offensive against Islam, criticizing its leadership of “duplicity” for projecting a face of peace and tolerance in the United States.38 Following the cue of Hindu groups in England, which had challenged the British media’s description of the race riots in North England in the summer of 2001 as “Asian” riots by arguing that those rioting were Muslims (Pakistanis and


•

KURIEN

•

Bangladeshis), not Hindus, Hindus in the U.S. tried to distance themselves from Muslims. According to Beth Kulkarni, coordinator of the Houston-based Indic Culture and Traditions Seminars, the organization was formed in the aftermath of 9/11 to “train non-Hindu, non-IndianAmerican teachers to better understand Indic traditions and culture . . . [and thereby to] dispel prejudice through providing authentic knowledge of its traditions.”39 Many Hindu Indian Americans around the country bombarded their politicians and the media with anti-Pakistani and anti-Islamic propaganda, filled with quotes from the Koran, and also called into radio and television talk shows to criticize Islam. Others spoke up at town meetings to denounce the treatment of minorities in Muslim countries and to challenge the positive portrayals of Islam by Muslim speakers. Members of the Indictraditions discussion group shot off letters to the President of the American Academy of Religion (AAR), demanding that the organization sponsor panels on Islamic fascism and on “Jihad: God as Weapon of Mass Destruction” in the upcoming annual meetings to counterbalance what they claimed was its excessive focus on Hindu fascism. In an email that was circulated to several Indian American Internet groups on April 2, 2002, titled, “Replicating the UK Model,” the author, a frequent contributor to such discussion groups, argued against the concept of South Asianism in light of the events of 9/11: In the U.K., sharp polarization has been achieved. Hindus and Sikhs are demanding that they not be called Asians and lumped with Muslims. . . So what can we learn and adapt to the U.S. environment: 1. Hindus must support profiling against terrorism. Under no circumstances must we help the Islamists under the guise of racism. 2. The U.S. hates Commies, tar the South Asians as Commies. Per U.S. law, Commies are liable for deportation. 3. Contact U.K. members on how to speed up the process. 4. In the current wave of nationalism sweeping the U.S., tar the South Asians as fellow travelers of Islamic terrorism.40

Some Hindu Americans also sent e-mails and letters to “South Asian” groups to press a point that they had been making all along: that India had nothing in common with Islamic countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh and, therefore, should not be lumped together with them.

275

276

•

JAAS

•

6:3

Groups like the Global Organization of Persons of Indian Origin (GOPIO) were criticized for trying to create an pan-Indian platform that included both “Indic” and “non-Indic” members. MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNICITY How can we understand the differences in the strategies and goals of the South Asian and the Indic organizations? In this section, I will turn to an explanation. Briefly, I argue that both South Asian and “Indic” groups are coalitional alliances “made in America” as a situational response to the “politics of recognition” of American multiculturalism.41 There are three aspects of the politics of recognition that are critical in shaping such coalitional alliances. Firstly, since social, economic, and political resources are distributed on the basis of ethnicity in a multicultural society like the U.S., there is pressure on individuals to organize into groups and to have ethnic representatives to “speak for the community” and its concerns. Thus, the politics of recognition of multiculturalism demands the construction of a public ethnic identity, as opposed to a purely private one. This public identity is one that at least partially is imposed by the society and is based ostensibly on certain types of cultural similarities deriving from national origin or ancestry. Secondly, the fact that ethnic categorization generally is mobilizing, by virtue of national origin, on the basis of an allegiance to the homeland tends to be viewed as politically threatening, due to the “container model” of the nation-state that is prevalent.42 This tendency means that immigrants mobilizing as ethnics have to be careful to emphasize and demonstrate their loyalty to their country of residence (in this case, the U.S.), particularly when they emerge in the public sphere. Finally, while many versions of multiculturalism try to side-step the issue of racialization by focusing on cultural similarities, race is an important principle of classification in the U.S. that does not always fit neatly with the official ethnic categories of American society. I argue that in reaction to these contradictory pressures, two different but overlapping types of ethnic alliances develop in the American context: coalitional alliances based on officially defined ethnicity and racial categorization, and coalitional alliances based on religion and racial background.


•

KURIEN

•

COALITIONAL ALLIANCES BASED ON ETHNICITY AND RACE: The politics of recognition of multiculturalism, combined with the reality of racism, means that groups that “look alike” frequently are lumped together and treated as though they are the same. Over the course of American history, many sub-groups have resisted this type of racial lumping by distancing themselves from groups that have come under attack from the wider society, so as not to be blamed for the alleged misdeeds of another group. For instance, early Japanese migrants differentiated themselves from Chinese migrants, since they were a more select group and because the Chinese were subject to the exclusion acts.43 When World War II broke out, however, Japanese Americans became “the enemy” and Filipinos, Chinese, and Koreans wore buttons saying, “I am Filipino,” or “I am Chinese,” or “I am Korean,” so that they would not be mistaken for being Japanese.44 Over time, however, as various groups that are lumped together have interacted in the U.S., they have become aware of common problems and goals. Thus, the tendency for racial categorization and the recognition of commonalities by those so categorized often has given rise to pan-ethnicity, particularly among members of the second and later generations. Groups that are lumped together, such as “blacks,” “Asians,” “Native Americans,” and “Latinos,” have developed ethnic solidarity by adopting voluntarily the ascribed category and by reinterpreting the history of the individual groups to create a common heritage.45 Unlike the distancing strategy of individual ethnic groups, those who adopt a pan-ethnic identity often deliberately define racist attacks against one sub-group as an attack against the whole group, thereby mobilizing on this basis. Since the interaction between members of different ethnic groups that were lumped together was often greatest on college campuses, pan-ethnic coalitions generally were formed first in such settings. For example, the 1960s student movements, in which minority students sought to have education made more relevant to their concerns, gave rise to Ethnic Studies programs and departments around the country. This is the same logic that explains the formation of South Asian groups in the United States.

277

278

•

JAAS

•

6:3

BECOMING SOUTH ASIAN Like the Asian American movement of the late 1960s, the South Asian American movement began on college campuses in the late 1980s.46 Before that time, activist South Asians had joined mainstream organizations, but when they experienced marginalization and rejection left to join organizations formed by people of color. However, according to Monisha Das Gupta, due to the “model minority” status of South Asians, “the responses of these groups to South Asians ranged from outright rejection to confusion as to the stakes South Asians had in people of color struggles.”47 At the same time, South Asians also largely were excluded from Asian American groups. The long history of U.S. engagement with East Asia and the relatively larger numbers of East Asian Americans in the country has meant that in the U.S. the term, “Asian,” generally refers to people of East Asian ancestry, and thus South Asians were made to feel as though they did not fit under the Asian American umbrella, either culturally or racially.48 As South Asians encountered each other on college campuses, they discovered how much they had in common—from their historical, social, and cultural heritage to their experiences of racialization in the United States.49 Thus, they came together to challenge the exclusion of South Asian voices within Asian American Studies courses, conferences, and publications, and to mobilize as a progressive coalition against the religious bigotry that seemed to be sweeping through their communities.50 This background explains the concern of South Asian groups for social justice issues, their emphasis on inclusivity, and their secular orientation. COALITIONAL ALLIANCES BASED ON RELIGION AND RACE: In another work, I have argued that the politics of recognition of multiculturalism, together with the psycho-social consequences of migration and the marginality that many immigrants experience, increases the importance of religion and religious organizations and leads to ethnic mobilization around religion.51 Although generally overlooked in the literature on immigrants and multiculturalism, within the sociology of religion it now is well understood that religion and religious institutions often play a central role in the process of ethnic formation. While na-


•

KURIEN

•

tional or regional origin officially is recognized as the criterion of ethnicity, particularly in American society, it traditionally has been religion that has been viewed as the most legitimate basis for community formation and expression, since maintaining a religious identification is not politically threatening to an American identity.52 The literature on contemporary immigrant religion in the U.S. indicates that religious organizations often become the means of maintaining and expressing ethnic identity, not just for non-Christians like the Hindus but also for groups such as Chinese and Korean Protestants as well as Maya Catholics.53 Since religion in the U.S. defines and sustains much of immigrant ethnic life, religion and religious institutions take on a greater significance in the immigrant context than in the home country.54 As de facto ethnic institutions, most immigrant religious organizations also develop regional and national associations to unify the group, define their identity, and represent their interests. Consequently, different religious groups tend to develop definitions of nationality from their own perspective, resulting in differences in the construction of homeland culture and identity along religious lines.55 Over time here, too, as groups that are lumped together by virtue of practicing the same religion interact, the tendency for religious solidarity has given rise to pan-ethnicity, particularly as religious groups in the U.S. have started, since the 1980s, to emerge in the public sphere in asserting and advancing their interests.56 Racialization and racial lumping historically have played an important part in the development of pan-ethnic religious solidarities as well. Thus, certain Christian denominations now are associated with white groups and others with black groups. There are Asian American Christian organizations and churches as well as Latino Catholic parishes. Racialization also can play an indirect role in the development of religious solidarities, since for racial minorities emphasizing a religious identity can be one way to avoid identifying on the basis of race.57 This is the logic that Hindu and Indic groups have followed. BECOMING HINDU For a variety of reasons, religion seems to have become more important for Hindus as a marker of identity in the United States. As emigrants

279

280

•

JAAS

•

6:3

from urban, cosmopolitan areas of India, many of the professionally educated Hindus whom I interviewed indicated that they had not been particularly oriented toward religion when they had arrived in the United States. However, many of these same individuals mentioned that they had become more religious in this country, where for the first time they had to think about the meaning of their religion and religious identity, something they could take for granted in India. Others, who claimed that they were not especially religious, nevertheless participated in Hindu organizations for social and cultural reasons, and “for the sake of the children.” According to Arvind Rajagopal, a further reason that Hinduism becomes important in the U.S. is that identifying as Hindus allows the predominantly upper-caste immigrants to side-step their problematic racial location.58 Hinduism and “Indianness” also seemed to become significant for the second generation during their coming-of-age process.59 In an earlier publication, I argued that many Hindu American students often were forced to come to terms with their cultural and religious heritage when their “brown skins” precluded them from being accepted as “just American” by their peer group.60 Unlike most other established religions, Hinduism does not have a founder, an ecclesiastical structure of authority, or a single canonical text or commentary. Consequently, Hinduism in India consists of an extraordinary array of practices, deities, texts, and schools of thought. Due to this diversity, the nature and character of Hinduism have varied greatly by region, caste, and historical period. It is also a religion that stresses orthopraxis over theological belief. For all these reasons, the average Hindu immigrant is often unable to explain the “meaning” of Hinduism and its “central tenets,” something that they repeatedly are asked to do in the American context. It is this need that Hindu organizations seek to fill. Hindu nationalist organizations, whose goal in India has been to unite, educate, and mobilize Hindu Indians of different backgrounds in support of Hindu interests, were well-positioned to take on this role in the U.S. as well. Not surprisingly, the “Hinduism under siege” Hindu nationalist message, along with its emphasis on the need for Hindu pride and assertiveness, is particularly attractive to Hindu Americans, who become a racial, religious, and cultural minority upon immigration and have to


•

KURIEN

•

deal with the largely negative perceptions of Hinduism in the wider society. Thus, Hindutva has become an important magnet around which many Indians from a Hindu background coalesce in their effort to obtain recognition and resources as American ethnics and to counter their relative invisibility within American society. This role explains the focus of Hindu umbrella groups like the VHPA and the FHA on anti-defamation and the glorification of Hinduism, as well as their anti-Muslim political agenda. While the American Indic groups described in this article do not officially endorse Hindutva, as I have argued that there is some overlap between the ideologies (and the rhetoric) of supporters of both types of organizations. Again, there has been a direct relationship between Hindutva supporters and Indic Studies in some instances. For instance, several of the invited speakers at the July 2002 International conference on India’s Contributions and Influence in the World, organized by the Center for Indic Studies at Dartmouth, were prominent Hindutva leaders and supporters.61 In the process of creating a unified Hindu identity in the U.S. by synthesizing different and often opposed Indian Hindu traditions, scholars have noted that Hinduism is being transformed into what has been described variously as an “American Hinduism” or “Ecumenical Hinduism,” as Raymond Williams explains in the following: An ecumenical Hinduism is developing in the United States that unites deities, rituals, sacred texts and people in temples and programs in ways that would not be found together in India. In temples and centers created on an ecumenical model, emphasis is placed upon all-India Hindu “great tradition,” on devotion to major deities, and upon some elements of the Sanskrit tradition.62

As we have seen, the Hindutva category of “Hindu” becomes transmuted into an “Indic” category in Western academia, drawing a commonality between a wide array of groups, including practitioners of almost all of the major religious traditions in India except for Muslims and Christians. This “Indic” unity essentially is forged in the West, since in India relations between Sikh and Hindu groups and between Jain and Hindu groups generally are characterized by rivalry and periodically by downright hostility.63

281

282

•

JAAS

•

6:3

CONCLUSION In short, my argument is that despite the apparent differences between South Asian and Hindu, or Indic, organizations, both types of groups have a lot in common. Both types of identities are “made in America” through a process of coalition-building; both organizations are formed as a reaction to racism and marginality and the lumping together of all people who “look alike”; and both are trying to reinterpret and transform the categories of the majority culture—South Asian, Hindu, and Indic— as a means for gaining empowerment, recognition, and resources. At the same time, leaders and members of both types of groups argue that there are cultural similarities that make a South Asian or a Hindu, or Indic, identity a “natural” one as well as a comfort zone where they can escape the cultural and racial slights they experience in the wider society. Both South Asian and Hindu groups are very concerned about their invisibility in the wider society and in American politics as well as the way in which they have been marginalized and misrepresented in academia. Finally, in both cases, part of the reason that the particular identity is chosen is so that it is not seen as politically threatening to their allegiance to the United States. In fact, mobilizing as South Asians or as Hindus is probably a sign of integration and assimilation into multicultural America, since both groups are following established American patterns of group formation and ethnic activism.64 At the same time, the differences in the strategies and goals of the two types of groups results in their having very different impacts on the community. The activities of Hindu organizations such as those mentioned in this paper are leading to a polarization of Indian Americans into Hindu versus non-Hindu groups (or Indic versus non-Indic groups), and Hindu versus secular groups as well as reinforcing tensions between South Asians of different backgrounds. These cleavages also impact people living in the sub-continent. For instance, several investigations have concluded that much of the financial support for extremist Hindu nationalist groups in India comes from Hindus in the United States.65 The development of a South Asian coalition also can be problematic, but for other reasons. If a South Asian identity is just another term for a certain kind of Indian American identity, as some of its critics charge, it


•

KURIEN

•

could lead to a further exclusion of the voices and concerns of non-Indian South Asian groups. Even if the South Asian coalitions are truly inclusive, Sarah Wildman argues that they are not without cost in that while they might increase influence over American domestic policy, they might decrease influence over American foreign policy. Specifically, she argues that many pan-ethnic coalitions steer clear of foreign policy altogether in order to avoid dissent within the group. If they do get involved in foreign issues, however, such coalitions face the difficult task of trying to balance the concerns of all their member groups.66 Since Indian Americans, and South Asian Americans more generally, do not fit neatly within the ethnic and racial categories in the U.S., they are a good example of an outlier group that reveals the limitations of these categories. The tensions between South Asian and Hindu groups also highlight the contradictions underlying some expressions of multiculturalist politics. The relationship between pan-continental and pan-religious groups largely is neglected in the academic literature, but this case shows how serious the implications are when the two types of groups work at cross-purposes from each other. This study also makes clear that the process of ethnogenesis is often the result of a combination of the factors alluded to in the beginning of the article. The development and mobilization of both South Asian and Hindu American groups in the U.S. were a consequence not only of both pre-existing cultural commonalities but also of emergent identities; these identities were ascribed but also were chosen voluntarily and redefined; and group formation was a reaction to marginality but also an opportunistic mobilization to gain resources. An important lesson, therefore, is that while such categories are useful for analytical purposes, we also need to be cautious about reifying these binaries. Notes 1. 2.

Eugeen E. Roosens, Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1989). Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Pan-ethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); David Lopez and Yen Le Espiritu, “Pan-ethnicity in the United States: A Theoretical Framework” Ethnic and Racial Studies 13:2 (1990):198–224; Feliz M. Padilla, Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1985).

283

284

•

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16.

JAAS

•

6:3

Espiritu, Asian American Pan-ethnicity ;Joane Nagel, “Construction Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture” Social Problems 41:1 (1994):152–176; Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Majid Al-Haj, “Ethnic Mobilization in an Ethno-national State: The Case of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 25:2 (2002): 238–257; Barany Zoltan, “Ethnic Mobilization and the State: The Roma in Eastern Europe” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21:2 (1998): 308–327. Francois Nielsen, “Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies” American Sociological Review 50:2 (1985):133–149; Zoltan, “Ethnic Mobilization and the State.” Espiritu, Asian American Pan-ethnicity ; Padilla, Latino Ethnic Consciousness; Mary C. Waters, Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities (New York and Cambridge: Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press, 1999). José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1994); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ed., The Muslims of America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Jane Smith, Islam in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Gerald Sorin, Tradition Transformed: The Jewish Experience in America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo and Kara Lemma, “Clergy Advocacy for Immigrants: A Comparison of the Sanctuary Movement and Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice.” Paper presented at the American Sociological Association annual meeting, Anaheim, August 18–21, 2001. Raju Patel, “UK Media Use of the Term ‘Asian’ Causes Confusion.” Report in Hindu Press International, November 17, 2002. Arun Kundnani, “An Unholy Alliance? Racism, Religion and Communalism,” Race and Class 44:2 (2002):71–80. Special Issue of Amerasia 25:3 (1999/2000); The Subcontinental 1:1 (2003); Sunaina Marr Maira and Rajini Srikanth, Contours of the Heart: South Asians Map North America, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002); Lavina Dhingra Shankar and Rajini Srikanth, editors, A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). Nirav S. Desai, “Forging a Political Identity: South Asian Americans in Policymaking,” The Subcontinental: A Journal of South Asian American Political Identity, 1:1 (2003):10. Ramesh Rao, “Its India Not South Asia,” The Subcontinental: A Journal of South Asian American Political Identity 1:1 (2003):27–40. The number of H1-B visas issued to people from India jumped from 2,697 in 1990 to 55, 047 in 2000 (www.iacfpa.org/press/census515.htm). C. Rajghatta, “India Tops China in Student Inflow to U.S.,” India West, November 22, p. A 35.


•

KURIEN

•

17. Figures from www.iacfpa.org. 18. This is based on census reports that count Dalit groups (former “untouchable” castes) as Hindu. However, many Dalits object to their being included within Hinduism. 19. S.K. Hofrenning and B. R. Chiswick, “ A Method for Proxying a Respondent’s Religious Background: An Application to School Choice Decisions,” Journal of Human Resources 34 (1999):193–207; John, Y. Fenton, Transplanting Religious Traditions: Asian Indians in America. (New York: Praeger, 1988), 28; Pyong Gap Min, “Immigrants’ Religion and Ethnicity: A Comparison of Korean Christians and Indian Hindu Immigrants,” Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies 2:1 (2000): 121–140. 20. Vinay Lal, “The Politics of History on the Internet: Cyber-Diasporic Hinduism and the North American Hindu Diaspora,” Diaspora 8:2 (1999): 137–172; Biju Mathew, “Byte-Sized Nationalism: Mapping the Hindu Right in the United States,” Rethinking Marxism 12:3 (2000): 108–128; Biju Mathew and Vijay Prashad, “The Protean Forms of Yankee Hindutva,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23:3 (2000):516–534. 21. Ramesh Rao, Narayan Komerath, Beloo Mehra, Chitra Raman, Sugrutha Ramaswami and Nagendra Rao, “A Factual Response to the Hate Attack on the Indian Development and Relief Fund (IDRF),” www.letindiadevelop.org/ thereport/synopsis.html (2003): 2. 22. Conventionally dated between 1500–1000 B.C. but dated at least as early as 3000 B.C. by Hindu nationalists. 23. Naheed Islam, “In the Belly of the Multicultural Beast I am Named South Asian” in Our Feet Walk the Sky: Women of the South Asian Diaspora, eds. by The Women of the South Asian Descent Collective (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1993): 242:245; Naeem Mohaiemen, “Bangladeshi New Yorkers: Beyond Token,” The Subcontinental: A Journal of South Asian Political Identity, 1:1 (2003):89–96; Akbar S. Zaidi, “Who is a South Asian,” www.dawn.com/ 2002/09/09op.htm#2 (2002). 24. See their web-site, www.saalt.org. 25. See their web-site, www.subcontinental.org. 26. Personal interview, February 25, 2003. 27. Sarah Wildman, “All for One,” The New Republic (December 24, 2001), www.thenewrepublic.com122401/diarist122401.html. 28. See the description on the web-site of the Dharam Hinduja Institute of Indic Research (DHIIR) at the University of Cambridge, UK., www.divinity.cam.ac. uk/CARTS/dhiir/default.html). 29. Mathew, “Byte-Sized Nationalism,” 126; Kamala Visweswaran and Ali Mir, “On the Politics of Community in South Asian-American Studies,” Amerasia Journal 25:3 (1999/2000):102–103. 30. www.infinityfoundation.comECITmissionframe.htm, extracted 12/16/00. 31. V. E. Krishnakumar and L. Prashanth, “Clinton Wishes Indians First Ever Diwali Greetings,” India Post (November 3, 2000):22.

285

286

•

JAAS

•

6:3

32. Prema Kurien, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics: Hindu and Muslim Indian Immigrants in the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24:2 (2001): 287; Dean E. Murphy, “Two Unlikely Allies Come Together in Fight Against Muslims,” New York Times, (June 2, 2001): B1, B6. 33. Wildman, “All for One.” 34. Author’s interview with Debashish Mishra of SAALT, February 21, 2003. 35. Michel Potts, “SAN Meets INS, Protests Registration Policy,” India West (January 3, 2003): A31. 36. South Asian Network, “Stop the Detention, Stop Attacks on Immigrant’s Rights,” Full-Page Advertisement, India West (January 3, 2003):A17; Michel Potts, “SAN, Activists Raise Voices Against INS Policy,” India West (April 4, 2003): A28. 37. Wildman, “All for One.” 38. From the texts of both talks posted on Indictraditions on September 25, 2001, and October 4, 2001. 39. Beth Kulkarni, “Indic Culture and Traditions Seminars—Sharing Our Dharma,” in the brochure of the Global Dharma Conference, Edison, New Jersey (July 25–27, 2003). 40. “Replicating the UK Model,” email sent to Indictraditions and Indian Civilization on April 2, 2002; name of poster withheld for confidentiality. 41. Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992):25–74. 42. Steven Vertovec, “Transnational Challenges to the ‘New’ Multiculturalism,” ESRC Transnational Communities Programme Working Paper, WPTC–01– 06, www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk. 43. Espiritu, Asian American Pan-ethnicity, 20–21. 44. Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989). 45. Espiritu, Asian American Pan-ethnicity. 46. Vijay Prashad, “Crafting Solidarities,” in A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America, eds. Lavina Dhingra Shankar and Rajini Srikanth (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998): 107. 47. Monisha Das Gupta, Identities, Interests and Alternative Spaces: A Transnational Perspective on South Asian Political Participation in the U.S., Ph.D. Dissertation, Sociology, Brandeis University, 1999. 48. Nazli Kibria, “The Racial Gap: South Asian American Racial Identity and the Asian American Movement,” in A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America, eds. Lavina Dhingra Shankar and Rajini Srikanth (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998): 69–78; Lavina Dhingra Shankar and Rajini Srikanth, “Introduction: Closing the Gap? South Asians Challenge Asian American Studies,” in Shankar and Srikanth, Ibid., 1–24. 49. Kibria, “The Racial Gap” ; Prashad “Crafting Solidarities,” 114. 50. Prashad, “Crafting Solidarities,” 112.


•

KURIEN

•

51. Prema Kurien, “A Theory of Multiculturalism, Immigrant Religion and Diasporic Nationalism: The Development of an American Hinduism.”Social Problems, 51:3 (2004) Forthcoming. 52. Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 2nd Edition, 1960); Stephen R. Warner, “Work in Progress Toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States,” American Journal of Sociology, 98:5 (1993): 1044–1093; Raymond Williams, Religions of Immigrants from India and Pakistan: New Threads in the American Tapestry, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Fenggang Yang and Helen Rose Ebaugh, “Transformations in New Immigrant Religions and their Global Implications,” American Sociological Review, 66:2 (2001): 269–288. 53. Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim, “Religious Participation of Korean Immigrants in the United States,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 29:1 (1990):19–34; Pyong Gap Min, “The Structure and Social Functions of Korean Immigrant Churches in the United States,” International Migration Review, 26:4 (1992):370–394; Fenggang Yang, Chinese Christians in America: Assimilation and Adhesive Identities, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press, 1999); Nancy J. Wellmeier, “Santa Eulalia’s People in Exile: Maya Religion, Culture and Identity in Los Angeles,” in Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998):97–122. 54. Williams, “Religions of Immigrants from India and Pakistan, 11. Tariq Modood makes a similar point about immigrants to the U.K. in his piece, “Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism and the ‘Recognition’ of Religious Groups,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 6:4 (1998):384. 55. Min, “The Structure and Social Functions of Korean Immigrant Churches in the United States”; Yang, Chinese Christians in America; Kurien, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics.” 56. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. 57. Arvind Rajagopal, “Better Hindu than Black? Narratives of Asian Indian Identity,” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the SSSR and the RRA, 1995, St. Louis, Missouri; Rudy V. Busto, “The Gospel According to the Model Minority?: Hazarding an Interpretation of Asian American Evangelical College Students,” Amerasia Journal, 22:1 (1996):133–147. 58. Rajagopal, “Better Hindu than Black.” 59. Sunaina Maira, Desi’s in the House: Indian American Youth Culture in New York City (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002). 60. Prema Kurien, “Becoming American by Becoming Hindu: Indian Americans Take their Place at the Multicultural Table,” in Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration, eds. R. Stephen Warner and Judith G. Wittner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998): 37–70. 61. See the description of the conference at www.lokvani.com/lokvani/ article.php?article_id=410.

287

288

•

JAAS

•

6:3

62. Raymond Williams, “Sacred Threads of Several Textures,” in A Sacred Thread: Modern Transmission of Hindu Traditions in India and Abroad (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: Anima Press, 1992):239. 63. Kundnani, “An Unholy Alliance?” 73. 64. Kurien, “Becoming American by Becoming Hindu”; Wildman, “All for One.” 65. Benedict Anderson, “Long Distance Nationalism,” in The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World, ed. Benedict Anderson, (London:Verso, 1998):73; Arvind Rajagopal, “Hindu Nationalism in the U.S.: Changing Configurations of Political Practice,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23:3 (2000):474; Mathew, “Byte-Sized Nationalism”; Mathew and Prashad, “The Protean Forms of Yankee Hinduism,” 529–530; Sabrang Communications Private Limited, The Foreign Exchange of Hate: IDRF and the American Funding of Hindutva (Mumbai: India, 2002). 66. Wildman, “All for One.”