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Playing chess and cards was the only thing mister Ramanand knew to do. ...... When the merchant Bankemal was going to open his moneybag, the newspaper-.
Table of contents

Transliteration Sources of examples

Chapter 1. Introduction. 1.1. Theoretical background. 1.1.1. The object of the research. 1.1.2. Towards a working definition.

1.2. Manifestations of modality and main types. 1.3. Means of expressing modality.

Chapter 2. Some previous works on modality in Hindi. Chapter 3. Inherent Modality. 3.1. Ability. 3.1.1. Inner ability. A) The agent is focal. B) The action is focal. 3.1.2. Acquired ability. 3.1.3. Circumstantial ability. A) The agent is focal. B) The action is focal.

3.2. Desire. 3.2.1. Wish. 3.2.2. Intention. 3.2.2.1. The main resources. 3.2.2.2. Additional resources.

3.3. Conclusions.

Chapter 4. Deontic Modality. 4.1. Need and Necessity. 4.2. Obligation. 4.2.1. Gerundive + temporal forms of the copula (hai,thā) or the verb ho-. 4.2.2. Gerundive + the verb par -. 4.2.3. Gerundive + cāhiye. 4.2.4. Evaluatives. 4.2.5. Conclusions.

4.3. Directives. 4.3.1. Mands. 4.3.1.1. Commands and requests. 4.3.1.1.1. The main resources. 4.3.1.1.2. Additional resources. 4.3.1.2. Demands. A) The agent is focal.

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B) The agent is non-focal. 4.3.2. Exhortatives. 4.3.2.1. Cohortatives. 4.3.2.2. Recommendations.

4.4. Volitives. 4.4.1. Volitives with future reference. 4.4.2. Volitives with past and present reference.

4.5. Consultatives. 4.6. Permissives. 4.6.1. Permissions. 4.6.1.1. Granting permissions. 4.6.1.2. Statements of permission. 4.6.1.3. Asking for permission. 4.6.1.4. Indifference. 4.6.1.5. Exemptions. 4.6.2. Prohibitions.

4.7. Deontic subordination. 4.7.1. Complement clause. 4.7.2. Purpose clause. 4.7.3. Relative purpose clause.

4.8. Conclusions.

Chapter 5. Epistemic modality. 5.1. Reality and truth. The Declarative. 5.1.1. Objective reality. 5.1.1.1. Is there anything epistemically stronger than fact? 5.1.1.2. Evidentials. 5.1.1.2.1. Sensory evidence. 5.1.1.2.2. Evidence of knowledge and experience. 5.1.1.2.3. Evidence of personal conviction. 5.1.1.2.4. Reportatives. 5.1.1.2.5. Inferential evidence. 5.1.1.3. Expectatives. 5.1.1.4. Future without doubt. 5.1.1.5. Specific and general truth.

5.2. Imagination and possibility. Judgments. 5.2.1. Speculatives. 5.2.1.1. Future possibility. 5.2.1.2. Present and past possibility. 5.2.2. Deductives. 5.2.3. Counterfactuals.

5.3. Epistemic subordination. 5.3.1. Conditional clause. 5.3.2. Concessive clause. 5.3.3. Relative clause.

5.4. Conclusions. Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusion. Bibliography. 6

Transliteration Vowels and diphthongs. (A long vowel occurs with a line above):

 - a,  -ā,  - ı,  - ī,  - u,  - ū, 

- ŗ,

i

u

 - e,  - a ,  - o,  - a .

Reduced ‘inherent’ a before  - h, which is not followed by a vowel, is marked with æ. Nasalized vowels. Anusvara and anunasika – no difference is made in the transliteration: i

u

 - ã,  - ā,  - ĩ, - ī,  - ũ,  - ū,  - ẽ,  - a ,  - õ,  - a . Consonants. Pure consonants:

 - k,  - g,  - ng,  - c,  - j,  - ny,  - t ,  - d ,  - r ,  - n ,  - t,  - d,  - n,  - p,  - b,  - m,  - y,  - r,  - l,  - v,  - š,  - s ,  - s,  h.

Aspirated consonants: h

h

h

h

h

-k , -g , -c , -j , -t , -d

h

,

h

h

h

 - r ,  - t ,  - d , 

- ph,

-

bh.

Loan consonants:

 - q,  - x,  - gh,  - z, 

- f.

Sources of examples Agnihotri – agnihotrī kŗsn a, “cātakī”, kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Amrita 1 - amŗtā prītam “jalte bujhte log”, sãskaran

1994,

dillī: rājpāl.

Amrita 2 - amŗtā prītam “das pratinidhi kahāniyā”, 1994, dillī: kitābghar.

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Ashk 1 - upẽdranāth ašk “girtī dīvārẽ”, pācvā sãskaran , 1987, ilāhābād: nīlābh prakāšan.

Ashk 2 - upẽdranāth ašk “das pratinidhi kahāniyā”, 1994, dillī: kitābghar.

Bhandari - mannū bhãd ārī “das pratinidhi kahāniyā”, 1996, dillī: kitābghar.

Chakravarti – cakravartī šaraccãdra, “belūr mat h: san 1902”, lekh in “Shantidoot” vol9, No.5. Chandrakanta – cadrakātā, “pošanūl kī vāpasī”, kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Chatursen - ācārya catursen “dharmaputra”, 1954, sãskaran

1993,

dillī: rājpāl.

Dinkar - rāmdhārī sĩh dinkar “ujlī āg”, 1956, pat nā: udayācal. Gupta - sušīlā guptā “bol-cāl kī hĩdī”, 1997, ilāhābād: lokbhāratī prakāšan.

Kamleshvar 1 - kamlešvar “kālī ādhī” , sãskaran

1992, dillī:

rājpāl.

Kamleshvar2 - kamlešvar “samudra mẽ khoyā huā ādmī”, sãskaran 1997, ilāhābād: lokbhāratī prakāšan.

Kishor - girirāj kišor “yātrāẽ”, In Damsteegt, Theo “Giriraj Kishor’s Yatraem. A Hindi Novel Analised”, 1997, Groningen: Egbert Forsten. Kumar - jainẽdra kumār “ātma-šikšan ”, “nau kahāniyā (kahānī sãkalan)”, 1985, sãskaran

1996, dillī: vikās publishing house.

Menan – menan o.cãtu “ĩdulekhā”, anuvād: sudhāšu caturvedī, 1994, dillī: nešanal buk t rast , ĩd iyā.

Mishra - bhagavatīšaran

mišra “ek aur ahalyā”, 1991, dillī:

rājpāl.

Mithileshvar - mithilešvar “ek the profesar bi.lāl”, 1993, dillī: kitābghar.

Mitra - bimal mitra “yaš kā mulya”, anuvād: sušīlā guptā, 1993, dillī: rājpāl.

Mohini – mohinī man ikā, “mat roo, āt ī” kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest hĩdī kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

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h

Mudgal – mudgal citra, “apnī vāpasī”, kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Nagar 1 - amŗtlāl nāgar “set

h

bākemal”, sãskaran

1995, dillī:

rājpāl.

Nagar 2 - amŗtlāl nāgar “bikhre tinke”, sãskaran

1997, dillī:

rājpāl.

Parasayee - harišãkar parasāī “lãkā vijay ke bād rām-rāj”, “nau kahāniyā (kahānī sãkalan)”, 1985, sãskaran

1996, dillī: vikās

publishing house.

Prabhakar – visn u prabhākar “das pratinidhi kahāniyā”, 1996, dillī: kitābghar.

Prakash – prakāš uday, “t epcū”, kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī

kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Prem Chand 1 - premcãd “mānsarovar. kahānī sãkalan. bhāg 4”, ilāhābād: hãs prakāšan.

Prem Chand 2 - premcãd “mānsarovar. kahānī sãkalan. bhāg 7”, ilāhābād: hãs prakāšan.

Priyamvada - usā priyãvadā “vāpasī”, “nau kahāniyā (kahānī sãkalan)”, 1985, sãskaran

1996, dillī: vikās publishing house.

Pushpa - maitreyī puspā “betvā bæ htī rahī”, 1994, dillī: kitābghar.

Raghav - rãgeya rāghav “kab tak pukārū”, 1996, dillī: rājpāl. Rakesh 1-

mohan rākeš “na ānevālā kal”, sãskaran

1994, dillī:

rājpāl.

Rakesh 2- mohan rākeš “ardrā” kahānī.”bolojī” a literary magazine on the Internet. (www.boloji.com). April 2001.

Ray - amŗt rāy “das pratinidhi kahāniyā”, 1994, dillī: kitābghar.

Reddi 1 - bālšauri reddī “dāvānal”, 1993, dillī: himācal pustak bhãdār.

Reddi 2 - bālšauri reddī “dharti merī mā”, 1995, dillī: ārya prakāšan mãdal.

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Sahni - bhīs am sahnī “das pratinidhi kahāniyā”, 1994, dillī: kitābghar.

Sankrityayan - rāhul sākŗtyāyan “volgā se gãgā”, 1942, sãskaran 1997, ilāhābād: kitāb mahal. “sārā ākāš” – Text of the film in “Three Hindi Film scripts” by Bruce R. Pray, Satendra Khanna, David Magier. 1980.

“Sarita” - “saritā” hindī kī patrikā, 1996, julāī (dvitīya). Shukla – šukla ŗtā, “pratikriyā”, kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī

kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Sinh - šivprasād sĩh “das pratinidhi kahāniyā”, 1994, dillī: kitābghar.

Sudhakar – sudhākar salil, “us gāõ mẽ jīte hue”, kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Tivari - surẽdra tivārī “ãtatæh”, 1989, dillī: kitābghar. Vijaikant – kāt vijay, “bāh” kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī

kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Vyas – vyās šyām, “abhī kuch aur baqī hai”, kahānī, in ‘1981 kī šrest

h

hĩdī kahāniyā’, dillī: st ār pablikešanz.

Yadav - rājẽdra yādav, mannū bhãd ārī “ek ĩc muskān”, 1997, dillī: rājpāl.

Yashpal 1 - yašpāl “terī merī uskī bāt”, 1974, sãskaran

1995,

ilāhābād: lokbhāratī prakāšan.

Yashpal 2 - yašpāl “yašpāl kī kahāniyā”, 1994, dillī: vikās

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Chapter 1. Introduction.

A famous truism says that ‘if you want to perceive any subject to the very depth, then start to teach it’. Having taught Hindi for several years, we saw in our own experience that Grammar and Semantics, these eternal friends, though they cannot live without each other, are still inclined to demonstrate independence. And for giving a right answer to the most common question of students, ‘What is the Hindi for…?’ thorough knowledge of grammar and a fairly large vocabulary are obviously insufficient. One has to take into account many additional factors which affect not only meanings of words, but even of whole grammatical categories. And on top of everything a foreign language grants to the disposal of the student opportunities for expression of different notions that are evidently not ‘foreseen’ by his native language. This feature of foreign languages is particularly salient for one who studies expressions of subjective opinions and evaluations, which in grammar are named ‘modality’. Here are some instances from the Hindi language: 1)

yadi vah āegā yadi vah āe yadi vah āyā

In all the three cases the translation will be ‘if he comes’, but for native speakers of Hindi the difference between the phrases is apparent even without context because of the verbal endings, whereas speakers of, for example, English, Hebrew or Russian while translating the above phrases have to give some additional explanations. In contrast consider the following example: 2) Ve ā sakte hai

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Depending on a context the phrase may be translated as: They are able to come They are permitted to come Their coming is possible And the phrase He could write can be translated according to context as: 3) vah likh pāyā vah likh sakā us se likhte banā us se likhā gayā

All the four convey the same notion of ability but each of them differs from the others in what is called ‘nuance’ or ‘shade of meaning’. The following note of Kratzer (1981:38) in this connection can be easily understood: “In dealing with the semantics of modals the main danger one is facing is to get utterly lost in the variety of interpretations one and the same expression can receive in different utterance situations.” In each aforementioned case the relevance of a chosen verbal form to the context and a concrete speech situation depends least of all on grammatical requirements of a specific language (all of them are grammatically correct after all) but mainly on the individual ‘choice’ of a speaker21, on how he evaluates the information being communicated to a listener and on the aims he has for presenting the information.22 It is the speaker who determines the choice between lexical and grammatical means (if a language possesses them) for expressing very close meanings as in: 4) a) kisī kī pratibhā chipāe na chiptī b) kisī kī pratibhā chipāī nahī jā saktī c) kisī kī pratibhā chipānā asamartha hai d) kisī kī pratibhā chipā saknā samartha nahī hai

“It is impossible to hide one’s talent” where in (4a,b) the meaning of possibility is rendered exclusively by grammatical, in (4c) – by lexical means, and (4d) has a combination of the preceding two. 21 2

The term of Halliday (1967).

About the complex system of interdependencies between different components of verbal interaction

see Dik (1989:8). 24

Selection of the linguistic means differs from the stylistic characteristics of speech which, while demonstrating the ability to select, combine and organize linguistic means, still remain solely individual - whereas the choice between likh pāyā and likh sakā (as in 3) is determined by the distinctions of meaning and so is

o b l i g a t o r y for each native speaker if he wants to be understood correctly. This means that modal devices, representing individual choices of a speaker, unlike stylistic features, are conventional. In other words, the use of different lexemes or grammatical forms makes it possible to express a great number of nuances of a single notion by different means (1, 3, 4 ) or with the help of one and the same means to render a wide range of senses ( 2 ). Even the few examples given above make it clear that Hindi possesses a modal component in its grammar and lexicon, which is sometimes crucial in understanding the meaning and purpose of a sentence. What are their limits? What kind of resources do they have? – Answers to these questions are equally important both from the theoretical and from the practical points of view.

1. 1. Theoretical background. 1.1.1. The object of the research. In the introduction to his book "Mood and Modality" Palmer puts forward two assumptions: “The first is that it is possible to recognize a grammatical category, that of modality, which is similar to aspect, tense, number, gender, etc.” (Palmer 1986:1); and, secondly, he surmises that the notion of modality is valid for “different and unrelated languages”. (Ibid.) Palmer was not, of course, the first to find out the significance of this notion. We cite him because many of his views on modality turned out to be a starting point for our analysis of modality in Hindi. The word ‘modality’ has different applications in a number of scientific fields, but as a term reflecting a specific category of linguistics, it came into use relatively recently. As a linguistic phenomenon, modality grew from modal logic, and the application of the postulates of modal logic to natural languages became a subject of linguistic research. As Lyons (1977:787) remarked, the central notions of traditional modal logic are necessity and possibility. These two notions are considered to be 24

closely related. Kiefer (1987: 71) presents a logical definition of modality in these words: “The modality of p means that p is necessarily true or false, or possibly true or false with respect to a certain background”. The relation between possibility and necessity is best of all represented in terms of negation. The logical formulae of modality can be found in many works. Here is one presented in a paper of Michael Herslund (1989:10 ):

□р═¬◊¬p where □ stands for ‘necessity’ operator, ◊ for ‘possibility’ operator, and ¬ for negation. The ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ operators are mutually interdefinable and the gist of the formulae is that “what is possibly true is not necessarily not true” (Herslund 1989:10). Such a merely logical approach excludes from the analyses either the speaker or the addressee, as well as communicative aspects of language and, consequently, the pragmatic background as the whole. The same logical formulae, expanded with the notion of ‘possible worlds’, obtained much more linguistic significance leaving behind the status of “empty mathematical drills” (Herslund 1989:10). A ‘possible worlds’ semantics was developed for modal logic by Kripke (1963) and Hinttikka (1963). Johnson-Laird (1978:17) gives the following description of the notion: “The central assumption in interpreting such models of modality is the Leibnizian idea that a proposition which is necessarily true is true in all possible worlds including the real world, whereas a proposition which is possibly true is true in some possible worlds”. Thus, the notion of modality with reference to language has turned to quantification of the predicate” (Lyons 1996:329). “Talk about possible worlds can thus be construed as talk about ways in which people could conceive the worlds to be different” (Kiefer 1997:243). The theory of possible worlds seems to reflect in the most proper way a process of defining by the speaker whether a proposition is necessarily applicable to all possible situations/acts (worlds) known to him or it is possibly applicable, i.e. whether a proposition could take place not in every case (world). The fact that people, regardless of their educational and cultural standards, can properly use the modal system for the evaluation of the possibility of a state or a process, suggests that the mechanism for the choice of modal means is rather simple and is, apparently, genetically conditioned

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as a part of the ability for logical reasoning and inferring.23 ‘Possible worlds’ is thus just an exquisite label for the whole evaluative mechanism, which in its turn uses a more comprehensive system possessing tremendous information about the world. Attacks by Johnson-Laird on the notion of ‘possible worlds’ seem to be groundless because of overly literal interpretation.24 Efforts to explain the nature of modality have produced other theories, such as the ‘Concept of Polyphony’ (O.Ducrot). Nølke (1989:53), who advocates the theory, writes: “The speaker …may put several ‘actors’, called ‘enunciators’, on the stage, each one communicating a certain act, i.e. (propositional) content presented in a particular way. He…may associate himself with or dissociate himself from each particular enunciator, or he may merely let this relation remain vague”. The concept introduced in this manner in fact seems to be very much like presentation of ‘possible worlds’, where the ‘worlds’ are substituted by ‘actors’. Speaking of logical modality, we should bear in mind that it is primarily about the necessary or possible truth of a logical predicate, whereas modality in linguistics has already left these tight bounds and absorbed a wide range of mutually connected notions, their number being dependent on the fundamental understanding of the phenomenon25. It must be noted that unlike other grammatical categories (such as aspect, tense), which though interpreted sometimes controversially, have distinct limits defined by their morpho-syntactic properties, modality lacks such limits. Anyone who studies modality thus first of all faces the problem of its definition. Since there is no common conception of modality at present, the gap in the position of various authors is considerable. Lyons (1996:327) pointed out that “the terms ‘modality’, ‘modal’ and 23

This statement does not refer, of course, to the principal controversy between the Functional and

Transformative-Generative Grammars about the nature of language – if it is an acquired or innate virtue of human’s mind. 24

He writes: “In order to establish whether a given state of affairs is possible, human beings do not

ordinarily have access to the complete set of ‘possible worlds’, that is to say, they do not search through the entire set of possible states of affairs in order to ascertain whether it contains the relevant situation. They lack both the machinery and the time for so exhaustive a search.”(1978 :20) 25

“The philosophical treatment of modality… takes place at a relatively high level of abstraction and

the problems raised are not typically susceptible to solution by observation and experiment. Linguistic investigation, however, is founded in empirical and scientific method and examins these same concepts in terms of the human attitudes and behaviour from which they are extrapolated” (Hoye 1997:1). 24

‘mood’…had been given a variety of conflicting interpretations by linguists and logicians…” And Бондарко (1990:59) in his study of modality remarks that “modality has remained steadily an acknowledged point in issue”. Some researchers insist on following the definitions of modal logic strictly as the theoretical source for linguistic modality (Панфилов 1977); others call the efforts to bind logical and linguistic conceptions ‘the dangerous philosophical fallacy’ (Brandt 1999:28). Some, like M.Grepl, interpret modality in a broader manner. He includes in the notion of modality “all affective aspects which manifest the personal qualities of a speaker” (quoted after Плотников 1994a:286). Some authors (e.g. Hinrichs 1984) believe that the entire content of modality is distributed with no remainder among other linguistic notions, such as predicativity, proposition, locutionary acts and so on. ”Such an approach does not leave room for modality”(Норман 1994:170). Some definitions present modality as a lexical and grammatical category characterizing a type of relations between the subject and the predicate of an utterance (Дешериева 1987), as a functional-semantic category (Ярцева 1990), or as a merely syntactic category (Виноградов 1975). Бондарко (1990) in his ‘field theory’ ascribes to modality the structure of a field where moods are considered to be its core; modal words are its immediate periphery and words with modal implications are the remote periphery. Such an approach avoids precise classification and the problem of modal merges. Sometimes mutually–incompatible views appear in one and the same collection of articles (as in “On modality in Slavischen”): “Emotional, expressive, actualisational and other semantic nuances, which do not have categorical force and lack morphologic means, are not modal” (Норман 1994:173). And in an article previous to it Плотников (1994:32-33) writes: “It is advisable to include in the category of linguistic modality the study of affective (emotional) attitudes of the speaker to the utterance.” Even in time of Jespersen’s “The Philosophy of Grammar” (1924) modality was associated mainly with the morphologically expressed category of moods, but today some authors include in modality all components of verbal interaction: “When a complex analysis of the pragmatics of speech will become possible, all the subjectiveemotional evaluative meanings and senses which are hardly allowed to set foot on the threshold of modality, will turn out to be the most important but not, of course, more

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important then intonation and paralinguistic items of discourse – gesture, facial expressions, glance” (Мечковская 1994: 195). Thus interpretations of modality range from analysis as a purely grammatical phenomenon to its representation as a universal semantico-functional category expressing “relations of the content of the whole utterance to the extra-linguistic reality” (Плотников 1994a:285). The discord in definitions is explained by the assertion that modality belongs to the field of semantics, where simple definitions are impossible: ”It is, however, no easy matter to state briefly what modality is. One reason for this difficulty is the fact that this elusive notion nowhere seems to correspond to any single systematic morphologic, syntactic or lexical category” (Herslund 1989:7) or in the words of Palmer (1986:4) “the real problem with modality is that there is no clear basic feature.” In addition, modality is a notion that has been used in the description of many different languages. This is also one of the reasons for the vague definitions. And against this background the statement of Herslund (1989:7) that “there seems to exist a fairly general consensus as to what modality is about”, sounds rather optimistic. Nevertheless, most linguists, in spite of different approaches, are really very close in their estimation of what should be attributed to the domain of modality; differences make themselves felt as they move away from the original source – modal logic.

1.1.2. Towards a working definition. We do not intend to propose an overall and complete definition of the notion ‘modality’, nor is this among the purposes of the work. But for the analysis of modality in a specific language one needs a certain theoretical framework, and the existing discord in opinions provides us with ample opportunity of choice. First of all it should be noted that most linguists agree that the limits of modal logic are too restrictive for linguistics (Kiefer 1987, Palmer 1986, Herslund 1989, Givón 1984). The logical understanding of modality is limited to necessity and possibility, while linguistic approach is based on considering the speaker’s evaluation of ‘States of Affairs’ (the term of Dik (1989)). We argue that while modal logic does not reflect all the peculiarities and features of natural languages, it nonetheless gives some idea of their structure. It would thus be wrong to say that modal logic, in this sense, seriously 24

conflicts with the linguistic understanding of modality. Linguistics only broadens the logical definitions and thus covers a wider range of linguistic features, making it possible to eliminate in particular the personal and social aspects of language. Michael Fortescue (1989:68) describing the question of language acquisition notes that what “children learning…any language…need to acquire here is the ability to express internal uncertainty and externally imposed obligation. The question is whether the adult language has systematized the means it disposes of to express these fundamental functions.” Language is a means of social relations, that is, it is a social and cultural phenomenon. Communication is an intrusion upon consciousness of a recipient, an effort to build in his cognition a certain model of the world, which may not coincide with his model or with the picture of the ontologically existing world. The category of modality is a notional category closely associated with important aspects of reality and its refraction in mind and language. Using the words of Herslund (1989:8) “man can intervene in numerous ways between reality and the linguistic expression of it”, so “modality defines the set of linguistic phenomena which signal the presence of man in language”(Ibid:7). Palmer (1986:2) complaining of vague and contradictory characteristics of modality, still chooses the definition given in Lyons (1977): “ ‘opinion or attitude’ of the speaker seems promising”. This point of Lyons is supported directly or indirectly in a number of works. Here is a definition given by Givón (1993:169):”Modality codes the speaker’s attitude toward the proposition”. Gonda (1956:9fn.) characterized modality as: ”The speaker’s view of the relation between the process and reality”. In many other definitions of modality (Норман 1994:170-171; Nølke 1989:46; Herslund 1989:8; Плотников 1994a:284; Kiefer 1987:72-73; Benveniste 1966a:85) we can see the same ‘attitude of the speaker’ either to the reality or to the propositional content of the sentence. On these grounds it is reasonable to conclude that the main point consolidating different definitions is the position of the speaker in an utterance. Still, ‘attitude of the speaker’ is not strongly opposed to the logical approach, which is unequivocally oriented to the necessity and possibility of the proposition. “Logic may distinguish the various ‘modalities’ or qualifications of the assertion expressed in the proposition…, according as it is, in the opinion of the speaker, actual, possible, necessary”(Gonda 1956:9). Palmer (1986:14) points out that Jespersen and Lyons distinguished between modality and proposition, between the content of the utterance and the attitudes of the speaker. In confirmation of his words he notes “that the presence of a modal marker or the change of one for 24

another does not usually greatly alter the structure of a sentence”. Givón (1993:169) compares modality with “a shell” that encases the propositional content of a sentence “but does not tamper with the kernel inside”. He wrote further: “The propositional frame of clauses – participant roles, verb-type transitivity – as well as actual lexical items that fill the various slots in the frame, remain largely unaffected by the modality wrapped around it”(Ibid.). Thus, linguistic and logical traditions differ in evaluating the relation of modality to propositions. Kiefer (1987) describing this difference observes that the logical approach is restricted to the propositional, and the linguistic approach emphasizes the non-propositional aspects of modality.26 The notion of ‘speaker’s attitudes’ is, certainly, very ambiguous. Lyons (1977) in addition to possibility and necessity includes also wish and intention as modal characteristics. Besides, he considers ‘commands’ and ‘interrogatives’ as modal and associates tense-expressing forms and speech-acts with modality. Kiefer (1987:82) adds also “emotional reactions toward a certain state-of-affairs,…evaluation of a certain state-of-affairs…, desires,…wishes, etc.” In view of the conclusions made in different papers devoted both to the typology of modality and to different ways of expressing modality in specific languages, one may note that by ‘attitudes of the speaker’ most of the authors mean such substantive notions as ‘knowledge’, ‘wish’, and ‘will’ of the speaker. These notions are divided into a wide spectrum of connected sub-notions.27 Such an interpretation of modality accentuates the leading part of subjectivity. Subjectivity together with non-factivity are essential constituents of ‘knowledge’, ‘wish’ and ‘will’ and serve for qualifying a proposition. The subjectivity of modality can be divided into several degrees, affecting in different ways the ‘force’ or ‘strength’ of a proposition (Lyons 1977). Indeed, an individual’s speech proves to be exclusively subjective. Even in cases when our speech seems to be objective and neutral, it, in fact, reflects individual perception and opinion. For instance, citing is putting forward someone else’s subjective statements; 26

In spite of this he comes to the conclusion that modality “can be expressed either propositionally or

non-propositionally”(Ibid.:84). 27

As the target of the ‘attitudes’ we prefer ‘propositional content’, as a linguistic term, to ‘reality’

which is rather a philosophical notion and may lead to a confusion between ‘real’ as existing independently of human consciousness and something perceived by a human being as ‘real’. These are, naturally, not one and the same thing. 24

and describing states or events is an interpretation of our own subjective perception. But we can measure the degree of the subjectivity. Consider: 1) The flowers are red and blue. In the sentence we express a minimum degree of subjectivity (but still subjectivity – a daltonian may not distinguish the colors). And the sentence 2) Perhaps they will come tomorrow which shows a higher degree of subjective attitude. The difference between (1) and (2) is best seen in the degree of confidence of the speaker towards the information he possesses or, in other words, in the reliability of the source of information. In sentences of the (1) type the speaker presents a proposition as a nonchalant mediator and provides the addressee with his knowledge about the world around him. Following Palmer (1986:26), we can say such sentences have ‘neutral modality’.28 In fact everything we say is colored with modality. “When we communicate some proposition to another person, we do so, normally, because we wish to influence in some way his beliefs, his attitudes or his behavior” (Lyons 1977:725). Many authors stress the important role of modality in language. Pedersen (1989), for instance, underlines the centrality of modality to language and logic.29 In our analysis we follow the principal point that “there are no sentences without modality, each sentence consists of ‘modus’ and ‘dictum’ ” (Kiefer 1987:80)30. We would like to conclude this section with the definition, which we are going to follow in this study: modality expresses the attitudes and opinions of the speaker to the propositional content of a sentence. We will exclude from our analysis the ‘neutral 28

Cf. Also Норман (1994:173)

29

Cf. Herslund (1989:9): ”One central aspect of natural language is modality or modalization…”

Nølke (1989:48): ”The speaker always indicates an attitude towards what he is saying, and thereby he modifies (or modalizes) his act of saying.” Нечаев (1976) : ”Модальность – одна из основных категорий языка”(Modality is one of the basic categories of language). 30

Explaining his terms Kiefer presents the following quotation from Bally (1950:36):"La phrase

explicite comprend donc deux parties: l'une est le corrélatif du procés qui constitue la représentation (p.ex. la pluie, une guérison); nous l'appelerons, á léxemple des logiciens, le dictum. L'autre contient la pièce maîtraisse de la phrase, celle sans laquelle il n'y a pas de phrase, à savoir l'expression de la modalité, corrélative à l'opération du sujet pensant. La modalité a pour expression logique et analytique un verbe modal (p.ex. croire, se réjouir, souhaiter), et son sujet, le sujet modal; toux deux constituent le modus, complémentaire du dictum". 24

modality’, that is sentences which are defined in traditional linguistics as mere ‘statements of fact’.

1. 2. Manifestations of modality and main types. As has been noted above, the main difficulty in defining modality is the lack of clearcut formal features. In English modality is associated with a limited set of modal auxiliaries, whereas many other languages lack such a grammatical phenomenon. But still the meanings, expressed by the English modals, can be successfully reproduced in all other languages. “The concepts encoded in the English modals CAN be rendered…presumably, in any other language spoken on Earth”, –thus Wierzbicka, (1987:30) supporting this assumption. But for rendering these meanings other formal markers can be used, and not necessarily within the verb or verbal complex. Rabindranath Tagore once wrote (quoted after Varmā Rāmcandrā , 1995:28) that    (Translation from one language to another is absolutely impossible, because the nature of one language cannot be converted into another). Varmā himself does not deny the possibility of translation but adheres to the opinion that

a

translation

can

be

very

close

to

the

original

but

not

more:

 (A translation which is very much like the original and approximating to it can undoubtedly be achieved.) There is no doubt that every language possesses some individual features that reflect the cultural and social conditions of the speakers. That is why an original book is preferable to its best translation, which is sometimes unable to transmit original image-bearing expressions and figurative style (Varmā, 1995:29; Bahri 1985:93). But for all that we cannot exclude the possibility of an adequate translation, otherwise we would come to an “unbridgeable gap in human communication” (Wierzbicka 1987:25). The same can be said about modality as well. ‘Attitudes of the speaker’, as shown in different papers on unrelated languages 31, exist in each of them as a compulsory element of their functioning. “Modality is a universal category in natural language” (Fortescue 1989:65). Typological researches in the field of modality (Palmer 1986; Bybee 1995) confirm its universal character. And we talk 31

Hebrew (Kopelovich 1982), Arabic (Mitchell 1994), Mongolian (Пюрбеев 1981), Eskimo and

Japanese (Fortescue 1989), Russian (Бондарко 1990), Hindi (Nespital 1980), and so on. 24

about the universality of a grammatical category which not only does not have clearcut formal correspondences among different languages, but even lacks any clear formal feature within any specific language. “It appears reasonable to assume the existence of a basic semantic system of modality which is formally realized in a variety of ways in each language”(Calbert 1975:1). And so the semantic approach proves to be the only reliable one and “a strictly structure-guided typological account of modality turns out sour”(Givón 1995:111). This seems to be the only point about modality which is shared today by most linguists.32 The differences begin when one tries to define the semantic boundaries of the category, for it is more independent than tense and aspect, which are attached to the verb alone. Thus the analysis of structure naturally gives way to the analysis of meanings and leads to an understanding of modality as a semantic category inherent in every language, for “the basic functions of language are very similar in different societies, though with different linguistic conventions” (Palmer 1986:3). Modality as a semantic notion serves the wider pragmatic field and is actually “instrumental with respect to pragmatics”(Dik 1989:7)33. It should be noted in this regard that many modal meanings can be interpreted properly only in a specific context and on the basis of the pragmatic knowledge either of the speaker or the addressee. We will devote some place in our analysis to the role of context, as an integral pragmatic medium needed for understanding modal meanings. The notion of modality traditionally covers two main spheres where attitudes of an individual can be represented as logical and social. Givón (1995:111) writes that “a well known analytic tradition…divides the modal pie into two distinct regions: the seemingly more semantic region of epistemics, and the seemingly more pragmatic region of deontics”. It has become commonplace to categorize modal statements with respect to epistemic and deontic interpretation. Johnson-Laird (1978:18) calls them 32

Lyons (1977), Halliday (1994), Dik (1989), Bybee (1995), Palmer (1986), Wierzbicka (1987),

Nespital (1980), Kiefer(1987), Herslund(1989), Nølke(1989), Fortescue(1989) and others. 33

Some other authors also consider the pragmatic orientation of modality as inevitable (Jachnow

1994). Kiefer (1997) argues, although with some restrictions, that practical inferences and implicatures play a decisive role in the grammaticalization of modal notions. Givón (1984:270) presents the gradation of TAM (Tense-Aspect-Modality) properties beginning from “a narrower, lexical-semantic scope”, continuing with “a wider propositional scope” and concluding with “the widest, discoursepragmatic scope”. 24

“two main interpretations”. The distinction between epistemic and deontic modalities results from the following capacities of human beings (as presented in Dik,1986:2): e p i s t e m i c c a p a c i t y – to maintain an organized knowledge base; p e r c e pt u a l c a p a c i t y – to derive knowledge from perceptions (‘evidentials’ of Palmer); logical

c a p a c i t y - to derive further pieces of knowledge by means of

reasoning (‘judgments’ of Palmer); s o c i a l c a p a c i t y – to know not only what to say, but also how to say it to a particular communicative partner in a particular communicative situation in order to achieve particular communicative goals34. It is not difficult to notice that the first three capacities have a common basis – i.e., knowledge, and differ only in the ways of obtaining knowledge. So, the modal notions derived from them could be combined under the label of ‘know-modality’ or ‘epistemic modality’. So, epistemic modalities have to do with ‘knowledge’ and ‘beliefs’ (Lyons 1977:785-786) and are “concerned with language as information, with the expression of the degree of nature of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of what he says” (Palmer 1986:121, see also Hirst & Weil 1982:660, Noveck et al 1996:622, Kiefer 1997:247). The fourth – ‘social capacity’ – dealing with social regulations, includes laws, norms and expectations, and is derived from moral or ethical considerations. This capacity serves as a basis for deontic modality. According to Palmer (1986:121) deontic modality “is concerned with language as action mostly with the expression by the speaker of his attitude towards possible actions by himself and others”. Palmer further stresses the point that epistemic and deontic modalities share some basic features – non-factuality, subjectivity, and involvement of the speaker. That is to say they are speaker-oriented.35 34

We omit here the notion of the l i n g u i s t i c c a p a c i t y – ability to produce and interpret

linguistic expressions, because this capacity represents not a feature of speech, but the common predisposition of human beings to speak. 35

I have to admit the fact that not all authors accept the division of modality into epistemic and

deontic domains. For instance Givón (1995:111-112) believes that such an explanation of modality is insufficient, for there are no clear-cut epistemic and deontic spheres in language. They are intermixed and prototypical. Wierzbicka (1987:37), too, though she finds such distinctions useful to some extent “for certain purposes”, thinks that “their value in representing semantic relations is rather limited”. What bothers Wierzbicka is that epistemic and deontic readings of the same word are actually efforts to open “seemingly unbridgeable gulfs between different uses of this word which are in fact so closely 24

It must be noted that opinions of linguists of different schools are not too far apart in qualifying epistemic modality, whereas deontic modality is interpreted in a much wider manner than the definition given by Palmer. For instance Lyons (1977:785-786) includes in it “will and ability”, and Kiefer (1997:247) argues that deontic modality reflects “physical or mental states or outer circumstances”. Moreover, many linguists consider deontic modality as part of a wider modal notion -‘root modality’ (Bybee 1995; Kiefer 1987,1997), which includes also dispositional modality, based on the agent’s dispositions; circumstantial modality, derived from various external and internal circumstances; and boulomaic modality, expressing the speaker’s desires.36 Following Palmer, we adhere to the point that wish and ability, as the notions forming predicativity, are more fundamental and represent the semantic basis from which deontic and epistemic modalities are derived. Thus, they should be regarded as a separate category, not modal in the strict sense of the word, but closely connected to modal categories. Palmer (1986) and some others (Wierzbicka 1987, Matthews 1997, von Wright 1951) subsume ‘wish’ and ‘ability’ under the term ‘dynamic modality’. We still prefer the term ‘inherent modality’ of Dik (1989) because this term attaches to the subject-oriented notions of ‘wish’ and ‘ability’ the meaning of the ground on which modal, speaker-oriented semantics developed. Besides, the term ‘inherent modality’ assumes that modality is inherent in language. As for other kinds of modality (alethic, boulomaic, circumstantial and so on), they might be considered as particular cases of more general epistemic and deontic modalities. For example alethic modality, which is a central notion of modal logic and takes in account “the necessary or contingent truth of proposition”(Lyons 1977:791), is rather peripheral in everyday language (Kiefer 1987:69). Palmer (1986:11) argues that in English there are no formal grammatical distinctions between alethic and epistemic modalities. He also puts forward the assumption that other languages lack related that sometimes it seems impossible to tell them from one another” (Ibid.). She proposes another analysis of modality, based on ‘semantic primitives’ and asserts that each notion of any language can be rendered in other languages not by exact lexical counterparts, but by their semantic analogues, by decomposing words into primitive components which exist in every language. (For further detailed discussion see Wierzbicka1996 and Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994)) Such an approach seems to us very effective for finding what meanings of different words have in common, but it may prove ineffective in revealing the sets of meanings of one and the same word. 6 e.g. in Sanskrit it is represented by the Desiderative: bubhuksu “eager to eat”.

0

24

such distinctions as well. It must be admitted that determination of one or another kind of modality depends either on what language is under consideration or on the personal evaluation of a researcher. Some degree of arbitrariness is thus inevitable both in the choice of items and in understanding their values. We think it is also necessary to explain our position with regard to o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e modalities as principal notions which have been used in a great number of works. According to one linguistic approach epistemic and deontic modalities can be either subjective or objective (Lyons 1977; Dik 1989; Hengeveld 1988). The purpose of the distinction is to show the speaker expressing his own beliefs, attitudes, and will (subjective) as opposed to the neutral observer who reports some state of affairs external to him. For instance, the phrase He may not come has a subjective epistemic reading: I-think-it-possible (taken as a unit) that he will not come; a subjective deontic reading: I forbid him to come; an objective epistemic reading: according to my information it is possible that he will not come; an objective deontic reading: it is not permitted that he comes (Lyons 1996:329-330). As Hengeveld and Dik demonstrate, objective modality operates on the predication, while subjective modality takes in its scope the whole proposition. But there are some principal objections to this classification. F i r s t, Lyons himself notes that either objective or subjective modalities reflect “an overt indication of the speaker’s unwillingness or inability to endorse or subscribe to, the factuality of the proposition expressed in his utterance, and both of them may well originate, ontogenetically, in the same psychological state of doubt” (1977:800). In other words in either cases doubt is expressed proceeding from an “objectively determinable chance factor” or “a purely subjective guess” (Nuyts 1992:74). In fact, what we are talking about is how the speaker expresses the degree of his confidence in the validity of a state of affairs, while this confidence depends on the reliability of the source of information. In this regard Nuyts (1992) notes that there is a rational kernel in the assumption that the appraisal of reality of a SoA is made either on the basis of knowledge or on the basis of guess, ”but the case of this intuition may be a matter not of two types of modality, but rather of a difference in the sources the speaker appeals to in putting forward one and the same modal qualification” (Ibid.: 82). So we can talk not about objective and subjective modalities, but about the evaluative force of an utterance, based on the 24

general knowledge of the speaker. And even those linguists, who adopted the subjective/objective opposition, point out that “the subjective and objective modality distinctions are vague to the considerable extent” (Плотников 1994:25). S e c o n d , Hengeveld asserts that subjective modality operates on states of affairs, the objective kind operates on predication. But what happens if predication is itself a state of affairs or vice versa? Where is the border between objective and subjective then? T h i r d, the ambiguity of the objective/subjective distinction is revealed in its contradictory and conflicting interpretations. For example in Slavic linguistics it is understood as a distinction between realization of modality by purely grammatical means (objective) and purely lexical means (subjective) (e.g. Бондарко 1990, Плотников 1994, Шуба 1994, Мечковская 1994). Compare this with the view of Lyons (1996:334): “Subjective modality… is much more commonly grammaticalised”. F o u r t h, what logicians call ‘objective possibility and necessity’ cannot serve as a suitable term for marking the expressions of possibility and necessity in speech, because for every speaker every fact, even well-known one, turns to a personal estimation and becomes subjective.37 “Modality could, that is to say, be defined as grammaticalization of speaker’s (subjective) attitudes and opinions” (Palmer 1986:16) and “only grammatical systems in which a great deal of subjectivity is involved can…be considered modal” (Ibid.:17).38 Summing up the above we would like to stress that here we confine ourselves to the analyses of the subjective attitudes of the speaker which are expressed epistemically or deontically, while epistemic and deontic modalities are themselves derivations from inherent modality.

37

About the correlation of subjective and objective we read in Gonda (1956:3): “The indicative

expresses that the person speaking visualizes the process – i.e. the act, action, event, in short any ‘idea’ expressed by a verb – as real or actual. As a rule the speaker is not conscious of this ‘subjective’ character of his statements expressed by means of verbs in the indicative…A state can be objectively incorrect…A wish, a desire, an appreciation are, moreover, often couched in the words of an objective statement.” Benveniste (1966:261) considers language as purely subjective: “Le langage…est marqué si profondément par l’expression de la subjectivité qu’on se demande si, autrement construit, il pourrait encore fonctionner et s’apeler langage. Nous parlons bien du langage, et non pas seulement de langues particulières”. 38

Halliday (1994), by the way, also restricts the application of the term ‘modality’ to subjective

expressions only. 24

1. 3. Means of expressing modality. As has been mentioned above, modality, being a semantic phenomenon, does not have any clear-cut morpho-syntactic boundaries and possesses a set of means larger than any other grammatical category. Modality is not as independent as aspect and tense and is subordinate to the semantics of the proposition in an utterance. Unlike aspect and tense, which are used by the speaker to orient the addressee in the sequence of states of affairs (SoA), modality aims at affecting the attitudes of the addressee to the SoA. As cited earlier, modality may be compared with a shell that encases the propositional content of an utterance (Givón 1993:169). The fact that modality, as a grammatical phenomenon, exists in all languages, i.e. has a universal application, is not called into question nowadays. The question is how it is expressed in every individual language. Lyons (1996:331) wrote that languages provide their users with a number of resources for expressing modality: “Some grammaticalize them in the category of mood and some…such as English lexicalize or semi-lexicalize them by means of modal verbs (‘may’, ’must’, etc.), modal adjectives (‘possible’, etc.), modal adverbs (‘possibly’, etc.) and modal particles (‘perhaps’, etc.)”. Lyons adds to this list also “prosodic resources – stress and intonation” (Ibid.). Thus, among the formal markers of modality there are phonological, morphologic, syntactic, and lexical ones. A supposition is proposed (Palmer 1986, Bybee 1994) that many modal meanings appeared in language and developed gradually; and the degree of their grammaticalization grew as the result of the fixing of their meanings. The degree of grammaticalization can be decided either in terms of affixation or syntactic restrictions (Palmer 1986:5). It is a commonplace that one and the same form is used for expressing different meanings (Норман 1994, Palmer 1986, Bybee 1994), and a wide spectrum of different expression forms is applied for certain meanings (Nuyts 1992, 1993). Polysemy of words and grammatical forms results from the tendency of language to be economical with its resources 39, although “there is no immediately obvious reason why the same forms should be used for expressing the speaker’s degree of commitment to truth and for getting other people to do things”(Palmer 1986:123). The reasons are found mainly in the history of semantic changes when some meanings were derived from others on the basis of analogues and correlations (Bybee 1994). Today most scholars agree that deontic 39

This is one of the main principles in Functional Grammar (Веденина 1978). 24

meanings are prior to epistemic meanings (Palmer 1986:103, Bybee 1994:194, Stephany 1986:399, Hirst & Weil 1982:660 and others) and inherent (dynamic) modality is prototypical of both of them (Lyons 1977, Palmer 1986, Kiefer 1987). Different languages use different sets of formal means for the expression of similar meanings. Here is a list of the main grammatical tools which are most often found in the studies dedicated to modality in specific languages: moods, modal verbs, modal adjectives, modal adverbials, sentence adverbials, special syntactic constructions (syntagmas), particles, clitics, interjections, conjunctions, parentheticals, word order and question words. But the long list of modal means is far from being exhausted. Most scholars pinpoint the connection between modality and tense: “The Past and the Future tenses contain a primordial disposition to modal connotation, to movement into the unreal dimension”(Норман 1994: 176). Some authors note the contiguity of negation and person with modal senses. In the framework of the theory of speech acts, developed by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), we can find a number of prosodic features, which are closely connected to modal meanings of an utterance (utterance modalities), such as intonation, interrogatives, exclamatives. There are attempts to envisage as modal, parallel with different means of prosody (stress, pauses), even paralinguistic means, such as gestures, mimicry, and motions of the body (Плотников 1994a). Lyons (1977:726) admits that gestures do express the speaker’s attitudes to the proposition, but still argues that they belong as much to another signal system as to the language. Along with the main modal means (moods, modal words) there are marginal cases, which exist in the peripheral zone of modality. Describing modality in Japanese Fortescue (1989:68) notes that “there is a broad peripheral area where modality shades into other functional categories”. And Palmer (1986:8) writes that elements of the modal system, that according to the formal means of expression belong to other categories (time, aspect and others), should be considered as mixed rather than belonging only to one system. The importance of lexical means must be noted separately. “Many of the features, associated with modality may not be marked grammatically” (Palmer 1986:5). For example, ‘hoping’ and ‘fearing’ in English are marked lexically rather than grammatically. Sometimes lexical means are parallel to grammatical. Many authors (e.g. Nølke 1989, Fortescue 1989) stress the fact that the expression of modality is “subject to considerable lexicalization” (Fortescue 1989:71). 24

Modality being a part of the wider pragmatic system of language is often revealed in a specific discourse situation. In this case the discourse components of speech (prosodic and paralinguistic means) may play an important role in interpreting either separate words or an utterance on the whole. Thus the role of context in the study of modality cannot be avoided. Lastly, modality can be manifested in subordinate clauses. “The use of modal forms in subordinate clauses (which is an essential part of a study of modality) depends to some degree on the choice of the lexical items in the main clause” (Palmer 1986:6). These lexical items, bearing modal meanings, often determine not only the kind of subordinate clause but the form of the predicate as well. And in some cases modal forms, which are used in subordinate clauses, lose their initial features and acquire new features. Our intention is to consider as far as possible all the grammatical and lexical means of expressing modality in Hindi. Some peripheral, mixed cases and subordinate modalities are also to be investigated. It must be noted that our corpus (literary works) is not sufficient for the study of discourse modalities; this category will therefore be examined only partly.

24

Chapter 2. Some previous works on Modality in Hindi.

Before we start the analysis of modality in Hindi, we would like to mention the works, which have touched upon the subject to some extent. It is worth noting above all that except an article of Nespital (1980) this subject has not been represented directly in any special research. It would be wrong to say that modality is not recognized in Hindi linguistics, but accepting its semantic status is very distant from acknowledging it as a separate grammatical category. In the grammars of Platts (1874), Kellogg (1938), Phillott (1913), Pincott (1933), Баранников (1934), Harley (1955) the only allusions to modal meanings were made in terms of real / unreal distinctions. The reasons, as we see them, have already been shown in Chapter 1 (lack of common morphologic devices; use of the markers of other independent categories – moods, tenses; miscellaneous lexical means: particles, adverbs, verbs; manifestation of communicative intent – assertion, question, command, negation, exclamation; different syntactic constructions etc.). Later grammars pay much more attention to modal devices, but still consider modality as a minor phenomenon in language. Scholars have preferred to talk about the ‘modal characteristics’ of some grammatical categories or some lexical combinations. Still, many components of the modal system were subject for detailed and accurate investigation. We mean first of all moods and modal words. Among the modal devices moods are broadly interpreted as basic: “Лексические средства

выражения

модальных

значений

следует

рассматривать

как

второстепенные‚ главным же‚ безусловно‚ является категория наклонения.” (Lexical means of expressing modal senses should be considered as accessory, and the main one is certainly the category of mood) (Дымшиц 1986:261).40 Being conscious of the importance of moods in the whole modal system of language, we nevertheless would not be so categorical with regard to Hindi. To start with, as Palmer noted (1986:168), “the number of lexical items to report modality is 40

Cf. Also Herslund (1989:12) : “The most obvious linguistic expression of modality is of course the

category of ‘mood’ ”. 24

far greater than the number of grammatical devices available”. Secondly, as Lyons writes (1996:331), “mood is by definition the category which results from the grammaticalization of modality (epistemic, deontic or whatever kind)”. But this grammaticalization results from the meanings of words. ‘Pure’ moods are not unambiguous and depend on context. Consider: 1)

ve āẽ

Lifted out of context this expression per se can be translated as “that they come , let them come” or “they may come” and only after adding a lexical component does the expression become definite in its meaning: 2) a) kaš ve āẽ

- (kaš – an interjection expressing wish)

b) šāyad ve āẽ – (šāyad – a word of possibility) kaš and šāyad in their turn do not bear any idea of reality / non-reality but only

‘wish’ and ‘prejudice’. Hence, the use of kaš is possible with different moods and the same can be said of šāyad: 3) a) kaš ve āẽ -

Subjunctive/Optative

b) kaš ve āte -

Counterfactual

c) šāyad ve āe hai -

Indicative

d) šāyad ve āẽ -

Subjunctive

e) šāyad ve āte -

Counterfactual

f) šāyad ve āte hõge - Presumptive Therefore, it is reasonable to assume an equal importance and interrelationship of both grammatical and lexical means. The attitude, which underestimates the role of lexical means, should be reconsidered. Authors differ also in quantification of moods, whose number varies from three to five59, not to mention a certain discord in terminology60. We would say that almost all

59

Platts (1874:135): “There are three moods; namely the Indicative, Imperative, and Subjunctive or

Conditional, which is also the Optative”. Guru (1962) gives five names: Indicative, Subjunctive, Presumptive, Imperative and Conditional. Баранников (1956): Indicative, Subjunctive, Imperative and Optative. Kellogg (1938): Indicative, Subjunctive, Imperative, Infinitive (which – he adds – is indeed the Gerund and Verbal Noun (p.221)). 37

grammarians are inclined to rename the accepted terms. Sometimes only from given instances it becomes possible to guess what the term is about. For example in Barz (1977:78) the Subjunctive Incomplete Tense means the Counterfactual mood and the Conditional Future means the Subjunctive mood. It is worth adducing in this connection the evidence of Wierzbicka (1987:27) that “the choice of terms supposedly representing the meaning of a particular modal is largely arbitrary”. In addition, she warns against the tendency to define “something clear by means of something obscure, or something more obscure by means of something even more obscure”. The traditional Indian grammarians are inclined to combine under the same label all the utterances, whose content is considered to be unreal - sambhāvanārth (which can be translated as Hypothetive). And what is understood in the non-Hindi grammars as Subjunctive is called bhavis yat sambhāvanārth (Future Hypothetive). The Counterfactual is called varttmān

sambhāvanārth (Present Hypothetive); and

bhūt sambhāvanārth (Past Hypothetive) takes in its scope the analytic forms of the

Subjunctive in the Past (example – gayā ho) (Bahri 1986, Tivari 1996, Vanshidhar & Shastri 1992, Nambudiri 1996). This classification arouses questions (for instance, why is the Counterfactual connected to the Present?). But the main reason why it cannot be accepted in our analysis, is that it confuses the conceptions of tense and mood. Moreover, the further distinctions are inevitable, because one cannot avoid the semantic differences of what is called “a classic triad of factivity, non-factivity and contra-factivity”(Bubenik 1985:33). There are two moods in Hindi, which as if ‘contend’ for their slot in the Mood system. They are the Subjunctive and the Optative. The problem is that the Subjunctive has undertaken the functions of the Optative, which vanished from MIA.61 Two semantically different moods thereby share the same morphological

The potential number of moods in language is sometimes considered about ten. (Cf. Плунгян 1996:153). 60

“The usual moods (so distinguished by their ability to occur in the T/M slot) are Subjunctive,

Presumptive, and Contrafactive: some languages have more; others have less. An attempt has been made to choose labels which are the most common and/or the least confusing: the Subjunctive has also been called the Contingent, the Potential or Conjunctive; the Presumptive also the Probabilitive or the Conjectural; the Contrafactive the Past Conditional or Conjunctive…; all three have been called the ‘Hypothetical’”. (Masica 1991:279). 61

See Липеровский (1962). 37

basis. Describing the nature of this basis most scholars point out that it has arisen from the MIA present indicative (and earlier from the Sanskrit present). 62 In modern Hindi this verb form, which we following a long-term tradition will call Subjunctive, accepted a new role, marking mainly the idea of non-factivity63 and remained unspecified in terms of tense and aspect64. Its endings serve as agreement markers “with no necessary semantic content” (Pray 1970:154). The Subjunctive of Hindi matches perfectly the description given by Gonda to the Subjunctive of the IndoEuropean languages: “A process in the subjunctive represents a mental image on the part of the speaker which in his opinion, is capable of realization, or even awaits realization” (1956:69-70)65. McGregor (1986:26), Shapiro (1989:96), Harris & Sharma (1976:100) and others also wrote about the hypothetical, imagination-based character of the Hindi Subjunctive. At the same time the old semantic baggage, which was brought by the Subjunctive from Prakrits, makes itself felt. It is “often employed as a present or even as a future” (Grierson 1968:62). But the tenses represented by the Subjunctive are not about facts. The present expressed by the Subjunctive acquired a generic reading, and the future is a merely manifestation of uncertainty. Besides, the Subjunctive of the existential verb ho- used as the copula occurs as a sign of doubt referring to factual propositions marked with tense (present or past). A wide range of these functions explains why it was labeled with so many terms – the Contingent, the Potential, the Conjunctive, the Subjunctive, the Optative, the Conditional, and the Hypothetical. Each of them may suit, and neither of them suits. In our opinion, it is impossible to find a single term that would be apt to reflect all the semantic facets of this morphologic form. The term ‘Subjunctive’ that we have chosen is generally applied to subordinate clauses of complex sentences and is typically associated with the verb forms of subordinate sentences. In spite of the fact that the Subjunctive occurs “in dependent clauses as well as independently” (Pray 1970:123), its subordinate nature seems to be basic. Consider the following example: 4) log mār dẽ yā chor

62

dẽ ? (Mithileshvar:46)

Platts (1874:139), Kellogg (1938:342-343), Pořizka (1963:214), Masica (1991:288), Hewson &

Bubenik (1997:267). 63

“The mood of generalized non-factivity” (Lyons 1977:817).

64

“This mode itself is…indifferent as to the concept of time” (Gonda 1956:65).

65

See also Palmer (1986:224). 37

This independently used sentence crowded out of context could be interpreted either as expressing a future possibility (“maybe the people will beat or maybe they will let go?”) or asking somebody’s instructions (“what should these people do – beat (them) or let (them) go?”). Only adding such phrases as “patā nahī …” (I wonder if …) or “kyā āp cāhte hai ki …”(Do you want that…) attach to the phrase an unequivocal meaning. This means that (in most cases at least) the right interpretation of subjunctive sentences depends on some deeper, underlying structure. Thus, the Subjunctive, even used independently, remains dependent.66 Therefore, this purely syntactic function (the term ‘subjunctive’ has the etymological meaning ‘subordinate’- Palmer 1986:131) seems to be the most appropriate for designating the phenomenon without specifying its various semantic functions. But since our analysis pertains to the semantic domain of language, we will have to maintain a specific terminology marking the manifestations of the Subjunctive both in epistemic and deontic fields. The distinction between the two main functions of the Subjunctive has already been made both in the Indo-European languages in general and in Hindi in particular. For example, Gonda (1956:68) described efforts of numerous scholars to distinguish between ‘volitional’ and ‘prospective’ functions of the Subjunctive (Compare with the ‘Voluntativer Subjunktiv’ of Nespital (1980:125)). A similar distinction was proposed by Lyons: “The so-called subjunctive of will is related to the imperative and to deontic modality in traditional treatment of the Indo-European system of moods and tenses; and the so-called subjunctive of likelihood to the future tense and to prediction” (1977:817). The Subjunctive with deontic functions (the subjunctive of will, used for expressing obligation, wish, command and so on) will be labeled in this work Optative; and the Subjunctive with epistemic functions (the subjunctive of likelihood, used for expressing uncertainty, doubt, possibility and the like) will be named Potential: Subjunctive Optative (deontic)

66

Potential (epistemic)

“It may… be concluded that this mood is especially apt to express a secondary process, that is to

say: a process continuing, following after, succeeding to and resulting from or being made possible by another process” (Gonda 1956:95-96). 37

Not all scholars recognize the Presumptive as a specific mood. It is traditionally subsumed under ‘a Future form of the auxiliary verb ho-, denoting an action that presumably takes place at the present time or took place in the past (Future II, Future III)’67. The refusal to recognize the Presumptive is to be accounted for by two reasons: its existence only in analytical forms, and those rare occurrences, when it really depicts future actions (See Липеровский 1962, 1964). But we should not forget that even the Indicative exists mainly in analytical forms (Present and Past Habitual, Present and Past Perfect, Present and Past Progressive), and such ‘simple’ forms of the Indicative as the Past Indefinite (e.g. gayā)and the Future (e.g. jāegā) convey the idea of factivity with some stretch; to class them with the Indicative is, therefore, problematical. We adhere to the opinion of other researchers who recognize the Presumptive68. We express our own opinions concerning this problem in chapter 5. Not enough attention has been paid to the role of the auxiliary verb in Hindi in creating the moods and interpreting their meanings. Most scholars prefer to name the copula ‘a form of the verb honā’ (Shapiro 1989, Дымшиц 1986, Tivari 1996), which is an existential verb and means ‘to be, to become’. But there is also a standpoint according to which the copula in Present (the forms hai, hai, hū, ho; Grierson 1968(1927) :57 presents it as √ha) and the verb ho- are not forms of the same word. It was noticed in Kellogg (1938), Platts (1874) and Grierson. So did some present-day scholars (Pray 1970, Barz 1977 ) as well. It would appear to us that the above-mentioned forms of copula in the Present Tense (together with thā in the Past) serve as the ‘real’ copula; and which verbs and under which circumstances function as copula (the verbs ho-,rah-,thæhar- par excellence) is still to be investigated. We think that our participating in this discussion is inevitable. There is one more problem, which is of great importance for the analysis of the modal devices - correlation of Tenses and Moods. For example, Shapiro (1989:53) calls both tenses and moods by the term ‘tense’: “…one of four tenses, i.e. the Present, Past, Presumptive, and Subjunctive”. He excludes the moods from his

67

Cf. Pořizka (1963), Nespital (1980, 1981), Bahri (1986).

68

“…the Future of the verb ‘to be’ , when used as an independent verb, may have either a Future or a

Presumptive sense – ‘he [will be / probably now is] in that room’, and it is this form which functions as the Presumptive marker. It should be noted that the Presumptive and the Future markers are different (although the former ‘contains’ the latter)” (Masica 1991:282). 37

characteristics of the verb forms: “The major grammatical categories that structure the verbal system of Hindi are those of aspect and tense” (Ibid.:53). Barz (1977) and Saihgal (1964) share this attitude of Shapiro and use ‘tense’ instead of ‘mood’. It must be noted that most scholars distinguish between tenses and moods, but still mix up the notions. Some grammarians believe that the analytical forms of the type ‘participle + auxiliary’, when the auxiliary carries a mood, are temporal forms of the mood. Баранников & Баранников (1956) talk about tenses of moods, and Дымшиц claims that the Indicative “реализуется системой временны′х форм”(is realized by a system of temporal forms) (1980:261). Pořizka (1963), Nespital (1980, 1981), Guru (1957) support this position and put forward such terms as Subjunctive I,II,III; Future I,II,III; Conditional I,II,III. Lack of a distinct tense / mood differentiation leads to understanding the Tense as a notion dependent on Moods. But what they talk about are in fact propositions where tenses and moods are defined independently. Consider: 5)

usne vahā šer dekhā haI

He has seen a tiger there -

Indicative

jaise usne vahā šer dekhā ho

As though he saw a tiger there -

Subjunctive

yadi usne vahā šer dekhā hotā

If he would have seen a tiger there -

Counterfactual

šāyad usne vahā šer dekhā hogā

He may have seen a tiger there -

Presumptive

Here are represented not the Past of Indicative, the Past of Subjunctive and so on, but one and the same proposition in the Past. It is obvious that the temporal characteristics of the proposition do not depend on the choice of a mood. The aspect-tense-mood correlation has been broadly debated in many theoretical works69. It is commonplace that moods and tenses are considered separate in Grammar, but co-existent in Semantics (Bahri 1985:207). Being evaluative markers of reality moods may relate to any tense (with one exception – lack of future reference in the Counterfactual mood). 69

Tense, Aspect and Modality “represent three different points of departure in our experience of

time”, “…modality encompasses among other things our notion of reality, in the sense of ‘having factual existence at some real time’ (‘true’),’having existence at no real time’(‘false’), or ‘having potential existence in some yet-to-be time’(‘possible’).” (Givón –272)

37

Future Tense, by the way, has very much in common with modality. Kuryłowicis disposed to consider the Future Tense as a mood, which is opposed in modal aspects to the Present and the Past. Indeed, the Future deals with hypothetical, possible acts or states and is used for expressing very often not future facts but intentions of the speaker and, therefore, can easily be acknowledged as modal. The question is if it is possible to convey factuality by the Future. Some investigations (Comrie 1985, in Hindi – Nespital 1980,1981) prove that it is possible. So it can be said that the Future, while being a tense, has certain modal characteristics. In this connection the statement of Kellogg (1938:233-234) is of a great importance - that neither Imperfect nor Perfect Participles have definite reference to time70. It means that grammatical forms employed for expressing tenses not always have temporal interpretations. The relation between temporal and modal senses in Hindi is still a problem to be solved. The idea of futurity can be rendered periphrastically as well, and Hindi in this sense is very rich in resources, which include either use of other temporal forms (Present Habitual, Present Progressive, Past Indefinite) or miscellaneous syntactic constructions. All the grammars and teaching books of Hindi adduce a long (although not exhaustive) list of alternative versions for expressing futurity. But they are not classified, and each case is examined separately in accordance with the part of speech it belongs to. On comparison all these cases reveal one general base – intention to perform an action rather than describing a future act. They denote primarily an affective intention to do the action. Thus, the periphrastic Future is always modal. Perhaps the least controversial and most investigated is the domain of “imperative forms”71. Commands and requests are rendered in Hindi not only by the Imperative72 but mainly through a large variety of additional means aimed to convey the wish of the speaker to see the SoA fulfilled. Commands and requests consequently contain both the idea of futurity and a wish and combine both the elements of deontic necessity and epistemic possibility (the former being more basic). Nespital (1980:100) even claims that the polite Imperative may have the meaning of evaluation of possibility. Whatever it is, a speaker, with no doubt, presenting a command, when 70

For further discussion see the recent investigation of Hewson & Bubenik (1997).

71

The term of McGregor (1986:39).

72

“…the principal mood of will and desire”. (Lyons 1996:746)

37

choosing verbal means takes into account the possibility of the action to be fulfilled. The modern grammars describe in detail all the possible occurrences of the polite Imperative (in –iye,-iyegā, Subjunctive and Infinitive). There is not much to add to this descriptions. There is another matter in Hindi grammar that lacks a clear explanation: which verbs should be considered modal? The most often cited in this connection are the verbs sak- (can), pā-(to get), cāh-(to wish), de- (to give), ā-(to come), jān-(to know). Sometimes some secondary stems in compound verbs, such as par -(to fall) and ræh-(to stay) are understood as modal, and even aspectuals such as lag-(to join) are added to this list.73 In our analyses we distinguish real modals (the verbs which have modal meanings as initial) from accessory, or semi-modal, verbs (with modal meanings, which are secondary, derived) and modal performatives (which are not grammatical, but lexical). In their classical grammars, Platts and Kellogg noted that the form of a subordinate clause depends to some extent upon the correlation between an utterance and reality. In the later grammars (Guru, Bahri, Дымшиц, McGregor) and in special studies (Липеровский (1962, 1972), Ульциферов (1962), Горюнов (1968)) different types of subordinate sentences were investigated and, although attention was focused mainly on the syntactic structure of the sentences, their modal features were not neglected. These works are of great importance for any student of Hindi. Nevertheless, what has been said about the complement clause, especially in its epistemic and deontic usage, about embedded complements and about if-clauses, is obviously not sufficient. But the first (and for now the only) effort to analyze modality in Hindi as a specific linguistic phenomenon was made by Nespital (1980), who offered his understanding of it, classified modal devices and explained their occurrences. Let us see what principles guided the suggested classification, how they match our principles and which of them we could perhaps adopt in our analyses. We will start with the aims, which the author put forward: what are the criteria for differentiation of kinds of modality, modal semes – both grammatical and lexical; which devices and under which conditions serve for conveying modal senses; what are the relations between different elements of the modal system? (See p.98) 73

For more detailed discussion see Masica (1991:373-384). 37

The same questions are of equal importance for us. But the answers we are going to give reflect another point of view. Modality, as Nespital describes it, is a universal functional semantic category (p.89), that defies any simple description. He divides “the single modal system” into two parts. The first part is “den Bereich, der die unterschiedlichen Arten der Beziehungen des Sprechers (z.T. auch einer anderen Person) zu einem Sachverhalt oder Aussageinhalt betrifft, wobei diese Beziehungen die Realitätsgradsdarstellung, die Beurteilung des Sicherheitsgrades durch den Sprecher, seine rationale und emotionale Disposition, seine kommunikative Zielsetzung sowie seine – bloß referierende oder auch kommentierende und wertende – Stellung zu objektiven Sachverhalten und zu Handlungen und Aussagen anderer Personen betrifft.”(p.90) The second part deals with the subjective / objective reality definitions: “Demgegenüber umfaßt die Modalität (2) die Art und Weise und die Kausalität von Erscheinungen der objektiven Realität oder von subjektiven.”(p.90) Such an interpretation allows us to include in the domain of modality a very wide range of linguistic phenomena. In fact, every attribute in an utterance under this definition can be considered as modal. And the definition “rationale und emotionale Disposition” makes the sphere of modality indefinite and permits a voluntary interpretation. In contrast, the explanation of Palmer superimposes distinct and exact limits on the domain of research and makes the notion “attitudes of the speaker” unambiguous. Nespital offers a large set of modal devices, which includes the moods (Indicative, Subjunctive, Irrealis (Counterfactual), Imperative); modal verbs; modal words; the Impersonal Passive; modal adverbs and adjectives; modal particles; the forms of necessity with cāhiye, ho- and par - ; syntactic means for expressing necessity; the means of prosody (stress, intonation); assertion and negation; and, what we would like to point to particularly, division into modal means, which are primarily modal and those which behave as modal under certain conditions (so the stress is on the role of context and specific discourse situations). All these modal resources Nespital devided into 20 modal complexes, each of which contains a set of formal means for expressing modal semes with the same or very close modal meanings. Thus, a semantic principle is proposed in his classification as basic. This is a very important point in his approach, and we share it completely. And what are the main semantic fields enclosed in these 20 complexes? They are evaluation of the reality of an utterance, necessity, ability, wish and will – in 37

short, a standard circle of notions associated with modality. The number of the complexes does not have a one-to-one reference to the number of semantic fields. Some of them merely represent a further gradation of more global notions into subnotions. For instance, evaluation of the degree of reality of an utterance is given generally in the Modal Complex (MC) 1, and the next MC2 and MC3 display its different manifestations, which can be glossed as Objective and Subjective Epistemic Modality; that is, those cases when such evaluation is made directly (agent-oriented modality) or with reference to somebody’s opinion (speaker-oriented modality). According to Nespital, it is important to determine who is the source of modality “Modalität einzunehmen”. We have already argued that the objective / subjective distinction is unreasonable. But the person who evaluates the proposition is of no doubt important, because this point has a serious impact on the choice of morphologic, lexical and syntactic means. We will return to this question in discussing the evidential means of Hindi. Nespital does not mention the Evidential System but a large number of his Modal Complexes are defined as independent units only in terms of the source of evaluation. And it is true of both epistemic (MC2, MC3, MC12, MC13) and deontic systems (MC5, MC7, MC8, MC9, MC10). This seems to show the adequacy of the method we have chosen, because Nespital, an unprejudiced analyst, unconsciously moved in the same direction. The importance he attaches to the “source of modality” leads sometimes to the substitution of the semantic principle, on which his classification is based, by a structural one. For example, the MC11 combines evaluation of the truth of the proposition with “Modalität der Wünsche” (modality of wish). But the basis for such a combination is not Semantics but Syntax, specifically a construction of the type “matrix clause + subordinate clause”, when the matrix clause expresses an attitude of the speaker: I suppose that… I want that… There are many interesting examples in the MC2 and MC4, which are about an intersection of epistemic, inherent and deontic meanings of the same modal word (concretely the verbs cāhiye and pā-). cāhiye, which belongs mainly to the deontic system and is employed for expressing necessity, appears with epistemic meanings of possibility: “javāb tīsre din ānā cāhiye” (The answer must come

37

in two days), demonstrating by this the conversion of deontic meanings into epistemic. The same can be said about the use of the verb pā- (to get), which is used: Inherently (ability)–ve samajh nahī pā rahe the- They were unable to understand. Deontically (obligation)–vah nā nikalne pāī- She was not allowed to go out. Epistemically (possibility) – vah pūch nā pāī thī- She had no chance to ask. All

these

examples

testify that

“morphology and

semantics

are

not

isomorphic”(Bubenik74). We found very important an effort of Nespital to reveal in MC19 a connection between modal devices and “kommunikative Zielsetzung einer sprachlichen Äuserung” (p.143) – statements, questions, commands. He tried to show what means are used to render communicative intent (mood, tense, intonation, word order – in short, both morphologic and prosodic means). This theme touches the question of discourse modalities, but literary texts do not provide enough material for unobjectionable corollaries. It would appear to us that the problem can be best analyzed either on the basis of living conversations or adapted film dialogues. It should be noted that some Modal Complexes duplicate one another. Sometimes a MC differs from a following one only in a single subpoint from a long list of shared qualities (MC7 – MC10). Nespital himself emphasizes that it is not always easy to fix boundaries between Modal Complexes. But abstracting from all of Nespital’s definitions, one might notice that all his examples (although not sufficient because of the size of the essay) may perfectly fall within the system proposed by Palmer: Dynamic(Inherent) – Epistemic – Deontic. The 20 Modal Complexes of Nespital certainly give an idea of the modal resources of the Hindi language, but still their “globale Gliederung”(p.92) is impossible because of the numerous complexes, where a distinct rule of their composition could not be traced. It is also true that Nespital aimed not at making a detailed survey of all possible modal devices, but at raising the problem: “Vielmehr ging es uns um die Darlegung der grundlegenden Probleme, die mit dieser komplizierten Thematik verbunden sind”(p.149). This explains the somewhat bulky and vague definitions given to modality. In general the essay bears the nature of reflection and discussion and rather raises questions than answers them.

74

Private communication. 37

The main contribution of this essay was to define modality as a grammatical category and to create a system for its classification. Nespital pointed out that “die detaillierte Analyse der Modalverben und verbalen und verbo-nominalen Syntagmen modaler Bedeutung in diesen Sprachen noch weitestgehend aussteht”(p.149). We would like to add that new research in the field of semantics and pragmatics of speech would be of great importance first of all for teaching foreign languages.75

75

See also Nespital (1980:149). Kopelovich (1982:2) complains that while teaching foreign languages the stress is made on the

mastering of syntactic constructions and morphologic forms and not on semantic meanings. Мечковская (1994:214) writes:”Несмотря на отсутствие универсальной классификации модальности, ныне создаваемые сисемы классификации тем не менее важны прежде всего для практики преподавания иностранных языков.” (In spite of absence of the universal classification of modality, the systems being created nowadays are still important, especially for the practice of teaching foreign languages). 37

Chapter 3. Inherent Modality.

Inherent Modality, as noted above, is not a generally adopted term. It is sometimes also called “dynamic” or “facultative”. However, it is not the term which is important, but its meaning. In spite of different labels, it is universally recognized that this kind of modality includes the notions of a b i l i t y and d e s i r e : “ability and willingness”(Dik 1986:205), “ability and disposition”(Palmer 1986:103), “capacity and volition”(Nuyts 1992 :95). Attempts have been made to treat ability and volition as deontically modal (Stephany 1986:376-377). It must be admitted that the boundary between Inherent and Deontic modalities is, in fact, very subtle, and the wish to avoid ambiguity in their interpretation leads, naturally, to the recognition of the so-called “root-modality”, which along with ‘ability’ and ‘desire’ contains also ‘obligation’ and ‘necessity’ (Bybee 1994). The above-mentioned notions, as Dik (1986:205) writes, “define relations between a participant and the realization of the SOA in which he is involved”. This common characteristic of them after further consideration could be represented as the sum of additional semantic components. In order to define them we turned to the point presented in Bybee (1994:177) that “agent-oriented modality reports the existence of internal and external conditions on an agent with respect to the completion of the action”. Internal and external conditions – these are the components we need to separate the notions ‘ability’ and ‘desire’ from ‘obligation’ and ‘necessity’. It must be taken into consideration that ‘ability’ and ‘desire’ represent conditions governed by internal factors. The agent is himself the authority to fulfil an action. Thus, ‘ability’ and ‘desire’ are agent-oriented. In contrast, ‘obligation’ and ‘necessity’ always have an external source of authority. Even when an agent imposes on himself some kind of obligation, he acts as an external factor. Thereby they are speaker-oriented. In Hindi, this semantic feature finds its expression also in syntactic forms, that is, in all expressions of need and necessity a transformation of the Subject into the Dative Agent is required. As is well known, the use of the dative ‘ko’ with the

agent

reports

its

non-volitional

37

participation

in

the

fulfilment of an action (Klaiman 1986, Kachru 1981:181), while in constructions conveying ability and desire the subject and the agent are the same: 1) mai dekh saktā hū – (I can see) - ability 2) mai dekhnā cāhtā hū – (I want to see) - desire 3) mujh ko dekhne kī āvašyaktā hai – (It is necessary for me to see) necessity 4) mujh ko dekhnā cāhiye - (I should see) - obligation Thus, we are inclined to analyze under Inherent Modality only the notions of ‘ability’ and ‘desire’, whereas ‘necessity’ and ‘obligation’ to apply to the Deontic Modality.

3.1. Ability . Our understanding of ability is based on the definition given by Bybee (1994:177): “Ability reports the existence of internal enabling conditions in the agent with respect to the predicate action”. For the analysis of ‘ability’, it is expedient to distinguish its main types. The first to be mentioned is the distinction of innate and acquired ability (Kiefer 1997:250), which in Hindi is not only semantic but also formal. The third type, which we intend to add to the previous two, is circumstantial ability. It underlines the dependence of the fulfillment of an action on outer circumstances. All these types can be expressed either lexically (free combinations of words, set phrase) or grammatically (modal and half-modal verbs, passive forms). To investigate such types as ‘ability acquired by everybody vs. acquired by a few people’ (Kiefer 1997:250) or ‘physical vs. mental ability’ (Bybee 1994:319) makes no sense in Hindi, because they have no distinct manifestations. Therefore, we define three main types of ability in Hindi – inner, acquired and circumstantial. Further distinctions are a matter of focus – if the subject or the action is in the highlight. The choice of a verb or the use of an active/passive construction depends on this focus. Let us consider each type of ability separately.

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3.1.1. Inner ability. A) The agent is focal. One of the basic means for rendering ability is the modal verb sak- (to be able, to be capable, can). In Баранников & Баранников (1956:125) this meaning of it is represented as basic. sak- is a modal verb in all respects. It does not have an independent usage and the rule of deletion restrictions “governing clearly modal verbs” (Masica 1991:375) has a direct relation to it. For example, it is possible to answer the question kyā āp batā sakte hai ? (can you tell ?) only by saying hā, batā saktā hū (yes, I can tell), and not with *hā,saktā hū (yes,I can).

Extrapolation of the sense of ability into the epistemic and deontic domains resulted in transformation and widening of its meanings. In Gonda (1956:51) we find an explanation of the transformation: “Words for ‘possible’ properly referring to what is ‘practicable by those who are able and competent’, rather than ’what may or may not happen’ or ‘what is capable of existing’, are in a significant way not infrequently related to, or identical with, terms for ‘being powerful, able, mighty’: Skt. šakya – ‘possible, capable of being’ also meaning ‘able’ belongs to šak – ‘to be powerful, able, competent’.” The verb sak- is the most grammaticalized means for rendering ‘ability’. That is the reason why it became so ambiguous and why its interpretation is so dependant on context (see example 2 in Chapter 1). One of the main conditions under which the verb sak- carries the meaning of ‘ability’ is volition of the subject. That is to say, an action should be provoked by the subject himself and not by outer factors. Transitive verbs match this condition, but intransitive verbs go with it only partly. There are many intransitive verbs with passive meaning such as ban- (to be built), kat - (to be cut), mil- (to be given), bik- (to be sold) and so on, which in combination with sak- will only convey the

sense of ‘possibility’. Inner Ability is broadly lexicalized. The lexical way for rendering its meanings is the most straightforward and unambiguous. Unlike sak- , which may have different interpretations depending on context and which is too much generalized, lexical means are unequivocal and can reflect different nuances of ability. Here is a selection: 1) yah bāt šāyad unkī samajh se pare thī. (Ashk1:58)

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Maybe it was beyond their understanding. 2) ham log šāyad bolne kī sthiti mẽ nahī the.(Kishor:44) Maybe we were unable to speak. 3)tumse bahas karnā mere būte kī bāt nahī hai, Dilīp.(Chatursen:64) To argue with you is beyond my power, Dilip. 4) cetan



bas

caltā

to

usī

vaqt

ur

kar

lahaur

pahũc

jātā.(Ashk1:54)

If Chetan could he would fly to Lahore in that very moment. 5) mai kuch bhī pāne yā dene mẽ nitāt asamarth ho gayā thā.(Kishor:202) I became absolutely unable to get or to give anything. Among the other possibilities are the words sāmarthya (power, ability, competence), samarth (able, competent, capable), šakti(power, might), šakya (practicable,

realizable), tāqat (might, power), lāyaq (fit, valid, worthy) and so on. Sometimes we can find in the same sentence a combination of lexical means with the verb sak-. This is a purely stylistic device whose aim is to emphasize ability (and primarily inability) to perform an action. In this case it is the verb sak-, which could be regarded as an additional, emphatic element which could be withdrawn without any negative impact on the meaning of the utterance or even on the shade of the meaning, whereas removing a lexical means leaves the utterance neutral and vague: 6) par tab mai apne se nišcay kar sakne kī sthiti mẽ nahī thā. (Rakesh:7) But then I was really unable to make any decision myself. (Compare with 2.) 7) lahaur kī par hāī ut hā sakne kī šakti unmẽ nahī thī. (Ashk1:26) They could not afford the expenses of learning in Lahore. 8) maut pūrī tarah maujūd hai par use mãzūr kar sakne kī tāqat usī man mẽ nahī thī. (Kamleshvar2:65)

The death was present in full but this heart was unable to accept it. There is a verb which in some circumstances may carry the meaning of ‘ability’. It is the verb ræh-. Used with the Absolutive or with the Perfective Verbal Adverb it has the meaning ‘to be able to keep the former state, to stay in the same position’ or in other words - ‘withstand, remain firm’:

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9) pitā ko tivra krodh āyā, par jāne kis vidhī vah apne krodh ko roke ræh gaye. (Kumar:52)

Father flied into a rage, but somehow he managed to control himself. 10) āj mai sab kuch sun kar rahūgī. (Film) Today I will be able to hear anything.

B) The action is focal. To transfer the emphasis from the subject to the action, the Impersonal Passive construction is used.87 Such passive construction differs from the usual Passive Voice in that 1) it allows the use of not only transitive but intransitive verbs as well and 2) when ‘ability/inability’ is rendered by it, the existence of the actor (marked with se) is obligatory. Even when the actor is not present in the utterance, it is understood

by the context. The intransitive verb in this construction is always masculine singular. As Bahri (1985(1945):202) notes, “there is no grammatical nominative or psychological accusative governed by it.” This, perhaps, was the reason why Barz (1977:175) called it “the False Passive”. By the way, Barz and Bahri (1986:187) are inclined to include in the Impersonal Passive only intransitive verbs, while most authors include “any verb” (Saihgal 1964:251). Besides, literary texts provide us with a great number of examples where no difference in usage of transitive and intransitive verbs can be traced (the distinction ‘physical’ vs. ‘mental’ is given to underline the similarity not only of the verbs, but of the contexts as well): 11) rikše par to begam mujh se car hā na jāegā. (Chatursen:132) I will not be able to climb on a rickshaw, madam. (Intr., physical ability) 12) usse to angrezī kā ek vākya bhī šudh na bolā jātā thā. (Ashk1:27) He could not pronounce correctly a single phrase in English. (Intr., mental ability) 13) mujh se unkī pir ā dekhī nahī gaī. (Reddi:8) I could not endure their pain. (Trans., mental ability) 14) dāl binā tumse khāyā jāegā? (Mitra:35) Will you be able to have meals without pulse ? (Trans., physical ability)

87

Cf. McGregor 1986:117.

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Most scholars underline that this construction is usually based in the negative (Pincott 1933:169, Platts 1874:372, Guru 1962 :94-95, Shapiro 1989:136). This is correct, and we would add that a great majority of the means for conveying the sense of ‘ability’ are in fact negative. One of the possible reasons may be an assumption that realized ability is actually a completed action which needs predominantly aspectual definitions, so that all the attention is concentrated on the result. But what has not been implemented has to be explained. Therefore, the aim of all other variants is to display the reasons why an action cannot (or could not) be fulfilled – because of inner potential inability or was provoked by specific conditions. Another feature of the Impersonal Passive arises from its nature. Since it emphasizes the action, it involves the idea of practicability and does not tend to express possible worlds. This feature distinguishes it from sak-, which expresses potential ability and is, therefore, predisposed to convey suppositions. Without mentioning an agent, the meaning of the Impersonal Passive is generalized and turns into a rule, an advice representing ‘obligation’ (Bahri 1985(1945):202, 1986:187). Thus, it has deontic reading: 15) udhar khelā jātā hai. (Bahri 1986:186) One should play over there. Intransitive verbs and especially ones with inherent passive meanings also serve to render inability. The use of such verbs with the Instrumental Agent (mujhse) shifts the emphasis from the agent to the action as if depriving the former of control over the latter. 16) naukar usse nahī dabte. (Saihgal 1964:201) He cannot control the servants. 17) mujhse yah sab nibhtā nahī. (Bhandari:54) I am unable to cope with it. Intransitive verbs with inherent passive meaning also convey the idea of absolute inability when they follow the Perfective Verbal Adverb of their First Causative. The meaning of the combination is ‘impossible in any way’: 18) ghar mẽ ab use koī sāthī d hūr he na miltā thā. (Chatursen:127) It was absolutely impossible for him to find a friend at home.

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19) log kæhte, vāh, is mūrti par se to ākh hat āe nahī

hat tī.

(Dinkar:60) People said, oh, it is impossible to stop oneself staring at the statue. Expressing one hundred percent inability, this type also depicts one hundred percent impossibility. Therefore, passivization proves to be one of the most effective means for widening the usage of ability-rendering verbs and constructions and converting them to possible worlds. The above-mentioned Verbal Adverb of the Causative can easily be replaced by post-positions or even by an independent clause. Compare 20 with 21, and 22 with 23,24: 20) hāth ut hāe na ut hte the. (Prem Chand1:20) He had no power to rise hands. (It was impossible to rise hands). 21) hāth hilāne par nahī hil rahā thā. (Amrita1:21) He was unable to move hands. (It was impossible to move hands). 22) kisī kī pratibhā va yogyatā chipāe nahī chiptī hai. (“Sarita”:6) It is impossible to hide somebody’s talent. 23) aisī bātẽ chipāne se chiptī nahī. (Film) It is impossible to hide such things. 24) in sab bātõ ko unhõ ne bahut chupāyā, phir bhī ve chipī na rahī. (Chatursen:25)

He tried very much to hide all these things, but all in vain. In the Impersonal Passive the verb ræh- acquires the meaning ‘to fail in maintaining the former state, to keep / refrain from’. The construction is used only with negative reference: 26) jab bahut der tak koī xat ut hāne nahī āyā tab usse nahī rahā gayā. (Kamleshvar 2:23)

When for a long time nobody came to take the letter, she could not restrain herself. 27) iske bād mujhse khar ā na rahā gayā. (Amrita 1:51) After that I could not keep standing. 28) āxirkār, mujhse cup nahī rahā gayā. (Mitra:80) After all, I could not keep silence.

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The same meaning, inter alia, may be rendered lexically in a more explicit manner by the verb bardāšt ho- (bear, endure, put up with) : 29) rammī se jab bardāšt nahī huā tab usne kamre mẽ jā kar kahā. (Kamleshvar 2:20) When Rammi failed to contain himself he went to the room and said. In view of the examples given above we would argue that the Impersonal Passive erases the difference between transitive and intransitive verbs representing them both as non-volitional; and intransitive (together with transitive) verbs present not an accidental (Saihgal 1964:117) but an uncontrolled act.

3.1.2. Acquired ability. The Acquired ability as opposed to the Inner ability means capacity to perform an act thanks to acquired habits and skills and is expressed exclusively by the verbs ā- (to come) and jān- (to know). The choice of a verb depends on what the speaker wants to stress in an utterance –the agent or the act. An underlined agent in the nominative is followed by the transitive jān-, which in this case obtains the meaning ‘to be able, to be trained to, to be experienced in’: 1) šrī rāmānand…sirf tāš aur šatrãj khelnā jānte the. (Ashk1:51) Playing chess and cards was the only thing mister Ramanand knew to do. 2) vaise lekhak kī lekhnī višrām karnā nahī jāntī. (Sankrityayan:introduction) Generally speaking, the pen of a writer is not acquainted with rest. In case the act is in the focus the verb ā- comes into play and obtains the same meanings as jān-. The main verb, which is in the form of the Gerund, becomes the subject and the agent is in the Dative: 3) harmoniyam bajānā ātā hai ? (Kamleshvar 2:83) Can you play harmonium? In both cases different additional words like hikmat (knowledge), šaūr (skill), upay, tariqā (way) and so on can be used for definitions that are more precise:

4) …use khānā banāne tak kā šaūr nahī āyā! (Priyamvada:97)

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She did not learn even how to cook!

3.1.3. Circumstantial ability. A) The agent is focal. Among the most generally used means for Circumstantial ability is the verb pā- (to get, to obtain). This verb can be used as an auxiliary like sak- for rendering ‘ability’, but unlike sak- it has an independent usage: 1) ek bār vah arun ādevī kī snehmaī god mẽ pyār pā cukī thī. (Chatursen:95) Once she already got love in the warm-hearted embrace of Arunadevi. Its meaning ‘to get’ is basic, original and ‘ability’ is derived. Thus, it can be interpreted as ‘can’ only when used as an auxiliary. The correlation between its basic and modal meanings can be seen in the next example: 2) aur jahā tum haq se kuch hāsil nahī kar pāī, vahā tumne āsuõ se sab kuch pānā cāhā. (Kamleshvar:50)

Where you failed to get anything by right, you wished to get everything by tears. However, even in the modal usage pā- retaines its original meaning ‘to get’, where the result depends not only on the desire of the agent but mainly on outer circumstances. It closely resembles the verb mil-, which means ‘to obtain with minimum or even without efforts on the part of the agent’.88 In 2) the active role of the agent in carrying out the action is verbalized by the verb hāsil kar- (to get). Adding pā- as an auxiliary attaches to the whole combination the meaning of ‘success in carrying out an action in spite of outer obstacles’ and can be translated as ‘manage to’ or ‘succeed in’ (Masica 1991:377).89 It should be noted that pā- is a transitive verb and in the independent usage it has an active agent in perfective ergative constructions – maine pāyā hai (I have got). As an auxiliary it loses its active meaning and converts the combination into intransitive. The elimination of ne proves that the action is not under complete control of the agent:

88

Cf. Barz 1977:65.

89

See also Shapiro 1989:104.

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3) darasal mai uskī pratikriyā abhī tak nahī jān pāyā thā. (Kishor:36) Actually, I had no opportunity to find out her reaction. In the negative it reflects inability to perform an act on account of outer obstacles. The conditions enabling or preventing fulfillment of an action are often represented in an utterance: 4) bar ī kat hināī se vah kæh pāī ‘dilīp’! (Chatursen :179) She hardly managed to say “Dilip”! 5)tūrayā kī kŗpā se hī mai apnī strī aur baccõ se mil pāyā thā. (Prem Chand 2:198) I succeeded in meeting my wife and children only thanks to favor of Turaya. This sort of evaluation Barz interprets as “emotional ability to do an action” (1977:130), which seems to be misleading, because ‘emotion’ in this case is subject to further evaluation and has other expressive means: 6) vah kuch samajh hī nahī pā rahā thā.

(Chatursen:77) – emphatic

enclitic hī. He was unable to understand anything. 7) mai yahā pæhre par hū, koī ā na pāegā. (Chatursen:32) – negative particle na. I stand guard here, nobody will enter. Both hī and na are wedged between the verbs and thus make it possible to separate their meanings and emphasize the shade of success (or failure), which together with stress and intonation allow for a needed emotional effect. pā- is considered by many authors as ‘modal’ (Masica 1991:377). For Kachru

(1980) all auxiliaries are modals. To us pā- is semi-modal for two reasons. First, it has an independent usage and, second, when used as an auxiliary it preserves its original meaning. The meaning ‘to get’ remains in all situations and narrows possibility of its usage as an evaluation means. For instance it has deontic readings, but cannot be used epistemically (Masica 1991:377) whereas the real modal sak- together with inherent has epistemic and deontic readings. In Kachru (1980:50) the use of pā- as opposed to sak- results from “some effort on the part of the agent” (see also Barz 1977:64) whilst sak- is neutral with respect

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to this feature. Such an explanation appears to us insufficient. It is obvious that in surmounting obstacles some efforts are supposed. But sak- seems to be neutral only because outer circumstances are not underlined and all the attention is put on the inner ability: 8) uskā aslī cehrā šāyad mere alāvā aur koī nahī dekh pāyā, šāyad dekh bhī nahī saktā. (Mitra:73)

Maybe nobody except me succeeded to see her real face. Perhaps, nobody was able to. sak- emphasizes the result, whereas pā- covers not only the result but all the

process of surmounting obstacles. (That is the reason why the phrase ve sīkh pā rahe hai (‘they are succeeding in their study’) is possible, but *ve sīkh sak rahe hai

(‘*they are being able to study’) is not). Consequently, the main

distinction, after all, is in the relation to the conditions of the fulfillment of an action. And in this respect sak- is undoubtedly neutral90. Here are some nuances of meanings expressed by pā- : a) to find the right word to say or the right thing to do: 9) rammī aur kuch nahī pūch pāī thī. (Kamleshvar 2:19) Rammi could not find what else to ask. b) to resolve, to make a firm decision, to overcome fear or doubt: 10) vah kisī se man kī vyathā kæh na pātā thā. (Chatursen:126) He was afraid to tell to anybody what bothered him. c) like b) but more explicitly, with lexical means. The verb pā- is used pleonastically: 11) vah apnī is kavitva šakti kī bāt tak prakat

karne kā sāhas

na kar pātā. (Ashk 1:57)

He did not dare even to speak about his poetical capacity.

90

Compare these verbs with their counterparts in Marathi: “Сочетания с глаголом pāvan ẽ

выражают главным образом значение объективной возможности... в то время как употребление çakan ẽ

универсально (охватывает все оттенки возможности)” (Катенина 1963:219)

(Combinations with the verb pāvan ẽ express mainly the meaning of objective possibility while the use of çakan ẽ is universal (it covers all the shades of possibility).

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A similar sentence can be presented without pā- when there are lexical equivalents: 12) yah kahne kī himmat na par ī ki gulnār ke ghar jātī hū. (Prem Chand 1:50) I was not brave enough to say that I go to the house of Gulnar. d) occur, happen to be (opportunity): 13) jaggī

bābū

ko

is

tarah

jāte

mai

nahī

dekh

pāyā

thā.

(Kamleshvar:26) I have never before happened to see Jaggi Babu retreating this way. e) not to be finished before something else happened: 14) ujālā pūrī tarah mukt nahī ho pāyā thā. (Kishor:35) The light of the sun has not yet completely released itself. Another notion that accompanies the verb pā- is ‘volition’ or “wish” (Shapiro 1989:104): 15) kaī vidyārthī cāhte hue bhī hindī nahī sīkh pā rahe hai. (Gupta:78) Some students in spite of desire are not succeeding in learning Hindi. When outer conditions for implementation of an action are underlined in an utterance then pā- takes the form of the Verbal Noun and adjectives like saral/āsān (easy), kat hin/muškil (difficult) or samarth/asamarth (capable /

uncapable) function as predicate. It is important to note that among the adjectives there are primarily those that mark the degree of difficulty of an action and not its possibility, whereas sak- is usually followed by adjectives like sãbhav/mumkin (possible). Note that like sak- the use of pā- is not obligatory but optional : 16) yah samajh pāne mẽ mai purn atayā asamarth thā. (Kishor:280) I was absolutely unable to understand it. 17) mere liye hil saknā kabhī sãbhav nahī hogā. (Kishor:280) I will never be able to move. The verb pā-, as other ability-rendering means, appears mainly with negative reference. Negation can appear with both nahī and na. Still na, as evidenced in our data, is preferable with the past copula (thā).

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Since the meaning of ‘ability’ in the verb pā- is derived, it is open to the influence of the verb sak-, the more so as the senses of both verbs are very close. Actually, some cases of its epistemic usage are marked, although it is difficult to claim that this phenomenon exists widely. It is important to note that in these cases the agent does not control the action and we have again some sort of passive construction: 18) kālej bhī jānā ho pāegā yā nahī. (Tivari:16) Will it be possible to go to the college or not. Among the expressive means of the Circumstantial ability there is another verb le- (to get, to take), which is not only synonymous to pā- , but closely resembles it

in usage91. Like pā- it is independent and obtains the meaning of ‘ability’ only when used as auxiliary. But unlike pā-, le- has more semantic nuances (Nespital 1980, Nespital 1997). However, in our opinion, most of the senses of the verb le-, used as an auxiliary, have much in common, because they convey the idea of ‘accomplishment, success in achieving aims, overcoming obstacles’. For instance: 19) …parkar hĩdī aur panjābī donõ guzāre lāyaq bol letā thā. (Rakesh:37) Parker could speak both Hindi and Punjabi fairly well. This is what Nespital writes (1997:944) about the meaning of the combination (‘verbal expression’) bol lenā : “to speak a foreign language quite well”. To speak a foreign language always means to solve the problem of expressing thoughts adequately. ‘To speak quite well’ means also ‘each time, when a translation is needed, to solve the problem quite well’. As McGregor (1986:100) notes, adding le- to the stem of the main verb carries “an implication that it is carried out with difficulty, cleverly contrived etc.” Many other scholars (Mizokami 1980:38, Masica 1991:377, Nespital:1997) pointed out that the verb le- may carry the meaning of ‘ability’. Its circumstantial nature is best of all seen in the background of the verbs sak- and pā- : 91

Bholanath Tivari (1993:43) giving examples of the pigin Hindi in the indian state of Meghalay

translates the usage of the word sakegā as ‘mai kar lūgā,mai kar saktā hū’, considering the both phrases as equal. By this he confirms our assumption that the verb lenā as an auxiliary is aimed to express ability, but he does not underline the difference between the verbs sak- and pā- , simply using the former in positive sences and the latter in negative.

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20) mai kuch bhī kar saktā hū … muskarākar kahā thā, kuch bhī kar lūgā. (Amrita 1:11)

“I can do anything”, (I) said smiling, “I will cope with anything successfully.” 21) yah samajh letī hai. mai nahī samajh pātā. So kyõ ? (Raghav 1:354) She manages to understand, but I fail to. So why ? le- can be combined not only with transitive, but also with intransitive verbs,

preserving the meaning of ‘ability’: 22) akelī rahegī host al mẽ ? – āxir merī baccī hai, ræh legī ! (Kamleshvar:75) She will remain alone in the hostel? -She is my daughter, you know. She will manage. Being synonymous and very similar in the ways of rendering ‘ability’, the verbs pā- and le- still have a principal difference in their usage. The aim of pā- is to

show failure, inability to fulfill an action or at least to underline obstacles, and it appears mainly with negative reference, while le- has only positive reference refracting a successful accomplishment of an act (see 21, the phrase * vah nahī samajh letī is semantically and grammatically not correct).

23) aurat dūsrõ kī bātẽ bar ī āsānī se sun letī hai. (Film ‘Anjam’) A woman very easily manages to hear what others say. 24) vah likhne lāyaq hogā to likh legā. (Mithileshvar:98) (If) he is gifted for writing then he will succeed in writing. Like in examples with sak- and pā-, the verb le- can be accompanied by words expressing the meaning of ability. In such sentences it also constitutes a stylistic device (Compare with 3.1.1.A-6,7,8 and 3.1.3.A-16,17): 25) vyavasāy yā paise ke liye sab kuch sæh lenā uske bas kā nahī thā. (Yashpal 1:17)

He was not able to bear everything for the sake of money or business.

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B) The action is focal. Ability or inability to fulfill an act in accordance with outer circumstances can be expressed also by the verb ban- (to become, to be transformed). Since it is intransitive, it shifts the accent from the actor (who turns into the Instrumental Agent) to the action, and adds to the main verb (which is always in the form of the Present Participle, masculine, plural) the meaning ‘to manage, to succeed in an action after some effort’: 26) šyāmlāl se ut hte nahī ban rahā thā. (Kamleshvar 2:65) Shyamlal could not get up. (He was trying to get up, but all his efforts were futile) 27) jo kuch karte ban rahā hai, kar rahā hū. (Kamleshvar 2:77) I am doing my utmost. Sometimes the main verb may be omitted, but it is understood from the context and seems to stay in the sentence as background: 28) mujhse jo banā, unkī xidmat kī. (Chatursen:138) I did my utmost to serve him. (Compare with 26. The background verb is kar-) 29) usse turãt uttar na ban par ā. (Ashk 1:57) He could not answer immediately. (The background verb is de-) Guru (1957:170-171; 1962:96) subsumes the combination of the Imperfect Participle with the verb ban- under “compound verbs expressing ability”(yogyatābodhak); and Mizokami (1980:40) argues that the construction ‘te + bannā’

indicates ‘possibility’: 30) mujhse yah kām karte nahī bantā . It is impossible for me to do this work. But according to the instance he gives, we would assume that he did not mean ‘possibility’ in the epistemic sense. Anyway, our data do not allow us to interpret the combination with ban- as related to possible worlds.

3.2. Desire. As a feature of Inherent Modality we prefer ‘desire’ to ‘volition’, because ‘volition’ is a more general notion including both agent-oriented and speaker-oriented modalities;

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epistemic evaluation of real/unreal – wishing vs. hoping (Palmer 1986:16); deontic necessity and commands. Volition is also understood as a degree of involvement of the agent in the fulfillment of SoA (Kachru 1981, Klaiman 1986). In our analysis of expressing desire in Hindi we proceed from the definition given in Bybee (1994:178): “Desire reports the existence of internal volitional conditions in the agent with respect to the predicate action…” Therefore, desire is the more particular and narrower notion, closely connected to the agent and reflecting his intrinsic motives to act. A desire expressed with reference to the second or the third person acquires other functions and turns into a command. We believe it is possible to divide Inherent Desire into two subclasses: 1. Wish and 2. Intent.92 Wish reveals understanding by the agent of the necessity for SoA to take place. Intent means decision (to plan, to decide, to think of) to fulfill the SoA. Both subclasses correspond to different stages of manifesting desire and have respectively different expressive force. Intent is presumably stronger than wish. Consider each subclass separately.

3.2.1. Wish. The most common means for expressing wish is the verb cāh- . Classification of this verb is rather problematic, mainly because it bears some interconnected meanings and in different situations may convey ‘wish’, ‘will’, ‘possibility’. Nevertheless, there are some reasons to consider ‘wish’ basic. Nespital (1980:92) treats it as modal.93 In our opinion the verb cāh- , like pā-, is semi-modal, because in the case of Inherent Modality it performs predicative functions94, but in some situations it may take on 92

Givón (1993.:131) presents a very detailed and comprehensive analyses of the notions reflecting

volition in language. But not all of them are modal (for instance, attempt) and they cannot be applied to our analyses. 93

In French, for instance, the verb vouloir (to want) is also considered to be modal (Bassano &

Mendes-Mailochon 1994:652). Катенина, too, (1963:218-219) is of the opinion that in Marathi the verb icchine (to want) is modal. 94

Мечковская (1994:212-213) writes in this connection that “слова с чисто модальной семантикой

в принципе не могут быть самостоятельным сказуемым в независимом (полном) высказывании и выступают только как часть составного сказуемого. (Не случайно в ряде грамматических традиций модальные глаголы называют недостаточными или вспомогательными.)”- (Words with purely modal semantics cannot be autonomous predicates in an independent (full) utterance and appear

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itself modal functions and also serves a basis for creating additional modal forms (cāhe, cāhiye). It is commonly accepted that the verb cāh- combines with the Infinitive. But taking into account that the infinitive in Hindi is “strictly speaking, a Gerund or Verbal Noun” (Kellogg1938:221),95 and also the fact that “the Infinitive or Gerund not only of transitive, but also of intransitive verbs, is frequently used as Gerundive” (Platts 1874:327), it becomes clear why the verb preceding cāh- in the ergative construction changes its ending in accordance with the number and gender of the direct object: 1) (usne)uske hāth se pãkhiyā (fem.sg.;dir.obj.) chīn lenī (fem.sg) cāhī (fem.sg.). (Prem-Chand 1:33) (He) wanted to snatch the fan out of her hands. Hence, the verb cāh- combines with the Gerundive, which reflects “some universally valid notion of obligation” (Bubenik 1985:41). According to Platts (1874:328) the Gerundive denotes that “a certain action is to be done”.96 It is obvious that the use of the Gerundive means definite evaluation of an act by the speaker and, therefore, should be subsumed under essentially modal categories.97 But we are not considering the Gerundive itself, but rather its combination with cāh-. We argue that cāh- carries the meaning of understanding and agreement with the necessity of an

action represented by the Gerundive. For example, in the dictionary “gyān šabdkoš” among the meanings of the verb cāh- – icchā kar- (to want) and prem kar- (to love) – the meaning samajh- (to understand) is also presented (Shrivastav

1972:244). Thus, it would appear to us that the phrase mai pīnā cāhtā hū (I want to drink) must be interpreted as “I understand and confirm that drinking is necessary for me”.98

only as part of combined predicate. It is not by chance that in some grammatical traditions modal verbs are called ‘insufficient’ or ‘auxiliary’ verbs.) 95 96

See also Platts (1874:324) “bolnā – Должно быть сказано, долженствует быть сказанным. (must be said, is proper to be

said)” (Баранников & Баранников 1953:183). 97

“The Gerundive is found typically in contexts of deontic modality” (Bubenik 1985:40).

98

In Pathak (1976:1057) the meaning of ‘want’ is presented as ‘ āvašyaktā kā anubhav karnā

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It is evident that ‘wish’ represented by the construction ‘Gerundive + cāh-’ bears some shade of evaluation. Still it is not evaluation of SoA, but rather a statement about somebody’s knowledge. An essential condition for such an interpretation is that the subject must be the agent. When the subject and the agent are separated, cāh-, instead of wish, turns into an instrument of will: 2) mai cāhtā thā thapthapākar use šāt kar dū. (Kishor:38) I wanted to calm her by tapping. (wish) 3) (vah) cāhtā thā lon pāršiyan kārpet

mẽ badal jāe. (Bhandari:55)

He wanted the lawn to be shaped as a Persian carpet. (will) The verb cāh- is the word where the meaning of ‘wish’ is generalized (like sakfor ‘ability’). It is neutral with regard to degree of understanding or emotionality. For expressing all these nuances, Hindi has different lexical means such as: a) nouns – icchā, irādā, abhilās ā, manorath, akākšā (wish); jī, man (heart, mood, wish). b) adjectives – icchuk, utsuk (wishing, wishful); pyāsā, betāb, becain, vyagra (wishing impationately).

c) verbal phrases with the above-mentioned nouns – icchā kar- (rakh-), irādā kar- (rakh-), jī kar- (cāh-), man kar- (cāh-) (to wish).

d) verbs like taras-, tar ap-, chat pat ā- (to desire anxiously). All these lexical counterparts of cāh- give emphasis to specific characteristics of ‘wish’. For instance, the use of nouns is a stylistic device which allows one, first, to shift the emphasis from the agent to the wish (the agent is dative and out of focus, and the noun expressing a wish becomes the subject) and, second, to express the intensity of the wish (by adding attributes): 4) apne mitr anant ko bulā lāne kī icchā…use nahī huī. (Ashk1:28) He did not feel a need to bring here his friend Anant. 5) cetan ke man mẽ prabal icchā huī ki…pūche. (Ashk1:28) Chetan felt an intense desire to ask.

(to feel necessity). To our mind ‘to feel’ in this context reports unconsciousness while cāh- renders clear understanding.

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Even when used with the verbs kar- or rakh- with nominative agent the wishexpressing nouns still remain in focus and preserve their tendency to corrections and expansion: 6) maine tumhārī ātmā kī svadhīntā ko chīnne kī kabhī icchā nahī kī. (Prem Chand1:48)

I never dreamed to bereave you of the independence of your soul. Adjectives, which are synonymous with the idea presented in cāh-, have the ability to express different levels of emotional qualification of wish: 7) sulocnā gulnār se milne kī icchuk na thī. (Prem Chand1:49) Sulochna had no desire to meet Gulnar. 8) sabhī bhārat mẽ apnī jar ẽ jamāne ko betāb. (Mitra:77) Everybody is anxious to strike roots in India. Various combinations with the nouns man and jī (heart, soul) - jī kar-, jī ho-, jī cāh-, jī mẽ ā-, man ho-, man kar-, man mẽ ā- – underline

lack of consciousness in understanding the necessity of an action. The necessity is performed as understood not by the mind, but mainly by the feelings, by the heart, by intuition. In this case the words man and jī become the subject and the agent at the same time: 9) ādmī kā jī vahā se hatne ko nahī cāhtā. (Dinkar:31) Man’s heart does not want to leave the place. 10) man baith jāne ko ho rahā thā. (Kishor:130) (I) was feeling like sitting. The Gerundive here is in Oblique case with ko, but when these verbal phrases take a complement clause, the verb of the complement is, as happens in all cases of intentional verbs, in the Subjunctive (which functions as the Optative): 11) ek man huā ki jaldī se vahā se ut

h

jāū. (Rakesh:22)

I felt I had better go. Depending on a context, the verbal part of the combination with man can be omitted: 12) mai cāy nahī piūgā. – kyõ? –

merā man. (Chatursen:172)

I will not have tea. – Why? – Don’t want (this is my desire).

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It follows from the given examples that ‘wish’ in Hindi is expressed exclusively by lexical means, as is the case in many other languages.99

3.2.2. Intention. The next point – intention – is the most problematic for classification, for it occupies an area where notions of internal desire and personal estimation of the truth of propositions are very close and even overlap. The reason is that intent involves futurity, and futurity is not always a statement about a future act, but is very often an evaluation of possibility. From this point of view it could be subsumed under prediction. That is why it is so important to draw a distinction between intent and prediction and delineate the boundary after which the desire to perform an act turns into an evaluation of its possibility and consequently moves to the epistemic domain. Although the Future Tense of a verb, expressing a deliberate action, contains some meaning of intention, still its purpose is primarily to manifest the future action and not the intention. And although intention presupposes some connection with the future, still it does not describe a future act and does not estimate its possibility but depicts a specific mental state and disposition of mind. That is why future and intention should be treated as very close, but independent notions. Intention means defining objectives and ways to attain them - in other words, planning. It is evident, that in describing lifeless things we do not speak about their ‘intentions’. Even living creatures, except human beings, do not have the capacity for planning, but behave according to instincts. Thus by saying “the dog wants to drink” or “the tiger is intending to attack a dear”, the speaker humanizes the behavior of an animal, making it reasonable and intelligible. Such description serves as a stylistic device; we find many examples in works on Nature.100 In reality such a description is nothing but an assumption about possible action by an animal. Why, then, should we distinguish a reasonable act from an instinctive one? The trouble is that in Hindi the same grammatical forms can describe both internal desire of the agent and assumption on the part of the speaker. Therefore, the former would be translated as ‘to intend’ and 99

“Wishes are not often expressed grammatically in a main clause.” (Palmer 1986:15)

100

Gerald Durrell in his book “The Whispering Land” describes a fur seal pup: “Oswald (the name he

gave to the seal – Sh.G.) decided that it was his duty to save the colony from this obviously dangerous enemy,…” .

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the latter as ‘to be about to’ or ‘to be likely to’. Thus, the former stays in the sphere of Inherent Modality whereas the latter turns out to be roughly epistemic.

3.2.2.1. The main resources. Among the means expressing intention the combination of the suffix vālā with the Oblique Gerundive is one of the most generally used. This suffix has the ability to join any verb without exception. This construction has different labels. For instance, Platts (1874:330) calls it ‘The Noun of Agency’ and in Баранников & Баранников 1956:98) it is titled ‘Причастие намерения’ (The Participle of Intention). Here is what they say about its meaning: “proximate future” (Platts1874:330); “intention” (Баранников & Баранников 1956:72); “an impending action” (Saihgal 1964:46). Thus, ‘intention’ and ‘future’101 have been pointed out as the main semantic components of the construction. But the deliberative aspect, which separates them, was not underlined in any definition. So, what criteria do we need to define the meaning of the construction? The semantic opposition of transitive / intransitive verbs (Kachru: 1981) is tempting: 1) tīn din bād uskā jan kuruõ par ākraman karne vālā hai. (Sankrityayan:29) Her tribe is planning to attack the tribe of Kuru in three days time.(Transitive) 2) …par rammī, ab lagtā hai kuch honevālā nahī. (Kamleshvar2:58) But Rummi, it seems now that nothing is going to happen. (Intransitive) Still, this distinction does not display a full picture: 3) agle

sāl

ve

par hāī

ke

liye

videš

jānevālī

thī.

(Kamleshvar1:12) She was planning to go to study abroad next year. (Intransitive) 4) ek rāt guzar cukī thī aur dūsrī rāt ānevālī thī. (Kishor:126) One night passed and the next one was to come. (Intransitive) In both examples (3,4) we have intransitive verbs, but (3) conveys the idea of planning whereas (4) predicts an action. But at the same time one notices that the agent of sentence (3) is capable of making decisions while the agent of (4) is not. 101

“ Intentional ‘quasi future’ ”(Gonda 1956:18)

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Therefore what determines the difference is not the transitive / intransitive distinction but belonging or not belonging to human beings. Hence, sentences (1,3) render agentoriented intention and (2,4) – speaker-oriented prediction. The verbal combination with vālā performs a neutral way of expressing intention because it does not carry the slightest shade of emotionality. It is ‘pure’ intention. An intention with lack of firm decision (to think of doing something) is rendered by the genitive feminine of the Gerundive followed by the verb soc- (to think). The semantics of the verb soc- excludes any other interpretation than intention. The verb soc- is always in the Present Progressive Tense, which makes it clear that the process

of shaping a decision has not finished yet: 5) amar alag ræhne kī soc rahā hai. (Priyamvada:97) Amar is thinking of living separately. One of the most generally used means for rendering intention is the combination of the postposition ko with the Gerund. “The Dative of the Gerund in connection with the verbs hai and thā expresses the intention to perform an act.” (Platts 1874:326) To this definition we would add “a firm intention, in the near fulfillment of which an actor has no doubt”. The distinctions regarding verbal combinations with vālā (conscious / unconscious) apply equally to the combinations with ko and express correspondingly intent (6,7) vs. possibility (8,9): 6) sabhī to khāne ko hai, ab kyā khilāūgī ? (Priyamvada:97) Everybody will come to eat , what will I give them? 7) dinman i uska upyukt uttar dene ko hī thī ki rāmratna cal kar apnī bait hak mẽ ā gaye.

(Kumar:48)

Dinmani wanted (she was just about) to give him an adequate answer but at that moment Ramratna came to his hall. 8) nīce us samay pahũncā jāe jab āge kī gār ī lagbhag calne ko ho. (Rakesh:167)

(My plan was) To come down at the time when the locomotive would be just about to start. 9) tāzī pad-pãkti xatam hone ko nahī ā rahī hai. (Sankrityayan:4) The fresh line of footprints seems not to end.

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Intention can be rendered also by the Genitive of the Gerundive. But unlike all the other intentional forms it appears exclusively with negative reference. Platts connects it only with “a strong negative future: vah nahī karne kā – he will not do it (he is not likely to do it)”(1874:326). To some extent he is right, and many examples seem to confirm his rightness: 10) rāt āt

h

baje ke pæhle vah nahī āne kī. (Mitra:59)

She will not come before eight in the evening. (She is not likely to come) 11) ise koī mehrī-camārī bhī nahī milne kī ghar basāne ko. (Rakesh:151) He will not find a wife even among the lower casts. But this verbal form is not so unambiguous and leaves room also for other interpretations. Some papers and numerous examples from the literature prove that its intentional nature cannot be ignored. Bahri (1945:209) writes that this construction “showes firm resolve and also points out to the characteristic assertiveness of the speaker”. And the sentence vah dene kā nahī he translates as “he is not willing to give”(Ibid.:211). Before giving more examples we would like to remind that they can be interpreted as expressing intention or possibility in accordance with the kind of the agent – human / non-human: 12) vah parde kī rānī bankar to bait hne kī nahī. (Chatursen:104) She is not intending to stay at home (all the time). (The agent is human) 13) yah kyā kæhtī ho bahin, yah to kabhī hone kā nahī ! (Chatursen:146) What are you saying, sister. It is impossible ! (The agent is non-human) 14) yah kitāb pāc sau pratiyõ se zyādā nahī bikne kī. (Mitra:119) It is doubtful that more than 500 copies of the book would be sold. (Non-human) Another intentional construction (the Oblique Gerund + the verb jā- in the Progressive Tenses) is somewhat artificial and is explained as the influence of the English “is going to” (Varmā 1995:31)102. This construction is identical to the vālā

102

He writes: “

 ” (Ibid.:184)

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one, but depicts a strong intention. And, again, we should take into consideration the conscious / unconscious distinction: 15) vah

svayam

ek

bahut

zordār

bhās an

dene



rahe

hai.

(Ashk1:46) He himself is going to make an impressive speech. 16) seth bākemal…gallā kholne hī jā rahe the ki hokar ne phir taqāzā kiyā. (Nagar1:34)

When the merchant Bankemal was going to open his moneybag, the newspaperseller demanded (the money) again. 17) unhẽ patā calā ki isī ilāqe mẽ cunāv hone jā rahe hai. (Kamleshvar:40) It became known to them that exactly in this region elections are to be held. There is a combination of the verb cāh- with the masculine singular form of the Past Participle, which also may be used for expressing intention although with some restrictions. Kellogg called such combinations desideratives and claimed that they “denote, primarily, desire to do the action expressed by the participial member; secondarily, the immediate futurition of that action. It can only be known from the context”(1938:266). In many other grammars (Platts, Saihgal, Баранников & Баранников) the stress is on employing the combination to express an act or state that is imminent (‘to be about to’, ‘to be ready for’). But one really cannot avoid the fact that we are dealing with the verb cāh- , which is a verb of wishing and its choice is undoubtedly not accidental. Therefore, the interpretation of the phrase vah jāyā cāhtā hai as ‘he is about to go’(Platts 1874:176) is, indeed, insufficient. If, on the

other hand, we admit the point expressed by Kellogg that this construction denotes ‘desire to do the action,’ then we will not see any difference between vah jānā cāhtā hai and vah jāyā cāhtā hai. Besides, Kellogg did not specify the

conditions under which this construction could be interpreted as conveying desire or futurition. An attempt was made in Pray(1970:149) to explain the phenomenon: 18) rām āyā cāhtā hai - Ram wants to come.

(Instead of saying clearly ‘what I want to tell you…’ or ‘what I will tell you now…’ we became accustomed to say and to write sentences like ‘what I am going to tell you is…’ )

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gār ī āyā cāhtī hai - the train is about to come.

In these examples Pray in fact argues that in a construction with a reasonpossessing agent the verb cāh- is employed for expressing ‘wish’, while such a construction with a non-reasoning agent has a meaning of prediction. Such an approach coincides to an extent with our understanding of intentional constructions. But it still does not explain the difference of vah jānā cāhtā hai and vah jāyā cāhtā hai. Moreover, the phrase ‘mai girā cāhtā hū ’ does not convey,

naturally, the wish to fall down. In our view the combination ‘Past Participle in ā with cāh-‘ has three facets. With non-human agents it conveys exclusively prediction about an imminent act or state: 19) dīvārõ par plast ar, lagtā thā ki girā hī cāhtā hai. (Ashk 1:90) It seemed that plaster of the walls was about to fall off. 20) (lakrī)bas phat ā hī cāhtī hai . (Prem Chand 1:24) It (the log) is just about to crack. 21) yudh mẽ anī kā samay āyā hī cāhtā hai. (Kumar:46) The war is about to top out. A human agent allows interpreting the combination as intention only when a participial verb depicts a deliberate action: 22) vah sirf merī tārīf kar ke mujhe cakmā diyā cāhtā hai. (Prem Chand 1:30) He is going to impose upon me by merely paying me a compliment. With a non-volitional verb it means prediction (as with a non-human agent): 23) ab girā hī cāhtā hū. (Film) I am about to fall down. Thus, the verb cāh- , as we see it, cannot be translated as ‘want’ in this construction because it is used figuratively.

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3.2.2.2. Additional resources. And here we came to the point where the meaning of intention is not quite the main one but somewhat marginal. Such marginal cases of intention are observed mainly in the constructions aiming to convey futurity. We mean first of all the use of different tenses. The trend to replace the Future Tense by the Present existed even in OIA and in MIA (Sen 1953:97). This trend is typical not only of Hindi but is widespread among other languages of the world (Comrie 1985:44-45, Stephany 1986:377-378). The Periphrastic Future is not, however, an equivalent substitution to the Future Tense. Hindi has a specific form with mainly future time reference, which is explained as a derivation from the Subjunctive by adding gā – “a remainder of the old Past Participle gatah ‘gone’” (Pořízka 1963:226). Kellogg notes that this form “appears to have

been one of the latest developments of the language” (1938:231). In older grammars as well as in recent ones it was pointed out that the purpose of the Future Tense is to render certainty about a future act or state.103 Thus, the Future Tense can describe either a future act 104 or a firm decision to fulfill it 105: 1) svatãtra kumār kī jān liye baghair mujhe cain nahī āegā. (Nagar 2:73) I will not calm down without taking the life of Svatantra Kumar. 2) unhõne nišcay kar liyā ki ab ghar kī kisī bāt mẽ daxal na dẽge. (Priyamvada :99)

He decided that he will not interfere in any affair of the family. In the Future Tense the action itself is highlighted. All the other meanings and their nuances are presented lexically (nišcay kiyā) or inferred. Besides, the Future 103

“Absolute Future” (Kellogg 1938:230), “Definite Future” (Masica 1986:288).

104

“A clear prediction…a definite statement about a state of affairs to hold at a certain time

subsequent to the present moment” (Comrie 1985:44). 105

“Voluntatives Futur” (Nespital 1980:125)

“The Future is formed by adding to the Aorist the participle in gā (a contraction of gaā, whence gayā, ‘gone’)… The Future is therefore properly a Desiderative, or Intentional: e.g. mai calūgā ‘I shall go or move’, is literally ‘I am gone (that) I move’ i.e. ‘I wish to move’ or ‘I am going to move’ ” (Platts 1874:142) .

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Tense presents an SoA as a remote one or irrespective of the speech moment; and in this sense it is clearly distinct from the other tenses used with future reference because their main purpose is to convey immediate future, to show the agent on the starting point, prepared to fulfill an SoA. In addition, they have different degrees of remoteness / imminence. Let us consider them separately. The Present Progressive Tense.

Among the others it has the most clear-cut

inclination to render a firm intention, a definite decision – “as already set in train” (McGregor1986:19). To be interpreted not as an action in progress but as an intended future action, an utterance should include an assumed time of fulfillment, or at least this should be understood from the context: 3) par tumne to kahā thā ki vah nišcit rūp se ā rahī hai. (Rakesh:72) But you said that she had definitely decided to come. It is very close in its meaning to the English Present Progressive Tense, which also describes an intended action: 4) mai agle saptāh ā rahā hū. (Bahri 1985:209) I am coming in the next week. The Present Habitual Tense. It is also “used for the Future to indicate that an action will take place forthwith or shortly after the time of speaking” (Platts 1874:351). It should be mentioned that the usage of the Present Habitual with future reference is very widespread and so, to distinguish between its basic usage and the subusage, the hearer needs some specific indications. For example the sentence

gār ī mẽ

bit hākar le ātā hū (Bhandari:51) could be translated either “I bring (him) in a

car (every day)” or “I will bring (him) in a car (right now)”. With adverbials of time, the temporal reference becomes clear: 5) har roz gār ī mẽ bit hākar le ātā hū. (every day) abhī gār ī mẽ bit hākar le ātā hū. (right now)

If the context does not help, then the adverbs abhī (right now), ab (now), āj (today) or any other indication of imminence must be added: 6) mai kāt tā hū mā ! tū thak gaī hai . (Sankrityayan:7) Mother, I will cut ! You are tired.

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7) ab mai tumhẽ vah durlabh prasãg sunātā hū. (Parasai:104) I will tell you now that amazing story. 8) mai das minat

mẽ ātī hū. (Kamleshvar:41)

I will come in ten minutes. 9) sāhab se milkar mai abhī ātā hū. (Mitra:60) I will come right now after I meet the master. One can easily note that in all these examples the stress is not on a prediction of a future act, nor on its description, but mainly on the intention of the agent, on his readiness to act. The emphatic force of the Present Habitual in this case is much stronger than in the Present Progressive, because it depicts a more imminent action. The Present Habitual may mark the remote Future when there are no clear indications that the action is to happen immediately, and the action is itself doubtful. Intention here gives the way to possibility: 10)

patā

nahī,

kamād ar

ijāzat

dete

bhī

hai



nahī.

(Kamleshvar2:24) No one knows if the commander gives permission or not. There is another case where the Present Habitual appears with intentional reference. It bears the meaning of futurity in the combination with the Perfective Verbal Adverb [mostly with the verbs de- (to give) and le- (to take)]106. This combination means that “действие должно совершиться в данный момент‚ без задержки и промедления”(the action must occur this very moment without delay) (Клюев 1962:240). Pray (1970:147) adds – “imminent or intended completion of the action”. We would claim that in this combination the intentional slant is of a greater importance than any other. It conveys a firm intention as a promise or a threat: 11) mai rupayā diye detā hū. (Prem Chand 1:34) I will give the money right away. 12) mai svayam lāye detī hū. (Kishor:275) I will bring (the shawl) myself. 13) vah mujhe māre d āltā hai. (Guru 1962:171) He will kill me.

106

Guru adds also d āl- and bait h- “the verbs of resolution, definiteness of the action”(1962:171)

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14) aisī bāt hai to mai tujhe talāq diye detā hū. (Yashpal 2:90) If so, I will give you a divorce. The Past Indefinite Tense. With future reference, it occurs mainly in conditional sentences. However, non-conditional indicative occurrences, although not so numerous as the previous tenses, are also registered. It presents a firm intention and confidence of the speaker to perform an action and takes place mainly in colloquial emotional speech: 15) mai editing xatam kar ke , bas , abhī āyā. (Mitra:51) I will come right now after finishing editing. 16) pasãd ko to koī aisī burī vah nahī par maine tumhẽ apnī rāe de dī. (Ashk1:24)

She is not so bad outwardly, but here is my opinion. It can also appear in the negative sense: 17) mai kitāb kyõ dene lagā? (Mitra:91) Why should I present books ? (I do not have any intention to present books) The semantic basis for such sentences is an affective attitude of the speaker, an attempt to represent an action as already launched. Gonda (1956) calls it “imaginative preterit”.107

3.3. Conclusions. The semantic structure of the Inherent Modality we see as follows:

Inherent Modality Ability Inner

Acquired

Desire Circumstantial

Wish

Intention

Fig.1 107

“As is often the case when in emotional speech the speaker enters the world of imagination his

thought guided by his fantasy anticipates the events, the boundary-line between actual reality and wished or proposed existence is wiped out, …he describes the immediate future… by means of past verb forms.” (Gonda 1956:184)

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‘Ability’ is rendered mainly by auxiliary verbs. Among them only sak- has lost its independent usage. All the others obtained in addition to their main lexical meanings the meaning of ability as a derivative. The main distinction in all the ability-rendering types is of focus (Fig.2). The agent is underlined when it is nominative and coupled with volitional auxiliaries. Passive forms with the instrumental agent attract the attention of the hearer to the action. It must be noted that the instrumental se only transfers the focus, but does not deprive the agent of its active role (unlike the dative ko). The forms of ‘acquired ability’ differ from the others in that they evaluate not the manifestation of ability, but its existence. Consequently, another machinery is put in action. The verbs jān- and ā- are combined with the Verbal Noun and, in order to shift the focus, the dative agent is used (instead of instrumental):

F o c u s

Agent

Action

Inner

Acquired

Circumstantial

1. sak- (stem + sak-) 2. ræh- (Absolutive or Perfective Verbal adverb + ræh-) Nominative Agent. Impersonal Passive of any verb.

jān(Verbal Noun +jān-)

Instrumental Agent.

Dative Agent.

1. pā - (stem + pā -) Negative reference. 2. le- (stem + le-) Positive reference. Nominative Agent. ban- (Imperfective Verbal Adverb, masc. pl. + ban-). Instrumental Agent.

Nominative Agent. ā(Verbal Noun + ā-)

Fig.2

Any deflection from these standards causes broadening of the semantic sphere of these forms, the changes covering both epistemic and deontic fields. For instance, non-volitional forms (intransitives with passive meanings, the Passive Voice), used with the Nominative Agent of sak- , create epistemic possibility. And absence of the agent in an impersonal passive construction leads to generalization, converting the proposition into a rule, exhortation, which is an element of deontic obligation. Almost all the grammatical forms of ability have their lexical counterparts: and the more a construction is grammaticalized, the wider range of possible substitutes it has (like in the case of sak-). In this connection it would be reasonable to assume that the more lexical items there are for expressing the same meaning, the greater is the opportunity of its grammaticalization.

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When we talk about ‘wish’ and ‘intention’ we should remember that they are notions inseparably connected to human beings. They share a common semantic ground – consciousness and volition of the agent. If in the case of cāh- and its counterparts an interpretation other than “wish” is excluded (apart from the case depicted in the Fig.3), the semantics of intention-bearing construction is not so unambiguous and requires stress on the nature of the agent – human or non-human. It might be conjectured that the intention-bearing forms belonging to the human were, over time, attributed to different kinds of activities. Being used figuratively, they acquired the meaning of possibility (Fig.4):

wish

will

mai karnā cāhtā hū

The subject = the agent

-----------------------

mai cāhtā hū ki vah kare

-----------------------

The subject = the agent

Fig.3

Emphatic force of intention

Construction

neutral weak strong strong strong

vah vah vah vah vah

karne vālā hai karne kī soc rahā hai karne ko hai karne jā rahā hai āyā cāhtā hai

vah girā cāhtā hai vah phatā cāhtā hai

strong

Tenses: Present Progressive Present Habitual Past Indefinite

Human agent

Non-human agent

intent intent intent intent intent (volitional verb) possibility (nonvolitional verb) ------------------intent (clear indications of imminence) possibility (without indications of imminence)

possibility ------------possibility possibility ------------------------possibility possibility

Fig.4

The Periphrastic Future also has an inclination to render a strong intention, though not so acutely as in the previous constructions. For this purpose the grammatical tenses are used seemingly improperly – the Present and the Past are to represent the Future. But they represent only immediate Future, and their intentional nature could be understood also from the fact that they occur mainly with the First Person Subject. Indeed, prediction and desire for an imminent future act are possible, but it is almost impossible to know the immediate intention of somebody else. In addition, the use of

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these tenses allows one to express different degrees of intention: the farther from the future is the basic meaning of a tense is, the nearer that future is and the higher degree of intention it depicts: Degrees of intention

4

-------------- Past Indefinite

3

----------------------------- Perfective Verbal Adverb + Present Habitual

2

----------------------------------------------- Present Habitual

1

------------------------------------------------------------------ Present Progressive 1

2

3

4 Remoteness of the future

Fig.5

The last thing to be noted is that all the forms of Inherent Modality could be divided into neutral and emphatic:

The neutral forms: sak-



ability

cāh-



wish

vālā



intention

All the rest bear some degree of emphasis and reflect different nuances in expressing the general notions of ability, wish and intention.

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Chapter 4. Deontic Modality.

Deontic modality deals with possible worlds consistent with social regulations and requirements. Deontically possible facts are understood as permissible, and deontically necessary facts are seen as obligatory; or, as Enç (1992:356) puts it, permission involves existential quantification over possible worlds and obligation involves universal quantification. Two English modal verbs – may and must – serve as the semantic models of the deontic meanings of permission and obligation consequently 108. In some works it was argued that the obligation of Deontic Modality does not always meet the requirements of the standard formula of possible worlds. Hatav (1997:139) claims that in some cases Deontic Modality expresses obligations, which may not be obeyed. Lyons calls this phenomenon “restricted” and “unrestricted (or absolute) obligation” (1977:824). Therefore, the notions of “better worlds” or “ideal worlds” were added, “reducing deontic modal statements to conditionals, whose ifclauses will define the ‘ideal options’.” (Hatav 1997:140). There is a straightforward connection between Deontic and Inherent modalities – ‘ability’ and ‘desire’ constitute the semantic ground for deontic utterances. Lyons underlies the fact that Deontic Modality “involves a reference to a future world-state and… it is connected in some way with intention, desire and will” (1977:825). Rephrasing the following statement of Lyons that “deontic necessity typically proceeds, or derives, from some source or cause” (Ibid:824), we would claim that Deontic Modality designates a subjective evaluation of a predication with regard to pragmatic aims of the speaker. Different factors can serve as a source of necessity – purely individual wish, “the rules of games, the conventions of society, and the laws of the land” (Johnson-Laird 108

“There is intuitively obvious connection, on the one hand, between the notions of necessity and

obligation, which are relevant to the semantic analysis of sentences containing “must”, and on the other, between the notions of possibility and permission, which are relevant to the semantic analysis of sentences containing “may”.” (Lyons 1977:791)

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1978:20), “what my father provides in his last will, what is good etc.” (Hatav 1997:140), “a set of moral and social norms and patterns of behaviour” (Lyons 1977:828). The ways of presenting an obligation or imposing it differ according to a social order and cultural traditions of a place. They broadly interact with factors of politeness, deference and social standing. “Different kinds of deontic modality can then be distinguished by specifying the source or cause of the obligation” (Lyons 1977:825). Deontic Modality deals with actions or refraining from action. It is called into being by the need of the speaker to influence the addressee’s behavior, to impose on the addressee specific external conditions with regard to the predicate action. This aim determines the choice of speech acts – commands, demands, requests, entreaties, warnings, exhortations etc., which are called directives in linguistics. Among our aims is to examine which kinds of directives in Hindi have grammatical means of expression; whether these means are always unambiguous and, if not, then what factors influence their interpretation, and what is the role of the context in this connection. We will also seek to elicit which forms of directives have a weak or strong reading and how the degree of the involvement of the speaker determines which form is to be chosen. In Palmer’s classification of Deontic Modality an important role is given to volitives (and we would also add exhortatives), to such forms, which express the desire of the speaker to see a SoA fulfilled (hoping and wishing), but not in a form of a command and, therefore, often appearing in subordinate clauses. This means that the role of the deontic subordination must also be investigated. The Imperative is the most striking means of Deontic Modality, but in the system of directives its functioning is limited to some extent, and it is often substituted by other different verbal forms. In short, we will examine the role of the verb (first of all) and other parts of speech in conveying the will of the speaker, the role of the speaker himself who selects the means for conveying his will, and the influence of external factors which limit in some way the choice of the means.

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4.1. Need and Necessity . The analysis of the deontic notions of obligation and permission is based on the semantic notions of necessity and possibility with regard to some person’s social activity. This means that each deontic sentence encompasses the attitude of an individual or a group with reference to the action to be fulfilled (an ordering source). Yet, in everyday life we can note a lot of such utterances where only a necessity to act is denoted without mentioning its source and a performer. The necessity itself becomes an underlined focal entity, which may receive either generic or restricted reference according to context. For this purpose Hindi possesses certain nouns and adverbials – zarūrat / āvašyaktā (need, necessity), zarūrī/āvašyak (needed, necessary) – which follow the Gerundive. Such a combination is translated as “there is a need / necessity of…” or “it is needed / necessary to…”. The notions of ‘need’ and ‘necessity’ are synonymous even in English. But if we gloss them as ‘lack’ and ‘compulsion’, respectively, then after translating them into Hindi we will find that both meanings are successfully rendered by the same means - zarūrat/ āvašyaktā and zarūrī/āvašyak. This does not mean that the possibility of

distinguishing between the notions of ‘lack’ and ‘compulsion’ is absent in Hindi. ‘Lack’, for instance, can be translated as ‘kamī’ or ‘abhāv’. But the sentence ‘I need it’ cannot be presented as *‘mujhe iskī kamī hai’, but only as ‘mujhe iskī zarūrat hai’. It follows that ‘need’ is not simply a lack of something, but rather the

sort of lack which cannot be endured and m u s t b e filled, whatever are its reasons. Therefore, it might be conjectured that need and necessity in Hindi are not distinct and represent a semantic unit, which depicts a sort of necessity with a non-focal ordering source. 1) kamre kī sab battiyā jalāne kī koī xās zarūrat nahī thī . (Kishor:281) There was no particular need to switch on all the lights in the room. 2) yahā ke kes ko pæhle nibt ānā zarūrī hai. (Chatursen:100) First of all it is necessary to solve this case. What is intriguing in our data is that most examples with the nouns zarūrat and āvašyaktā were used for denying necessity, while the examples with the adverbials zarūrī and āvašyak asserted it. It would appear to us that the reason is in the nature

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of the words. zarūrī comprises a positive evaluation. Hence, it is more appropriate for assertion, whereas zarūrat bears neither positive nor negative meaning: 3) ābrū kā xayāl rakhnā to zarūrī hai. (Yashpal 2:8) It is necessary to care for honor. 4) tumhẽ ratnā ko lekar jāne kī zarūrat nahī hai. (Yashpal 2:75) There is no need to take Ratna with you. The combination with zarūrat/āvašyaktā occurs in positive sense only when it describes the origin of a necessity as an action: 5) ratanlāl set par

h

ko putra ke parāmarš aur sahāyatā kī zarūrat

gayī. (Yashpal 1:13)

The merchant Ratanlal felt the need of advice and help of his son. (a necessity arose) If the performer of an action is represented in a sentence then in the case of the nouns zarūrat/āvašyaktā it takes preferably the postposition ko, and with the adverbials zarūrī/ āvašyak – the postposition ke liye : 6) tumhẽ mujhe par hāne kī koī zarūrat nahī hai. (Reddi 2:59) You do not need to teach me. 7) mere liye is vaqt ārām karnā zarūrī hai. (Rakesh 1:82) It is necessary for me to have a rest now. The only ordering source with which this construction can be associated is the speaker himself, and it can be understood only from a specific speech situation. Then it has the same force as a command or demand: 8)

mere

māmale

mẽ

kisī

ko

dāxal

dene



zarūrat

nahī.

(Mithileshvar:22) Nobody should pry into my private affair! 9) lar āī-jhagr ā karne kī zarūrat nahī.

(Mithileshvar:23)

Stop fighting ! (Stop the quarrel) It is necessary to point out that the verb describing an action to happen is represented by the Gerundive, the form which indicates that some action is to be done (see above - 3.2.1). Even in the sentences where the expressions of necessity are used without a verb, the absence of the verb could be explained by ellipsis:

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10) parantu uske sarvekšan

ke liye sarkār kī anumati (lene) kī

āvašyaktā hai. (Reddi:42)

But for its survey an agreement of the government is necessary (to get). 11) mārkin kā ek kurtā pāyjāmā (pæhannā, xarīdnā) zarūrī ho gayā thā. (Yashpal 2:12)

(To wear/ buy) a shirt and a pantaloon of nankeen became necessary. The ellipsis is possible in a specific context when the interlocutors are well acquainted with the deictic background of the colloquy. This mode (ellipsis) is widespread both in colloquial speech and in the literature for it allows economizing on speech resources.

4.2. Obligation. Given the existence of the Gerundive (evident or understood) in such phrases and taking into account its meaning of “what is to be done necessarily” (Pincott 1933: 175), one may conclude that it is just the Gerundive that bears the main meaning of necessity and not the lexical equivalents that follow it. What is the purpose then of combining synonymous elements? There is, after all, nothing accidental in language. We see a plausible explanation of it in the historical development of Hindi as a successor of Sanskrit, where the Gerundive or Future Passive Participle occupied a similar place in expressing deontic necessity and possibility -“kāryaFPP – ‫"דבר שיש‬ ‫ שמן הראוי לעשותו‬,‫ שאפשר לעשותו‬,‫לעשותו‬

(what is to be done, what may be done, what is

worth doing) (Shulman 1997:190). All the efforts to retrace the ontogenesis of the Gerundive (which is often called Infinitive, Adjectival Infinitive, Verbal Noun) lead to the OIA Future Passive “Participle of Obligation” which underwent some phonetic transformations in the Prakrits (Platts 1874:130, Kellogg 1938:338, Chatterji 1960:95, Masica 1986:288). Modern Hindi preserved the notional relations with its predecessor but chose another way of formal expression. In contrast to Sanskrit, which is a distinctly synthetic language and whose meanings are expressed synthetically, modern Hindi is typologically an analytic language where the word order in a sentence and combinations of words acquire ever more important roles. Remember that in Sanskrit the Gerundive is created by adding to the root of the verb one of the three endings – ya, -tavya, -anīya; and it is also often the case that one and the same root generates

017

more than one gerundive form carrying various meanings (Shulman 1997 :190). The Gerundive of Hindi, like that of Sanskrit, agrees with its object in number and gender, but unlike Sanskrit it carries none of the nuances of necessity (must be done, should be done, worth doing and so on). It bears a mere idea of necessity, which is to be concretized by adding specific words. Most often it occurs in combination with the nouns zarūrat/āvašyaktā, the adverbials zarūrī/āvašyak, the auxiliaries hai,thā, the verbs ho-,par - and the āp-oriented imperative form of the verb cāh(cāhiye). These words provide the speaker with necessary tools for presenting

different sources of necessity and the degree of his own involvement. After necessity acquires a specific ordering source compelling the agent to perform the predicate action, it becomes obligation. Sentences with the Gerundive can be evaluated by a variety of adjectives and nouns such as acchā (good), behtar (better), ucit (proper), munāsib (proper), lāzmī (obligatory), adharma (injustice) and so on which qualify an action to be

done162. In this case we deal not with Directives, which bring into existence a certain obligation, but with “deontic statements to the effect that the obligation exists” (Lyons 1977:828). This kind of utterance cannot be ignored in analyses of deontic modality, because “a set of moral and social norms and patterns of behavior includes not only directives, but also statements” (Ibid.). The characteristics of the Gerundive as a “universally valid notion of obligation” can also account for its use in imperative sentences. All the above-mentioned cases will be now exemplified one by one. First, however, we would like to note one property shared by all the necessityexpressing forms: that is, the agreement of the Gerundive. Except for zarūrat/āvašyaktā which take the Gerundive as a noun in Genitive (karne kī zarūrat ‘necessity to do’), in all other cases the Gerundive of transitive verbs agrees

with the direct object (without ko). The Gerundive of passive intransitive verbs agrees with the subject in gender (and in the masculine, also in number). Absence of agreement in standard Hindi is considered as irregularity (Bahri 1995:157): 162

Compare with the properties of the Sanskrit Gerundive: “…the use of Sanskrit gerundive may

reflect some universally valid notion of obligation (which can be lexicalized by a variety of distinctions, such as adharmya ‘wrong’, anyayya ‘illegal’, anarha ‘improper’, dus t a ‘immoral’ etc.)” (Bubenik 1985:41)

018

1) uske āhār kī mātrā (fem.subj.) bhī adhik honī (fem.ger.intr.) zarūrī thī. (Sankrityayan:26)

It was necessary that the amount of his food would be bigger. 2) unhẽ hazārõ rūpaye (masc.dir.obj.) xarc karne (masc.ger.tr.) par te hai. (Reddi:45)

They have to spend thousands of rupees. 3) mujhe kahānī ke bāre mẽ āpse kuchek bātẽ (fem.dir.obj.) karnī (fem.ger.tr) hai. (Mitra:51) I must talk to you about the story. 4) mere qasbe mẽ har hālāt mẽ šāti (fem.subj) ræhnī (fem.ger.intr.) cāhiye. (Nagar 2:71)

Peace should remain in my settlement in any case.

4.2.1. Gerundive + temporal forms of the copula (hai,thā) or the verb ho-. This grammatical form for rendering the idea of obligation is ambiguous enough, and its interpretation depends to certain extent on context. Still it brings some specific meanings and shades of meanings that are absent in zarūrī/zarūrat constructions. The same phenomenon exists in English in the form of ‘be to’ construction, which “indicates that the agent has been set or scheduled to do something by some outside forces and is thus obliged. However the agent’s commitment to the obligation is left open” (Bybee 1994:184) This definition given to an English construction matches precisely the properties of the Hindi ‘Gerundive + copula’ construction with the exception that among the “outside forces” we may find the agent himself. It means that the agent may decide what action he is to do, and his own decision serves as the ordering source.163 But whatever sources of obligation may be presented by the construction, there is an obviously common basis in all possible cases; the theme is laconically presented in Mizokami (1980:41) as “Compulsion. Plan”. One of the main characteristics of the ordering source is that it is not active and leaves to the agent the possibility of evaluating the strength of the obligation, and, consequently, of deciding whether to act or not. In such circumstances the 163

“Обязательства‚ взятые по отношению к самому себе” (Obligations that someone imposes on

himself) (Жмотова 1962:69)

019

commitment of the agent to the obligation may vary from displeasure (like what is expressed by Gerundive with the verb par -) to agreement (like Gerundive + cāhiye) or even full support (like Gerundive + cāh-). But in all these cases there is

only similarity and not a full analogy, because, unlike ‘the Gerundive + par -’, Gerundive + copula never underlines a complete incongruity of an obligation and the will of the agent; unlike ‘Gerundive + cāhiye’ it does not link an obligation with moral norms. The ‘Gerundive + copula’ differs from the combination of the Gerundive with cāh- in that it refers to a wish which is not inherent in the subject. Here are some examples: A) The ordering source – rules, laws (conditions of a labor agreement, decrees of authorities, rules of communal life, tradition – in short, obligations which refer to anyone and do not always reflect the will of the agent): 1) mai to mæhæz qānūn kā kīr ā hū … d igrī to unhẽ milnī hī thī. (Chatursen:37) I am only a worm of the law… (according to the law) the decree could be only in her favor. 2) har karmcārī ko tanxah denī hotī hai. (Mitra:32) (I) must pay to every employee. (according to the labor agreement). 3) unhẽ rāt kī pālī par jānā hotā. (Kamleshvar 2:72) They were to work in the night shift. (according to the schedule). 4) pæhle hamko zamīn sāf karnī hai. (Reddi 2:65) First of all we must clean the ground. (rules of agriculture). B) The ordering source – a treaty, a contract, a promise. In this case we may talk about a particular someone who acts in accordance with a decision taken before: 5) mujhe kuch der ke liye bāhar jānā hai. kaī log hai jinse milnā hai. (Rakesh 1:153)

I must go out for a while. I am to meet some people. 6) kyā progrām hai? kahā-kahā jānā hai? kitnī sabhāẽ (Kamleshvar 1:36) What is the program? Where are we to go? How many meetings are there?

hai?

7) haricaran ko d okt ar kī salāh kā pālan karnā thā. (Reddi 2:118) Haricharan was to fulfill the doctor’s recommendations.

051

C) The ordering source – fulfillment of an action as a necessary condition for achieving a goal. When the agent is not presented in a sentence, the utterance is understood as a rule. As such, it is very much like an if-clause with a real condition: 8) is d ar se ki pair phisal nā jāe, kāfī bac-bac kar pagd ãd ī se utarnā hotā thā. (Rakesh 1:26)

It was necessary to go down the path carefully enough so as not to slip. 9) bābū banne ke liye to dasvī pās karnā hī thā. (Tivari:7) (If one wanted) to become a clerk, it was necessary to finish the tenth grade. 10) sãgyādi šabdõ ke šust hū prayog ke liye unke t hīk-t hīk arthõ ko jānnā hogā. (Bahri 1995:110)

For the correct usage of nouns and other words, it is necessary to know their exact meanings. D) The ordering source – outer circumstances, which force the agent to act sometimes against his will. This is the case which is similar to the ‘Gerundive+par -’. In most sentences of this kind the translation is ‘have to’, but still the attitude of the speaker is left open: 11) par jorū bankar ā bait hī thī radhiyā uske ghar mẽ. grihasthī kī naī vyavasthā karnī thī use. (Mithileshvar:32)

But Radhiya came to his house as a wife. She had to keep the house in another way. 12) calnā to hogā hī. rizarvešan ho cukā hai. (Kishor:123) We will have to go. A reservation has already been made. 13) hamẽ yah zæhar kā ghūt

pīnā hī hogā. (Chatursen:60)

We will have to take this gulp of the poison. All the cases mentioned above have a simple purpose – to present the necessity to perform an act as based on a specific ordering source. The sentences are concerned neither with imposing obligation nor with granting permission. They can in fact be subsumed under ‘deontic statements’. But sometimes the meanings of the construction are inferred from certain contextual circumstances. The notion of necessity being related semantically to the ‘wish’, ‘will’ and ‘future’, allows one to interpret it also in terms of deontic directives, inherent and even epistemic modalities as well. In such cases the ordering source is the speaker (deontic-directives), the agent (inherentintention) or is not relevant at all (epistemic-possibility):

050

E) The ordering source is the speaker. These are the sentences where the obligation is laid on the agent in the form of advice, recommendation (again based on some plan), and is not unavoidable. Therefore, they are not, strictly speaking, commands. Following Palmer (1986:107) we call them ‘prescriptives’: 14) kal subah mazdurõ ko bulākar surãg banānā hai – rūpnārāyan ne salāh dī. (Reddi 2:45)

Tomorrow morning you must bring workers and build a tunnel – Rupnarayan gave an advice. 15) sab se pæhle bāt jo karnī hogī voh yah ki biran kī maut ko manzūr karnā hogā. (Kamleshvar 2:77)

The first thing to be done is to recognize the death of Biran. 16) billū ko ab kãt rol mẽ lenā hogā cācā. (Nagar 2:66) Billu must be taken under control, uncle. When asking an advice or recommendation the prescriptives can be questioned: 17) mujhe kyā karnā hogā ? (Tivari:15) What am I to do ? F) The ordering source is the agent. He does what he decided to do by himself and acts according to his own plan. That is why ‘to want’ is the most appropriate translation: 18) par rāmcaran ko jo karnā hotā hai, kartā hai aur jo karnā nahī hotā, vah nahī kartā. (Kumar:46)

Ramcaran does what he wants and does not do what he does not want. 19) jise ānā ho āe, nā ānā ho nā āe. (Prem Chand 1:39) Those who decided to come, let them come; those who decided not to come, let them not come. 20) sonbāī, mukhī tumse bāt karnā cāhtā hai. – (mujhe bāt) nahī karnī (hai)! (Film ‘mirc masālā’)

Sonbai, the headman wants to talk to you. - I don’t want! G) The ordering source is irrelevant. The meaning of such a construction in this case meets the definition given in Bybee (1995:186): “Another sense closely related to obligation and often conflated with it is the sense of destiny or what is to be.” In this construction, the main verb presents an impending, forthcoming, expected action:

051

21) jo honā thā so ho gayā. (Sinh:23) There happened what was to happen. 22) jisko jo bannā hotā hai, vohī bantā hai. (Mitra:8) Everybody becomes the one he is preordained to. 23) par mol par jākar jin logõ se milnā hotā thā unse pæhle hī din bhar ūbkar āyā thā. (Rakesh 1:10)

But in the mall he was supposed to meet the people he got bored with during the whole day.

4.2.2. Gerundive + the verb par -. This construction, too, has something to do with the ordering source, but the only thing that is relevant about it is its strength. Some authors (McGregor 1986:80, Saihgal 1964:150) underline this property as the main distinction between them. Unlike the ‘Gerundive+copula’ construction, the ‘Gerundive+par -‘ does not leave any freedom of choice for the agent. The ordering source of the latter is always external and not associated with a wish or will of the agent. The strength of the obligation is, indeed, a very important factor, but the main distinction is, to our mind, in what Masica (1991:380) calls “the control of the Agent”(freedom of choice) and his “involvement in making prior arrangements”(planning). In the case of the ‘Gerundive+copula’ the fulfillment of an action is under the agent’s control and he has both time and right to make a decision about it, while par - is the sign of a sudden obligation with no alternative (“inevitability”- Saihgal 1964:150, see also Жмотова 1962:69). 164 The shade of meaning, which is attached to the Gerundive by adding par -, is determined by the more literal meanings of the verb par -, which in an independent usage (to fall, to occur, to happen) and as an auxiliary (ex.: nikal par -) depicts an “action happening suddenly or inexorably” (Barz 1977:85):

164

It is curious that some researchers consider the combination of the Gerundive with the copula and

the verb par - as “identical in meaning” (McGregor:80), while others present them as absolutely different: 

 (If we say ‘you are to go there’, then it will be a simple declaration of a command. But if it is said ‘you will have to go there’, then it will carry a certain peculiarity) (Varma 1995:134).

051

1) idhar pacās vars

se unhẽ is tarah bhāgne kā avasar nā par ā

thā. (Prem Cand 1:35)

For fifty years he had no opportunity to run so. 2) vah cīx par ā. (Butt 1993:35) He screamed suddenly (despite himself) The gradation of the examples with par - could be made relative to how the speaker evaluates the undesirability of the action for the actor. A) Full contradiction to the will of the actor, a forced, compulsory action: 3) latrū

ke

sãvāgiyõ

ko



cāhte

hue

bhī

mānnā

par ā.

(Mithilesvar:47) The servants of Latru unwillingly had to agree. 4) khān ko ve šaitān samajhte the lekin lācār ho jāne par uskī hī šaran lenī par ī. (Yashpal 2:18)

They held the mine to be a devil but having no choice, they had to find shelter in it. B) Urgent necessity of an action that requires considerable efforts: 6) ye šabd kæhne mẽ use prānõ kī pūrī šakti lagā denī par ī. (Yashpal 2:71) For saying this, he had to use the whole strength of mind. 7) donõ samajh gaye, āj lohe ke cane cabāne par ẽge. (Prem Cand 1:28) Both (men) understood that today they would have to do a difficult work. C) An unexpected action: 8) kyā jāntā thā, ek din ye t hokrẽ khānī par ẽgī. (Prem Chand 1:29) How could I know that one day I would have to get such strokes. D) A reprehensible action that the agent decides to undertake, forced by outer circumstances: 9) sab qānūn jab viphal ho jāte hai to jãgal ke qānūn kī šaran lenī hī par tī hai. (Sankrityayan:24)

When all the laws become ineffectual then one has to find a shelter in the law of jungle.

051

10) bacpan hī se apne bar e bhāī ke liye use hamešā jhūt

h

bolnā

par ā thā. (Ashk 1:58)

From the childhood he always had to lie for the sake of his older brother. E) used with the future tense and addressed to the second or the third person it sounds as a threat: 11) e javāb unhẽ denā par egā! (Kamleshvar 1:23) They will have to give the answer ! 12) is vaqt kahī mat jāo, nahī to hamešā ke liye pachtānā par egā. (Prem Chand 1:49)

Do not go anywhere now or you will always regret it. More exactly the sense of unwillingness can be expressed by different lexical items, like majbūr, lācār, vivaš, bādhya (forced) + copula. In this case the Gerundive is represented by the oblique form with the postpositions ko or ke liye and the agent is in the Nominative: 13) gāv

chor

kar

bhāg

jāne

ke

liye

bādhya

ho

gayā

vah.

(Mithileshvar:40) He was induced to leave the village and run away. 14) donõ… rāh khojne ko vivaš the. (Mishra:9) Both … had to seek for the way. It should be noted that these lexical items used with kar- (to do) signal a reluctant action caused by the agent itself, while the combination with par - means only passive tolerance of an unwelcome action: 15) unhẽ yah višvās nahī thā ki unke khetõ mẽ kām karnevāle… barābarī



darjā

dene

ke

liye

unhẽ

bādhya

kar

dẽge.

(Mithileshvar:33) They could not believe that those who worked in their fields… would force them to give the workers equal status.

4.2.3. Gerundive + cāhiye.

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The word cāhiye is qualified in different ways by different scholars. For instance, Guru (1962:120) calls it “the polite imperative form”. Жмотова (1962:70) writes that cāhiye is an adverb, which “по форме является желательным наклонением от

глагола cāhnā” (is the Optative of the verb cāh- in its shape). Липеровский (1962:43) talks about a predicative adverb, and Баранников & Баранников (1956:193) together with Клюев (1962:287) label it a ‘verbal adverb’.165 As for its origin, all grammarians point to the old Prakrit stem cāhi, formed from cāh- and meaning “is wished, is necessary” (McGregor 1986:77, Kellogg 1938:461,

Masica 1991:381-382). As a matter of fact, cāhiye has the form of ‘polite imperative’ and, according to Липеровский (1962:43), acquired its modal meaning as a result of the lexicalization of the imperative forms. But it may also be analyzed “as a present /e/ on a passive stem /cahi/” as Pray (1970:156) presents it. Indeed, its counterpart in Punjabi cāhīdā has nothing in common with the Imperative and conjugates as an imperfective participle (cāhīdā e, cāhīde ne, cāhīdī sī). In any case, it is obvious that the passive stem with ‘-i’ formed both the word cāhiye and the ‘polite imperative’ (see also Oberlies 1998:31). Though an

imperative form, it is never used as an imperative of cāh- (want), although some cases of its independent usage are recorded: 1) pāc baje tak jab cāhiye cārj le lījiye. (Nagar 2:9) You may take the charge till five o’clock any time you like. Still, it cannot be interpreted as a command, but rather as a possible future action, which would be better rendered by the Subjunctive (Potential). In combination with the Gerundive, the word cāhiye bears the meaning of what could, in short, be labeled ‘a moral obligation’ (Masica 1991:381-382), with different nuances - duty, advisability, propriety. Its passive nature and the imperative form determine its specific usage as a sign of commonly accepted need or obligation generated by the society and presupposing an action which is felt to be good and desirable. The ordering source is, therefore, always external. Possible translations of the combination with cāhiye could be made by means of the modals should, ought to, must or simply by ‘it is necessary’. It should be noted that nowadays cāhiye 165

In Marathi Катенина (1963:220) calls the verb pāhije with function identical to cāhiye

“недостаточный глагол модального значения” (a defective verb with modal meaning).

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occurs only in its singular form, the plural being considered non-standard (Tivari 1996:164). This reflects the common tendency of modern Hindi to do away with inflection. There is a generally accepted point of view that cāhiye may be used without the Gerundive with nouns, and then it means ‘need’ or ‘want’ (Gambhir S. 1993:53, Saihgal 1964:145-146), but to us this is only the result of ellipsis, as in the case of zarūrī/zarūrat (see above). The Gerundive is easily omitted when it is

represented by existential verbs, like ho-(be), ræh-(stay) or the passive mil-(get), which remain implicit. Another reason to omit the Gerundive is to present a necessity as not linked to any particular person and having a generic reading: 2)us aks ay bhãd ār kā patā lagānevālī ākhẽ cāhiye. (Reddy 2:160) (honī cāhiye) To discover that inexhaustible wealth one must have competent eyes. (there must be competent eyes) 3)bhagvān kī mæharbānī cāhiye. (Prem Chand 1:30) (honī, milnī cāhiye) One needs the mercy of god. (there must be) 4)hamẽ to kām cāhiye ki cār paise milte rahẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:54) (honā, ræhnā cāhiye) We need work to earn four paisa every day. (We must have a work) Compare with similar examples where the Gerundive was not omitted: 5)rājya ke sab pad hamẽ milne cāhiye. (Parasayee:105) We must get all the posts of the state. 6)iske liye ek acchā sā šabd-koš bhī tumhāre pās honā cāhiye. (Bahri 1995:110) For this, you should also have a good dictionary. 7)pratyek vidyārthī ke pās ek pramānik vyākaran



pustak

avašya ræhnī cāhiye. (Bahri 1995:109).

Every student should obviously have a book of the standard grammar. Used in a specific, concrete situation, when associated with the opinion of the speaker, cāhiye adds the meaning of advice, recommendation: 8)bālak ko yah pustak par hnī cāhiye. (Bahri 1945:191)

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The boy should read this book. 9) kohlī ko usne salāh dī ki… use ek nayā gaun bhī xarīd lenā cāhiye. (Rakesh 1:45)

He advised Kohli that… he should also buy a new gown. When cāhiye follows an intransitive verb, it adds the meaning of desirability: 10) ab is ghar mẽ bahū ānī hī cāhiye. (Film ‘sārā ākāš’:4) It is necessary now to bring a daughter-in-law into this house. (Lit. A daughter-inlaw should come into this house). In a generalized context an utterance with cāhiye turns into an exhortation, admonition: 11) tabīyat ke liye jo acchā lage vahī cīz khānī cāhiye. (Reddi 2:37) One should eat what is good for health. 12) bar õ kī āgyā sadā sunnī cāhiye. (Kumar:55) One should always obey orders of older people. With the help of cāhiye one can evaluate the correctness of an action (worthwhile, expedient): 13) vah kuch der cup rahā, jaise yah socne ke liye ki iske bād use āge bāt karnī cāhiye yā nahī . (Rakesh 1:83)

He was silent for a while as though deciding if it was worth saying more or not. When questioned, this construction serves for asking advice: 14) yah bāt kæhnī cāhiye thī yā nahī ? (Kishor:276) Was it worth saying or not ? Used with the past copula (thā), the construction means disappointment, upset, or displeasure that an action has not taken place: 15) vah bāt jo usne kahī thī mujhe kæhnī cāhiye thī. (Kishor:122) I should have used the phrase that she used. Negated with na or nahī and used with the past copula it means censure of an action which has taken place:

058

16) dilīp jaise sušiks it tarun

ko aisā na karnā cāhiye thā.

(Chatursen:86) An educated young man like Dilip should not have behaved so. The negative particles nahī and na are placed mainly before the Gerundive and not before cāhiye (the same can be said about the copula and par -), thus showing the correctness of our assumption that the main idea of obligation lies in the Gerundive. The strength of the obligation with cāhiye is considered the weakest among all the three forms under discussion (Жмотова 1962:70). This is true to the extent that the agent has a wider opportunity to refuse an obligation, but among the three only the ‘cāhiye’-construction possesses the property of directives – to impose an obligation on somebody else. Bahri (1986:221) regards the sentences with cāhiye as jussive sentences (āgyārthak vākya). Every utterance with cāhiye where the speaker identifies himself with the obligation can be considered a polite request, whereas the constructions with the copula and par - only describe necessity, and their possible imperative usage can be only derived from context. cāhiye has a direct connection to the future – what is wished, is always expected.

That is the reason why epistemic senses of the evaluation of the reality were derived from it. In this connection we should note that such an evaluation can be made only in combination with intransitive verbs in sentences with a distinct future reference: 17) merī yah ājvālī fāyal kal daftar mẽ khulne se pæhle hī nagar mẽ tæhalkā mac jānā cāhiye. (Nagar 2:17)

An uproar will probably rise in the town before my today’s file opens in the office. 18) hamāre pūjya bābū jī kī caran rāj āj pæhlī bār āfis mẽ par ī hai, koī bar ī bāt to honī hī cāhiye. (Nagar 2:92)

Our respected father came today to the office for the first time - something important must happen. The idea of ‘wish’, which is inherent in cāhiye, makes the use of cāhiye with Gerundive tautological and senseless in a subordinate clause if the main clause expresses ‘wish’ or ‘demand’, as in the following example: 19) kũdan cāhtā thā yah kām rāmā ko karnā cāhiye. (Bhandari:53)

059

*Kundan wanted that Rama should do this work. (Kundan wanted Rama to do this work.) Bahri (1995) also gives some examples of such incorrect usage of cāhiye (in brackets): 20) pratyek nāgrik kā kartavya hai ki vah *(use) is kārya mẽ sahāyatā *(karnī cāhiye) kare. (p.156)

The duty of every citizen is to help in this business *(that he should help). 21) ab samay ā gayā hai ki senā kā nirastrikaran

*(honī cāhiye)

ho. (p.157)

The time has come to disarm the army *(that the army should be disarmed).

4.2.4. Evaluatives. These are deontic statements, in which “the speaker or subject does not present the facts, he merely evaluates them” (Palmer 1986:121). Like the previous forms, evaluatives are based on the Gerundive: but unlike them, they are not grammaticalized. The Gerundive is followed by adverbs, adjectives and nouns which explicitly introduce the attitude of the speaker toward an action or situation at hand. In terms of meaning these constructions have much in common with those in which the Gerundive is followed by the word zarūrat or cāhiye. Unlike these words, evaluative adverbs, adjectives and nouns reveal more precise and clear-cut characteristics of an action and thus make the position of the speaker more definite. However, it is often the case that the speaker uses evaluatives to express not his own position but a generally accepted point of view. Such evaluatives may have the force of a declaration of the norms of behavior. Still, even in this case one can appraise the speaker’s attitude by deducing that the speaker supports the point; otherwise, he would not have enunciated it. Evaluatives occur in all tenses: 1) merā cup ræhnā hī behtar thā. (Kamleshvar 1:83) It was better for me to hold my tongue. (Past Simple) 2) ūpar jānā use ucit nahī lagā. (Ashk 1:51) He thought that it was not suitable for him to go upstairs. (Past Indefinite) 3) sarkār ko kosnā vyarth hai. (Mishra:190)

061

It is senseless to vilify the government. (Present Simple) 4) abhī jānā t hīk bhī nahī hogā. (Kamleshvar 2:58) It would not be right to go now. (Future) But only in sentences with future references are the meanings of obligation derivable. They can then be interpreted as directives, as moral and legal obligations aimed at impacting the behavior of the listener. These are very weak obligations, imposed on the addressee only by presenting a certain pattern of conduct. Sometimes they are called ‘imperatives in disguise’, which are more precise in meaning, but less strong than the previous forms: 5) afsar se pæhle ut hkar cal denā beadabī hai. (Yashpal 2:7) To get up and go before the officer means disrespect. (prohibition - rules of conduct) 6) āt

h

baras kī vidhvā kā dūsrā byāh karnā bhī adharma mānā

jātā thā. (Chatursen:67)

To marry again an eight years old widow is considered illegal. (prohibition – law, ethics) 7) in logõ se dūr ræhnā hī acchā. (Prem Chand 1:41) It is better to keep away from those people. (advice – morality) 8) parãtu āpkā is tarah jānā to t hīk nahī hai. (Chatursen:101) It is not correct of you to leave so. (prohibition) The Gerundive in this construction (like in the construction with zarūrī) is used as a verbal noun; syntactically it is the subject. That is why it does not agree with the words which normally stand for the direct object: 9) is liye uljhī huī bātẽ karne se behtar hai cuppī sādh lenā . (Kishor:36) That is why it is better to be silent than to say entangled things. (choosing silence) In combination with the verbal noun of the Gerundive the words yogya, lāyaq (worthy, proper), which have the meaning of evaluation, can also be glossed as giving advice: 10) kaun kām karne aur na karne yogya hai. (Bahri 1985:180) Which work is fit to be done and which is not. 11) vah kahī jāne ke yogya bhī nahī. (Chatursen:130) This (story) is not worth being told.

060

4.2.5. Conclusion. In summary we would like to underline once more that the main means for expressing necessity and obligation in Hindi is the Gerundive; different lexical items attached to it provide more precise definition of the essence of obligation - the ordering source. The table below specifies the similarity and differences in the meanings of those items. We can see that their interpretation depends not only on their own nature but also on many other factors, such as the transitive / intransitive distinction, degree of the speaker’s or agent’s involvement etc. Sometimes these combinations with the Gerundive are very close to each other in meaning because they share important properties. For example, the copula (like par -), attached to the Gerundive may depict an action caused by external circumstances. Moreover, these two combinations are used mainly not in generic but in specific contexts. Nevertheless, they are not identical, for they differ in their reference to the involvement of the agent and consequently impart different strength to the obligation verbalized by the Gerundive. Influenced by the speaker’s attitude, all these constructions acquire different shades of imperative. The differences are best seen when they occur in the same context: 1) upanyās kī aglī qist kab denī hai ?…- qist to kal hī denā zarūrī hai. (Mitra:17)

When are you to give the next chapter of the novel? The emphasis is on the date, which was fixed in the agreement between the writer and the publisher…- I must give the chapter tomorrow. The emphasis is on the strong necessity to finish it till tomorrow. 2) ræhne ke liye ghar cāhiye aur pet

pālne ke liye dhãdhā bhī

zarūrī hai. (Nagar 2:24)

To live one ought to have a house, but to subsist one needs also a profession. Both parts of the sentence express the same idea of necessity due to the Gerundive of the existential ho-, which is understood (honā cāhiye, honā zarūrī hai). The words cāhiye and zarūrī attach to this idea the evaluation of the speaker – cāhiye means ‘advisable, preferable’, and zarūrī means ‘essential, vitally important’.

061

3) yadi kisī ko… acchā abhinay dekhna ho…, to use jimī ko dekhnā cāhiye. (Rakesh 1:98)

If somebody… wants to see a good acting…, then he should see Jimmi. If somebody is going to act according to his own decision, then I would advise him to see Jimmi. 4) ab socnā hī par egā, haricaran jī, fursat nikālnī hī hogī. (Reddi 2:53) Now you will have to think, dear Haricharan; you will have to find spare time. You will think about it although you do not want it (what is important is if you want it or not), and the necessity to think will induce you to find time for this (what is important is the reason of the action). In the table below we can see how the functions of the Gerundive change when it is combined with different words:

061

Gerundive + adverbs, adjectives, nouns (Evaluatives)

Gerundive Gerundive Gerundive Gerundive + cāhiye

+

+

par nā

copula

External Moral obligation, social regulations.

Exhortatives advises, recommendations

Requests, Threat exhortatives, (future suggestions. tense).

Prescriptives Commands, demands. .

---------------

---------------

---------------

Wish– ‘want’.

++

---------------

weakest

weak

Any obligation, which contradicts the will of the agent.

strongest

+

---------------

---------------

Intransitive verbs Possibility

+

External

zarūrī/ zarūrat

External Moral obligation, social regulations.

+++

External

+

+

Plan.

+ strong

+

+

---------------

---------------

Intransitive verbs Destiny, expected action ---------------

061

No specific source, pure necessity.

Ordering Source (generally)

Ordering source – the speaker --------------- Ordering source the agent not relevant

Control of the agent

not relevant

Strength of the obligation Deontic statement of obligation Epistemic

+

--------------

evaluation --------------

Generic reading

---------------

+

---------------

--------------

+

Ellipsis of the Gerundive

4.3. Directives. We based our understanding of directives on the definition given by Lyons “utterances which impose upon someone the obligation to make a proposition true (or to refrain from making it true), by bringing about (or refraining from bringing about) in

some

future

world

the

state

of

affairs

that

is

described

by

the

proposition”(1977:824). The further dividing of directives into subclasses is also guided by the notions proposed by Lyons. The first subclass of directives includes commands, demands, requests, which are united under the term ‘mands’ – “utterances which impose, or propose, some course of action or pattern of behavior and indicate that it should be carried out” (Ibid.:745-746). In order to avoid misunderstanding arising from the similarity in meaning of the words ‘demand’ and ‘command’, we apply the term ‘demands’ to the directives addressed to the third person agents or to nobody in particular, while ‘commands’ and ‘requests’ are addressed directly to the listener. The second subclass of the directives – exhortations - includes invitations and recommendations. The two subclasses differ in the speaker’s attitude with regard to the action to be carried out. Mands are issued according to the interests of the speaker to see the action fulfilled, while exhortations are concerned with the interests of the addressee.

4.3.1. Mands. In ‘mands’ the speaker is himself an ordering source. The main purpose of mands is to give the speaker the means which underline his own wish to see the SoA fulfilled, his own role in generating necessity. So one of the main characteristics of mands is that they are issued by the speaker. Mands impose obligation in the most direct and straightforward way. But in Hindi a very diversified and sophisticated system of mands was created due to the complicated social structure of the Indian society. Hindi speakers have various

065

possibilities of conveying through mands different nuances of intimacy / officiality, respect / discourtesy. In addition, they can express commands, which may be expected to be fulfilled immediately or after a while.

4.3.1.1. Commands and requests. Normally, the role of mands is played by the Imperative, “the principal mood of will and desire” (Lyons 1977:746). Following Palmer (1986:111), we prefer to restrict the term ‘imperative’ to second person forms only and consider it a direct instruction of the speaker to the addressee to act. But in Hindi rather a large number of forms serve this purpose, forms that differ in their illocutionary force. Here are the most common ones (with the stem kar-): kar, karo, kījiye, kījiyegā, karnā, karẽ. kar is associated with the second person pronoun tu, karo – with tum, kījiye, kījiyegā and karẽ – with āp and karnā with all three:

1) xabardār, hoš mẽ ā. (Mitra:97) Beware, collect yourself. 2) ut ho mistar malik, jaldī karo, der ho gaī hai. (Amrita 1:26) Get up, mister Malik, hurry up, it is already late. 3) phir kyā karẽ? koī upāy sociye to. (Reddi 2:101) What shall we do then? Think out something. 4) āp avašya dekhne āiyegā. (Nagar 2:11) Come to see by all means. 5) dekh, is tuarī kā xayāl rakhnā aur kabhī corī mat karnā. (Sinh:29) Look, take care of Tuari and never steal. 6) āp aisā na kahā karẽ. (Kishore:123) Please, don’t repeat it. Most of them function as Imperative only in a specific situation. That is why we think that instead of ‘Imperative’ in Hindi it is more reasonable to talk about ‘imperative forms’, as McGregor suggested (1986:39). Palmer (1986:30,108) indicates that imperatives differ from other directives in being formally unmarked for most of the other categories associated with the verb (tense, gender, person). Lyons expresses the same idea when he says that in the Indo-

066

European languages “the second person singular imperative carries no overt indications of person and tense” (1977:746). As for notions that may be grammaticalized in imperatives, Lyons names “distinctions of more immediate and more remote futurity” (Ibid.:746-747). Bybee (1985:171) adds to the list of possibly grammaticalized distinctions that of ‘number’: “In many languages the imperative has only two forms, one for singular and one for plural.” Bubenik considers it correct to add to the list also aspectual distinctions166. At the outset of our analysis of imperative forms in Hindi, let us first confirm that none of the forms mentioned above are marked with gender; most of them (except for kījiyegā) carry no indication of tense. Since direct commands are addressed to the

second person, there is no need to note this explicitly. As far as tense is concerned, it is obvious that commands, requests and demands can be carried out only in the future, at any time following the moment of speaking. Thus, the temporal domain of mands is always in the future, but with the help of different imperative forms speakers of Hindi may express at what point of the future they expect the action to be performed – the nearest one or a remote one. So, the distinction presented by Lyons fits the features of Hindi. Let us see what other distinctions characterize the ‘imperative forms’, what kind of differences they have in their meanings and what other forms in Hindi serve as their counterparts.

4.3.1.1.1. The main resources. Among other properties of the imperative forms it is important to see if the singular / plural distinction is relevant to Hindi. Most grammarians, for instance Platts (1874:357), Kellogg (1938:459), Saihgal (1964:18), and Kachru (1968:40) have distinguished the second person singular (kar) from the plural (karo) imperative. Putting aside the specific meanings of these imperative forms, we note that neither of them carries the meaning of number and each may be addressed both to a single person and to many people according to context. We observe, however, that the form of the bare stem (kar) correlated with the pronoun tū is applied in practice exclusively to single addressees (at least in our data we did not find any example of its 166

He writes: "Aspect can be expressed by the Imperative (cf. Slavic, Sanskrit, Greek)" (Private communication).

067

non-single usage), although theoretically it may be applied to a number of persons, because the second person pronouns are not expressive of number: 1) le yah āxrī cīz le kutte. (Vijaykant:217) Take this last thing, you dog. (Sg. addressee) 2) phir unhõne use aur līlā ko hidāyat dī, ‘jāo, jākar sīriyaslī par hāī karo.’ (Mohini:193-194)

Then she instructed him and Lila: “Go and study seriously”. (Pl. addressee) 3) jāo bet e, tum jākar par ho. (Mohini:198) Go, son, you go and learn. (Sg. addressee) 4) hā, pāpā, parsõ kī sīt

karvā dījiye. (Amrita 1:170)

Yes, daddy, reserve a seat for the day after tomorrow. (Sg. addressee) 5) āiye, āp log ãdar calī āiye. (Prem Chand 1:44) Please, come in. (Pl. addressee) 6) der ho jāe to tum log so ræhnā. (Yashpal 2:8) If I am late you go to sleep. (Pl. addressee) 7) kabhī kuch zarūrat ho to likhnā ganešī. (Priyamvada:91) If you need something then write me, Ganeshi. (Sg. addressee) 8) āp log ghabrāiyegā mat. (Kamleshvar 2:24) You don’t worry. (Pl. addressee) 9) paise āp na dījiyegā, pāpā. (Nagar 2:16) Don’t give the money, dad. (Sg. addressee) 10) šāt hõ bhagat jī. (Nagar 2:98) Calm down, dear Bhagat. (Sg. addressee) 11) āp sab log šāt ho jāẽ. (Nagar 2:63) Please, calm down all of you. (Pl. addressee) As follows from the examples, the idea of ‘plurality’ is revealed not by the imperative forms, but by adding ‘log’ to a second person pronoun or by additional comments such as ‘unhõne use aur līlā ko hidāyat dī’ (She instructed him and Lila). In terms of the ability of imperative forms to express urgent commands or postponed ones, it should be said that the forms of kar, karo, kījiye and karẽ

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are neutral in this respect. Each of them may be used either for immediate or for remote future: 12) jaldī cal, mujhe zabardast bhūkh lagī hai. (Mohini:193) Hurry up, I feel awfully hungry. (immediate) 13) tū nifikr ho kar āyā jāyā kar. (Mithileshvar:42) You may come any time without ceremony. (remote) 14) hā bet ā, šīghra kuch mãgāo. (Mishra:21) Yes, son, order something right away. (immediate) 15) prithā in kesõ ko sābun se nahī dhoo. (Mishra:23) Pritha, never wash your hair with a soap. (remote) 16) dekhiye na! (Mitra:106) Have a look, please! (immediate) 17) āp kal hamāre sãtošī prašād ke daftar mẽ cale āiye. (Nagar 2:95) Come tomorrow to the office of our Santoshi Prashad. (remote) 18) āp bolte jāiye, vakīl sāhib. (Film ‘rājā kī āegī bārāt’) Continue talking, mister advocate. (remote) 19) āp bhī taiyār ho lẽ. (Kishor:129) Prepare yourself and join us. (immediate) 20) āp log … apnā kām karte rahẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:73) Keep working, please. (remote) The remote future in these examples is expressed by temporal adverbs (like kal – tomorrow), by aspectual conjugation (frequentive – e.g.13, progressive – e.g.18, durative – e.g.20) or by context (as in example 15, where the speaker advises a woman not to use soap). These examples confirm the assertion of Lyons that “the vast majority of directives…are temporally unrestricted, unless they contain an adverbial expression of time...”(1977:831). And we would add: “or aspectual indications”. The given above examples show that Aspect is one of the essential characteristics of the imperative forms. The other two forms (kījiyegā,karnā) serve almost exclusively for such commands whose fulfillment is intended at a future relatively remote from the moment after the speech act, “after some lapse of time”(Bubenik 1985:36). “Almost

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exclusively”, because there are some cases when they are used with reference to the actual moment of speech (see below). Unlike other imperative forms they need no special lexical indication of temporal interval (‘tomorrow’,‘afterwards’ etc.) to be interpreted as remote, although they are often followed by them. The form ‘kījiyegā’ (“The future imperative”- Bubenik 1985:35) has an illocutionary force similar to ‘kījiye’, the termination –gā moving it farther from the moment of speech167: 21) āp jā kar bæhan jī se milẽ, to unhẽ bhī batā dījiyegā. (Rakesh 1:151) When you go and meet your sister then tell it also to her. 22) āp sāt-āt

h

din to yahā rahiye, phir cale jāiyegā. (Mitra:63)

Stay here seven or eight days, then go. 23) to kyā huā, bād mẽ nahā lenā. (Vyas:230) A big deal, wash yourself later. 24) acchā, ise mai rakh detī hū, tū bar ī ho kar pæhannā ! (Agnihotri:67) O.K., I will put it (a dress) away, you will grow up and put it on. When used with reference to the moment of speech these forms usually sound like very polite requests: 25) myā, zarā idhar ānā. (Chatursen:43) Mister, please come here. 26) mujhe sīdhā na samjhiyegā. (Prem Chand 1:30) Do not think, please, that I am guileless. These forms are also apt to convey restricted or unrestricted obligation168. In other words, they may signal if the speaker means a specific act, or if he is stating a general direction. This distinction is expressed both by aspectual differences (ex.13, 18, 20) and by adding the so-called ‘intensive’ verbs169. The imperative forms of single verbs 167

Cf. Latin crās petitō (tomorrow beg – future tense + imperative) vs. pete (beg) (the example of

Bubenik) 168

“Both directives and deontic statements can be understood as referring to either restricted or an

unrestricted obligation.” (Lyons 1996:828) 169

See Varma 1995:134.

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are expressive of imperfective aspect and are, thus, ambiguous. They may have either a specific or a general reading, while the perfective aspect, expressed by the intensive verbs, imparts to the directives concreteness and unambiguity and presupposes a single action170: 27) zarā

d hūd

h

to, lālī ne kãghā kahā rakh diyā ? (Mohini:191)

Look, please, where did Lali put her comb ? (A prolonged action) 28) cabūtre ke nīce bhaiyā kī sāikil khar ī hai, ut hākar chipā de. (Nagar 2:75)

There is brother’s bicycle under the veranda, hide it. (A single action) 29) d et

nišcit kījiye aur byāh kar d āliye. (Mudgal:106)

Determine the date and celebrate a wedding. (A single action) 30) āj ãgrezī aur itihās ke t īcar nahī āe hai aur āp hī unke pīriyad

par hāne kā kast

karẽ. (Ashk 1:60)

Today the teachers of English and of history have not come, so be so kind as to give their lessons. (A multiple action) 31) xair, sab t hīk hogā, āp nišcĩt ho jāẽ. (Nagar 2:95) Well, everything will be all right, calm down. (A single action) 32) khāne ke same tak ā jānā. (Tivari:13) Come before the time of dinner. (A single action) 33) kabhī milne ko jī cāhe rāt ko ānā aur akelī. (Prem Chand 1:44) Whenever you feel like coming, come at night and alone. (A multiple action) 34) tumhẽ use apnī prernā banānā ho to banā lo, par uskī āvasyaktāõ kī pūrti karo. (Mishra:49)

If you want to turn her into your inspiration then do it (a single action), but satisfy her requirements (a multiple action). To continue the analyses of the imperative forms, it is necessary to say something about their origin. There is a widely adopted point of view according to which the tum-imperative was derived from the Sanskrit second person plural imperative (Kellogg 1938:346 – Ātmanepada in ‘dhvam’: chaladhvam > chalahun > chalahu > chalau > chalo). 170

“…this difference between singular and generic temporal reference will be grammaticalized in

terms of the category of aspect.”(Lyons 1996:830)

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Липеровский (1962) wrote about ‘resemblance’ of the tum-imperative and a subjunctive form. But we think that it is not a matter of a true resemblance. It would be more correct to surmise that one and the same form assumes different functions as a result of the operational proximity of the Imperative and the Subjunctive (Optative), because, as Bybee noted, they “have similar modes of expression within a language”(1985:165). Stephany (1986:382) describes the same phenomenon in modern Greek: “The imperative mood is functionally very similar to the 2nd person of the subjunctive mood used in directive speech acts.” Since the ‘singular / plural’ distinction is not relevant for the tum-imperative, then it is reasonable to assume that this form may have another source, namely, the Optative. Indeed, sometimes the tumimperative form is used in utterances which have nothing to do with commands, but reflect different cases of imagined situations, where the addressee is informed about a) the possibility to act without obstacles: 35) ‘jelxāne mẽ sab kuch mil jātā hai’. usne kahā, ‘bīr ī sigret to hāthõ hāth le lo. (Sahni:153)

‘ There is everything in the jail’,- he said,-‘Biri and sigaretes you may get in plenty.’ b) necessity to act under specific circumstances: 36) roz cār sūiyā lo. (Mishra:215) (One has) to make four injections daily. c) a certain course of action, modus vivendi: 37) bhūkhõ mar jāo, par qarz mat lo. (Sudhakar:237) Die from hunger, but do not borrow. (It is better to die than to borrow) In all these cases, the subject corresponds to no peculiar person, and all the sentences have a generic reading. The same o-ending form occurs in subordinate clauses as well as in main ones. It may be used equally either in a relative clause with the meaning of generalization (Potential) or in a complement clause bearing the sense of will (Optative): 38) jaisā ucit samjho, karo. (Reddi 2:57) Do what you think is right. (Relative clause) 39) mai cāhtā hū vah citt hī tum par

h

lo. (Rakesh 1:48)

I want you to read the letter. (Complement clause)

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But if we use the sentence in example 39 without the main clause mai cāhtā hū, then it is impossible to distinguish an optative form from the imperative one. A quotation carrying a command in o does not differ in form from a complement clause with the Optative: 40) mai kab kæh rahā hū ki tum nārī ko mātr bhogya ke rūp mẽ agikār karo. (Mishra:48)

Am I saying that one must see in the woman only a pleasure? The tum-imperative, which is a second person imperative form, is used according to the same rules as the third person Optative: 41) tum jaise bartan mẽ cāho, khāo; vah jis mẽ cāhe khāe. (Yashpal 2:65) You eat from the dishes you like, let him eat from what he likes. The most striking fact is that tum-imperative appears in subordinate clauses. As Palmer (1986:108) points out, the imperative is not used in subordination. Hence, it may be a form, which is not imperative per se but is able to express commands. As Bybee writes, “imperatives and subjunctives are related in that there are languages in which one form serves both for forming commands and for marking subordination.” (1985:192). Thus, taking into account the ability of this form to express imagined situations (which is in fact one of the noticable properties of the Subjunctive mood) and to occur in subordinate clauses, it is tempting to assume that the tum-Imperative form is nothing but the tum-Optative. After all, the subjunctive nature of another second person āp-imperative (karẽ, aẽ) is not called in question (see Дымшиц 1986a:310). The other two forms (in -iye and -iyegā) are also not the Imperative per se. Platts (1874:136) subsumes them under the Precative, and Баранников (1953:1183) calls them the Optative, while McGregor defines them as the “third person singular passive subjunctive, and earlier passive indicative forms” (1986:176). McGregor draws attention to the fact that they are very much like subjunctives in force. Actually, there are many examples in which the imperative forms in –iye substitute the Optative: 42) behtar ho, āp likhnā chor

dẽ. (Mitra:92) – Optative.

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It would be better if you give up writing. 43) isse

to

acchā

hai,

kathī-mālā

lekar

dhunī

ramā

lījiye.

(Shukla:49) - Imperative in –iye. You would better put on a necklace and become an ascetic. 44) jo tere jī mẽ āe so kar. (Chatursen:75) – Optative. Do what you like. 45) to jo āp thīk samjhiye kījiye. (Kamleshvar 1:94) - Imperative in –iye. Do what you consider correct. In spite of the fact that this phenomenon is rather widespread, Bahri (1995:156) classifies it as not normative: 46) mai cāhtā hū ki āp uskī gambhīrtā par vicār *(kījiye) karẽ. I want you to think about its seriouseness. The ending –gā attaches to the form in –iye the meaning of “absolute future” (Kellogg 1938:460). Either in questions or in assertive sentences it is often used for expressing a future act, which is equal to the Future Tense form: 47) kāfī pījiegā? bhijvāū? (Sahni:166) Will you have coffee? Shall I order? 48) ab to bahut der ho gaī. kahā jāiyegā? (Prem Chand 1:33) It is very late. Where will you go ? 49) hamẽ xatre mẽ d āliyegā! (Yashpal 1:20) You will lead me to trouble! The unchangable ending –gā , in Липеровский’s opinion (1962:38), is the evidence of its passive origin, where there is no agreement between the agent and the predicate171. Still, it seems to us that this form may have other explanations. For instance, there is the influence of colloquial Hindustani. Describing the first Hindi grammar by J.J.Katelaer (1698), Chatterji (1978:252) points out that he dealt with “bazar Hindustani of Bombay and of Gujarat towns”, where “one hears /ham jaenga,

171

gā < gayā < gata (PP of Skt. gacch ‘go’) – Bubenik (Private communication).

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woh jaenga, we log karenga, seth ji kal jaenga/ etc.” This simple form exists till now172. Presenting the speech of uneducated persons writers use this colloquial form: 50) āp jo kahiyegā karūgī. (Nagar 2:48) I will do what you will say. We would add in this connection that this universal usage of –gā seems to us less a linguistic atavism, than evidence of the existing tendency of the modern spoken language to avoid a complex system of conjugations and agreements and to proceed to a more simple and unified one. Among the imperative forms, the most unambiguous one is tū -imperative. It is important to note that tū -imperative never occurs in subordinate clauses, and the sentence *mai cāhtā hū ki tū kar is not correct. This form, which is in fact the stem, is used only for direct commands. Guru (1962:120-121) subsumes it under “explicit imperative” and most of the other forms (karo, kījiye, kījiyegā, karnā) he calls “implicit imperative”. Palmer also writes that “the Imperative is best

seen as the unmarked member of the deontic system”; “the Imperative is often a simple form…” like “the bare root173 in Latin for singular” (1986:108).174 In the indological literature quite a lot has been said about why Hindi has so many different forms for expressing ‘mands’. In this connection two main reasons are mentioned – considerations of politeness and strength of obligation. These notions are, no doubt, mutually related in some respect, but not mutually dependent. On the one hand, politeness, indeed, determines the degree of authority of the speaker, but on the other politeness may only reflect moral norms existing in the society. A strong 172

“When I first studied a grammar of correct Hindustani…I received a shock of linguistic discovery. I

found that where we used simply one form for the verb future in all the persons and numbers (e.g. ham jaega – ham log jaega – tum jaega – tum log jaega – ap jaega – ap log jaega – wo jaega – u log jaega), the grammar gave at least four (mai jaunga – ham jaenge – tu jaega – tum jaoge – who jaega – we jaenge).” (Chatterji 2:258) “Из глагольных форм универсальный характер приобрела форма третьего лица единственного числа и своеобразная форма множественного числа с неизменяемым окончанием ā . Эти формы применяются ко всем лицам.” (Клюев 1962:189) (Among the verb forms the third person singular form and a peculiar plural form with unchangable ending ā acquired a universal character. Both are used with reference to any person.) 173

174

Bubenik Vit comments: “Rather stem – root + thematic vowel”. Compare with Bybee (1985:173): “Zero-marking is common in imperative”.

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obligation in its turn may be conveyed either by ‘polite’ or ‘impolite’ imperative forms175: 51) he bhagvān! kisī tarah mujhe ut hā le! (Kamleshvar 2:79) O, God! Please, take me anyhow! 52) billū ise das paise de ke vidā kar ! (Nagar 2:4) Billu, give him ten paisa and show him the door ! 53) xudā ke liye zardā khāne kī ādat mat d ālo. (Kamleshvar 1:52) For goodness sake, do not get accustomed to eating zarda ! 54) maine kahā na, ekdam sunā d ālo ! (Mishra:105) Haven’t you heard? Tell me immediately! 55) kal subah zarūr ā jānā. (Amrita 1:55) Come tomorrow morning without fail. 56) āj mai tumse prārathnā kartī hū, …tum mān lenā. (Ashk 1:81) Today I am begging you,…please agree. 57) caube jī, turãt cale āiye. (Nagar 2:17) Mister Chaube, please go there right away (and come back). How one should understand an imperative form – as a request or a command – is possible to know from a specific context176 (e.g. 49 – addressing God) or from the attached lexical items (“harmonic combinations” – Palmer 1986:63-64), such as xudā ke liye (for goodness sake), ekdam, turãt, jaldī (right away), zarūr, avašya (without fail, of course), zarā, kŗpayā, mæharbānī karke (be so kind

as). Morover, the phrase 58) ‘kahiye’, maine bahut šist tā ke sāth kahā. (Rakesh 1:148) Tell, please, - I said with particular courtesy. implies a special intonation and even a specific expression of face, which is not less but, perhaps, even more important for determining the strength of an obligation. Норман (1994:200) noticed a very interesting fact: even word order and the length of

175

“Commands are often given ‘politely’ in one of the variant forms, and requests abruptly”.(Hamblin

1987:7) 176

“Our examples, or most of them, to be typed accurately as REQUEST or COMMAND, need to

have read into them typical contexts, without which they could be either or neither”. (Hamblin 1987:7)

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an utterance influence the interpretation of an obligation. For example, the shorter an utterance, the stronger the command: 59) tum mujhe spast

likho ! (Rakesh 1:107)

Write me clearly ! 60) mis mīnā šarmā! bhīr

se zarā sā idhar ā jāo! (Amrita 1:130)

Miss Mina Sharma! Come closer from the crowd! The āp-oriented plural Optative is not considered a form expressing commands. Guru does not mention it even among the ‘implicit imperative’ forms (see above), and Ramchandra Varma writes: “ 

” (1995:48) (‘Do not make noise (āp -Imperative G.Sh.)’ – this will be an utterance bearing the meaning of command. ‘Do not make noise (āp -Optative G.Sh.)’ – this utterance will bear the meaning of polite request). But depending on the presence of specific lexical items, intonation and contextual circumstances, even āp -Optative may be interpreted as a command. In this case it underlines an emotional distance between the interlocutors: 59) merī vintī zarā yād rakhẽ. (Mitra:13) Please do not forget my request. (polite request) 60) misez saksenā ne kat hor svar mẽ kahā – jī nahī, āp jāẽ! (Prem Chand 2:44) Misses Saksena said sharply – no, you go, please! (command, coldness) There are even such cases in which a command is rendered not by a verb, but by its arguments. Since a verb has a definite number of arguments (‘quantitative and qualitative valency’ – see Dik 1986), it is also possible to define a verb on the basis of an argument. Contextual circumstances serve as the delimiter of the choice. For instance, when a sick child says “water!”, it means nothing else but “give me water!”: 61) ‘babbū’, tūrī hāphtī huī bolī, ‘pānī!’ (Sinh:28) ‘Daddy’,- said Turi gasping, - ‘Water!’ 62) yād rakhnā. chat he piriyad

mẽ hed

ke kamre mẽ. (Rakesh 1:36)

Don’t forget. In the sixth period, (come) in the room of the headmaster. Lyons (1977:749) writes in this connection that “the difference between commands and requests is in fact mainly conveyed, as one might expect, in the non-verbal

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component…the prosodic or paralinguistic component of the utterance”. This means that the force of the obligation is determined by the addressee depending on specific communicative conditions177 and not on a certain verbal form. The assertion of Stephany (1986:378) that more polite directives leave “an option to the addressee to comply with the directive or not” seems to us misleading, because it implies that the speaker issues a directive with no purpose. In fact, commands are simply made with more of an air of authority than requests, and refusal is not an option granted to the addressee but a possibility foreseen by the speaker.178 As for the degrees of ‘politeness’ of the imperative forms, we think this term is rather unfortunate because it implies that in the same situation with the same second person pronoun more polite or less polite forms may be used,179 while in reality each imperative form simply corresponds to a particular pronoun. This pronoun alone reflects the social rank of the addressee and the personal relations between the interlocutors. It is the usage of a personal pronoun that defines the choice of an imperative form. Thus, instead of polite / abrupt definitions we prefer to talk about tū-oriented, tum-oriented and āp-oriented forms (the three imperative forms

associated with āp are expressive of different degrees of ceremoniousness and not of politeness). Addressing in tū shows the obvious superiority of the speaker, and the verbal form used with it conveys command in the most authoritative way. Hence, it may be called a real imperative. tum signals relatively equal status of the interlocutors, and āp reflects inferiority of the speaker. That is the reason why the forms used with tum and āp present an action not as obligatory but as desirable. The Gerundive may be used

177

“The hearer is left to judge the force of his obligation to act from circumstances” (Palmer

1986:108). 178

“The distinction is, above all, sociological. Requests are made by those who have no authority to

give commands, at least on the matter at issue…Requests, in short, can and perhaps must be made from a position of inferiority, or at best equality; commands not” (Hamblin 1987:8-9) 179

We have to admit that such cases really exist in the colloquial speech. For instance, Surendra

Gambhir (1993:39) writes about two directive forms, used with the pronoun āp (āp karo, āp kījiye). But this is evidence not of different levels of politeness, but of a low educational level of the

speakers. Grammarians do not recognize the usage of the imperative form in –o with the pronoun āp as a grammatical norm (Bahri 1995:155) and consider it a manifestation of illiteracy (Ibid.:8)

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with any personal pronoun and so avoids emphasizing social differences between the interlocutors.

4.3.1.1.2. Additional resources. One of the means, which has unequivocally the sense of command, is the Genitive of the Gerundive. It occurs instead of imperative forms as a strong negative command. To us, it looks like an application of the intentional meaning which the form can bear (see above). The difference is that as a command it is applied to the second person pronoun, and the ending ā of the postposition kā is unchangeable. But it seems to be exclusively a colloquial form, for our main data (literary works) lack such examples, while feature films abound in them: 1) hāth nahī lagāne kā ! (Film “andāz apnā apnā”) Don’t touch ! 2) mere ko namaste nahī bolne kā ! (Film “mere do anmol ratn”) Do not say ‘hello’ to me ! Клюев (1962:180) speaking about colloquial forms of commands, notes a form which is in fact the same Genitive of the Gerundive, but when it is used with the word sahī, the postposition kā turns to kī: “batāne kī nahī sahī – do not tell”

(Ibid.) It is important to note that nowadays this form occurs not only with negative but with positive reference as well: 3) jab vah darvāzā kholegā, tab fon karne kā! (TV serial) When he opens the door then ring up ! Like the Gerundive used as a command, the Genitive of the Gerundive is not oriented to any particular pronoun and, being very authoritative, still avoids the usage of personal pronouns and, thereby, ignores social inequality. All the other forms that may be used for commands or requests are not so unambiguous as those mentioned above and always need a specific context to be interpreted as mands. One of them has already been mentioned (4.1) – the words zarūrat / āvašyaktā. This is one of the main means for expressing necessity, but applied to

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the second person as exclamation it may turn into a command (in a written text there must be a specific description of the situation) - revealing by this the personal attitude of the speaker to the SoA, and thus converting a neutral necessity into obligation (See 4.1.e.g. 8,9). This testifies that for transmitting a command prosodic or paralinguistic modulation is more important than the morphologic form180. The main condition is that from a specific context (intonation, deictic background) an inference could be made that the speaker wishes the addressee to fulfill the action. If this assumption is correct or not we can see in other examples. Let us begin with the Future Tense. So far we have discussed the ability of the Future Tense to express intention and factuality (3.2.2.2). Gonda (1956:78-79) argues that since it renders certainty and positiveness, it is used for expressing positive statements, assertions, threats and commands. For instance, the sentence 4) plīz, āp rizain nahī karẽge … maltī jī ne isrār se kahā. (Kamleshvar 1:81) Please, you will not resign (do not resign), - said Malty firmly. can be understood as a request due to the word ‘please’ and an additional description underlining the attitude of the speaker (said firmly). But in a conversation all these elements can be easily replaced by intonation. Intonation and context are a decisive factor in interpreting the sentence 5) ek roz šyāmlāl ne ākar ghosn ā kar dī – ‘kal se tārā nahī jāegī’. (Kamleshvar 2:6)

One day Shyamlal came and announced – “Beginning from tomorrow Tara will not go!” as a demand. It is presented with exclamation, and it emphasizes that the decision not to act was made by the speaker and not by the actor. Otherwise, it would be a mere assertion of the future act.

180

“ A number of studies … show that very young children use intonation and other prosodic devices

for communicative purposes. … Intonation is one of the first linguistic forms that children match with function” (Bassano et al. 1994:653-654).

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As a mand, the Future Tense may function also in an interrogative sentence. One may decide if it is a mand or a question from a particular speech situation where the speaker expresses his will or displays his curiosity about a possible future act181: 6) kākā, thor e se kamalgatte tālāb se khīc doge kyā ? (Prakash:29) Uncle, will you bring me some pips of lotus from the pond ? Given that the main distinction between requests and commands lays in the degree of authority of the speaker, the interrogative of the Future Tense can only be interpreted as request

182

. The āp-related Future Imperative behaves in a similar way

in an interrogative sentence: 7) bahū ne amar se pūchā, sinemā le caliyegā na ? (Priyamvada:102) The daughter-in-law asked Amar: “Will you take me to the cinema ?” The impersonal form (plural, masculin) of the Present Habitual Tense also may occur as a mand. It imposes obligation by presenting a conventional pattern of conduct, which may be either positive or negative: 8) are lālā jī, mān bhī jāte hai ! (Film “sārā ākāš”:14) Accept it, my dear! (People usually accept it) 9) are betā, ghussā nahī karte. (Sahni:127) Don’t be angry, my son. (People would not be angry on such occasions) We know from contextual circumstances and from the modulation of voice whether such an utterance is a command or request. The advantage of this construction is in the fact that the speaker’s command is supported by the opinion of the majority, and as such it aquires the meaning of moral obligation (should): 10) cup, aisī bātẽ nahī bolte ! (Mishra:215) Shut up! You should not say this! (People usually do not say such things) 181

Materna (1981:403) mentions also "question-like imperative sentences". He asserts that "there is a

distinctive kind of command, namely commands to answer specific questions". 182

“Requests are related to questions in the way that commands are related to categorical assertions.”

(Lyons 1996:766) “The etymology of the word request indicates a felt connection with question-asking. Ask is also the commonest verb in reporting requests (matching tell for orders)… The ask/tell test, though it is not utterly reliable, must be the simplest one for dividing requests from orders. (Presence of please is not a good indication)” (Hamblin 1987:7).

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Context and intonation play the main role in defining the meaning of the combination of the verb jā- (to go) with the potential verb sak- (be able): 11) āp jā sakte hai. (Nagar 2:100) You can go. Depending on context it can be understood as a permission to go or as a command to clear off (the context includes a peculiar tone and a countenance). However, it seems that as a command this combination is restricted to only one verb, jā-. The impact of the context becomes apparent even in understanding the meaning of the Counterfactual mood. The relation of this mood to ‘wish’ and ‘will’ was noted by many scholars. For instance, Норман (1994:180), describing the application scope of the Counterfactual mood, writes that it sometimes depicts actions irrespective of any conditions, in this sense “приближающихся к оптативным ситуациям (вежливая просьба, пожелание, предрасположенность и т.п.” (approximating to optative situations – polite request, wish, predisposition and so on). With regard to Hindi the role of the Counterfactual mood was described by Nespital (1980:100): “Andererseits Können bestimmte Grammeme der anderen 3 Modi, also des Indikativs, des Subjunktivs und des Irrealis, auch die Modalität der Aufforderung wiedergeben, also Primärfunktionen des Imperatives übernehmen.” And Липеровский (1962) points out only ‘shade of obligation’ which may carry the Counterfactual mood. Here are some examples: 12) dilīp se zarā pūch lete to. - pūch lūgā, cĩtā na karo. (Chatursen:61) You should ask Dilip (You should have asked Dilip) - I shall ask, do not bother. 13)

are bhāī, āpke ksetr ke mãtrī kũvar uttamsĩh hai, unse

udghāt an karāte. (Nagar 2:59)

My friend, the minister of your region is Kunvar Uttamsinh, you should ask him to expose it. (You should have asked) In both examples the obligatory condition for interpreting the utterances as proposal or request is understanding that the possibility for the fulfillment of the action still exists. These verbal forms include in their possible meanings a reproach that the act has not been fulfilled and advice / request to do it because the possibility has not been exhausted.

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The ap-oriented Optative is widely used as an imperative form. It may occur as a very polite request also in conditional sentence. This form allows avoiding direct ordering and considerably tempers the request: 14)

gurusaran jī, āp ek minat

ruk sakẽ to mæharbānī hogī.

(Kamleshvar 1:26) I would be grateful to you, mister Gurusaran, if you stay for a minute. 15) ināyat hogī agar apnā vah šer sunāẽ. (Ashk:55) We would be very pleased to hear that poem of yours. 1st person Optative (Sg. and pl.) is aimed at rendering meanings which could be glossed rather as asking for permission than issuing commands. Even when somebody demands an action from himself, he appeals to himself as to a 2nd person addressee. Still, there are cases when imperative senses may be induced even by the 1st person Optative: 16) kaunsī kitāb par

h

rahe hai, zarā dekhū! (Mitra:51)

Let me see (I would like to see), what book you are reading! 17) āxir ham bhī sunẽ, kis rājrānī ne hamāre lādle kī mati badal dī hai? (Shukla:45)

Let us listen (we also want to listen) which princess changed the mind of our beloved son. In form these sentences are very much like consultatives (see below), which express doubt and ask for permission; but uttered in an interrogative sentence with exclamatory intonation they acquire new properties. The speakers of sentences 16 and 17 do not seek somebody’s permission, but want somebody to perform an action (16 – to show a book, 17 – to tell). Such directives are obviously not authoritative and in most cases can be considered polite requests. According to the definition of commands / requests that we follow in our work, they must be applied to the addressee (second person). When this condition holds, even the first person Optative may serve as command or request.183 And again its interpretation depends on a specific context. The third person Optative is also not intended for direct orders, but in a specific situation it may function as an additional imperative form: 183

Kellogg calls them “hortatory phrases” (1938:459).

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18) mahārāj! merā aprādh ks amā ho! (Reddi 1:12) Your majesty! May my offence be excused! Such utterances are made with no reference to any specific agent and without emphasizing the authority of the speaker.184 The speaker simply presents his wish to see a SoA fulfilled, and the listener (who is not the addressee in the full sense of the world) is left to evaluate the force of the obligation: 19) yah fāil jo mehnat se banākar mai taiyār kar ke rakh āyā hū vah ghāyab na ho jāe. (Nagar 2:20)

This file, that I have prepared with difficulty, should not disappear. 20) merī is yojnā se jo log sæhmat hõ, ve kŗpayā hāth ut hāvẽ. (Reddi 2:65) Those, who will agree with my plan, let them raise their hands. 21) mai pāc minat

kā samay detā hū. bhīr

turãt yahā se calī

jāe. (Nagar 2:61)

I give you five minutes. Let the crowd go away immediately. 22) rājyamãtrī jī kā ādeš huā, ‘lāš ke carõ taraf kar ā pæhrā lagā diyā jāe’. (Nagar 2:67)

The state minister ordered, that guards must be placed around the body. The third person Optative verb is best interpreted as demand (see below), but in the given examples the sentences are uttered in the presence of the people who are supposed to react: 23) kabhī das rūpaye adhik le ātā to sāth hī apnī pacās māgẽ uske sāmne rakh detā: “is bār mā, do qamīzẽ sil jāẽ aur ek bar hiyā sā jūtā ā jāe”. (Rakesh 2)

When sometimes he brought ten rupees more, then he used to put before her his fifty claims: “This time, mother, two shirts will be sewed and wonderful shoes will come.” 24) rāstā to batā hī dẽge, lekin pæhle to e patā cale ki tumhẽ jānā kahā hai. (Film “Shankara”)

I will tell you the way, but first I would like to know what is your destination. 184

Platts says they are made with less authority than the Imperative. (1874:360)

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With negation it sounds stronger, for negation makes the utterance more authoritative and is better interpreted as command: 25) lekin yād rakho – āĩdā aisī bhūl na ho. (Reddi 2:91) But remember – such a mistake should not be made in the future. 26) phir unhõne use aur lālī ko hidāyat dī, ‘koī das baje se pæhle na soe’. (Mohini:193)

Then she instructed him and Lali: “Nobody should sleep before ten”.

4.3.1.2. Demands. Lyons (1977:751) writes that “demands differ from commands and requests in that they are not necessarily addressed to those upon whom the obligation of fulfillment is imposed”. In our analyses the term ‘demand’ stands for such constructions, where the speaker presents his wish to see an SoA realized when the performer is absent or is not defined. Consequently, the agent of these constructions may be focal or non-focal.

A. The agent is focal. When the performer is known, he can be only the third person agent, because he is never present at the speech moment. The focal agents go with the Optative or, more rarely, with the Future Tense. This sort of indirect order usually presupposes an intermediary. The strength of the obligation remains undefined. One can evaluate it only from specific context. For instance, the sentence 1) vah mujhe merī zyādatiyõ ke liye muāf kare. (Chandrakanta:96) can be translated as * ‘I demand that he pardon me for the excesses’ (this variant is improper, because we know from our experience that pardon is begged and not demanded), or as ‘I ask him to excuse me for the excesses’ or ‘Tell him, please, my apologies for the excesses’. The problem of accuracy in translating such utterances arises because of the nature of the Optative. In fact, the Optative is a sign of

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subordination and nothing more.185 The exact meaning of the verb expressed by the Optative can be determined only from the main clause: 2) mai nahī cāhtā ki pulīs mere darvāze par āe. (Nagar 2:28) I do not want police to come to my door. 3) maine …isrār kiyā ki ve kalakt arī par ā jāẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:108) I demanded that they come to the tax collector’s office. 4) mai apne sāre kāryakarttāõ aur samarthakõ se vintī kartā hū ki ve ab māltī jī kā sāth dẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:91)

I beg from all my workers and supporters to join Malty now. If only the subordinate clause is uttered, then the meaning of the absent main clause can be inferred from the context: 5) koī yahā calā āe. (Kamleshvar 1:36) Let anybody come here. (The matter cannot be solved by a telephone conversation. We must meet and talk. So, ask them to come.) Here, again, we deal with the evaluation of the speaker’s authority, the strength of which varies from commanding (6) to wishing (7): 6) nārā badal gayā. ‘suhāgī kī aurat ko pulīs āzād kare’ (Nagar 2:63) The slogan changed: “Let the police liberate the wife of Suhagi”. 7) jab log byāh ke bād byāh ko koste hai to ve kyõ karte hai šādī? na karẽ! sukh se rahẽ. (Ashk 1:173)

If people vilify marriage after they get married, then why do they marry? Let them not marry. May they be happy. The Future Tense (see e.g. 5 in 4.3.1.1.2.) differs from the Optative form in that it is more authoritative and presents only orders, which are not to be discussed.

185

“There is a close parallelism between the subjunctive in an independent (main) clause and the

subjunctive in a subordinate clause where the semantics of the modality are carried by lexical elements of the main clause” (Palmer 1986:40)

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B. The agent is non-focal. The third person Optative appears also in demands, which propose some action or pattern of behavior that must be carried out without mentioning the performer. Such demands do not impose an obligation on somebody particular. They only demonstrate the attitude of the speaker (positive or negative) to the action. Non-focal demands are represented by passive forms - either by the passive voice or by intransitive verbs with passive meanings: 8) in ghāvõ se hamārī yogyatā ākī jāe. (Parasayee:106) Let our merits be appreciated through the wounds. 9) pūjīpatiyõ kā nāš ho! (Nagar 2:106) Let the capitalists be abolished! The demands with no specific address, naturally, have the features of slogans. Besides passive constructions, other verb forms, which have a generic reading (tumoriented imperative form, the ‘Gerundive + copula’ construction) also occur in slogans: 10) sarasvatī devī kī maut kā badlā lo! …ādi nāre lagne lage. (Nagar 2:67) Take revenge on the death of Sarasvati Devi !…and other slogans began to sound. 11) yah sarkār badalnī hai ! (Nagar 2:67) This government must be changed !

4.3.2. Exhortatives. The further gradation of Directives is made also on semantic and not morphologic grounds. The principle at the basis of this distinction is the interest of the speaker. As we can see in the previous subclass of Directives – the mands – all the utterances are provoked by the private interest of the speaker. The Exhortatives take into account or are guided mainly by the interests of the addressee. We present here two subclasses of the exhortatives – cohortatives and recommendations.

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4.3.2.1. Cohortatives. Hamblin (1987:10) writes that so-called ‘invitations’, unlike commands, requests and demands “are not designed to serve exclusively the interests of the issuer. The interest, rather, is mutual.” The cohortatives that go with the 1st person plural Optative are not so authoritative, and have an illocutionary force of ‘I suggest’ or ‘I propose’ and not ‘I order’. They do not sound like orders even if uttered with exclamation and firmly: 1) bait ho, ham log kuch bātẽ karẽ. (Kishor:279) Sit, let us talk a little. Usually the invitative sentence is introduced by the imperative forms of the verbs ā- (to come) and cal- (to move) according to the personal pronoun:

2) ā, yahā šilā par bait hẽ. (Sankrityayan:15) (Come) Let us sit here on the rock. 3) calo, pæhle khānā khā lẽ. (Nagar 2:83) Let us have some meals first. 4) āiye, is vanpãktī ko kuch samīp se dekhẽ. (Sankrityayan:1) Let us see the line of the forests closely. Negation does not change its authoritative level: 5) ham log āj na calẽ. (Kishor:121) Let us not go today. The ‘invitative’ senses can be rendered also by sentences the predicate of which are in the Present Habitual Tense. We have discussed the ability of this tense to express intention to act in the near future (see 3.2.2.2). If the verb is in plural form and the sentence is introduced by the ‘invitative’ verbs cal- and ā-, then it acquires the meaning of inviting the addressee to act together with the speaker: 6) cal, bāgh mẽ calte hai.(Mohini:197) Let us go to the garden. 7) to calo, sab se pæhle mahāvīr mãdir calte hai. (Mishra:25) Let us go to the Mahavir Temple first, then. 8) āo idhar sofe par bait

h

kar bātẽ karte hai. (Rakesh 1:54)

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Let us sit here on the sofa and talk. The list of the cohortatives is closed by the third person Optative of the Impersonal Passive. Basically, this form serves for expressing demands, for it presents action as necessary in the speaker’s mind and does not refer to any particular person. But addressed directly to someone in particular, it turns out to be a directive with the illocutionary force of ‘suggestion’, ‘wish’ especially when a sentence begins with the ‘invitative’ verbs: 9) calo, let ā jāe ! (Kishor:132) Let us go to bed. 10) hā, caliye, mil hī liyā jāe. (Mitra:6) O.K., let us go and meet him. These forms reflect the inclination of the speakers of Hindi to express different shades of relations between the interlocutors. The second person Optative forms are a little stronger than the third person Optative of the Impersonal Passive, but less authoritative than the Indicative forms. The common elements in all the three options are the invitative verbs, which attach to the above-mentioned expressions a hortatory meaning.

4.3.2.2. Recommendations. Recommendations, advice and suggestions also propose some sort of action or pattern of behavior, but they differ crucially from the mands in that, as Hamblin (1987:10) notes, they are “concerned not with the interests or wishes of the utterer, but with those of the addressee”. Recommendations are issued on the basis of the speaker’s understanding of what is good and reasonable. They carry “rational authority rather than the social authority of the issuer” (Ibid.). We have shown so far two morphologic forms that can function in a specific context as recommendations and advice – the combination of the Gerundive with cāhiye (see 4.2.3. e.g. 8-9) and the combination of the Gerundive with copula (see 4.2.1. e.g. 14-17). Here is one more form – the third person Optative of the Passive Voice (including the Impersonal Passive). This form has appeared several times in this chapter as demand, command, request, invitative; and now – as recommendation.

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Since the same form bears so many different meanings, only contextual background may help to distinguish them. For instance, the phrase ‘lekin dilīp se pūch liyā jāe’ (Chatursen:61) could be interpreted as ‘I want you to ask

Dilip’, ‘Let us ask Dilip together’ or ‘I think that it would be correct to ask Dilip’. The latter has an evaluative meaning and hence can be understood as a recommendation or advice. Taking into account the situation from which the utterance was extracted, this is, in fact, exactly what it means. If the context provides the listener with understanding that the speaker simply intends to declare what is, in his opinion, good (correct, reasonable), then such passive optatives are recommendations: 1) keval pustakīya gyān ke sthān par unhẽ vyāvahārik gyān diyā jāe. (Mishra:98)

Instead of bookish knowledge, practical knowledge must be given to them. (This is what I think correct). There are sentences that already include the evaluation of the speaker (mai soctā hū, merā xayāl hai – ‘I think’, kyõ na – ‘why not’ etc.). In this case, its

interpretation is less dependent on the context: 2) isliye soctā hū ki kyõ na pæhle kuch din is ilāqe mẽ jākar ghūm liyā jāe ! (Rakesh 1:139)

That is why I think - why not go and travel some days in that region. Some notes are in order. Since the Optative may have a generic reading in the Present, a sentence like (2) may mean displeasure, indignation: 3) kyõ na pæhle hī saral rūp mẽ likhā jāe. (Varma 1995:187) Why not to write simply from the very beginning? That is why in order to be interpreted as a recommendation, the sentence with kyõ na must have clear reference to the future.

The verb sak- , which contains the meaning of ability, permission and possibility, in specific situations can be used for giving advice. But it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determe which of these meanings prevails: 4) tumne jo qadam uthāyā hai, ise tum apnī behtarī ke liye bhī istemāl kar sakte ho. (Rakesh 1:34)

The measures, that you have taken, you can use in your own favor.

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4.4. Volitives. There is a large group of notions, which are closely related in their meanings to the Directives in that they express the wish of the speaker to see an SoA fulfilled, but differ from them in that the speaker deals not with facts and reality but with an imagined, possible situation. Such utterances convey wishes, blessings, hopes, and fears. This is the case when Deontic and Epistemic modalities overlap. It is not simple, and may be impossible, to define such an utterance as belonging exclusively to one or another modality. Following Palmer, we would say that such cases belong to either. To some extent they are connected with the evaluation of the truth of propositions, but, as Palmer (1986:97) emphasizes, they are concerned mainly with possible actions. Proceeding from logical arguments one may expect that hopes and blessings refer to the future only; but wishes and fears may pertain either to the future or to the past. As for fears, it must be added that they can be rendered in all tenses including the present.

4.4.1. Volitives with future reference. The only morphologic mechanism that serves this purpose is the Optative. The main reason is that the Optative involves both wish and non-factuality: 1) tumhāre yaš kī sugãdh sab dišāõ mẽ mahak ut he. (Reddi 2:142) May the flavor of your fame spread in all directions. 2) sālgira mubārak ho, šæhzādī. (Film ‘farhad aur šīrī’) Many happy returns of the day, princess. 3) jai ho gãgā māī. (Tivari:5) Long live mother Ganges. Wishes are often accompanied by the exclamative particle kāš (if only), which emphasizes a strong wish of the speaker and without which the Optative form could be glossed as a mand or an exhortative: 4) kāš! har koī e bāt samjhe aur amal kare! (Reddi 2:21) O, if only everyone would understand it and act ! 5) kāš, mere mũh se ek šabd bhī na nikle ! (Дымшиц 1980:64) If only not a single word would escape from my lips !

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The particle kāš may be replaced by appealing to God: 6) bhagvān kare mohan mil jāe ! (Film ‘gunāh aur qānūn’) May God make us meet Mohan. Addressing God (bhagvān, īšvar, rām, xudā, allā) is one of the common forms for wishing and blessings: 7) xudā aisā hī kare ! (Chatursen:48) Let it be so ! (May God make it so) 8) allā āpko salāmat rakhe ! (Prem Chand 1:32) May God save you ! This form is not used to make somebody act. That is why the predicate verb is usually non-volitive and the subject is not active. The only active performer in these utterances is God, who cannot, naturally, be forced to act. Curses (which are also wishes, but with negative content) are very much like slogans (demands). The difference is very subtle. The only distinction that we see is that curses are more emotional and less practical than slogans: 9) burā ho is sarkār kā ! (Mishra:189) May this government fail ! 10) are bhār

mẽ jāe aisī par hāī ! (Sahni:16)

May such education burn away ! 11) rām jī tujhe uthā le ! (Yashpal 2:40) May Rama take you ! (Go to hell) For expressing fear, apprehension, or other negative attitude about some undesired action that may take place in the future, again the Optative is used. But this time it is accompanied by the word kahī (by chance) and the negative particle na: 12) sãbhal kar utarnā par tā hai, kahī

phisal na jāe . (Kishor:277)

Here we have to go down carefully that we would not slip. 13) šãkā huī kahī

rame dra is mazār ke višay me

pūch na bait he.

(Prem Chand 1:37) She was afraid that Ramendra would ask about this grave. Fear is a negative counterpart of hope. Without negation (na) sentences like (12) and (13) present the proposition as possible and desirable:

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14) is liye mai jhākkar dekh rahā hū ki kahī

ve dikhāī dẽ. (Reddi

2:11) That is why I am looking out (with a hope) that they may appear. There are investigators which subsume apprehension under epistemic modality. For instance, Lichtenberk (1995) proposes a term ‘apprehensional epistemics’. He writes that sentences like those described above, express mainly “the speaker’s degree of certainty about the factual status of a proposition” (p.293) which is undesirable “in some way” (p.295). In fact, he does not deny the presence of the deontic semantics: “This is a case not of polysemy but of mixed modality…, both types of modality are present simultaneously” (p.293)186. Given the temporal domain of deontic modality belongs to the future, an element of evaluation of its truth presents in each deontic utterance. It may be the case that such evaluation constitutes the main purpose of an utterance; then one may naturally assume that its epistemic qualities prevail, as in the following example: 15) terī koī šikāyat to nahī hai na ? (hãs – “rājū kā parišram”) There are no complaints against you, are there ? In (15) an element of apprehension and discomfort undoubtly exists (the particle to), but what bothers the speaker is not how serious the situation is, but how real it is.

Contrarily, any utterance, where a negative/positive wish with respect to the proposition is presented overtly (12, 13, 14), should be considered deontic.

4.4.2. Volitives with past and present reference. Wishes for the past are expressed by the Counterfactual mood. In order to distinguish them from conditional sentences with unreal content, the particle kāš is used as an introducer. As in the case of the Optative, this particle attaches to the whole utterance the meaning of a strong wish. The Counterfactual is expressive of “unrealized or unrealizable action” (Pořízka 1963:231). Therefore, the wish accompanied by the Counterfactual expresses the feeling of regret that an action has not taken place, often

186

Nuyts (2001:336) expressed a similar idea: “At first sight there are no combinations of these two

meanings (epistemic and deontic – Sh.G.) in one lexical form… unless forms such as hopefully, I hope, and I fear would qualify as such”.

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with an inference that this action is possible and desirable in the future (see also 4.3.1.1.2. e.g. 9-10): 1) kāš (ki) mai vahā jā saktā ! (McGregor 1986:70) How I wish I could go there. 2) hunar sāhib ne cetan kā utsāh bar hāte hue kahā ki kāš vah lāhaur mẽ hotā ! (Ashk 1:56)

Mister Hunar said, inspiring the enthusiasm of Chetan, ‘Oh, would he were in Lahore!’ 3) kāš mai terī tarah patthar kī hotī ! (Film ‘farhad aur šīrī’) I wish I would be made of stone like you. The fear (conjecture, supposition) of the speaker that some non-desirable action may has possibly taken place is rendered by the Past Indefinite Tense with the addition of the word kahī and the particle to. Such a sentence is uttered with an interrogative intonation, and the predicate verb is negated: 4) kahī ve tyagpatra dekar to nahī cale gaye ? (Kamleshvar 1:99) If he may not have gone after giving a discharge application? 5) kahī aisī koī bāt to nahī ki bīran ne xūdkušī kī ho? (Kamleshvar 2:61) May not it possibly the case that Biran committed suicide? The fear for the present is expressed in the same way as the fear for the past. The difference is, of course, in the verbal form: 6) to kahī isī vajah se to tum naukrī chor kar nahī jā rahe ho? (Rakesh 1:130) Is it, maybe, the reason why you are leaving the job? 7) kahī sulocnā chipkar iske pās ātī jātī to nahī? (Prem Chand 1:45) If she does not go to her secretly? All these examples testify that neither separate words, nor ‘pure’ morphologic categories, but, rather, their combinations are able to render the complete semantic spectrum of the contents expressed.

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4.5. Consultatives. Among the cases of Deontic modality, some are situated between various evident and clear-cut categories and have properties of every category upon which they border. Therefore, it is very difficult to subsume them under any specific name. One of these cases is a sort of interrogative sentence traditionally labeled “deliberative questions” (Lyons 1977:755) or “consultatives” (Palmer 1986:108). We think that they can be distinguished as a separate category of Deontic modality in terms of their semantic features. Consultatives are a kind of question, whose answers are mands or other directives. Consultatives are concerned with the interests of the issuers and are uttered with an air of inferiority. The experience (rational authority) and will of the addressee take on specific significance, because he is supposed to turn to an issuer of a directive. In Hindi consultatives are interrogative sentences with the first and the third person Optative predicate: 1) to mai kyā karū? (Dinkar:56) What am I to do? 2) vācū kyā javāb de? kyā kahe? (Sahni:25) What could Vanchu answer? What could he say? Without questioning, such a sentence expresses the speaker’s intention: 3) tab tak mai bhojan kar lū. (Prem Chand 1:20) Till then I would better have some meals. Since consultatives use the verbal forms of the Optative, they depend to considerable extent on context; that is to say, they need some explanation to be understood correctly as carrying the meanings of a) doubt, uncertainty, hesitation, b) inquiring about the will of the listener: 4) vah hairān thā ki kyā kare aur kyā na kare (Ashk 1:52) He wondered, what he should do and what he should not do. (Uncertainty) 5) bar ī der se soc rahe the ki mā se kahẽ ki na kahẽ. (Pushpa:23) We have been thinking for a long time – to tell mother or not. (Hesitation) 6) bolo, kitne paise curākar laū? (Amrita 1:19) Tell me, how much money am I to steal? (Inquiring)

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7) ab kaho – tumhāre liye kyā karū? (Chatursen:142) Now say – what do you want me to do for you? (Inquiring) The Passive Voice in the consultatives means generalization, and the verb does not specify who will be the performer. A possible action is presented as applicable to anyone, at least to all those who are related to the action at hand: 8) merī samajh mẽ nahī ātā , kyā kiyā jāe. (Chatursen:161) I am at a loss, what could be done. 9) to pæhlā nām kiskā likhā jāe? (Kamleshvar 1:11) Well, whose name is to be registered first? A written text should be supplied with necessary explanations, otherwise only the conditions of the dialogue can determine the meaning of the consultative phrase ab bhī laut

jāū? (Yashpal 2:72) as asking for advice (should I return?) or

permission (may I return?). Only the context tells us that the sentence kyā karẽ? (Menan:10) means ‘there is nothing to do’, and mai kyā karū? (Chatursen:37) means ‘what do you want me to do?’ Only from context do we know that the sentence naqal ko sãraks an

dū? (Mithileshvar:99) conveys indignation (‘you want me

to cover up cribbing?’) and not asking for permission or inquiring about the wish of the addressee. In one case we do not see any possibility to separate consultatives from invitations: 10) maine vanyā se kahā, ‘ab soẽ?’ (Kishor:42) I said to Vanya: “Let us sleep”. (or “What should we do now – go to bed?”) Without the question the sentence is less ambiguous and can be glossed as an invitative, but when questioned it bears the meanings of either.

4.6. Permissives. Under this category we subsume the cases, which fall within the definition given in the beginning of chapter 4 for deontic possibility and are translated by the English modal ‘may’. Permissions have a straight connection with such notions as ‘necessity’ and ‘wish’, but the speaker is neutral about them. The speaker has some sort of authority to grant

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permission, but he does not display his own wish. He can only evaluate the desirability of an action for the addressee, because, as Lyons notes, “we do not normally grant people permission to do something which we have no reason to believe that they wish to do or might wish to do” (1977:838). Permissions do not lay down obligations but eliminate barriers for carrying out some act.187 Permissions are expressions that have evident social and communicative roots.188 The source of permission can be either specific (a person or an institution) or general (laws of the society, rules of conduct and so on). Permissions with a specific source seem to be stronger than those with a general source. The strength of a permission can be evaluated also in terms of active/passive voice distinctions, the former being stronger. Moreover, Hamblin (1987:30) claims that permissives can be issued not only by those who have the authority to command, but also by those who are in the position to request, advise, demand. He calls them a command-permissive, a requestpermissive etc. When granting permission the speaker is in an active position, and his commitment to the action is not taken into account. But when he asks for permission, then his position is passive - he is the one who wishes the action to be fulfilled, and he is supposed to turn to the addressee of the permission. Both expressions have much in common and possess some cognate devices for their expression. As we have already said, the wish of the speaker in granting permission is irrelevant. The only shade of his attitude which can be marked is absence of his interest – indifference. Analyzing permission in terms of the absence of prohibition (Lyons 1977:840), we consider indifference a sub-type of permissives, which grants permissions by abstaining from creating obstacles.189 There is one more sub-type of permissives, which is called ‘exemptions’. According to Lyons (1977:840) they are analyzed in terms of the absence of obligation. Negative permissives are known as prohibition. In prohibitions the will and the wish of the speaker are more relevant than those of the addressee. In some respect 187

“What a speaker intends to permit is often that a specific person be given discretion to choose what

is done.” (Hamblin 1987:31) 188 189

“Permission is simply the presence of social enabling conditions.” (Bybee 1994:193) Von Wright (1951:1-2) noted that permission and indifference use the same mechanism.

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prohibitives are like mands and, as Palmer (1986:113) notes, “denial of permission is equivalent to giving instructions not to act, since ‘not possible’ is equivalent to ‘necessary-not’ in a logical system”, but “denying permission is not the same as obliging someone not to act”(Ibid:99). Lyons, discussing the subject in more detail, claims that prohibitions are issued as instructions to refrain from acting and “they are to be analyzed as “I say so – let it not be so – (that) p’, rather than as ‘I say so – so be it – (that) not p” (1977:774). As for the temporal domain of the permissives, one might, in fact, believe that it is possible to permit or to prohibit only an impending action. This does not mean, anyhow, that the past or the present tense forms cannot occur with permissives, for we have already seen that the forms employed for specific temporal characteristics may refer to different tenses. Hindi has no means that serve solely for expressing permissions, and this is, perhaps, the case also in other languages.190 Permissives are mainly rendered by verbal forms belonging to other categories and serving other purposes. We should not leave out of our reckoning also lexical means. So, let us see what these means are and how they work.

4.6.1. Permissions. 4.6.1.1. Granting permissions. There are cases when permission can be given by means of imperative forms.191 In order to know what meaning an imperative form bears – permission or command – one needs a contextual background. Both Lyons (1977:838) and Hamblin (1987:30) point out that the main condition for a mand to be interpreted as a permission-granting utterance is the clear wish of the addressee to fulfill an action: 1) mai tumhārī tarah st eyar karūgā. – karo. (Amrita 1:93) I will stare like you. – Stare (all right). 190 191

Cf.Lyons 1977:840. “Although imperative sentences are characteristically used to issue mands, they may also be

employed, in certain situations, to grant permission. For example, when we say Come in! in response to a knock on the door, we are not normally understood to be issuing a command (or even a request), but to be granting to the person who has knocked permission to enter the room.” (Lyons 1977:837)

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A relative clause can replace a sentence which is produced by the addressee in a dialogue and in which his wish is represented: 2) tujhe jis jis ciz kā bil cāhiye, uskā bil le le. (Rakesh 1:63) You may take a bill of any thing you need. 3) suniye, ab āpkā rāj hai, jo cāhe kījiye, jo cāhe na kījiye. (Kumar:53) Listen, it is your rule now, do what you like, do not do what you do not like. In many cases context allows one to omit the imperative form, which can be understood. For instance, the phrase jaise āp kī marzī (as you like) implies the existence of such verbs as do, act, think, play etc., which can only be derived from the dialogue: 4) usne āhistā se kahā, ‘jaisā āp munāsib samjhẽ’. (Chatursen:11) He said quietly: “As you consider it proper.” The following sentence, in which the tum-oriented imperative form is used twice, can illustrate the difference in its usage as a permission (the first verb) and as a command (the second verb): 5) mujhe

tum

jo

cāho

sazā

de

lo

par

aisā

mũh

na

banāo.

(Chatursen:26) You may give me any punishment you like, but do not look at me like this. The next resource for granting permission , which is, perhaps, the prevailing one, is the verb sak-. We have discussed the ambiguity of sak-, the interpretation of which depends exclusively on the context. For example, the sentence 6) ham log kisī bhī višay par bāt kar sakte hai. (Rakesh 1:99) We can discuss any subject. can be glossed inherently (‘we are able…’), deontically (‘we are allowed…’), and with certain additions – epistemically (‘it is possible that we…’). All these meanings are encoded in the verb sak- and can be taken out of this shell, each of them under certain conditions. What allows the speaker to use sak- for granting permissions, and allows the listener to see permission in it? By using this verb, the speaker seems to confirm the ability of the addressee to cope with the situation. If the speaker is in a

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position to permit, then his confidence is interpreted as permission. So, permission is an implied and not directly and unambiguously expressed notion: 7) kamãd ar ne ijāzat de dī thī ki chutt ī ke samay mẽ bīran us sāhasik abhiyān par jā saktā hai. (Kamleshvar 2:25)

The commander gave a permission that during the vacations Biran may go on this courageous expedition. 8) arest

karānā cāhẽ to karā sakte hai, bablū bhaiyā. (Nagar 2:81)

If you want to initiate arrest, then you may do it, brother Bablu. 9) tū āj yā kal kisī vaqt ā sakte ho. (Rakesh 1:39) You may come any time today or tomorrow. These examples prove the claim of Hamblin that permissions can be made with different degrees of authority. Thus, examples (7) and (8) can be glossed as a command-permission and (9) – as a request-permission. When used with passive forms sak- can also convey the idea of permission to a non-focal agent (a demand-permission). But the compulsory condition is that the permission-granting authority be clearly present in the context. Otherwise such a sentence will render an estimation of possibility: 10) is mẽ (āg bujhāne mẽ – G.Sh.) lar ke agar virodh karẽ to āsū ges kā prayog kiyā jā saktā hai. (Nagar 2:67)

If the boys resist extinguishing the fire then tear gas may be used. Permissions given to the third person agent use the Optative, which is particularly dependent on context, in which two main constituents – the wish of the agent and the permission-granting authority – must be evident. Otherwise, we will have too many options for translation: 11) uske jo jī mẽ āe, kare. (Mithileshvar:32) Let him do what he wants. 12) na pasãd āe (lar kī), na kare (šādī). (Ashk 1:32) If he does not like (the girl) then he need not marry her.

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4.6.1.2. Statements of permission. Statements that describe acts of permission are obviously not modal.192 We think, however, that it would be appropriate to show some forms that are semantically connected to the permissives, especially since some of them are used both to grant permissions and to create propositions. The most striking examples of such forms are the combinations of the verbs de(to give) and pā- (to get) with the oblique Gerundive: de- refers to the active agent and bears the meaning ‘allow, permit, let’, while pā- refers to the passive agent and is translated as ‘to be allowed, to be permitted, get’: 1) ham tumhẽ us māl ko kahī bhī nahī becne dẽge. (Nagar 2:20) We will not allow you to sell the commodity anywhere. 2) mujhe yah hukm hai ki julūs yahā se āge na jāne pāe. (Prem Chand 2:50) I have got an order that the demonstration would not be allowed proceed from here. There is one point which is worth mentioning. In spite of some examples given in different grammars (Platts 1874:178, Kellogg 1938:240, Saihgal 1964:142, Pray 1970:149), in which these constructions are used positively, in practice they occur mainly with negation (na or nahī). The negative particles may precede or follow the combination of verbs: 3) tum mujhe bhī hãsne nahī dete, apnī aurat ko šāyad ut hnebait hne, khāne-pīne bhī na doge! (Reddi 2:35)

You do not allow even me to laugh, you will probably not allow your wife to stand up or to sit down, to eat or to drink! When de- and pā- are combined with verbs designating a non-volitional, nondeliberate action, then with negation they mean ‘to prevent’ and ‘to be prevented’ respectfully: 4) tum us sthiti ko āne hī nahī dogī. (Mishra:6) You will prevent such a situation. 5) unkī talvārõ par kabhī zãg na lagne pātā thā. (Prem-Chand 2:173) 192

“Permissions are locutions that permit, not locutions that talk about permission” (Hamblin 1987:31)

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Their swords have not got rusted (were prevented from rusting). When the addressee is not in a position to permit, then the imperative forms of the verb de- with the Oblique Gerundive mean “wait untill…”: 6) ilaikšan ho jāne dījiye, mujhe koī jaldī nahī hai. (Kamleshvar 1:26) Wait till the elections end. I am not in a hurry. 7) rãjo bet ī ko āne do, usse patā karūgā. (Tivari:8) Wait untill daughter Ranjo comes, I will ask her. The verb sak- can not only grant but sometimes state the existence of permission when it occurs within a narrative sentence in the Present Habitual Tense. It can convey permission given by laws, agreements, contracts and so on (6) and give a moral permission (7): 8) unse anumati lene ke bād hī mai film-adhikār dubārā bec saktā hū. (Mitra:50)

I can sell the rights for the film again only with their consent. 9) mai badnām hū, dalit hū, tyājya hū. mujhe sab kuch kahā jā saktā hai. (Prem Chand 1:51)

I am fallen, crushed, deserted; one may say anything to me. And, of course, permission can be stated to exist explicitly by lexical items such as ijāzat / āgyā (permission) and their counterparts anumati (consent), āzādī

(freedom) and so on: 10) …kisī jal-bhare bādal kī tarah jise na barasne kī ijāzat thī, na laut ne kī. (Mishra:6)

…like a cloud full of water which had neither permission to rain, nor to go back. 11) merī ko thīet ar le jāne kī anumati de rahe hai kyā? (Reddi 2:125) Are you giving your consent to take Mary to the theatre?

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4.6.1.3. Asking for permission. In this sub-type of permissives we have the same set of tools with an inevitable addition of interrogation, as the word ‘ask’ implies: 1) sāhab, kyā mai ye samācār sabko sunā saktā hū? (Reddi 2:57) Mister, may I tell the news to everybody? In view of the fact that the verb sak- may have different interpretations, in the case of the request for permission the presence of a permission-granting authority is necessary (in the background at least); otherwise a phrase containing sak- may be understood as inquiring about ability or possibility: 2) socā kyā unhẽ hat ā saktā hū? (Kishor:38) I wondered if I may take them (the cups) away? (My wife may not allow me that) 3) kyā ham ek-do roz ruk nahī sakte? (Kishor:44) Cannot we stay here for some days? (This is a question that a woman asks her husband. Thus, it is inquiring about possibility. The same question applied to a property owner sounds as asking for permission). An interrogative sentence with a verb in the Future Tense may mean either asking for information or for permission. Only a specific speech situation can give the needed explication: 4) ham bhī sūghẽge sarkār? (Film ‘mirc-masālā’) May I smell, sir? Deliberative forms of the 1st person Optative, which have been shown in (4.5) to be consultatives, may serve also as a form of asking for permission: mai bolū? mai pūchū? (May I say? May I ask?). The meanings of hesitation, suggestion that are

inherent in this form are easily glossed as asking for permission, a fortiori when it is accompanied by explicit lexical items: 5) to kisī din zyārat kar āū, ijāzat hai? (Chatursen:47) So, some day I will go for pilgrimage, may I? 6) sāhab, ek bāt pūchẽ? (Rakesh 1:111) May we ask, sir?

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This form retains its meaning also in the conditional sentence. Interrogative intonation, again, plays the leading part: 6) aur agar mai āp ko ‘tum’ kæhkar pukārū ? (Chatursen:21)

And if I call you ‘tum’ (thou) ? The only construction, which asks for permission not as interrogative, but as imperative, is the combination of the oblique Gerundive with the verb de- (to give, to let, to allow). Unlike the former constructions, it is more pressing, urgent. It marks an appeal directly to those who has the authority to permit: 8) mujhe kuch kæh lene do, bānū. (Chatursen:22) Allow me to say something, Banu. 9) hamẽ āpkī sevā karne dījiye. (Reddi 2:62) Please, allow us to serve you.

4.6.1.4. Indifference. Besides the lexical means like meri balā (se) or merā kyā bantā-bigar tā hai (I do not care) we have found two morphologic means for expressing

indifference, namely the third person Optative and the imperative forms of the verb de- with the oblique Gerundive, that is to say the forms which serve other permissives

as well. The Optative is a form, not a meaning.193 The third person Optative helps to express demands, wishes, fears, and permissions. Now we have ‘indifference’ as well. What conditions distinguish it from all the above-mentioned senses? First, the speaker does not wish or might not wish to see the agent acting in a certain way: 1) jalā karẽ ye log. (Dinkar:4) Let194 these people burn, I do not care. 2) bigar tā hai to bigr e. (Sahni:138) 193

“In various languages, also in the ancient I.-E. idioms, the present indicative can also serve to

express volition, stimulation etc. … We should therefore conclude that the mood of the verb helps to formulate a desire, exhortation etc., not that it expresses them.” (Gonda 1956:89) 194

S.Migron observes: “It is curious that Palmer, a native speaker of English, does not devote a single

word to the modal employment of ‘let’ in his “Mood and Modality” (Private communication).

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He is getting worse? I do not care. Second, the speaker is not in the position to permit: 3) jise d ūb marnā ho, vah jākar d ūb mare. (Mithileshvar:22) Those who want to drown, let them drown. 4) yug bīt gaye. duniyā badal gayī. -

badal jāe. (Chatursen:146)

Epochs have passed. The world has changed. - I do not care. The second condition is also present in the sentences expressing unavoidable result, demonstrating inability of the speaker to change something in the future, resignation: 5) jo ho so ho. (Saihgal 1964:100) Let it be what is to be. 6) billū apne kāmõ kā jo phal pāe so pāe, mai bhalā kyā kar saktā hū. (Nagar 2:20)

Let Billu get what he is to get. What on earth can I do ? The imperative forms of the verb de- with the oblique Gerundive express indifference only in short phrases, which are uttered as a reaction to some assertive sentence: 7) bāhar ke log anek virudh bātẽ karte hai. -

karne de na.

(Chakravarti:17) The people outside are blaming us. - Who cares. 8) bāriš tez ho gayī hai. vah hãs dī, ‘hone do’. (Kishor:200) The rain became stronger. She laughed: “Never mind”. The Gerundive of two verbs jā- (to go) and mar- (to die) in combination with the verb de- are used figuratively in the sense ‘leave it, forget it’: 9) mere samajhne na samajhne kī bāt jāne do. (Rakesh 1:45) It does not matter if I understand or not, leave it. 10) ‘marne

do,

āt h-das

āne



kyā

hai,

mālik.’

dhakkū

ne

beparvāhī se kahā. (Yashpal 2:63-64)

“A big deal, eight-ten anas make no difference, master,” – said Dhakku carelessly.

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4.6.1.5. Exemptions. In the deontic system the logical formula ‘not necessary that p’ is equivalent to ‘possible that not p’. Thus, absence of obligation means granting permission. In Hindi this option is realized lexically by negating necessity (karne kī zarūrat / āvašyaktā nahī ). We have already showed that this construction sometime occurs

as a command (4.1). This time, again, only a context can help to distinguish its different meanings - if it is a mere denying of necessity, instruction or permission not to act. In the case of permission, the speaker is the one who imposed an obligation or at least supported it: 1) bablū se unkā zikr karne kī zarūrat nahī. (Nagar 2:48) There is no need to mention their names before Bablu. (Instruction, advice) 2) kahne kī zarūrat nahī. (Reddi 2:30) You need not say. (Permission) 3) mere liye āne kī zarūrat nahī. (Menan:11) You need not come because of me. (Permission) A somewhat passive permission is represented by the combination of the verb dewith the oblique Gerundive of the verb rah- (to remain): 4) kitāb ko mez par rahne dījiye. (Клюев 1962:240) Let the book remain on the table. 5) bas use rāz hī ræhne do bahin. (Chatursen:53) Let it remain a secret, sister.

4.6.2. Prohibitions. The most prevalent form for issuing prohibitions is the Imperative. It is directed to those who have a definite intention to act, are on the way to act or even have already begun to act. In fact, the distinction between negative mands and prohibitions is rather transparent. Prohibitions are simply more colored by personal attitude, while mands are neutral in this respect. In spite of their formal and semantic similarity, there is one word that can serve as a more or less reliable marker of prohibition – the prohibitive particle mat, the origin of which is, as one might conjecture, the Sanskrit negative

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particle mā. Taking into account the fact that mat in modern Hindi never occurs as a negative particle (unlike na and nahī), we argue that its main purpose is to mark prohibitions rendered by the imperative forms: 1) tū mat ro bet ī. (Kamleshvar 2:47) Do not cry daughter. 2) šor mat macāo, bād mẽ ānā. (Kishor:208) Do not make noise, come later. 3) merā dard jānkar apnā hīyā mat dukhāẽ. (Mithileshvar:27) Do not hurt your heart by knowing my pain. 4) usse us višay mẽ bāt mat karnā. (Rakesh 1:81) Do not discuss it with him. The prohibitions, which are expressed by imperative forms, may refer to an impending action (e.g.4) or to one that has already been started (1,2,3). That is, they are aimed either at preventing an action or at stopping it. All the other prohibitives are used for preventing a possible action. Threats are the strongest among them.195 They are often introduced by the word ‘xabardār’ (beware), which precedes an imperative form: 5) xabardār, murdā ut hāne mat jānā. (Prem Chand 1:25) Do not dare to take away the dead body! But mostly ‘xabardār’ goes together with the Past Indefinite Tense, which when used with future reference, is capable of transmitting an affective attitude of the speaker (see also 3.2.2.2): 6) xabardār jo ek qadam āge bar hāyā! (Mishra:247) Do not dare to make a step forward! (You will pay for it!) 7) xabardār jo phir d abhkī- d ubhkī calāī. (Mithileshvar:42) Do not you dare to shed tears again! 8) xabardār jo mũh se upšabd nikālā! (Mithileshvar:23) Don’t dare to tell me a swear-word.

195

Threats are often considered as ‘unwelcome promises’ and ‘at most statements of unwelcome intention’

(Hamblin 1987:34).

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In order to prohibit by preventing an action, speakers of Hindi use also the verb sak-. With volitional verbs the agent is focal and with non-volitional verbs – non-

focal: 9) bole – nahī, nahī, yah nahī ho saktā. (Prem Chand 1:34) He said; “No,no, it is impossible” (that somebody pays for me) The Passive Voice turns a prohibition into a rule: 10) khāne mẽ kisī kī vajah se der nahī kī jā saktī. (Rakesh 1:93) A meal cannot be postponed because of anybody. Performative verbs manā kar- / nis edh kar- serve for stating the existence of prohibition. Their components, the words manā / nis edh (prohibited), is used for issuing general prohibition: 11) maine hī use manā kiyā thā ki vah bāt kare. (Rakesh 1:61) It was me who prohibited him to talk 12) sneh se bolnā bhī manā hai? (Reddi 2:81) Is it not allowed to talk even with love? 13) kisī bhī nāgarik ko bhūl se hī sahī rājā ke nijī kaks

tak

pahũcnā manā hai. (Reddi 1:11)

Not a single citizen is allowed to reach the private room of the king even by mistake. 14) dhumrpān nis edh hai. (“samar” journal, 06.2002, p.81) Smoking is prohibited.

4.7. Deontic subordination. The deontic idea of moral, social obligation can also be expressed in subordinate clauses.196 Subordinate clauses themselves are not expressive of any shades of obligation, but serve as additional information specifying these shades in the main clause. Among the deontic subordinatives, we distinguish complement, purpose and

196

Palmer (1986:15) citing Resher writes, that where a proposition is subject to further qualification,

this qualification represents modality. This fact rather implies that “any kind of subordination that involves complement clauses can be regarded as a matter of modality”.

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relative purpose clauses. They possess a common verbal form – the Optative, which can be regarded as a marker of deontic subordination. 4.7.1. Complement clause. The semantic structure of the deontic complement clause can be shortly described in the formula ‘S wants that p’, where S stands for the subject of the main clause and ‘wants’ designate any verb of will. The deontic complementation differs from that of the epistemic complementation based on the formula ‘S knows that p’. The particle ki (that) plays the role of the complementizer. By origin this particle is a quotative.

The quotative of Sanskrit – iti – occurred always after the quotation. Meenakshi (1986) writes that later in MIA the quotatives ti / tti and in Inscriptional Prakrits and Pali the quotatives kimti / kiti began to precede the quotation. On these grounds she assumes that the particle ki of modern Hindi is based on the same morpheme. It would be more correct to talk about a semantic correspondance of the words, since the particle ki is known to be of the Persian origin.197 The semantic filling of the Optative in the complement clause depends on the meaning of the predicate in the matrix clause (see also Huddelstone 1993:91). Kellogg (1938:520) noted that if a complement clause denotes result “as a wish or expectation, the verb must be in the Contingent Future (Subjunctive – G.Sh.)”. Deontic predicates of the main clause are performative verbs expressing different shades of ‘wish’ and ‘will’ such as necessity, obligation, command, request, demand, exhortation, permission, prohibition, warning, caution, concern, advice, recommendation, suggestion, fear, apprehension (negative wish), intention, exertion, dream, duty, condition, decision, and so on: 1) hamārī māg …hai ki ãgrez yahā se cale jāẽ. (Chatursen:110) Our demand is that the Englishmen withdraw. 2) sarkār kā hukm hai ki huzūr ko āne diyā jāe. (Chatursen:44) The mistress ordered that mister be let in. 3) koī zarūrī hai ki mai har din tumhāre sāth hī jāyā karū? (Bhandari:54) 197

“ ”(Tivari 1996:32)

(From

1500 untill 1800 in the Middle Ages sentences began to be constructed using the Persian word

‘ki’)

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Is it necessary that I go with you every day? 4) uskā kartavya hai ki kahī naukarī kare. (Ashk 1:26) His duty is to work somewhere. 5) ab mai māltī jī se darxvāst karūgā ki ve apnī bātẽ āpse kahe. (Kamleshvar 1:86) I will ask Malty to tell you her story. 6) ab ‘is amar’ ko kyā adhikār hai ki vah aprādhī mahsūs kare? (Yadav:9) What right does ‘this Amar’ have to feel himself a criminal? Sometimes the above-mentioned senses are not rendered unequivocally but implied, when polysemantic and vague verbs like kæh-, (to say), soc- (to think), likh- (to write) and others are used. The understanding of such verbs depends on

context: 7) usne cetan se kahā ki vah… lapakkar pānī garm kar lāe. (Ashk 1:50) She told (ordered) Chetan to boil and bring some water immediately. 8) socā āp logõ se miltā calū. (Kamleshvar 2:46) I thought (decided) that I will keep meeting you. 9) aur ise d āt ā ki uske sāth ghar ā jaldī-jaldī khĩcvāe. (Ashk 1:59) She gave her a scolding (demanded) that she take out the jug with her quickly. In fact, all these shades of ‘wish’ and ‘will’ exist in the Optative sentence when it is used independently, and all of them can be accounted for in terms of the deleted matrix clause.198 Our crucial claim is, thus, that independent sentences with the Optative are nothing but subordinate clauses, the main clauses of which are understood. That is why their glossing is so much dependent on context. Many scholars (Platts 1874:364, Lakoff 1969, Givón 1984:117, Lyons 1977:778) noted the fact that complement clauses in most cases can be substituted by verbal phrases, which are analyzed as embedded complements (non-finite clauses). It is worth noting that deontic complements in Hindi are mutually substitutable by the 198

“It is the context – and particularly the verb of the principal clause – which lends the idea of

volition to the utterance, not the subjunctive.” (Gonda 1956:104)

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Gerundive, which replaces the Optative. One can well understand this, because, as Lyons noted, both contain a “so-be-it component” (1977:840). This is true either of identical or different subjects in the main and the complement clauses: 10) sarsutiyā hamse kæhtī thī ki kahī bhāg calẽ. (Nagar 2:22) Sarsutiya said to us to escape somewhere. 11) āj šām ko hī āpse cale jāne ko kæh diyā jāegā. (Rakesh 1:41) Today in the evening you will be told to leave the place. 12) myunisipal bord ne ārd ar jārī kiyā hai ki dukānẽ hat āī jāẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:116) The municipal board ordered to withdraw the shops. 13) usne faurā jahāz ko t āpū kī taraf calne kā hukm diyā. (Kamleshvar 2:51) He ordered the ship to go in the direction of the island. 14) apne mittra ānand ko bulā lāne kī icchā bhī tab use nahī huī. (Ashk 1:28) He even had no wish then to invite his friend Anand. 15) cetan ke man mẽ prabal icchā huī ki vah apnī mā athvā dādā se unke ‘šubhāgaman’ ka t hīk kāran

pūche. (Ashk 1:28)

Chetan had a strong desire to ask his mother and grandfather about the reason of their ‘blessed coming’. As Bahri (1985:221) writes, “the main object of splitting of a simple sentence into clauses is to call special attention to one or another of a fact and its causes”. He considers the use of the Gerundive neutral and the use of the Optative emphatic. It appears to us that sentences with the so-called ‘embedded predication’ are intended to report the existence of obligation, while the sentences with ordinary complementation underline the source of obligation. In the following examples we can see that ‘evaluatives’ are actually embedded predicates, which can be easily ‘unfolded’ with the use of the Optative: 16) kyā yah ucit thā ki unhẽ vahī bairõ-caprāsiyõ mẽ bāt jāe? (bāt nā ucit thā) (Rakesh 1:148)

Was it appropriate to divide them among the servants?

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diyā

17) isse behtar hai ham unkī madad paisõ se kar diyā karẽ. (paisõ se madad kar denā behtar hai) (Kamleshvar 2:62)

We would better help them with money. Complement clauses seem to be a type of reported speech, which in its turn arose from quotation. A mutual form and the use of the complementizer (quotative marker) confirm this assumption. In most cases instead of oratio obliqua, the Hindi speakers employ quotations

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. This means that actual speakers usually present the exact

utterance of the original speaker: 18) uskī āxirī nasīhat thī, ki merī lāš jalāī na jāe. (Prem Chand 1:52) Her last will was that ‘may my body would not be burned’. 19) unhõne …kahā ki mere sāth lāhaur calo. (Ashk 1:85) He told him to go with him to Lahore. (…that ‘come with me to Lahore’) 20) sulocnā kī icchā hotī thī, yahā se bhāg jāū. (Prem Chand 1:38) Sulochna wanted to escape from here. (She wanted that ‘I would better escape’) 21) vah cāhte the ki mere ekātvās mẽ koī vighna na d āle. (Prem Chand 1:40) He wanted that nobody would break his solitude (my solitude). Still this rule is not kept strictly, and very often quotations are replaced by some sort of reported speech, obviously under the influence of English syntax. For this reason, it is not always clear if we are dealing with quotation or reported speech. Bahri (1945:270) wrote in this connection: “Hindi presents ambiguity also in reported speech as it does not make distinctions between direct and indirect narration. usne mujhe kahā ki merā bhatījā pās ho gayā may mean: his nephew passed or

my nephew passed.”200 In the modern literature we can find many examples where quotation is presented as reported speech. It is, indeed, not simple to interpret them: 22) phir usne socā ki kyõ na jāe. (Tivari:13) Then he thought, why would I not go (he goes).

199 200

“There is no ‘indirect’ narration in Hindi” (Saihgal 1966:166, see also Kellogg 1938:519) Varma (1995:209) criticizing such phrases writes that they “ 

 ” (not only contradict the nature of Hindi but are ugly and ambiguous).

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23) unhõne cetan kī mā se kahā ki zarā unkī bāt sune. (Ashk 1:80) He told Chetan’s mother to listen to what he says (what they say).

4.7.2. Purpose clause. I regard the purpose clauses as a sub-type of complement clauses. Both structurally and semantically, they are close to each other. Both explain the intentions of the subject of the main clause, and in both the predicates appear as the Optative. Purpose clauses have three positions with regard to the main clause: preceding, subsequent and embedded: 1) elbart

yahā hed māst ar ho jāe, iskī bhī košiš vah kis liye

kar rahī hai. (Rakesh 1:68) – Preceding.

That Albert becomes a headmaster here? For what is she trying to do this? 2) dūsre sadasyā ne bahut samjhāne kī košiš kī. (Kamleshvar 1:44) – Embedded. Another member tried a lot to explain. 3) vah bhī isī košiš mẽ ræhtā thā ki uske kāran

ghar mẽ koī

parešānī na ho jāe. (Kamleshvar 2:11) – Subsequent.

He tried all the time not to cause any trouble to his relatives. These positions are registered also in complement clauses. The difference is that a preceding position (parataxis) of complement clauses is rather rare, while purpose clauses occur in it even more frequently than in other positions (Bahri 1945:224): 4) ab hĩdī mẽ bhī usī upanyās par film bane, iske liye mai razāmand nahī thā. (Mitra: 13)

That on this novel a Hindi film could be made – I was not ready for that. The complementizer ki (that), which occurs in the subsequent position may take the form of tāki201: 5) abe to jeb se ek at hannī bhī nikāl de tāki ek kilo barf bhī le āū. (Nagar 1:55)

Hey, take half a rupee out of your pocket so that I can buy one kilogram of ice. 201

Cf. Persian tā.

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The embedded clauses of purpose have the same structure as the embedded complements. That is, they occur in the form of the Oblique Gerundive: 6) āsāmiyõ ke māthe dūdh, pūrī, mit hāī ādi padārth khāne ko mil jāte the. (Prem Chand 1:27)

The tenant peasants used to get milk, bread, sweets and other things for eating. The postpositions ko and ke liye, by which the Gerundive is followed, may be omitted before the verbs of motion: 7) sušil





āpse

kuch

kæhne (ke

liye

- ommitted) āī

hai.

(Chatursen:101) The mother of Sushil came (to) say you something.

4.7.3. Relative purpose clause. Palmer writes “it is possible in a number of languages to combine a relative clause and a purpose clause” (1986:178). Our impression is that Hindi can be listed among such languages. The relative pronoun jo (which) sometimes functions like the conjunction ki or tāki and is followed by the Optative: 1) mai madārī nahī hū jo bãdariyā ko nacāyā karū. (Prabhakar:38) I am not an itinerant tamer to cause monkeys dance. The matter is that relative clause is situated on the very border between epistemic and deontic modalities and may serve both of them. The case becomes even more complicated because of the common morphologic form, shared by the Potential and the Optative, which occur in the relative clauses but with different missions. The Potential is used in order to mark a generalized possibility, while the Optative underlines intention combining it with the function of an attribute. Let us analyze two sentences with a similar structure: 2) koī aisā nahī jo uskī sune. (Kamleshvar 2:56) - Potential, generalization. There is nobody to listen to her. 3) koī to ho jisse ādmī hãse, bole. (Prem Chand 2:47) - Optative, purpose. There must be somebody, with whom a man could talk and laugh.

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Sentence (2) defines existence of an entity in the possible worlds, while sentence (3) explains the purpose of this existence. Here is another pair of sentences: 4) ghar mẽ aisā koī nahī jo mere liye parešān ho. (Mitra:98) There is nobody at home who would worry about me. 5) babaī ko itnī fursat kahā hai, jo roz roz bāzār jāe? (Mitra:37) My father has no spare time to go to the market every day. In (4) the relative clause is concerned with the truth of the proposition. In (5) it describes the purpose of the main clause. If we are not mistaken, this factor must distinguish the deontic and epistemic functions of the relative clause.

4.8. Conclusion. The analysis of the Deontic modality in Hindi shows that it has a semantic structure principally similar to that of other languages and is used for transmitting such general notions as need, necessity, and obligation. The main verb forms employed for expressing deontic notions are the Gerundive and the Optative. The Gerundive carries the meaning of abstract necessity expressed overtly, and for this reason, it is semantically independent. Still, a ‘pure’ Gerundive appears only as an imperative form associated with the will of the speaker (the speaker is the source of obligation). For marking other sources of obligation (moral laws, social regulations) some additions are attached to the Gerundive – the copula, the verbs par- and cāhiye, which, if compared with English, impart to the ‘must be done’ of the ‘pure’

Gerundive the senses of ‘to be to’, ‘to have to’, and ‘should’, respectfully. Until the Gerundive forms are associated with the opinion of the speaker, they serve for the statement of an existing obligation. But when a context makes it clear that the speaker desires the action to be done, then these forms acquire the functions of directives, which impose obligation on the addressee. Like other languages, Hindi possesses a special means for laying down obligations – the Imperative mood. However, the complicated and many-sided social order of India had a great influence on the Imperative. Among a number of imperative forms only the tū-oriented form is uttered with an air of superiority and can be considered a real Imperative. All the others deal with the addressees whose social rank does not

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allow the speaker presenting an action as obligatory but only as desirable. For this reason, the Subjunctive (Optative) forms were applied with regard to the pronouns tum and āp. Thus, the choice of imperative forms depends exclusively on a personal

pronoun, and the only distinction marked among the forms is that of urgent and postponed obligations. The imperative forms are important but not the only means for imposing obligation. Together with them, we can find not only the mentioned above Gerundive, but the first person and the third person Optatives, the Counterfactual mood, the Future Tense, the Present Habitual Tense and others. The chart below shows occurrences of the main grammatical means of deontic modality: The verb sakTense forms The Counterfactual

The Optative The Gerundive The Imperative

Recommendations Permissions Commands / Requests

Prohibitions Volitives

Obligation Cohortatives Consultatives Demands

Most periphrastic commands expressed by miscellaneous morphologic forms are not aimed at transmitting direct commands. They are inferential and can be understood as ‘mands’ only in a specific discourse context. This proves that communicative conditions have decisive role in rendering commands. This assumption is supported by the fact (and by plenty of examples) that the force of an obligation and the request / command distinction are determined not by a verbal form,

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but by various additional factors such as context, prosodic and paralinguistic modulation. In this connection it is important to point to the role of the addressee in every deontic utterance. Deontic modality is interactive by definition and exists only in the presence of the addressee(s), which is(are) one of the key factors of deontic evaluation. The analysis of the deontic forms reveals the role of the Optative. In fact, this form is basic for the long list of deontic notions beginning with demands and ending with permissives, not to mention subordinate clauses. One and the same form serves such a wide range of notions because all the necessary qualifications are provided by lexical items in the sentence or exist in context. The Optative sentence even used independently, without a specific context can be interpreted in a dozen ways. This confirms our assumption that the Optative is the formal marker of deontic subordination, where the predicate of the matrix clause (verbalized explicitly or understood) conveys the principal idea of wish and will of the speaker, while the Optative in terms of meaning fulfills a secondary, ancillary role.

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Chapter 5. Epistemic modality.

It must be noted that among all the conceptions of Epistemic Modality presented by different researchers, there is no controversy about the main subject matter. Epistemic Modality is proposed as a qualificational category, which serves the speaker for expressing his commitment to the truth, validity or factuality of propositions202 (cf. Lyons 1977, Palmer 1986, Nuyts 2001). Palmer (1986:97) adds that this commitment can be made about propositions in the past, present, or future. Although the formulations diverge, still, whether it is said about “quantifying over possible worlds consistent with what is known” (Enç 1992:356) or about ‘judgments of the probability that some state of affairs in the world can occur or not” (Nuyts 1992:74), the main issue is the impression the speaker wants to produce in the mind of the addressee about the reliability of the piece of knowledge being communicated. Defining the subject generally in a similar way, researchers still differ in determining the linguistic scope of the category, in what types it should be subdivided and how it correlates with other linguistic categories. In short, “epistemic modality is one of those phenomena which keeps on puzzling linguists” (Nuyts 2001:22). Efforts to classify different occurrences of epistemic (and also deontic) modality have been made by dividing it into objective and subjective types (cf. Lyons 1977, Dik 1989). But since we consider subjectivity one of the main constituents of modality, such division arouses some objections (see 1.3). It is important also to designate the position of evidentials in epistemic modality. Palmer (1986), whose main principles of classification of modality we have adopted in this work, presents evidentials as an integral part of epistemic system. It is doubtful

202

“It may be common knowledge by now that we cannot talk about a state-of-affairs without

evaluating it one way or the other, expressing our (epistemic) attitudes about its truth or likelihood” (Doherty 1987:47).

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that one would like to debate the connection between evidence and epistemic qualification. It is straightforward and apparent. “Without evidence, no evaluation of the probability of the SoA is possible – one could then only say that one does not know” (Nuyts

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1993:946). But the approach according to which evidentials are considered modal seems to us not warranted. We are inclined to support the opinion of Nuyts (1992, 1993, 2001) who demarcates the notions of evidence and modality. He presents evidentiality as the speaker’s evaluation of the nature or quality of his evidence leading to modal qualification. In his opinion, the evidential element is basically independent of the expression of the modality element and not necessarily present in utterances (see also Bybee101). In this connection we should notice that evidence could be presented with regard to any proposition asserted by the speaker or inferred on the grounds of some knowledge. For instance, phrase such as mai jāntā hū ki …(I know that), merā xayāl hai ki …(my opinion is that), maine samjhā thā ki…(I decided that) are

usually followed by verbs in the Indicative (marking confidence based on knowledge) or in the Presumptive (marking probability based on limited knowledge). But their secondary role can be inferred from the fact that they could be withdrawn from sentences without prejudice: 1) mai jāntā thā ki ab ek-d er

h

minat

ki bāt-cīt ke bād ãk

samāpt ho jāegā. (Rakesh 1:88)

I knew that the act (of a play) would end after a short dialogue. (The Indicative) 2) mai jāntī hū

ki āpne ise dekhte hī nālī mẽ phẽk diyā hogā.

(Kamleshvar 1:89) I know that you must have thrown it into a gutter after the first glance. (The Presumptive) 3) maine to nahī laut āyā, sulocnā ne laut āyā. par mere xayāl mẽ acchā kiyā. (Prem-Chand 1:45)

I did not send (her) back. Sulochna did. But to my mind she acted properly. (The Indicative) 101

“The evidentials, however, signal only the way the speaker arrived at knowledge about the event,

whether in the past, present or future” (Bybee 1985:182). She writes also that evidentials are “markers that indicate something about the source of the information in the proposition” (Ibid.:184).

4) merā xayāl hai, mist ar vhislar ne unhẽ rok rakhā hogā. (Rakesh 1:46) To my mind, mister Whistler must have stopped her. (The Presumptive) It is important to note that these evidence-bearing phrases in most cases are in fact main clauses in complex sentences. In contrast to the wish-expressing sentences they do not determine the choice of a mood. In the given examples the same main clauses are followed by different moods. The situation becomes much more complicated when we deal with evidentials rendering a complete lack of information – patā nahī ,

mālūm nahī

(not

known). They may accompany either assertions or assumptions. Such sentences or combinations of words could be labelled “evidence of ignorance”. Semantically they look very much like the adverbs “perhaps”, “possibly”, “maybe” and so on. One may decide that they indeed carry some element of epistemic qualification. But on more thorough inspection it becomes clear that evidence is only a certain background for the speaker’s commitment to the actuality of the state of affairs: 5) patā nahī e log kahā se āe hai. (Kamleshvar 1:53) It is not known where these people came from. (The Indicative) 6) patā nahī

māltī



aur

jaggī

bābū

ko

kyā-kyā

yād

hogā.

(Kamleshvar 1:35) Who knows what Multy and Jaggy Babu remember. (The Presumptive) 7) patā nahī māltī jī pasãd karẽ yā na karẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:31) I do not know if Multy likes it or not. (The Potential) 8) bas, lagtā hai tamām din-rāt sikur kar behad chot e ho gaye hai. (Mitra:107)

It seems as though all the days and nights shrank and became too small. (The Indicative) 9) patā nahī

kyõ ekāek lagā, jaggī bābū kā fon hogā. (Kamleshvar

1:35) I do not know why I decided immediately that it must be a call of Jaggi Babu. (The Presumptive) 10) mujhe lagtā hai koī bāhẽ hilā hilā kar bulā rahā ho. (Yadav:6) It seems to me that somebody is calling me by waving hands. (The Potential)

In spite of the fact that three different moods are accompanied by the same evidence we cannot deny that there is a logical connection between the evidence and the speaker’s qualification of the SoA. After all, we find no examples where evidences like patā nahī and lagtā hai would occur with the Counterfactual mood. In turn, the statements like yah sac hai (it is true), sacmuc/saccī (in very truth) can occur with the Counterfactual but, according to our data, are not accepted by the Potential: 11) yah sac hai ki ghar me kuhrām mac gayā. (Ashk 1:46) It is true that weeping and wailing began in the house. (The Indicative) 12) ānand kyā sacmuc itnā t hos, itnā sthūl hotā hogā? (Dinkar:36) Is joy really so substantial, so simple ? (The Presumptive) 13) nahī, birādar, agar mai ruk saktā to saccī cain kī sās letā. (Mitr:24) No, brother, if I could stop then, believe me, I would breathe quietly. (The Counterfactual) So, one might tentatively argue that evidence cover, generally speaking, two main domains of knowledge – what is known or obvious or what is unknown or possible, without specifying their nuances. Including evidentials in our analysis of epistemic modality, we view them not as an essential component of the classification system (in contrast to Palmer’s position), but as an accessory element, which accompanies epistemic utterances in discourse. In order to find a reliable basis for construing a classification system for the epistemic modality in Hindi, let us throw a cursory glance at the linguistic means which are most noticeable in terms of their ability to mark epistemic attitudes of the speaker. The moods – indicative, potential, presumptive, counterfactual – are aimed at marking the speaker’s evaluation of the reality of the state of affairs. Nevertheless, if we try to classify epistemic modality on the basis of the moods we will fail in building a distinct and a tenable system, for the simple reason that none of the moods has a definite and unambiguous reference to the actuality. Among the means of epistemic evaluation we find the modal verb sak- (can), which, if compared with the English modals, is a true and at the same time the only

modal verb of Hindi. We discussed its inherent and deontic meanings above. In epistemic modality it fulfills a very important but rather limited mission. Like other languages Hindi possesses epistemic adverbs and adjectives such as šāyad/kadācit (perhaps), sãbhav/mumkin (possible), sãbhāvatah (possibly), zarūr/avašya/nišcay hī (certainly) which are obviously modal for they take in

their scope the entire proposition and are used to express the speaker’s attitudes overtly. But the examples with the very first word from this list – šāyad – lead us to even more striking results than was in the case of the evidentials. The examples make it clear that šāyad (like sãbhav, sãbhāvatah) occurs with all four moods: 14) in dvãdva bhāvõ mẽ sãghars

šāyad avašyãbhāvī hai. (Reddy :36)

A clash between these conflicting feelings is, perhaps, inevitable. (The Indicative) 15) šāyad ārām kar rahe hõge. (Kamleshvar 1:33) He might be resting. (The Presumptive) 16) ab šāyad dozax kī āg se bac jāū . (Chatursen:52) Now perhaps I will avoid the flames of the hell. (The Potential) 17) šāyad yah bāt mai vānyā ko batātā lekin apne āp hī usne kahā. (Kishore:278) Perhaps I would have said this to Vanya but she said it herself. (The Counterfactual) But, again, as happened with the evidentials, the moods are not “omnivorous”. The Potential as a rule does not accept the adverbials of certainty – zarūr, avašya, nišcay hī : *ab zarūr dozax kī āg se bac jāū . (see e.g.16) . This fact

again turns our attention to the known / unknown, or speaking linguistically, realis / irrealis distinction as, possibly, basic for the initial division of the whole category. Thus the first step is to divide the main category into two sub-categories – the first one includes information about events and states presented by the speaker as existing in the reality (irrespective of their temporal domain) and the second one covers all the other cases existing only in the speaker’s imagination. 102

102

“The realis-irrealis distinction reflects judgments that certain ideas stem from direct perception,

memory, or expectations of what is normal, while others have their source in imaging.” (Chafe 1995:363)

The next sub-division reflects the semantic differences existing in Hindi for evaluation of reality - the distinction of factual, non-factual and contra-factual. The non-factual and contra-factual distinctions fall within the imaginative sub-category of epistemic modality. Some authors consider factual utterances as non-modal (e.g. Lyons 1977)

103

and prefer to concentrate upon the analyses of the ways the speaker

renders his doubts. It is our impression, however, that factive states of affairs can provide us with

material needed for better understanding of the evaluation

mechanisms. Besides, on each level of epistemic evaluation (including the ‘real’ domain) there are neutral and emphatic, focal and non-focal forms and even different degrees of commitment of the speaker to what he presents as real or unreal. For more precise analysis of the linguistic phenomena falling in the scope of the imaginative states of affairs, we can adopt the classification system proposed by Palmer (1986), at least with its fundamental tenets (taking, for example, the section regarding evidentials with some corrections). The generic / specific distinction is also a matter of our concern because Hindi has a special mechanism for expressing this distinction as well.

5.1. Reality and truth. The Declarative. According to our assumption, epistemic statements could be divided into those expressing, or at least pretending to express, real events or states and those that in some way or other render the speaker’s doubt as to their reality. Reality-rendering statements are usually studied in linguistics under the label ‘Declarative’104. In the languages with a system of moods the Declarative is predominantly represented by the Indicative mood – “the mood of statement” (Lyons 1977:746). In this relation we would like to accentuate some semantic properties of “In all the languages, events and states classified as nonactualized, those that remain within the realm of thought and imagination, are overtly distinguished from those portrayed as actualized, having occurred or currently occurring.” (Mithun 1995:386) 103

Palmer sees the Declarative as a component of the epistemic system but defines it as “epistemically

unmarked or neutral.” (1986:29) 104

“It is undoubtedly the case that most, perhaps all, languages have a clear way of indicating that the

speaker is making a statement that he believes to be true. This is what may be called the Declarative – the grammatical form that is typically used for such statements” (Palmer 1986:26)

the Indicative in Hindi (which may be idiosyncratic also for many other languages). First, using the Indicative the speaker does not necessarily reflect the objective reality. He simply wants to create in the hearer’s mind an impression that the information being communicated is true. The Indicative is used either for expressing a universal truth –“two by two is four”, or specific information, which may give rise to doubt –“I saw a spaceship of aliens” (see also Gonda 1956:114). Second, the commitment of the speaker to the truth of the statement, expressed exclusively by the Indicative, is left undefined. Citations can be presented in the Indicative even when the speaker considers the cited information as not true. In other words, the Indicative is “semantically neutral (or unmarked) mood” (Lyons 1996:332). Third, the Indicative being a basic mood for rendering reality, nevertheless, does not belong exclusively to the Declarative. The Past Participle form together with the Future tense often occurs in sentences expressing different nuances of uncertainty and possibility. And the Habitual tenses have already been mentioned above as intention-bearing forms belonging to Inherent Modality105. The fact that the Indicative may render other senses apart from reality leads us to the conclusion that the Indicative and the Declarative cannot be identified automatically. This becomes obvious also in view of the fact that there are nonindicative declarative sentences. This is why Lyons suggested to distinguish ‘declarative’ from ‘indicative’ (1996:332). Intuitively we see in this distinction a division between a semantic notion (reality) labeled by the term ‘declarative’ and a kind of its morphological realization (indicative). Thus, the Declarative may have expressive means other than the Indicative. There is another notion, namely, ‘assertion’ which has to be explained properly. What we assert we declare to be an essentially reliable information. But what is meant by ‘categorical assertion’? The addition of ‘categorical’ to what is presented as true means applying an individual attitude to a neutral statement with undefined position of the speaker (futher discussion on the matter see in 5.1.1.1). Thus, we can talk about different degrees of qualification of states of affairs which are considered to be true.106 And this is the function of the modal affirmative adverbs such as zarūr (certainly), 105

“The ample use made of the present indicative is due to its functional diversity, which includes

modal usage” (Stephany 1986:379) 106

“Degrees of certainty” and “degrees of subjectivity” (Sanders & Spooren 1996:244)

nissandeh (no doubt) and different kinds of evidentials, which reveal the source of a

statement (viz., the speaker’s conviction) and attach to the faceless Indicative a character of a modal qualification. I prefer to analyze such cases under the category of Declarative and not as a cooccurrence of the Declarative with the ‘assertive modality”. This approach, naturally, precludes the claim of Palmer that “the declarative does not indicate commitment at all, even if generally it is assumed that the speaker is telling the truth as he sees it” (1986:87). The last point to be discussed in this section is what devices Hindi uses for presenting the ‘specific’ vs. ‘general’ distinctions with regard to the reality. This is the area of the Declarative where indicative sentences sometimes give way to the Potential.

5.1.1. Objective reality. As we have noted, the main device, which the speaker uses for rendering his confidence about the actuality of a SoA, is the Indicative mood. In most cases this mood is represented by a present or past form of the copula – hai, hai, hū, ho (present), thā, the, thī, thī (past) – which follows the main verb in a form of the perfective, imperfective or progressive participle. It is obvious that it is just the copula that grants to the whole expression the meaning of reality. In the Indicative there are also, of course, simple forms. The Past Indefinite tense is expressed by the perfective participle without any extension. The Future tense is a simple form as well. But their belonging to the Indicative is semantic and not formal. And even semantically they belong to the Indicative only under specific conditions. The perfective participle (as well as the imperfective participle) is not expressive of tense and is defined only in terms of aspect. Therefore, glossing it as a tense is a result of inference made on a contextual background, excluding its existence in any other temporal locus. The case of the Future tense is even more complicated, because it is not simply a linguistic but rather a philosophical problem. Anyway, the morphological form employed for describing future situations, if supported by particular lexical items or context, can, indeed, show a certain confidence. The actuality of states of affairs expressed by the past participle or by the Future is inferred and not overt. There are cases where the meaning of these forms is ambiguous and can be

interpreted either as expressing a possible action or a factive situation. This is especially evident when they occur in conditional sentences: 1) yadi dãgā ho gayā to ghazab ho jāegā. (Kamleshvar 1:52) If a riot breaks out then it would be a disaster. Because a riot broke out, it will be a disaster. The Future tense in conditional sentences never reflects reality: 2) agar āpko koī xabar milegī to bãbaī se hī. (Kamleshvar 2:53) If you get any information then you get it only from Bombay. In contrast, phrases containing the copula are unambiguously actual and even ifclauses are unable to change their actuality. Besides, the meaning of the ‘if’ itself is converted into ‘since’, ‘because’; and a sentence, conditional in form, becomes ‘causal’: 3) agar āp tãg ā gaye hai, to āiye āpko sāth ke kamre mẽ chor āū . (Amrita 2:28) Because you feel bored, let me take you to the neighboring room. 4) kyā huā yadi usne lahaur nahī dekhā. kyā huā yadi use bahut sī bātõ kā gyān nahī . (Ashk 1:57)

He did not see Lahore – a big deal. What of it that he does not know many things. (Remember that the copula is absent in this sentence because it is part of the negative word nahī ). 5) agar itnā hī pyār hai to mahīne do mahīne kī chut t ī lekar use kahī bāhar le jāo. (Rakesh 1:145)

If (since) you love so much then take a leave for a month or two and go with her to another place. Relative to what is known, it would be reasonable to conjecture that the Indicative in Hindi has morphological markers, namely, present and past forms of the copula, while in many other languages it is morphologically unmarked (cf. Palmer 1986:81). Thus, as we see, the copula assumed the function of a modal marker. In the case of the Indicative it is a marker of neutral, zero-modality. Since Hindi has three more moods there was need for additional markers that by definition must be auxiliary verbs. The verb ho- took this function. It is often the case that grammarians regard the present

and past copula as forms of the verb ho-. Such an approach can scarcely withstand criticism. Sometimes it is explained by reason of “convenience to treat hai and thā as related to ho-“ (Kachru 1980:41). At least since the publication of Platts’ Hindi grammar it is known that the present copula (hai), the past copula (thā), and the verb ho- are words of different origin.107 The point is that in course of time the verb bhū (to

become, to happen) assumed also the meaning ‘to be’; and its derivatives have successfully developed the copulative function (Bai 1986:206) and became an important device for expressing moods other than the Indicative.108 The difference in the functions of hai and ho- could be explained by the semantic difference between their predecessors – ‘as’ asserted with emphasis the existence of something or somebody while bhū (hoti in Pali) was not emphatic (Bai 1986:203). There is one more important difference between hai and ho-: hai is defined in terms of time (the present), thā bears the past reference, but ho- in the copulative usage acquires only modal characteristics. ho- is not an alternative to the present or past copula. It only assumes its functions

for expressing other moods. But there are at least two verbs that do substitute the copula. They are the verbs thæhar- (to be established, proved) and ræh- (to live, to stay). ræh- occurs in the copulative function instead of ho-. As Masica (1986:143) writes “there is, after all, not a great deal of difference between a subject of ‘be / exist’ and of a verb like ‘lived’”. The verb ræh-, thanks to its literal meaning is apt to express a prolonged action or state, i.e. a reality, which is presented not as a point on the axis of time, but as a line: 6) mitrõ kī bhī unhẽ kabhī kamī na rahī. (Chatursen:58) 107

“…honā springs from the Sanskrit bhū, ‘to be or become’, the Prakrit form of which is ho or huva;

whereas the form hū , etc., are derived from the present tense of the Sanskrit as, ‘to be’… The form thā is traceable to the Sanskrit root sthā, ‘to stand’, which is used even in Sanskrit as a substantive verb with the sense of ‘to be’ ” (Platts 1874:143, see also Kellogg 1893:232). Oberlies (1998:28) shows the development of the present copula in the following order: 1 st per., sg. (Sanskrit) asāmi > (Prakrit) asămi > (Apabhramśa) havi > (Braj, Hindavi, Dakhini) haū / hū > (Hindi) hū. Still we have to admit that this explanation is not accepted by some researchers. For instance, Bubenik (private communication) asserts that “hū goes back to bhavami (> havam > havm > hoū > hū ) .” 108

“The empty stem ho- is inserted as a carrier for the mood endings “ (Pray 1970:131).

He had never been short of friends. (The state was prolonged) 7) kuch der mai uskī āvāz mẽ ghirā rahā. (Kishore:127) For some time I was surrounded by his voice. ( “For some time”) 8) ve yah jānte the ki āj cādnī rāt rahegī. (Sankrityayan: 7) They knew that today there will be moonlit night. (A night is not a momentary event) 9) calo bahin, dilīp kī bāt hī rahe. (Chatursen:166) O.K., sister, let it be as Dilip says. (What Dilip suggests may continue for a while). 10) kuch zamīn hotī to ās bhī ræhtī. (Film “mirc masālā”) If we had some land there would have been a hope. (‘Our hope would have lasted for some time’). The verb ræh- replaces the real copula “in pointing out or motioning towards some object, in conjunction with the demonstrative pronouns yah, vah, ye, ve: 11) yah rahā āpkā mitr – Here is your friend.” (Shapiro 1989:105)”. We consider it worth noting that ræh- in this case occurs instead of the copula under semantic stress, “in affective expressions” (McGregor 1986:171), and is always perfective in form: 12) acchā yõ karo, ve rupae na tumhāre rahe na mere. (Chatursen:42) Let us do so – this money is not yours and not mine. (Instead of hai) 13) baigan kā yah xūb cust fikrā rahā ! (Chatursen:41) It was a splendid joke about an eggplant! (Instead of thā) Indeed, the present and past copulas are not emphasized at all. So, the forms substituting them have a pronounced tendency to stress, to affirm the existence of a described quality. This is what also the verb t hæhar- does: 14) tumhẽ mai kaise samjhāū? mai jãglī aurat t hæhrī. (Reddi 2:35) How can I explain you? I am but a woodland woman. 15) bīs bīsve misir t hæhre. (Yashpal 2:35) Twenty biswa constitute a misir (5/8 of acre), after all. (a proverb ≈ take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves) 16) tum t hæhre patle charhare, cālāk-cust ! (Ashk 1:24) You are slender, active, quick-witted, after all.

These emphatic counterparts of the copula, naturally, stimulate us to consider the question if it is possible to present reality in ways that are more reliable or less reliable.

5.1.1.1. Is there anything epistemically stronger than fact? We would take the liberty to give a negative answer to this question. Statements of reality differ in their convincing force. We argue that only those statements report the objective reality in the strongest way that are uttered in the Indicative mood and have no comments on the reality at all. Therefore, among the phrases 1) a) vah hĩdī samajhtā hai. He understands Hindi. b) vah hĩdī avašya samajhtā hai. Of course he understands Hindi. c) mai jāntā hū ki vah hĩdī samajhtā hai. I know that he understands Hindi. d) ismẽ koī sãdeh nahī ki vah hĩdī samajhtā hai. There is no doubt that he understands Hindi. (a) is the strongest and the most convincing one. Lyons (1977:809) writes: ”The fact of introducing must, necessarily, certainly, etc., into the utterance has the effect of making our commitment to the actuality of the proposition explicitly dependant upon our, perhaps, limited knowledge.” The same idea was expressed in Benveniste (1966, vol.2:84): “Dans son tour syntaxique comme dans son intonation, l’assertion vise à communiquer une certitude, elle est la manifestation la plus commune de la presence du locuteur dans l’énonciation.” Sharing their position, one may say that any intrusion of elements which bring with them into the neutral, unqualified ‘it-is-so’ the meaning of ‘I-say-so’ or ‘they-say-so’ (the elements that in contrast to assertion we would call affirmation) lessens the assertive and convincing force of an utterance. We must underline that ‘affirmative elements’ do not qualify the truth-value of a SoA. They simply advance arguments for

its factivity, reveal the source of the evaluation or, in other words, display evidence of the speaker.109 Thus, arranging the reality-expressing utterances in order, we may put the unqualified ‘it-is-so’ utterances on top of the whole pyramid. Now we are to place properly the other components of the construction in accordance with what we will consider ‘strong’ or ‘weak evidentials’ (Sanders & Spooren 1996:244). Here we inevitably will have to rely upon logic and intuition.

5.1.1.2. Evidentials. We do not intend to cover all possible cases of affirmation and to give exhaustive characteristics of the phenomenon. Our aim is only to present a general picture with the most striking examples. The matter of evidence in epistemic modality has been thrashed out by many researchers (Dik, Hengeveld, Palmer, Chafe, Sanders & Spooren, Nuyts). But their understanding of what should be enclosed in the notion “evidentials” and how to classify them differ in considerable extent. It seems that only two sub-categories of evidentials are accepted by all – sensory evidence and hearsay-evidence. One note here is in order. Since evidence is not a marker of reality, it can occur with different kinds of qualificational categories. These can accompany either statements of reality or of imagined possible situations. In this section we are considering the evidentials that go with factual claims. After analyzing our data we came to conclusion that all the variety of examples could be divided into four main groups according to the degree of their firmness utterances whose truth is supported 1) by sensory evidence of the speaker, 2) by his experience or general knowledge, 3) by his personal confidence or 4) by opinions or witness of other people.

109

Many researchers contributed to the discussion. Their opinions, naturally, differ. For instance,

Brandt (1999) supports the position of Lyons, while Hoye (1997) objects to the main point that inclusion of modal markers in an utterance heralds a weaker commitment. He writes: “The inclusion of modal markers in an assertive utterance formally, semantically and pragmatically distinguishes that utterance from its unmarked counterpart where the nature and even degree of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition is simply not at issue” (Ibid.:60)

5.1.1.2.1. Sensory evidence. Such evidence is considered to be the strongest (Chafe 1986) and more basic (Sanders & Spooren 1996). It is expressed by the verbs of feelings dekh- (to see), sun- (to listen), mahsūs/anubhav kar- (to feel), pā- (to get, to find to be) as well as their passive counterparts dikhāī/dikhlāī de- (to be seen), dikhāī/dikhlāī par (to seem), dikh-/dīkh- (to seem), nazar ā- (to come into view), sunāī de- (to be audible to), sũghāī de- (to smell), mæhsūs/anubhav ho- (to be felt), and mil(to be found). The choice between an active and a passive verb is determined by the desire of the speaker to present an agent as an active participator in a process (active verb) or as an accidental eye-witness (passive verb). Such evidence can occur either in a simple or in a complex sentence. In a complex sentence the state of affairs is in the subordinate clause. In a simple sentence the SoA is embedded. The difference in their position is accounted for by necessity to emphasize the source of perception or a perceived action consequently. Thus, the position of evidence can be focal or non-focal. In the non-focal position evidence is prefaced by imperfective or perfective participles, which indicate that an act (imperfective) or a state (perfective) are perceived. 1) cetan ne yah bhī dekhā ki … bhāī sāhib svayam hī istrī le kar kapr õ ke d her ke d her pres kar dete. (Ashk 1:44)

Chetan saw also that …brother by himself used to press with an iron heaps of clothes. (Evidence is in a spotlight, in the main clause). 2) jhagr e kā signal hotā dekh cetan ne mā se kahā ki khānā paros de. (Ashk 1:51)

After Chetan saw a sign of a quarrel, he said to his mother to lay the table. (Evidence is in the non-focal position. SoA is embedded. The imperfective participle shows that an act is perceived). 3) kuch log hazārõ kī jagah ‘hazārhā’ bhī likhte dekhe jāte hai. (Varma 1995:191) Some people are seen writing ‘hazarha’ instead of ‘hazaron’. (Non-focal evidence, embedded SoA, imperfective participle). 4) kyā mujhe aisā karte hue āpne kabhī dekhā yā sunā hai? (Mithileshvar:99)

Have you ever heard or seen me doing so? (Non-focal evidence. Because of the dative subject the main verb is in an unchangeable form – masculine, plural). 5) mai usko bhīgte hue dekh rahā thā. (Kishore:43) I was watching her getting wet. (Non-focal evidence, dative subject). 6) prifekt

jasvãt ko vahā khar e dekh kar mujhe kuch āšcarya huā.

(Rakesh 1:79) I was a little surprised to see the prefect Jasvant standing there. (Non-focal evidence, dative subject. The perfective participle indicates that a state is perceived). 7) eksāth apne darvāze par birādarī ke itne gan yamānya logõ ko āyā dekh vah kuch caukā. (Mithileshvar:21)

He was startled when he saw that so many distinguished people of the community came to his door. (Non-focal evidence. Past participle) The imperfective participle can be replaced by the verbal noun, which emphasizes more strongly the action itself: 8) uskā sonā mai pæhlī bār dekh rahā thā. (Kishore:35) For the first time I was watching her sleeping. Here are some examples with other verbs: 9) rāt ko sote mẽ mujhe apnī sās ghut tī mæhsūs hone lagī thī. (Rakesh 1:7) By night while sleeping I began to feel my breath gasping. (Imperfective participle) 10) us same cādnī pūrī khir kī par phailī huī mæhsūs hone lagī thī. (Kishore:42)

At that time arose a feeling that the moonlight has spread over the whole window. (Perfective participle). 11) maine do-ek bār vācū ko kanakhiyõ se uskī or dekhte pāyā thā. (Sahni:17) Several times I noticed Vanchu looking at her surreptitiously. (Imperfective participle). 12) aur tab unhõne karor õ-karor õ kī bhīr pāyā. (Kamleshvar 2:8)

mẽ apne ko khar ā

And then he found himself standing in a crowd of millions people. (Perfective participle). It should be noted that such verbs as dekh-, sun-, mæhsūs kar- occur in evidence-bearing phrases either in focal or non-focal positions. The others tend to be predominantly non-focal. The evidence of the senses, and especially the visual one, is considered to be the strongest kinds of evidence. In this connection we would like to recall that Hindi also possesses tenses that could be called evidential, i.e., the Progressive tenses, which by definition record actions that are perceived by the senses while being carried out, and also the Perfective tenses that certify the existence of results of completed actions (but not necessarily by the senses): 13) usne dekhā ki uske bhāī pãd it banārasidās kī dukān par cãd befikrõ ke sāth tāš khel rahe hai . (Ashk 1:47)

He saw that his brother was playing cards with some loafers at the shop of the pundit Banarasidas. (Present progressive) 14) is same āp yahā kyõ āe hai? (Chatursen:163) Why have you come here at this time? (Present perfect) 15) log is samay is tarun

dilip



tārīf

kar

rahe

the.

(Chatursen:167) People were praising this young Dilip. (Past progressive)

5.1.1.2.2. Evidence of knowledge and experience. The truth-value of indicative sentences can be supported by the evidence of the speaker’s knowledge about, or acquaintance with, some specific state of affairs. The verbs like jān- (to know), patā lag-/cal- (to be known), combinations of adjectives and nouns with the copula, e.g. mālūm/gyāt/patā + copula (to be known), yād/smŗti + copula (to remember) are the most common: 1) ve jāntī thī ki asaphal hone par lekhā burī tarah se unke prān

legī. (Sankrityayan:13)

They knew that in case of failure Lekha would kill them badly.

2) mujhe ve din yād hai jab māltī jī aur jaggī bābū kā milnā šurū huā thā. (Kamleshvar 1:12).

I remember the days when Multy and Juggy Babu began to meet. 3) mujhe mālūm hai ki gāv jaisī īmāndārī šæhrõ mẽ nahī hai. (Kamleshvar 1:63) I know that in cities there is no such honesty as in a village. 4) mujhe patā hai, mai kaccī nīd se jagā hū. (Amrita 1:25) I know that I have waked up from a light sleep.

5.1.1.2.3. Evidence of personal conviction. This kind of evidence is offered when other options are not available or when the speaker regards himself authoritative enough in the eyes of the addressee. These evidences have the most numerous resources in comparison with other kinds of evidence and include modal adverbs zarūr / avašya / nišcay(hī) (of course, certainly, definitely), vastutæh (in fact),

nissandeh / bešak / šartiyā

(undoubtedly) vāqaī / yaqīnan (really, truly); modal particles to / hī (of course, exactly); parenthetical adverbial expressions darasal / asal mẽ / vāstav mẽ / yathārth mẽ (in fact, in reality); saccī / sac(hī) / sacmuc(hī) (really, truly), albattā (indeed), nišcit rūp se (definitely); or are represented by simple

clauses of the kind “yah sahī hai” (it is true), “yah haqīqat hai” (the truth is), “is mẽ sãdeh / šak nahī” (there is no doubt in it), “zāhir / sāf / spas t hai” (it is clear) etc.

These means explicitly transmit the arguments of the speaker to the factivity of the SoA. Still, the decisive role in defining the actuality of the SoA belongs to the Indicative. How does this assumption match the previous statement that the Indicative may render non-real senses as well? (Remember the multiple functions of the perfective participle, the Present Habitual and other tenses). The matter is that these modal means combine with the Indicative only when it is definitely used to express reality. Thus, followed by the abovementioned evidences, the Indicative is unambiguous. For instance, the phrase ‘mai abhī ātā hū ‘ (I’ll be back in a moment), expressing intention, cannot be uttered correctly with evidence of

confidence: * ‘mai abhī zarūr / darasal ātā hū ’. The perfective participle followed by words of confidence, in conditional clause becomes factive, and the conditional clause becomes causal: ‘agar tumne kahā’ (if you say…)

‘agar

tumne asal mẽ kahā’ (since you really said). Thus, a mood being a decisive factor

in an utterance interacts semantically with evidence, and the interpretation of a mood depends to some extent on their interaction. That is, since the moods are not unambiguous in reflecting reality, the employment of evidentials attaches to them more definite reference to reality. Here is a selection of examples: 1) pās ān -parašuõ

ne

kāfī

kām

kiyā

thā,

ismẽ

šak

nahī.

(Sankrityayan:20) Stone-axes had carried out plenty of work. There is no doubt in that. 2) tum mānoge nahī, lekin sac kæhtā hū , mũh mẽ anāj kā dānā d āle pūre cār roz ho gaye the. (Yashpal 2:103)

You won’t believe me but I tell you the truth – four days have passed since I put a wheat-grain into my mouth. 3) zarūr unkī aqal sat hiyā gaī thī. (Ray:23) They certainly went off their head. 4) nišcay hī vah bhogne aur jīnevālā amar dūsrā thā. (Yadav:9) He was certainly another Amar, ready to live and enjoy. 5) nissandeh d ākt ar ko vah pyār karne lagī thī. (Chatursen:27) She undoubtedly fell in love with the doctor. 6) vahā sacmuc sannāt ā chā gayā. (Tivari:17) Really, a dead silence reigned there. 7) vāstav mẽ vah sinhā ke liye prān

de dene ke liye hī becain

thī. (Yashpal 2:70)

Actually, she was eager to give her life for Sinha. 8) darasal ve hunar sāhab ke bāre mẽ kuch kæhnā cāhte the. (Ashk 1:58) In fact, he wanted to say something about Mr. Hunar. Among the expressive means of confidence-rendering evidentials, the emphatic particles to and hī occupy a special place. Bahri characterizes them in these words: “to is derived from tab…In such expressions as yah to kisī ne dekhā hī

nahī [‘Nobody saw it, I can assure you – G.Sh.], to means ‘of course’…hī is an

intensive adverbial particle, added to many, if not all, parts of speech. It has the meaning of ‘just’ or ‘definitely’ or ‘even’” (1985:189). The particles are polysemantic, but not all the cases of their usage are the matter of our concern. We will regard only those of them, which indicate the attitude of the speaker to the truth of the SoA. The place of hī and to in the sentence is strictly defined. hī follows immediately the stressed word (enclitic), while to occurs before it (proclitic). So, if the particles emphasize any other word apart from the predicate, they have no reference to the actuality of the utterance as a whole. Compare the pairs of sentences in which the predicates or other words in the sentences are underlined: 9) hā, hā , yahā sabhī māltī jī ke gharvāle hī hai. (Kamleshvar 1:6) Yes, yes, all here are relatives of Malty. (The word ‘relatives’ is emphasized – they are relatives and not friends or strangers). 10) kitne xūšnasīb ho tum! – hā, ek tarah se hū hī. (Rakesh 1:114) How lucky you are! – Yes, in a sense I really am. (The predicate is emphasized). 11) ve to mere hī dharm ko māntī hai. (Chatursen:62) She is of the same religion as mine. (It is my religion and not other) 12) dukhī ne zarā cĩtit ho kar kahā – hā, yah bāt to hai. (Prem Chand 1:18) Dukhi said slightly puzzled: “Yes, that’s true”. (The predicate is emphasized). When these particles emphasize a complex predicate, they occur immediately after the main verb: 13) magar ādmī binā kisī se mile-jule ræh bhī to nahī

saktā.

(Prem Chand 1:45) But a human certainly cannot live without becoming close with anybody. 14) āp jānte hī hai ki mere āpke rāste alag ho cuke hai . (Kamleshvar 1:48) You definitely know that our ways have parted. Used together in the same sentence these particles have more assertive force: 15) uske sprĩg apeks akŗt kam cubhte the, par cubhte to the hī. (Rakesh 1:12)

Its springs pierced relatively less, but still they certainly did pierce. 16) thakī huī to hai hī. (Rakesh 1:83) She is definitely tired. If the particle hī asserts a negative proposition, then the negation (nahī) follows it: 17) maine dekhā hī nahī . (Kamleshvar 1:73) I really did not see. In all the abovementioned cases the particles play an accessory role. This is exactly what Gonda stated in 1956:197: “…the ‘modal force’ – if we understand by this term the attitude of mind of the speaker – is in the form of the verb, not in the particle”. The evidence of the speaker’s conviction can be offered in many other ways, for instance, by the idiomatic use of the imperative phrase sac pūcho to (ask me the truth, if the truth is asked then)110, interrogative sentences, e.g. “kām šurū kar rahe hai? – hā, aur kyā? Are you starting work? – Yes, of course” (McGregor

1986:182); and last but not least – inversion of the copula111: 18) magar hai sab bar e himmatī. (Prem Chand 2:63) But all are very brave indeed. 19) bāt thī bhī sahī. (Kamleshvar 1:19) It was definitely true.

5.1.1.2.4. Reportatives. This kind of evidentials is used to qualify knowledge as “having been acquired through language rather than direct experience” (Chafe 1986:268-269, see also Groenendijk et al 1987:183). Most scholars define two main sub-divisions of the Reportatives – ‘Quatatives’ and ‘Hearsay’. The Quatatives report opinions about the validity of the proposition and may include:

110

See Липеровский (1962b:41)

111

“The copula receives the greatest emphasis when placed in the beginning of a sentence, as hai to

sahī,

(it) is there, of course” (Bahri 1985:238).

A) Personal opinions without revealing their grounds, such as merā

xayāl / vicār

hai ki…, mere / uske xayāl mẽ (se), merī / uskī rāy (dŗs t i, nazro) mẽ –

‘to my / his mind’; merā / uskā matlab hai – ‘I / he mean(s)’, and so on: sãsthā kā adhyāpak tab cetan kī dŗs t i mẽ sab

1) kisī praivet

se bar ā ghulām thā. (Ashk 1:54)

A teacher in any private institution was in Chetan’s opinion a slave indeed. 2) unke xayāl mẽ ālā darje ke st ār banne ke sab gun

unmẽ the.

(Chatursen:35) He was of the opinion that he had all the qualities for becoming a film star of the best kind.

B) An opinion can be presented as widely accepted in the society or belonging to many people. In this case the position of the speaker is latent. For such an impersonal opinion passive forms of the verbs like kæh- (to call), mān- (to believe), gin- (to count, to consider), samajh- (to understand, to consider), gan nā kar- (to count, to consider); or the verb with an inherently passive meaning kæhlā- (to be called) are used: 3) inmẽ se ‘usne kahā thā’ kathāvastu aur šilp kī dŗs t i se hĩdī kī šres t

h

kahāniyõ mẽ ginī jātī hai. (Nayak:1)

Among them “He had said” is considered to be one of the best Hindi stories in terms of skill and the subject. 4) merī niyukti ke bād vah vyavasthā t hīk ho gayī mān lī gayī thī. (Rakesh 1:54)

After my appointment the situation was admitted to have returned to normal. 5)

javāharlāl

bh ī

deš-videš

mẽ

ugravādī

kahe

jāte

the.

(Chatursen:123) Even Jawaharlal (Nehru) was called an extremist both in the country and abroad. 6) kæhlāne ko set

h

calte hai paidal. (Prem Chand 1:28)

People call him a respectful merchant, but he walks on foot.

C) Reported speech, which in Hindi is represented primarily by quotation (the evidence could be placed either before the cited sentence or after it):

7) usī ke kālej mẽ cācā mujhe bhī bhartī karvā dẽge – aisā unhõne kahā hai. (Tivari:8)

Uncle will prompt me to enter his college – this is what he said. 8) mai kisī had tak to badnām bhī ho cukā hū – hākim sāhib hī gavāh hai. (Chatursen:40)

To some extent my reputation has been destroyed. Mr.Hakim is a witness. 9) jvālī kā yah kæhnā thā ki brāhman ī jīvī ne apnī ‘šubhkāmnāõ’ ke ks etr ko vistār dene kī t hān lī. (Ashk 1:59)

Jvali asserted that Jivi, the Brahman woman, decided to widen the extent of her ‘wishes’ (swear words). ‘Hearsay’ indicates that the responsibility of the speaker for the truth of what he is saying is limited by the fact that someone else said it (Palmer 1986:21). The most often occurring indicators of Hearsay are the phrases sunā hai (they say), logõ kā kæhnā hai (people say), sunne mẽ ā- (to be heard), aisā kæhte hai (it is said):

10) hā , sunā hai uskī bīvī guzar gaī hai. (Rakesh 1:47) Yes, people say his wife is gone. 11) maine sunā gulnār abhī badhāvā lāī thī, tumne use laut ā diyā. (Prem Chand 1:45) I have heard that Gulnar had come just now with presents, and you sent her back. 12) sunne mẽ āyā hai, āp viks ak ke rūp mẽ ræh rahe hai … dekhiyegā! (Mithileshvar:98)

I have heard that you are going to be a controller (in the exams)…check, please. 13) sunā huā thā ki tarīzā kisī raīs bāp kī bet ī thī – uske marhūm bāp kī šohrat amīrī ke lihāz se sunī huī thī. (Amrita 1:13)

It was rumored that Tariza was a daughter of an aristocrat – her late father was famous for his wealth.

5.1.1.2.5. Inferential evidence. There is a large group of predicates, which serve for meeting a lack in the information that the speaker possesses. On the grounds of incomplete information the speaker

concludes about the validity of a states of affairs. It is clear that such evidence is very weak and is rather an expression of doubt than a demonstration of confidence. This means that such a SoA can be understood either as factive (with a considerable portion of doubt in its facticity) or non-factive. With the help of moods the speaker demonstrates which direction he considers to be more relevant. Among these evidentials there are ‘mental work’ predicates, such as soc- (to think), samajh- (to understand, to decide), ãdāzā lagā- / anumān kar- (to estimate, to evaluate). They are always focal and, therefore, the SoA is in the position of complement clause: 1) maine samjhā thā, kursī par kapr õ kī gat hrī par ī hai. (Amrita 1:26) I decided that on the chair there is a bundle of clothes. 2) maine ãdāzā lagāyā, bāp bet ī mẽ xāsī zor-šor se bæhas cal rahī thī. (Mitra:35)

I estimated that the father and the daughter were arguing hotly. But the main part of the group are the verbs of sensory perception with inferential qualities. This means that they report deductions made on the basis of perceived events or states. Here is a list of such verbs which most frequently occur in our contexts: jāc- (to be examined, to seem), bhān ho- (to appear, to seem), ābhās mil- (to be felt), mālūm ho- / par - (to be supposed, to seem), jān par - (to be

perceived, to seem), pratīt ho- (to be evident, to seem), nazar ā- (to be seen, to seem), dīkh- (to appear, to seem), lag- (to be felt, to seem). They occur either in a focal (foregrounded) or non-focal (backgrounded) position. Their focal occurrences are less common: 3) use jān par rahā thā, sabhī log use vismay se dekh rahe hai . (Yashpal 2:71) She had a feeling that everybody was looking at her with astonishment. 4) aisā pratīt hotā thā ki vah bhīl bastī kā āyudhāgār hai. (Reddy 2:68) The impression was that it was an armory of the Bheel-tribe’s settlement. 5) mā ko bhī lagā ki lar kā bahut par

h

gayā hai. (Tivari:7)

Mother, too, came to the conclusion that the boy has studied enough. 6) mujhe lagā vah dhīre dhīre jag rahī hai. (Kishore:36)

It seemed to me that she was awakening gradually. The non-focal position (Palmer [1986]) calls such a construction ‘subject-raising’) of these verbs is grammaticized to a considerable degree, and they look like an extension of the SoA’s predicate. Relatively high degree of grammaticalization makes it possible to interpret the verbs of perception (nazar ā-, dīkh-, mālūm ho-) inferentially (‘seem’). In most examples of our data the non-focal position was registered. It may be accounted for the fact that a certain element of epistemic qualification is present in each inferential evidence, but, as Nuyts (2001:266) writes, “grammatical markers are informationally ‘low profile’ expressions, and this suits the normally non-focal position of the epistemic qualification”: 7) jo ãš dekh gayā hū, vah mujhe bahut upyogī jãcā hai. (Varma 1995:127) The element I have seen appeared to me very useful. 8) un ãšõ kā vibhājan karnā kat hin pratīt hotā hai. (Reddi 2:52) To divide those shares seems to be difficult. 9) apne cārõ or chal-kapat

kā jāl sā bichā huā mālum hotā thā.

(Prem Chand 1:40) He believed that nets of deceit and tricks were spread around him. The aspectual features of the SoA’s predicate, which are easily expressed in the complement clause, are preserved in the embedded clause by the forms of the participle (imperfective, perfective, progressive): 10) vah to ‘gãgā kī læhrõ kī bhās ā’ bhī samajhtā jān par tā hai. (Bahri 1986:1) It seems that he understands the ‘language of the waves of Ganges’. (Imperfective participle) 11) thor ā hī calne ke bād surya ks itij ke nīce calā gayā jān par tā thā. (Sankrityayan:7)

After a short walk the sun seemed to have gone down the horizon. (Perfective participle) 12) dādī lar kõ kī āvāz ko acchī tarah sun rahī jān par tī hai. (Sankrityayan:2) Grandmother seems to hear well the voices of the boys. (Progressive participle)

Amidst the verbs of inferential evidence, the verb lag- is the most frequently used. It is a very special verb. Different dictionaries count from 26 (Shyamsundaradas 1995) till 65 (Shrivastav 1972) meanings of it. Besides, it actually can be used instead of any other verb of inferential evidence. It has accumulated all their meanings and performs them in a simplified manner: 13) vah to bahut hī acchā lar kā lagtā hai. (Tivari:12) My impression is that he is a very good boy. 14) rikkī itnā mujhe nahī jitnā xud ko kæh rahī lagtī thī. (Amrita 1:109) Rikky was seemingly saying (it) rather to herself than to me. 15) gale mẽ se ek cīx sī nikaltī lagī. (Amrita 1:21) Something like a scream seemed to go out of my throat. 16) ve apne pāpā kī bet ī sābit huī lagtī hai. (ind iyā t ud e, April 1997:84) She apparently proved to be her father’s daughter. This verb can be paraphrased (both in a focal and non-focal position) as “from what I have seen / heard / felt / read / been told, I infer (without asserting it) that it is / must be p”. The option ‘is / must be’ is rendered by other devices, namely, by the moods. The verbs of inferential evidence are expressive only of lack of confidence and not of the real / non-real distinction. Thus, they are not modal. Best of all, this claim of ours can be tested while analyzing comparative clauses. Consider the following examples, where the evidence is applied to real and non-real propositions: 17) vācū ko lagā, jaise vah apne ghar pahũc gayā hai. (Sahni:26) Vanchu felt like he had come to his own house. (The Indicative) 18) lagā bataxõ ke dal mẽ kisī ne d helā phẽk diyā ho aur ve kikiyātī huī bhāgne lagī hõ. (Sahni:127)

It was as though somebody threw a stone at a lake full of ducks and they began to run away quacking. (The Potential) 19) ise lagā jaise uske cārõ or nānā rūpõ mẽ vahi svar ut

h

rahā

hai. (Prabhakar:47)

He felt like it was the same sound arising around him in different ways. (The Indicative)

20) use lagā jaise bhūlā svapn yād ā rahā ho. (Yashpal 1:14) He felt as though a forgotten dream was coming to his mind. (The Potential) These two pairs of examples are syntactically similar. They are similar also in terms of tenses. The difference is made by the use of the Indicative and the Potential, which convert the comparison into real (like) or imaginative (as though).112 Evidence undoubtedly adds semantic justification to the epistemic qualification of the state of affairs, but it is not, strictly speaking, of vital necessity. A comparison (real or nonreal) can be made without any evidence at all: 21) set

h

jī ko mānõ jūr ī car

h

āī. (Prem Chand 1:31)

The merchant felt something like a fever. (The Indicative) 22) uske vastr jaise mere liye pārdaršak ho gaye hõ. (Kishore:40) Her clothes became as though transparent for me. (The Potential) When a state of affairs is presented in an embedded clause, where the use of moods is impossible, the real / non-real distinction is manifested by the particle sā which is used for expressing “the notion of ‘general resemblance’” (McGregor 1986:147). A participle form of a verb followed by sā is equal to that of a complement sentence with the Potential: 23) us din rāt ke gæhre ãdhere mẽ dīvārõ par kuch hiltā sā lagā thā. (Amrita 1:21)

On that day in the heavy darkness of the night I felt as though something was moving on the walls. 24) aur yahā yah vyakti sāks āt isī satya ko pratipādit karne ko avatārit huā sā pratīt hotā thā. (Mishra:12)

It seemed as though this man came from heaven to proclaim this very truth.

5.1.1.3. Expectatives. Evidentials are to a considerable extent, if not exclusively, a feature of discourse. What is important in epistemic expression is “a matter of how the speaker presents it

112

“Subjunctive is used in comparisons…when the comparison is made not with an actual event, but

with a supposed case.” (Kellogg 1938:470, see also McGregor 1986:131)

rather than of how it ‘really is’. The position of the interaction partner can be expected to be critical in this respect” (Nuyts 2001:35). In a dialogue the speaker unconsciously evaluates a number of factors, namely, the mental outlook of the addressee, his or her views, educational level, social status. Before presenting a proposition it is important to know if the addressee is familiar with it or not. While choosing one form of evidence or another, the speaker takes into consideration the opinions of the addressee expressed earlier on the subject of the dialogue, opinions of other competent sources, the necessity of helping the hearer to make up his mind, and so on. The choice of a source of evidence results sometimes from reasons of deference, respect to the position and views of the addressee. Thus, devices revealing what the speaker expects the addressee to know about some specific piece of knowledge are closely related to the evidential system of language. But they are placed in a very peripheral domain of modality. Most expectatives (e.g. xāmaxāh, bekār, nāhaq – ‘in vain, useless’) are rather signs of emotional attitudes to the proposition than evaluations. Still, some of them may serve as a kind of evaluation of reality. For instance, some grammatical devices show real actions that actually have taken place but with an air of surprise or disappointment. For this purpose the particle hī can be inserted into a complex verb: 1) nyū thīet arsvalõ ne āxir mujhe pakar hī liyā. (Mitra:28) The workers of the New Theatres caught me after all. 2) thor ī der aur socā, phir cal hī diyā. (Kamleshvar 1:73) He thought some more time, but nonetheless moved away. A way to express an unexpected action in the past and, on the contrary, expected in the future is to use the verbs sābit / siddh ho- (to be proved) or nikal- (to prove to be): 3) anek mahilāõ ke liye yah yojnā bar e kām kī sābit huī hai. (Gupta:75) For many women this program proved to be very useful. 4) yah kuā sab se bar ā niklā. (Reddy 2:10) This well turned to be the biggest one. 5) to kyā tum samajhte ho ki tumhārī bhavis yavānī satya siddh hogī? (Nagar 2:10)

Do you think that your prediction will come true? The negative particle na marks expectations of the speaker in two ways: A) “When an affirmative answer is expected or desired to a question, this is very commonly indicated in ordinary conversation by the negative particle na (never nahī) at the end of the sentence, uttered with a peculiar rising intonation” (Kellogg

1938:537). In its meaning it is equal to the English tag questions: 6) bahut afsos kī bāt hai na ? (Rakesh 1:47) It is a pity, isn’t it? 7) ghãtī bajī thī na? (Kamleshvar 2:33) The bell has rung, hasn’t it? B) This particle is also used when the speaker reminds the addressee that they share some information that he is expected to know: 8) cerī ne iskī gardan daboc rakhī hai na, usī se yah itnā hatāš ho rahā hai. (Rakesh 1:60)

As you know, Cherry took him by throat. That is why he is becoming so desperate. 9) maine pichlī bār kahā thā na? (Reddi 2:47) I told you last time, remember? Negative expectations are often expressed by the Future tense accompanied with exclamative intonation. In this case its meaning is sarcastic and skeptic: 10) t hik hī vah merī par hāī mẽ mujhe madad degī ! (Ashk 1:33) Really, she will help me in my study! 11) t hākurānevāle mujhe khat iyā dẽge ! āg tak to ghar se nikaltī nahī, khat iyā dẽge ! (Prem Chand 1:18)

The family of the landlord will give me a bed! Even fire does not come out of their house – they will give me a bed! The verb cuk- can also be used for negative expectations. Here is how Platts (1874:172) describes it: “The Past Indefinite tense is often used most idiomatically to express the utter improbability of the speaker’s performing an act, or of his belief in the improbability of another’s performing it; as mai kar cukā, ‘I am not at all likely

to do’… vah jā cukā, ‘he is gone (as much as he ever likely to go)’, i.e. ‘he is not gone at all, and is not likely to go’.113 The theme of expectations in particular and evidentials in general must be a subject for a special and detailed study. The given examples are aimed only at underlining their connection to the wider semantic category of epistemic modality.

5.1.1.3. Future without doubt. The future obviously pertains to the world of imagination.114 But linguistic expressions can render high confidence of the speaker in the likelihood of an event or, as Comrie (1985:44) writes, to make “a definite statement about a state of affairs to hold at a certain time subsequent to the present moment”. So far we have discussed different ways of expressing futurity in Hindi and came to the conclusion that it has only a grammaticized remote future. The periphrastic future forms, which are used for the immediate future, have strong modal characteristics and are intentional and emphatic by nature. The origin of the future tense morphology has been described in detail in the literature. As in Greek, where differentiation of temporality and modality led to the division of the old category of the Subjunctive into the Future tense and the Subjunctive mood (Stephany:398-399), the Subjunctive of Hindi developed in a similar direction. Kellogg (1938:228) called the new formations ‘the Absolute Future’ (representing the future as reality) and ‘the Contingent Future’ (representing the future as possibility – we call it the Potential) where the Absolute Future is formed from the Contingent Future. In the time of Kellogg the connection between the element -gā, distinguishing the Future tense from the Subjunctive mood, was not stable enough and occasionally was found separated from the rest of the verb by the emphatic particle hī – karūhīgā (ibid.:231). In the present-day literature such occurrences have not been registered. Today the Future tense is regarded as expressing mainly certainty and positiveness. And in spite of multiple occurrences of the Future tense in sentences rendering doubt, some grammarians consider such cases as a misuse (Bahri 1986:223). The Future tense, indeed, is able to make a clear prediction about some future state of affairs, but this 113

See also Клюев (1962:341)

114

“Any future event is potential rather than actual” (Chung & Timberlake 1985:243)

prediction is set on the very border of possibility, and as in other languages, in Hindi “degrees of possibility depend to some extent on the speaker’s (or source’s) convictions”(Chung & Timberlake 1985:243). In an utterance such convictions are represented by evidentials. Here is a list of evidence-markers arranged in accordance with their persuasion: zarūr, hī (of course); jān-, patā ho- (to know); tay kar- (to decide); nišcay / faislā kar(to take a decision); višvās / yaqīn ho-, āšvast ho- (to be sure); āšā / ummīd kar- / ho- (to hope); sãdeh / šak ho- (to doubt); d ar ho- (to be afraid); šāyad

(‘maybe, perhaps’ – considered by grammarians as incompatible with the future, but existing in practice). It is particularly interesting that evidence also lessens the convincing force of an utterance which predicts the future, that is the phrase ‘he will come’ is stronger than ‘he will certainly come’. This fact shows a semantic relation of the Future tense to the Declarative (but see the further discussion in 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.2): 1) tū bar ā honhār hai, zarūr lakhpatī banegā. (Nagar 2:13) You are very promising; you will certainly become a millionaire. 2) logõ ke pās jab koī kām nahī hogā, log bhūkh se marẽge to julūs to nikālẽge hī. (Tivari:17)

When people have no work, die from hunger then they will certainly go to demonstrations. 3) vah jāntā hai ki āg se alag ho jāne par hāth nahī jalegā. (Dinkar:56) He knows that he will not burn his hand if he keeps away from the fire. 4) unhõne nišcay kar liyā ki ab ghar kī kisī bāt mẽ daxal na dẽge. (Priyamvada:99)

He took a decision that he wouldn’t interfere in any affair of the house. 5) use pūrā višvās thā ki abhī uske dādā use āvāz dẽge. (Ashk 1:27) He was absolutely sure that his grandfather would call him now. 6) use qataī ummīd nahī thī ki ājn a mil jāegī. (Kamleshvar 2:25) He did not believe at all that he would get permission. 7) use d ar thā adhik pūchne se nārāz ho jāẽge. (Yashpal 2:7) He was afraid that, if asked any more, he would become angry.

Confidence about some future event can be expressed also by the present copula, which certifies that a firm decision has been made to act in the future. Such an utterance must be followed by an adverbial of time: 8) šām ko bahut bar ī mīt ĩg hai, kal mahilāõ vālī sabhā hai… jagatsĩh ne dāyarī dekh kar kahā. (Kamleshvar 1:70)

In the evening we have a big meeting, tomorrow there will be a meeting with participation of women…- said Jagat Sinh after having looked in the diary.

5.1.1.4. Specific and general truth. Usually when we talk about reality expressed by the Indicative, we mean actions or situations registered in our memory, in books or in any other way, which are associated with some specific event or process that occurred in a specific place in a specific time, with some specific person or a group of people. The aspectual differences of verbs allow the speaker to widen temporal and spatial borders of a described state of affairs. But still, the subjects of such sentences remain specific. One of the main requirements for generalization is to represent a quality as belonging not to a specific entity, but to any (or to any of this sort). This kind of generalization is found in compound sentences with relative clauses (adjectival, temporal, and locative): 1) jis ke sāth koī lar kā jur jātā hai, vah kitnā badal jātī hai. (Kamleshvar 2:10) Any girl, who is in friendly ties with a boy, changes greatly. (The Indicative is used, but generalization is rendered lexically, through the word koī (some)) The only way to express generalization grammatically is to use the Subjunctive. The Subjunctive is apt to make indefinite statements with no reference to any particular individual. Moreover, as Gonda (1956:73) asserts, the Subjunctive has not only “voluntative” or “prospective”, but “timeless use” as well. We have to admit that in generic sentences marked by the Subjunctive the meaning of general truth and imagination overlap: 2) jab ãdar āg lagī huī ho, to bāhar šāti kahā? (Prem Chand 1:41) When fire is inside, can it be quiet outside?

3) umr zyādā ho jāe, to ādmī ko har tarah se parešānī. (Mitra:5) When the age growths, a man suffers from different troubles. 4) jo ādmī apnī jān kā mālik na ho, vah ādmī hī kaisā ? (Reddi 2:35) If a man is not a master of his life, how can he be called a man? 5) jis ke sir par bijlī gir par ī ho, vah kyā soce, kyā roe, kyā bole. (Prem Chand 1:50)

Who is struck by a lightning on his head, will he think, cry or speak? In spite of the fact that these sentences describe imaginative situations, and semantically and syntactically are very much like if-clauses, they do not express possibility, but timeless truth, which existed, exists and will exist. The relative pronouns jo (who), jab (when), and jahā (where) serve as natural restrictors of the sphere of the reality it is applied to. This feature of the Subjunctive is widely used in proverbs: 6) jahā na pahũce ravi vahā pahũce kavi. (Бескровный 1972:452) A poet reaches the places, which the sun does not reach. 7) (jab) rājā kahānī kahe, (to) rānī jū t at ole. (Yashpal 2:95) (When) a king speaks, the queen looks for lice (keeps silent). 8) hāthī cale bāzār, kuttā bhõke hazār. (Mithileshvar:42) An elephant goes to a market, a dog bays at him. 9) jo dhāve so pāve, jo sove so khove. (Fallon 1886:122) Who runs gets, who sleeps looses. Proverbs, which inter alia are the best examples of generalized reality, equally often use other moods: 10) jo bovegā so kāt egā. (Fallon 1886:122) Who sows will reap. 11) jo car

h

egā so giregā. (Fallon 1886:122)

Who climbs will fall. 12) jo garajte hai vah baraste nahī. (Fallon 1886:122) The cloud that thunders much rains little. In such sentences the copula in the existential function is often omitted:

13) jahā gãj(hai)vahā rãj(hai). (Fallon 1886:109) No gains without pains. 14) jis kī lāt hī (hai)uskī bhẽs(hai). (Fallon 1886:119) Who has the cudgel has the buffalo (Might is right).

5.2. Imagination and possibility. Judgments. In this section we will consider the cases of epistemic modality dealing not with facts or knowledge, but exclusively with guesses. The guesses, or in other words, imaginative states of affairs, reveal distinctions, which allow attributing them either to non-factive or contra-factive spheres. Non-factive and contra-factive SoAs could be presented in their turn with different degrees of confidence (possibly, probably, certainly). According to Palmer’s proposal, utterances which evaluate contingency of states of affairs (Judgments) could be divided into Speculatives (expressing opinions, when any definite information about the SoA is not available) and Deductives (conclusions, inferences, based on some limited information). We will consider the Counterfactuals as a separate sub-division of the Judgements. Counterfactual suppositions differ from the Speculatives and the Deductives in terms of the informational grounds – they result from the factive information fully known to the speaker. But the propositions built on this information are absolutely imaginative.115

5.2.1. Speculatives. Speculatives are considered to be ‘weak judgments’, and their Hindi counterparts are equal to the English may or might representing epistemically possible states of affairs. Expression forms and means of the Speculatives vary according to temporal reference of a SoA being evaluated. A possible future action is usually described with the help of the verb sak-, the Potential mood or the Future tense. The Potential and the Future tense are accompanied as a rule by evidentials like šāyad or sãbhav hai. Likelihood of an action in the present or in the past is rendered by the subjunctive forms of the verb ho- in the copulative function, which follows perfective, imperfective or 115

“Counterfactual and conditional constructions convey ideas that are most clearly within the realm

of thought (imagination) rather than actualized reality (perception)” (Mithun 1995:384)

progressive participles. The imperfective form of sak- is also used for expressing suppositions about some future possibility. Let us consider them separately.

5.2.1.1. Future possibility. The modal sak- is one of the most widely used modal means of Hindi. Together with ‘ability’ (inherent) and ‘permission’ (deontic) it carries also the meaning of contingency, which is clearly epistemic. Many studies have been devoted to the combination of different senses in one word, and there is an extensive discussion as to which of them is more prototypical. For instance, Guo (1995:207) asserts that ‘permission’ grew on the soil of ‘physical ability’ and in its turn gave rise to the epistemic uses, while Wierzbicka (1987:32) assumes that it is ‘permission’ that generates ‘ability’. Whatever is the right answer, it is clear that all these meanings are closely connected, and what we intend to do is to elucidate under which conditions and circumstances the epistemic meaning prevails. The ambiguity of the verb (see 3.1.1, 4.6.1.1) sometimes does not allow separating its internal meanings, but there are some factors thanks to which its interpretation can be unequivocally epistemic or, on the contrary, obviously non-epistemic. What, then, are these conditions? Since the epistemic definition is based on the notion of possible worlds, the term ‘possible’ presupposes multiple situations.116 This means that in a sak-sentence which bears epistemic meaning there must be some multiplier – a multiplier of time, place, or agent: 1) par kæhkar mujhe lagā ki merī bāt kā kuch dūsrā arth bhī nikal saktā hai. (Rakesh 1:81)

Having said this I felt that my words could be interpreted differently (Another meaning could be derived -The subject is multiplied). 2) pitā kisī bhī ks an

ā sakte hai. (Mishra:11)

Father may come any moment. (The time of the action is multiplied) 3) iskā matlab hai ki koī bhī rājmahal mẽ ā saktā hai. (Reddi 1:12) This means that anyone may enter the palace. (The subject / agent is multiplied)

116

As Palmer (1990:152) writes, “the notion of number is relevant in the definitions of possible

worlds”.

When rendering epistemic possibility the verb sak- is in the habitual present or habitual past tense form. It is easy to understand the reason. The imperfective aspect of the Habitual tenses serves for expressing iterative actions. Thus, it itself becomes a multiplier. It must be noted that when the reference time is the future, possibility is rendered by the Present Habitual tense and never by the Future tense: 4) kal ko koī ut hkar yah bhī kæh saktā hai ki yah merī baccī nahī hai. (Kamleshvar 1:76)

Tomorrow somebody may rise and say that she is not my daughter. The verb ho- (to be) in the existential function combined with sak- (ho saktā hai) turned to be an idiomatic expression and successfully substitutes the modal word šāyad (perhaps) or the modal expressions sãbhav / mumkin hai (it is possible).

Usually it is followed by the complement clause: 5) yah bhī ho saktā hai vah anubhavhīntā kā bhay ho. (Kishore:37) Maybe it was fear of inexperience. 6) ho saktā hai ve lilī ko lekar kahī aur cale jāẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:101) He will possibly go somewhere with Lily. This expression is sometimes used improperly, tautologically, together with other possibility-bearing words. Bahri (1985:228) calls this phenomenon “a bad style”: 7) kisī pal bhī jhagr e kī sãbhāvnā kī jā saktī thī. (Ashk 1:32) Possibility of a quarrel was possible any moment. Sometimes it even follows the predicate verb in different tenses as an auxiliary verb, which is regarded as a misuse and a glaring mistake (Varma 1995:135): 8) use ab bhī kahī lag rahā ho ki maine sirf itne kām ke liye use nahī bulāyā ho saktā. (Rakesh 1:168)

It possibly seemed to him even now that I might not have called him only because of this small matter. The next condition that attaches to the verb sak- the meaning of possibility is passivization. So far we have noticed intransitive verbs with passive meanings and

non-volitional intransitive verbs that in the combination with the verb sak- will only convey the sense of possibility (see 3.1.1a, 3.3). Passive voice constructions with sak- obviously exclude ability, because the subject of the constructions is not the agent. For interpreting them as a general permission we need a very specific communicative situation when the speaker is in the position to grant permissions. The Passive voice is a very effective way to express generic situations, generalization being itself a kind of multiplier: 9) unse ab bhī sab bātẽ sāf sāf kahī jā saktī hai. (Chatursen:62) Everything can be said to them clearly even now. 10) kyā abhī isī ks an

nahī calā jā saktā bābūjī? – nahī bet ī,

aisā kabhī nahī ho saktā. (Chatursen:88)

Is it not possible to go right now, daddy? – No, daughter, it is never possible. 11) āpkī jaisī daks atā bahut kam logõ mẽ dekhī jā saktī hai, sāhib! (Reddy 2:56)

It is possible to see competence like yours in very few people, sir. Different factors holding the verb sak- in the epistemic domain may occur in the same sentence, thereby reducing its ambiguity and other possible senses to zero: 12) kisī bhī ks an

bātẽ surū ho saktī hai. (Kishore:38)

The conversation may start any moment now. (The time multiplier + an inherently passive verb) 13) hālat

aisī

hai

ki

kisī

bhī

vaqt

jhagr ā

ho

saktā

hai.

(Kamleshvar 1:52) The situation is such that any time there may be a quarrel. (The time multiplier + an inherently passive verb) 14) uskā jo sāmān vahā par ā hai, vah jab cāhe, use bhej diyā jā saktā hai. (Rakesh 1:17)

Her things lying there can be sent to her any time she wants. (The time multiplier + passive voice) But there are grammatical constructions in which the verb sak- is interpreted nonepistemically as a rule. For instance, perfective forms of sak- are expressive of ability only, and in the Future tense the meaning of ability prevails over other meanings:

15) dilīp bahut cāhkar bhī ‘hā’ na kæh sakā. (Chatursen:152) In spite of a great desire Dilip could not say ‘yes’.(Perfective) 16) bāt chipī na ræh sakī. (Nagar 2:71) The matter could not be hidden.(Perfective) 17) ab ham unko nāmālum kab dekh sakẽge. (Reddy 2:125) Who knows when we will be able to see them.(Future) 18) jānā to āj na ho sakegā āpkā. (Chatursen:100) Today you will not be able to go.(Future) The rationale for the interpretation is in the semantic properties of the forms. The Future tense is intended to express confidence, certainty about future events, and perfective forms underline completion and, thus, certainty about past events. Both forms function as restrictors of possible worlds. Among other restrictors we may name the words sirf / keval (only), the particle hī (just, only, exactly), and the first person agent. The latter excludes possibility if the

predicate is a volitional verb. It is often the case that in a single sentence there are several restrictors: 19) mai to ise vāpas nahī le jā saktī. (Chatursen:91) Actually, I cannot take her back. (First person agent) 20) aur sãgat han sãskŗti ke dvārā hī ho saktā hai. (Chatursen:63) A union can be established only through the culture.(The particle hī) 21) mai apne bāre mẽ to yah kæh hī saktā hū . (Kishore:38) This is just what I really can tell about myself. (First person agent + the particle hī)

22) mai tumhẽ samjhā saktī hū . (Prem Chand 1:48) I can explain to you. (First person agent) 23) har fūd

ĩspekt ar kī āmadnī inkī mut t hī garm kiye binā ho

hī nahī saktī. (Nagar 2:2)

Not a single food inspector can earn without giving him a bribe. (The particle hī) The Potential is as ambiguous as the Optative. The same morphological form and the future reference require, naturally, some outer factors to distinguish the two forms. In contrast with the Optative, the Potential never occurs automatically in complement clauses after certain predicates. But it always needs some lexical justification of its

use. Otherwise it will inevitably be confused with the Optative (see chapter 2, e.g. 2; see also Gambhir 1993:74). Since one of the main functions of the Potential is to transmit the idea of possibility, it is always accompanied by words of doubt or by expressions of unawareness, lack of information. A Potential sentence may follow such predicative expressions as sãbhav / mumkin hai (it is possible), aisā lagtā hai (it seems), ho saktā hai (it may be), sãbhāvnā / gũjāyaš hai (there is

possibility), patā / mālūm nahī (it is not known) etc.: 24) sãbhav hai vah laut

āe. sãbhav hai na bhī āe. (Mithileshvar:19)

It is possible that he comes. It is also possible that he does not. 25) is bāt kī pūrī sãbhāvnā hai ki unhẽ sabhā mẽ giraftār kar liyā jāe. (Ashk 1:46)

There is all probability that they will be arrested in the meeting. 26) patā nahī kitnī der lage. (Prabhakar:89) I do not know how much time it will take. 27) na mālūm, phir āpse bāt karne kā mauqā kab mile! (Reddy 2:127) Who knows when will arise an opportunity to talk to you! 28) ho saktā hai mai hī ā jāū. (Kamleshvar 1:74) Perhaps I will come. The modal adverbs šāyad / kadācit (perhaps) and sãbhavatah (possibly) are even more general in use with the Potential. Nuyts (2001:85) describing the modal usage of the English adjectives (probable, possible) and the modal adverbs (probably, possibly) explains it in terms of “discourse functionality”. He claims that the predicative adjectives can be used to focus strongly upon the modal qualification. The same is true not only of the modal adjectives sãbhav / mumkin, but of all the other evidential expressions in Hindi used predicatively. In contrast, šāyad / kadācit and their counterparts šāyad hī (hardly, scarcely), sãbhavatah (possibly) are not focal: 29) šāyad šām tak ghar na laut ẽ. (Reddy 2:101) Perhaps they won’t come back before the evening. 30) aur lar kī dikhāne ke liye šāyad ve taiyār na hõ. (Ashk 1:29) Perhaps they will not be ready to show the girl. 31) agar us pradeš kī pūrī jāc kī jāe to sãbhavatæh sīse kā bhãd ār hī mil jāe. (Reddy 2:42)

If this province is examined, then a field of lead might be discovered. 32) isīliye kæhtā hū, apne guru jaisā lar kā šāyad hī kahī mile. (Mitra:7) This is why I say that you will hardly find a boy like Guru anywhere. A complement clause with the Potential following the nouns sãbhāvnā / gũjāyaš (possibility) and āšā / ummīd (hope – in the meaning of ‘expectation’ and not ‘desire, wish’) can be embedded. Then the meaning of possibility remains exclusively in the nouns: 33) sammelan sthagit hone kī sãbhāvnā hai. (Varma 1995:129) The conference may be postponed. The modal adjectives sãbhav / mumkin as well as the subjunctive forms of the verb jān- (to know) – jāne, na jāne, kaun jāne (who knows) sometimes occur in the sentence parenthetically. They lose their focal position and demonstrate full semantic correspondence to modal adverbs and even are best translated as ‘perhaps’ or ‘possibly’: 34) tum mumkin hai apne ko māf na karo. (Kamleshvar 1:22) You will perhaps not forgive yourself. 35) jāne ve us din pakar

liye jāẽ. (Ashk 1:46)

They will possibly be caught on that day. 36) lāhaur mẽ yadi anukul jalvāyu mil gayī to na jāne vah mahān bargad kā rūp dhar, dhartī-ākāš ko cāp le! (Ashk 1:56)

If the atmosphere of Lahore proves to be helpful then he will possibly embrace the sky and the earth like a great banyan tree. Gambhir (1993:74) claims that šāyad and its synonyms, used with the Subjunctive, denote probability, while “a subjunctive construction without šāyad or its synonym denotes possibility or permission depending upon the context”. Still, my opinion is close to that of McGregor (1986:131) according to which the Subjunctive is not intended for rendering future probability. Probability presupposes some sort of confidence. Such confidence we can find in the Future tense of Hindi as opposed to pure doubt expressed by the Subjunctive (Potential). Consider some examples: 37) ab mai soūgā kaise? nīd kī davā kahā se āe? (Mitra:94)

How will I sleep now? (The Future tense) Where will I get a soporific? (The Potential) 38) par usse rištā karke pīche hamāre baccõ ke rištõ mẽ to vighna na hogā? – šāyad ho. (Chatursen:61)

But after we arrange his marriage will it not cause later an obstacle in our children’s marriage? (The Future tense) – It may. (The Potential) 39) us din šāyad mai na rahū, magar tū rahegī. (Mitra:36) On that day I will possibly not be alive (The Potential), but you will certainly live (The Future tense). When combined with šāyad and its synonyms the Future tense loses a great deal of its confidence, but not all of it, turning to be an instrument of probability. Such combination, inter alia, is not always recognized to be correct. For example, Bahri (1986:223) presents as an example of incorrect usage the sentence šāyad pitā ā jāẽge (Perhaps father will come - the Future tense) considering the Subjunctive (ā jāẽ) more appropriate in this case. In any case, such a phenomenon exists in Hindi

and is widely used: 40) šāyad mai kal na ā sakūgā. (Reddy 2:21) I will probably not be able to come tomorrow. 41) šāyad tum bhī uskā samarthan karogī. (Prem Chand 1:48) You will probably also support it. 42) parãtu sãbhavatæh vah byāh to hogā hī nahī. (Chatursen:82) But it is very possible that the marriage will not be contracted. 43) tab bhī logõ ko šak thā ki itnī qīmatī kitāb jāne bikegī bhī yā nahī. (Mitra:19)

Even then people were not sure whether this so expensive book would be sold or not. There is one more distinction between the Future and the Potential combined with šāyad. The future is always about an assumption of a forthcoming event, while the

Potential bears the impression of the speaker’s personal attitude for the event – his wish or hope that the event will take place. It is apparently impossible to disregard completely the Optative senses of the form (“Apprehensional epistemics” – see 4.4.1): 44) šāyad gharībī is bār mit

sake! (Kamleshvar 1:100)

This time success will possibly be achieved in eliminating poverty. (The speaker desires it) 45) dhan to use na dho sakā, šāyad vidyā dho d āle. (Prem Chand 1:37) Wealth failed to wash it (the disgrace) away, maybe education will succeed. (Hope) 46) maine unhẽ ghaur se dekhā. šāyad ve saxt nazar se hī kuch samajh jāẽ. (Kamleshvar 1:42)

I looked at them attentively. Perhaps they would understand something from a harsh glance. (Desire) 47) ve āšā karte the ki šāyad koī lat kā hāth ā jāe. (Chatursen:74) They hoped that maybe some method would be invented. (Hope) Other mechanisms depicting future possibility are based on forms bearing primarily the meanings of wish and intention. They could be understood as expressing possibility if the agent is not human or, in the case of tense forms, with a human agent but without a clear indication of imminence. These forms have already been discussed in detail in 3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.2, and 3.3. A future state of affairs can be presented by the Future tense followed by the modal adverbs like zarūr / avašya (certainly), nissãdeh / bešak (no doubt) and the like (see 5.1.1.3). The addition of these words converts the sentence from a prediction into personal estimation. Another device of conviction about a future SoA is the verb samajh- which goes together with the perfective participle. The verb samajh- is used for convincing the hearer and is addressed straightly to him. That is why it has the form of the Imperative. At the same time the form is intended least of all to impose obligation, but rather to transmit to the hearer a message of confidence about some future state or action. In this sense its usage is metaphorical. The feeling of confidence is doubled by the perfective participle of the main verb, which shows an action as already fulfilled. The main part in transmitting the idea of non-reality belongs none the less to the verb samajh-, without which any sentence of this kind would be interpreted only in one

way – as existing in the past: 48) mar to gaī hī samjho. (Yashpal 2:45) You can consider her dead (She has no chances to survive).

49) kām to huā hī samjho. (Film “Station master”) Consider the work done. Sometimes samajh- occurs also with the Future tense: 50) samajh lo xūn zarūr bahegā. (Film “mirc masālā”) You can be sure that the blood will be shed. The non-real nature of such constructions becomes apparent from the fact that they occur mainly in the apodosis of conditional sentences: 51) ab šæhar mẽ qavvalī pāt

h

bhī ho jāe to samjho, pūrā maidān

mār liyā. (Kamleshvar 1:65)

If a recitation of qawwali songs would be organized in the town, then you can be sure the territory will be ours. 52) inke zimme kar diyā to samjho sab caupat . (Bhandari:50) If I entrust (the matter) to him then, no doubt, everything will be spoiled. 53) yadi aisā huā to hamārī maryādā gaī samjho. (Chatursen:98) If it happens then consider our honor lost. Thus, the Future tense and perfective forms together with certain lexical items are employed by the speaker to create confidence that some SoA will take place in the future.

5.2.1.2. Present and past possibility. Any future state or event is not certain but possible (more or less) by definition, and we need special devices to present it as a prediction. The situation with present and past states of affairs is quite the reverse. They tend to be factive and bear all the grammatical attributes of tense and aspect. Therefore, if the speaker wishes to express his doubts about the actuality of some present or past SoA, he has to preserve at the same time the temporal and aspectual characteristics of the sentence. We have already pointed out that it is the copula that bears the meaning of reality. Substitution of the copula proper by modal forms of the verb ho- leads to a switch from the factual domain to the non-factual (the Potential and the Presumptive) or to the counter-factual (the Counterfactual). But remember that real events acquire also temporal reference by forms of the copula (hai – present, thā – past), while verbal

combinations with the modal forms of the verb ho- retain only aspectual characteristics. The temporal reference is made clear by the context. It is the case when the tense is not a feature of the verb. Since we are discussing the cases of pure speculation based on lack of information, the most appropriate mood for it will be the Potential: 1) jātī hoū yā nahī? samajhtī avašya hū. (Mishra:199) Whether I know or not, I certainly understand (the Present Habitual tense). 2) kaun jāne sũdar hī ho. (Ashk 1:24) Who knows, maybe she is beautiful (instead of the present copula). 3) jān par tā thā unke pair lar khar ā rahe hõ. (Yashpal 2:9) It seemed as though his feet were stumbling (the Past Progressive tense). 4) ho saktā hai inhẽ kabhī cūhõ ne khodā ho, aur ab sāp ræhte hõ. (Nagar 2:74) Maybe mice dug them out sometime (the Past Perfect tense) and snakes might be living there now (the Present Habitual). The temporal references in the above-mentioned sentences are created either by the perfective aspect (khodā), by the context (jān par tā thā) or by the adverbials of time (ab). These sentences are usually accompanied by expressions of ignorance or assumption such as šāyad, patā nahī, ho saktā hai, jān par tā hai, kaun jāne, sãbhav hai, sãbhavatæh and so on. The same words applied to an

indicative sentence can express doubts about its factuality as well. But in this case the temporal reference is more exact and needs no additional specifications: 5) šāyad dūsrõ kī dekhā dekhī is jāl mẽ phãsā. (Dinkar:58) Perhaps looking at others he got stuck in the net. 6) šāyad cetan ke bar e bhāī bhī ise mæhsūs karte the. (Ashk 1:58) Perhaps the elder brother of Chetan felt the same. 7) šāyad āp ghalat samajh rahe hai. (Kamleshvar 1:50) Perhaps you understand it the wrong way. 8) sãbhavatæh vah ātmārpan

kar bhī gaī hai. (Chatursen:93)

She might have devoted herself (to him).

The question arises – what is the function of the moods here? Why do we need the distinctions between them if it is possible to express doubts with the help of lexical items alone? Actually Hindi possesses a very complicated verbal system which is apt to distinguish different nuances of actions and the speaker’s attitudes to them. It is true that certain lexical items in sentences with indicative and potential predicates convey the idea of doubt equally well, but the moods allow adding some refinements to this general attitude. First, the doubt-expressing words with the Indicative underline predominantly the relevance of the agent, place, time, reason, purpose or result of an action; but when compounded with the Potential they cast doubt on the validity of the action itself. Second, under equal conditions, when the truth of the action is in focus, the Potential expresses a high degree of doubt while the Indicative presents an action as very probable: 9) ho saktā hai mai hū xatarnāk. (Rakesh 1:44) Perhaps I am really dangerous. (The Indicative) 10) yah bhī ho saktā hai vah anubhavhīntā kā bhay ho. (Kishore:37) It may be a fear of inexperience as well. (The Potential) 11) āp šāyad yahā arse se nahī ræhte hai? (Chatursen:12) Perhaps you live here not for a long time? (The Indicative) 12) sãbhavatæh mahilāẽ aise avasarõ par yahī kartī hõ. (Kishore:42) Women may act like this on such occasions. (The Potential) 13) sãbhavatæh isliye maine usse sīdhe savāl kiyā. (Kishore:42) Maybe for this reason I asked her directly. (The Indicative) 14) yah unhõne šāyad isliye kiyā ho ki ve nahī cāhte the ki… (Chatursen:56) He might has done so because he did not want that… (The Potential) 15) šāyad ye pãktiyā kisī ne use sunāī thī. (Yadav:5) Somebody might have recited these lines to him. (The Indicative) 16) šāyad koī bar ā sarkārī afsar samajhkar cup ræh gaye hõ. (Yashpal 2:96) They might have stopped speaking because they took him for an important official. (The Potential)

5.2.2. Deductives. Deductives are strong epistemic judgments. They are conclusions and inferences made on the basis of some information, not full, but sufficient to arrive at a high level of certainty about the possibility of occurrence of some SoA, a certainty which is equal in degree to the English ‘must’. Deductives in Hindi have only one grammatical means of expression – the Presumptive mood. It is not accepted as a mood by all grammarians of Hindi. Therefore, before turning to its deductive function, we consider it necessary to explain our own understanding of the phenomenon. Those who recognize the Presumptive mood attribute to it the future form of the verb ho- combined with the perfective, imperfective and progressive participles (e.g. vah kām kartā hogā – he presumably (I suppose) works; vah kām kar rahā hogā – he must be working now; usne kām kiyā hogā – he must have worked).

The verb ho- can appear also in the existential function – vah yahā hogā (He must be here). This form is employed for rendering “doubt in something”(Guru 1962:102), “possibility or uncertainty of an act” (Platts 1874:146), “what is presumed to be true” (Kellogg 1938:463), “probability” (Harris 1976:127, Tivari 1996:162). As Enç (1992:347) notes, “the non-future modal interpretation of the future morpheme… is also observable in other languages”. He presents an example from English – Pat will be sleeping now – where not a prediction about a future action but a belief about the present is expressed. Enç defines the meaning of ‘will’ in this sentence as expressing “epistemic necessity” which is equal to ‘Pat must be sleeping’. Gonda (1956:12) quoting G.Sansom writes that in Japanese the future suffix ‘mu’ in ‘gukamu’ can be translated ‘he will go’, ‘he will probably go’ and even ‘he probably goes’. Kиселёва (1976) points out that in the literary form of Dari and Pushto the Future tense is widely used for rendering suppositions, and in Dari the word xât meaning supposition is connected directly with the Future tense. In Russian the future copula is also used for expressing suppositions although it is limited to existential usage in present time – Сколько до города? – Километров

пять будет (How far is the town? – About five kilometers); Вы будете господин Булгаков? (You are mister Bulgakov, aren’t you?).117 A phenomenon similar to that of Hindi exists also in Marathi, where it is also called the Presumptive mood: “Предположительное наклонение, показателем которого является глагол asan ẽ в форме будущего времени, выражает максимально вероятное предположение” (Катенина 1963:241) (The Presumptive mood, whose indicator is the future form of the verb asan ẽ, expresses the most possible supposition). In Hindi the phenomenon has been explained in different ways. Initially the most prevalent was the formal approach – a tendency to connect its understanding exclusively with the future morpheme of the auxiliary ho-. Therefore, such terms as ‘Future II’ and ‘Future III’ (Баранников 1956, Pořízka 1963, Nespital 1981) or “imperfective, continuous and perfective future” (McGregor 1986:27) were created. Still, aware that this terminology does not precisely reflect their semantic content, some authors widened their definitions: “the present probable tense, the progressive probable tense, the probable complete tense” (Barz 1977:104), or “present dubious tense and past dubious tense” (Saihgal 1964:54-55). However, these word combinations make the subject even more complicated because they confuse the notions of time and evaluation of reality. The most decisive steps were made by those scholars who rejected the formal approach and accepted the existence of the Presumptive (Hypothetical, Conjectural, Probabilitive, sãdigdhārth) mood (Masica 1991:279, Pray 1970:67, Harris 1976:127, Guru 1962:102, Shapiro 1989:56, Bahri 1994:121). Indeed, even the opponents of this explanation admit that the future forms of

ho-

“в

большинстве

случаев

используются

для

выражения

предположительного значения” (in most cases are used for expressing suppositions - Липеровский 1964:37). Yet such vague wording as “expressing suppositions” may match any doubt-expressing form like e.g. the Subjunctive. After all, the Presumptive is distinguished as a separate grammatical category because it has very specific properties. “Presumptive forms are used to indicate a state of affairs that is presumed, but not known through first-hand experience, to exist”, - thus Shapiro (1989:45). The Presumptive means an inference and not a pure supposition and in this sense it could be more properly called Inferential or Deductive. But we decided not to change the 117

Same in Czech: Bude to pĕt kilometrů (the example of Bubenik).

widely accepted term. Just like other moods represented by the auxiliary ho-, the Presumptive joins only aspectually defined participle forms: 1) tapasyā kar rahā hogā, tujhe prāpt karne ke liye. (Pushpa:22) He must be carrying out ascetic practices in order to get you. 2) jī to ūbtā hī hogā. (Prem Chand 1:40) You get bored, I suppose. 3) nanho ne is bīc muškil se usse do-cār bātẽ kī hõgī. (Sinh:23) In the meantime Nanho hardly exchanged a few words with him. 4) prakŗti

kī vikarāltā se ve sab xud d are hue hõge. (Kamleshvar

2:30) They themselves are probably frightened by the hideousness of nature. The main purpose of the Presumptive is to verbalize an assumption which contains a personal opinion. A translation of each presumptive sentence may include the phrases underlining the inferential nature of the speaker’s point of view – mai soctā hū ki (I think that), merā xayāl hai (to my mind), mujhe aisā lagtā hai ki

(it seems to me that); verbs like anumān / ãdāzā lagā- (to estimate), kalpanā kar- (to imagine), samajh- (to understand) and so on. There are many examples

which illustrate this description either by overtly presented evidentials or by the context of a conversation: 5) becārā kab se kām kar rahā hai. bhūkhā hogā. (Prem Chand 1:22) Poor fellow, he has been working for a long time. He must be hungry. 6) āvāz to sunī

thī!



lagī

to

mujhe

bhī

thī.

havā

hogī.

(Kamleshvar 2:41) But I heard a voice! – So did I. It must be the wind. 7) mastišk me sæhsā kaudhā: kyā isī mausī ne mere janm par sone ke kãgan diye hõge! (Yashpal 1:14)

It dawned upon him: she must be the aunty who presented the golden bracelets on my birthday! 8) cetan bahut der bād ghar pahũcā – is āšā se ki uske pitā…cale gaye hõge. (Ashk 1:38)

Chetan came home very late in the hope that his father… must have gone.

9) lallū bābū ne jab kahā ki kæhnā mālti jī ne bhejā hai, to unhõne hī bhejā hogā. aur kaun bhej saktā hai. (Kamleshvar 1:101)

If Lallu Babu said ‘tell them that Malty has sent it’, then she must be the one who sent it. Who else can it be? 10) maine ãdāzā lagāyā, vah unkī bet ī hogī. (Mitra:6) I estimated that she must be his daughter. The choice of the Presumptive not in the least depends on the usage of the evidentials of certainty or doubt. A presumptive sentence can include evidentials expressing a degree of the speaker’s confidence like zarūr / avašya / nišcay hī (certainly), vāqaī / sacmuc hī (really), šāyad / kadācit (perhaps), sãbhav / mumkin (possible), sãbhavatæh (possibly), na jāne / patā nahī (not known) etc.

The Presumptive contains the idea of probability, and addition of evidentials does not impinge upon its main idea but presents the probability as more or less certain. The Presumptive with zarūr says that a state of affairs is not a fact, and with šāyad – that it is not unlikely: 11) sunā to hogā usne kuch na kuch zarūr hī. (Tivari:5) He certainly must have heard something. 12) merā xayāl hai cerī bhī zarūr samajh gayā hogā. (Rakesh 1:64) My opinion is that Cherry also must have understood. 13) itnī dūr se dekh to nahī pā rahā thā, lekin is bāt se mai pūrn atayā āšvast thā ki dīvarõ par bāriš ke bar e bar e dhabbe bane hõge. (Kishore:203)

I could not discern it from such a large distance, but I was quite sure that two very big stains appeared on the walls because of the rain. 14) vah bhī šāyad roz aisā hī soctī hogī. (Amrita 1:24) This is probably how she thinks every day. 15) yātrī ne socā ki sãbhavatæh yah vyakti koī rājpurus (Reddi 1:10) The traveler decided that this person must be a state official. 16) aise hī na jāne aur bhī kitne godām hõge. (Nagar 2:63) There must be many other warehouses of the kind.

hogā.

That the Presumptive is a mood in the full meaning of the word, can be seen from examples where it is compared with other moods (indicative and subjunctive): 17) patā nahī dal ke kitne sāthiyõ ke bilkul apne log tat

par

khar e hāth hilā rahe hai aur kitnī ākhõ me āsū jhilmilā rahe hõge. (Kamleshvar 2:28)

Who knows, very close relatives of how many members of the expedition are waving their hands standing on the shore, and in how many eyes tears must be sparkling. 18) kisī but ke acānak kisī ghar ī hõt

h

muskarā par e hõ, kisī

ne nahī dekhe hõge, maine dekhe the. (Amrita 1:14)

I guess nobody saw that lips of a statue would smile for a moment. I saw. 19) jo mai dekhtā hū aur log bhī kyā use usī rūp mẽ dekhte hõge? ho saktā hai ve use kisī aur rūp mẽ dekhte hõ. (Kishore:43)

Is it probable that other people see things in the same way I do? Maybe they see them in some other way? 20) socā ki phephr e to ab tak syāh ho cuke hõge, šāyad unmẽ kẽsar kī šuruāt bhī ho cukī hõ? (Rakesh 1:16)

I assumed that the lungs have already become black. Perhaps cancer has appeared in them? The verb ho- can appear in the Presumptive mood in the existential function as well as in the copular one. In that event it is used for expressing assumption about existence or presence of things or qualities: 21) samũdar hai, to læhrẽ bhī zarūr hõgī. (Mitra:67) If there is a sea, there must be waves. 22) āpkī dukān par dūdh to hotā hogā? (Kamleshvar 2:70) Usually there is milk in your shop, isn’t it? 23) kũvar sāhib hõge itne udār. (Prem Chand:45) Mister Kunvar is probably so generous. 24) yah to is šæhar kā koī bahut hī chot ā sā hissā hogā. (Tivari:5) It must be a very small part of the city.

The Presumptive may have past tense references in spite of its future form. In this case the temporal characteristics are presented either overtly by adverbials of time or by the context: 25) us samay merī umr bārah vars

ke lagbhag hogī. (Липеровский

1964:39) I was probably about twelve then. 26) kār… nayī thī. vridh kī āyū assī ke ūpar hogī. (Chatursen:9) The car… was new. The old man was about eighty years old. 27) prācin kāl mẽ isī bhāti… bhiks u pahār õ aur ghāt iyõ ko lāghkar bhārat mẽ āyā karte hõge. (Sahni:13)

In ancient times holy men presumably used to come to India in the same way, crossing the mountains. 28) jo jaggī babū ko nahī jānte the ve nišcay hī unhẽ koī bar ā netā samajh rahe hõge. (Kamleshvar 1:85)

Those who did not know Jaggi Babu were certainly taking him for a big leader. The presumptive form being at the same time the form of the future makes it sometimes difficult to interpret the verb ho- properly. In fact it has become a stumbling block in Hindi grammar. Indeed, how should we translate the sentence (21) – ‘there must be waves’ or ‘there will be waves’? And does the sentence ve kis kamre mẽ hõgī mean “in which room can she be now?” or perhaps “in which room

will she be?”118 Here we touch the subject that is most important for understanding the distinctions between the Presumptive mood and the Future tense. Gambhir asserts that a presumptive construction is applicable to the past, present and future alike (1993:123). So far we have discussed the present and past interpretations of the constructions. Let us consider some examples where the Presumptive takes on future sense: 29) kal subah ham iskā zikr bīte kal kī šām ke rūp mẽ kar rahe hõge. (Rakesh 1:85)

Tomorrow morning we will be discussing it as an evening of the bygone yesterday. 30) phir mai socne lagā ki agle sāl in dinõ mai kahā rahūgā, kyā kar rahā hūgā. (Rakesh:40) 118

See also Pray 1970:125.

Then I began to think Where I will be in these days next year, what will I be doing. 31) ek din aisā bhī āegā jab is ghar kī caukhat

par logõ kī bhīr

lagī hogī. (Mitra:36)

A day will come when many people will gather on the threshold of this house. 32) jab tak ijāzat milegī tab tak ye log jā cuke hõge. (Kamleshvar 2:24) Until permission is given, these people will have gone. 33) usī din kitāb bhī prakāšit hogī. lekin

us vaqt mai bambaī jā

cukā hūgā. (Mitra:119)

In that day the book will be published. But I will have gone to Bombay then. A future interpretation of the sentences is possible because of the adverbs of time (kal subah – tomorrow morning, us vaqt – then, jab – when, agle sāl – next year). This means that temporal reference of the presumptive construction (past, present or future) depends exclusively on time modifiers, which are presented either lexically or by context. The Presumptive itself does not bear any temporal idea, and, thus, cannot be called a ‘tense’. But it does bear the sense of assumption in every sentence where it is used, even when it occurs with future reference. The fact that a future form needs specific temporal indications to be interpreted as future tells us that it is probably not a future form (Future tense and presumptive sense – Gambhir 1993:123), but is the Presumptive, which under certain conditions can be interpreted as future (Presumptive mood and future sense). There is a commonly accepted point of view according to which “future forms are derivable from subjunctives by suffixation of the adjectivally inflected element -gā” (McGregor 1986:27). The necessity to distinguish between the presumptive and future senses made some authors look for other explanations. For instance, Pray suggested that “the Future is to be analyzed as the present plus -gā and the Presumptive as the Subjunctive plus -gā” (1970:125). But it is our impression, however, that this solution is not satisfactory, mainly because it confuses the notions of ‘mood’ and ‘tense’. We chose a clue presented in the works of Shapiro and Barz. Barz (1977:97) argues that Hindi has no certain future and calls it “probable future”119 Shapiro also claims that 119

“This tense describes action that probably will happen in the future but is not certainly to happen. It

is important to keep in mind that the meaning of the Hindi probable future tense is not the same as the

sentences like kal merā bhāī dillī mẽ hogā (my brother will (presumably) be in Delhi tomorrow) “are always felt to embody a presumptive judgment about some state of affairs, rather than a positive assertion that this state of affairs will come to be” (1987:46). The only thing we have to do now is to call a spade a spade: the Future tense of Hindi is a semantic derivative of the Presumptive mood, which in its turn had been derived from the Subjunctive. Such an assumption settles many problems – the Presumptive gets a single form and not only the complex forms with the auxiliary ho(note that one of the main objections of the opponents to calling the Presumptive a mood was the claim that it exists only as an auxiliary – Липеровский 1964:43-44). It explains also why the ‘future’ form with evidentials like zarūr and šāyad conveys only probability and never possibility (see 5.2.1.1). So, we can consider the Presumptive a full-value mood. This does not mean that we exclude the existence of the Future tense, but we consider it a semantic derivative of the Presumptive mood.120

5.2.3. Counterfactuals. Sentences with the Counterfactual mood can render a sort of doubt about past events. But in such sentences reality and facts overlap in a very tricky way with imagination. The counterfactual predicate depicts a SoA, which is opposite to reality, without having an atom of doubt what the reality is like. Such a SoA exists only in the imagination of the speaker and can be considered as a) contraposition to a factual state of affairs and b) past possibility. The first option (a) is represented most strikingly by the complex form of the verb (aspectually defined participles plus a counterfactual form of the verb ho-121). It occurs predominantly in conditional sentences, either in the protasis or in the apodosis. In the protasis the speaker uses it to stress his

meaning of the English future tense. The English future tense describes action as certain to occur while the Hindi probable tense says only that action is very likely to occur. The Hindi language shows the future as unpredictable while the English language presents the future as determinable with a high degree of precision” (Barz 1977:95). 120

“The so-called future tenses of the Indo-European languages…are of secondary development. There

was no future tense in Proto-Indo-European” (Lyons 1977:815). 121

In fact, there is no special counterfactual form. The Counterfactual mood exploits the imperfective participle forms.

knowledge about the actual state of affairs, whereas in the apodosis he expresses his confidence in a possible result: 17) agar unhõne kisī kulīn strī se vivāh kiyā hotā, to unkī yah dašā kyõ hotī? (Prem Chand 1:41)

If he had married a woman of a good family, then how would he be in such a situation? (Stress on the actual state of affairs) 18) agar pæhle batā diyā hotā, to ham kisī mot ar-vot ar ka ĩtazām kar lete. (Sahni:131)

If you had let us know before, then we would have organized for you some sort of transport. (Stress on the actual state of affairs) 19) mujhe vahā se vāpas na bulāte to mai ab tak bahut prasidh pẽt ar ho gayā hotā. (Ashk 1:43)

If you had not called me back from there, then I would have become a famous painter by now. (Confidence in the result) 20) vahā hotā to āj bhī yah tīsre aur cauthe form kī klāsẽ le rahā hotā. (Rakesh 1:66)

If he had been there, then he would be teaching the children of the third and the fourth form. (Confidence in the result) The confidence in a possible result can be rendered by the simple form of the verb too if followed by the adverbials zarūr / nišcay hī (certainly): 21) tumhẽ dekh na liyā hotā to zarūr calī jātī. (Rakesh 1:121) If I had not seen you, then I would certainly have gone. 22) unke pīche nīlā ākāš na hotā to nišcay hī ham unhẽ na dekh pāte. (Sankrityayan:5)

If there had not been the blue sky behind them, then we certainly would have failed to see them. The simple form of the Counterfactual mood (the imperfective participle) is intended to underline an imagined possibility. That is why in most cases it is followed by the expressions of the personal attitude of the speaker to this possibility – the adverbs šāyad (perhaps), sãbhavatæh (possibly). Note that these adverbs do not occur with the complex form, which is expressive of confidence. They do not occur

also in the protasis, the ‘ifs’ of which apparently exclude the necessity of additional means of doubt: 23) koī aur din hotā šāyad calā jātā. (Amrita 1:36) If it were another day, then, perhaps, I would have gone. 24) agar fon na ā jātā to šāyad vah khulte bhī nahī . (Kamleshvar 1:74) If there had not been a telephone call then he would not have indulged in confidences. 25) abhī ve nahī hai. ræhte to yah kārd

sãbhavatæh unhī ke hathõ

mẽ par tā. ((Mishra:9)

She is not here yet. If she had been here, then the card would have possibly come into her hands. The Counterfactual is used also in simple sentences to depict an imagined possibility, but still it looks like the apodosis of the conditional sentence where the condition of the protasis is provided by the context: 26) bātõ kā silsilā jāne kab tak caltā. acānak bāhar gurudatt kī gār ī kā hārn baj ut hā. (Mitra:41)

Who knows how long the conversation would have lasted. Suddenly the horn of Gurudatt’s car sounded from outside. 27) vah bāt jo usne kahī thī mujhe kæhnī cāhiye thī. sāyad kæhtā bhī. lekin vanyā ne itnī jaldī kī thī ki merā avasar samāpt ho gayā thā. (Kishore:122)

I should have told the words she told. Perhaps I would have told. But Vanya was so quick that I lost my chance. The Counterfactual mood is used for expressing past possibilities in complement clauses as well, which follow predicates like sãbhav / mumkin thā or ho saktā thā (It was possible). The past form of the copula in the main clause underlines that

the possibility existed in the past; and the counterfactual mood indicates that it was not realized: 28) ab to is ghar mẽ yah bhī mumkin nahī thā ki ve cīx sakte. (Kamleshvar 2:20)

Now in this house it was not possible that he would cry. 29) lekin yah bhī sãbhav thā kapr e utārte jāne kā sãdarbh rāt se jur

jātā. (Kishore:122)

But it was also possible that the process of undressing would have been connected to the night. 30) vanyā ke hone se yah fāyadā zarūr ho saktā thā ki kamrā bhar jātā aur us uthal-puthal kī gũjāyaš na ræhtī. (Kishore:191)

One benefit of Vanya’s presence could certainly be that the room would have been filled and there would have been no possibility for disorder. The last means, which is worth noting, is the past Habitual tense of the verb sak- . It conveys the meaning of the past possibility in the way the counterfactuals

do.122 What has already been said about multipliers and restrictors of the possible worlds in section 5.2.1.1 with reference to the present habitual form of sak-, is relevant for its past habitual form: 31) kām to koī bhī šurū kiyā jā saktā thā. (Kamleshvar 2:40) Any work could be started. (Multiplier of the subject) 32) bāriš kisī bhī vaqt šurū ho saktī thī. (Kishore:199) The rain could begin any time. (Multiplier of time) 33) mere

us

prašn

par

hãs



cũki

vah

hãs



saktī

thī.

(Kishore:193) She laughed at this question of mine because she could do nothing but laugh. (Restrictor hi) 34) unke pairõ ke cihn cādnī rāt mẽ rāste ko acchī tarah batlā sakte the. (Sankrityayan:8)

The marks of their feet could show the way clearly in the moonlit night. (Restrictor of time)

5.3. Epistemic subordination. 122

“The locution jā saktā thā expresses only continued ability to go, leaving open the question

whether this ability was exercised or not. But in practice the majority of sentences of this kind refer to an ability not exercised” (McGregor 1986:88).

Most subordinate clauses may render either deontic or epistemic senses. At the same time there are subordinate clauses that pertain inherently to the epistemic domain. They are conditional and concessive clauses. We will observe all the main kinds of subordinate clauses capable of rendering epistemic senses.

5.3.1. Conditional clauses. Conditional clauses are usually prefaced by words like ‘if’, which naturally can be considered overt markers of possibility. Therefore, they should belong by definition to the dimension of possible worlds and to the imaginative states of affairs in our classification. This statement, nevertheless, needs some corrections and clarifications. Firstly, in Hindi it is not necessarily that the conditional clause begins with the words agar / yadi (if). The words are optional and may only be understood without being

uttered. And what is more, the protasis can be represented by a grammatical form other than a conditional clause (for instance, by the Imperative). Secondly, as we have shown in 5.1.1, the real copula (hai,thā) used in the protasis influences not only the factuality of a SoA (moving it to the factual domain), but even the meaning of the words agar / yadi, which are converted into ‘since, because’. This fact clearly indicates that agar / yadi cannot be regarded as reliable markers of possibility. Still, the fundamental nature of the conditional clause (introduced by agar / yadi or without them) is about the truth of states of affairs only. So, conditional clauses are essentially epistemic. We would even claim that conditionals are among the main resourses of epistemic modality. 123 Except for the case of the real copula (hai,thā), all the other conditional sentences deal with imaginative situations (either in the future or in the past), and their relation to the reality is mutually defined by the mood and by the meaning of possibility existing inherently in the protasis: 1) nahī

mālik, (agar is understood) āp hī aisā kahẽge, to ham

gharībõ ke bāl-bacce kahā se palẽge. (Prem Chand 1:32) 123

“Particular languages tend to place less emphasis on the possibility / necessity of an event in

absolute terms than on its possibility / necessity under certain conditions” (Chung & Timberlake 1985:243).

No master, if you say so (the Presumptive), then with what money will we poor people rear our children? (Proceeding from the assumption that the Future tense is in fact the Presumptive mood interpreted as Future in a specific context, which implies confidence, we may certainly come to the conclusion that, since in conditional clauses there is no room for confidence, the form in this sentence is used not in a future but in a presumptive sense.) 2) (agar is understood) farq hogā to yahī āt h-das āne kā. (Yaspal 2:63) If there is (probably- the Presumptive) a difference, then it is of eight-ten annas. 3) maine use kuch nahī kahā thā, par agar kæhnā cāhtā to kæh saktā thā. (Amrita 1:25)

I said nothing to him but if I wanted (the Counterfactual) then I could have done so. (It is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of the examples with the Counterfactual mood are conditional sentences. For this reason the Counterfactual mood is sometimes called the Conditional.) 4) unke pīche nīlā ākāš na hotā to nišcay hī ham unhẽ na dekh pāte. (Sankrityayan:5)

If there were not the blue sky behind them (the Counterfactual), then we certainly would not have succeeded to see them. 5) acchā, kadācit vah phir āe to kyā bāt karūgā? (Chatursen:92) O.K., perhaps he comes again (the Potential), what will I say then? (The words agar / yadi are equal in their meaning to ‘maybe, perhaps’ and can be substituted by

them in a sentence. This is why the Subjunctive in the conditional sentence is unambiguously interpreted as the Potential). 6) agar vah cāhe to caukhat ā lāghkar nīce lahrõ par utar jāe. (Yadav:5) If he wants (the Potential) he may go out of the house down to the waves. 7) yadi yahī kram caltā rahā to šāyad log is prakār ke vākya bhī likhne lagẽge. (Varma:188)

If this method remains (the perfective participle) then people will start writing sentences of this kind.

8) isī bīc mai soctā (thā) agar barf girne lagā to kyā hogā ? (Kishore:277) Meanwhile I thought, what will happen if (god forbid) snow begins to fall (the perfective participle)? 9) us ādmī ne agar nāt ak pæhle se nahī par

h

rakhā thā to yah

qusūr kiskā hai ? (Rakesh 1:84)

If this man has not read the play beforehand then who is to blame? (The Past Perfect tense here is an indication of a factual event, and the sentence, conditional in form, turns to be a causal one). 10) agar tūne sac hī insān kā janm liyā hai to is duniyā mẽ apnī koī nišānī to chor tā jā. (Mitra:27)

If you really were born as a human, then leave some mark of yours in this world. (Causal sentense) The choice between a simple and a complex form of a mood is dictated by the same circumstances which were discussed in 5.2.1.2, that is to say by the wish of the speaker to underline aspectual distinctions: 11) (agar) bhram mẽ hogā to manis , (agar) sapne pāl rahā hogā to manis . (Mishra:8)

If anybody is mistaken then he is Manish; if anybody is creating illusions then he is Manish. (The Presumptive) 12) tum logõ ko (agar) ghūmnā acchā na lag rahā ho to vāpas calẽ. (Tivari:12) If you possibly are not enjoying the walk then let us go back. (The Potential) 13) agar mai laut

na āyā hotā to vahī mulāqāt ho gaī hotī.

(Kishore:192) If I had not come back then this meeting would have occurred over there. (The Counterfactual) The question of the relation between the protasis and the apodosis has been discussed in many works.124 Our general impression is that when the predicate of the protasis is couched by the Counterfactual mood, the predicate of the apodosis is 124

See, for example, Kellogg 1938, Harley 1955, Баранников 1956, Липеровский 1972, McGregor 1986.

obligatorily counterfactual; and the perfective participle of the protasis induces the Presumptive mood (the Future tense). In all other cases the choice of a mood (presumptive, potential, indicative) is prescribed by the internal logic of the apodosis, the truth-value of which does not depend on the condition adduced. This situation matches the description given by Chung & Timberlake (1985:250): “The typical conditional sentence consists of a condition (the event described by ‘if’ clause) and a consequent (the event described by ‘then’ clause). Both condition and consequent can in principle be evaluated for their degree of (epistemic) actuality. The actuality of the consequent is, of course, related to the actuality of the condition. The relationship involved is usually taken to be necessity; so ‘if α, then β’ means that β necessarily occurs when α occurs. In practice, though, the relationship can be weakened, so that a conditional sentence can mean ‘if α, then certainly / probably / perhaps β’”. We have noted the fact that the particles agar / yadi are facultative, and in fact sentences with agar / yadi are much more rare that the ones without them. Nevertheless, the meaning of condition is preserved equally in both types. The necessity of the conditional particles must be a subject for a special research, but we can shed light on one facet of the question in any case. According to Hatav (1997:127) “the if-clause functions as a restrictive term which limits the set of accessible worlds in which the event of the then-clause occurs.” If this statement is correct then the corollary could be made that if-clause excludes possibility of expressing a generic action. In practice the generic reading can be realized even through the structure of the if-clause. Thus, agar / yadi in Hindi are not restrictors of possible worlds but indices of imagined situations: 14) koī itne apnepan se bulāe to mai thīk se bāt bhī na karū? (Bhandari:58) Somebody would call me with such kinship, and I would not even talk to him properly? 15) agar pāv phisal jāe to ham use kāt

kar phẽk nahī dete. (Prem

Chand 1:47) If a foot slips then we do not cut it off and throw it away. The typical structure of the conditional sentence can be modified. A condition may be presented by the Imperative or by the Absolutive:

16) thor ā jaldī laut ā to t hīk rahegā! (Kamleshvar 2:19) It will be good if you come back soon. (tu-imperative) 17) tum kaho to samīrā ko dukān par lagā lū.. (Kamleshvar 2:62) (If) you tell me I will employ Samira in the shop. (This case is rather ambiguous, because the tum-imperative is in fact tum-subjunctive. But without agar this is formally imperative). 18) āp mãzūr kar lījiye to mai yah bhī arz karūgā. (Chatursen:13) (If) You accept it, (and then) I will tell this as well. (āp-imperative) 19) yah nazārā dekh kar bhalā kis lekhak ko ghussā nahī ātā? (Mitra:28) What writer would not have been angry after seeing this. (Absolutive). 20) jāti aur dharm gãvākar parlok bhī bigār lete! (Yashpal 2:35) Losing caste and religion you would have spoiled your world after the death! (Absolutive). In colloquial speech the particles agar / yadi are often replaced by the particle jo (cf. je in Punjabi) or by the imperative forms of the verb mān le- (to imagine): 21) jo dātõ ko itnā tez karnā hai to gošt khāyā kar! (Sahni:129) If your aim is to sharpen your teeth then eat meat. 22) jo bit iyā huī to… (Pushpa:7) If a daughter will be born then… 23) mān lo lar āī ā jāe to vah kis cīz ko bacāẽge. (Kamleshvar 2:99) Imagine a war begins – what will he save then? 5.3.2. Concessive clause. In a concessive sentence the main clause asserts a state or an event as existing in reality or possible in spite of some circumstances specified in the subordinate clause. That is why Kellogg called them “a species of conditionals” (1938:535). The intrinsic semantic properties and the syntactic structure of the concessive clause, indeed, have very much in common with the conditional clause. Both convey the idea of condition, against the background of which a certain SoA takes place. The position of the concessive clause (initial or final), like the position of the conditional clause, is only a matter of stress. The difference is in the interaction between the main

and subordinate clauses. In the conditional sentence the main predication is realised only if the condition is fulfilled, while in the concessive clause the main predication occurs in spite of the specified circumstances. Thence the difference in conjunctions – to (then) of the conditional sentence is replaced by the adversative conjunctions magar, par, lekin, parãtu, kĩtu, phir bhī, to bhī; and instead of agar / yadi appear words stressing the independence of the main predication from

the concessive one. The choice of words depends to a large extent on the actuality of the concessive predicate. Some of them are normally used with factual SoAs (although), while others accompany non-factual or contra-factual ones (even if). Hence we may divide the concessive clauses into two main groups – real and imagined. The predicates of reality-rendering concessives are characterized by the Indicative and by words with which the speaker demonstrates his awareness of the actual state of affairs. These, in their turn, can be qualified as expressing personal attitudes or neutral in this respect. Among the former most frequently appearing are the adverbs avašya / zarūr (certainly), sahī (alright) or its negative counterpart na sahī (although), the evidential particle to (actually), the emphatic combinations to sahī / hī sahī (alright, indeed), predicative expressions like yah sac hai ki…, yah t hīk hai ki…(it is true that…), or the idiomatic expression with the verb mān- (to accept) – mānā ki (although):

1) cal to vah kāfī der se rahā thā, magar ghar pahũcne mẽ, phir bhī, kāfī der thī. (Dinkar:17)

Although he had been walking for a long time, home was still very far. 2) yūrop kī bahut sī bhāšāẽ bhī hai to ārya parivār kī hī, phir bhī ve bahut dinõ se hamse alag ho cukī hai. (Varma 1995:28)

It is true that in Europe there are many languages which belong to the Indo-Aryan family, but they have parted from us long ago. 3) maine kahā zarūr lekin apne šaithilya ko samajh rahā thā. (Kishore:44) I did say, but I was aware of my weakness. 4) mai jāntā thā, ve t hākur hai zarūr, par sīdhe sāde ādmī hai. (Raghav:12)

I knew that he was a person of rank all right, but also that he was a very simple man. 5) mahirām hī ke sahī, lekin… barāmade mẽ kyõ par e ho ? (Ashk 2:71) Even if (even in the case that) you are a man of Mahiram, why are you lying on the verandah? 6) mai buddhimān na sahī, par itnā jāntā hū

ki ye log deš aur

jāti kā uddhār karne ke liye hī košiš kar rahe hai. (Prem Chand

2:55) I am not clever alright, but I know that these people are making efforts only to free the country and the nation. 7) ‘ājkal’ niklā to sahī, lekin uske sãpādak aur sãpādakīya vibhāg mẽ cakrapān i jī kā kahī sthān na thā. (Nagar 2:18)

Although “Ajkal” was published, there was not any trace of Mr. Chakrapani in the editorial. 8) yah t hīk hai

ki

vivāh

ke

bād

tatkāl

vah

sasurāl

nahī

gaī…lekin…uske dainik jīvan mẽ koī ãtar nahī āyā. (Ashk 1:71)

It is true that after the wedding she did not go to the house of her husband, but not the slightest difference occurred in her everyday life. 9) mānā kũvar sāhib ke ghar mẽ pālan pos an prabhāv itnī jaldī nahī mit

huā, magar rakt kā

saktā. (Prem Chand 1:45)

He was brought up in the house of Mr. Kunvar very well, but the impact of blood cannot disappear immediately. 10) mānā ki rājo bæhan kā dil bar ā hai,…parãtu phir aurat kā dil hai. (Yashpal 2:72)

Although the heart of sister Rajo is big…still it is the heart of a woman. There are concessive clauses in which the attitudes of the speaker are not traceable. They are pure indicative sentences introduced by the conjunctives yadyapi / agarce / hālāki / go – ‘although, notwithstanding’ (the last three are more usual in the Urdu language): 11) yadyapi ūpar ke donõ rošandān khule the, to bhī kamrā garm ho gayā thā. (Ashk 2:71)

Although both windows were open, the room became warm. 12) yadyapi gitõ kā bhāv atithiyõ kī samajh mẽ nahī ā rahā thā, lekin unkī dhun bar ī ākars ak aur madhur thī. (Reddi 2:70)

Although the guests did not understand the meaning of the songs, their melody was attractive and charming. 13) log kæhte hai xūbsūrat bhī thī, go tum sī nahī. (Chatursen:51) People say she was beautiful, although not like you. The concessives with an imagined content have potential or counterfactual predicates. What attaches the concessive meaning to them is the moods and the opposite content of the main clause. The opposition could be marked explicitly by an adversative conjunction or could be self-evident. Then a sentence could be interpreted correctly even without additional markers: 14) ab lākh bātẽ hõ… mai to barbād ho gayā. (Kamleshvar 2:48) Whatever you say…I am ruined. 15) merī film cale yā na cale, har mahīne bayālīs hazār rupaye ke ĩtazām ke cakkar mẽ merī nīd ur ī ræhtī hai. (Mitra:35)

Whether my film succeeds or not, every month I lose my sleep trying to get 42 thousands rupees. In practice a majority of concessive sentences have specific markers both in the main and in the subordinate clause. Among the markers of the hypothetical concessives there are the conjunctions cāhe, bhale (hī) (even if, though), the emphatic particle bhī (too, even), and the collocation of the interjection kyõ (why) with the negative particle na (kyõ… na). Since concessive meanings could be inferred without these markers, they can be considered emphatic only. But they obviously make the sentence unambiguous and exclude other interpretations. These markers may occur alone or in combination (for greater emphatic force). cāhe and bhale are synonymous and, therefore, do not combine. Their occurrences with factive

concessives have been registered as well, but it must be noted that they are very rare: 16) jis kārya mẽ abhirucī hai vah kārya kat hin nahī mālūm hotā, cāhe ham jãgal mẽ bhī rahẽ. (Reddi 2:16)

A work which is interesting does not seem difficult, even if we live, for instance, in a jungle. 17) mithileš bhale kavi hõ, lekin unkī bet ī to kavi nahī. (Mitra:59) Mithilesh may well be a poet, but still, his daughter is not. 18) vah kitnā hī kukarmī, adharmī kyõ na ho, par āp uske gale mẽ višvās kī zãjīr d āl kar use jis or cāhẽ, le jā sakte hai. (Prem

Chand 2:102) However wicked and immoral may he be, still with the chain of hope you can take him to any direction you would like. 19) svarg aur narak bhale hī na hõ, kĩtu… janm-janmātar kī yah yātrā svayam bhārī vipatti hai. (Dinkar:8)

Even if there is no heaven and hell, all this long way from birth to birth is itself a severe trial. 20) jahā mānav mẽ kŗtrimtā ātī hai, vah bhale hī ākars ak kyõ na ho, sthāī nahī hotī. (Reddi 2:36)

When a human obtains artificial qualities, they are not stable, even if they are attractive. 21) ek ādmī to hotā hī hai, cāhe vah kaisā bhī ho. (Kamleshvar 2:88) There always is a man (at home) whatever he would be. 22) pæhlā hed mast ar cāhe pādrī thā, par use tāmīz thī khāne pīne kī. (Rakesh 1:63)

Although the first headmaster was a priest, he had good manners at the dining table. The Potential mood depicts a possible future or a generalized situation. For the past concessive sentences the Counterfactual mood is used: 23) vah kahī jāne ko taiyār na thī cāhe uske t ukr e kar dete. (Yashpal 2:90) She was not ready to go anywhere even if they would have cut her into pieces. 24) agar vah ghar ā gayā hotā to hamẽ rone kī kyā zarūrat thī… phir cāhe āp log use janmqaid hī de dete. (Kamleshvar 2:54)

If he had come home, then what was the need for us to cry, even if you had given him life imprisonment? The particle bhī should be noted separately, for it has a very special role in creating concessive senses. “Sometimes in a complex sentence, the only word to suggest a concessive meaning is bhī (‘even’ = ‘even in that case’)” (Pořízka 1963:269, see also Солнцева 1972:71). Most often it occurs after the Absolutive or the perfective participle in the adverbial function: 25) bāl khicr ī ho jāne par bhī ve ragghū hī rahe. (Yashpal 2:35) His hair became gray, but still he remained Raghu (a child’s name). 26) lekin xāmoš hote hue bhī mai apne ko mukhar anubhav kar rahā thā. (Kishore:39)

In spite of being silent, I felt myself talking. The matter of special interest is the ability of the particle bhī to influence the meaning of the conditional clause. Used within a conditional clause bhī changes it into concessive, while the conjunctives agar / yadi (if) acquire the functions of cāhe / bhale. Here we give examples with different kinds of the conditional clause:

27) agar mai unhẽ likhtī bhī to zyādā sãbhav yahī thā ki ve mujhe uttar na dete. (Rakesh 1:20)

Even if I had written to them, then it was most likely that they would not have answered me. 28) calo, maine ‘ārt ’ film banā bhī lī, lekin jo bandā paisā lagātā hai, vah ārt

kī xātir nahī lagātā. (Mitra:34)

O.K., imagine yourself I made an ‘art’ film; but the person who invests the money does not invest it for art’s sake. 29) yadi vah šīšā t akkar ke kāran

t ūt

bhī jāe to cūr cūr ho

jāegā, kĩtu uske t ukr e uchal kar cālak ko ghāyal nahī karẽge.

(“Sarita”:127) Even if the glass breaks from an impact, it will smash into smithereens, but its pieces won’t hurt the driver.

The last to be noted is the construction where the concessive meaning is rendered by repeating the predicate verb in the accusative form with addition of the particle to125:

30) kæhne ko to mai kæh dū, lekin unhẽ višvās na āegā. (Prem Chand 2:133) I will say it all right, but they won’t believe it. 31) māyā ne yah kæhne ko to kæh diyā, par uskā mũh lāl ho gayā. (Chatursen:149) Although Maya has said it, her face blushed.

5.3.3. Relative clause. Speaking of ‘relative’ clauses we mean adjectival, temporal and locative clauses which are connected to the main clauses by the relative pronoun jo (which) and the adverbs jab (when) and jahā (where) consequently. It is not the form of a sentence containing any of the three which determines the truth-value of a SoA, but the mood. Again, like in the cases discussed above, the speaker himself decides which of them to choose. The choice depends on how he is going to represent the SoA – as real, possible, probable or unreal: 1) unhõne pæhle us pustak kī prašãsā kī jo usne ek din purv samāpt kar ke unhẽ dī thī. (Ashk 1:367)

First of all he praised the book which he gave him after heaving read it. (The Indicative) 2) pīche bhāī sāhib kī jo durdašā huī hogī, uskā anumān lagāyā jā saktā hai. (Ashk 1:37)

It is possible to imagine into what an evil plight the brother has got afterwards. (The Presumptive) 3) is nazar mẽ koī tezī na thī jisse vah d ar jātī. (Yashpal 2:86) 125

A construction similar to it exists also in Russian (also with a particle to)– “сказать-то я скажу...

сказать-то я сказал” (I will say all right…, although I have said…). S.Migron (private communication) adds examples of similar constructions in modern Hebrew and Italian: “...‫( לשנוא אני לא שונא אותו אבל‬Hebrew); Dispiacere mi non dispiacete, ma… (Italian)”.

There was not any sharpness in this glance that would have frightened her. (The Counterfactual) 4) jab tak mai na āū, mere kamre mẽ kisī ko bhī nahī āne denā. (Prabhakar:89) Until I come do not allow anybody to enter my room. (The Potential) 5) auratẽ yāni hamārī ādhī jansãkhyā jab tak is tāmir mẽ hāth nahī

bãt āẽgī tab tak har kām kī spīd

ādhī rahegī. (Kamleshvar

1:5) Until women, that is to say, half of our population, will not participate in this construction, the speed of each work will remain a half-speed. (The Presumptive) 6) jab tak āp ko cot

nahī lagtī, hãgāmā caltā ræhtā. (Kamleshvar

1:59) As long as you had not been hurt, the commotion would have continued. (The Counterfactual) The use of moods other than the Potential needs no specific explanations, but the Potential in relative clauses may have one of two main purposes – to mark a future possible or generic state of affairs (see also 5.1.1.4): 7) tumhẽ kisī aise ādmī se bāt karnī cāhiye jo is višay mẽ jānkārī rakhtā ho. (Rakesh 1:116)

You should talk to such a person who is an expert in the subject. (Generalization) 8) jo tere jī mẽ āe so kar. (Chatursen:75) Do whatever you want. (Possibility) 9) sab tumhārī xušāmad karẽ, tab tum khāoge? (Kumar:51) When everybody flatters you, then you eat? (Possibility) 10) jab tak nām na mil jāe, upanyās āge kaise bar htā? (Mitra:46) Can a novel move forward while it has not got a name? (Generalization) 11) jahā kī sar akẽ tak xālī hõ, vahā restrā kahā se bharegā? (Kishore:207) Can a restaurant of a place be full where even the streets are empty? (Generalization) 12) jahā cāho bait

h

jāo. (Bahri 1986:219)

Sit wherever you like. (Possibility)

Bahri (1995:157) gives a sample of incorrect use of a mood: jo lekhak bannā cāhte hai ve apnī bhās ā par dhyān dẽ. His suggestion is to use cāhe

instead of cāhte hai. But firstly, the sentence is correct both grammatically and logically. It may be wrong only if the speaker does not mean any special agent, but speaks generally. Secondly, the suggestion of Bahri stresses a future possibility (those who possibly will desire to become writers) and not a general reading. Such a reading requires aspectual definitions with the potential copula like in a similar sentence of Varma (1995:136): 13) jo lekhak bannā cāhte hõ, ve bhās ā par dhyān rakhẽ. Anybody who wants to become a writer should pay attention to language. And we would like to pay attention also to the similarity in the meanings of the conjunctions agar and jab when used in clauses with potential predicates. It might be said that the meaning of possibility inherently exists in jab. Combined with the potential it becomes almost indistinguishable from agar: 14) socā… jab kuch ho jāe tab batāūgā. (Kamleshvar 2:11) I decided…when (if) something happens, then I will say it.

5.4. Conclusions. Even a cursory glance at epistemic modality in Hindi makes it clear that the totality of the speaker’s evaluation of reality is bisected into factual and imagined pieces. Imagined states of affairs in their turn can be presented as non-factual (possible or probable) or as counter-factual. Besides, epistemic qualifications in Hindi are capable to distinguish different shades of either factive or imagined events / situations, such as specific or generic or emphasize degrees of contingency. Among a rather miscellaneous set of epistemic means (both grammatical and lexical) the system of moods is more fundamental. The Indicative, Potential, Presumptive and Counterfactual moods are first in importance, but not independent tools, which, if used ‘bare’ without additional means and conditions, are vague and fuzzy. It is context and lexical items that impart clear-cut meanings to each mood. The evidential system of Hindi is also an important instrument of conferring more definite interpretations upon the moods. Evidentials interact with the moods, and the glossing

of moods depends to some extent on their interaction. At the same time evidentials are not markers of reality but expressions which reveal the source of evaluation. In the chart below we demonstrate our assumption as to how epistemic modality in Hindi may be represented in a diagram form:

Epistemic modality Subordinate clauses Real

Declarative

Imaginative

Speculatives

Deductives

Counterfactuals

Evidentials

In Hindi evaluation of reality cannot be made only lexically or grammatically. Only their combination and interaction is able to eliminate the fuzziness that surrounds grammatical categories and lexical means.

Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusion.

In order to elaborate a unique theory of modality and understand this linguistic phenomenon, it is necessary first of all to reveal modal mechanisms in specific languages. In this work we tried not only to define the modal resources of Hindi but also to detect their interrelations by arranging them in accordance with a certain typological system. Like many other languages, Hindi possesses a wide range of media, both grammatical and lexical, for verbalizing modal meanings. A very important role in this respect is assigned to verbal moods, but their interpretation is not unambiguous and depends on many factors. Various lexical items (for example, expressions of evidence, tense markers, emphatic particles or markers of subordination) as well as context and discourse conditions create a specific background that provides a mood with necessary glossing. But even the words accompanying the moods are not always unambiguous. Thus we encounter a phenomenon of polysemy both lexical and grammatical. In such circumstances not a single formal element of the language can serve as a reliable basis for classification of modality. Ultimately we have come to the conclusion that only a system based on semantic grounds may adequately reflect the actual state of affairs. This explains our predilection for the system elaborated by Palmer. Our experience shows that with some additions and corrections this system can be applied successfully to the Hindi language and encompass all its peculiarities. It should be noted that in most works where modal means of Hindi were mentioned, their relations and interdependencies were not examined. Modality as such had not been recognized as a separate grammatical category. A semantic approach allows viewing the existing categories from a non-traditional point of view. For instance, with regard to the subjunctive it is usually said that ‘the subjunctive expresses possibility’. With the semantic approach, the point of departure is altered. Now we state that ‘possibility can be expressed by the subjunctive’, but not only by it. The usual assertion of traditional Hindi grammars that ‘the subjunctive expresses…’ is misleading because it turns an instrument into an actor.

In recent years many works have been devoted to semantics and pragmatics of speech. Study of modality is of practical importance, especially in teaching foreign languages inasmuch as it separates meaning and form. Correctness of a translation is determined by the right semantic choice and not formal analogues. Together with building a classification system of modal means in Hindi, we tried to underline their semantic nuances. This may prove helpful for those who are engaged in translations from Hindi. Dividing modality into three subclasses – inherent, deontic, and epistemic – seems to us well-grounded and, for the present, the only reliable method which reveals all manifestations of the speaker’s subjective attitudes. Each subclass has primary and secondary expressive means. For instance, in epistemic modality the primary means are the Indicative, the Potential, the Presumptive, and the Counterfactual mood; in deontic modality they are the Gerundive, the Optative and the Imperative; in inherent modality they are the verbs sak- (to be able) and cāh- (to want). But this does not imply that these means

belong solely to one subclass. Under specific circumstances the Counterfactual mood may serve deontic modality, and the Gerundive acquires epistemic senses, not to mention the verb sak- which may turn out to be an important medium in all three subclasses. To be more precise, most modal means are associated with a minimum of two subclasses (see the table below). Meanings of different forms are transformed under certain conditions. For instance, the Gerundive + the suffix vālā marks intention when the agent is human and becomes a means of prediction when the agent is not human. In transforming the meanings of the verb sak- into deontic modality both context and intonation take part. Numerous tense forms along with temporal characteristics could also render attitudes of the speaker. Each subclass of modality has both grammatical and lexical means. The grammatical means of inherent modality in Hindi have lexical counterparts which can be used independently, while the lexical resources of epistemic and deontic modalities are properly used only in combination with grammatical means.

Inherent Modality

Deontic Modality

Epistemic Modality Confidence, fact

The Indicative Mood The Presumptive Mood The Counterfactual Mood The Imperative Mood

Assumptions, probability - deductives

The Subjunctive Mood

The Gerundive

Requests, volitives

Past possibility

Commands, requests, permissions, prohibitions The Optative – commands, demands, requests, cohortatives, volitives, consultatives, permissives, indifference Necessity, obligation; commands, requests; recommendations (with cāhiye or the copula) Command

Possibility (in the conditional clause) The Potential – Possibility, generalization

Possibility (with cāhiye or the copula)

The Genitive of the Gerundive

Intention (human agent)

The Dative of the Gerundive The Oblique Gerundive + vālā The Oblique Gerundive + jāin the Progressive Tense The Oblique Gerundive + deThe Present Progressive Tense The Past Habitual Tense + sakThe Present Habitual Tense

Intention (human agent)

Possibility (non-human agent)

Intention (human agent)

Prediction, possibility (non-human agent)

Intention (human agent)

Prediction, possibility (non-human agent)

The Future Tense The Past Indefinite Tense

Permission, indifference Firm intention

Eye-witnessed fact Past possibility, counterfactual

Intention (with indications of imminence) Intention Intention

The Passive Voice The Impersonal Passive

Prediction (non-human agent)

Ability

Commands, cohortatives

Possibility (with sak-)

Commands (with a respective intonation) Prohibitions (with xabardār)

Reality, possibility; negative expectations Threat, unwished or desired possibility (in the conditional clause) Generalization; possibility (with sak-)

Demands, recommendations (with the Optative) Advice, rule (without mentioning the agent); recommendations (with the 3d person Optative)

Intransitive verbs with inherent passive meaning The Perfective Verbal Adverb + the verbs de-,

Ability (the agent + se) or absolute inability (with the Perfective Verbal Adverb of the first Causative) Intention

le-, d ālbait h- in the

Present Habitual Tense The verb sak-

The verb cāh-

The verb socThe verb ræh-

The verb banThe verb pāThe verb leThe verb āThe verb jānThe verb samajh-

Ability (+ transitive verbs or + intransitive verbs with active meaning) Wish (the subject = the agent) Intention (the human agent, a deliberate action, with the Perfective Participle) Intention (with the Present Progressive Tense) Ability (with the Perfective Verbal Adverb or with the Absolutive) Inability to maintain the former state (with the Impersonal Passive) Ability (with the Present Participle masculine, plural) Ability (circumstantional) Ability (circumstantional) Ability (aquired)

Recommendations, permissions, prohibitions (with a specific context and intonation) Will (the subject and the agent are different)

Possibility (+ intransitive verbs with passive meaning, the Habitual Tenses, Passive Voice)

Permission

Ability (aquired) Confidence in a future action (with the Perfective Participle)

Our work can be seen as an initial step in the direction of more sophisticated analyses of Hindi modality. We have only slightly touched on such aspects as the correlation of modality with negation and interrogation as well as discourse properties of modality. We have also left aside the important issue of the compatibility of different kinds of modality. The traditional view of modality precludes existence of more than one kind of modality in one utterance, but the classification system which

we have adopted allows us to review such an approach. Further analyses of modality require linguistic sources other than literary works, which constituted our corpus. Carefully fashioned literary speech is best to reflect standards of a language, but, as Ramchandra Varma wrote (1995:35), the acquaintance with the nature of a language is possible only through colloquial speech, which has some idiosyncrasies. Spoken language, spontaneous speech, is notable for discord in using the same words, neglect of standard grammatical patterns and sweeping usage of extra-linguistic means. If this work has shed some light on the modal mechanisms of Hindi language, then we consider our mission a success. We hope it will serve a basis for further study in this field.

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