Transnational Climate Governance

Transnational Climate Governance Liliana B. Andonova Michele M. Betsill Harriet Bulkeley Global Environmental Politics, Volume 9, Number 2, May 2009, pp. 52-73 (Article) Published by The MIT Press

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gep/summary/v009/9.2.andonova.html

Access Provided by Universite de Geneve at 09/13/10 12:12PM GMT

Transnational Climate Governance

Liliana B. Andonova, Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley

Transnational Climate Governance •


Introduction Scholars and practitioners have traditionally viewed multilateral agreements negotiated by national governments as the central mechanism for global environmental governance.1 Today, the governance of global environmental issues is multifaceted, with governance mechanisms taking on a variety of forms beyond multilateral agreements. Moreover, authority is diffuse across levels of social organization and types of actors. This complexity is clearly illustrated in the case of climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol exemplify intergovernmental cooperation. National governments develop and implement climate policies within a context of national politics and institutions, sometimes under the umbrella of the international climate change regime, but not always (e.g. the United States). European Union countries function within an additional layer of regional, supranational cooperation that includes climate change along with many other policy areas. Subnational authorities have become active players in the climate change policy arena in a number of countries, often ahead of central governments. In the private sphere,2 both nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations have initiated programs to shape public understandings of climate change and to develop innovative policies and technologies for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. In this manner, climate change exempliªes the multi-actor and multi-level nature of global environmental governance. One area that has received relatively limited systematic attention is the growing trend of transnational cooperation on climate change between subnational governments, regions, NGOs, corporations, and government agencies. Several studies have examined individual networks for climate cooperation ranging from cities,3 to climate-related partnerships,4 a climate action plan for 1. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the International Studies Association and the 2007 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change. We are grateful to Frank Biermann and Dimitris Stevis, three anonymous referees, and editor Matthew Paterson for their helpful comments. Liliana B. Andonova is grateful to Colby College and to the Jean Monnet Fellowship Programme of the European University Institute for supporting the research presented in this article. 2. Here we use the term “private” to include both corporate and civil society actors. 3. Bulkeley and Betsill 2003. 4. Andonova 2008; and Glasbergen and Groenenberg 2001. Global Environmental Politics 9:2, May 2009 © 2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

52


• 53

US New England states and Eastern Canadian provinces,5 or the insurance industry’s response to climate risk.6 There has been little attempt, however, to put the different pieces together and examine the varieties and the broader signiªcance of this phenomenon.7 This article addresses this gap in the literature. We argue that such networks frequently constitute a form of transnational governance, which involves the authoritative steering of network constituents to achieve public goals, and which is of growing signiªcance in world politics and in climate cooperation in particular. The article develops a framework for systematically analyzing and documenting the phenomenon of transnational climate change governance. In the ªrst section, we draw on the literatures concerning transnational relations and global governance to establish a deªnition of transnational governance that clariªes who engages in transnational governance and what it entails. We emphasize that transnational governance is characterized not only by the types of actors involved, but also by a particular set of relations and forms of purposive steering. This is important for distinguishing both analytically and empirically transnational governance in its different forms from the broader phenomenon of transnational relations. In the second section, we discuss the factors that have contributed to the emergence of transnational governance on the issue of climate change, and its relation to the intergovernmental climate regime and other institutions of climate governance. We then introduce a typology that distinguishes between public, private, and hybrid transnational networks on the basis of the actors and authority involved, and identify three governance functions through which steering is accomplished—information-sharing, capacity building and implementation, and rule-setting. Through some illustrative examples, we demonstrate that the typology provides a foundation for the systematic study of transnational climate change governance. Speciªcally, it allows us to identify the various institutional forms that governance takes, and to investigate the process of governing through transnational networks. In the conclusion, we consider the implications for the future study of transnational climate change governance and global affairs.

Towards Transnational Governance Transnational relations are not a new phenomenon. Direct cross-border contacts of business people, bureaucrats, aristocracy, elites, intellectuals, and revolutionaries have long been and remain a part of the international system. Keohane and Nye were among the ªrst to draw attention to the contemporary signiªcance of these cross-border transactions and networks, which they deªned as “contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are 5. Selin and VanDeveer 2005. 6. Jagers and Stripple 2003. 7. For exceptions, see Bäckstrand 2008; and Pattberg and Stripple 2007.

54

•


not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments.”8 In the 1970s, a number of studies on the organization and inºuence of transnational actors such as companies, societal organizations, ªnanciers, and foundations charted a new dimension of international politics beyond the nation-state and intergovernmental politics.9 Theoretical interest in transnational relations, however, proved transient. Much of the debate in mainstream International Relations during the 1980s focused on intergovernmental regimes. Transnational actors and their networks were treated as epiphenomenal. As Ruggie points out, “If they did not directly challenge the state by potentially embodying a substitute for it, they might be interesting in practice, but not worthy of serious consideration.”10 The study of transnational relations was revived with new vigor in the 1990s. In an edited volume titled Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Nonstate Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Risse-Kappen added more detail to the deªnition of transnational relations, highlighting the types of actors involved: “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a nonstate agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an international organization.”11 Importantly, Risse-Kappen contends that interactions by governmental actors across national boundaries constitute transnational relations “when at least one actor pursues her own agenda independent of national decisions.”12 The reality of world affairs, not least the increasing salience of global environmental problems and various manifestations of globalization, meant that transnational actors became increasingly hard to ignore. The transnational relations literature has since made great strides in analyzing the role of transnational actors and networks. It has illuminated the strategies and inºuence of multinational corporations and industry associations,13 advocacy networks,14 epistemic communities,15 and government bureaucrats.16 This reintroduction of the study of transnational relations into mainstream International Relations placed an emphasis ªrst on understanding transnational actors as agents of change, uncovering the mechanisms through which these actors inºuence domestic and international politics, states, and international policies. Perhaps curiously, given the now ubiquitous use of the term global governance, less systematic attention has been given to the extent to which the activi8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Keohane and Nye 1971, xi. Forsythe 1976; Huntington 1973; Keohane and Nye 1971; and Strange 1976. Ruggie 2004, 500. Risse-Kappen 1995a, 3. Risse-Kappen 1995a, 9. Andonova 2003; Choucri 1993; and Garcia-Johnson 2000. Betsill and Corell 2008; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mathews 1997; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; True and Mintrom 2001; and Wapner 1996. 15. Haas 1989. 16. Slaughter 2004; and Steinberg 2001.


• 55

ties of transnational actors and networks constitute transnational governance.17 The term “global governance” owes much to the work of James Rosenau and his distinction between “government,” here encompassing the world of states, and “governance,” which “occurs on a global scale through both the co-ordination of states and the activities of a vast array of rule systems that exercise authority in the pursuit of goals and that function outside normal national jurisdictions.”18 Global governance can, then, take place with and without the state. While some authors choose to reserve the term “governance” solely for nonhierarchical forms of steering which include either private or both private and public actors,19 a broader interpretation includes multiple modes through which governing can be accomplished.20 In its broadest sense, governance “relates to any form of creating or maintaining political order and providing common goods for a given political community on whatever level.”21 From these broad deªnitions, several features of governance stand out. First, governance is deªned by the “public” nature of its goals. Governance is concerned with conducting the “public’s business.”22 This is not to say that only public actors are involved, but rather that governance seeks to achieve some form of public good. Second, governance is regarded in the literature as ordered and intentional. Lowndes captures this sense with her deªnition of governing as the “purposive acts of ‘steering’ a society or polity” and governance as the resulting “instituted process” that “serves to guide and constrain future governing behavior.”23 At the heart of the process of governing is therefore the notion of “steering”—providing direction towards particular goals.24 As we consider in more detail below, this process of steering or direction can take several forms, and may be more or less successful. Third, governance is regarded as authoritative. For example, governance is deªned as the means of “authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination.”25 Signiªcantly, if gover17. Though we note the point made by Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) that the analysis of global governance owes much to earlier debates concerning transnational relations. In the main, analyses of transnational actors in global governance have focused on single case studies or forms of network. We discuss this further below. 18. Rosenau 2000, 167. 19. Risse 2004. 20. Kooiman 2003; and Bulkeley et al. 2007. 21. Risse 2004, 298. 22. Ruggie 2004, 504. 23. Lowndes 2001, 1961. 24. The notion of steering is prominent in the literature, with many scholars explicitly using the word “steer” in their deªnitions of (global) governance or implicitly deªning governance in a way that suggests it involves efforts to steer society towards the pursuit of collective goals (Brand 2005; Commission on Global Governance 1995; Kjaer 2004; Latham 1999; Pierre and Peters 2000; and Rosenau 1995). We note that some authors stress the importance of “selforganisation” in network governance, but suggest that empirical evidence provides little support for the sort of horizontal power relations and mutuality of constitution that this approach indicates (e.g. Leitner and Sheppard 2002; and Kern and Bulkeley 2009). 25. Rhodes 1996, 653.

56

•


nance is to be authoritative in this sense, it rests upon a mutual recognition between the governor(s) and the governed, a process that is subject to signiªcant contention. As Ruggie sums up the debate, “governance, at whatever level of social organization it may take place, refers to conducting the public’s business—to the constellation of authoritative rules, institutions, and practices by means of which any collectivity manages its affairs.”26 Rather than be deªned by the actors involved (e.g. state or nonstate) or the structures created (regimes, networks, etc.), a concern for governance should direct our attention to the mechanisms by which steering occurs as well as the particular social relations that enable governing to take place. We contend that transnational governance occurs when networks operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals. In the transnational realm, governance is primarily organized through cross-border networks of different conªgurations of actors. To be considered a form of transnational governance, such networks must seek to address some form of public goal (though they may not accomplish it). In addition, in keeping with the deªnitions of governance offered above, these networks must involve steering (an intentional, directed process) and be recognized as authoritative by the individuals and organizations that constitute the network. We choose to use the term “constituents” to describe the actors and organizations that are part of the network. To constitute the network, such actors and organizations must not only recognize the authority of the network (e.g. agree to its terms of membership where such formal criteria exist, undertake speciªc reporting requirements made by a network, or declare their solidarity with network goals), but also must be recognized by network authorities as legitimate parts of the network.27 The constituents of any one network are therefore determined by the mutual recognition of authority, establishing a particular set of social relations that characterize governance networks. This allows us to distinguish between transnational networks that inºuence the creation and operation of governance institutions but are not recognized as authoritative (as in the case of nonstate actors involved in multilateral negotiations), and those that govern “in the sense of bringing together a sufªcient marriage of power and legitimacy to establish, operationalize, apply, enforce, interpret, or vitiate the [network’s] behavioral rules.”28 Studies in the ªeld of global environmental politics have contributed analyses of a number of transnational networks engaged in governance, includ26. Ruggie 2004, 504. 27. Note that the term constituent is deªned by Chambers 21st Century Dictionary as both “forming part of a whole” and “having the power to create or alter a constitution,” as well as in relation to the power to vote. Using the term in the ªrst two senses captures the way in which actors and organizations actively constitute a network, rather than being members of an existing structure. This sense draws on the root of the term, from constituere, meaning to establish. 28. Conca 2005, 190.


• 57

ing ISO 14000,29 forestry certiªcations,30 municipal networks for climate governance,31 transgovernmental networks,32 and public-private partnerships.33 Despite this growing recognition of the governance role of transnational networks, the literature lacks a general framework within which one might study the phenomenon in a more comprehensive and comparative light, thereby illuminating the commonalities, differences, and implications of the multiple manifestations of transnational governance networks.34 In addressing such a diffuse ªeld, we suggest that critical attention must be paid not only to who is involved in transnational governance, but also to the ways in which transnational networks deploy different sources of authority and mechanisms of steering in order to govern. To this end, we consider a typology approach to be useful, both in terms of mapping the (relatively uncharted) terrain of transnational governance and in providing an analytical framework through which to examine how, and with what effects, networks are governing. First, though, we consider the sources of transnationalization in climate governance and the interplay between more traditional intergovernmental institutions and transnational governance networks.

The Transnationalization of Climate Governance The transnationalization of governance is not a phenomenon constrained to climate change.35 However, climate change is an issue area that has lent itself more readily to the emergence and proliferation of transnational governance due to several political and institutional factors. First, it is an arena densely populated by advocacy and business organizations whose interests and activities span borders and scales. While environmental politics more broadly is characterized by a high density of transnational actors, climate politics has added a tremendous diversity to the mix of affected groups, and a growing crystallization of cross-border interests and coalitions. This has meant that climate governance is more exposed to the direct inºuence and initiatives of nonstate actors. Second, climate change is characterized by unenviable complexity and the need for policy coordination vertically, horizontally, and across sectors. Unlike many other environmental policies that often focus on one industry or several 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Clapp 1998; and Prakash and Potoski 2006. Cashore et al. 2004. Bulkeley and Betsill 2003. Selin and VanDeveer 2005. Andonova 2008; Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Benner, Reinicke, and Witte 2004; and Glasbergen, Biermann and Mol 2007. 34. For recent contributions in this direction see Bäckstrand 2008; and Pattberg and Stripple 2007. 35. Other examples include coordination of monetary policy among central bankers (Slaughter 2004), security, athletics, union activity, public health, and poverty alleviation. We are grateful to participants at the 2007 annual meeting of the International Studies Association (where a version of this paper was presented) for these suggestions.

58

•


sets of actors, climate governance has to involve multiple sectors, often with divergent interests and roles. As a result, interests are more likely to be disaggregated around narrowly deªned climate-related issues (e.g. adaptation, carbon markets, renewable energy, reporting), which in turn facilitates collective action across borders within speciªc governance niches. Third, the intergovernmental regime for climate cooperation through the Kyoto Protocol opened new opportunities and incentives for transnational governance by endorsing market authority and a set of market mechanisms. While national and intergovernmental bodies ultimately approve the broad agreement on (and transactions under) the three ºexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, their practical implementation has necessitated the creation of a range of governance structures. Such institution building to support a new global market involves diverse skills and capacities, inevitably creating opportunities for crossborder cooperation between government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nonstate actors. Finally, the evolving political landscape and variable involvement of nation-states in climate cooperation provides additional incentives and terrain for the building of transnational governance networks. With some key players (the United States) outside the regime and others (such as China, India, and Brazil) participating without speciªc obligations to reduce emissions, there have been efforts to integrate subnational and other actors from countries with limited commitments into coalitions of the willing and governance practices, ultimately supporting the broad objectives of the regime. For example, such political motives lay behind the UK-California initiative, a partnership agreement reached in 2006 through which “California and the UK commit to build upon current efforts, share experiences, ªnd new solutions, and work to educate the public on the need for aggressive action to address climate change and promote energy diversity.”36 In sum, while climate change is not a special case uniquely ªt for transnational governance, it offers an arena conducive to such governance, and one often characterized by a conscious search for transnational mechanisms to support more traditional intergovernmental and state institutions. Examining the sources of diversity and types of transnational governance within the climate regime can therefore provide us with a rich basis for analysis of the broader landscape of transnational governance networks.

A Typology of Transnational Governance Transnational governance is a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon. Typologies can be useful in deªning such complex concepts by identifying component parts and clarifying how these parts interact.37 Our typology provides a 36. State of California 2007. 37. Babbie 2007; and Neuman 2003.


• 59

tool to pull together the patchwork of transnational governance networks and guides us in identifying their various institutional forms. Thus, contrary to prior studies which tend to focus on individual transnational networks and illuminate their speciªc structure and functions, our approach creates a cumulative perspective on different forms of transnational governance, and represents an effort to map the scope of this relatively amorphous phenomenon. The proposed typology categorizes transnational forms of governance according to two criteria: the types of actors involved and the governance functions provided by the network (Table 1). The ªrst criterion provides a means through which to consider how the authority of transnational governance is established and maintained. The second criterion provides a window through which to examine how the process of governance operates. We discuss each dimension in turn before moving on to consider the nine “institutional types” of transnational governance that this approach reveals. Throughout these discussions, we use speciªc examples for illustrative purposes.38 We conclude by arguing that this approach allows us to investigate the processes through which governance occurs within different forms of transnational climate change governance networks. Actor Types One of the distinctive characteristics of transnational governance is that it involves a variety of nonstate and state actors, contributing different capacities and sources of authority. This dimension of the typology allows us to explore how transnational networks become authoritative agents of climate change governance. It suggests the possibility of multiple forms of authority through which networks can steer constituents. In differentiating transnational forms of climate governance based on actor types, we can investigate whether different types of actors draw upon distinct resources or deploy particular rationales to gain recognition as authoritative. At one end of the spectrum, we identify purely public transnational governance networks (Table 1). These governance mechanisms are established by and for public actors such as sub-units of government, city or local governments, legislators, judges, or units of intergovernmental organizations acting quasiindependently of national decisions. Typically, public transnational networks are established through soft forms of cooperation such as memoranda of understanding, rather than intergovernmental agreements formally sanctioned by the foreign policy apparatus of the state. They can involve public authorities in network governance across scales from local to global. The signiªcance of 38. Note that these examples are by no means exhaustive. The purpose of this paper is not to provide an extensive or detailed summary of the phenomenon of transnational climate change governance, but rather to develop a typology for analytical purposes. As such, the examples used are illustrative.

Public

UK-California initiative

Cities for Climate Protection (CCP)

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)

Function

Information sharing

Capacity building and implementation

Rule setting

Type of Actors

Renewable Energy and Energy Efªciency Partnership (REEEP) Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)

The Climate Group (TCG)

Hybrid

Pew Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC) World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) The Gold Standard

Private

•

Table 1 Typology of Transnational Climate-Change Governance Networks

60 Transnational Climate Governance


• 61

transnational public networks for global governance is celebrated by the work of Slaughter39 and Raustiala40 as a critically important development in an age of globalization. In the climate arena, Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) is an example of a public transnational governance network. The CCP program is an initiative of ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability and consists of more than 600 local governments from 30 countries, each of which has committed to controlling greenhouse gas emissions within its jurisdiction.41 This example illustrates the workings of public transnational networks which transcend the boundaries of formal intergovernmental diplomacy, and engage in authoritative steering to seek to address emissions of greenhouse gases. Private transnational governance networks stand at the other end of the typology spectrum (Table 1). This category includes transnational networks established and managed by nonstate actors only. Increasingly, nonstate actors come together to establish private, network-based governance systems ranging from forestry codes of conduct,42 coffee certiªcation,43 or voluntary standards for chemical safety and environmental protection.44 Distinctive of private networks is that they bring together in a voluntary alliance autonomous actors from one or multiple sectors, who pledge to align their behavior in ways that support both private and public goals. Networks facilitate such alliances and help constituents identify common goals, reduce the transaction cost of achieving them, and gain public recognition for voluntary action. Private governance networks may create authority and recognition through the functioning of markets; by institutionalizing a set of moral principles, norms and ideas; or by the combination of normative and market mechanisms.45 An example in the climate change arena is the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), which brings together more than 190 chief executive ofªcers of international ªrms to address issues of business and sustainable development.46 WBCSD has initiated or facilitated a range of climate governance activities under its Energy and Climate project. These WBCSD initiatives steer climaterelated actions of member companies “by devising practical mechanisms, measurement tools and market-based solutions . . . and helps them prepare for a carbon-constrained future by exploring the energy frameworks, sources and technologies that will be needed tomorrow.”47 The climate work of the WBCSD thus seeks to ªnd innovative ways for businesses to address climate change. There has been a growth in the number of transnational governance arrangements on climate change initiated by and for nonstate actors, which has not 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

Slaughter 2004. Raustiala 2002. Bulkeley and Betsill 2003. Cashore et al. 2004. Raynolds, Murray, and Taylor 2004. Garcia-Johnson 2000. Hall and Biersteker 2002; and Cashore et al. 2004. WBCSD 2007. WBCSD 2008.

62

•


been captured by the literature. One of the values of the typology is that it forces us to look more systematically at transnational governance as a phenomenon, revealing aspects that were previously not fully explored. Finally, there has been growing collaboration between public and private transnational actors, resulting in hybrid transnational governance networks. In this category, actors from the public and private sectors establish joint transnational networks with a set of governance objectives, merging the realms of public and private authority in global governance. It is perhaps this ªeld that has attracted the most academic attention, with scholars concerned to examine, amongst others, the emergence of new global public policy networks48 and public-private partnerships.49 In the climate arena, public-private networks have also proliferated, not least prompted by the merging of market and regulatory instruments in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. The growing interest of industrialized country governments to experiment with softer approaches to climate governance as complements to (or, in the case of the US, substitutes for) regulation has further supported hybrid networks for transnational cooperation on climate change. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary cap-and-trade system, is an example of a hybrid network with a membership including private ªrms, NGOs, universities, and state and local governments.50 Governance Functions The second dimension along which we build our typology of transnational governance networks has to do with the primary governance functions they perform. This dimension is particularly important as it seeks to specify the means through which these networks steer constituents. This second dimension of the typology also allows for empirical investigation into how transnational governance networks are clustered in terms of functions, and how these functions compare to other forms of governance. Previous studies of transnational networks identify a wide array of speciªc functions that these networks can or do perform. The functionalist bent in the analysis of hybrid networks is particularly strong. Case studies of public-private partnerships such as the Global Compact, the World Commission on Dams, Roll Back Malaria, and the partnerships endorsed by the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development detail a range of governance functions provided by partnerships such as norm coordination and diffusion, collective learning, rule implementation, capacity building, direct societal representation, and the development of new products, markets, or services.51 Scholars focusing on transnational codes of conduct and self-regulation emphasize the standard-setting and public-relations functions of such networks, which could 48. 49. 50. 51.

Benner et al. 2004. Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; and Biermann et al. 2007. Chicago Climate Exchange 2007. Bissel 2001; Ruggie 2002; Reinicke and Deng 2000; and Witte, Streck, and Benner, 2005.


• 63

be purely private as well as hybrid.52 The functions of private governance systems for the environment have, in turn, been differentiated as regulative, cognitive/discursive, or integrative, whereby the private governance system succeeds in integrating existing public norms or rules into the private governance domain or vice versa.53 Scholars also distinguish between the levels of interdependence among actors within a network (tied or untied) and the patterns of interaction (bargaining or deliberation), and suggest that, to varying degrees, such networks perform four different types of governance: regulative, normative, cognitive, and identity-constructing.54 What we see in this brief review of scholarly discussion of transnational networks and their governance functions is a considerable diversity of concepts and overlap of functions identiªed, despite the varied focus on largely public, largely private or hybrid networks. The degree of overlap among these accounts suggests that their insights can help to pinpoint our analysis to the sorts of broad governance functions in which networks engage in order to steer constituents. The functional dimension of the typology developed here seeks to build on this foundation and provides a more general framework for analyzing how the process of steering takes place within transnational governance networks, applicable to the broad range of phenomena that fall under this category. On this basis, and from our own research, we derive the three functional categories by considering the ways in which networks steer members towards particular public purposes: information sharing; capacity building and implementation; and rule setting. This necessarily involves an engagement with the types of resources that transnational governance networks have at their disposal to yield governance power. The literature on transnational networks has identiªed several types of resources that give networks leverage across borders: the diffusion of information, knowledge and norms; the pooling and distribution of ªnancial, managerial and technical resources; and more recently, the negotiation and establishment of a set of norms, rules, and standards outside of the intergovernmental arena.55 Information sharing is central to many transnational governance networks. In these types of networks, information is the main resource that is channeled to steer constituents towards network goals. This includes cognitive, discursive, and knowledge-generating and diffusion roles. The role of knowledge exchange has been seen as a central basis for the new wave of transnational relations documented since the 1990s. For the purposes of this analysis, it is critical to distinguish between the use of information by transnational epistemic communities, advocacy networks, or business lobbies as a tool of organization and political leverage, and the use of information in governance networks as a means of gov52. 53. 54. 55.

Gerefª et al. 2001; and Hauºer 2001. Pattberg 2005. Marcussen and Torªng 2003; and Klijn and Skelcher 2007. See among others Andonova and Levy 2003; Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Marcussen and Torªng 2003; and Risse-Kappen 1995b.

64

•


erning. In the former, information is used by groups such as the Global Climate Coalition as a form of political pressure targeted at actors outside the network (often states) who in turn do not view the Global Climate Coalition as authoritative.56 Information sharing takes on a governance function when it is recognized as authoritative and serves to direct constituents within the network. This may take place through norm diffusion, consensus building, or changing practices. For example, The Climate Group seeks to use a strategy of information sharing to steer its constituents, describing its mission as one of putting “the world on track for a low carbon economy by rapidly expanding the uptake of best practice on reducing greenhouse gas emissions” (emphasis added).57 They seek to achieve this through an explicit program of fostering learning through working “one-on-one with our members, developing speciªc leadership groups to work on solutions and running a low-carbon excellence programme that enables peer-to-peer learning” currently conducted through “monthly ‘webinars’ for our members and network partners.”58 Whether such a strategy is effective in governing the constituents of The Climate Group or other transnational governance networks who adopt similar strategies is an empirical question. Nonetheless, it is clear that information sharing is an explicit strategy that The Climate Group has adopted in order to steer constituents.59 The second category of capacity building and implementation includes networks that provide resources (ªnance, expertise, labor, technology, or monitoring) to enable action. We consider capacity building and implementation to be more than a simple transmission belt of policies and practices from the global to the local level. Rather, we assume that it is a process entangled with negotiation over rights and responsibilities and struggles over the nature of the problem and its appropriate solutions. Under these circumstances, such functions become a critical means through which governing—steering subjects and their actions—is accomplished. These types of transnational governance activities may take place in reference to an explicit set of already agreed-upon intergovernmental or domestic rules and norms, and may seek to enhance the capacity of network constituents to implement them effectively. Transnational networks that seek to build capacity and implement climate policies and projects may also work from the bottom-up, creating and involving actors in alternative frameworks for cooperation. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efªciency Partnership (REEEP) is a case in point. This hybrid network includes “eight regional secretariats and more than 3,500 members” and has “funded more than 50 . . . projects in 44 countries that address market barriers to clean energy in the developing world and economies in transition” which are “beginning to deliver 56. 57. 58. 59.

Conca 2005. The Climate Group 2007a. The Climate Group 2007b. We recognize that the line between inºuence and governance is a ªne one, but nonetheless contend that such a line exists and that its delineation requires specifying the distinction as we seek to achieve here, as well as in guiding further empirical research.


• 65

new business models, policy recommendations, risk mitigation instruments, handbooks and databases.”60 Whether working within a broader regulatory framework or seeking to support capacity for climate action from below, distinctive of networks with primarily capacity-building and implementation functions is the leveraging of a set of material and non-material resources that may include technologies, knowhow, management skill, contacts, or ªnancial resources. Indeed, one of the main functional advantages of networks identiªed in a range of studies is that they leverage transnationally the resources and skills of multiple actors from different levels of governance and sectors in society. In the absence of the network, the pooling of resources across such scope through traditional mechanisms of cooperation, which traditionally do not afford direct inºuence to nonstate actors and local authorities, may be impossible or inhibited by transaction costs. Finally, rule-setting transnational governance networks contribute to climate change governance by validating a set of norms and establishing rules intended to guide and constrain constituents. This type of transnational governance mimics traditional systems of intergovernmental and domestic governance in terms of function, although through a different conªguration of authority, and frequently through “softer” agreements rather than through the rule of international or domestic law. Traditionally, the capacity to set rules and generate compliance is equated with a hierarchical, sovereign form of power backed by (the threat of) sanction.61 As Risse points out, however, generating compliance with rules need not be based on a hierarchical mode of steering.62 The rule-setting functions of transnational governance networks could emerge in parallel to existing intergovernmental or domestic rules, or as a substitute in the absence of rules in the international or domestic sphere. For example, the Gold Standard is a carbon credit labeling scheme developed by a group of nongovernmental organizations as a means for ensuring the credibility of carbon offset credits.63 In contrast, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was developed in order to ªll a void in climate change regulation in North America. RGGI consists of ten US states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions, as well as one additional US state and two Canadian provinces as observers.64 RGGI is tasked with creating a regional cap-and-trade program for CO2 emissions from power plants among its members. Through RGGI, participants have developed a Model Rule to guide each state in the development of individual regulatory and legislative proposals necessary for implementation. Clearly, it is possible for some transnational governance networks to engage in several of the broad functions identiªed here. Indeed, we hypothesize 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

REEEP 2007. Risse 2004. Risse 2004, 293. The Gold Standard 2008. RGGI 2008.

66

•


that all functional types involve some information sharing to support their capacity-building and implementation, or rule-setting, activities. The functional dimension of the typology is designed to emphasize the primary steering functions undertaken as identiªed by the network itself. A clear and systematic understanding of the primary purpose and processes of steering as suggested by the functional dimension of the typology is important in order to analyze, for example, why some networks seek to steer constituents mainly through the diffusion of information, while others purposefully add a capacity-building or rule-setting function. It is furthermore useful to explore each of these ideal types of transnational governance functions on their own terms in order to gain a deeper analytical understanding of the means through which transnational networks may affect climate governance. On this basis, climate governance scholarship can move with greater conªdence to undertake more detailed empirical research on questions of how forms of network governance might interact with regime-based governance arrangements, national policy, and indeed with each other, and the consequent effects and implications. As the following discussion indicates, most transnational governance networks for climate change tend to be explicitly centered around one of these functional types, while other functions appear as auxiliary.

Actors, Authority and Processes of Transnational Climate Governance Our typology provides a foundation for the systematic study of transnational climate change governance by enabling us to examine and compare the forms which such phenomenon take, and the ways in which the processes of governing vary between distinct “ideal” types of transnational network governance. Transnational forms of governance, while proliferating in the climate change arena, have remained largely amorphous and undertheorized phenomena. This typology clariªes the general notion of transnational governance by deªning some its component parts. Table 1 helps to illustrate the dimensions as well as the value of the typology in raising important analytical questions and motivating research about the interplay between sources of authority and mechanisms of steering in the evolving landscape of global governance. The table provides examples of nine distinct institutional forms of transnational climate change governance networks: each involves interactions across national borders where at least one actor is a nonstate agent or at least one public actor is not operating on behalf of a national government or international organization, and where those interactions are designed to steer constituents authoritatively towards public goals. However, each category potentially involves different forms of authority and focuses on different governance functions. We can therefore use the typology to better explore the similarities and differences among different empirical examples of transnational climate change governance according to the form that they take. Take, for example, the UKCalifornia Initiative, the Pew Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC), and RGGI. The UK-California Initiative commits the two public parties


• 67

to share information about the use of market mechanisms for managing carbon, coordinate research on the economics of climate change, collaborate on technology research, and enhance linkages between their respective scientiªc communities.65 It is similar to the BELC in its information-sharing function. The BELC also provides a means for sharing information about climate change, speciªcally about how members can gain competitive advantage through climate mitigation activities.66 However, the BELC comprises 42 multinational corporations rather than government ofªcials. RGGI, like the UK-California Initiative, is a transnational governance network of government ofªcials. However, it differs from both the UK-California Initiative and the BELC in that its primary function is rule setting. Such insights allow us to take a more ªnely grained approach to the study of transnational governance, on climate change and more generally. They also allow us to recognize its multiplicity and hence the differentiated governance capacity that exists beyond the formal politics of international agreements. The second contribution of the typology is that it allows us to investigate in a systematic manner the processes through which transnational climate change governance occurs, and to consider whether and how these processes differ across different institutional forms. The public-private hybrid dimension of the typology allows us to explore the forms of authority that different types of transnational networks bring to bear in governing climate change. Most discussions of global governance recognize that the nature of authority in world politics is being reconªgured as new actors develop governance mechanisms aimed at steering societies towards collective goals.67 It is far too simplistic to view this reconªguration as a shift in power from state to nonstate actors, a point clearly demonstrated in the case of transnational governance networks involving public actors who cannot be neatly characterized as either state-based or nonstate.68 Rather, it suggests the presence of multiple forms of authority through which different conªgurations of actors can shape outcomes. Some (mostly public) actors may be recognized as authoritative based on their ability to exercise control through law or force, while authority for other actors may ºow from public recognition, expertise, or moral position rather than a monopoly over particular modes of power.69 We might expect, for example, that the process of performing the capacitybuilding and implementation function looks quite different in the CCP program and REEEP because each network draws on different forms of authority. Through the CCP network and with the assistance of ICLEI staff, network members are provided with material and non-material resources aimed at helping them realize their respective goals regarding controlling GHG emissions. The 65. State of California 2007. 66. BELC 2008. 67. Jagers and Stripple 2003; Pierre and Peters 2000; Roseneau 1995; and Sending and Neumann 2006. 68. Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; and Okereke and Bulkeley 2007. 69. Jagers and Stripple 2003.

68

•


ability of network members to establish climate-related goals and programs derives from their position as state actors with legal authority to regulate activities within a particular political jurisdiction. In contrast, REEEP includes a mix of state and nonstate actors such as national governments, intergovernmental organizations, development banks, and NGOs seeking to reshape energy markets and develop capacity for energy efªciency and renewable energy. Here, authority to build capacity is derived from the claims to expertise and experience that REEEP can make, as well as from its ability to build consensus across public and private actors about the nature of the problems surrounding the uptake of energy technologies (predominantly market-based) and its mobilization of resources to address these issues. By focusing attention on the processes of governing, the typology also allows us to explore the different techniques and practices employed by transnational networks. Critiques of current approaches to the study of global governance argue that while the intention may be to analyze processes of governance, the focus has largely been on its changing structure. Sending and Neumann contend that the literature is dominated by explorations of “the types of actors involved and the authority they are able to bring to bear, as opposed to the substance of the processes of governance that ºows from such authority” (emphasis in original).70 As we explore how transnational networks carry out different governance functions, we can begin to catalog the range of mechanisms and tools employed in the process of governing climate change and consider whether and how these speciªc tools vary across institutional form. While one might suspect that private transnational governance networks populated by actors from the business sector are most likely to promote market mechanisms of governance, we note that such instruments are prominent in all of the examples of transnational governance networks included in Table 1. Future research can investigate whether this holds true when we look at a wider population of transnational climate change governance networks, and whether this is unique to this particular form of climate change governance. Furthermore, empirical research is needed to ascertain whether the use of one particular form of governing—e.g. rulebased—is more or less effective in the context of different actors and sources of authority. While forms of, for example, rule-based governing may be found across all three types of networks, their deployment, effectiveness and implications may well vary with context. Using the typology to distinguish amongst the actors and forms of authority through which such forms of governing are exercised can assist in conducting these kinds of more detailed empirical analyses.

Conclusion In this article, we have sought to link renewed interest in transnational relations with debates about the changing nature of global governance. We argue that 70. Sending and Neumann 2006, 654.


• 69

transnational governance is a distinct form of global governance, consisting of transnational actors operating in a political sphere in which public and private actors interact across national borders and political jurisdictions. Importantly, these actors must be engaged in authoritative forms of governing to constitute transnational governance networks. We have developed a typology of transnational climate change governance that differentiates the forms of transnational governance both in terms of the types of actors participating and their recourse to authority. This typology also allows differentiation in terms of the forms of governing, that is, the type of steering process that is deployed. This perspective allows us to begin to document and analyze emerging forms of transnational governance that have become prominent in the area of global climate change, and how these transnational governance networks relate to each other and to other institutions in the climate regime. It provides a tool with which to study not only the sources of this governance phenomenon, but also to examine the effects of different types of networks, assess how these effects are achieved, and, ultimately, to attempt an assessment of the combined impact of transnational governance networks on behavior, policies, and problem solving. The empirical task of capturing such a broad, amorphous phenomenon is challenging. Our typology of transnational governance will serve as a guiding tool for future analysis. A ªrst task is to populate the typology with additional examples of transnational climate change governance networks. Studies of climate governance could use the concepts and typology offered here to explore some general trends, such as whether some cells are populated more or less densely and why. The typology also facilitates a more systematic selection and examination of cases to investigate a range of questions about the process through which governance occurs in transnational networks. Our discussion of transnational governance networks challenges the distinction between state and nonstate actors, which is often taken for granted in International Relations. In the area of climate change, we observe hybrid networks, as well as largely public or private forms of transnational governance, engaging in rule making. This in turn raises an array of questions about how governance is accomplished by a range of actors, and what this means for the conªguration of power and authority in complex, multilevel governance systems such as those that cluster around the issue of climate change.

References Andonova, Liliana. 2003. Transnational Politics of the Environment: The European Union and Environmental Policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 2008. Networks, Club Goods, and Partnerships for Sustainability: The Green Power Market Development Group. Report Prepared for the US National Academy of Sciences Partnership for Sustainability Initiative. Andonova, Liliana, and Marc A. Levy. 2003. Franchising Global Governance: Making Sense of the Johannesburg Type II Partnerships. In Yearbook of International Co-

70 •


operation on Environment and Development 2003/2004, edited by Olav Schram Stokke and Oystein B. Thommessen, 19–31. London: Earthscan Publications. Babbie, Earl. 2007. The Practice of Social Research. 11th edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. Bäckstrand, Karin. 2006. Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness. European Environment 16 (5): 290–306. ———. 2008. Accountability of Networked Climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational Climate Partnerships. Global Environmental Politics 8 (3): 74–102. Benner, Thorsten, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Jan Martin Witte. 2004. Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance; Towards a Pluralistic System of Accountability. Government and Opposition 39 (2): 191–210. Betsill, Michele M., and Elisabeth Corell, eds. 2008. NGO Diplomacy: The Inºuence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. 2004. Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program. International Studies Quarterly 48 (2): 471–493. Biermann, Frank, Man-san Chan, Ayçem Mert, and Philipp Pattberg. 2007. Multistakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Does the Promise Hold? Paper presented to the 2007 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Amsterdam. Bissel, Richard E. 2001. A Participatory Approach to Strategic Planning. Environment 43 (7): 37–40. Brand, Ulrich. 2005. Order and Regulation: Global Governance as a Hegemonic Discourse of International Politics? Review of International Political Economy 12 (1): 155–176. Bulkeley, Harriet, and Michele M. Betsill. 2003. Cities and Climate Change: Urban Sustainability and Global Environmental Governance. London: Routledge. Bulkeley, Harriet, Matt Watson, and Ray Hudson 2007. Modes of Governing Municipal Waste. Environment and Planning A 39 (11): 2733–2753. Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC). 2008. Companies Leading the Way. Available at http://www.pewclimate.org/companies_leading_the_way_belc, accessed 7 May 2008. Cashore, Benjamin, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom. 2004. Governing Through Markets: Forest Certiªcation and the Emergence of Nonstate Authority. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chicago Climate Exchange. 2007. Current Members of the CCX. Available at http:// www.chicagoclimateex.com, accessed 1 September 2007. Choucri, Nazli. 1993. Global Accords: Environmental Challenges and International Responses. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Clapp, Jennifer. 1998. The Privatization Of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and The Developing World. Global Governance 4 (3): 295–316. Climate Group, The. 2007a. Our Mission. Available at http://theclimategroup.org/ index.php/about_us/our_mission/, accessed 7 October 2007. ———. 2007b. Our Work Programme. Available at http://theclimategroup.org/ index.php/about_us/our_work_programmes/, accessed 7 October 2007.


• 71

Commission on Global Governance. 1995. Our Global Neighborhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conca, Ken. 2005. Old States in New Bottles? The Hybridization of Authority in Global Environmental Governance. In The State and the Global Ecological Crisis, edited by John Barry and Robyn Eckersley, 181–206. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dingwerth, Klaus, and Philipp Pattberg. 2006. Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics. Global Governance 12 (2): 185–203. Forsythe, David P. 1976. The Red Cross as a Transnational Movement: Conserving and Changing the Nation-State System. International Organization 30 (4): 607–630. Garcia-Johnson, Ronie. 2000. Exporting Environmentalism. U.S. Multinational Chemical Corporations in Brazil and Mexico. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gerefª, Gary, Ronie Garcia-Johnson, and Erica Sasser. 2001. The NGO-Industrial Complex. Foreign Policy 125: 56–65. Glasbergen, Pieter, and Ria Groenenberg. 2001. Environmental Partnerships in Sustainable Energy. European Environment 11 (1): 1–13. Glasbergen, Pieter, Frank Biermann, and Arthur P. J. Mol. 2007. Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development: Reºections on Theory and Practice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Gold Standard, The. 2008. What is the Gold Standard? Available at http:// www.cdmgoldstandard.org/, accessed 5 May 2008. Haas, Peter, M. 1989. Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control. International Organization 43 (3): 377–403. Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds. 2002. The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hauºer, Virginia. 2001. A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-regulation in a Global Economy. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Huntington, Samuel P. 1973. Transnational Organizations in World Politics. World Politics 25 (3): 333–368. Jagers, Sverker, and Johannes Stipple. 2003. Climate Governance Beyond the State. Global Governance 9 (3): 385–399. Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph Nye. 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kern, Kristine, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2009. Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Networks. Journal of Common Market Studies. 47 (2): 309–332. Kjaer, Anne Mette. 2004. Governance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Klijn, Erik-Hans, and Chris Skelcher. 2007. Democracy and Governance Networks: Compatible or Not? Public Administration 85 (3): 587–608. Kooiman, J. 2003. Governing as Governance. London: Sage. Latham, Robert. 1999. Politics in a Floating World. In Approaches to Global Governance, edited by Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, 23–53. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Leitner, H., and Sheppard, E. 2002. The City Is Dead, Long Live the Net: Harnessing European Interurban Networks for a Neo-liberal Agenda. Antipode 34 (3): 495– 518.

72

•


Lowndes, Vivien. 2001. Rescuing Aunt Sally: Taking Institutional Theory Seriously in Urban Politics. Urban Studies 38 (11): 1953–1971. Marcussen, Martin, and Jacob Torªng. 2003. Grasping Governance Networks. Centre for Democratic Network Governance, Roskilde University, Working Paper 2003: 5. Available at http://www.ruc.dk/upload/application/pdf/6a6925ad/Working_ Paper_2003_5.pdf, accessed 1 October 2007. Mathews, Jessica T. 1997. Power Shift. Foreign Affairs (January): 51–66. Neuman, W. Lawrence. 2003. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative. 5th edition. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Okereke, Chukwumerije, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2007. Conceptualizing Climate Change Governance Beyond the International Regime: A Review of Four Theoretical Approaches. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Working Paper 112. Available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/twp112.pdf. Pattberg, Philipp. 2005. Transnational Organization(s) as Governance: A Comparative Analysis of Private Rules Beyond the State. Paper presented at the Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change. Pattberg, Philipp, and Johannes Stripple. 2007. Remapping Global Climate Governance: Fragmentation Beyond the Public/Private Divide. Global Governance Working Paper No. 32. IVM, Free University Amsterdam. Pierre, Jon, and B. Guy Peters. 2000. Governance, Politics and the State. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd. Prakash, Aseem, and Matthew Potoski. 2006. The Voluntary Environmentalist?: Green Clubs and ISO 14001, and Voluntary Environmental Regulations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Raustiala, Kal. 2002. The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law 43:1, 1–92. Raynolds, Laura T., Douglas Murray, and Peter L. Taylor. 2004. Fair Trade Coffee: Building Producer Capacity Via Global Networks. Journal of International Development 16 (8): 1109–1121. Reinicke, Wolfgang H., and Francis M. Deng, eds. 2000. Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance. Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Center. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 2008. About RGGI. Available at http:// www.rggi.org/about.htm, accessed 5 May 2008. Renewable Energy and Energy Efªciency Partnership (REEP). 2007. Welcome to REEEP. Available at http://www.reeep.org/index.cfm?articleid⫽2, accessed 3 October 2007. Rhodes, R. A. W. 1996. The New Governance: Governing without Government. Political Studies 44 (4): 652–667. Risse, Thomas. 2004. Global Governance and Communicative Action. Government and Opposition 39 (2): 288–313. Risse, Thomas, Steven Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995a. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction. In Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Nonstate Actors, Domestic Structures and


•

73

International Institutions, edited by Thomas Risse-Kappen, 3–33. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ed. 1995b. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Nonstate Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Rosenau, James. 2000. Change, Complexity and Governance in a Globalizing Space. In Debating Governance, edited by Jon Pierre, 167–200. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roseneau, James N. 1995. Governance in the Twenty-First Century. Global Governance 1 (1): 13–43. Ruggie, John G. 2002. The Theory and Practice of Learning Networks, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Global Compact. Journal of Corporate Citizenship 5 (Spring): 27–36. ———. 2004. Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors and Practices. European Journal of International Relations 10 (4): 499–531. Selin, Henrik, and Stacy D. VanDeveer. 2005. Canadian-U.S. Environmental Cooperation: Climate Change Networks and Regional Action. American Review of Canadian Studies 35 (2): 353–378. Sending, Ole Jacob, and Iver B. Neumann. 2006. Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States and Power. International Studies Quarterly 50 (3): 651–672. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004. A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. State of California. 2007. Fact Sheet: United Kingdom and California Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Collaboration. Available at http://gov.ca.gov/ index.php/fact-sheet/united-kingdom-and-california-announcement-on-climatechange-clean-energy-c/, accessed 7 October 2007. Steinberg, Paul. 2001. Environmental Leadership in Developing Countries: Transnational Relations of Biodiversity Policy in Costa Rica and Bolivia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Strange, Susan. 1976. The Study of Transnational Relations. International Affairs 52 (3): 333–345. True, Jacqui, and Michael Mintrom. 2001. Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming. International Studies Quarterly 45 (1): 27–57. Wapner, Paul. 1996. Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Witte, Jan Martin, Charlotte Streck, and Thorsten Benner. 2005. The Road from Johannesburg: What Future for Partnerships in Global Environmental Governance? In Progress or Peril? Partnerships and Networks in Global Environmental Governance. The Post-Johannesburg Agenda, edited by Jan Martin Witte, Charlotte Streck and Thorsten Benner, 59–84. Washington, D.C./Berlin: GPPi. World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 2007. About the WBCSD. Available at http://www.wbcsd.org, accessed 3 November 2007. ———. 2008. Energy and Climate. Available at http://www.wbcsd.org, accessed 3 October 2008.