Turning out the Latino Vote in Los Angeles County ...

Turning out the Latino Vote in Los Angeles County:, Did Interest Group Efforts Matter? Adrian D. Pantoja and Nathan D. Woods Since the 1994 presidential election, the increased voter turnout among California Latinos prompted many pundits and academics to argue that the "Sleeping Giant" had awakened. To explain this surge in turnout, many mainstream news sources turned to Latino interest groups as the answer. However, a systematic analysis of such groups, either supporting or dismissing the notion, is largely absent in academic literature. Theoretically, Latino interest groups should help offset the individual costs associated with political participation. Do they? This article examines empirically the role Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP) played in mobilizing Latino voters in Los Angeles County, California, during the 1996 and 1998 elections. In a probit analysis, demographic predictors

such as age, income, education. and language, better explain individual-level

Latino voter

turnout than does the presence of SVREP mobilization activities. Latino interest groups like SVREP have not been as successful as is popularly believed in turning out the vote among California's Latino voters.

Introduction

Fueled by immigration and high birth rates, the Latino population in California grows larger every year-from 19 percent of the state's general population in 1980, to 26 percent in 1990, to a projected 33 percent by the year 2000.1 Largely because of the growth in the Latino population, by the end of 2000, California's population is projected to be less than half nonhispanic white (Census Projections 1999). Should these trends continue, the U.S. Bureau of the Census predicts that 43 percent of Californians will be of Latino origin by the year 2025. Exit polls report that Latinos are turning out at unprecedentedrates in state elections; mobilizationefforts on the part of groups like SouthwestVoter RegistrationEducationProject (SVREP) are purportedly part of the reason why. This article seeks to determine the extent to which mobilizationefforts significantly increase individual Latino voter turnout, by examining the role the interest group Southwest Voter Research Education Project (SVREP) plays in this process.

ADRIAND. PANTOJA and NATHAN D. WOODS are Ph.D. candidates in the School of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University. Authors' names are presented in alphabetical order. We would like to thank Tom Marshall, Jose Gutierrez, Gary Segura and Yishaiya Abosch for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. and Matt Barreto for his invaluable research assistance. We also would like to thank Southwest Voter Research Education Project for their time in granting us interviews and for the use of their research materials. The American Review of PoliJics, Vol. 20, Summer, °1999 The American Review of Politics

'1999: 141-162

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On a broad scale, because of the growing presence of the Latino population and the corresponding majority/minority shift, California also serves as a good point of departure to study Latino politics and electoral participation. More specifically, with over 40 percent of the California Latino population and roughly 13 percent of the national Latino population, Los Angeles County may be a benchmark of what can be expected throughout other heavily-Latino parts of the country. Uhlaner (1996) points out the importance of studying Latino political participation in California: "Since one-third of the U.S. Latino populationlives in California (as of 1988; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989), national Latino politics reflects politics in California." Despite representing such a large segment of the general population, however, Latinos do not participate at high rates in statewide electoral politics (de la Garza and DeSipio 1993; Desipio 1996),2In the 1988 presidential election, for example, the Latino statewide vote constituted only seven percent of the total state's presidential vote (Guerra 1992). Expectations of a substantialincrease in the 1992Latinopresidentialvote were high, in part as a result of the recently released 1990census, which indicated that Latinos comprised over a quarter of the California population. At 10 percent, Latino voters did represent a larger percentage of the total state vote than they had in 1988, however, the growth in the Latino vote since 1988 barely kept pace with the growth in the Latino population over the same time period (Subervi-Velez 1996). More sobering was the finding that even if no California Latinos had voted in 1992, the presidential election in California would not have changed (Guerra and Fraga 1996). Moreover, in the 1994 mid-term election, California was the only state in which Latino participation remained as high as in the 1992 presidential election. Once again, turnout barely kept pace with the growth in the California adult Latino citizen population (Tomas Rivera Policy Institute 1996). These examplesall underscore the limited levels of Latinovoter turnout in recent presidential and midterm elections. Such a substantial portion of the California general populace having so insignificant an impact on statewide elections has important policy ramifications. If California's Latino community is to exert influence over political outcomes and policy outputs, its votes must be delivered at rates at least similar to those of non-Latino voters. Understandingwhy Latinoshave voted at such low rates and the circumstances under which Latino voting rates will increase are important to understanding the political forces that will shape Los Angeles County, California state and, by extension, national politics. To increase this understanding, our article considers the role SouthwestVoter RegistrationEducation Project (SVREP) plays in turning out Latino voters.

Our focus on the role of interest groups in this process stems from some recent increases in Latino voter turnout-especially in 10cilland legislative elections-and the credit which Latino issue interest groups claimed for the surge (CaliforniaJournal 2000; Hispanic 1997; Los Angeles Times 1997). The increase in Latino voter turnout since 1994 was fueled in part by Proposition 181, which appeared in California's 1994 ballot, and the related mobilization efforts by various Latino interest groups. Proposition 187 was intended to deny any public or social service to illegal immigrants; it also required individualsproviding these services to report undocumented inuD.igrantsto the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Most Latino interest groups in California (whose population is 45% foreign-born) saw this proposition as "anti-Latino." As a result, intense mobilization efforts aimed at defeating the proposition were carried out by various Latino interest groups such as SVREP, Hermandad Mexicana Nacional, the National Associationof LatinoElectedOfficials(NALEO)and the MexicanAmerican Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). The changing political environment and increased mobilization efforts, according to the media, raised Latino voter turnout from 39 percent in 1990 to 57 percent in 1994 (California Journal 2000; Inland Valley Daily 1995; Southwest Voter Research Notes 1995). In the aftermath, many pundits argued that the "sleeping giant" had finally awakened. Antonio Gonzalez, president of SVREP, exclaimed in one article, "What it shows is that we are the beginning of a new era. Latinoswere politicallyimpotent, but we are leaving that era now" (CaliforniaJournal 2000; see also Inland ValleyDaily 1995). A variety offactors, rangingfrom individualto contextual, can enhance or depress Latino voter turnout. Our primary area of inquiry is how the Latino interest group Southwest Voter Registration Education Project fits into the process. To what extent is SVREP helping to deflate those factors working against Latino electoral participation?Are SVREP's efforts to turn out Latino voters working as they claim, or are their efforts falling short? In sum, what role can be expected of SVREP in promoting changes in the Californiaelectorate, a change already well underway in the general population? Previous Literature Previous research on interest groups and their influence on mobilizing Latinoregistration and voter turnout is far from extensive (Hero 1992). In surveyingpast research on Latinopolitical participation, only one article has been written specifically on the effects Latino organizations have on influencingvoter turnout (Garcia and de la Garza 1985). That article, however,

focused specifically on the effects of group membership on voter turnout, not on the mobilizationefforts of such groups. Studies of minority electoral participation usually have focused on the Civil Rights Movement and the electoral participationof African-Americans (Garrow 1978; Morris 1984). The 1965Voting Rights Act produced further scholarship, again focusing almost exclusively on the Act's impact on African-Americanvoter participation (Coyners and Wallace 1975; Williams 1982). Scholarship on Latino electoral participation was aimed primarily at explaining why Latinos fail to participate politically at high rates (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Cain and Kiewiet 1987; DeSipio 1996; Garcia 1997). Latino Political Participation Early explanationsfor low levels of participationtook two very contradictory approaches: one Cultural, the other Institutional. The cultural explanationwas characterizedby a set of hotly contestedanalyses-later dismissed-that positedthat the peasant-likedysfunctionalattitudesof MexicanAmericans accounted for why they failed to vote (Edmonson 1957; Lewis 1959; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961; Knowlton 1962; Madsen 1964; Rubel 1960; Rubel and Kupferer 1968). These authors describe low levels of participation as the result of a cultural predisposal to delegating decision making to others, a phenomenonreferred to as a "patron-peondependency" (Kluckhohnand Strodtbeck 1961). A similar explanation, suggestingthat an emphasis on the home and the family precludes especially Mexican-Americans from participatory activities, has also drawn criticism (Klobus and Edwards 1976). Argumentsthat.contradict the cultural explanationposit that racism and discrimination have produced institutional-level barriers that obstruct full political participation (Takash-Cruz 1990;Menchaca 1994; Quinones 1990). This explanation provides evidence that, far from having a predisposal againstorganizationand political activity, Latinoshave formed long standing interest groups that have been political and socially active, but they were inhibitedpolitically primarily by traditionalpolitical institutions. The Voting Rights Act expansion in 1970, and again in 1975, better addressed institutional electoral discrimination against non-African-American minorities, particularly non-English speaking minorities and minorities residing in the Southwest. Academic analyses of VRA expansion attempted to discern the impactof expansionon Latino communitiesand found .thatin large measure, the most formidable of the institutional barriers have been removed (de la Garza and DeSipio 1993; Garcia 1986).

Although VRA expansion removed some discriminatory obstacles to Latino participation, other important impediments remained, including barriers such as lack of transportation and the inability of many Latinos to . leave work to vote (Pachon, Arguelles and Gonzalez 1994). As well, harassment, discrimination, inadequate numbers of polling booths, inconvenient placementsof polling booths, and biased administrationof election laws may suppress Latino access to registering and voting (Rosenston and Hansen 1993). California registration and campaign procedures, if not its formal laws, are also cited as having a discouraging impact on the Latino vote. For example, by the time campaigns become visible in Latino communities, it is late in the electoral season and the deadline to register has often passed (Pachon et a1. 1994). This example illustrates the promotion of an ironic circle; candidates and campaigns will not focus on a community until the community delivers votes, but until a candidate or campaign focuses on a community, that community will not deliver votes. Scholarship focusing on cultural and institutionalexplanations for low voter turnout rates among Latinos is augmented by other explanations. For example, significant literature has discussed the problems associated with accurately measuring the Latino vote based on a general population that includes many non-citizens (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Garcia and Arce 1988). Uhlaner et a1. (1989) conclude that a substantial portion of nonvoting Latinos throughout the 1980swere in fact non-citizens. In her analysis, when adjusted for citizenship, 60 percent of Latinoseligible to vote did so as opposed to the 44 percent Latino rate based on general population figures. In 1985, even when restricted to Latinos of voting age, 38 percent of the California Latino population were not citizens (Pachon 1987). . Another partial explanationfor low levels of Latinovoter turnout stems from the relatively young age of the California Latino population (Guerra 1992). For example, 40 percent of the California Latino population was under eighteen years of age in 1985. By 1991, this percentage had dropped to 30 percent, a number still considered high relative to the average of 20 percent for the total population (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Pachon et a1. 1994). The demographic and SES factors included in this analysis are taken from the voter turnout literature, as well as studies of Latino populations. Income is firmly established as an important predictor of voter tUrnout (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Bennet and Klecka 1970; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Another explanationis low-income communitiesare characterizedby low rates of formal education. Low participation, in this explanation, may result from low levels of knowledgeabout the political process that should be garnered through formal education

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(Campbell et al. 1960; Verba,and Nie 1972). Finally, language-or limited English proficiency (LEP)-has been established as important in the literature on Latino voter turnout (DeSipio 1986; DeSipio 1996; Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Uhlaner et al. 1989). Taken as a whole, a number of factors work to depress Latino registration and voter turnout, includingage, low income levels, low rates of formal education, non-citizenship and language (LEP). Largely absent in past research is the role of interest groups. Little scholarship is devoted to interest groups and Latino participation specifically, although the interest group literature broadly provides insightsthat may be extrapolated to Latino registration and turnout. Latino Interest Groups and Voting To date there has been no systematic accounting made of Latino interest groups and their political or mobilization influences (Hero 1992). In general, membership and activity in interest groups is well known to increase political activity and the proclivity of voting (Rosenstoneand Hansen 1993; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Verba and Nie 1972). Further research done on the correlation between naturalization, participation, and organizational membership, specifically for Latinos, reinforces this finding (Garcia and de la Garza 1985; Pachon and DeSipio 1994).Very little empirical work, however, focuseson the degree to which interest groups influence get-out-the-vote-efforts. . What work that does exist suggeststhat group outreach should increase the probability of Latino voting (DeSipio 1996; de la Garza and Desipio 1992). A forthcomingstudy suggests that, at least for those Latinos who are contacted by Latino interest groups, the probability of voting is much higher than for non-contactedLatinos. However, in fact, very few potential voters are contacted at all-in this particular study, just 18 percent of potential Latino voters according to the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute. This may be due to the tremendous expense associated with such personalized-contact mobilization efforts. Further, there is reason to believe that those potential voters who are easiest to contact, are the voters most likely to turn out anyway. Rosenston and Hansen (1993) posit the theoretical importance of the interest group role in mobilizing citizen participation. They point out.that the processes of government are" so remote from the experiences of most Americans that they would be nearly clueless about its functioning," were it not for interest groups and political leaders. Similarly, Walker (1991) argues that interest groups serve as a vital link between government and the

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citizenry, providing "channels of communication" by which citizens may become informed. Walker argues that interest groups are important because they provide cues to citizens. Some interest groups can mobilize voters in response to particular issues. Social issues such as Civil Rights and the Vietnam war came to the fore in the late 1950s and early 1960s; as a result, citizen groups with ideological, rather than professionalinterests, have proliferatedover the past thirty-five years (Walker 1991). Establishedpolitical norms were called into question, and the exclusion of some groups from the democratic process provided the impetus for interest groups to emerge and press these issues. Most Latino issue interest groups like Southwest Voter Registration Education Project emerged to ensure "equal access to and equal treatment from" political institutions and practices (Hero 1992). The Case Study: Southwest Voter Registration Education Project Organizations aimed at registering and turnings out Latino voters are not a recent phenomenon. The earliest national organizations that focused on registering and mobilizing Latinos were the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) (founded in Texas in 1929) and the G.I. Forum (founded in 1948) (Acuna 1988; Quinones 1990). An organization that proved to be more focused and effective in registering and turning out Latino voters was the Community Service Organization (CSO). Founded in Los Angeles in 1947, the group's main goal was voter mobilizationin East Los Angeles in an effort to elect Edward R. Roybal to the Los Angeles City Council. CSO grew to over 3,000 members, registered over 40,000 voters and was successful in electing Roybal to the Ninth Council District in 1949. Despite its initial success, CSO declined in membership and influence, and became a more service oriented organization by .the mid-1960s (Quinones 1990). While other Latino interest groups have been active in registering and mobilizingLatino voters, perhaps no organization has been as effective and can claim as long a history as the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project. Social activist Willie Velasquez founded the non-partisan SVREP in San Antonio in 1974. The initial mission of SVREP was political empowermentthrough voter registration and mobilization. According to many sources, the political gains made by Latino elected officials can be directly attributedto the organization's registration and mobilizationefforts. Since SVREPwas establishedin 1974, Latino registration doubled from 488,000 to over a million by 1985 (Acuna 1988). .

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Voter registration and mobilizationare not the group's only activities. SVREP also conducts research on Latino voter trends, attitudes and beliefs through its research arm, the Willie C. Velasquez Institute (WCVI). Their research has been instrumental in helping the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) challenge at-large districts and other electoral methods that dilute Latino voting strength. Recently, SVREP created the "Latino Academy," a four-day yearly program whose activities are to educate community activists and novice politicians in the skills of campaigning and governing (Los Angeles Times 1999).

In the aftermath of Proposition 187 and with the subsequent increase in Latino naturalization, various organizations sought to mobilize the new potential electorate to vote. Key among them was SVREP. With Latino Vote USA-Campaign '96, SVREP begin intensive voter registration(VR) and get out the vote (GOTV) drives in order to maintain and increase the levels of electoral participation among Latinos. Projects included phone banking and mailing program, absentee/early vote campaign and precinct-based election day GOTV mobilization. Another innovation introduced during this campaign was the use of Voter Pledge cards. Here is how they work: By filling out the card with their name, address, and phone number, registered voters promise to vote in upcoming elections. That information is the processed by SVREP and the card is mailed back to voters just prior to elections as a reminder to vote. In addition to its reminder role, the card also serves to strengthen and build SVREP's data bases and research capabilities. The voter pledge card was very well revived by project participants, utilized extensively, and proved to be a very effective campaign tool (Southwest

VoterResearchNotes 1995/1996).

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Of the nine states in which SVREP pursued vigorous voter outreach activities during the 1996election cycle, the state with the greatest number of projects was California. (The others were Washington State, Oregon, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas.) One of the reports gives a detailed description of their efforts in California communities3(both within and without Los Angeles County)duringLatino Vote USACampaign '96: In successful California

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in 12 communities,

5,547 voters were

registered and more than 4,000 voter pledge cards collected. The bulk of the registration came from the San Fernando Valley where close to 400 volunteers registered 1,932 voters! The voter pledge cards worked great in Fresno County as the project there collected 1,074 of them and registered over 700 voters. In the San Gabriel Valley (El Monte, Baldwin Park, and Duarte), our coordinators worked with 353 volunteers to walk precincts in time to register

762 voters for their November 1995election.The SanBernadinoprojectgot off to a late start but soon was on its way to a successful campaign. Up north, Tulare County delivered 431 registrations and over 700 pledge cards. San Benito County, Sacramento, Watsonville, collectively registered over 800 voters (Southwest Voter Research Notes 1995/1996).

Once again, newspaper coverage and a report written by the SVREP indicated high turnout among Latinos in the 1996 mid-term election. For example, SVREP reports: 1996 will be remembered as the year that naturalized Latinos made their presence felt in Latino voting trends. Because of massive movement of noncitizen Latinos to citizenship and voter registration, the Latino electorate has grown by 30 percent nationally over 1992s total-substantially higher than the 15-20 percent average Latino voter registration increase experienced every four years since 1980. More than 6.5 million Latinos are registered and five milIion will vote in November. Both a huge increases over 1992 (Southwest Voter Research Notes 1996).

Again, articles appeared in Latino and non-Latino newspapers and magazinesattributing the high turnout and political gains made by Latino to SVREP's efforts. One article in Hispanic magazine stated: In order to attract attention in Washington, the SVREP spearheaded a voter registration drive in Hispanic communities that helped make the difference in the 1996 election. Thanks to the drive and the get-out-the-vote efforts,' Hispanic voting in Texas rose by 60 percent to a record breaking 1.4 million. In California, the increase was 40 percent; in Florida it was 10 percent. The surge in Hispanic turnout indicated a new political maturity-before the 1996 election, Hispanic turnout was only about 80 percent of the rest of the population (Hispanic

1997).

Following the success of Latino Vote USA-Campaign '96, SVREP launchedLatino Vote '98 in September and November 1997 (Latino Vote Reporter 1997). By the final phase of Latino Vote '98 in the fall 1998, SVREP, conducted forty~five get-out-the-vote,projects in four states, 20 projects being in California alone. Moreover in 1998, SVREP organized three "special projects" in San Fernando and Santa Ana, California, and in Denver, Colorado. The San Fernando special project (the only one of the threeincluded here), was, according to SVREP, little different with regard to resources, but it was especially significant with regard to result~. San Fernando was our most successful project. More than 7,000 voters were registered to vote and 15,000 voters were targeted in a Get-Out-The-Vote

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program. The Latino candidate running for the 20th state senate seat won by 29 votes (Latillo Vote Reporter 1999). .

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By every account, this could not have been possible without SVREP's voter .turnout efforts. . From 1994 to 1998, SVREP estimates that their non-partisan campaigns accounted for 16 percent of the increased Latino voter turnout in California (Latino Vote Reporter 1999). SVREP President Antonio Gonzalez announced a new campaign for the 2000 presidential election to register and turnout 1.5 million additional Latino voters (Los Angeles times 1999). In this same news article, Gonzalez stated, "We are a one-trick pony" of grassroots activism. "It's what we do best. We mobilize Latino political potential, the result of which has been a significant increase in power that the community .

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wields in terms of expressing itself, punishing politiciansnot advocating for Latino issues and electing those who do" (Los Angeles Times 1999). SVREP has not escaped controversy or criticism. Other Latino organizations have questioned the numbers SVREP claims to have registered or documented turning out to vote (Hispanic Business 1995)., Most data concerning Latinos SVREP claims to have registered or turned out to vote emanate from their own research organization, the Willie C. Velasquez Institute (Latino Vote Reporter 1999). It is difficult to estimate what Latino registration and voting rates would have been like without these efforts (DeSipio 1996). This study will better ascertain if the Southwest Voter get-out-thevote projects significantly increased the turnout among Latino voters in cities

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where projects were targeted during the 1996 and 1998 elections. Predicting Latino Voter Turnout.

Can SVREP efforts offset the individuallevel costs of political participation? Political participation is a costly endeavor more easily afforded by people with high levels of educ~tion and income (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Interest groups engaged in Latino voter turnout drives are primarily. interested in offsetting these costs by providing materials, political information, and even rides to the polls. In their absence, Latino voters-who generally have lower levels of income and educationthan their non-Hispanic .white counterparts-would encounter greater barriers to informationregarding polling places, candidate positions, and the like. These opportunitycosts may be sufficientlyhigh to discourage political participation. Recall that the' available Latino interest group mobilization literature suggests that such efforts can improve the probability of Latinos turning out (DeSipio 1996a; de la Garza and DeSipio 1992).

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Nonethele$s.,mobilizing voter turnout is difficult, and SVREP's task is made more difficult'by barriers including non-citizenship, la~guage, age, and other socioeconomicfactors. We expect that Latinoissue interest groups like SVREP find'itdifficult to effec~ivelyoffset all costs to turnout, and'that their efforts will be only negligibly, if at all, related to individual Latino voter turnout. The task of turning out the vote, particularly the Latino vote, has been a historiCallydifficult one to accomplish. Our expectations further stem from at least two additionalconcerns. First, from what little is known on Latino interest groups, these groups lack substantialresources and influence, and are limited in their ability to significantly offset the costs of. turning out to vote. Even if mobilization is effective in turning out the' majority of those SVREP reaches,. it is far from clear that most (or even many) potential voters are contacted at all (Pachon 1985). Second, focus groups in predominantly Latino populated East Los Angeles, California, ' found that no respondents cited appeals by organizationsor groups for their decision of whether or not to vote (Pachon et al. 1994). It is difficult to generalize focus group results from one neighborhood to Los Angeles County as a whole, and the nuances of Latino Interest group roles may be m~re involved than they at first appear. However, given these considerations, we hypothesize that Latinovoters are negligibly, or no more Ii~elyto turnout where get-out-the-voteprojects are present, than wh~rethey are not. A number of explanationshelp explain the low voter turnout in Latino communities. In analyzing interest group influence, we do not intend to discount the importance of the barriers that still exist. Despite VRA expansion, a number of authors contend that important obstacles remain which work to suppress voter registration and turnout (Pachon et al. 1994; Rosen-

stone and Hansen 1993).Nor do we downplaythe significantimpacton . ;11