Understanding China's Military Strategy

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Understanding China's Military Strategy Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Online Publication Date: 01 November 2008

To cite this Article Pillai Rajagopalan, Rajeswari(2008)'Understanding China's Military Strategy',Strategic Analysis,32:6,1013 — 1046 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09700160802404547 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160802404547

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Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 6, November 2008

Understanding China’s Military Strategy 1754-0054Analysis 0970-0161 RSAN Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 6, september 2008: pp. 1–37

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan Understanding Strategic Analysis China’s Military Strategy

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Abstract Chinese military modernization and its resulting aggressive posturing have serious implications for Asian stability and Indian security. This article is an attempt to understand the main security challenges from a Chinese perspective; the kind of responses, especially military, that China has undertaken; and the way Chinese military strategy has evolved from Mao’s People’s War days to a modern hi-tech military force today. In the short run Chinese military objectives appear focused on finding ways to defeat the United States in the event of a conflict between the two countries, possibly over Taiwan. But the long-term consequences of Chinese strategy remain uncertain, at least partly because the rise of China, on which that military power will depend, is itself difficult to predict with certainty. War is the continuation of politics.1

Introduction

Few will doubt the important role of the Chinese military and how it affects Asian stability as well as India’s security.2 China’s military modernization has generated considerable debate. China’s rapid rise as a major economic power, coupled with its military expansion, has serious implications for Asia and the world. For example, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has reported that Chinese military expenditure, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. She can be reached at [email protected]. This essay is a shortened version of a forthcoming monograph to be published by Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. ISSN 0970-0161 print / ISSN 1754-0054 online DOI: 10.1080/09700160802404547 © 2008 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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if calculated in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, is almost US$200 billion every year.3 China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 is another indicator of its ambitions that go well beyond its borders. The most worrying aspect is the pace of its military modernization and the secrecy that shrouds it. Concern also stems from the fact that the military leadership in China sometimes appears to have an independent agenda. The first section of this article looks at security challenges from the Chinese perspective. Specifically this concerns the following major issues: the challenge of integrating Taiwan, balancing the United States, countering other Asian powers such as India and Japan, and the possibility of a resurgent Russia. The second section deals with Chinese responses to these evolving issues. The concluding section focuses on how effective Chinese military strategy is in dealing with them. Chinese Security Environment China does not face any serious security threat in general terms and does not foresee a war breaking out in the near future. In fact, China appears to be enjoying one of its most stable and peaceful periods. It is seeking to follow a road of peaceful development, focusing on economic and technological issues. China believes that construction of a harmonious world remains a long-term goal, which needs concerted efforts from people all over the world, rather than just from China alone.4 As Chinese strategic thinkers and leaders have pointed out from time to time, the three most important national security concerns of China relate to maintaining national unity, safeguarding stability, and maintaining sovereignty.5 General Jijun argues, for example, that each nation and its notion of war is conditioned by its own ‘cultural background’.6 As its defence white paper of 2006 notes, China seeks ‘a road of peaceful development and a harmonious world, enduring peace and common prosperity’.7 With this background China has identified the following critical challenges: •

Taiwan;



US foreign and militarily policies/strategies, particularly in Asia;



a resurgent Japan;

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Russian revival; and



India’s growing political and military profile in Asia and beyond.8

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Taiwan Secessionist Threat The most important security threat that China faces concerns Taiwan. Calls for independence by the Taiwanese leadership will be a direct threat to China’s basic concerns—unity, stability, and sovereignty.9 The defence white paper of 2004 stated clearly that ‘the separatist activities of “Taiwan independence” forces have increasingly become the biggest immediate threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as peace and stability on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and the Asia-Pacific region’.10 Taiwan on its own may not be a large threat but, combined with major defence assistance from the United States, it is a worry for the Chinese leadership.11 US assistance to Taiwan has gone up significantly after the Chinese missile firings in 1995–1996 during the Taiwan Straits crisis.12 Taiwan’s military expenditure has generally been constant for the past five years, being 241 billion new Taiwan dollars in 2006 (four new Taiwan dollars equal one RMB yuan).13 Further, although the US missile defence may not be of a totally offensive nature, the Chinese leadership will continue to oppose it because its mobile, ship-based, upper-tier systems can protect Taiwan against China’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. A more potent threat for the Chinese will be the development of a ship-based system by the United States along with Japan, because it could raise the potential danger of Japanese naval involvement in a Taiwan crisis.14 In essence, an independent Taiwan continues to remind Beijing of the Chinese suffering and even humiliation at the hands of imperialist forces, and it is a perfect symbol of the ‘incompleteness in China’s sovereignty’, especially after the peaceful ceding of Hong Kong and Macao to China.15 Further complicating Taiwan’s relations with China is the territorial dispute over the South China Sea, specifically the Spratly Islands.16 The Chinese Government has consistently reiterated its claims on Taiwan. There have been two white papers on the Taiwan issue—one in 1993 and the second in 2000—that clearly provide the ‘basis for one China, de facto and de jure’.17 The defence white papers of 2004 and 2006 reiterated this theme, as did Premier Wen Jiabao at the 10th National Party Congress, and President Hu Jintao at the 17th National Party Congress.18

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China has tried to deal with these challenges through a range of measures.19 Since the mid-1990s the Beijing leadership has recognized the importance of military modernization in crushing the Taiwan threat. However, given the huge political, economic, and even social cost of using force against Taiwan, Beijing may not perceive this as a serious policy option, but may use it as a deterrent against Taiwan.20 Any Chinese attack on Taiwan will be a formula for disaster, and Chinese leaders are aware of this.21 However, this does not mean that China will sit by and watch the Taiwanese making moves towards independence, as was evident in the statement made by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, that ‘if Taiwan should provoke major incidents of “Taiwan independence”, the Chinese people will crush their schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost.’22 The following are some of the major options short of war that have been considered in recent scholarly literature on the issue but may not necessarily be options that the Chinese leadership might actually be considering. Air and Missile Strikes:23 Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) strikes and precision strikes against vital installations in Taiwan would weaken its leadership’s will to start a counter-attack. The attacks could target Taiwan’s air defence systems, its air bases, radar sites, missiles, and command and control facilities, in effect crippling all of Taiwan’s defences against a Chinese attack. Limited Military Campaign: An attack on Taiwan’s information and computer networks, particularly in the country’s political, economic, and military infrastructure, would be able to dilute the leadership’s capability and will to undertake any counter-measures. As a Pentagon report noted, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Special Forces have in recent years upgraded themselves from being an auxiliary and supplementary force to a fully fledged ground combat force.24 Naval Blockade:25 Naval blockade is another option that Beijing could consider. A complete submarine blockade of Taiwanese ports would pose an enormous security threat to Taiwan.26 This may not even need China to have a very advanced navy, in terms of power projection. Submarine use as an effective coercive instrument in China’s naval warfare strategy has been highlighted in several Chinese articles.27 Taiwan’s close location to

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the mainland also makes it an easy target for a blockade.28 Sea mining or a sea-air blockade is another tactic that the Chinese could employ. Amphibious Invasion:29 China has improved its amphibious capabilities in recent years, with Beijing conducting more than a dozen such exercises in the past decade or so.30 Although China has beefed up its capabilities in this regard, given the logistics-intensive nature of these operations and the need to have air and sea superiority, the probability of the Chinese venturing into amphibious operations against Taiwan is unlikely. In any of the above-mentioned scenarios the United States and even Japan might be involved, though China’s improving submarine capabilities would increase the risk for US forces or vessels operating in the region.31 China’s improving air defence systems would also have an effect on US forces. Although China’s air defences have traditionally been weak, they have made significant progress in this area, setting up multilayered air defence systems through Russian-origin surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and advanced Russian aircraft such as the SU-30. Pre-eminence of the United States in Asia China has viewed with caution the emerging international scenario as well as some of the arms control regimes, which are spearheaded by the United States. China has vacillated from an extreme viewpoint of ‘imminent US hegemonic decline’ to a viewpoint that ‘US-dominated unipolarity’ will continue well into the 21st century.32 Additionally, there is not a single major strategic issue in which the West and China are on the same side.33 In fact, the Chinese also believe that, after the end of the Cold War, the nuclear balance has shifted in favour of the United States, which has led to US hegemony over the rest of the international community.34 The Chinese continue to believe that the post-cold war phase of a USdominated world is likely to be a transition period. They visualize a multipolar world emerging after this transition period, with China, the United States, Japan, Europe, and Asia emerging as the significant poles.35 In fact, Chinese scholar Li Zhongcheng wrote in 1997, that ‘the US will strive for maintaining global unipolarity with its status as the sole superpower intact’.36 Yao Youzhi of the Department of Strategic Research of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, PLA, believes that the United States

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has undertaken several measures to incorporate and integrate certain powers like Europe and Japan, or to try and contain other powers like Russia and China, to stem the rise of any potential regional grouping opposing its hegemonic power.37 Although China, in an effort to counter such unilateral tendencies on the part of the United States, has started aligning itself with major powers such as Russia, as well as strengthening bilateral and multilateral ties within the region, it has not been able to shift the balance in its favour or even to form a wider coalition of nations to counter Washington. China is also clear that its economic engagement with Washington is beneficial and it will continue. Most importantly, China appears to believe that a US strategic presence in Asia is still necessary for stability in the region. While China believes that its economic interaction with the United States is to its own benefit, it is clearly wishful thinking to imagine that ‘economic and institutional engagement with the US will automatically bring about a democratic and peaceful China’.38 A serious conflict with the United States is possible only under two conditions: (1) a Taiwanese call for independence and (2) a situation of Chinese superiority sufficient to challenge the US superpower status directly, resulting in yet another Cold War, in which case a US–Soviet style confrontation will be a possibility. The United States, in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), noted that a ‘military confrontation over the status of Taiwan’ could force the United States to consider the use of nuclear weapons as well.39

Emergence of a Resurgent Japan Although an economic superpower, Japan has never managed to become a major geopolitical actor because of its pacifist military posture. This posture is undergoing change, with Japan assuming larger security responsibilities, as was evident in the deployment of Japanese troops in Iraq and of its naval vessels in the Arabian Sea in support of US military operations in Afghanistan.40 The resurgence of a militarily assertive Japan will pose serious challenges for China. Although Beijing recognized the need to have better relations with Tokyo, which resulted in a ‘new thinking’, followed by then President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, the anti-Japanese disturbances in China in 2005 were a pointer to the difficulties that exist in the bilateral relationship, carrying as it does heavy historical baggage.

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Visualizing a more aggressive Japan in the coming decades, China has called for more dynamic political ties, while maintaining that Japan adopt stances that are not offensive to Chinese sensitivities. These Chinese efforts can also be construed as laying the foundation for a counter-US grouping in East Asia.41 Issues that worry Beijing where Japan is concerned include its aggressiveness, its participation in a US-led ballistic missile shield in the region, recent Japanese naval exercise with the United States, India, Singapore, and Australia, and its trilateral summit last year with the United States and Australia. China is also seriously concerned by the possibility of Japan adopting a more ‘manipulative role’42 in a Taiwan conflict as well as in directing the shape of Taiwanese politics. This possibility, along with the new security alliance between the United States and Japan, which encompasses not just bilateral security issues but also those of Japan’s neighbours, has become a serious worry for the Beijing leadership.43 But Beijing appears resigned to the idea that a resurgent Japan is a reality.44 Bilateral tensions also revolve around various territorial issues such as the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands.45 Similarly claims by Tokyo and Beijing over the gas-rich East China Sea continue to affect their bilateral ties.46 Russian Revival47 Russia today exhibits a peculiar mix of weakness and strength, as was illustrated in the 2003 Russian defence white paper, which stated that Moscow might consider preventive strikes in case of dire threats to its national security. It illustrated both the weakness of its conventional military might and the continuing potency of its strategic forces. Despite their mutual wariness, both Russia and China have utilized opportunities after the fall of the Soviet Union to solidify relations, essentially through trade and arms transfers.48 Relations were further strengthened with the signing of the ‘Sino-Russian strategic partnership of equality, trust and cooperation’, following which the two countries maintained that their improved relations were not directed against any particular country and did not have an anti-US agenda. More significant was President Putin’s offer in 2000 of Russia’s ’direct military assistance to China’ in the case of a Taiwan crisis.49

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Nonetheless, one of the major nuclear challenges that China may face comes from Russia. Published in 2000, the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000 Concept) and the Military Doctrine made bold statements about the use of nuclear weapons. These documents are significant for two reasons: first, because they highlight the importance of nuclear weapons in Russia’s military strategy and, second, because they make a departure from the declared ‘no-first use’ policy, widening the scope of the use of nuclear weapons.50 Further, Russia has continued with its programme of modernizing its nuclear triad of land-based strategic missiles (ICBMs), sea-based strategic weapons (SLBMs and submarines), and air-delivered strategic weapons (heavy bombers).51 And there are other statements emanating from the Russian leadership which may be worrisome to the Chinese leadership.52 While these may not necessarily be targeted against the Chinese, Beijing is doubtless wary of Moscow’s willingness to have options that include pre-emption. Despite the existence of a tactical understanding between Russia and China in shaping the international order and undermining the role of US hegemony, there exist deep mutual suspicions between the two countries. Despite a border agreement between the two countries, territorial issues have not been entirely sorted out. Another issue, that of bilateral economic ties, appears to be the weakest link in the wide spectrum of Russia–China ties.53 The Chinese might also be interested in getting a deeper foothold in Russia’s far east.54 Another serious Russian concern centres on the issue of Chinese migration, both legal and illegal. Despite the Russian law on regulation of migration (January 2007), the government reported the registration of two million Chinese migrants in May 2007.55 Another aspect that worries Russia concerns the Chinese development of intermediate range missiles. In the absence of long-range missiles that can target US cities, it is quite clear that Russia and India remain China’s potential targets.56 Even in military-to-military relations or arms transfers,57 while the general assumption is that all is well, there exist concerns. The Chinese often complain that Russia has given the best technology to India.58 The desire to dominate the Central Asian states is another issue between China and Russia. Though disguised by diplomatic facades like

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the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), two recent military exercises were essentially a Chinese display of modernization of its military prowess. Despite their rivalry as two major powers, a technological gap and the US and EU embargo on technology has forced China to rely on Russian technology to get its arms industry going, while it is value-added by stolen Western technology. Besides their science and technology cooperation, for both China and Russia, it is the anti-US sentiment that is critical in cementing bilateral relations.59 However, whether Russia prefers to see itself as a rising Asian power or as a Eurasian power remains to be seen. India’s Growing Political and Military Profile in Asia and Beyond Relations between India and China have vacillated from one end of the spectrum to the other, with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s ‘Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai’ to the 1962 war and the rancorous ties after India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Relations have smoothed out a great deal thereafter and in fact today are at their best in decades. While it is never easy to predict the future of this relationship, it is amply clear that SinoIndian ties will certainly be a factor in establishing a stable balance of power in Asia. For China improving ties with India is not only an end in itself, but a means to achieving its larger objective of emerging as a major regional and global player. While China may not be interested in seeing another giant in Asia, it does not want India to forge closer ties with the US or other Asian powers as that may be detrimental to Beijing’s own regional and global role.60 Finally, the way the issue of energy security affects bilateral ties—whether it will foment and be manifested in a cooperative partnership or result in a conflicting framework—remains to be seen. Despite recognizing their inevitable role in shaping the Asian security order, the two countries differ on the kind of Asian layout they favour for the future. India continues to look for an inclusive approach as opposed to China’s exclusivist approach, which appears directed against India, the United States and Japan. Beijing continues to believe that its peaceful rise and emergence as a dominant power in Asia is only an assumption of its rightful place in the region and, in fact, a return to the old, but natural order. For its part, India may not be willing to see an Asia dominated by any one power.

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China’s Response to the Emerging Threats and Challenges Although Chinese policies in Asia and elsewhere in Africa today are more defensive and economic in nature, they are meant to create a deeper foothold in these areas. In the short run the Chinese military objectives remain focused on finding ways to defeat the United States in the event of a conflict between the two countries, possibly over Taiwan. But the longterm consequences of Chinese strategy remain uncertain, at least partly because the rise of China, on which that military power will depend, is itself difficult to predict with certainty. Specific Military Measures One of the most effective deterrent measures that China has developed in recent years is its missile capabilities, particularly a series of SRBMs. PLA strategists, especially after the first Gulf War, recognized the importance of precision strikes in modern warfare and hence the importance of precision-guided weapons in their operations, particularly as they plan a Taiwan contingency.61 Chinese attention to developing SRBM capabilities began in the early 1990s.62 During this time Beijing developed—specifically for export purposes—the M-9 and M-11 solid-fuelled missiles (with a 300 km to 600 km range) for sale to the Middle East and South Asia. After receiving serious criticism from the US and other Western powers, China stopped exports of these missiles and in 1994 inducted them in to the PLA’s Second Artillery, under the new designations of Dongfeng-11 and Dongfeng-15, popularly known as DF-11 and DF-15. These missiles were placed in the missile brigades facing Taiwan.63 This also coincided with the period when the role of the Second Artillery was evolving and expanding to include several unconventional activities like blockading and deterrence.64 In addition, the Chinese continued to make improvements in their capabilities by, first of all, increasing the number of missile launchers, making a transition from liquid to solid-fuelled missiles and shifting from fixedlaunch sites to mobile missiles, all of which increases the survivability of their nuclear and conventional missile forces.65 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates, cited in the Pentagon annual report to the US Congress on China’s military power, suggest that there were roughly 900 SRBMs with the PLA as of October 2006. Production was estimated to be at a rate of 100 units

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per year. Towards the end of 2003 the Taiwanese president, Chen Shui-bian, put the figure at 496 units, deployed at bases in Jiangsi, Guangzhou, and Fujian provinces.66 More than the numbers, this signifies a systematic development pattern being followed by the Chinese in anticipation of a Taiwan crisis or to create an effective deterrent to stop Taiwan from declaring independence. It also illustrates the Chinese capability to undertake development of these missiles and the willpower to withstand any international backlash. Other missile capabilities developed by China include medium-range ballistic missiles, with a range of between 1,000 and 3,000 km. These capabilities may not be targeted against Taiwan, but can be used to conduct precision strikes, particularly on naval ships operating far from China’s shores.67 Given that the range of these missiles is insufficient to reach the shores of the United States, it is clear that Russia, Japan, and India remain the main targets. Other measures adopted by Beijing include a variety of unconventional means like political and psychological warfare, information and electronic warfare, and even Shashaiojian weapons.68 The Chinese recognize the increasing potential of communications and reconnaissance in future warfare.69 Emphasizing this, Chang Mengxiong of the Committee of Science, Technology, and Industry of the System Engineering Institute said that gaining information superiority is more important than air and naval superiority.70 The PLA is now believed to have built information warfare units in the Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Jinan military regions, each with about 500 specialists.71 The PLA is also believed to have conducted exercises focusing on offensive and defensive computer network attack operations.72 Recognizing the significance of electronic warfare at both the strategic and tactical levels, the 4th Department of the General Staff was set up in 1990, focusing entirely on electronic warfare. Besides concentrating on the defence of key military and state institutions in Beijing, this department might also be developing the capability to jam other communication satellites, radar satellites, and the US global positioning system (GPS).73 China’s ASAT in January 2007 is an indicator of its evolving capabilities in this regard.74 As well as jamming and other attacks on electronic/computer networks, the PLA is also believed to have developed the means for soft kill and hard kill options.75 However, recognizing its backwardness and inability to catch up with the United States in terms of its command, control, communications,

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computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), the Chinese have resorted to the use of asymmetric weapons, or what are called ‘assassin’s mace’ weapons.76 Some media reports say that China has developed lasers that can disable low-Earth orbiting satellites as well as a range of miniature satellites.77 Such nano satellites can be launched in batches on demand by road-mobile DF-21 or DF-31 booster rockets.78 US capabilities or defence against such weapon systems are unknown. The Chinese military has also learnt a great deal from US operations in Iraq in terms of the use of special operations forces.79 US Department of Defense reports have affirmed the Chinese capability to ‘adopt a decapitation strategy, seeking to neutralize Taiwan’s political and military leadership on the assumption that their successors would adopt policies more favourable to Beijing’.80 Similar capability-building has been undertaken with regard to airborne forces.81 Another effective method in the field of asymmetric warfare that China is engaged in involves the capability to disrupts opponents’ logistics. Shen Zhongchang of the Naval Research Institute in Beijing details the vulnerability of superior naval forces like those of the United States because of the significant amount of human and material resources employed in these kinds of situations, whereby ‘logistics survival will face a greater challenge, [thereby] making logistics security harder’.82 The Chinese use of submarines with new types of torpedoes is another effective approach in the new warfare. China is believed to be making systematic progress in this arena, as is evident from its agreement with Russia in May 2002 to procure eight new Kilo-class diesel submarines.83 In addition, China continues with its domestic production of the new Song-class diesel submarine. China’s nuclear propulsion programme is also estimated to be fielding its new second-generation vessels, which will include both attack submarines and strategic missile boats.84 The Chinese are seriously pursuing their nuclear submarines project to match other advanced navies. Production of the second-generation SSBN (Type 094) appears to be underway. China might also be working to get the more advanced SSBN (Type 095), which carries more capable ballistic missiles.85 Simultaneously, the PLA Navy is seriously reworking its weaponry, training, recruitment, and doctrine.86 The evolution of the PLA Navy and its strengths was deliberately showcased by China when its diesel submarine surfaced 25 miles off the southwest coast of Japan in November 2003.87

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In this regard, Shen Zhongchang suggests that in this century, ‘the most powerful weapon will be the submarine. In addition to submarines, subsonic radiate weapons, high-energy electromagnetic wave weapons and computer virus would be used to increase the power of weapons’.88 The Chinese have also paid great attention to the kind of weaponry that will be employed, particularly in naval warfare. This includes nuclear technology to be in wider use in naval propulsion systems as a means of supporting the development of larger naval ships; growth of ‘stealth technology with anti-visible light, anti-radar, anti-sonar, anti-infrared and anti-electronic reconnaissance’;89 infrared technology; precision-guided technology; satellite technology; development and employment of superconduction technology that will enable ships to travel very fast without noise, making a qualitative jump in naval combat capability; new materials technology to make it possible for undersea weapons systems; and laser technology to be used in anti-ship missile defence systems.90 Denial of air space may also be adopted as a tactic in the overall Chinese military strategy. For instance, Taiwan considers it to be a militarily provocative move for China to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) within the Taiwan Straits.91 Similar tactics were adopted by China in the East China Sea area in September 2007.92 As a rising superpower China can be expected eventually to seek sufficient capabilities for a sea control strategy, but clearly Beijing is decades away from such capabilities. The continued significance of an aircraft carrier in the PLA’s strategic thinking comes from its objective of sea control,93 as does the recognition that air superiority is essential in future combat for power projection purposes, as was evident when PLA officials told visiting US commanders that ‘there is no more prominent and visible signal of a nation’s resolve and might than an aircraft carrier coming into port’.94 Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Thinking What is the value of nuclear weapons in the Chinese strategic calculus? Historically speaking, China had neglected the role of nuclear weapons in its strategic thinking. Mao was famous for calling them ‘paper tigers’.95 However, this position changed in the late 1950s and 1960s. The nuclearization of China was critical to Deng’s view of making China a great power.96

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Even though the original intention of making nuclear weapons was a forced one, over the years Beijing has begun to see greater potential for nuclear weapons in its strategic thinking. The Chinese leadership has begun to view nuclear weapons as its ‘only reliable assurance of military supremacy’.97 Developing a nuclear capability is considered to be an important element of its national defence strategy, which constantly strives to improve the comprehensive fighting capability of the PLA. The PLA leadership takes the view that China should ‘develop a limited number of high quality strategic nuclear weapons that could be used effectively to strike back against an enemy using nuclear weapons to attack us. We should strive to build a small in number but effective strategic missile corps with Chinese characteristics, and make further contributions to the safeguarding of our country, world peace and the progress of mankind’.98 Beijing continues to assert that its nuclear weapons have a limited role in the overall national security strategy, and it will adhere to the no-first-use (NFU) principle, including on Taiwan.99 Beijing has reiterated from time to time that it does not propose to use nuclear weapons on any of its smaller neighbours; in fact the only probable situation where China will consider the use of nuclear weapons is when the sole superpower threatens to destroy it. Since border and territorial issues have been partially resolved, Beijing does not foresee the use of nuclear weapons against Russia.100 The symbolic importance of the presence of nuclear weapons in China and the asymmetry they create cannot be neglected. China’s possession of nuclear weapons and of a triad of delivery mechanisms has tilted the balance in its favour. Despite the existence of an NFU policy, it feels that it can use nuclear weapons under extreme circumstances (Taiwan being one case), ‘without fearing a large-scale retaliatory strike on its territory’.101 Conclusion Essentially, China’s military strategy has evolved from the People’s War direction of Mao to Deng Xiaoping’s people’s war under modern conditions in the late 1970s. Deng further developed the local/limited war concept in 1985, emphasizing that limited wars are the wars of the future, similar to the one that China had with Vietnam in 1979. The adoption of this doctrine brought about changes in force restructuring and modernization of the PLA. Large-scale troop reductions took place, rapid reaction or ‘fist’ units were established and joint forces training initiated. It was

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emphasized that, in the new evolving warfare, the PLA should have the capability to win quick victories, with concepts like active defence, forward-positioning, pre-emptive strikes, in-depth strikes, and victory through elite troops becoming pronounced. Further changes came about after the 1991 Gulf War, where the PLA recognized the importance of fighting a ‘modern war under high technology conditions’.102 Woodward notes that even a limited war under high-tech conditions will require a ‘forward defense posture’ rather than just an active one.103 Also highlighted is the need to develop rapid information communication technology, stealth capabilities, and long-range precision weapons, as well as the capability for intercontinental and outer space combat. This will essentially mean the development or procurement of precision-guided weapons, improvement of command and control structures as well as of non-conventional methods of warfare like electronic warfare, and use of ultra-sonic weapons, laser weapons, stealth weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, and electromagnetic guns. The PLA is also believed to be designing a three-tier (land, sea, and air) defence system for ‘outer detection and implicit warning, intermediate interception, and inner denial, including the lethal use of force against intruders’.104 Economic compulsions sometimes determine a nation’s military strategy, as is evident in the case of the Chinese Navy. With China’s huge dependence on oil imports, concepts such as the protection of sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) have emerged as a result of the aggravating shortage of energy resources as well as of the vulnerability of transporting such resources from one part of the world to the other.105 Sea denial and denial of air space are also emerging as major features of the new military strategy. Finally, China’s military expenditure figures illustrate which way the PLA is going. Although there is a huge discrepancy in the Chinese defence budget figures, these still remain an important indicator of its national defence priorities, strategies, and capabilities. The discrepancies have varied from the current Chinese official estimates of US$45 billion to the DIA estimate of US$115 billion.106 China is the world’s fourth largest military spending power after the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, but in PPP terms (which is more relevant), China stands second at US$188.2 billion after the United States (see Appendix A). According to Chinese official sources, its military budget for 2007 is 350.92 billion yuan or roughly US$44.94 billion, which is a 17.8 per cent increase over the previous year (see Appendix B on Chinese defence expenditure). The Chinese argue that this growth is primarily caused

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by the sharp increases in the wages, living expenses, and pensions of 2.3 million PLA officers, civilian personnel, soldiers, and army retirees.107 The Chinese budget comes under sharper criticism because it does not cover several critical areas. These include: military-related research and development costs,108 arms imports, and expenses for the People’s Armed Police and reserve forces, while the financial support for China’s militaryindustrial complex comes from the State under a different head.109 Several of the PLA-run businesses110 also provide large amounts of revenue to the government, which are being diverted for modernization purposes. It is also revealed that the defence budget covers only 70 per cent of PLA expenditure, with the balance of 30 per cent having to be generated from elsewhere.111As the country reaches the higher stages of economic growth, its military spending is only bound to increase, hence one can visualize higher per capita military spending as well.112 The final question is whether China matters, as Gerald Segal put it in an article in Foreign Affairs. In economic and political terms China has managed to create a space for itself, highly interlinked with the international community, more so in economic terms. How China is progressing in military terms is still a debatable issue. While it has come a long way from its People’s War orientation and tried to adapt itself as a modern force, whether the PLA take on the major powers or even assume the same position as the USSR during the cold war years is doubtful.113 Notes 1

Mao, ‘On Protracted War’, Selected Works, Vol. II, May 1938.

2

See Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (eds.), In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1998; Bang Quan Zheng, ‘A Rising China: Catalysts for Chinese Military Modernisation’, in Sujian Guo (ed.), China’s Peaceful Rise in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions, Ashgate Publishing House, Hampshire, 2006, pp. 183–210. Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness, Frank Cass, New York, 2005; Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings, Project AIR FORCE, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000; and Rommel C. Banlaoi, ‘Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security after 9/11’, Parameters, Summer 2003, pp. 98–107.

3

Petter Stalenheim, Catalina Perdomo, and Elisabeth Skons, ‘Military Expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 270.

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4

Yu Xintian, ‘Harmonious World and China’s Path for Peaceful Development’, International Review, 45, 2006, p. 6, at http://www.siis.org.cn/ (Accessed August 5, 2008).

5

‘PLA Threat Perceptions and Force Planning’, in Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C. Mulvenon, and William H. Overholt, Modernising China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2005, p. 192.

6

Li Jijun added that, for a country that has been the victim of repeated aggression and pillage and which suffered a great deal of war and turmoil, peace, and unity are very critical in the national thinking. See Li Jijun, ‘Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China’, address at the United States War College, Letort Paper No. 1, August 29, 1997, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB82.pdf (Accessed July 21, 2007).

7

The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defence in 2006, Beijing, December 2006, at http://www.chinadaily. com.cn/china/2006-12/29/content_771191.htm (Accessed August 5, 2008).

8

Although India has not been identified as a threat by China in any of the white papers or other documents, it might be useful from an Indian point of view to analyse Chinese perspectives on the country and its role in the emerging Asian security architecture.

9

A Taiwan seeking independence could also give rise to new separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet. The move is also seen as an exercise that would provide the United States with a much better manoeuvring space, as well as the ability to shape the Chinese security environment to its advantage.

10

The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004, ch. I, ’The Security Situation’, at http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html (Accessed July 4, 2007).

11

The United States, bound to protect Taiwan under the US–Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, is authorized to supply it with weapons of a defensive nature. See Shirley A. Kan, ‘China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei’, CRS Report for Congress, updated December 13, 2007, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf (Accessed January 7, 2008).

12

During 2002–2006, Taiwan was the 12th largest recipient of major conventional weapons, at an aggregate value of US$2.1 billion (at constant 1990 prices). ‘Appendix 10A: The suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons’, SIPRI Yearbook 2007, n. 3, pp. 418–421.

13

‘Table 8A.2: Military Expenditure by Country, in Local Currency, 1997–2006’, SIPRI Yearbook 2007, n. 3, pp. 303–309. In June 2007, Taiwan’s legislature passed the national defence budget, which allotted funds for the purchase of P-3 Orion antisubmarine reconnaissance, the upgrading of the Patriot missile defence batteries, and to provide for the purchase of additional F-16 C/D fighters. In September 2007, the Pentagon announced the total weapons sales at a value of US$2.2 billion, which additionally included 12 surplus Orion P3-C maritime patrol craft and 144 SM-2 Block 3A Standard anti-aircraft missiles. Kerry Dumbaugh, ‘Taiwan: Recent

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Developments and US Policy Options’, CRS Report for Congress, updated November 9, 2007, at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33510.pdf (Accessed January 7, 2008). 14

In March 2005, the United States and Japan designated Taiwan as a common strategic objective. If the United States decides to transfer such a system to Taiwan, Beijing would construe that move as the restoration of a quasi-alliance. See Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict’, The Washington Quarterly, 25(4), 2002, pp. 13–14.

15

See Jing Huang, ‘Economic and Political Costs’, in Steve Tsang (ed.), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 201.

16

The economic significance arises out of the large volume of trade shipments that pass through the region. More importantly, from China’s point of view, about 75 per cent of Japan’s oil is transported through the South China Sea. There is also a great potential for oil and gas exploration in this region, which complicates the issue further. See David G. Wieneck, ‘South China Sea Flashpoint’, China Brief, July 24, 2001, at http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2372974 (Accessed September 5, 2007).

17

Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, The OneChina Principle and the Taiwan Issue, February 21, 2000, at http://jm.chinaembassy.org/eng/zt/zgtwwt/wp/t211261.htm (Accessed September 10, 2007).

18

The 2004 defence white paper stated that ‘It is the sacred responsibility of the Chinese armed forces to stop the “Taiwan independence” forces from splitting the country.’ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, n. 2, ‘National Defense Policy’, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004. html (Accessed July 3, 2007). For Hu Jintao’s statement, see Hu Jintao, ‘Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all’, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007, at http:// www1.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm#1 (Accessed November 16, 2007).

19

The anti-secessionist law brought out by Beijing in March 2005, was one such measure. See text of the translation of the explanations on the draft Anti-Secession Law, made by Wang Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), at the NPC session Tuesday, March 8, 2005, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/08/content_422875.htm (Accessed August 5, 2007). The law brought to the fore Beijing’s intention to use ‘non-peaceful means’ to crush any Taiwanese independence movement.

20

Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan’, International Security, 25(2), 2000, especially p. 53; and David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China–Taiwan Confrontation and Options for US Policy, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, cited in Michael A. Glosny, ‘Strangulation from the Sea: A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan’, International Security, 28(4), 2004, p. 126.

21

Specifically it would isolate Beijing from its important economic partners—the United States, European Union, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Australia—as well as constituting

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a blunder of sorts from a military point of view. For detailed analysis of the economic costs of attacking Taiwan, see Jing Huang (ed.), ‘Economic and Political Costs’, in Steve Tsang, n. 6, pp. 193–206. The economic impact would be felt in bilateral and multilateral trade as well as in the huge loss of foreign direct investment (FDI). In December 2003, Major General Peng Guangqian and Colonel Luo Yuan listed loss of the 2008 Olympics, loss of foreign investment, deterioration in foreign relations, economic slowdown or recession, and ‘necessary’ casualties in the army as the costs China would have to bear to reunify the mainland by use of military force. Joseph Kahn, ‘Chinese Officers Warn that Taiwan Referendum Could Lead to War’, New York Times, December 3, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/03/international/asia/03CND-CHIN.html?ei=5070&en=9ab78294dca72de0&ex=1201064400& pagewanted=print&position= (Accessed August 5, 2007). 22

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, ‘Taiwan Affairs Office Issues Statement on Current Cross-Straits Relations’, May 17, 2004, at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t111117.htm (Accessed August 5, 2007).

23

Many books written by PLA officers have suggested possible use of SRBMs and submarines as effective methods of coercion against Taiwan. See Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye (eds.), Zhanyi Xue (The science of campaigns), National Defense University Press, Beijing, May 2000, pp. 320–324, 407–421; Li Mingliang, Fengsuo yu Fan Fengsuo Zuozhan (Blockade and anti-blockade warfare), Military Sciences Press, Beijing, 2001; and Hu Wenlong (chief ed.), Lianhe Fengsuo Zuozhan Yanjiu (Research on joint blockade operations), Military Sciences Press, Beijing, 1999, all cited in Michael A. Glosny, n. 20, p. 127.

24

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007, p. 32.

25

The PLA Navy may not actually have to destroy very many merchant ships in Taiwanese waters to create a major economic problem for Taiwan. Once there was a serious threat, ships would be deterred from entering the waters, while Taiwan’s potential competitors would exaggerate the threat in an effort to divert the shipping traffic to them. This would all be a recipe for disaster for Taiwan’s economy.

26

The Beijing leadership is apparently of the view that this option is less likely to provoke outside intervention than others. US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2003; US Department of Defense, ‘The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait’, February 1999, at http:// www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/twstrait_02261999.htm (Accessed August 7, 2007); Michael O’Hanlon, Budget Options for the Bush Administration, Brookings, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 225; and China Post, cited in Michael A. Glosny, n. 20, p. 127.

27

See, for example, Tang Fuquan, Huang Jinsheng, and Zhang Yonggang, ‘Shin Shiji Haiyang Zhanlue Xingshi Zhanwang’ (Prospects for a maritime strategy in the twenty-first century), Junshi Kexue (Military Science), 15(1), 2002, pp. 88–97; Hou Songling and Chi Diantang, ‘Zhongguo Zhoubian Haiyu de Zhanlue Diwei

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Strategic Analysis he Dilu Zhanlue Jiazhi Chutan’ (China’s near seas: strategic position and geostrategic importance’, Dangdai Yazhou (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), 10, 2003, pp. 47–52, cited in Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, ‘Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force’, International Security, 28(4), 2004, p. 162; and Captain Shen Zhongchang, Lieutenant Commander Zhang Haiyin, and Lieutenant Zhou Xinsheng, ‘The Military Revolution in Naval Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1997, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/ pills2/index.html (Accessed June 10, 2007). In May 2003, China reported that 70 of its navy’s submariners had died in an undersea accident, which was revealing of its capabilities. However, it should be borne in mind that even the most advanced submarines are not immune from accidents. Following the accident Hu Jintao changed the top leadership and Admiral Shi Yunsheng, who had been the Navy leader since 1996, was relieved of his command and replaced by Adm. Zhang Dingfa. See John Pomfret, cited in Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, n. 27, p. 165.

28

These ports handle about 90 per cent of shipping entering and exiting Taiwan, including most of Taiwan’s imported items like food and oil, increasing the potential for a blockade. Further, the shallow waters of these ports make it difficult for Taiwan to operationalize its anti-submarine warfare operations. Michael A. Glosny, n. 20, p. 130. These three ports together manage traffic of about 30,000 merchant vessels every six months.

29

Some China scholars are of the view that Beijing may not actually carry out an amphibious invasion before 2010 and may instead take recourse to employing coercive strategies. See Michael A. Glosny, n. 20, p. 126.

30

One of the two exercises conducted in 2004 dealt purely with a Taiwan scenario.

31

Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, n. 27, p. 183. There have been debates on the Chinese capability in this regard, particularly in the West and views are divided, with one group suggesting that US anti-submarine warfare capabilities have withered after the end of the Cold War. The Taiwanese capabilities are also estimated to be poor.

32

Yong Deng, ‘Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global Strategy’, Political Science Quarterly, 116(3), 2001, pp. 343–344.

33

Gerald Segal, ‘Does China Matter?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999, at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199909/msg00848.html (Accessed September 10, 2007). Although in the post-9/11 era the United States and China have agreed to cooperate in the war against terror, the Chinese role has been minimal. Despite the Chinese wariness of the US presence in Asia, in some ways it views its favourably as a factor for regional stability. China otherwise believes that new potential powers could emerge, and even a nuclear Japan.

34

Wang Zhongchun, ‘Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices’, China Security, Winter 2007, pp. 53–54. On a similar note, speaking on rules of the game in international relations, the two colonels—Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui—who

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authored Unrestricted Warfare say that small nations use rules to protect their own interests, whereas large nations employ rules to control other nations. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, PLA Literature and Publishing House, Beijing, February 1999, p. 131. 35

See Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 2000, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/china/doctrine/pills2/index.html (Accessed June 10, 2007). These five poles would by then have more or less equal Comprehensive National Power (CNP). CNP, an important concept in Chinese contemporary political thought, refers to the general power of a nation-state. Chinese political thinkers believe that CNP can be calculated numerically and there is a number of formulae which combine various quantitative indices to create a single number which purports to measure the power of a nation-state. These indices take into account both military factors (hard power) and economic and cultural factors (soft power). In fact, the concept comes out of the ancient Chinese notion of shi which when translated means ‘strategic configuration of power’, although this still does not fully capture the sense of the word.

36

Li Zhongcheng, ‘World Politics’, Contemporary International Relations, 7(1), 1997, p. 1, cited in Michael Pillsbury, n. 35.

37

See Deng, n. 32, p. 347.

38

Ibid., p. 344.

39

Further, the NPR adds that ‘due to the combination of China’s still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency’. Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts), January 8, 2002, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (Accessed December 15, 2007).

40

The rise of a more independent and assertive Japan in the coming years is a reality that China, Russia, and the United States will have to deal with: the change of nomenclature from Japanese Defence ‘Agency’ to ‘Ministry’ appears to indicate this new reality. Japan’s 2005 White Paper saw a shift from its earlier reports in the sense that, unlike the 2004 report, Chapter II of the 2005 Report included the new National Defense Programme Guidelines, which will determine the form of Japan’s defence capability from now on, and the whole report has been compiled in accordance with these guidelines. Some of the main threats and challenges identified in the report include nuclear developments, missile tests conducted by North Korea and the rise of China. The report also emphasized Japan’s need to deal effectively with ballistic missile and guerrilla attacks, while maintaining the ability to respond to invasions of Japanese islands and intrusions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters.

41

The feasibility of such a grouping is seriously questionable given the historical baggage that both nations have. Meanwhile, several Chinese security analysts have begun to identify cracks in the US–Japanese security alliance, as a result of

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Strategic Analysis which Japan has begun to assume assertive roles in the military/security sphere, possibly leading to a nuclear Japan sometime in the near future. For instance, Feng Zhaokui of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) states that Japan’s nuclear ambitions will distance it from the United States and ‘will very likely damage the 50-year old US–Japan security relationship’. See Feng Zhaokui, ‘Lengzhan jiexu dui Ri-Mei keji guanxi de xiangying’ (The impact of the end of the Cold War on US–Japan relations in science and technology), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and Development), 48(2), 1994, pp. 5–13, cited in Michael Pillsbury, n. 35. Others believe that the United States itself has become wary of the changes taking place in Japan and of it becoming a more ‘normal’ nation and assuming a more independent and aggressive military role. See Zhao Jieqi, ‘The Present Status and Prospect of Japan–US Military Relations’, International Strategic Studies [English], 4, 1989, pp. 12–15. See also Ge Gengfu, ‘Changes in the Development of Japan’s Defense Policy and Defense Capabilities’, International Studies [English], January 13, 1989, cited in Michael Pillsbury, n. 35.

42

Michael Pillsbury, n. 35.

43

For instance, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said: ‘The Taiwan question is China’s internal affair and should by no means be deliberated in the framework of the security alliance between the United States and Japan.’ See Hu Xiao, ‘Japan and US Told: Hands off Taiwan’, China Daily, March 7, 2005, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/07/content_422393.htm (Accessed October 25, 2007).

44

Therefore Beijing wants to see how a positive spin could be given to its relations with this resurgent Japan and to find a way of bringing it under its influence. See Lu Lei, Wu Youchang, and Hu Ruoqing, Riben fu guo zhi mi (The riddle of Japan, the wealthy country), Jiefangjun wen yi chubanshe, Beijing, 1994, cited in Michael Pillsbury, n. 35.

45

The Senkaku Islands or Diaoyutai Islands are a group of disputed uninhabited islands currently under the control of Japan, but claimed by both China and Taiwan. When the United States was to hand over the disputed islands to Japan, the PRC, and ROC governments protested and reiterated their sovereignty over the islands.The ROC made an official announcement on June 11, 1971, followed by the PRC on December 30. Despite the Chinese protest, the United States handed over the disputed islands to Japan in 1972.

46

Tokyo proposed the joint development of four gas fields, including Shirakaba and Asunaro (known by the Chinese as Chunxiao and Longjing, respectively), which straddle the median line that it claims divides the two countries’ overlapping exclusive economic zones. Beijing does not recognize this border and insists on joint development only on what Japan claims to be its side of the line. See Yasuhiro Goto, ‘East China Sea Dispute: Learn from the Australians and East Timorese’, AJISS-Commentary, December 7, 2007, at http:// www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/200712/07-1.html (Accessed December 15, 2007).

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47

This section has benefited immensely from my discussions with Nandan Unnikrishnan; however, I take responsibility for any shortcomings that still remain.

48

By the mid-1990s, the two countries were equal partners, principally thanks to the economic advantage that Beijing enjoyed. In April 1996, Moscow undertook a major troop readjustment, moving forces away from the 2,500-mile border with China. For its part China shifted its troops—at least 200,000 soldiers and a substantial amount of heavy weaponry—from the Russian and Kazakh borders to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea coast. See Alexandr Nemets, ‘Russia and China: The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance’, Journal of International Security Affairs, 11, 2006, at http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/11/ nemets.php (Accessed December 12, 2007).

49

However, what was more significant in that agreement was article 5, Russia’s opposition to Taiwan’s independence. It was reported that, after his meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, President Putin instructed his military that, in the case of a US intervention in the Taiwan crisis, ‘Russia would dispatch its Pacific Fleet to cut off the route of the US fleet in order to keep the latter far away from the Taiwan Strait.’ See Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), internet edition [Chinese], July 8, 2000, cited in Yu Bin, ‘In Search for a Normal Relationship: China and Russia Into the 21st Century’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5(4), November 2007, p. 66. It should be borne in mind that the security scenario has undergone major changes since 2000, when the agreement was signed. Whether Russia will extend direct military assistance in the changed scenario is doubtful, given the emerging strains in the Russia–China bilateral relationship.

50

Chinese concerns also arise from the fact that the 2000 Concept document did not shy away from threatening the use of nuclear weapons to deter small-scale wars that do not necessarily threaten Russia’s security or territorial integrity. See Wang Zhongchun, ‘Nuclear Challenges and China’s Choices’, China Security, Winter 2007, pp. 53–54, at http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_4.pdf (Accessed January 10, 2008).

51

Nikolai Sokov, ‘Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia: The Emerging New Posture’, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), May 1998, at http:// www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/modern.htm (Accessed December 15, 2007).

52

While speaking at a scientific conference in Moscow, Chief of General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky said, ‘We are not planning to attack anyone. But our partners should clearly understand … that the armed forces will be used if necessary to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, including on a preventative basis, including with the use of nuclear weapons.’ ‘Top Brass Defends Russia’s Right to Preemptive Strike’, Moscow News, January 24, 2008, at http://mnweekly.rian.ru/news/20080124/55305669.html (Accessed December 10, 2007).

53

Russia is wary of the Chinese capability to dominate the Russia/Central Asia region economically. What Russia calls ‘too much’ relates to the large quantities of

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cheap poor-quality Chinese products dumped in the Russian market, as well as to the huge number of Chinese migrants in Russia’s far east and in Moscow. See Yu Bin, n. 49, p. 72. 54

The far east isan area that is abundantly rich in resources of all kinds, whose territory remains predominantly unoccupied. The Chinese might be tempted to extend their hold all the way up to the far east, to gain a firmer grip of the region.

55

Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Russia: The Domestic Sources of a Less-than-Grand Strategy’, in Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Strategic Asia 2007–08, National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 168.

56

Alexander Hrmchin, head of the Analytical Division of the Institute for Political and Military Analyses, suggested an interesting arrangement among all the nations that possess intermediate-range missiles with a range of 500–5,000 km. As of now the majority of these missiles are in China. Hrmchin suggested that India, China, Iran, and other West Asian countries join and form a comprehensive agreement on such missiles. He added that, if China, for instance, does not join (China is certainly not going to join), it would become very clear who China is targeting. Alexander Hrmchin, ‘Without Panic and Hysteria’, Nezavisamaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), March 30, 2007. I thank Nandan Unnikrishnan for bringing this source to my attention.

57

The arms trade between Russia and China began on a contradictory note, contradicting Russia’s strategic interests. In the immediate post-cold war period, Russia was in dire need of hard currency and China was looking for a major supplier of arms. Hence, the Sino-Russian arms trade was imposed on Russia rather than chosen, keeping in mind its long-term strategic interests. Russia was faced with the choice of accepting China as an arms buyer or facing economic and social instability in Russia. See Nicklas Norling, ‘China and Russia: Partners with Tensions’, Policy Perspectives, p. 42, at www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/ publications/2007/Norling_China_and_Russia.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2008).

58

Since 2006 there have been no new major contracts from China to Russia. The causes of this are (1) Russia’s postponement of the delivery of 40 IL transport planes and 10 oil tankers, worth US$1.5 billion; (2) the near saturation of China’s market with Russian fighter planes or naval vessels; and (3) the lack of a breakthrough in getting any major technology transfers from Russia to China. Yu Bin, n. 49, p. 79.

59

At the beginning of 2000, after the signing of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership agreement (during President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to China) both Russia and China were enamoured of each other, and hailed the agreement as historic for a new type of inter-state relations. However, officials of both countries were keen to highlight that neither the treaty nor their relations were based on ‘anti-Americanism’ or any other hidden agenda. Ibid., p. 66.

60

Beijing is also wary of India’s ‘Look East’ policy, and of the strengthening of New Delhi’s ties with Japan, Vietnam, and several other ASEAN countries. Beijing feels that India’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia could potentially hamper China– ASEAN ties as well as reduce Beijing’s manoeuvring space in Asia.

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61

Zheng Shenxia and Zhang Changzhi, ‘The Military Revolution in Air Power’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27. Zheng Shenxia and Zhang Changzhi of the Air Force Command College highlighted the need to develop precision-guided weapons, automatic command and control systems, and a combination of air defence, aviation, and space defence weapons.

62

This was following the suspension of military-to-military interactions between China and the United States, the sale of 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan and the pro-independent moves in Taiwan after Lee Teng-hui became president.

63

These missiles were used by the PLA in the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995–1996. Mark A. Stokes, ‘Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses’, in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (eds.), Chinese Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Capabilities, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, September 2002, p. 114.

64

Ka Po Ng, n. 2, p. 124.

65

Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes,‘The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence’, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Reference Volume, v1.0, RAND Corporation, CF-182-NSRD, Santa Monica, CA, 2002, pp. 510–586; and Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivlehan, ‘Implementing PLA Second Artillery Doctrinal reforms’, paper delivered at the Center for Naval Analyses–RAND Conference on PLA Affairs, December 2002, cited in Jonathan D. Pollack, ‘Short-range Ballistic Missile Capabilities’, in Steve Tsang, n. 15, pp. 60–61.

66

Taipei Times, cited in Jonathan D. Pollack, n. 65, p. 61.

67

‘Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends’, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007.

68

For a detailed analysis of these measures, see Richard D. Fisher, Jr., ‘Unconventional Warfare Options’, in Steve Tsang, n. 15, p. 72.

69

From the early 1990s, soon after the Gulf War, China started devoting considerable resources to developing doctrine, infrastructure, and the means to conduct information warfare, attacking the computer network of enemy forces. Major General Wang Pufeng, the former Director of the Strategy Department of the Academy of Military Sciences highlighted the importance of information warfare when he stated that, ‘in the near future, information warfare will control the form and future of war. We recognize … it as a driving force in the modernization of China’s military and combat readiness. This trend will be highly critical to achieving victory in future wars.’ Major General Wang Pufeng, ‘The Challenge of Information Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.

70

Chang Mengxiong, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: Weapons of the 21st Century’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.

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Strategic Analysis

71

Estimate by Andrew Yang of Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), cited in Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 79.

72

These exercises could potentially come in handy to the Chinese in the case of a Taiwan crisis where the heavily networked US and Japanese forces were employed on a large scale. Significant cyber counter-attack operations could include: jamming as well as changing network data of the opponents or enemy forces, destroying computer systems through an infusion of computer viruses, releasing of cloned information, formation of network spy work stations, and so on. Zhang Haiping and Zhou Meng, ‘Nanjing Military Region’s Information Warfare Drill was Splendid but received Scattering of Applause, which was Worrying’, Jiefangjun Bao, August 9, 2000, cited in Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 79.

73

The PLA is also said to be developing the capabilities to jam US airborne radar and modern communication networks like the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). Taiwan is believed to have procured one of these versions. Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 53, cited in Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 81.

74

Certain media reports also point to another anti-satellite weapon in the works, which is a land-based laser that blinds the sensitive sensors of satellites or even destroys them completely. Victor N. Corpus, ‘America’s Acupuncture Points: Part 2—The Assassin’s Mace’, Asia Times, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ HJ20Ad01.html (Accessed February 10, 2008).

75

Soft kill options could include defensive jammers, use of electromagnetic bombs or high-power microwave weapons that disable electronic circuitry. Hard kill options are the use of surface-to-air missiles, and close-in weapon systems, designed for attacking electronic hardware. Anti-radiation missiles could potentially target Taiwan’s fixed early warning radar, Patriot missile radar, and the E-2T Hawkeye airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). Use of microwave weapons to ‘destroy the opponents’ is a considered option in any future warfare that China might be engaged in. See Chang Mengxiong, n. 70. China has strengthened its capabilities in anti-radiation missiles too, through its collaboration with Russia and Israel. See Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 82.

76

The phrase ‘assassin’s mace’ is the English translation of ‘Shashoujian’, a term of ancient Chinese strategy. This essentially applies to any weapon that will incapacitate the enemy, suddenly and totally, instead of fighting him according to ‘the rules’, which the two colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in their work Unrestricted Warfare, characterize as Western nonsense.

77

They are apparently experimenting with ‘parasitic microsatellites’, which could possibly latch onto US satellites and disable them or even hijack information that they have gathered. See ‘The Assassin’s Mace: China’s Growing Military Might’, The New Atlantis, Summer 2004, p. 109, at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/6/soa/ TNA06-State%20Of%20The%20Art-Assassins%20Mace.pdf (Accessed September 23, 2007).

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78

Victor N. Corpus, n. 74. Other more traditional weapons, some of which have an asymmetric capability, might include supersonic cruise missiles that can defeat and sink US aircraft carriers; and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles with independently targetable warheads. Ibid. See also Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Towards Contextualizing the Concept of a Shashoujian (Assassin’s Mace)’, August 2002, at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/shashoujian.pdf (Accessed September 23, 2007).

79

These forces are not just support forces of the regular army units; they can have an independent impact.

80

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2002, p. 47.

81

According to a 2001 Taiwanese assessment, the capabilities of airborne forces have been strenghtened to a significant level, much beyond the role of ‘an auxiliary, supporting arm’ particularly as they relate to a Taiwan scenario. These kinds of exercises, along with simultaneous air and missile attacks, could hamper Taipei’s capability to counter-attack, even if some of its vital installations are intact. Although China is relatively new in these areas, it has improved and constantly updated its skills by studying the Soviet operations in Hungary, US operations in Iraq and other such cases. Lin Chu-chin, ‘PLA Special Operations Exclusive—PLA Airborne Operations’, Chun Shih Chia (Defense International), May 2001, pp. 24–39, cited in Richard D. Fisher, Jr., n. 68, p. 85.

82

Shen Zhongchang, ‘21st Century Naval Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.

83

The new Kilo-class submarines ordered from Russia, and expected to be delivered in five years (but currently delayed) are likely to be more advanced, with superior batteries, an enhanced digital sonar system, and quieter main engines. In addition, they are expected to be equipped with a better and more potent Klub weaponcontrol system that will allow them to fire their 3M-54E anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). It is suspected that these new submarines will deploy the supercavitating Shkval torpedo. See Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, n. 27, p. 166.

84

Ibid., p. 162.

85

Ibid., p. 172.

86

Ibid., p. 166.

87

The recent confrontation between the Chinese attack submarine and destroyers and the USS Kitty Hawk and its battle group (January 2008) is another indicator of the PLA Navy’s increasing capabilities in this regard. In yet another instance Taiwan’s Vice Minister for Defence, Ko Chen-heng, in an interview with the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, reported that Chinese warships had expanded their naval activities ‘along the first island chain with five to six recorded incursions in the past two years.’ These incursions, Taiwan claims, demonstrate the Chinese intentions to make the Taiwan Strait an ‘internal sea of China’. See China Times, January 24, 2008, cited in Russell Hsiao, ‘China’s Expanding Naval Presence Troubles Neighbors’, China Brief, January 31, 2008,

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at www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373935 (Accessed February 11, 2008). 88

Shen Zhongchang, ‘21st Century Naval Warfare’, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.

89

Ibid.

90

Ibid.

91

Liberty Times, December 6, 2007, cited in Russell Hsiao, ‘“China Plans Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) Within Taiwan Straits’, China Brief, January 4, 2008, at http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373912 (Accessed February 11, 2008). Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian added that China has plans to submit the proposal to the International Civil Aviation Organization and meanwhile plans to inaugurate a new air route some 4.2 nautical miles (7.8 km) west of the centre line. This move would constrain or even deny access to foreign aircraft in the area. See Taipei Times, December 20, 2007, cited in Russell Hsiao, n. 91

92

This route is jointly covered by the Taiwan Straits Air Defense Identification Zone and the Japan Air Defense Identification Zone. It was reported that Chinese Hong-6 bombers from the Huanining air force base flew 20 sorties on September 11 and 23, following which the Japanese F4 fighter jets flew a total of 12 sorties along these routes. Such moves could be construed as militarily provocative and could spiral into a limited conflict. Russell Hsiao, n. 91. A Japanese expert, Kensuke Ebata believes that Hong-6 bombers, a copy of the Russian Tupolev Tu-16, can carry long-range air-to-sea missiles and that this was a possible training exercise for a scenario of blocking the arrival of US aircraft carriers in Taiwan. The H-6 bombers have remained the backbone of the PLA’s long-range strike fleet for more than three decades.

93

There were media reports towards the middle of 2007 that China had given contracts to a few Chinese companies for the development of systems and components for the aircraft carrier. Further, towards the end of the year, there was another media report, citing Xu Guangyu, an analyst and director of the governmentbacked China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, saying that it has almost been decided that the Chinese navy will build aircraft carriers. See Tim Johnson, ‘Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?’, San Diego Union Tribune, November 11, 2007, at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp. html (Accessed August 5, 2008). Earlier, in 1997, Hong Kong media had reported Chinese plans to acquire a smaller aircraft carrier, rather than a fixed-wing carrier. In 1999, the media reported that the Chinese leadership had essentially sanctioned Y250 million for two carriers, estimated to be completed by 2009, with a displacement of 48,000 tons and the ability to carry 24 Su-27Ks. However, it appears that these were speculations made on the basis of the arrival of a partially finished ex-Soviet carrier, the Varyag at a Dalian shipyard. See Sibapada Rath, ‘China’s Tryst with Aircraft Carrier’, Naval Despatch, December 2005, p. 37, at http://indiannavy.gov.in/ NavDespatch05/Chapter%207.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2008).

94

Tim Johnson, ‘Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?’, November 11, 2007, at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html (Accessed November 14, 2007).

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95

‘Talks with Marshal Montgomery on the Three Principles and the Question of Nuclear Weapons (September 1961)’, Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-09/28/content_6143129.htm (Accessed January 12, 2008). However, this appears to have been more of a propaganda exercise by the Chinese leadership, making a virtue out of necessity. This is evident from a statement made by Mao in 1955 on the need to develop nuclear weapons on a priority basis. He said, ‘During the past years we have been busy doing other things, and there was not enough time for us to pay attention to this matter [of nuclear weapons]. Sooner or later, we would have had to pay attention to it. Now, it is time for us to pay attention to it. We can achieve success provided we put it on the order of the day. Now, the Soviet Union is giving us assistance, we must achieve success! We can also achieve success even if we do this ourselves.’ See Atomic Forum, ‘China’s Nuclear Weapons Programme’, at http:// www.atomicforum.org/china/china.html (Accessed January 12, 2008).

96

Deng Xiaoping said, ‘If China does not have atomic and hydrogen bombs and has not launched satellites since the 1960s, it is not worthy of being called a big and influential country and will not have its present international prestige’. See Federation of American Scientists, China Doctrine Overview, at www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/china/doctrine/overview.htm (Accessed January 12, 2008).

97

Thomas M. Kane, ‘Dragon or Dinosaur? Nuclear Weapons in Modernizing China’, Parameters, Winter 2003–2004, p. 98, at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/ usawc/Parameters/03winter/kane.htm (Accessed July 26, 2007). As Major General Yang Huan noted, ‘to oppose nuclear war, smash nuclear blackmail, safeguard national security and sovereignty, and keep peace throughout the world, China needed a powerful national defense and its own strategic nuclear weapons’. See Major General Yang Huan, ‘China’s Strategic Nuclear Weapons’, excerpted from Defense Industry of China, 1949–1989, National Defense Industry Press, Beijing, 1989, in Michael Pillsbury, n. 27.

98

Major General Yang Huan, n. 97.

99

Nuclear Threat Initiatives, ‘China’s Nuclear Doctrine’, at www.nti.org/db/ china/doctrine.htm (Accessed September 15, 2007). Recently there have been some debates on China’s NFU policy, particularly its application to Taiwan.

100

This is again debatable given the fact that, despite the so-called border agreement, the territorial issues are not entirely sorted out. Hence, if a war breaks out in the future, use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out.

101

Sujit Dutta, ‘China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia’, in Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang, In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1998, p. 97.

102

Y. Ji, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic Thinking’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21(3), December 1999, p. 353, cited in Dennis Woodward, ‘The People’s Liberation Army: A Threat to India?’, Contemporary South Asia, 12(2), June 2003, p. 231.

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Strategic Analysis

103

Dennis Woodward, n. 102, p. 231.

104

Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and International Impact’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, n. 55, p. 61.

105

Beijing has serious fears that this could become a reality at a time of crisis, as China still lacks the naval power necessary for the protection of SLOCs. It is in this context that Japan and China attach significant importance to the Malacca Straits. The Malacca Strait is a narrow and congested waterway separating Indonesia and Malaysia, with Singapore located at its southern tip. As the shortest route between the Indian and Pacific oceans the Malacca Strait is one of the world’s most important waterways. See Ian Storey, ‘China’s “Malacca Dilemma”’, China Brief, April 12, 2006, at http://www.jamestown.org/ publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3686&article_id=2370974 (Accessed October 15, 2007).

106

Chinese military expenditure grew at the fast rate of 12 per cent in 2006.

107

It is to be noted that there was a pay rise in the latter half of 2006.

108

Interestingly the Chinese defence budget does not cover costs relating to research and development for new weapons and equipment. In the Chinese usage there are two classifications: military research and defence research. Military research, covered under the official defence budget, covers research in military science, including medical research for military purposes, and testing and evaluation of weapons and equipment currently used by the PLA. This research is done exclusively in PLA research institutes. However, defence research covering all kinds of defencerelated research, done by research institutes belonging to other government agencies, is not covered by the official defence budget. The allocation of military R&D sometimes comes under money earmarked for the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), which is the main body responsible for co-ordinating military R&D as well as for the production of weapons. COSTIND is responsible to the Ministry of Finance for budget preparation on military R&D. See Shaoguang Wang, ‘Estimating China’s Defence Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources’, China Quarterly, 147, 1996, pp. 892, 896.

109

Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Just the Facts, Ma’am: The Challenge of Analysing and Assessing Chinese Military Expenditures’, China Quarterly, 173, 2003, pp. 169–170.

110

According to a Chinese scholar, profits from PLA-run business have ranged between US$600 million and US$3 billion. See Wang Shaoguang, ‘The Military Expenditure of China, 1989–98’, at http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/ Milex.pdf (Accessed December 14, 2007).

111

Earnings from foreign arms sales are believed to be a major source of the PLA’s extra-budgetary revenue. Shaoguang Wang, ‘Estimating China’s Defence Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources’, China Quarterly, 147, 1996, pp. 893, 907.

112

The same point was brought out by President Hu Jintao when he said, ‘We will gradually increase input in national defense as the economy grows, and continue

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to modernize national defense and the armed forces in a way that serves the interests of our national security and development.’ See ‘President Hu: PLA budget to rise with the economy’, China Daily, August 2, 2007, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/02/content_5447330.htm (Accessed September 10, 2007).

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113

This is so despite China maintaining the pace of its modernization, in tune with global changes taking place in defence science and technology, and weaponry. President Hu Jintao reiterated that China must build a ‘slim but strong’ armed forces by striking a sound balance between speed, quality, and efficiency in the modernization drive of the country’s 2.3 million troops. Ibid.

528.7 59.2 53.1 [49.5] 43.7 734.2

37.0 [34.7] 29.9 29.0 23.9 888.7

6 Germany 7 Russia 8 Italy 9 Saudi Arabia 10 India Sub-total top 10

Country

1 USA 2 UK 3 France 4 China 5 Japan Sub-total top 5

Rank

Spending ($ Bn)

447 [244] 514 1152 21

1756 990 875 [37] 341

Spending Per Capita ($)

Military Expenditure in MER Dollar Terms

3 [3] 3 3 2 77

46 5 5 [4] 4 63

Spending

1 2 1 – 17 50

5 1 1 20 2 29

Population

World Share (%)

Table A1 Top 15 Countries with the highest military expenditure in 2006

Country

6 France 7 Saudi Arabia 8 Japan 9 Brazil 10 Germany Sub-total top 10

1 USA 2 China 3 India 4 Russia 5 UK Sub-total top 5

Rank

46.6 36.4 35.2 32.0 31.2 1147.0

528.7 [188.2] 114.3 [82.8] 51.4 965.5

Spending ($ Bn)

Military Expenditure in PPP Dollar Terms

Appendix A: Top 15 Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2006 in Market Exchange Rates and PPP Terms

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1044 Strategic Analysis

21.9 13.8 13.5 13.4 12.3 963.7 1,158 177

455 676 414 71 284

2 1 1 1 1 83 100

1 – – 3 1 56 100

11 South Korea 12 Iran 13 Italy 14 Turkey 15 Pakistan Sub-total top 15

30.1 28.6 28.6 20.2 15.6 1270.2

Notes: MER, market exchange rate; PPP, Purchasing Power Parity. The estimated figures are in square brackets. Spending figures are in US$, at constant (2005) prices and exchange rates. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2007, p. 270.

11 South Korea 12 Australia 13 Canada 14 Brazil 15 Spain Sub-total top 15 World

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Strategic Analysis

Appendix B: Chinese Defense Budget (1991–2007) Table B1 Budget of national defense

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Budget Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

RMB Yuan (Billion)

=$USD (Billion)

% of Total National Expense

32.50 37.00 42.70 55.00 63.00

3.92 4.46 5.14 6.63 7.59

93.47 107.67 121.29 141.04 166.00

11.26 12.97 14.61 17.00 20.00

8.66 8.20 8.29 8.30

200.00

24.00

297.93 350.92

44.94

7.7 7.3 7.4 7.5

% Increase over Last Year 13.8 15.4 28.8 14.5

15.2 12.6 16.2 17.6

17.8

Notes: Unit: billion yuan RMB/billion yuan US$, and the exchange rate between USD and RMB is about 1:8.3. Sources: White Paper on National Defense issued by Chinese Government and other government publications.