Eur J Forest Res DOI 10.1007/s10342-015-0874-2
ORIGINAL PAPER
Understanding forest owners’ preferences for policy interventions addressing mushroom picking in Catalonia (north-east Spain) Elena Go´rriz-Mifsud • Glo`ria Domı´nguez-Torres Irina Prokofieva
•
Received: 9 September 2014 / Revised: 2 January 2015 / Accepted: 27 February 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Abstract The present study investigates private forest owners’ perceptions of mushroom picking in Catalonia and develops a model of preferred policy intervention (introducing a regulation, a payment or keeping the status quo). The results allow the modelling of forest owners’ preferences regarding policy interventions based on two factors: their perception of property rights over mushrooms and their perception of related nuisances. Owners perceiving a low degree of harm and expressing a preference for free access rights for mushroom picking would maintain the current situation. Owners suffering from actual harm or threatened by potential harm call for regulation on mushroom harvesting. Payment is advocated by those who already experienced harm and consider mushrooms to be private goods, hence legitimating benefit gain from mushroom picking on their properties. Actual implementation of picking limitations or payments largely depends on perceived constraints, especially the fear of revenge and control costs. Interviewees considered that interventions
Communicated by Martin Moog. E. Go´rriz-Mifsud (&) I. Prokofieva Forest Economics Department, Forest Sciences Center of Catalonia (CTFC), St. Pau Art Nouveau Site – St. Leopold Pavilion, St. Antoni Maria Claret 167, 08025 Barcelona, Spain e-mail:
[email protected] E. Go´rriz-Mifsud European Forest Institute - Mediterranean Regional Office (EFIMED), St. Pau Art Nouveau Site – St. Leopold Pavilion, St. Antoni Maria Claret 167, 08025 Barcelona, Spain G. Domı´nguez-Torres Universitat de Lleida, Plac¸a Victor Siurana 1, 25003 Lleida, Spain
led by the government could potentially overcome such constraints. Regarding design features of potential intervention, most forest owners advocated a more favourable treatment of local pickers, although almost no difference was found in the treatment of commercial and recreational harvesters. Keywords Qualitative research Private forest owners Payments for mushroom picking Regulations Property rights Non-wood forest products
Introduction In Spain, non-wood forest products (NWFPs) are an important resource for society. Cork, resin, pine nuts, or truffles are generally collected with landowners’ permission and often by paying them a harvesting fee. However, the collection of other NWFPs (i.e. wild chestnuts, asparagus, or mushrooms) is rarely done with landowner’s consent, who seldom benefits from this activity. In Catalonia (north-eastern Spain), mushroom picking constitutes a rooted tradition, with a well-developed gastronomy and a relevant market. The last omnibus survey (Go´rriz et al. 2014) reveals that one-quarter of the Catalan population goes mushroom picking at least once a year. In this region, where 80 % of forests are privately owned, this activity does not generate revenue for the landowner, who is the legal owner of the mushrooms. Based on Roman law tradition (see Bouriaud and Schmithu¨sen 2005), Spanish Forest Law considers mushrooms as a forest product susceptible to exploitation and gives landowners the right to exclude others from collecting them. Yet, in practice, access to forests is open, due to either customary traditions or large fencing costs. While two-thirds of private forest area
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is split into holdings over 25 ha, 52 % forest holdings are under 1 ha and represent 4 % of the forest area (Fletas et al. 2012). As forest plots are typically small and most landowner’s unorganised, the lack of scale economies hampers financial resources for restricting access. Silvicultural models developed for Catalonia illustrate that mushroom-oriented forest management would be more profitable than traditional timber-oriented silviculture if the owner could capture part of the commercial value of mushrooms (Palahı´ et al. 2009). In terms of recreational value attached to mushroom picking, Martı´nez de Arago´n et al. (2011) estimate a total value of 39 € per trip and picker in Solsone`s county in Catalonia; of this value, 7 € would correspond to the commercial value of picked mushrooms and 32 €/trip to the leisure experience. There are, however, no instruments in place to channel either commercial or recreational values towards landowners; hence, forest owners have little incentive to consider mushrooms in their forest management decisions. Traditionally pickers in Catalonia have not found limitations in the field when collecting mushrooms. In other countries (i.e. Finland), this custom is accepted based on the fact that there is low intensity of NWFP utilisation (Rekola 1998). However, this is not necessarily the case in Catalonia, where the rising popularity of mushroom picking in the last decade puts additional pressure on a resource very dependent on climatic patterns and therefore vulnerable to climate change. Moreover, the harvest pressure is concentrated on a few species, prominently on the saffron milk cap (Lactarius deliciosus), sought by 89 % of pickers (Martı´nez de Arago´n et al. 2011; Go´rriz et al. 2014). Due to its economic nature, the current situation of nonfenced wild mushrooms falls under the Common-Pool Resources (CPR) definition of a good rival in consumption and left in open access, hence non-excludable (Ostrom et al. 1999). CPR may have different property rights regimes, from no restrictions to more or less formal harvest norms. In this context, the debate arises every season on the possible introduction of a mushroom picking regulation. Forest owners, according to the State legal framework (Civil Code, Forest Law) as well as Catalan Forest Law, are ascribed decisions on access, management, social use of their land and ultimately whether to participate in any voluntary initiative. Such a legal frame would, in principle, enable decentralised landowners’ initiatives to derive income from mushroom picking. Yet, the lack of specific mushroom legislation and subsequent sanctioning system means that forest guards have no clear jurisdiction over private lands on this topic; moreover, a landowner reporting mushroom-related infringements faces judicial uncertainty and high costs. The fact that there are almost no initiatives to internalise mushroom value raises the
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following questions: Are private forest owners interested in access and wild mushroom harvesting regulation in their properties? Which policy options do they consider? Which critical factors drive their positioning? The opinions of mushroom collectors and the general public in Catalonia regarding different policy options have been explored in the studies of Martı´nez de Arago´n et al. (2011), Prokofieva et al. (2013) and Go´rriz et al. (2014). Previous scientific literature (Janota and Broussard 2008; Moon and Cocklin 2011; Quartuch and Beckley 2014) highlights the importance of investigating landowners’ preferences as key players in the practical implementation of policy instruments, especially if dealing with forest externalities (i.e. biodiversity conservation). To our knowledge, no systematic examination of private landowners’ views regarding policy interventions on wild mushroom harvesting has been carried out in this area or in other regions. To fill this gap, the objectives of this study are (1) to investigate the attitudes of private forest owners in Catalonia towards mushroom picking on their properties and (2) to explore landowners’ preferences regarding which type of policy intervention to implement and corresponding design features.
Methodology Grounded theory To study the phenomenon of forest owners’ perceptions on mushroom picking, we use a Grounded Theory approach (Charmaz 2006). This methodology follows a constructivist and inductive approach and seeks to answer questions without preliminary hypothesis; these are derived instead from the patterns resulting from the data. The key steps of this approach are systematic data collection and its subsequent analysis that allows for the emergence of variables and their possible relationships, permitting the elaboration of models that explain the phenomenon studied. The analysis was conducted simultaneously with data collection, testing and proofing the consistency of model hypotheses using constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss 1967) until saturation point. Data collection and coding Data collection was carried out through in-depth, face-toface interviews with 26 forest owners in diverse forest areas in Catalonia during 2011–2013. The semi-structured interview guideline included questions on forest property, management practices, economic instruments, and mushroom picking; it included fixed open questions on attitudes towards pickers, opinion on related policy interventions
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and their perceived bottlenecks, enabling the reasons and consequences of their statements to be explored in more depth. Interviews lasted an average of 90 min were transcribed and analysed using MaxQDA software for coding respondents’ statements. Codes were structured using the coding paradigm (Strauss and Corbin 1990): after an initial phase of open coding, we grouped fragments related to the phenomenon context, its factors or intervening conditions, interactions between such factors (patterns), and strategies in terms of preferred policy intervention. The coding paradigm follows a general theory of action (Kelle 2005) that fits our purpose of explaining policy preferences and permits building a model with factors and patterns emerging from first memos, which were corroborated across progressive interviews.
are aware that very small owners are under-represented; our sample depicts instead owners with greatest forest area, which is relevant for policy-makers in achieving relevant change, and for pickers, who are not necessarily knowledgeable of ownership divisions. The implementation of management plans was reported by forest owners as uneven; hence, we consider as ‘‘active managers’’ those owners who carry out most of the planned tasks. There is heterogeneity in the main occupations, and forestry is a side activity for all respondents but two. Currently, only two interviewees take part in a harvest fee system: one organised by himself and another joining a public forest within a protected area.
Results Sample design There is no comprehensive register of forest owners in the region; therefore, interviewee selection was not aimed to represent the population. Instead, sampling has been intentional, selecting forest owners covering major forest types in Catalonia and focus on areas with predominant private forest ownership, based on contacts provided by technicians and officials. Figure 1 illustrates the location of interviewees’ properties. Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the interviewees. Most owners have medium to large forest plots and have a management plan. This is a deviation attributable to the sampling design as these owners were easier to identify; consequently, it is less easy to generalise the results for the entire population of forest owners. We
Concerning our first objective, two intervening conditions emerged determining private forest owners’ attitudes towards mushroom picking by outsiders on their property: their perception of mushroom harvesting rights and their perception of related harm. In relation to our second objective, we found that attitude factors, together with the barriers to implementation described by the forest owners, configure their preference for, and actual implementation of, the following policy interventions: no intervention, information, regulation, and picking fee. The following sections present attitude factors as well as opinions on identified interventions. The results are illustrated by quotations from the interviews. We refer to the landowner in the masculine to facilitate reading. Forest owner attitudes towards mushroom pickers Perceived mushroom picking rights Interviewees referred to access and mushroom harvest rights regimes, which could be sketched as a continuum (Fig. 2). We grouped these in four categories: • •
•
• Fig. 1 Map locating interviewees’ properties, based on the map of private forest ownership by county. The colours indicate the percentage of privately owned forests in relation to the total forest area. Source: courtesy of CPF
‘‘Free’’ for forests with open access where mushrooms would be available free of charge to anyone. ‘‘Bounded’’ when mushroom pickers still have open access but must follow a more or less formal set of norms. ‘‘Community’’ when favourable conditions for access and harvest are granted only to a defined group or community. ‘‘Private’’ asset when the landowner decides forest access and mushroom harvest conditions and benefits from pickers’ activity.
The free and bounded options always refer to non-limited access, illustrating situations of CPR. Community
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Eur J Forest Res Table 1 Summary of interviewees’ characteristics Attribute Main species
Categories Coniferous (Pinus) pure
6
Broadleaves (Quercus) pure
4
Mixed forests Forest area (ha)
Recreational use
Forest owners’ association
Frequency
6
101–300
15
301–700
5
No
9
Own recreation
8
Related business
9
Member
Main occupation
16
30–100
No member
Attribute
19 7
Active forest management Protected area Management plan
Categories
Frequency
Farmer
5
Rural tourism
2
Farmer and rural tourism
5
Forestry
2
Forestry and construction
1
Other
11
Yes
12
No
14
Yes/No
15/11
Yes
24
No
2
Fig. 2 Continuum of perceived mushroom property rights
rights, when mentioned, were complementing private rights. Open access to mushrooms Open access is characterised by the right of the general public to roam through forests and harvest mushrooms free of charge. Some interviewees expressed conformity with the current, limit-free, situation on mushroom picking that it is a ‘‘free’’ right: ‘‘Let him [the picker] go… It has been always like that. The forest has an owner, but people have gone always there. You can’t change people’s mind in 10 years or 50 years’’ (FO211). Among those interviewees regarding open access positively, some acknowledge the need for governing mushroom picking by formal or informal social arrangements. Owners expressing these concerns accept having pickers on their properties if they behave as ‘‘good pickers’’: ‘‘I don’t want fences. It should be a free access. Respectful but free. (…) I think there’s a need here of
1
Hereinafter, FOx stands for ‘‘Forest Owner’’ and the number assigned to each respondent to respect anonymity. Square brackets clarify phrases rendered inaccurate when extracted from the dialogue. (…) indicates the existence of intermediate sentences not related to the topic, which is later picked up again.
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giving culture to the citizens’’ (FO8). We refer to this regime as ‘‘bounded’’ rights, where open access is legitimated by picker’s behaviour according to a set of norms implicitly agreed with the landowner. Community right The community right refers to the differentiation between picking rights of a community (generally locals) in contrast to those of outsider pickers. Outsiders are identified as unknown people, usually considered to come from large urban centres (Barcelona city being the capital). ‘‘I don’t know anyone [of the pickers in my forest]… I know my neighbours, and I know of someone [who picks]. But those [coming] are people I don’t know’’ (FO22) ‘‘Now all retirees from Barcelona come, all the people from Barcelona come (…) Locals also pick, but people from Barcelona didn’t come before’’ (FO9) These interviewees postulate a positive discrimination based on traditional use by locals, which has been often related to more respectful practices in the field. ‘‘In the past [those] who went to the forest for mushroom picking were villagers, who had already
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learned very basic things from father to son, and now you realise that these [basic things] are unknown (…) aren’t so obvious’’ (FO2) ‘‘I consider that perhaps locals should be helped. Come on, they’re also those taking care of it [the forest]!’’ (FO18) Some interviewees refer to gentlemen’s agreements between locals and the forest owner, which vary from town to town. The landowner seems to allow locals to collect mushrooms in his forest as long as certain norms are abided, reflecting respect towards both the land ownership and the traditional right of the local picker, i.a.: •
•
•
giving part of the total mushroom harvest to the landowner: ‘‘If you fill 3 baskets then you bring me one home’’ (FO17); not picking when the owner is around, or within a close distance from landowners’ house: ‘‘if they’re from this area and they see you, they won’t come; or if they’re very close to your house they won’t pick either’’ (FO12); granting free access to locals believed to help in case of wildfire: ‘‘In case of fire people will say ‘‘look, this chap doesn’t allow us to go there during the year. Then, we’re not going to help him while it’s burning either’’ (…) [Because when there’s fire] everyone mobilises (…) even those who aren’t forest owners’’ (FO26)
Pickers from metropolitan areas are criticised for their ignorance about rural etiquette, about private ownership of the forest, and for not respecting good practices in mushroom picking. Interviewees attribute these critiques to an implicit urban arrogance, to ignorance about the cost posed by pickers’ activity to forest owners, and also to the recent trend for mushroom picking. This trend is mainly ascribed to a specialised regional prime time TV programme during mushroom season. ‘‘Because rural people (…) are already close to the forest, they go on foot and not by car (…) Who does more damage is the one coming on Saturday morning (…) S/he spends the day seeking mushrooms because s/he has seen it on TV’’ (FO18). Nevertheless, the urban profile is considered to have greater potential willingness to pay for the collection of mushrooms: ‘‘The problem and the market is the market from outside [the village]’’ (FO6). Private rights We consider that interviewees defending a landowner’s decision power over mushroom picking, and advocating ‘‘deserved’’ compensation for allowing this activity, refer to a private goods right. These respondents claim their legitimate right to extract economic benefits (be it monetary or non-monetary) from mushrooms harvested on their property.
The owner claiming monetary rewards consider that, if his mycological resource is valued by pickers, he should be able to benefit from that social use of his property. Not being able to capture mushroom picking value annoys him, especially if pickers derive profit from this activity. Among the owners expressing these concerns, some consider mushroom collection as a potentially exploitable asset. ‘‘If there’s a benefit then the owner should get also something. That’s what I say. Because if hundreds and hundreds of people go there, then, come on!’’ (FO3) ‘‘Another thing [income potential] I see [for my forest] is the mycological exploitation (…). Our value is in the mushroom’’ (FO6) Yet, none of the respondents directly traded nor planned to trade with mushrooms they collect themselves. Arguments given were the lack of expertise in the mushroom market, as well as the intense labour and need for extensions larger than their own forest for commercial purposes. Nevertheless, most respondents revealed some knowledge (listing several mushroom species growing in their forests and even some ecological patterns) and described how they benefit from mushrooms, by either picking for own family consumption or advertising mushrooms as an attraction for their rural tourism business. Interviewees asking for in-kind benefits seem not to speculate with mushroom-related revenues, but instead aim at improving the current forest situation through their mushroom asset: ‘‘We don’t want money. We want to be told: this year we’ll fix the road thanks to the money collected from mushrooms’’ (FO18). Perception about harm attributed to mushroom pickers Most interviewed owners expressed concern about nuisances from mushroom picking. Respondents’ attitudes range from those who perceive no negative effects to those who are angered by intolerable impacts (Fig. 3). No explicit positive perception of mushroom picking has been identified; indeed, an interviewee stated ‘‘For the landowner, recreation in his forest, if he can’t derive any economic yield, the fewer the better’’ (FO25). Below harm perception threshold Neutral positioning has been identified when mushroom picking does not present harm to forest owners and hence does not seem bad to them: ‘‘With pickers I’m fine, the relation is good. Let them do it!’’ (FO4). Other respondents do not perceive nuisances yet, but acknowledge their potential (‘‘threatened’’).
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my property for mushroom picking; it’s fine. The only problem is this: sometimes you find someone who… uses an all-terrain to get to the middle of the forest or onto the fields…’’ (FO25) ‘‘What can you do? (…) As far as they don’t make a mess and throw litter, for me it’s fine [that pickers come to my forest]’’ (FO15) ‘‘You can’t tell them ‘‘these mushrooms are mine’’ (FO14)
Fig. 3 Perception of damages related to the mushroom picking activity, with frequency. ?c: referred to locals
Most of those manifesting these views utilised quantitative terms to illustrate the existence of a harm perception threshold, above which forest owners could be negatively affected by pickers. These terms relate to the overcrowding and behavioural patterns of pickers in the forest. ‘‘Yes, my forest produces mushrooms. But not too many pickers come and do harm’’ (FO7) ‘‘At home [the farm] there aren’t many [pickers]’’ (FO5) The threshold is manifested alongside the perception of overcrowding, which is lower in areas with lower mycological production. The following quotation illustrates harm in relation to forest type: ‘‘No mushrooms are produced there [in my forest] (…) There aren’t any conifers in general and therefore it has few saffron milk-caps. There are some pines, but it isn’t a zone for the most typical mushrooms. It’s good for other species, for ceps [Boletus edulis], for panther caps [Higrophorus russula], for a number of species… There are people who walk around. They don’t have much impact… They have, but little’’ (FO5). The harm intensity from mushroom picking varies from categorical statements expressing complete aversion to anyone who enters the property to pick mushrooms (highly over the threshold), to a certain degree of acceptance of the discomforts. Forest owners expressing the latter position have noticed some annoyance from mushroom picking but are somewhat resigned to the situation. They show either a certain degree of adaptation to the nuisances (considering them tolerable) or some degree of frustration for not being able to overcome certain behavioural factors. ‘‘If they respect my plot, to me it’s the same if they come or not. I mean, I’m not against them entering
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Above harm perception threshold Other owners have mentioned that the presence of people picking mushrooms in the forests causes them discomfort. Annoyances include material damages and immaterial harm, as compiled in Table 2. Conveyed immaterial harm mainly involves lack of respect to the private property, including rudeness, questioning landowners’ decisions, disturbing privacy, having strangers on their property, or not leaving mushrooms for the landowner. ‘‘They [pickers] aren’t used to be told what to do.’’Now you put a chain and I can’t pass!’’ And I tell him: ‘‘listen, who pays the Treasury? You or me?’’ That’s clear! So, if I pay then I have the right to put a chain’’ (FO17) ‘‘Me, who is paying a lot of things, I find people on my property who don’t pay anything and have more freedom than me!’’ (FO23) Some of the complaints mentioned involve direct costs to the landowner: i.e. road reparations, damage to agricultural production. Owners pointing out these damages do not necessarily live on the farm or on the property. The following statements illustrate these perceptions: ‘‘In a good season you can find people picking mushrooms everywhere! (…) They scratch the forest a lot. I mean, when they go to pine forests, they scratch everything and spoil all the seeds’’ (FO9) ‘‘They leave rubbish and don’t respect anything. I have the electric fence for cows and they leave it open! Or they come with lunch and leave the wrappers there… (…) others park in the middle of the road!’’ (FO13) Views on the introduction of different policy interventions In the last decade, there has been an open debate in the region on the adequacy of introducing mushroom picking regulations. Among other aspects, measures that would
Eur J Forest Res Table 2 Expressed annoyances by forest owners perceiving discomfort from mushroom pickers on their property and frequency expressed Expressed annoyances
Forest owners
Lack of respect for private property
Presence of externals in the property
Rudeness to the owner
7, 9, 13, 22
Rudeness about the decision of limiting access
12, 17, 18, 19, 24
Rudeness about the legal ownership of mushrooms
12, 20
Disturbance of owner’ privacy and peace
22, 23
Not leaving mushrooms for landowner’s own consumption
2, 9, 12, 18, 20
Congestion: too many people, over the bearable threshold
2, 7, 13
Lack of pickers’ insurance and risk of personal damages
21
Presence of rubbish
For example, snack wrappers, toilet paper, and old car pieces
2, 7, 13, 19, 22
Forest roads
Congestion, problem of access in own roads
9, 20, 22
Losses in agricultural and livestock production Damage to the forest
Wear on forest roads (especially private roads)
13, 17, 22
Leaving open or cutting the cattle fence Squashing crops
13, 24, 25 14, 16
Raking the soil
9, 12, 17, 24, 26
Damage to understory
23
enable forest owners to internalise some of the mushroom benefits are being discussed. While examples of payments for gathering mushrooms are scarce in Catalonia, the longlasting debate allows landowners to have a reasonably mature opinion on the subject. For that reason, they have been consulted on the policy measures they think should be implemented. This section covers measures addressing the demand and the provision of mushrooms, and also addresses the perceived constraints for their implementation as well as the role of the public administration in this process. Policy interventions towards pickers Interviewees mentioned the following measures in relation to mushroom pickers, namely (1) no intervention, (2) the increase in pickers’ knowledge of good practices, (3) the regulation of mushrooms harvesting, and (4) a fee for acquiring mushroom picking rights. Table 3 shows illustrative sentences about these options. The rationale behind
each intervention would be, respectively: maintaining the status quo and avoiding adverse effects (namely revenge); reducing harm by relying on people’s compliance with good practices; ensuring low harm by penalising those not following good practices; and meeting landowner’s economic expectations from mushrooms. Owners who expressed their preference not to change the current situation are in fact against introducing any economic or regulatory instrument on mushroom picking. They are concerned primarily about control, costs, and the role of government in such a system: ‘‘We all will get hurt. (…) I think it [a picker’s fee] shouldn’t be done (…) From the administration I’ll never see the funds reaching the landowner’’ (FO14). Increasing pickers’ knowledge about good practices of harvesting and behaving in the forest could, for the forest owner, constitute some forms of prevention from potential problems. Those who advocate awareness raising tools suggest: ‘‘I think there’s a need here to give culture to citizens (…) to teach how to extract mushroom, which are
Table 3 Preferred instruments on mushroom picking Intervention type
Illustrative sentence
Frequency
Doing nothing Informational tools
‘‘I think it’s silly to have to pay for the mushrooms’’ (FO4) ‘‘Maybe it’s good training people so that city dwellers can also do it [picking mushrooms]’’ (FO2)
6 (?3 with information) 7 (3 doing nothing ? 4 for non-locals)
Harvest regulation
‘‘The access to forest cannot be limited, but should be regulated’’ (FO 11)
2 (?6 with payment)
Picking permit payment
‘‘There should be a [picking] fee for all’’ (FO15)
9
‘‘The owner should get money’’ (FO 9)
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the [right] mushrooms (…) So that the citizen is more aware that they are entering a place where there aren’t only mushrooms, but also small animals, trees, plants that must be respected’’ (FO8). Several interviewees preferred a regulation restricting who can go mushroom picking and how to conduct the activity. Limiting access includes both physical exclusion via fencing and crossing gates, as well as implementation of a license or collector card with only holders allowed to carry out the activity. Such regulation is often mentioned jointly with a harvesting fee, drawing parallelism with hunting. ‘‘I think that it should be regulated. Because I know that residents of this area… (…) found nothing when they went mushroom picking. Everything was ransacked (…). If, for example, a neighbour doesn’t want anyone entering his property, I consider he has the authority. It’s his. He’s the owner. (…) I think that this [putting a sign] should be done, or some sort of license, permit, as is done with hunting’’ (FO12). Interviewees advocating payments for picking permits justify them as a legitimate contribution from pickers to the landowner, while the concept ranges from compensating social use and its derived harm, to improving forest status or simply creating a new source of income for the landowner. When talking about payments or regulations, interviewees have not referred to exclusion of outsider pickers. Instead, they express positive discrimination towards locals (i.e. laxer requirements, free access, and reduced fee in comparison with outsiders). Interestingly, whereas most interviewees are consistently differentiating between outsiders and their neighbours, they are not so vehement when referring to commercial versus recreational pickers. Statements seem to indicate that keeping a good relationship with locals is crucial, while the appropriateness of commercial pickers paying more or anything at all is less conclusive. Some landowners have referred to their relatives, housekeepers, or tenant farmers as trading with mushrooms to complement their livelihood. ‘‘There are some pickers selling mushrooms in the local market. I know a couple of them. Mountain people make their living as they can… I don’t find that wrong (…) They [mushrooms] are one more aid to their rents’’ (FO17). Policy interventions towards forest owners The majority of respondents are dissatisfied with having a socially valuable resource on their property that does not benefit the owner. Among them, most preferred a symbolic contribution from pickers that would cover potential damage and/or help in forest enhancement, mainly covering actions towards fire prevention that are often in line with improvement of timber quality. Those owners
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supportive of some type of pickers’ payment were asked about their preferred manner to organise such a system, i.e. how the collected fund should be used. In-kind and monetary contributions were mentioned, their choice being dependant on the economic expectations owners have about their properties, as illustrated by the following statement: ‘‘All this depends on the profit you could extract from the property (…) If you could extract x € per mast (…) maybe it’s in my interest to pay for road improvements. If, on top of that, I get some money from mushrooms, well, we’ll see what we use it for. But these forests [my property] are only useful for biomass (…) Therefore the only value we can extract [from the forest] is from mushrooms. Then you say ‘‘well, welcome if with that [mushroom payment] 50 metres of road can be arranged!’’’’ (FO18). Respondents mentioning an in-kind contribution do not foresee themselves or their neighbours becoming wealthier due to this resource, but instead consider that this would somewhat compensate harm and increase their acceptance of social use on their properties. ‘‘I don’t see the forest owner being paid. Instead the money should be invested in thinning, in general maintenance, in fire prevention… It should be well explained that the money doesn’t go into an individual’s pocket, but is for the benefit of all’’ (FO26). Forestry improvements might be carried out by forest owners themselves or by the government. Delegating management power is seen by some as a relief from their plentiful tasks: ‘‘The issue of forestry work, I don’t know whether it should be done by the landowner, or by the Administration jointly with the owner (…) Maybe it’s better that you’re given the money and you do it (…) Well, if it’s something in consensus and I agree, I prefer that they [Government] do it. Controlling and knowing what they do rather than me doing it… because we’ve plenty of other duties’’ (FO25). Interviewees preferring monetary payments consider that delegating can potentially create more trouble (i.e. the selection of forestry workers). Owners with economic expectations from mushrooms would prefer a monetary payment that gives them freedom to choose whether to reinvest it in the forest or use it for something different. The underlying reasoning is that receiving income from the forest supposes recognition of its value that encourages them to continue efforts in maintaining it. Such cash would complement their main income. Among our interviewees, we have not found a clear relationship between forest size and the preference for monetary payment. ‘‘A mushroom pickers’ fee must be established, like with hunting: the Government issues a card and the money reverts to the landowner according to their area’’ (FO9)
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‘‘If the card’s price is 5, 2.5€ is for the administration and 2.5€ is for me’’ (FO22)
happening (…) Therefore I think it [the license] shouldn’t be done’’ (FO14)
Participating in other economic instruments [i.e. biodiversity conservation grants, subsidies for sustainable forest management (SFM), SFM certification] has not been found to be related with the preference for policy interventions; neither active management nor forest size. A recurrent statement is the importance of ensuring landowners’ freedom to engage in any policy intervention. This relates to the landowner’s primary decision power over his territory and resources, the competence to decide whether to limit the picking activity in his forest and ultimately to enter or not into a payment scheme (voluntary engagement).
‘‘[Within the association] we haven’t talked about this (…) It’s a delicate issue. We’re few who think like this [a mushroom license]… Why? Because the fear of them [pickers] burning it [the forest]… Be very careful if you do that, they’ll put fire!’’ (FO20)
‘‘It’s like hunting: who doesn’t want to, doesn’t join’’ (FO6) ‘‘The Government has no right to do it [a mushroom payment]! Mushrooms belong to the landowner’’ (FO14) It is worth noting that, in general, forest owners not wishing the application of any mushroom picking intervention to their own forests do respect (and usually also support) that other owners implement them in their forests. ‘‘In the season of fruit, mushrooms or truffle picking, a landlord wanting to put up a chain and to say ‘‘from here beyond is mine, if you want to pass then pay’’; that sounds perfect for me, huh? But not in my woods’’ (FO8) ‘‘If the owner thinks it’s business, he believes it’s worthwhile, then let him put his guard, his fence…’’ (FO14) Obstructing factors The interviews revealed a widespread fear of revenge reactions from the affected population that does not accept the new limitations of potential policy interventions. We found that even those owners expressing their willingness to participate in a system of mushroom regulation with a possible payment may prefer not to implement any individual initiative if they perceive a large potential loss from fire or an increase in harmful behaviour:
‘‘All these forests can burn very easily. I’d never put pressure on those going to look for mushrooms because… You just need a despicable guy having an off day, (…) just one of those to come, to create a problem (…) So, I could find one that says: ‘‘I have all the right in the world to do what I want. I have a mushroom picking license’’. I’m sure it’ll end up
However, proving that such fears are unfounded at local level could encourage owners to adhere to such schemes: ‘‘The owner should agree (…) I’m in favour of not forcing people. Maybe just the first year not many get involved, but gradually they’ll join. (…) When you see that it’s a help, when you see that it works… Now there’s an owner here in this area that charges for going mushroom picking. He has fenced the farm and people said ‘‘it will burn’’. And you see: it hasn’t been burned. People are reluctant, but eventually maybe… [they change their minds]’’ (FO13). Another limiting factor identified by interviewees is the implementation scale, linked to the ease of control and the costs of launching and maintaining such a programme. Coordination among neighbouring landowners is seen as a prerequisite, and even up to the whole region level. ‘‘What I won’t do is fencing the forest to control. First, because fencing my property would be very difficult, because there’re pastures and riverbanks and it’ll cost a lot. And second, because me alone no. That should be done at a global level; with that I agree’’ (FO20).
The role of the public administration Most interviewees reported their preference to avoid direct contact with pickers. In particular, in the case of pickers causing harm, landowners do not see themselves directly intervening, even though the event occurs on their property. This is due to perceived futility -they will not be taken seriously as long as most pickers believe forests are publicly owned- and unwillingness to put up with pickers’ negative reactions. While this passive response has been traditionally assumed, with picker frequency increasing, landowners’ resignation seems to evolve into calls for government intervention, as they do not feel intervention is their role. Organizing a payment scheme themselves does not interest most interviewees; instead, they would delegate this to an intermediary. While only few mentioned forest owners’ association, interviewees mainly referred to the public administration assuming the role of collecting fees and issuing mushroom licenses, as well as managing funds, but also something similar to hunting associations, where the association itself manages the money. The type of body interviewees trust varies (i.e. protected area office, town hall, or county forest agency) based on their past
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experience and contacts. The most frequently expressed opinion is that of a higher body establishing a system to which they could adhere. Forest owners think that even if pickers dislike the idea, it would be successful because it is the government who implements it: ‘‘[If the regulation comes from the capital] of course they’d think it’s bad, but they’d do that and nothing would happen’’ (FO20). In interviewees’ opinion, the implementing public body would also execute field control of such an initiative. Regarding control, interviewees mostly mentioned the adequacy of extending the existing competences of rural agents to include ‘‘mushrooms’ policing’’, therefore not requesting a new institution but finding synergies with the current ones. Forest owners’ statements revealed a negative opinion of the rural agents’ body, hence the view that delegating them this task without providing extra resources would make their job ‘‘useful for the landowner’’. ‘‘Why not a mushroom picking license, and that the administration does it exactly the same [as the hunting license]? I think the easiest is to copy and control everything, isn’t it? They [the administration] are the rural agents themselves, who haven’t much work! (…) Everything that relates to the administration I see as feasible. [For] everything that isn’t administration I see it would be complicated to have control and to be effectively implemented’’ (FO3) ‘‘The forest guards, the same setting wouldn’t cost anything, staying in places and request the card. They already have a salary. And besides you give them another task’’ (FO20)
Model of intervention preference The interviews shed light on forest owners’ attitudes towards mushroom picking. Based on their perception of property rights over mushrooms, and of harm caused by that activity, we suggest a model of preference for policy interventions, as depicted in Fig. 4. Owners expressing a low degree of harm and advocating for free access rights for mushroom picking would prefer the current situation to continue. Owners perceiving harm (potential or otherwise) and with a variable degree of perception on property rights call for regulation on mushroom harvesting. Payment is advocated by those already experiencing some degree of harm and who consider it legitimate to derive some benefit from mushroom activity on their properties. It can be observed that there are overlapping preferences. For example, receiving a payment often goes hand-in-hand with regulation, implying that fine-tuning of current regulation is needed to establish a payment. The overlapping between status quo and regulation preferences could be explained through the perceived constraints. ‘‘It’s impossible to control that! (…) To me it’s fine as it’s now. Of course now there’re a thousand people looking for mushrooms and before there were only one hundred. So now we’ve to guard the forest? Well, ok, but we won’t achieve anything with that’’ (FO21). Many forest owners defending open forest access and harvest of mushrooms advocate increasing awareness among pickers. Thus, intervention related to pickers’ good practices range from the merely informative to a formal obligation with penalties for non-compliance. Regulation is
Fig. 4 Preferred policy intervention according to perception of property rights and harm
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also advocated as a preventive measure by those that have not yet experienced harm, but have evidence that the threshold may be reached. Preferences over payment for picking mushrooms are linked to the economic expectation of landowners regarding their resource. Forest owners defending private rights over mushroom picking prefer that the mushroom benefit reflects economically in the form of monetary payments. There are divergences in attaching obligations to the funds collected: some would earmark them for covering forest management costs (similar to current subsidy schemes), while others would prefer to keep it open for their own purposes (and hence, funds might be reinvested in forest management or not). The underlying rationale of these forest owners is the possibility of making (or improving) their living from the forest and its products. Owners preferring monetary rewards recall those whose main forest management motivation is business-oriented (Domı´nguez and Shannon 2011). Other owners would be satisfied receiving some indirect benefits from mushrooms, i.e. forest improvements, which could be executed by others in agreement with his will. The two owners from our sample currently involved in a payment mechanism fit under the private rights and over the harm perception threshold: one found the risks tolerable (i.e. arson) and launched the scheme on his own; the other acknowledged the risks but had the opportunity to join a scheme with adjacent forests, which dissipated his fears. The other interviewees with similar rights and harm perceptions faced other factors, which hindered undertaking any initiative. A potential regulation with/-out payment would preferably include positive discrimination towards locals, based on perceived traditional rights and activity with less impact. Both establishing a regulatory framework to limit collection in specific forests and charging pickers would preferably be voluntary for landowners, who would have the choice whether or not to participate.
Discussion The present study has identified a variety of positions held by Catalan private forest owners regarding mushroom picking. The interviews allowed us to discover that perception in terms of property rights and mushroom-related harm clearly influences opinion towards a potential policy instrument that aligns the social demand of mushroom picking with forest owners’ expectations. A model of policy intervention preference and actual implementation has emerged, which could find support in the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991) (see Fig. 5). Landowners’ preferences for mushroom policy intervention result from
Fig. 5 Factors affecting forest owners’ positioning towards policy intervention and its actual implementation
the combination of their own evaluation of an intervention (‘‘attitude’’: positive or negative evaluation of restricting mushroom harvesting, often based on their own harm experience), the influence of the social context (‘‘subjective norms’’: rights’ perception, alignment with local traditions, support from peers or forest officials), and the external factors that may constrain implementation (‘‘perceived behavioural control’’: expected revenues, scarcity of control resources—costs, guards-, legal backing and trust in forest institutions). Once the intention is constructed, other external factors may interfere in the transition to action, namely those linked to the perceived success probability (‘‘perceived behavioural control’’), such as the fear of revenge in the form of arson or negative pickers’ behaviour (i.e. more litter, intensified rudeness towards the owner). This last component recalls lexicographic preferences, where the landowner only considers moving from the status quo if revenge is not perceived as problematic, and other external factors are only taken into account subsequently. Interestingly, no explicit pride to have pickers on their properties has been found. On the contrary, pickers are rather seen as a potential source of conflict, a probable reason why promoting picking has not emerged as a policy option unless it is accompanied by landowner revenues (ex. mycotourism). Our data do not show that forest size or active management influences rights’ perception or policy intervention preference. One could argue that very small landowners have different expectations from their forest and having them under-represented in our sample may affect the model; however, having reached theoretical saturation, we presume that including them would increase neither categories nor interaction patterns, but would just change the frequencies of preferences or obstructing factors. The relevance of policy interventions relies on implicit changes in the mushroom governance arrangements. Added value of NWFPs at source primarily depends on access to forest resources (Wiersum et al. 2013:1). In line with Davidson-Hunt et al. (2001:7), we have found that the agents benefiting from the harvest of NWFPs are different from those benefiting from timber (traditional main product
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for the forest owner). Indeed, while timber is largely understood as private goods, many forest owners interviewed consider mushrooms as a common-pool resource with diverse property rights regimes. The well-established legal framework for timber partly explains this perception, and hence, timber-related claims for different policy interventions (i.e. subsidies, certification) built upon that legality; in contrast, the less consolidated mushrooms’ framework calls for a clarification of landowners’ and pickers’ rights and duties. References both to ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘bounded’’ seem to be comparable to what Roman law considers ‘‘res nullius’’, meaning ‘‘open access resource available for appropriation as private property by acts of extraction or consumption’’ (Cole et al. 2014:362), where pickers’ actions are based on the ‘‘first come, first served’’ principle. While some respondents do not see problems in maintaining the ‘‘free’’ right and hence the status quo, some scholars may warn of the well-known threat of the ‘‘Tragedy of the commons’’. However, Ostrom et al. (1999) suggest that sustainable extraction of CPR could be reached by implementing (more or less formal) harvest rules shared among pickers. Our model encompasses this option, including environmental but also social norms: keeping open access for anyone but subject to certain behavioural norms (‘‘bounded’’ rights understood as the ‘‘ius usus inocui’’ principle of harmless use of the forest), or alternatively keeping traditional access to neighbouring pickers who already share that set of behavioural norms (‘‘communal’’ rights). We have found that owners claiming private rights over mushrooms do not necessarily plan to pick them themselves, but would like to internalise part of mushrooms’ value through payments whenever there is pickers’ demand. These owners consider that mushrooms are theirs, and paying for their harvest entails recognising property rights. Insofar as the landowner is institutionally allowed to benefit from NWFPs, s/he may find incentives towards more efficient NWFP production systems, therefore meeting social demand. From an individualistic approach, this would mean monetary rewards for single landowners, whereas a more collective-benefit approach would mean in-kind benefits for forest management. Regulations restricting harvest rights hinder the ability of commercial pickers to derive revenues, which could indirectly affect economic development in rural areas. This could be a plausible explanation for the weak difference found in treatment of commercial versus recreational harvesters. Such positioning of interviewed landowners contrasts with general Catalonian opinion, where nearly half the population supports charging only commercial pickers (Prokofieva et al. 2013:9). Positive discrimination for local pickers consistently appears in the interviews, following the current trend of increasing formalisation of customary
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practices (Wiersum et al. 2013:7), as practices considered ‘‘good’’ and based on traditional ecological knowledge, attributed to locals but questioned for outsiders. Differentiating the treatment between locals and outsiders is aligned with the opinions of the general population, agreed by 63 % of the omnibus survey respondents (Go´rriz et al. 2014). Nevertheless, if neighbouring villagers have a poorly defined sense of collective ownership and no traditional institutions, Laird et al. (2011:238) warn of possible weak enforcement and less sustainable management of NWFP. Positive discrimination for locals already occurs in Castilla-Leo´n [Central Spain, (BOCyL 1999)] and Italy (Gazetta Ufficiale 1993); there are, however, no studies proving better behaviour by locals versus non-locals. The landowner seemingly reflects an ethical obligation towards nearby communities and rural individuals struggling to find revenue channels, in line with a moral duty to grant access to visitors, as indicated by Quartuch and Beckley (2013:457). However, the interviews show that such ethical criterion becomes secondary when the landowner perceives nuisances derived from allowing wild products’ harvest. This supports the findings of Shumsky et al. (2014:57–58), who report reluctance of private landowners in Kenya to grant harvest access to externals based on their concerns over impact to land and infrastructure. Potential harmful effects of pickers not accepting the introduction of a policy intervention are present; reducing the uncertainty of such effects emerges as a key factor in promoting forest owners’ engagement. This is a relevant contribution, not identified in previous NWFP studies, and provides insights for action by the public administration. Awareness campaigns for pickers as well as increased vigilance to deter bad intentions could help to reduce uncertainty. Specific legislation and administrative structures facilitating the reporting of violations by forest owners could support the emergence and consolidation of private initiatives. Having an external body implementing access and harvesting restrictions would diffuse the image of forest owners as the ‘‘bad people who limit this customary use’’, which may constitute the main cause of expected negative reactions. In this case, joining an initiative led by external agents could facilitate owners’ participation; hence, the administration could act (or set the basis for an organisation acting) as a catalyser for interested landowners, also in view of overcoming scale challenges. Also, owners resigned to the status quo could eventually modify their position towards preferring an intervention if constraining factors were overcome. Moreover, the gradual implementation of various initiatives could prepare the affected population and dispel owners’ doubts. For example, the SylvaMED project (www.sylvamed.eu) introduced pilot cases for mushroom payments, one in a public woodland (DOGC 2012) and one in a private forest
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(Simoncic et al. 2013:43), which received positive feedback from pickers. Transaction costs appear a key aspect for implementation, in line with Coggan et al. (2010). Supporters of payments assume that the costs of such a system will be covered by the funds raised. However, others doubt the efficiency of its implementation: if the payment amount is kept low to improve pickers’ acceptance, yet the payment scheme entails expenses in signalling, surveillance, license issuing, etc., will the funds raised cover these expenses? It may be naı¨ve to expect that the costs will fall to the administration and the entire benefits will reach owners. An exhaustive cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to shed light on this point. Finally, there is widespread agreement among respondents that their participation in any regulatory initiative or payment must be on a strictly voluntary basis. This indicates the importance attached to freedom of choice, both concerning whether or not to engage in an initiative, and, if taking part in an in-kind reward scheme, to decide what silvicultural operations to carry out in their forests.
Conclusions This study reveals the existence of a diversity of forest owner positions regarding the use of their forests for mushroom picking, a deep-rooted activity in Catalonia. Knowing this heterogeneity enables a more precise design of policy interventions that simultaneously solve latent conflicts (nuisance from mushroom picking) and meet the economic expectations of owners about their forests, as reflected by their understanding of mushroom harvesting rights. The qualitative approach employed allowed identification of the determining factors and, based on these, the elaboration of a model of preference for policy intervention. Interviews with forest owners in Catalonia reveal different perceptions regarding mushroom picking rights. Whereas some owners find public access to the activity appropriate, others treat mushroom picking as a traditional right of the nearby community and others consider it as an asset from which they would like to benefit. Some interviewees perceive harm from mushroom gatherers, while others do not express discontent. Harm reported ranges from lack of respect for private property, litter, congestion and wear of forest roads, and damage to crops, livestock or forest soil. Some of these problems entail direct monetary costs to the owner, whereas others are of a more intangible nature. Some owners showing a neutral perception to mushroom picking used terms describing the intensity of pickers’ presence, making us consider the existence of a threshold of discomfort perception, which could be
surpassed by an increased number of collectors. Notably, the majority of owners interviewed make a distinction between the local collector, towards which they show more sympathy, and the outsider, usually from urban centres, who are attributed most of the perceived inconveniences. The opinion over mushroom picking activity influences forest owner’s positioning regarding the type of requested intervention. Those with a lower sense of harm and more open access rights perceptions prefer to stay in the status quo. Those closer to the harm threshold (on both sides) call for regulation of mushroom picking. Owners considering mushrooms as a private asset prefer a payment system with some economic benefits. Whatever the intervention, owners acknowledging traditional rights for community members would like to see them positively discriminated. On top of any appreciation of nuisance, we find the determinant influence of implementation expenses and potential negative reactions by affected pickers. In this last case, the owners feel vulnerable and prefer not to apply any instrument. The government could play a relevant role, according to interviewees, to reduce uncertainties and costs, by delimiting rights and duties of landowners and collectors, implementing field control through forest guards, and eventually acting as intermediary in a permit system. Interviewees also noted that the participation in any policy initiative must be voluntary. Theories of property rights regarding NWFPs and their enforcement, therefore, appear crucial for understanding the legitimisation of reforming governance arrangements. To contrast forest owners’ views, the opinions of pickers should be studied. A deepened understanding of informal norms, the evolution of good picking practices, and good functioning of decentralised mechanisms are needed to establish policy instruments in this respect. Finally, how these reformulations of property rights affect the NWFP value chain deserves further research. Acknowledgments This study has been conducted within the EC FP7 project Newforex. The authors thank the participating forest owners and the officials and technicians who collaborated with the study. We are grateful to Sarah Adams, and to the two anonymous reviewers for providing very insightful comments.
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