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Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series Series Editor: Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, Murdoch University, Australia Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific showcases new research and scholarship on what is arguably the most important region in the world in the twenty-first century. The rise of China and the continuing strategic importance of this dynamic economic area to the United States mean that the Asia Pacific will remain crucially important to policymakers and scholars alike. The unifying theme of the series is a desire to publish the best theoretically-informed, original research on the region. Titles in the series cover the politics, economics and security of the region, as well as focussing on its institutional processes, individual countries, issues and leaders.

Titles include: Thomas Birtchnell INDOVATION Innovation and a Global Knowledge Economy in India Lindsay Black JAPAN’S MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY The Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Outlaws Aurel Croissant, David Küehn, Philip Lorenz and Paul W. Chambers DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVILIAN CONTROL IN ASIA Giovanna Maria Dora Dore, Jae H. Ku and Karl Jackson (editors) INCOMPLETE DEMOCRACIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC Evidence from Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand Kelly Gerard ASEAN’s ENGAGEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY Regulating Dissent Felix Heiduk (editor) SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA From Policy to Practice Brendan Howe THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN EAST ASIA Jane Hutchison, Wil Hout, Caroline Hughes and Richard Robison POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE AID INDUSTRY IN ASIA Eun Mee Kim and Pil Ho Kim (editors) THE SOUTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE Beyond Aid Jikon Lai FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN EAST ASIA Jonathan London (editor) POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY VIETNAM Party, State, and Authority Relations Arndt Michael INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM

Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin EXPLAINING COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA Claudia Tazreiter and Siew Yean Tham (editors) GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC The Australian and Malaysian Experience Sow Keat Tok MANAGING CHINA’S SOVEREIGNTY IN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN William Tow and Rikki Kersten (editors) BILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL SECURITY Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region Barry Wain MALAYSIAN MAVERICK Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times Mikael Weissmann THE EAST ASIAN PEACE Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding Robert G. Wirsing, Christopher Jasparro and Daniel C. Stoll INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER RESOURCES IN HIMALAYAN ASIA Hidetaka Yoshimatsu COMPARING INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN EAST ASIA Power Politics, Governance, and Critical Junctures Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series Series Standing Order ISBN 978-0-230-22896-2 (Hardback) 978-0-230-22897-9 (Paperback) (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Indonesia’s Ascent Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order Edited by

Christopher B. Roberts University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Australia

Ahmad D. Habir Strategic Asia, Indonesia

Leonard C. Sebastian Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Editorial matter and selection © Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir and Leonard C. Sebastian 2015 Chapters © Contributors 2015 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-39740-9 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG21 6XS Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN 978-1-349-48494-2 ISBN 978-1-137-39741-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137397416

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

This book is dedicated to all those that have worked so hard to make Indonesia what it is today, and to all those who must continue to push for an even brighter future

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Contents List of Figures and Table

xii

Acknowledgements

xiii

Notes on Contributors

xv

List of Acronyms and Glossary 1

2

3

xviii

Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian Conceptual foundations: The nature of power and influence in international relations Book structure Notes Bibliography Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and Global Role, 1945–75 Sue Thompson Nationalism, revolution and independence Guided democracy Konfrontasi (Confrontation) The New Order Conclusion Notes Bibliography The Economy in Indonesia’s Ascent: Making Sense of it All Satish Mishra Setting the stage: The polity Indonesia and emerging international perspectives on development policy Indonesia: The economy in the midst of systemic transition Indonesia: Taking the economic pulse Post-election development policy in Indonesia Conclusion Notes Bibliography

vii

1

3 9 15 19 22

22 24 26 29 34 35 38 40 40 41 44 46 60 62 64 66

viii Contents

4

5

6

7

Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National Stability, and Economic Development in Indonesia Mark S. Williams Introduction Islam in the republic: National stability and economic development Islam as a revolutionary force and the discourse of a revisionist state Democratic stability, economic development, and an Islamic ethics during the SBY era, 2004–14 Conclusion Notes Bibliography Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and New Challenges Bob Lowry Introduction The utility of violence Militant Islam Communism Separatism Aceh Papua Cathartic violence TNI Notes Bibliography Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis: Implications for Indonesia’s Continued Ascent Stephen Sherlock Introduction A decade of democratic achievement Indonesia’s third transition: A time of uncertainty Stalled reform and policy paralysis Failings of the party system and the 2014 election Conclusion Notes Bibliography Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia: The Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki Introduction

69

69 70 76 81 86 87 90 93

93 94 94 95 96 96 96 97 98 106 109 112

112 114 117 118 119 124 126 128 130

130

Contents ix

8

9

10

Indonesia’s ongoing security landscape Indonesia’s core interest and strategic approaches Fundamental trends of Indonesia’s foreign policy Indonesia’s defense policy direction Conclusion Notes Bibliography

130 133 136 141 146 147 150

The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values and Identity Avery Poole Introduction A ‘more activist’ foreign policy ‘Democratic identity’ in foreign policy International role Regional role Public opinion and democracy ‘Democratizing’ foreign policy Challenges to the democratic image Economic growth and inequality Post-2014 foreign policy Conclusion Notes Bibliography

155

Indonesia and International Institutions: Treading New Territory Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir Introduction Independent and active foreign policy The roles of the G-20, NAM, and the UN: The Indonesian perspective Challenges in implementing vision and policy Indonesia and international institutions: Beyond symbolism Notes Bibliography

177

Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir The evolution of political and security relations Causal dynamics: The roles of perceptions, knowledge, and trade Policy implications and the ways forward Notes Bibliography

195

155 156 157 159 160 163 164 165 167 168 169 170 173

177 179 180 185 187 188 192

196 204 208 210 218

x Contents

11

12

13

14

The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation between Indonesia and Australia? Mark Beeson and Will Lee Middle power theory and practice Is Indonesia a middle power? The evolving relationship Competing interests Still strange neighbors? Concluding remarks Notes Bibliography Key Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships: Opportunities and Challenges Yongwook Ryu Introduction Indonesia–Malaysia relations Indonesia–Singapore relations Indonesia–Vietnam relations Conclusion Notes Bibliography

224

225 228 230 232 234 236 237 240 244

244 245 250 254 259 260 262

Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN: Mediation, Agency and Extra-Regional Diplomacy Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih Indonesia in intra-ASEAN conflict mediation and management Indonesia as an agent of institutional and normative change The global nexus between Indonesia’s ascent and ASEAN Conclusion Notes Bibliography

264

Indonesia among the Powers: Will ASEAN Still Matter to Indonesia? See Seng Tan Introduction Indonesia rising: Domestic and external challenges Relevance of hedging in a time of rebalancing Frameworks for engaging the great powers Multiple paths to Indonesia’s security Conclusion: Indonesia driving and suffering the region? Notes Bibliography

287

265 269 273 277 279 283

287 289 293 295 297 299 299 304

Contents xi

15

16

Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, Maritime Security and the Great Powers Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made Andi Arsana Introduction Archipelagic Outlook: The evolution of a concept Archipelagic sea lanes, maritime boundaries, and choke-points How to designate East–West sea lanes Sharing the ocean: Anticipating Indonesia’s completion of maritime boundary delimitation Maritime security and defense conundrums Conclusion: Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook Notes Bibliography ‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspirations Leonard C. Sebastian and Christopher B. Roberts Notes Bibliography

Index

308

308 309 312 314 318 322 324 327 331 335

345 346 348

List of Figures and Table Figures 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 10.1 15.1 15.2 15.3

GDP Indonesia from 2000 to 2012 Growth of per capita GDP in Indonesia (2000–12) Sector wise contributions in % GDP Savings and investment as % of GDP (2000–12) Revenue expenditure gap as a % of GDP from 1995–2012 Fiscal balance in Indonesia 2000 to 2012 (% of GDP) Tax and non-tax revenue share of GDP (2000–12) VAT volume in Indonesia Tax structure and composition, 2000–12 Public expenditure as % of GDP, 2000–12 Indonesia’s total expenditure by function (sectors) Percentage expenditure by function year 2012 Current account balance as % of GDP Public debt as % of GDP Net external debt as % of GDP Overseas development assistance – Trends as % of GDP Indonesia: Energy subsidies, 2005–13 Australian ODA to Indonesia, 2001–02 to 2013–14 ($m) Combination of all proposals, views and suggestions Possible option of ASLs for Indonesia with an emphasis on East–West routes Indonesia and its ten neighbors

46 47 48 48 49 49 50 51 52 53 53 55 56 56 57 57 58 207 317 318 319

Table 3.1

Indonesia’s total expenditure by function (sectors)

xii

54

Acknowledgements Many people have generously given their time in contributing to this book and we fear it will be impossible to acknowledge everyone specifically. That said, we will try to cover as many names as possible: should we miss anyone, we are truly sorry. First and foremost, we would like to thank the National Security College (Chris was a Senior Lecturer there at the time) for providing a research grant that not only funded two fieldtrips to Jakarta and Singapore, but also a range of other College-based activities. These included several roundtables, a public seminar, and conferences in Canberra and Jakarta. The editors are deeply appreciative of all those who contributed to the two conferences and the author workshops that followed. In particular, we would like to thank the ‘commentators’ for each session in the two conferences; they not only provided an invaluable set of responses to the presentations of each author, but they also served as early reviewers for each paper. The commentators for the two conferences were Professor Michael Wesley (ANU), Prabowo (Strategic Asia), Dr Cornelius P. F. Luhulima (Indonesian Institute of Sciences, LIPI), Professor Mark Turner (University of Canberra), Associate Professor Leonard Sebastian (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies), and Dr Yayan G. H. Mulyana (Assistant Special Staff of the President for International Relations, Indonesia). The project was structured in this way so that each author would receive feedback and guidance at an early stage, and we believe that this approach has significantly improved the final content the book. The editors are also deeply indebted to Dr Satish Mishra, Managing Director of Strategic Asia (Jakarta), not only for his own contributions to the conferences and book, but also for kindly hosting the conference in Jakarta. His venue, together with the hospitality of his staff, was second to none. The editors are also very grateful to the many people who provided their time and advice during meetings and interviews in Jakarta, Singapore, and Canberra, including Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Defence, and Office of the President, as well as Australia’s Department of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Office of National Assessments. In particular, the editors would like to thank Ambassador Soemadi D. M. Brotodiningrat, Dr Makarim Wibisono, Dr Riefqi Muna, Dr Hassan Wirajuda, Major General I Wayan Midhio, Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Ms Kusuma Habir, Brigadier General (Ret) M. Supriyatno, Professor Hasjim Djalal, Brigadier Gary Hogan, Ambassador Greg Moriarty, and many more for their time, advice, and the invaluable perspectives they offered during the process of interviewing for the project.

xiii

xiv Acknowledgements

We are also grateful beyond words for the work that Robert (Bob) Lowry undertook in reviewing four of the sections in this book. We are similarly indebted to the patience, hard work, and never-ending professionalism of Dr Andrew Watts (textedit) for his editorial and formatting assistance. Last, but by no means least, we would like to thank Professor David Lovell, Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (Australian Defence Force Academy campus), for providing both the time and additional funding to enable the completion of the final stages of this book.

Notes on Contributors I. Made Andi Arsana is Head of the International Collaboration Division and Lecturer at the Department of Geodetic and Geomatic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University. He received his PhD at the Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong, Australia. Mark Beeson is Professor of International Politics at the University of Western Australia. Before joining UWA, he taught at Murdoch, Griffith and Queensland (Australia), York and Birmingham (UK), where he was also head of department. He is the co-editor of Contemporary Politics, and the founding editor of Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific. Iis Gindarsah is a Researcher in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta. His research interests include military transformation, civilmilitary relations and regional security complex in East Asia. Ahmad D. Habir is Senior Fellow at the Strategic Asia Bali Institute, Indonesia and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy campus at the University of New South Wales. Yulius Purwadi Hermawan is currently the Deputy Dean (Academic) of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung. Will Lee is a PhD candidate at the University of Western Australia and an associate lecturer at the School of Politics and International Relations at the Australian National University. His thesis is entitled ‘Post-Suharto democratisation and the obstacles to a security community between Australia and Indonesia’. Bob Lowry is an adjunct lecturer at the Australian Defence Force Academy campus of the University of New South Wales (UNSW). He is the author of The Armed Forces of Indonesia (1996). Aside from his role as a military attaché and three years at the Indonesian army command and staff college (SESKOAD), among other things, he returned to Jakarta in 2001 to undertake research on military and police reforms for the International Crisis Group.

xv

xvi Notes on Contributors

Satish Mishra is currently Managing Director of Strategic Asia, a policy research and consulting group. He has held senior positions in the World Bank, OECD, UNDP and USAID. Avery Poole is a Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Her research explores the evolution of norms and institutional change, particularly in Southeast Asia. She focuses on ASEAN and other regional groupings such as the EAS and ARF; human rights institutions in Southeast Asia; and the evolving regional and global roles of Indonesia. Adhi Priamarizki is an Associate Research Fellow of the Indonesia Programme, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests are Indonesian politics, Indonesian Military History, and Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia. Christopher B. Roberts is Associate Professor and the Director of Executive Education Programs at the School of Humanities within the Australian Defence Force Academy Campus of the University of New South Wales. Aside from two monographs, ASEAN Regionalism and ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis, he is the author of more than 40 other publications and reports concerning politics, security, and regionalism in East Asia. Yongwook Ryu is a Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. His main research expertise covers international relations of East Asia, the foreign policies of China, Japan, and Korea, ASEAN, and identity politics. He has published widely in The Pacific Review and Asian Survey among others. He is currently working on a monograph in which he examines the different patterns of interstate relations between Northeast and Southeast Asia since the 1980s. Leonard C. Sebastian is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Indonesia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is author of Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force (2006). His research focuses on a variety of fields related to Indonesia covering politics, political economy and decentralization, defense and security, civil-military relations, foreign policy and Islam. Stephen Sherlock is Adjunct Associate Professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy campus of the University of New South Wales. He is also a political analyst and development consultant who specializes in govern-

Notes on Contributors xvii

ance and political change in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. His interests include political systems, political parties, electoral systems, public sector reform, legislative strengthening, and anti-corruption. He has published widely on Indonesian politics and governance. He was Director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI) at the Australian National University from 2010 to 2013. He also worked for 11 years as an analyst on Indonesia, East Timor and the South Pacific for the Australian Parliament. Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is an Associate Research Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. See Seng Tan is an Associate Professor, Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, and founding and current head of the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. A student of Asian security, he is the author/editor of nine books and has published over 40 refereed scholarly papers and books. His most recent book is The Making of the Asia Pacific: Knowledge Brokers and the Politics of Representation (2013). Sue Thompson is the Graduate Convenor at the National Security College in the Crawford School of Public Policy. Prior to completing a PhD at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, Sue worked as an international news journalist for the Associated Press and as a ministerial adviser in the Australian Parliament. She has held academic positions as Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Canberra and as Research Coordinator at the Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence. Erlina Widyaningsih completed a PhD at the ANU Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy in 2013. Her dissertation examined what ASEAN’s methods of crisis management revealed about regional security in Southeast Asia. She previously worked at the Directorate General of ASEAN Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and has returned to this department since completing her PhD. Mark S. Williams is a Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Vancouver Island University. His research examines the political culture of Islam in the Republic of Indonesia, as well as the international political economy of the Asia-Pacific.

List of Acronyms and Glossary abangan ABRI adala Ijtimaya àdâlah ADMM ADMM+ AEC AFC AICHR AIPR AMM ancaman disintegrasi ANU APEC API APT ARF ASA asas tunggal ASEAN ASEM ASL ASLP Bakorkamla baya BBK BDF bebas dan aktif benar membangun demokrasi BIG BNPP BPK

nominal or syncretic Muslims in rural areas Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) social justice justice ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus ASEAN Economic Community Asian Financial Crisis ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation ASEAN Ministerial Meeting threat of disintegration Australian National University Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Air Pollution Index ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asia sole foundation Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting archipelagic sea lane archipelagic sea lane passage Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut (Maritime Security Coordinating Board) pledge of allegiance Batam, Bintan and Karimun (free trade zone) Bali Democracy Forum independent/free and active building a strong democracy Badan Informasi Geospasial (Geospatial Information Agency) Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan (National Agency for Border Management ) Badan Permeriksa Keuangan (State Audit Agency)

xviii

List of Acronyms and Glossary xix

BPS BPUPK

BRIC CARAT CINC CLMV COC CSO CT DAK DAU DCA demokrasi Demokrasi Terpimpin Dewan Nasional DFAT DI Dishidros DOC DPCs DPR EAS ECOSOC UN EEZ falsafah fatwas FDI fitna FPI FTA G-20 GAM GBC GDP Golkar golongan Islam golongan nasional GST

Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Board of Statistics Indonesia) Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence) Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Composite Index of National Capability Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam Code of Conduct civil society organization counter-terrorist Dana Alokasi Khusus (Specific Grants Allocation) Dana Alokasi Umum (General Fund Allocation) Defence Cooperation Agreement democracy Guided Democracy National Council Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Darul Islam – House of Islam Dinas Hidro-Oseanografi TNI-AL (HydroOceanographic Office) Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea data processing centres Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council) East Asian Summit Economic and Social Council exclusive economic zone philosophy decrees foreign direct investment conflict between Muslims Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defense Front) Free Trade Agreement Group of Twenty Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Liberation Movement) General Border Committee Gross Domestic Product Partai Golongan Karya (Party of the Functional Groups) Islamic group national group goods and services tax

xx List of Acronyms and Glossary

guncangan sosial Hajj HMI hurriyyah IAEA IAMM ICJ ICMI ICWA IDR IEG IMB IMET IMF IMO INASOC infaq IORA IOR-ARC IPSC IR islahu bain’an-nas istibdad jahiliyya JBC JCET JCLEC JI jihad JIL jiwa dan semangat Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa Keadilan Sosial keamanan dan ketertiban kebebasan kebenaran atas pilihan rakyat kami

social shocks pilgrimage to Mecca Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students’ Organization) freedom International Atomic Energy Agency Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting International Court of Justice Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Indonesian Council on World Affairs Indonesian Rupiah Intelligence Exchange Group International Maritime Bureau International Military Education and Training program International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization Indonesia SEA Games Organizing Committee charity without any expectation of return (see also zakat) Indian Ocean Rim Association Indonesia in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation Indonesia Peace and Security Center in West Java International Relations reconciliation between peoples despotism the age of ignorance Joint Border Committee Joint/Combined Exchange Training Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Congregation) holy war Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network) soul and spirit belief in one God social justice security and order freedom the truth that is the choice of people

List of Acronyms and Glossary xxi

Kemlu kepentingan nasional ketahanan nasional KISDI

KKN Komando Lintas Laut Militer-Kolinlamil konfrontasi KOTI

Indonesian Foreign Ministry national interests national resilience Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World) Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism) military sealift command

confrontation Komando Operasi Tertinggi (Supreme Operations Command) KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission) Lemhannas Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional (National Resilience Institute) LIPI Indonesian Institute of Sciences LTU large tax payer unit Majlis Syuro Muslimin Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Indonesia Maphilindo Greater Malayan Confederation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia MDG Millennium Development Goals MEF minimum essential force mekarnya flowering Mendayung di Antara Rowing between Two Reefs Dua Karang MIKTA Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Australia (middle power countries) MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Mujahideen Council of Indonesia) MORA Ministry of Religious Affairs MoU Memorandum of Understanding MP3EI Master Plan for Planning, Extension and Accelerating Economic Development MPR-RI Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—Republik Indonesia (People’s Consultative Assembly) MSC Maritime Safety Commission MSP Malacca Strait Patrols MSSP Malacca Strait Sea Patrols Muhammadiyah the Way of the Prophet MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesian (Islamic Scholars/Leaders Council)

xxii List of Acronyms and Glossary

MUI musawah NAM Nasdem NATO NEFOS NGO nilai-nilai dasar NKRI NPT NU OIC OIC OPEC Orde Baru PAD Pajak Daerah PAN Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra Partai Islam Indonesia PBB PD PDIP

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council) equity Non-Aligned Movement National Democrat Party North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Emerging Forces non-governmental organization basic values Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Nahdlatul Ulama Revival/Awakening of Religious Scholars Organization of Islamic Cooperation Organization of the Islamic Conference Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries New Order People’s Alliance for Democracy Local Tax Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence

Great Indonesia Movement Party

Indonesian Islamic Party Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party) Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Pe˘rjuangan (Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle) pembangunan development pembangunan ekonomi economic development pemenuhan hak-hak fulfilment of human rights asasi manusia PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) posisi silang crossroads location PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)

List of Acronyms and Glossary xxiii

PPP PRC prinsip-prinsip PRRI

PT DI PT PAL PT PINDAD REDD+ reformasi SAF salâm santri Sarekat Islam SAS SBY SDI SEANWFZ sejarah shadaqah sharia shûrâ SI SI Sijori SLOC SME stabilitas nasional stabilitas politik TAC tanah-air tasâmuh tawassuth tawâzun tawhid TCG tenang terjadi guncangan politik

purchasing power parity People’s Representative Council principles Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) PT. Dirgantara Indonesia (Indonesia Aerospace Industry) PT. Penataran Angkatan Laut (Navy Upgrading Industry) PT. Pindad (Pindad Industry – government-owned defense manufacturer) (see UN REDD+) reform Singapore Air Force peace urbanized orthodox Muslim Islamic Union Special Air Services (Australia) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Islamic Commercial Union Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone history charity for a return or protection (see also zakat) Islamic law consultation Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) Islamic Union Singapore, Malaysia’s Johor and Indonesia’s Riau Islands (Growth Triangle) sea lines of communication small- to medium-sized enterprise national stability political stability Treaty of Amity and Cooperation homeland tolerance moderation balance belief in the indivisibility and oneness of God Tripartite Core Group quiet/soft political shocks

xxiv List of Acronyms and Glossary

TNI toleran dan menyejukkan TVET ukhuwwah Islamiyah ukhuwwah wathaniyah Ummah UN REDD UN REDD+ UN UNAMID UNCLOS UNDP UNESCAP UNGA UNIFIL UNSC USAID waqf Wawasan Nusantara wong cilik WTO zakat ZOPFAN

Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces) tolerant and soothing Technical and Vocational Education and Training Islamic brotherhood national brotherhood Islamic School United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation UN REDD, joined with additional national and other climate change implementation initiatives United Nations United Nations Mission in Darfur UN Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Development Project United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific United Nations General Assembly United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Security Council U.S. Agency for International Development donation of land for charitable purposes (see also zakat) Archipelago Outlook little people World Trade Organization the obligation of charity as stipulated by the pillars of Islam (see also shadaqah, infaq, waqf ) Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (Treaty)

1 Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian

As Indonesia’s economy grows, it is increasingly being referred to as a rising middle power, and there is mounting speculation that Indonesia might eventually join the ranks of Asia’s great powers. Regardless of just how far Indonesia will rise, its government and the will of its people will become increasingly influential in terms of its regional leadership and the values and the norms Jakarta espouses. Such speculation raises questions as to the domestic opportunities and constraints that inform Indonesia’s rise, and how various domestic contexts affect Indonesia’s foreign policy and the values it espouses. Meanwhile, the image of Indonesia as an increasingly stable and democratic nation has contributed to its significant deepening of security ties with other nations such as Australia and the United States. But how might these ties be perceived across East Asia, and how might East Asian perceptions affect relations with those countries? Within Southeast Asia, what will the rise of a more independent and potentially assertive Indonesia mean for the future of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Will it serve to strengthen this body as Indonesia strengthens what many regard as its natural leadership role within ASEAN, or will it threaten ASEAN’s continued viability and strategic centrality as a more assertive and independent Indonesia opts increasingly to forge its global path independent of other regional nations? And what will Indonesia’s rise mean for the Asian balance of power more generally? Will the Indonesian archipelago, with its vital sea lanes for instance, become a theater for great power competition? Will a rising Indonesia substantially influence the Asian balance by allying with either the United States or China? Or might Jakarta continue to hedge and maintain an equidistant position between the two great powers, thereby acting as a Southeast Asian ‘swing state’? These are the questions and issues that are examined by a diverse range of specialists from Indonesia and its immediate neighborhood. Why a book on this subject? Aside from the above dynamics, issues, and questions, Indonesia is the fifth largest country in terms of population. Further, it is the world’s largest majority Muslim nation and the third 1

2 Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations

largest democracy. While this mix is in itself important in demonstrating that both Islam and democracy can coexist, Indonesia’s economic record is equally impressive: between 2010 and 2014, it has simultaneously maintained an economic growth rate averaging 6 per cent in Real GDP. 1 Just over a decade ago, and following the domestic devastation of the East Asian Financial Crisis, some regional analysts viewed Indonesia as an economic and political ‘basket case’, ready to implode at any moment.2 Despite such pessimistic predictions, Indonesia’s economy—in purchasing power parity terms (PPP)—now represents 33.67 per cent of the combined GDP of all ten of the ASEAN countries, and Indonesia’s GDP has long since surpassed that of conventional middle powers such as Australia and may, within the next few years, also surpass South Korea.3 Moreover, 37.6 per cent of ASEAN’s population is Indonesian (248 million people) and the median age of Indonesia’s population is just 29.2 years. The country also has an abundance of natural resources including hydrocarbons, tin, nickel, timber, bauxite, copper, fertile soils, coal, gold, and silver.4 Regarding its territorial size, the landmass of the Indonesian archipelago is nearly half the combined landmass of ASEAN (42.5 per cent), and within broader East Asia, Indonesia’s territorial size is second only to China. While the above trends and statistics bode well for Indonesia’s future, some of them simultaneously highlight the extent of the catastrophe that would befall the broader Indo-Pacific region should the country significantly destabilize in the future. As will be analyzed in later chapters, Indonesia still faces significant issues regarding the quality of its democratic institutions, economic structures, and infrastructure, as well as continued problems with corruption, religious intolerance, organized crime, terrorism, and separatist movements. The nation shares land-based borders with Malaysia, Timor-Leste, and Papua New Guinea. Indonesia’s territory is separated from Singapore by only ten kilometers of sea; it is 110 kilometers from the Philippines (vis-à-vis Borneo), and just 240 kilometers from Australia (vis-à-vis the tip of Cape York).5 With 17,508 islands—6,000 of which are inhabited6—and the porous nature of their associated borders, the future onset of significant state fragility—or even state failure—could lead to devastating consequences regarding the maintenance of law and order, the eruption of significant violence, the large number of potential refugees, and the onset of heightened piracy and other forms of organized and transnational crime such as illicit narcotics, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. While the risk of significant state fragility will hopefully never be realized, it is important to acknowledge and analyze the challenges that Indonesia continues to confront because, in the very least, their analysis leads to an important discussion regarding how best to respond to these problems and, moreover, such analysis is central to the book’s assessment concerning the future trajectory of Indonesia’s ascent.

Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian 3

Despite Indonesia’s rising regional and global stature, together with the potential risks and consequences of a failed democratic model, only two substantive works have addressed the issue of Indonesia’s rise.7 While these works provide critical insights in a number of spheres, much has happened at the domestic and regional levels since their date of publication. Moreover, nearly half of the authors in the present book are from Indonesia and this, together with the way the book has been structured, is designed to result in a more representative analysis of the domestic and international issues and consequences associated with Indonesia’s ascent. These include analysis of bilateral relations—such as with Australia and also critical ASEAN partners— as well as Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN. There is also a deeper and wider range of contributions concerning the domestic considerations that inform the nature of—and possible constraints to—Indonesia’s ascent. As an expansive archipelagic state, the book also addresses critical issues such as the country’s maritime interests and Jakarta’s potential influence vis-à-vis its neighbors, ASEAN, and the great powers. The analysis in this book has also been reinforced by the application of fundamental conceptual and theoretical insights concerning the impact of identity and norms on the nature of Indonesia’s leadership regarding issues such as religious tolerance and human rights. Further, this book distinguishes itself from other works on the subject by examining the conceptual and analytical properties behind considerations of what it means to be a rising power and how such a phenomenon should be analyzed and measured.

Conceptual foundations: The nature of power and influence in international relations Within the international relations literature, a country that is ascending is generally taken to mean that it is rising in terms of power. Max Weber defines power as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’.8 However, as Robert Gilpin argues, definitions concerning the concept of power are among ‘the most troublesome in the field of international relations’.9 A common realist approach has been to calculate the sum total of a country’s tangible and intangible capabilities—known as the ‘power as resources’ (or capacities) approach, by which resources are interpreted as ‘possessions’ or ‘property’ of the state.10 While the size of each country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the most common single indicator of power, other tangible indicators include population, territory, resource endowment, and military strength.11 Less tangible indicators include ‘political culture, patriotism, education of the population, and strength of the scientific and technological base’.12 Most of the indices that rank the power of states rely on the


measurement of some combination of these resources or capabilities. Examples include the Correlates of War ‘Composite Index of National Capability’ (CINC), the Google Public Data ‘Power Index’, and China’s ‘Comprehensive National Power’ index.13 As argued by Waltz, when seeking power, state actors are in fact seeking to maximize security (that is, survival) rather than the other way around.14 Here, the argument is that through a strong military, which is enabled by a strong economy, countries can mitigate their security dilemma. However, the obtainment of greater security—that is, material power—by one state creates a security dilemma for other states. This dilemma can lead to a cyclical process of action and reaction regarding military procurements and/or investments designed to enhance each state’s military capabilities.15 In a worst case scenario, the process can escalate to the point of an arms race, in which a stable balance of power can be difficult to obtain and significant resources from other sectors are redirected toward state responses to the constantly shifting security dilemma. Within this realist perspective, material power is the core of international relations and security is synonymous with state survival.16 Accordingly, discussions of security are primarily limited to an assessment of military and economic capabilities.17 Thus, Vayrynen argues that a state and its people are only secure when there is a low past, present and future probability of using serious coercive force between or within nations. Coercion can be both military and economic in nature as both of them can inflict major damage and pain on the targeted people. Peace is broken … if people are subjected to physical destruction and suffering. In other words, peace and security mean, ultimately freedom from coercion and its threats.18 The maintenance of ‘security’ within a given state’s territory is a condition that both superpowers and great powers are normally able to sustain. With the exception of fundamental disruptions to the international order—for example, the two world wars—great powers are usually in a position to maintain a ‘balance of power’ by shifting their alignments with other great or emerging powers, and sometimes middle powers, in order to balance against a perceived threat—whether from a great power or a superpower. In the case of the latter, the United States (US) is currently the only country to be characterized as a superpower. While superpowers are generally distinguished from great powers through their possession of global influence in most domains,19 in practice the United States has struggled to assert its will without sufficient international support, particularly in the security domain. Thus, less tangible factors also constrain the actions of superpowers, as the experiences of the US in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq aptly demonstrate.20 Finally, at the material level, superpowers can also be


constrained by contending alignments, and in this regard a new balance in the international order is currently emerging in which resistance to perceived US hegemony—that is, domination—has contributed to a convergence of interests between Russia and China.21 In the interim, and for the purposes of this book, it is important to benchmark the core material attributes of both great and middle powers. Great powers, together with superpowers, determine the structure of the international order; they are the few states that possess ‘the military capabilities to support their foreign policies effectively’.22 However, unlike superpowers, great powers are geographically limited in the exercise of their material power.23 Based on the aforementioned strategies of power balancing and realignments, great powers have sufficient power that they can only be defeated militarily by another great power.24 Following a power as resources ranking, the great powers of the Asia-Pacific are currently China, Russia, India and Japan—the US being a superpower.25 Within this realist lens, middle powers have traditionally been characterized as those states that are ‘weaker than the great powers in the [international] system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small states’.26 However, more specific guidance can be found in the definition provided by Hugh White. In the case of Australia, White argues that ‘[t]o be a middle power, we would need to be able to resist pressure from a major power without the support of another major power. In military terms, that means being able to impose enough costs and risk on the forces that a major power could deploy in our approaches to outweigh whatever benefit it was trying to gain’.27 According to Gilley and O’Neil, the four middle powers in the Asia-Pacific are Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Australia.28 Should the analysis in this book be limited to a power as resources or capabilities approach, then the assessment of Indonesia’s power and its future trajectory would be modest at best. However, a more nuanced and comprehensive assessment can be obtained by reference to two other approaches within the international relations literature: the structural power approach and the relational power approach. In the case of the former, scholars depict structural power as the capacity to establish and/or control political, security and economic structures within the international system. This entails the ability ‘to change the range of choices open to others without apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others’.29 A key example concerns the hegemonic influence of the United States in shaping the global economic order, including its initial role in establishing and maintaining the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates and capital flows. According to some interpretations, when the United States later determined that the Bretton Woods system was constraining its policy options and interests, it then used its hegemonic influence to undermine the very system it had hitherto sustained.30 Relational power, by contrast, seeks to ascertain a causal


relationship whereby State A can influence State B to do something that State B otherwise would not have done.31 According to the relational power approach, power is derived from potential or actual social engagement between states. Thus, rather than being equal to a state’s resources, power is based on the ability of a state to use effectively a mix of both tangible (material) and intangible (ideational or soft power) attributes in a given situation in which the state influences the actions of another state.32 Enrico Fels argues that ‘this shift from a concept of power-as-resources to a relational understanding allows for a more complex understanding of power’ and that ‘some authors have noted that … [the approach has] constituted a revolution in power analysis’.33 Within this approach, power is analyzed across five dimensions: scope, domain, weight, costs, and means. Scope refers to the issue areas— spheres—in which one state has influence over another state or states.34 Domain links to geopolitics and the nexus between power and proximity;35 it considers the number of states and/or the territorial area over which a given state has influence. The weight of a country’s power equates to the reliability of that power and influence. Interdependent with this is the dimension of cost: what economic, material, or other resources will need to be expended by A in order to influence B? The final dimension concerns the means or tools that a state can use to influence another state or states. The means of influence include military, diplomatic, economic, and symbolic—for example, appeals to normative symbols or the provision of information.36 The concept of symbolic ‘influence’ or ‘power’ derives from the constructivist literature. Here, Wendt divides international relations theories into those that emphasize ‘brute material forces’ as bases of power and those that view power as ‘constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts’.37 However, in practice the two paradigms are not mutually exclusive and power embraces both material and ideational aspects. Such ideational components of power—including the constructivist notion of ‘agency’—are compatible with Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power. Soft power concerns the capacity to generate change through co-optation rather than coercion; it is about ‘getting others to want the outcomes you want’.38 The three main resources for soft power are generally considered to involve a state’s ‘culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)’.39 The attractiveness and implications of how culture will affect the influence of one state over another is further qualified by social identity theory, by which states that identify with each other—whether based on culture, norms and/or values— will interact on the basis of absolute gain rather than relative gains.40 As political values are interdependent with identity, an important caveat is that democratic values do not necessarily equate to influence, as their pro-


jection may be interpreted—at the elite level—as a threat to survival by authoritarian regimes.41 Nonetheless, where a country’s political system has been particularly successful—for example, achieving significant stability and economic development—a zeitgeist effect may emerge whereby the political values of one country organically spread to other neighboring countries.42 Such an outcome is a form of co-optation or soft power. Given these considerations, the relational power approach also provides insight regarding the means and behavior to be expected from powers of various tiers—whether a superpower, great power, regional or middle power.43 As noted, regardless of how a state is ranked in terms of power, the extent of power and capabilities a state has can be derived from less tangible sources such as religion, ideology, and nationalism.44 Such capabilities can lead to the exercise of coercive power, such as the national will of the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, or the organic provision of soft power—that is, co-optation or appeal. In the case of middle powers, certain material constraints have historically contributed to—caused—a greater reliance on soft power means. For example, middle powers have historically been viewed ‘as defenders of the balance of power as well as providers of peace and order’.45 In one of the most recent expositions on middle powers, Gilley and O’Neil bring together practically all the relevant literature and find that there are three dimensions to middle power behavior: peace and conflict management, multipolarity, and rules-building.46 Thus, as Cooper, Higgott and Nossal write, ‘middle powers have a tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, … to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and … to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their diplomacy’.47 An understanding of middle powers and their potential rise—for example, this book’s examination of Indonesia—provides critical insight regarding a relational understanding of power because, as Wight highlights inter alia, their support is often sought by the great powers in their quest for regional influence.48 However, and perhaps because of this, ‘there remain serious reservations about the ability of these second tier [middle] powers to supply an abundant measure of international leadership’.49 This caveat links to the aforementioned issue of ‘power being relative to proximity’ and the concept of ‘regional powers’. The countries that have been depicted as regional powers include China, India, Brazil and South Africa, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Indonesia.50 Problematically, and as highlighted earlier, some of these countries have been characterized as ‘great powers’ and the literature has struggled to distinguish between middle powers and regional powers. However, such a debate is somewhat superfluous for the purpose of understanding the dynamics behind Indonesia’s ascent and its future trajectory. Instead, this study limits the distinction to the idea that a regional power not only exercises significant leadership but also bears ‘a special responsibility for regional security and


for the maintenance of order in the region’.51 As mentioned, middle powers have been accredited with a special interest in supporting multilateral institutions. Similarly, regional powers pursue their interests by managing the ongoing power disequilibrium with other great powers through the construction of regional institutions. This behavioral tendency has been conceptualized as cooperative hegemony, which is ‘soft rule within and through co-operative arrangements based on a long-term strategy’.52 The motives and implications of this strategy are described by Detlef Nolte in the following manner: From the perspective of a regional power, a strategy of cooperative hegemony (in contrast to unilateral hegemony) offers the following advantages: regional institutionalization and integration are instruments of power aggregation (advantages of scale). This is especially important for emerging regional powers, which want to boost their influence in global politics. A domination based on cooperative hegemony is more stable and more legitimate because it co-opts other states via positive incentives, because it guarantees stability in the region, and because it makes it more difficult to form counter-alliances inside the region or with states outside of the region. It is inclusive because the strategy facilitates and hedges the access of the regional power to strategic resources (raw materials) in the region. It facilitates the diffusion of political ideas and models which serve the interest of the regional power.53 Having examined the critical forms and attributes of power, it is important to consider the indicators and circumstances by which a state might transition from one characterization to another in terms of power—for instance, from a regional power to an emerging great power. In the context of the indicators, ‘the single most evident commonality is growing economic heft’.54 Further guidance is provided by Andrew Hurrell, who highlights several trends among emerging powers including: increased military and political power resources; the capacity for effective state action; a rising capacity to ‘contribute to the production of international order’; and an associated ‘belief in their entitlement to a more influential role in world affairs’.55 Regarding the potential circumstances behind a transition, one possibility concerns what Commuri terms a ‘historical juncture’. A historical juncture represents a series of events that enable a paradigm shift in a country’s trajectory.56 As noted in later chapters, a pivotal example of such a historical juncture occurred during and in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, when a series of events culminated in the resignation of President Suharto and the collapse of his New Order regime. Fortunately, the power vacuum was filled by reform-minded leaders, and this led to a lengthy period of substantial political and economic reforms (reformasi) resulting in the democratic system that exists today.


Regardless of whether a state undertakes a sudden or a gradual shift in its political and/or economic trajectory, the consolidation of internal cohesion is also critical to the development of the less tangible sources of power such as nationalism and national will. Therefore, the mobilization of domestic resources requires an absence of the attributes of state weakness. State weakness or fragility involves a void in any one of three spheres: (1) a security gap where the state is either unwilling or unable to maintain basic order, for example, protection of the citizens within its territory; (2) a capacity gap where the state is either unwilling or unable ‘to provide other basic social values, such as welfare, liberty, and the rule of law’; and (3) a legitimacy gap ‘in that the state offers little or nothing, and gets no support in return’.57 In the case of Indonesia, for example, the outcomes of state weakness were highly visible in the aftermath of Suharto’s downfall when Indonesia withdrew from its normal leadership role in ASEAN until its proposal for a regional security community—via the Second Bali Concord—in October 2003. In summary, the issue of power and the analysis of power transitions involves an assessment of both the tangible and intangible material resources—capabilities—as well as its relational influence—soft power. However, an analysis of ‘tangible’ power resources does serve as a useful starting point. For example, and as Hugh White contends, ‘[n]o country in history has exercised great power without great wealth’.58 As noted, such wealth and power will generally equate to rising military capabilities. While this outcome can lead to reactions from other countries such as balancing, hedging, or bandwagoning,59 a rising power is not necessarily a disruptive power because the world order is also shaped by values, norms and ideas. Therefore, as argued by Gilley, ‘[r]ising powers that adhere to existing norms and principles and whose structural impact reinforces world order can be non-disruptive even as they change the balance of power’.60 Gilley’s argument complements the relational power approach which, in turn, enables a more nuanced understanding of Indonesia’s power and influence as well as its future trajectory. Here, Andrew Hurrell argues that the next questions that should be asked are: what actors does a state have influence over, for what period, and with regard to what matters?61 However, by the conclusion of the analysis, all five dimensions of power should be examined: scope, domain, weight, costs, and means.

Book structure Based on the framework above, 18 authors in 14 chapters examine the full spectrum of issues that inform Indonesia’s national coherence and domestic capacities. The book’s contributors also examine the implications of domestic developments for the values and norms espoused via Jakarta’s foreign policies. In the second half of the book, Indonesia’s relational


power is examined in the context of its bilateral relationships, role and influence in ASEAN, its relations with the great powers, and the pursuit of its interests in the maritime domain. Nevertheless, the editors to the volume believe in the applicability of ‘path dependency’ and, for this reason, Chapter 2 considers the historical foundations to Indonesia’s place in the region. Here, Sue Thompson argues that Indonesia’s regional leadership and great power dependence were the dominant characteristics of its postwar history. Since Indonesia’s declaration of independence in August 1945, the new nation’s place in the world was viewed as pivotal by outside powers, although Jakarta struggled to balance its desire to avoid external interference in its affairs with the need for financial support. Nevertheless, Indonesian leaders made use of their advantageous position and gained support for some of their foreign policy initiatives. The country’s size and power has meant that most initiatives for regional cooperation initiated by other countries have failed in the absence of Indonesia’s participation. However, internal instability has continuously threatened to destabilize the country. Finally, Thompson assesses the historical basis for Indonesia’s importance as well as its dependency on foreign powers to exercise its leadership role in Southeast Asia and beyond. Chapter 3, by Satish Mishra, provides an analysis of the Indonesian economy in the context of the democratic transition since the Asian Crisis of 1997–98. He challenges the notion that good economic policy necessitates a minimalist role for the state in the economy, insisting that free markets and the democratic state are intertwined with systems of social and economic management, with the state as an active player. The chapter focuses on the macroeconomic dimensions of development policy in the context of structural and political changes in Indonesia, in particular fiscal policy. The state meets competing and growing demands for public services, infrastructure development, public education and other demands revolving around the efficiency of budgetary allocation and the prevention of economic leakage as the core elements of what a developmental state should do. The two inter-related challenges facing Indonesia are to consolidate a democratic state and to build its ability to supply essential public goods, such as health, education, food and physical security. In Chapter 4 Mark Williams examines the political culture of Islam in Indonesia and its nexus with national stability and economic development. He argues that historically the nation’s Islamic political culture has contributed to national stability and been invoked to justify international cooperation. For example, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) transformed the political culture of Islam in Indonesia as organizations challenged political authority and established parties to compete in elections. Despite the tumultuous nature of demokrasi (democracy) and reformasi (reform era), the major Islamic organizations withstood forces of radicalization. Consequently, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono justified Indonesia’s


continued participation with economic globalization, in part through an appeal to Islamic ethics, and identified Islam as a source of strength for Indonesia’s democratic future. In Chapter 5 Bob Lowry, by contrast, examines various political and social movements that threaten to derail Indonesia’s ascent. He predicts that Islamic terrorism and Papua will be continuing challenges, but does not see separatism as a real threat to Indonesia. He forecasts that the greatest threat to Indonesia’s ascent will come from the failure of government to create the plural, open, and inclusive political and economic institutions necessary to lift its population out of poverty. Such failure will inspire a search for political alternatives that could include mass mobilization and the use of violence at the fringes. If this cannot be managed by Indonesia’s civilian police force, it might draw the military (TNI) back into the political fray in ways that are not now imaginable. Stephen Sherlock, in Chapter 6, also provides some cautionary notes in the context of the quality of the country’s political institutions. While his chapter examines ‘Indonesia’s great progress in building democratic institutions since 1998’, he argues that Indonesia today has lost momentum because the political underpinnings of continued economic growth have been neglected. Consequently, there is a backlog of urgent policy reforms, but the Yudhoyono administration has been marked by policy paralysis. While the hardware of a reformed constitution and electoral democracy has been firmly established, the software of democratic politics retains many bugs. In particular, political parties are widely seen as the weak link as they have failed to fulfil roles that are conventionally expected of them in an effective democracy. This is especially true in regard to the development of policy alternatives and recruitment of high-quality candidates for public office, as exemplified by the choice presented to the electorate in the 2014 presidential election. In Chapter 7 Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki examine the contemporary nature of Indonesia’s security outlook and its implications in strategic policymaking. By focusing on the country’s geostrategic location, strategic vulnerabilities, geopolitical aspiration and constitutional mandate, this chapter draws attention to the core interest of the Indonesian government—that is, the maintenance of ‘strategic autonomy’ in its external relationships. Moreover, by looking at recent strategic developments, the authors explore the means by which the post-authoritarian administrations in Indonesia preserve international security and attain a level of selfreliance on national defense. The chapter concludes that only through the effective combination of a cooperative security approach and a defense modernization strategy will the country be adequately prepared for the unlikely event of major international conflict. Chapter 8 is authored by Avery Poole, who demonstrates how Indonesia’s foreign policy has become a higher priority in recent years, and


that the government has tried to improve Indonesia’s international and regional image. Poole argues that Jakarta’s foreign policy goals now emphasize peace, prosperity and stability together with a rising perception by elite in Jakarta that Indonesia has a crucial role in the pursuit of these goals. She argues that significant aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda are explained by the evolution of its ‘democratic identity’—reflecting a set of democratic values—and that this identity has significantly influenced its changing role in the world. According to Poole, the democratization of foreign policymaking itself has also shaped Indonesia’s role, as a broader range of domestic actors are able to express their views and seek to influence policy decisions. However, domestic challenges may constrain Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions and, as outlined in Chapter 16, Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities inevitably shifted following the election of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in July 2014. Chapter 9, by Yulius Hermawan and Ahmad Habir, marks a shift in the book to a more exclusive focus on foreign affairs and international relations. The focus of their chapter is on the challenges Indonesia faces as a newly emerging power in its participation within various international institutions. The chapter emphasizes Jakarta’s involvement in three major but uniquely different international institutions: the United Nations (UN), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Group of Twenty (G-20). The introduction looks at the birth of the ‘free and active’ orientation of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the 1955 Asia–Africa Conference, which laid the foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Hermawan and Habir argue that the Yudhoyono government had preserved the essence of the traditional narratives of Indonesian foreign policy while reshaping it in the context of Indonesia’s economic and political ascent. In the process, Indonesia has influenced global agendas and strengthened its position in representing the interests of the developing world. However, as argued in Chapter 13 by Roberts and Widyaningsih, there is also a need for Indonesia to strengthen its representation of the interests of ASEAN in these forums— particularly the G-20. Given that Indonesia’s foreign policy may have shifted considerably as a consequence of significant structural changes to its political institutions and an evolution in the political values associated with such reforms, it is important to examine the implications of these developments for Indonesia’s relationships in its immediate neighborhood. The next four chapters examine various aspects of its relationships with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and ASEAN more broadly. Consequently, in Chapter 10 Christopher Roberts and Ahmad Habir examine both the contemporary areas of progress as well as the long-term and persistent issues that have challenged the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Australia. In the case of Australia, an interdependent mix of weak social relations and underdeveloped trade links has significantly undermined the


foundations of the relationship. The subsequent lack of societal affinity and mutual understanding has enabled the political elite of Australia—and, to some extent, certain segments of Jakarta—to fail to appreciate the full importance of the relationship—and thereby disregard each other’s interests—and, at times, even undermine the relationship by pandering to populist rhetoric for domestic political gains. That said, the level of cooperation and collaboration between certain sectors of the two governments in recent years—for example, intelligence, the federal police, and the military—has been nothing short of remarkable and it is also argued that this trend has been reinforced by Indonesia’s democratic transition. Mark Beeson and Will Lee, in Chapter 11, build on the analysis by canvassing the prospects for middle-power cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. In line with the conceptual framework from this chapter, they also argue that middle powers are not only defined by their material attributes, but by their willingness to collaborate in order to institute rules-based behavior in international politics. However, Beeson and Lee argue that despite both Australia and Indonesia harboring ambitions of middle-power diplomacy, their respective national interests impose limits on what they can collaborate on. For Australia, its unalloyed alliance with the United States hampers middle-power activism, while for Indonesia, the Westphalian parameters of the ‘ASEAN Way’ constrain initiatives that seek to attenuate state sovereignty in international politics. Chapter 12, by Yongwook Ryu, reviews Indonesia’s bilateral relations with key neighbors, namely, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, and notes that all three bilateral relationships have meaningfully developed under the institutional settings of ASEAN. Security cooperation has been especially encouraging, with the resolution of some territorial and boundary disputes and the initiation of joint maritime patrols. Despite this, more can be achieved in the maritime and non-traditional security domains, and the countries should work to develop and consolidate both the quality and quantity of interactions under regular institutional settings. This is increasingly necessary and important because the days when stable bilateral relations were sustained by strong rapport between individual leaders—the former ASEAN ‘strongmen’—have long since passed. There are several issues, including boundary disputes and emotional issues, that could adversely affect the bilateral relationships, but it is expected that these relationships will progress positively, even if slowly, in the future. Christopher Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih’s analysis in Chapter 13 considers the factors supporting and motivating Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN, and their implications for the Association. The chapter examines Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN in terms of: its role in managing crises and mediating conflicts and disputes; Indonesia’s leadership and norm entrepreneurship within ASEAN; and finally, Indonesia’s rising global profile, which complements the significance of its leadership in ASEAN. Each area


of leadership has resulted in a diverse field of both positive and, at times, negative implications for Indonesia and the Association. While the size, economy and power of Indonesia means that ASEAN cannot survive in the absence of Indonesia’s leadership, the chapter demonstrates that Indonesia continues to face resistance from some of its ASEAN colleagues. As a result, its attempts to institutionalize democratic values, human rights, and a more effective decisionmaking process within ASEAN have been particularly difficult to realize. Chapter 14, authored by See Seng Tan, examines Indonesia’s relationship with the great powers and whether ASEAN will still matter to Indonesia in the future. Tan highlights that with Indonesia’s ascendance as a player in world affairs and apparent disunity within ASEAN—long the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy—a debate has emerged within Indonesian strategic circles regarding a ‘post-ASEAN’ foreign policy for Indonesia. Nonetheless, his chapter argues that ASEAN will remain relevant for Indonesia for three reasons. First, the institution continues to be useful in supporting Indonesia’s propensity to hedge against the great powers. Second, despite Indonesia’s membership in the G-20, the evolving regional architecture established by ASEAN and its dialogue partners remains relevant to Indonesia’s engagement with external powers and global actors. Third, despite its purported pride of place in Indonesian foreign policy, ASEAN regionalism has historically never been Indonesia’s exclusive option, but could remain one of several in Indonesia’s policy toolkit. Chapter 15, authored by Sebastian, Supriyanto, and Arsana, examines Indonesia’s maritime interests and argues that Indonesia’s approach to maritime security has always emphasized an inward-looking emphasis to security owing to the Archipelago Outlook (Wawasan Nusantara) doctrine, which has primarily emphasized the primacy of national unity and territorial integrity. For much of Indonesia’s post-independence history, the security situation in and around Indonesia’s archipelagic waters remained tranquil and benign, especially during the Cold War. The region’s current geopolitical environment, now characterized by the rise of maritime powers in Asia, will require Indonesian strategic planners to adopt more proactive security strategies, particularly in relation to archipelagic sea lanes (ASLs) and associated maritime choke-points (Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits). The chapter concludes by analyzing how a rising Indonesia may redefine the security of its maritime domain in light of the growing assertive presence of the great powers in the sea lanes of East and Southeast Asia. Authored by Leonard Sebastian and Christopher Roberts, the concluding chapter (Chapter 16) speculates on the foreign policy priorities of the new Joko Widodo Administration, emphasizing that Indonesia’s growing international profile as an emerging power will be another further indication of power shifts in global politics. Indonesia’s size, strategic location, potential


economic trajectory and pivotal regional role within ASEAN are significant indicators of its latent potential. Like India, China, Brazil and Russia, it remains vulnerable to internal instability, which from time to time threatens to destabilize the country, undermining its ability to achieve its full potential. Further, Indonesia continues to be a developing economy and a developing society. Regardless of this, Indonesia has never allowed its lack of material capabilities to hinder its regional and global ambitions. However, its post-independence history clearly provides evidence that Indonesia was willing to challenge the status quo and that it also sought to revise the prevailing norms of the Cold War era to reflect values enshrined in its Constitution and promote its national interests of the time. The need for domestic consolidation and national development has since tempered Indonesia’s ambitions significantly. Instead, through the promotion of a new form of multilateralism, Indonesia has sought to create in Southeast Asia what Hurrell has termed a ‘consensual hegemony’ through a combination of strategies that embody a ‘particular set of values’ and its ability project a regional position that ‘is actively supported by those outside the region’.

Notes 1 ‘Economic Factsheets’, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014, www.dfat.gov.au [accessed 25 July 2014]. 2 Presentation by Senior Official, Canadian Armed Forces (University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba), October 2001. See also Jamie A. C. Mackie, Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects, Lowy Institute Paper (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2007), p. 59. 3 ‘Economic Factsheets’, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014. 4 ‘Indonesia’, CIA World Fact Book, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/ [accessed 24 July 2014]. 5 Measurements made via Google Earth ‘ruler’ tool. 6 ‘Indonesia’, CIA World Fact Book, 2014. 7 Anthony Reid, ed., Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012); Tamara Nasir, Indonesia Rising: Islam, Democracy and the Rise of Indonesia as a Major Power (Singapore: Select Books, 2009). 8 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), p. 152. 9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 13. 10 Fen Zhang, ‘Reconceiving the Balance of Power: A Review Essay’, Review of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2011): p. 643. 11 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: AddisonWesley, 1979), p. 131. 12 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 9th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2010), p. 47. 13 ‘Power Index (Percent of Global Total) – Base Case’, Google Public Data, 2013, http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=n4ff2muj8bh2a_&ctype=l&strail =false&nselm=h&met_y=POWER&hl=en&dl=en#ctype=l&strail=false&nselm=h


14 15 16

17 18

19 20

21

&met_y=POWER&fdim_y=scenario:1&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=world&idi m=ungroup:219&idim=country:CN:US:IN&hl=en&dl=en [accessed 18 March 2013]; ‘National Material Capabilities’, Correlates of War, 2013, http://correlatesofwar.org/ [accessed 9 March 2013], David J. Singer, ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985’, International Interactions 14, no. 2 (1987): pp. 115–32. Cited in Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 42. Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan and Steven C. Roach, International Relations: The Key Concepts, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 291. According to Gelb, ‘power is the platinum coin of the international realm, and that little or nothing can be accomplished without it’. Cited in Enrico Fels, ‘Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers’, in Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer and Katharina Kronenburg, ed., Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), p. 5. However, as demonstrated by later arguments in the section, broader behavioural conceptions of power are also central components of other approaches such as constructivism. For example, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 94. For Gilpin, the only relevant resources that constitute a state’s power are military, economic, and technological means. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. Raimo Vayrynen, ‘Stable Peace through Security Communities’, in Arie Kacowicz et al., ed., Stable Peace among Nations (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 112. Fels, ‘Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers’, p. 11. One example of the salience of intangible power concerns the case of the Vietnam War. The United States had overwhelming superiority in terms of tangible military power ‘and used virtually all military means short of nuclear war to bring about a North Vietnamese withdrawal’. Yet, despite this, the Vietnamese were able to tip of scales of overall power in their favor by drawing on a massive volume of intangible power. In the Vietnamese case, their intangible power was both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. The direct intangible power consisted, inter alia, of being able to seize and utilize massive amounts of national will or nationalism. The indirect-intangible power was provided by the US through the ‘deteriorating support for the war in the United States and among Washington’s allies’ and the Vietnamese were able to achieve politically what they could not achieve militarily: governmental self-determination and the expulsion of American force’. Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, 5th ed. (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1985), p. 246. In May 2014, one of the world’s largest commercial agreements was signed between the leaders of China and Russia, a US$400 billion agreement to supply Russian gas to China. The two countries have strengthened what they term their ‘strategic partnership’ and this has been broadly reported as a move to counter ‘U.S. influence and create greater room to pursue their economic and strategic interests’—such as in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in the case of Moscow and in the East and South China Seas in the case of Beijing. Brian Spegele and Wayne Ma, ‘Analysis: Putin Visit Shows China’s Strength’, The Wall Street Journal, 16 May 2014; Andrew Browne, ‘Chian’s World: Sino-U.S. Discord Grows as


22

23 24 25

26

27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39

40

Beijing Courts Russia’, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 28 May 2014. President Putin himself stated, in interview, that the relations between the two countries have developed to an all-time high and added that the relationship ‘will significantly influence the modern architecture of international relations’. ‘Putin Hails Russia’s Relationship with China’, Reuters, 17 April 2014. David A. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, ed., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2005), p. 177. Fels, ‘Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers’, p. 11. Goldstein and Pevehouse, International Relations, p. 54. Globally, Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil list the following as great powers: the U.S., China, Japan, India, German, Russia, Brazil, the U.K., and France. Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, ‘China’s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers’, in Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, ed., Middle Powers and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), p. 5. Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 4. See also Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 441. Hugh White, ‘Power Shift: Rethinking Australia’s Place in the Asian Century’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011): p. 92. Gilley and O’Neil, ‘China’s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers’, p. 5. Susan Strange, States and Markets, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 1988), p. 31. Ngaire Woods, ‘International Political Economy in an Age of Globalisation’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, ed., The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 244–9. Robert. A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioural Science 2, no. 3 (1957): p. 202. Fels, ‘Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers’, p. 6. Ibid. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, p. 178. In other words, power and power projection are relative to proximity and, therefore, there ‘are some states which are “powerful within their geographic regions” … but not able to express similar power globally’. Andrew Carr, ‘Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): p. 73. This chapter builds on this notion in the context of the literature on ‘regional powers’ and ‘emerging powers’. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, pp. 178–9. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 97. Joseph S. Nye., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5. Gitika Commuri, ‘“Are You Pondering What I am Pondering?” Understanding the Conditions under which States Gain and Lose Soft Power’, in Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer and Katharina Kronenburg, ed., Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), p. 44. According to Hemmer and Katzenstein, these ‘findings have been consistent across studies even with the flimsiest and most arbitrarily defined groups’.

18 Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism’, in Matthew Evangelista, ed., Critical Concepts in Political Science (Milton Park: Routledge, 2005), p. 114. Identity is a relative phenomenon. The notion of a relative differentiation between groups is explained by Trine Flockhard in the following manner: What actually happens is that identities are constructed through complex constellations of ‘we-groups’ in a system of social groups consisting of the ‘Self’/‘We’, placed in a hierarchical system between the ‘Other’ and what I call the ‘Significant We’. The ‘Other defines what the “Self”/“We” is not and what it seeks to distance itself from, whereas the “Significant We” is as important (perhaps even more so) for the construction of identities, as is the other’. Trine Flockhart, ‘“Complex Socialisation”: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization’, European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006): p. 94. 41 Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012), pp. 119–24. 42 December Green and Laura Luehrmann, Comparative Politics in the Third World: Linking Concepts and Cases (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 187–224. 43 Here, the term small power has been deliberately excluded as while small powers can undertake strategies to increase the probability of state survival—e.g. bandwagon—for the purpose of this chapter and the book, they do not project sufficient power or adequately influence the actions of other states to warrant a separate category of analysis. 44 Goldstein and Pevehouse, International Relations, p. 46. 45 Carsten Holbraad cited in Fels, ‘Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers’, p. 14. 46 Regarding multipolarity, some scholars claim that middle powers are also counter-hegemonic. Within this perspective, the middle powers of Australia and Canada have been interpreted as exceptional case studies. Gilley and O’Neil, ‘China’s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers’, pp. 12–13. 47 Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgot and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), p. 19. 48 Cited in Fels, ‘Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers’, p. 14. 49 Andrew Fenton Cooper, ‘Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview’, in Andrew Fenton Cooper, ed., Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 13. 50 However, as with middle power analysis, much debate surrounds such classifications. See Detlef Nolte, ‘How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics’, Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): p. 883. 51 Ibid., p. 890. However, the clear dominance of a regional power is not as prevalent as one might first expect. This is because smaller powers can easily defect from such influence by aligning with a great power that is outside the region. In the context of Southeast Asia, one example could be the Philippines as it has a treaty relationship with the United States and has been depicted as a regional outlier by scholars such as Amitav Acharya. Donald E. Weatherbee, International


52

53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60

61

Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Regional Autonomy, 2nd ed. (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p. 13. Thomas Pederson’s use of the term ‘strategy’ is not accidental. He argues that the ‘theory of co-operative hegemony is based upon an ideational-institutional realism, not a structural realist theory’. Thomas Pedersen, ‘Cooperation Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration’, Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (2002): p. 683. Nolte, ‘How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics’, p. 895. Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, ‘How do Rising Powers Rise?’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52, no. 6 (2010): p. 65. Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?’, International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): pp. 1–2. Commuri, ‘“Are you Pondering What I am Pondering?” Understanding the Conditions under Which States Gain and Lose Soft Power’, p. 55. Georg Sorensen, ‘After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Liberal Values’, Security Dialogue 38, no. 3 (2007): pp. 365–6. Cited in Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘China’s Rise and the Passing of U.S. Primacy: Australia Debates its Future’, Asia Policy 17, no. 12 (2011): p. 19. Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2010): pp. 366–9. Bruce Gilley, ‘Middle Powers during Great Power Transitions: China’s Rise and the Future of Canada-US Relations’, International Journal Spring (2011): pp. 247–8. Andrew Hurrell, ‘Rising Powers and the Emerging Global Order’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, ed., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 87.

Bibliography Baldwin, David A. (2005) ‘Power and International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds, Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage). Browne, Andrew (2014) ‘China’s World: Sino–US Discord Grows as Beijing Courts Russia’, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 28 May, 2. Carr, Andrew (2014) ‘Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, 1: 70–84. Commuri, Gitika (2014) ‘“Are You Pondering What I Am Pondering?” Understanding the Conditions under Which States Gain and Lose Soft Power’, in Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer and Katharina Kronenburg, eds, Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World (Dordrecht: Springer), 43–57. Cooper, Andrew Fenton (1997) ‘Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview’, in Andrew Fenton Cooper, ed., Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (New York: St Martin’s Press), 1–24. Cooper, Andrew Fenton, Richard A. Higgot and Kim Richard Nossal (1993) Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press).

20 Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations Dahl, Robert A. (1957) ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioural Science 2, no. 3: 201–15. Emmers, Ralf (2003) Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon). Fels, Enrico (2012) ‘Power Shift? Power in International Relations and the Allegiance of Middle Powers’, in Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer and Katharina Kronenburg, eds, Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World (Dordrecht: Springer), 3–27. Flockhart, Trine (2006) ‘“Complex Socialisation”: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization’, European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1: 89–118. Gilley, Bruce (2011) ‘Middle Powers during Great Power Transitions: China’s Rise and the Future of Canada–US Relations’, International Journal Spring: 245–64. Gilley, Bruce and Andrew O’Neil (2014) ‘China’s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers’, in Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, eds, Middle Powers and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), 1–22. Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Goldstein, Joshua S. and Jon C. Pevehouse (2010) International Relations, 9th ed. (New York: Pearson). Green, December and Laura Luehrmann (2007) Comparative Politics in the Third World: Linking Concepts and Cases (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Griffiths, Martin, Terry O’Callaghan and Steven C. Roach (2008) International Relations: The Key Concepts, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge). Hart, Andrew F. and Bruce D. Jones (2010) ‘How Do Rising Powers Rise?’. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52, no. 6: 63–88. Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein (2005) ‘Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism’, in Matthew Evangelista, ed., Critical Concepts in Political Science (Milton Park: Routledge), 102–36. Holbraad, Carsten (1984) Middle Powers in International Politics (London: Macmillan Press). Hurrell, Andrew (2006) ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?’. International Affairs 82, no. 1: 1–19. ——— (2014) ‘Rising Powers and the Emerging Global Order’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, eds, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 80–94. Jones, Walter S. (1985) The Logic of International Relations, 5th ed. (Boston: Little Brown & Co.). Mackie, Jamie A. C. (2007) Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects, Lowy Institute Paper (Sydney: Lowy Institute). Morgenthau, Hans (1961) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). Nasir, Tamara (2009) Indonesia Rising: Islam, Democracy and the Rise of Indonesia as a Major Power (Singapore: Select Books). ‘National Material Capabilities’, Correlates of War (2013) http://correlatesofwar.org/ [accessed 9 March 2013]. Nolte, Detlef (2010) ‘How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics’, Review of International Studies 36, no. 4: 881–901. Nye, Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs).

Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian 21 Pedersen, Thomas (2002) ‘Cooperation Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration’, Review of International Studies 28, no. 4: 677–96. ‘Power Index (Percent of Global Total)–Base Case’ (2012) Google Public Data, http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=n4ff2muj8bh2a_&ctype=l&strail=f alse&nselm=h&met_y=POWER&hl=en&dl=en#ctype=l&strail=false&nselm=h&met _y=POWER&fdim_y=scenario:1&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=world&idim=ungr oup:219&idim=country:CN:US:IN&hl=en&dl=en [accessed 18 March 2013]. ‘Putin Hails Russia’s Relationship with China’ (2014) Reuters, 17 April. Reid, Anthony (ed.) (2012) Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS). Roberts, Christopher B. (2012) ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge). Ross, Robert S. (2010) ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15, no. 3: 355–95. Singer, David J. (1987) ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985’, International Interactions 14, no. 2: 115–32. Sorensen, Georg (2007) ‘After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Liberal Values’, Security Dialogue 38, no. 3: 357–78. Spegele, Brian and Wayne Ma (2014) ‘Analysis: Putin Visit Shows China’s Strength’, The Wall Street Journal, 16 May. Strange, Susan (1988) States and Markets, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum). Thayer, Carlyle A. (2011) ‘China’s Rise and the Passing of U.S. Primacy: Australia Debates Its Future’, Asia Policy 17, no. 12: 20–6. Vayrynen, Raimo (2000) ‘Stable Peace through Security Communities’, in Arie Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, Ole Elgstrom and Alexander Jerneck, eds, Stable Peace among Nations (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield), 108–29. Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley). Weatherbee, Donald E. (2010) International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Regional Autonomy, 2nd ed. (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield). Weber, Max (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press). Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). White, Hugh (2011) ‘Power Shift: Rethinking Australia’s Place in the Asian Century’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1: 81–93. Woods, Ngaire (2014) ‘International Political Economy in an Age of Globalisation’, in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, eds, The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 243–57. Zhang, Fen (2011) ‘Reconceiving the Balance of Power: A Review Essay’, Review of International Studies 37, no. 2: 641–51.

2 Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and Global Role, 1945–751 Sue Thompson

Despite turbulent times, Indonesia has been a rising power in Asia since independence, and has become increasingly prominent on the world stage. Many scholars have highlighted Indonesia’s large population and its abundance of strategic resources—which was the focus of government, business and the military—as the reason for its prominence in regional and global affairs.2 Some have also emphasized Indonesia’s strong sense of nationalism as a legacy of its long struggle for independence from Dutch colonialism,3 while others have stressed the importance of international relations during the Cold War.4 Stemming from these three perspectives are considerations of the extent to which Indonesian leaders have influenced their nation’s future, and the degree to which outside powers have shaped the development of Southeast Asia’s most populous country. Indeed, primary source material shows that Indonesia’s regional position has been the result of various factors. Internationally and historically, Indonesia has been strategically and economically significant: the close ties between the Suharto government and consecutive United States (US) governments reveal the increasing influence that Jakarta is capable of exerting globally, despite its dependence on foreign support.

Nationalism, revolution and independence Before independence, Indonesia had been a major colony in Southeast Asia; ruled by the Dutch and known as the Netherlands East Indies, it consisted of wealthy estates producing rubber, sugar, spices, tea and other crops. Under the Dutch, the colonial administration suppressed radical Indonesian nationalist organizations, exiled a number of nationalist leaders and, by 1942, many Indonesians were hostile to Dutch rule. The Second World War prepared the foundation for change. In 1942, the Japanese occupied the Netherlands East Indies, trained and armed an Indonesian army and encouraged the return of exiled nationalist leaders, 22

Sue Thompson 23

promising Indonesia independence. Indonesian nationalists were then able to exploit the power vacuum created by the Japanese surrender in 1945. In Jakarta, on 17 August, Sukarno proclaimed independence, becoming the first president of the Indonesian Republic. Despite this declaration, The Hague sought to re-establish its position in Southeast Asia. Indonesia remained of great economic value, particularly for Holland’s postwar economic recovery, but also as a symbol of its wider world importance. However, the Dutch lacked the military power to restore their colonial authority and sought British and Australian assistance. Britain had the responsibility of disarming Japan in southern Indochina and western Indonesia, including Java, the most populous island in the region. Australia held military control over eastern Indonesia. Australian troops allowed Dutch forces to re-establish military presence in the east Indonesian islands, where Republic of Indonesia forces were weaker. Yet, having been forewarned that it would be a major military endeavor to overthrow the Republic, Britain was initially unwilling to permit Dutch troops to land on the republican strongholds of Java and Sumatra, instead pressing the Dutch into negotiations. London worried that one part of Southeast Asia could be disadvantaged economically and politically by instability in other parts of that region. Consequently, the welfare of British territories in the Far East depended on the stability of other parts of that region.5 Recovery of the Netherlands East Indies’ trade and assets depended on settlement of the troubles in Java. London saw its role as ‘trustees for our Allies the French and the Dutch, whose sovereignty in their respective colonial territories we have a strong moral obligation to restore’ and therefore hoped to help broker a settlement between the nationalist movements and Britain’s allies.6 Both America and the Cold War became key factors in Indonesian independence. After World War II, the US was overseeing the reconstruction of the Japanese economy as a key element of its strategy to stem the spread of communism in the region. Japan’s economic progress would depend greatly on expanded exports of industrial goods and imports of regional resources. Washington had begun considering Southeast Asia, and especially resource-rich Indonesia as a well-situated and wealthy market for Japanese trade. In 1947, the US provided aid to the Netherlands East Indies to expedite economic reconstruction and the resumption of regional trade. This assistance was supplied on the assumption that the Dutch would regain sovereignty over the entirety of the former colony. Washington noted that the goal of Indonesian nationalists, despite their making public statements welcoming private foreign capital, appeared ‘to be the achievement of a state along Socialist lines’. Indonesian republican leaders seemed to be attempting to balance their ‘basic Socialist aspirations’ with the need to attract foreign capital for the sake of the economy.7

24 Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and Global Role, 1945–75

However, the Dutch were losing control, and colonial and Western nations considered that continued instability in Southeast Asia could work to communist advantage. Washington lent its support for United Nationssponsored Indonesian–Dutch negotiations, leading to a cease-fire agreement in January 1948. Later that year, the Indonesian army crushed a rebellion at Madiun in Java launched by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), at the time closely associated with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For the Americans, this action made Sukarno a much more acceptable independence leader. The Dutch made a last attempt to win militarily, but Washington responded by encouraging The Hague to agree in November 1949 to hand over all the islands of the Netherlands East Indies, with the exception of West New Guinea (also known as West Irian, Irian Jaya, West Papua), to the Indonesian Republic. West New Guinea remained open for negotiation as the Dutch insisted on keeping the territory. The Indonesians were concerned about this concession because if one portion of the former Dutch colony was allowed to break away from the region, a precedent might be set for other territories to secede. However, during the negotiations, the urgency to achieve independence resulted in the Indonesian leadership relinquishing West New Guinea so as not to delay independence: acquisition of that territory would have to wait. Indeed, Sukarno announced in a major speech in August 1950, ‘Irian is also Indonesian territory … not tomorrow, not the day after tomorrow, but now at this very moment’.8 American support for Indonesia was associated with Washington’s growing eagerness to halt communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Behind this lay the growing international interest for the significant natural resources in the region and the fact that in 1950 Malaya and Indonesia produced more than half of the world’s natural rubber and tin, and that Indonesia’s exports in 1949 reached the value of US$500 million.9 Therefore, the threat of communist takeovers in the region could greatly threaten Japan’s political and economic reconstruction.10 In addition, Washington would encourage South-East Asian nations to restore and build their own economies and expand both commerce and the flow of raw materials with their neighbors, and in particular, Indonesia was pivotal in achieving these aims. Washington would thus seek to strengthen the noncommunist elements in the government in Jakarta and promote Indonesian economic development, which would then encourage regional security in South-East Asia.11

Guided democracy By the mid-1950s there was increasing support for communism in Indonesia. In that nation’s first national election in 1955, the PKI, which increasingly adopted Maoist policies and had been allowed to campaign

Sue Thompson 25

openly, received almost 16 per cent of the vote, a major comeback after the Madiun uprising in 1948. After these elections, the Communists were the fourth largest party in a parliament where no party had a majority of seats.12 In 1957, Sukarno suspended parliamentary government in favor of presidential rule under the term ‘Guided Democracy’. Under this new system, the PKI and the army started to consolidate their positions. From the mid-1950s, Jakarta moved away from Western support, reflecting not only the growing influence of the PKI in the Sukarno government, but also the Indonesian leader’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Sukarno emphasized that Indonesians should see themselves as part of a global struggle against the forces of imperialism. In that context, he sought to become leader in a group of non-aligned states, hosting a conference of African and Asian nations at Bandung, Java in 1955. However, although Sukarno sought to maximize Indonesian independence, many regarded internal subversion as the primary threat to national security.13 During the 1950s there was growing resentment in the outer islands towards the government in Jakarta, with a number of rebellions occurring in the Moluccas, northern Sulawesi, and northern Sumatra. While much of Indonesia’s population lived on the island of Java, a large proportion of the country’s natural resources were located on these outer islands. In March 1957, Colonel Sumual, the regional military commander in east Indonesia, proclaimed martial law over his district and declared a Charter of Universal Struggle, named Permesta. Other military officers and civilian leaders supported the Charter, which called for the restoration of regional rights in Indonesia, including financial autonomy and a greater input regarding the appointment of government officials. The Charter did not call for secession, but rather for fundamental reform in Indonesia.14 In February 1958, another insurrection occurred in northern Sumatra in which the rebels received outside help in the form of weapons and equipment. Australia, Britain and the US were involved covertly because of both the anti-communist views expressed by the rebels, and concern over developments in Sukarno’s government. The Indonesian military quickly crushed the regional uprisings, leaving a legacy of Indonesian hostility to the West. Sukarno then turned more toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (USSR) for military support and economic aid. Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev visited Indonesia in 1960. His visit resulted in an arms deal between the two nations.15 Armed with new Soviet weapons, Jakarta renewed its attention on West New Guinea. There was now deep concern in Washington that Jakarta might move closer to the communist bloc. Eager to halt the spread of communism in Indonesia, Washington leaned on The Hague to participate in peace talks with Jakarta. In January 1961, President John F. Kennedy’s new administration sought peaceful settlement of the dispute in Indonesia’s favor. Britain


also backed down from supporting the Netherlands. The result was that in August 1962 Indonesia achieved the right to occupy West New Guinea on 1 May 1963, although the agreement included a face-saving clause to assuage the Dutch. In 1969, there would be a UN-supervised vote on the future of the territory by the indigenous people. Indonesia had finally completed its struggle for independence from the Netherlands. However, the international environment in 1963 was significantly different to that of 1945. Indonesian nationalism and independence had moved from being part of the postwar decolonization process to an important factor in Cold War strategy in Southeast Asia. The Kennedy administration also looked to expand economic and military assistance to Jakarta, thus laying the groundwork for a clash between the PKI and the Indonesian military in which Washington hoped that the latter would eliminate the communists.16 However, despite American aid, Sukarno’s policies coincided with economic decline. The government had neglected restoration of the domestic economic infrastructure, which the Second World War and the war for independence had devastated. Indonesia could not reap the full benefit of its great natural resources; there was a massive national debt and accelerating inflation. This period saw a contest between leaders striving for economic stabilization and those wanting to perpetuate the revolution.17 Under those conditions, Sukarno initiated another regional military campaign, this time against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia.

Konfrontasi (Confrontation) The Federation of Malaysia, inaugurated on 16 September 1963, was a solution to the problem of the decolonization of Britain’s remaining Southeast Asian possessions: Singapore and the territories of Brunei, Sarawak and British North Borneo. Malaya had achieved independence in 1957 after its defeat of the communist insurgency, but Singapore—which Britain administered separately, and which contained an important British naval base— was not initially included in independent Malaya. However, continuing pressure for Singapore’s integration into Malaya resulted in opposition among Malay political leaders, because the incorporation of Singapore, where the majority of the population was ethnically Chinese, would give the latter a clear majority population in Malaya. To prevent this occurring, in May 1961 Malayan Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman advocated the inclusion of the British territories in Borneo within an amalgamated state of Malaya and Singapore. That proposal would give the new nation a majority of ethnically Malay people.18 Britain agreed to the proposal to incorporate their Borneo territories into Malaysia, as they would otherwise have difficulty surviving economically as independent countries, or even as an independent federation. In addition,

Sue Thompson 27

competing Malayan and Indonesian influences in the region might eventually lead to pressure from the Borneo territories for an end to colonial rule.19 Furthermore, the agreement would ensure security for Britain’s military installation in Singapore, as two of the main conditions were the extension of the defense agreement between Britain and Malaya to all the territories in the new federation, and that the British would not be restricted in their use of the Singapore base.20 In 1961, Indonesia’s foreign minister, Dr Subandrio, initially indicated approval for the creation of the Federation of Malaysia. However, this soon changed with Sukarno’s suppression of uprisings in Sumatra and Sulawesi, as well as the incorporation of West New Guinea into Indonesia. These events had strengthened Sukarno’s position in Jakarta, while opposition to Malaysia provided a useful distraction from economic problems and the factional conflict between the PKI and the army within the Indonesian government.21 The PKI presented an image of Malaysia as a colonial outpost, worried that the new federation would provide Malaysia with economic success and threaten the socialist agenda in Indonesia. The army opposed the new nation because the inclusion of Singapore could result in Chinese domination with loyalties to China.22 Sukarno also labeled the Federation of Malaysia as British neo-imperialist. He claimed that the creation of Malaysia would ensure continued British presence in Southeast Asia—militarily at Singapore and economically through British ownership of resource industries. During the previous year, Sukarno had been gradually moving Indonesia closer to Chinese antiimperialist ideals. In October 1962, Sukarno’s second wife had been guest of honor at national celebrations in Beijing and Subandrio had held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai, in April 1963. These links were encouraged by the leader of the PKI, D. N. Aidit, because Zhou was steadily increasing support for the communists in Indonesia.23 In opposition to the creation of Malaysia, Sukarno launched a campaign known as Confrontation (Konfrontasi). Within Britain’s Borneo territories, the major source of opposition to federation came from the Sultan of Brunei, and that territory remained external to the new federation. For the other Borneo leaders, the merger was the only path to independence from Britain. However, there were also anti-Malaysian tendencies within these territories, which Sukarno sought to exploit. By late 1963, Indonesia was sponsoring and supporting Sarawak guerrillas opposed to the Federation.24 Indonesia faced major military problems in launching Confrontation. One was the nature of its army. The Indonesian army was essentially a guerrilla force, which its doctrine reflected. Its leaders in the 1960s had mostly gained their first major military experience in the guerrilla war against the Dutch. Therefore, the Indonesian military had developed a defensive territorial doctrine: to defend Indonesia and its core principles. This included maintaining internal security against threats of rebellion that


had become a major concern for the newly independent government. Another objective of the army was to counter PKI influence.25 While the conflict never became a full-scale war, hostilities continued, and Malaysia secured reinforcements from Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The United States had initially left Confrontation to the British, with Kennedy stating clearly that American forces would not commit support for Malaysia. Nonetheless, he had agreed to resuscitate multilateral aid to Indonesia in exchange for a commitment from Sukarno to negotiations and a withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Borneo, reflecting the strategic and economic importance he placed on the resource-rich nation. Following Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, the new Johnson administration altered the direction of United States policy towards Indonesia.26 Johnson disliked Sukarno’s accommodation of communists in his government; Congress drafted a resolution halting aid to Indonesia unless it was in the national interest. By the end of March 1964, Johnson decided to cut United States’ aid to Indonesia significantly.27 However, from as early as September 1963 American assistance to Jakarta had been steadily declining. United States aid was concentrated on training civilians within Indonesia and military personnel in the United States. Concerned that the antiMalaysian cause in Indonesia might influence radical nationalists or the PKI, Washington was careful not to provide aid that would help Sukarno’s campaign against Malaysia. Nevertheless, it sought to perpetuate a military training program that would continue the special links that the United States had developed with Indonesian army officers, ties ‘which have reinforced the army’s anti-Communist posture and have given us unique entrée into the leadership of the country’s strongest politico-military force.’28 Efforts such as these reveal that Washington’s support for politicomilitary and economic development in Indonesia in the early 1960s encouraged the emergence of a military regime in Jakarta in the mid1960s.29 While Konfrontasi resulted in external pressure on Sukarno, tension also continued within Indonesia. A meeting in early 1965 of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI)—a military command headed by Sukarno— recommended that the government seize all Western business interests; declare persona non grata any US officials engaged in subversive activities; and investigate clandestine radio broadcasts believed to be contributing to conflicts between Islamic activists and the PKI. Washington was alarmed that the PKI appeared to be increasing its influence in Jakarta and that Sukarno either did not want to curb the communists’ growing power or was unable to do so.30 Konfrontasi ended because of an attempted coup in Jakarta from the night of 30 September to the early morning of 1 October 1965 that involved the murder of six army generals. The British Embassy in Jakarta informed

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London that a coup attempt by ‘elements of the Indonesian armed forces’ had been put down.31 The following day, the embassy reported that the cause of the attempted coup appeared to be a split within the Indonesian army and that General Suharto had taken charge of the situation. Rumors had already begun that the PKI was behind the operation.32 Between the beginning of October 1965 and the middle of March 1966, the PKI was destroyed as a political force, and many of its members and associates killed. Political power gradually shifted from Sukarno to Suharto, and by the end of March 1966 a new government was formed that was committed to economic reform and new foreign policy. While Sukarno remained president in name, Suharto had effectively taken power.33 The new Suharto government ended Konfrontasi in August 1966.

The New Order Under the staunchly anti-communist Suharto, Indonesia’s foreign and domestic policies changed. Jakarta severed ties with Beijing, Hanoi, and Pyongyang, banned the PKI, and re-joined the UN and other international organizations. The new regime also pursued efforts to obtain Western aid. Washington in particular was keen to help to establish the new leadership and, in addition to providing emergency assistance, indicated privately to Jakarta that the US would participate in multilateral efforts to reschedule Indonesia’s debt, indicating how significant Indonesia was to the Americans. Yet Washington was aware that, despite Jakarta’s change of direction, the new government would remain nationalistic and nonaligned in its foreign policy position.34 In the new government, Suharto chaired a Cabinet Presidium that consisted of five ‘first ministers’, each responsible for a group of portfolios. The new president was responsible for defense, internal security, and the army. While Suharto included high-profile civilians in his government, his ‘inner circle’ predominantly comprised army generals and colonels, as he was generous in apportioning executive and administrative positions to the military. The army leadership had already benefited from roughly 20 years of participation in political affairs under the Sukarno regime, and following the demise of the PKI, the military could now play a leading role in Indonesian affairs.35 One of Suharto’s main priorities in taking charge of government was to concentrate on economic reconstruction. With the exclusion of petroleum, domestic agriculture and mineral production since the mid-1950s had stagnated, and manufacturing had declined. Indonesia’s external debt at the end of June 1966 was US$2.3 billion, and between December 1964 and June 1966, the Jakarta cost-of-living-index increased more than 25-fold. In response, Suharto prepared a stabilization program with IMF assistance that included cuts to government expenditures, increased taxation, revision of


the banking system, strict credit controls, and the promotion of domestic and foreign private investment.36 Suharto’s other main priority—a change in Indonesian foreign policy— reflected not only his own dislike of communism and distrust of China, but also his ambitions for Southeast Asia. While he sought Western economic aid and implemented Western-leaning policies, he also pursued a foreign policy posture of non-alignment. However, unlike Sukarno’s non-aligned position, Suharto showed no interested in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East; once Indonesia was on the path to economic reconstruction, Suharto’s focus was steadfastly regional.37 Indonesia’s interest in its near neighbors was reflected in Jakarta’s decision to participate in a new regional forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), made up of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The initiative to form ASEAN originated in the Bangkok talks to end Konfrontasi. Member governments were all anticommunist, and the new organization received support from the US and Britain. For the Western powers, the creation of ASEAN heralded a new era of regional stability. London and Washington believed that the greatest threat to the region would derive from internal insurrection rather than external invasion; therefore, economic development was essential. There was also a decreasing need to maintain an externally directed military presence because Indonesia had ended its confrontation campaign and cut its ties with China. This represented a new diplomatic strategy that Washington supported, indicating that in order to achieve a ‘stable political security situation’, it wanted to see the disbandment of bilateral relationships and the introduction of cooperative organizations: to achieve this, American assistance and leadership was vital.38 The British were also keen for Indonesia to take a leadership role among this new grouping and take charge in containing communist advances in the region: What the United States want—and what we too want—is a strong Indonesia able and willing to maintain her independence from the Communist bloc and acting in close collaboration with Malaysia and the Philippines. If this turns out to involve a considerable degree of Indonesian ascendancy over Malaysia, I think the United States will be prepared to pay that price and I think we probably would too.39 The inauguration of ASEAN on 8 August 1967 included the declaration that the member countries would share responsibility for ensuring the economic and social stability of Southeast Asia. Although ASEAN was not directly concerned with defense, it also required that all foreign bases remain temporary and that the countries in the region share the main responsibility for defending Southeast Asia. Of the five founding members,

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Indonesia was the only country that did not maintain Western forces inside its territory, and Jakarta insisted that the declaration should stress the temporary nature of the regional Western bases. At first, the Philippines opposed this stipulation, but backed down after the inaugural meeting began. However, the final statement was nonetheless a compromise. Indonesia initially wanted no reference to foreign bases, but accepted the notion that bases remain ‘temporary’; and Malaysia accepted this as a condition of Indonesian membership.40 This result suited Indonesia. Suharto reportedly stated earlier in February 1966 that the defense of Southeast Asia was a matter for the countries in the area, and that the British base in Singapore was a target for China’s expansion, while the Malaysian and Singaporean governments, on the other hand, had preferred that the base remain in the region.41 Initially, ASEAN’s structure permitted considerable latitude, with no economic unity among member-states and only Singapore gaining any great benefit from intra-ASEAN trade. Internal tension also persisted. Manila’s ongoing claim to Sabah—the northern region of Borneo—caused the breakdown of Philippine–Malaysian diplomatic relations in 1968. However, ASEAN encouraged resolution to the crisis, essentially by keeping the dispute outside the ASEAN framework, which in turn encouraged Malaysia and the Philippines to resolve their tensions through bilateral engagement.42 Another factor encouraging ASEAN unity was a change in the strategic environment in Southeast Asia. This was signaled by Britain’s announcement in 1968 of its withdrawal from its military commitment to the defense of Malaysia and Singapore and closure of its military base in Singapore by 1971. In 1969, US President Richard Nixon declared, in what became known as the Guam or Nixon Doctrine, that henceforth the United States expected Asian nations to provide increasingly for their own defense, although the US would continue to uphold its treaty obligations. The Indonesians ostensibly accepted much of what was outlined in the Guam Doctrine, as it appeared consistent with the basic Indonesian policy that Southeast Asian nations develop responsibility for their own security and defense. It also provided Jakarta with a platform from which to stress the need for extensive foreign aid to counter the militarily weakness of countries in the region. Jakarta’s attitude was that Indonesia lacked the capacity to contribute to joint defense and military security; rather, the country’s first priority was economic development—only once Indonesia grew in economic strength would it be able to take on regional responsibilities commensurate with its size and importance.43 Jakarta then became a beneficiary of an expanded US military aid program when in March 1970 Washington approved approximately $15 million per year—an increase of $10 million from the original budget.44 However, the Indonesian government sought increased support. It attempted to negotiate for the Americans to remain in the region until at


least 1973, based upon a graduated withdrawal in order to avoid a power vacuum. Suharto sent General Sumitro to Washington in July 1970 to ask for further military aid. During discussions with Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, he stressed that Indonesia was not yet a ‘real’ power and was currently unable to accede to full responsibility for security in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the Indonesian government had originally not intended to build up its armed forces before 1973, deciding instead to concentrate on economic development, sacrificing security for the sake of national reconstruction. Now that Washington had announced America’s departure from the region, Jakarta was worried that its neighbors— Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia—lacked sufficient military power to withstand potential internal instability, or confront the military threat inherent in intensive Soviet diplomacy: these Asian nations might turn to Moscow as a means of countering Chinese infiltration. Therefore, Indonesia realized the necessity of strengthening its armed forces. Jakarta was hopeful that it could acquire military supplies from Western Europe and from the US; if America were to reduce its military strength, there would be surplus material that Indonesia could use. In return, Indonesia would provide AK-47 small arms to Cambodia to use against communist forces.45 The view in Washington was that Indonesia’s requests were consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. Therefore, when Jakarta requested additional military assistance, Nixon agreed that Indonesia would need to play a bigger role in regional defense and would need to modernize its forces. Kissinger responded very positively to Sumitro’s request, stating that his relationship with Suharto was, ‘one of the warmest he possessed,’ and that the US, ‘recognized the Indonesian role which was precisely what the Nixon Doctrine required’.46 The Americans did not presume that Indonesia’s request for more arms was out of regional altruism. Jakarta was extremely keen, in particular, to secure funds or six C-130 planes and an M-16 rifle factory, and it was observed in Washington that they might have shown support for regional cooperation as part of their bid. This was pointed out to Kissinger by National Security Council member John H. Holdridge, who noted that while there was still no movement towards a regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia, ‘the Indonesians might just be able to get things going’.47 Not wanting to appear unhelpful, or at the same time wanting Jakarta to dictate terms, Nixon authorized an increase in military aid to Indonesia to $18 million for the 1971 fiscal year.48 Western military retreat from Southeast Asia had been Jakarta’s aim during the negotiations to form ASEAN, and the Indonesian strategic outlook suited the aims of the Nixon Doctrine. Since independence, Jakarta’s policy was to strengthen Indonesia without involving foreign powers in any military commitment. As the US role diminished, Jakarta

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was eager to develop Asian regional military cooperation with help from Washington, which, in turn, was willing to continue to assist Indonesia in its development programs and efforts to improve regional cooperation. For the US, Indonesia was ‘one of the models of the Nixon Doctrine’. It was using American economic and military aid, and private investments, to build its own strength without drawing the US into any military commitment. Jakarta viewed American financial assistance as vital to achieving national economic development that would promote regional stability. This was necessary to resist the expansion of Beijing’s political influence and to avoid economic domination by Japan. The Australian government’s assessment of the situation concluded that: Indonesian attachment to the forms of an independent and active (i.e., non-aligned) foreign policy, and the ‘low posture’ scrupulously maintained by the United States in Jakarta, mask a very close relationship, based on a shared conviction that the two countries’ policies and performance serve each other’s national interests.49 For the US, underpinning these efforts to contain communist influence in Southeast Asia was the region’s importance as a source of raw materials, including petroleum.50 Washington was grateful to Indonesia for not participating in the 1973 OPEC-led oil embargo. And, despite Indonesia’s increased petroleum revenues, Washington continued to supply military aid to Jakarta.51 Yet the country remained one of the poorest in the world on a per capita basis and, while there were signs in 1973 that the Indonesian economy was improving, there was still ‘an increasing risk of distortions due to the use of political power to enrich individuals’.52 As a result, the first significant opposition to Suharto’s government started to emerge at the end of 1973 in the form of growing student protests against official corruption, foreign investment and government handling of economic policies.53 While Indonesia played a leading role in regional stability and worked towards economic development, it risked causing regional instability through its own aspirations to incorporate West New Guinea and Portuguese Timor within its borders. The US chose not to stand in Jakarta’s path in achieving these ambitions; for the Americans, Indonesia was ‘the largest and most important non-Communist Southeast Asian state and a significant Third World Country’.54 When Indonesia took control of West New Guinea, it began to prepare the territory for a UN-supervised self-determination plebiscite in 1969, as set out in the agreement reached with the Netherlands seven years earlier. A little over 1,000 Papuans representing a population of approximately 800,000 people participated in the act of ‘free choice’ in front of UN representatives and foreign diplomats. Washington chose not to become directly


involved. Kissinger viewed the so-called act of free choice as consisting, ‘of a series of consultations rather than a direct election, which would be almost meaningless among the stone-age cultures of New Guinea’.55 Six years later, concerned there would be a left-wing takeover in Portuguese Timor, Jakarta sought to incorporate the territory by force within Indonesia. Washington was aware that a guerrilla war would be the result of any Indonesian action. US President Gerald Ford and Kissinger discussed these issues with Suharto during a visit to Jakarta on 6 December 1975, the day before the invasion. While Ford was present in the capital, the Indonesian leader sought his counterpart’s ‘understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action’. The response from Ford was that the US would, ‘understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have’.56 The attitude of Indonesia’s neighbor, Australia, was ambivalent. In 1974, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam had told Suharto privately that a merger of East Timor with Indonesia was the only possible outcome.57 Canberra did not want to upset the improved relations that it had developed with its northern neighbor since the end of Konfrontasi. The only support Australia gave East Timor was to vote against resolutions in the United Nations recognizing the Indonesian acquisition of East Timor. By the late 1970s, Canberra had shifted its vote in UN General Assembly resolutions on East Timor to abstention. All of the ASEAN nations except Singapore supported Indonesia, reflecting growing cooperation among the member-states.

Conclusion Regional leadership and great power dependence are dominant characteristics of Indonesia’s postwar history. After gaining independence from the Dutch, outside powers perceived the new Indonesian nation’s place in the world as pivotal. However, Jakarta struggled to balance its desire to avoid external interference in its affairs with the need for external financial support. Nevertheless, Indonesian leaders used their advantageous position of internal and international support in gaining backing for some of their foreign policy initiatives. Although the country’s large population and abundance of resources were major determinants in Indonesia’s rise to prominence, both regionally and globally, internal instability has remained as a destabilizing national threat. Leadership does not derive from size and wealth alone: it also requires vision, and Indonesia’s leaders had a role to play in their nation’s successes as well as its setbacks. On the one hand, the Indonesian sense of nationalism and independence was a product of the long struggle against the Dutch, which helped to establish Indonesia’s foreign relations. On the other hand, the failure of Indonesian leaders to capitalize on their economic potential compounded the problems of an already unstable region and strengthened the influence of outside powers.

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This presented a conflict between Indonesia’s aspirations: non-alignment and expansion in regard to East Timor and West New Guinea; which antagonized policies of dependence on foreign financial assistance and the desire to strengthen regional security. The onset of regional cooperation provided Indonesia with its chance to seize a leadership role, as Southeast Asia could not achieve stability without the support of its largest nation. Yet, despite its standing in ASEAN, Indonesia remained dependent on external powers, and while this dependence supported some leadership aspirations, it exposed internal vulnerabilities as well.

Notes 1 The author wishes to thank Dr Chad Mitcham and Dr Allison Mitcham for providing advice and reading many draft versions of this chapter. 2 Evan A. Laksmana, ‘Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2, August 2011, p. 157. 3 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, p. 17. 4 Richard Mason, ‘Nationalism, Communism and the Cold War: The United States and Indonesia during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations’, in Richard Mason and Abu Talib Ahmad (eds), Reflections on South East Asia History since 1945, Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2006. 5 Paper on Principal British Interests in the Far East, January 1946, CO 537/4718, The [British] National Archives (TNA). 6 Draft paper by Far East Civil Planning Unit, circulated by Cabinet Office, 14 January 1946, CO537/1478, TNA. 7 Background Information on Far Eastern Countries: Political Conditions and Economic Recovery Problems, Prepared for the use of the Committee on Armed Services in consultation with the Department of State, 80th Congress, 1st Session–Senate Committee Print, September 9, 1947, Papers of John D. Sumner, ECA Files (C-I), Box 6, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL). 8 Quote in Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, p. 27. 9 Address by Mr. Allen Griffin, publisher of the Monterey Peninsula Herald, Monterey, California, delivered at the Institute on Southeast Asia, San Francisco State College, San Francisco, July 21, 1950, Student Research File (B File), Pacific Rim: Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, #31A, Box 1 of 2, HSTL. 10 Report to the National Security Council (NSC) by the Executive Secretary on Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries, 26 August 1948, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–6, Disaster File, Box 33, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL). 11 Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary, 25 June 1952, White House Office, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Papers, Box 3, DDEL. 12 Syamsuddin Haris, ‘General Elections Under the New Order’, in Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth (eds), Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2004, pp. 18–19.

36 Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and Global Role, 1945–75 13 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, ISEAS, Singapore, 1994, pp. 18–19. 14 R. Cribb and C. Brown, Modern Indonesia: A History since 1945, Longman, Harlow, 1995, Ch. 5. 15 Audrey. R. Kahin and G. McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1995. 16 Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008, pp. 38 & 83. 17 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, ISEAS, Singapore, 1994, p. 22. 18 Cabinet submission by Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs, 25 February 1963, A5619, C470 Part 1, National Archives of Australia (NAA). 19 Cabinet submission by Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs, 25 February 1963, A5619, C470 Part 1, NAA. 20 Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: Malaysia, Series B, Volume 8, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 2004, p. xlix. 21 Pierre Van der Eng, ‘Konfrontasi and Australia’s Aid to Indonesia during the 1960s’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2009, p. 52. 22 Dewi Fortuna, Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1994, pp. 25–6. 23 R. B. Smith, Changing Visions of East Asia, 1943–93, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, pp. 76 & 80–1. 24 CIA Weekly Review: Political Trends in Malaysia’s Borneo States, 2 June 1967, Box 276, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, LBJ; R. B. Smith, Changing Visions of East Asia, 1943–93, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, p. 75. 25 Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996. 26 Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008, pp. 126–8. 27 H. W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 156–64. 28 Memorandum, 15 September 1964, NSF, Country File, Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia, Box 246, LBJL. 29 Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.– Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008, p. 3. 30 CIA cable, 2 March 1965 and May 1965, NSF, Country File, Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia, Box 247, LBJL. 31 Telegram, British Embassy, Jakarta to London, 1 October 1965, FO371/180316, TNA. 32 Telegram, British Embassy, Jakarta to London, 2 October 1965, FO 371/180317, TNA. 33 Report on Indonesia, NSF, Country File, Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia, Box 248, LBJL. 34 Ibid. 35 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) no. 55–67, Prospects for Indonesia, 15 February 1967, NSF, NIEs, Box 7, LBJL. 36 Ibid.

Sue Thompson 37 37 Ibid. 38 Airgram, Bangkok to Washington, 6 September 1967, Box 1850, Central Policy Files (CPF) 1967–69, Political Affairs and Relations, RG 59, [US] National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). 39 Foreign Office minute by J. E. Cable, 4 January 1966, FO 371/190783, TNA. 40 Outward Savingram to all posts from Department of External Affairs, 5 September 1967, A1838, 3004/13/21 Part 3, NAA. 41 Telegram, Canadian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to Ottawa, 22 February 1966, FCO 15/18, TNA. 42 Nobuhiro Ihara, The Formation and Development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1966–1969: An Historical Institutional Approach, Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne, 2010, pp. 201–6. 43 Cablegrams from Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 2 January 1970, A5882, CO818, NAA. 44 Kissinger memorandum for the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, 11 March 1970, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL. 45 Memorandum of Conversation (MEMCON) between General Sumitro and Kissinger, 1 July 1970, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL. 46 MEMCON between General Sumitro and Kissinger, 8 July 1970, KissingerScowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL. 47 Memorandum, John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, 13 October 1970, KissingerScowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL. 48 Memorandum, John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy to Kissinger, 18 November 1970, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File: Indonesia, Box 14, GRFL. 49 Summary of the situation in Indonesia in mid-1973, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, July 1973, A1838, 638/72/57, NAA. 50 Memorandum, G. C. Lewis, Intelligence Assessment Section, to Peachy, 4 September 1973, A1838, 638/72/57, NAA. 51 Memorandum, Robert S. Ingersoll, Acting Secretary, to the President, 1 July 1975, Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files, (1972) 1974–1977, Temporary Parallel File, Box A, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (GRFL). 52 Memorandum, Department of Foreign Affairs, July 1973, A1838, 683/72/57, NAA. 53 Memorandum, W. R. Smyser to Kissinger, 15 January 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976. 54 Memorandum, Kissinger to the President, 21 November 1975, The [US] National Security Archive (NSA). 55 Memorandum, Kissinger to the President on Djakarta Visit: Your Meetings with President Suharto, 18 July 1969, NSA. 56 Telegram, Jakarta to Secretary of State, 6 December 1975, NSA. 57 Memorandum, W. R. Smyser to Kissinger, 4 March 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Country File: Indonesia, Box 6, GRFL.


Bibliography Primary documents Australia: Australian Archives (Canberra) A5619: Cabinet Files. A1838: Department of External Affairs.

United Kingdom: The National Archives (London) CAB 148: Cabinet Office, Defence and Overseas Policy Committees and Sub-committees, Minutes and Papers. CO537: Colonial Office and predecessors: Confidential General and Confidential Original Correspondence. FO 371: Foreign Office, Political Department, General Correspondence from 1906.

United States of America Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (Independence, Missouri) • ECA File: Papers of John D. Sumner • Student Research File (B File), Pacific Rim: Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (Abilene, Kansas) • Disaster File: White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948–6 Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (Austin, Texas) • National Security File: Country File, Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (Ann Arbor, Michigan) • Temporary Parallel File: Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft Files

Secondary sources Anwar, Dewi (1994) Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Fortuna). Brands, H. W. (1997) The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Cribb, R. and Brown, C. (1995) Modern Indonesia (Harlow: Longman). Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey (1996) Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin). Haris, Syamsuddin (2004) ‘General Elections Under the New Order’, in Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth (eds), Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond (London: RoutledgeCurzon). Ihara, Nobuhiro (2010) ‘The Formation and Development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1966–1969: An Historical Institutional Approach’, Ph.D. thesis (University of Melbourne). Kahin, Audrey R. and Kahin, G. McT. (1995) Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle: University of Washington Press). Laksmana, Evan A. (2011) ‘Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 33: 2, August. Lijphart, Arend (1966) The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Sue Thompson 39 Mason, Richard (2006) ‘Nationalism, Communism and the Cold War: The United States and Indonesia during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations’, in Richard Mason and Abu Talib Ahmad (eds), Reflections on South East Asia History since 1945 (Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Sains). Simpson, Bradley (2008) Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Smith, R. B. (2007) Changing Visions of East Asia, 1943–93 (Abingdon: Routledge). Stockwell, A. J. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in A. J. Stockwell (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: Malaysia, Series B, Vol. 8 (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies). Van der Eng, Pierre (2004) ‘Konfrontasi and Australia’s Aid to Indonesia during the 1960s’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 55: 1.

3 The Economy in Indonesia’s Ascent: Making Sense of it All Satish Mishra

Setting the stage: The polity The 2014 presidential election in Indonesia was a celebration of 15 years of democracy.1 During that time the country had recovered from economic crises following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98,2 multiple natural disasters, separatist movements, and the occasional terrorist attack. In addition, Indonesia has arrived on the world political and economic stage with its entry into the G-20 and as the largest country in the new post-2015 ASEAN Common Market. Forecast to be the sixth largest economy in the world by 2030, it is on an accelerated track to join the OECD. It has become a preferred market for new investment from large Asian neighbors such as India and China, and its youthful workforce holds promise of rising productivity and a demographic dividend in the next two decades. Its high priority on education and human capital development, as well as on industrial diversification into manufacturing and higher valueadded services such as IT, design and tourism allow Indonesian policymakers a measure of confidence about escaping the ‘middle income trap’. Indonesian policymakers avoided the political polarization of the destructive intensity witnessed in present day Egypt or the fragmentation and discord seen in the post-Berlin War years in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. The tendency to seek political coalitions, the absence of political party platforms, and the preference for ‘transactional politics’ might have saved Indonesian democracy from fragmenting into highly polarized groups with the potential to undermine democracy. The economic foundations of the new democracy were also helped by considerable good luck. First, it benefited from the international commodity price boom of the mid-2000s that fuelled its consumption-based economic recovery. Second, it largely escaped the onslaught of the global financial shock of 2008–09 and may have actually benefited from it as Indonesia became an attractive new investment destination of foreign direct investment. Third, the combined result of political stability and eco40

Satish Mishra 41

nomic recovery was the emergence of a large middle class and the fastest rate of urbanization seen anywhere in the developing world. This marked rise of a class of young ‘non poor’3 also produced a constituency for democratic governance and a rising demand for new leaders who might be more representative of public opinion and public preference. The growth of the digital and social media helped to insert a new dynamic into Indonesian politics whereby the young became an attractive constituency and voting pool. But more than anything else it was the dramatic political decentralization introduced within the first year of the new democracy that defined the political terrain of Indonesian politics. Whether out of political necessity or group self-interest, Indonesia’s historically rather conservative leadership managed to lay the foundations of a ‘big bang’ decentralization that has changed its political dynamics forever. The evolution of decentralized governance continues. Indonesia’s 298 districts in 2000 have now grown to over 500.4 For all practical purposes its regional governments exercise public expenditure authority almost as great as each state of the United States or any of the Indian provinces. Indonesia has become a unitary form of government with a de facto federal political system. Moreover, decentralization, while creating all kinds of management and economic difficulties and much regulatory confusion, has also managed to rest historical Indonesian fears of political fragmentation and territorial disintegration. The world and the Asia region have not stood still while Indonesia has recovered from its deep economic crisis in 1998. Nor have they been disinterested bystanders. First China and then India have become new powerhouses of manufacturing, technology and education. They have become major trading partners not only of each other, but also of Indonesia and more generally of ASEAN.5 The rise of the ‘rest’ in which China and India are interconnected engines continues to shape Indonesia’s neighborhood and its trading environment. Indonesia’s New Order government, created partly as a reaction to the spread of communism in South East Asia in the end gave way to multi-party democracy in an Asia characterized by deep structural reforms in China and India, and systemic shifts in Cambodia and Myanmar. Indonesia is an archipelago within a mosaic of structural transformations breaking out across its own neighborhood.

Indonesia and emerging international perspectives on development policy It was not that long ago that effective economic policy, especially that advocated by international financial institutions and aid donors, consisted of one central recommendation: that of reducing the footprint of the state on the economy. Much of that thinking vanished following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–98, and any remaining doubt was removed by the

42 The Economy in Indonesia’s Ascent: Making Sense of it All

advent of the mortgage and financial market collapse in the United States (US) in 2007–08 and the ‘great recession’ that was triggered in its wake. As large corporations sued for government bailouts in the US and entire countries in hitherto prosperous and technologically advanced Europe fell into political disarray in the throes of fiscal austerity programs, the neat separation of free markets and the democratic state could not be taken for granted. Indeed they were intertwined systems of social and economic management that could be pulled apart only at the risk of bringing down both the free market and multiparty democracy. The result was inevitable. Policymakers and academic theorists, not forgetting social activists and party think-tanks, went back to the drawing board. The work is still ongoing, but some significant conclusions are beginning to emerge. Given the confusion and concern with austerity, it is not surprising that much of the rethinking has begun with macroeconomic policy. However, the recent global recession has served to underscore the importance of macroeconomic dimensions of development policy, especially in the context of large structural or political changes as we witnessed in Indonesia. This has been partly due to the role of the IMF as the leading global advocate of macroeconomic stabilization, and partly due to the debates from the 1980s onwards over the size and functions of the state in developing countries.6 Another factor has been the concern with the misuse of public funds for political ends, especially in countries still evolving politically stable systems of governance. The state in many countries has been as much an arena for corruption and rent seeking, often autocratic, rather than a vehicle for public participation and economic inclusion.7 The attempt at rolling back the state where less state and more market was seen to be the formula for development success has now been more or less abandoned everywhere. The state is instrumental in the management of social vulnerability caused by frequent and relatively unpredictable financial shocks in both domestic and regional economies, and of the need to create or support market institutions where they remain fragmented or incomplete. In developing countries new agendas of inclusive growth, technological innovation and containment of horizontal inequalities and violent social conflicts all gave a more comprehensive role for the state than had been thought possible in the 1980s and early 1990s.8 The advent of democracy has been another driving element in the rethinking of the appropriate role and size of the state in developing economies. Contrary to popular views of the state in the 1980s, democratic states tend to be larger and garner a larger proportion of total public expenditure than others. Of course, the size of the state varies considerably in mature democracies, but on average it is much higher in the developed and democratic North than it is in the politically evolving South.9

Satish Mishra 43

Yet no discussion of macroeconomic policy in the new world of the smart or proactive yet democratic state can be undertaken unless close attention is paid to the driving mechanics of government: what it can earn and garner in the form of government revenue and how it chooses to allocate the revenues it collects. Renewed interest in the State has naturally led to a vigorous interest in the degrees of freedom it has in both revenue generation and public expenditure choices. Fiscal, not monetary policy lies at the core of the current discussions on macroeconomic policy in developing countries. The underlying idea of creating fiscal space is straightforward: how to enlarge freedom of movement for the government in fiscal policy while maintaining macroeconomic stability. It is a response to the observation that the state is in fact not too large but too small in developing countries. It is engaged in both economic and human development, where the multiple and simultaneous needs of economic growth, poverty and inequality reduction, and building new institutions have to be met from very low levels of government revenue and expenditure.10 Attempts to enlarge fiscal space therefore have focused on the revenue as well as the expenditure sides of the public ledger. The former has concerned itself with reform of tax administration and enforcement of tax collection, including elimination of tax subsidies and holidays to foreign and large domestic investors, enlarging the tax base, simplifying tax procedures, and reducing corruption by the use of digital technology. The latter encompasses multi-year budgeting processes, more transparent public policy processes that determine priorities for public spending, and removing waste and inefficiency in budget allocation and use. Dispensing with inefficiency has also involved the use of civil society and community based organizations to monitor the quality of public services funded by the budget as well as ensuring that those entitled to public support in social welfare and protection programs are aware of their rights under these schemes.11 Clearly attempts to enlarge the fiscal space in a bid to meet competing and growing demands—including those for public services, support to new employment schemes and to SME development, the building of both hard and soft infrastructure and public education—are not only technical issues revolving around the efficiency of budgetary allocation or the prevention of illicit leakages. They are core elements of what a development state does, and constitute the architecture of its leading institutions. All this is far from the concept of the ‘night-watchman state’: content to provide law and order, regulate the currency and provide a ‘level playing field’ to a very unequal set of corporate players. All this is highly relevant to understanding economic policy priorities in today’s Indonesia. The 1999 elections marked the first step in the creation of a democratic state. Consolidation of this new democratic state and the


way it meets the expectations of those who elected it is perhaps the most critical development priority of the day. Yet, without a resilient and growing economy, with its benefits spread across the archipelago, Indonesia risks rising horizontal inequality and renewed social conflict. Fortunately—and unlike two decades ago—it is now considered perfectly natural to examine a country’s economic health by taking into account its political, financial and regulatory processes. New perspectives on the proactive state, widening the fiscal space, and generating social consensus on ‘wicked problems’12 of economic fairness and justice are all highly relevant to Indonesia today.13

Indonesia: The economy in the midst of systemic transition Macroeconomic data conceal as much as they reveal about development policy in Indonesia. Above all, they give little weight to the massive and historically unprecedented transformation still underway in Indonesia following the Asian Financial Crisis and the implosion of the New Order. Indonesian decentralization: One state or many? Indonesia represents a case of systemic transition whereby a country undertakes wholesale restructuring of virtually all its economic and political institutions. The period between 2000 and 2012 falls within that period of system-wide transition. During that period Indonesia reformed not only its entire political system, but also recovered from the deepest economic crisis in its post-independence history. From being a military supported, centralized autocracy, Indonesia transformed itself into perhaps the most decentralized multiparty political and economic system in the world. Indeed its system of direct fiscal transfer to over 300 districts in 2001 became even more decentralized as the number of districts increased to over 500 by 2012. Public expenditure authority was thus dramatically devolved to the districts, although most of them remained dependent on the center for fiscal transfers, as only a minority of Indonesia’s natural resource-rich districts could remain fiscally solvent without grants from the center. Two other factors characterize Indonesia’s public finance system. First, fiscal transfers to sub-national levels of government are divided into two components, the general funds allocation (Dana Alokasi Umum: DAU) and the specific grants allocation (Dana Alokasi Khusus: DAK). The former is a block grant essentially allowing largely recurrent expenditure allocations for government, the schools, and the health service. The DAK is a grant made to cover capital expenditure at the district level. A third component is locally collected taxes and charges (PAD) on land and a variety of other sources. With the large expansion of the number of districts the Indonesian public finance system is grappling with the problem of how to increase

Satish Mishra 45

DAK allocations to allow poorer districts to cover capital expenditures from such grants. One of the consequences of such an expansion of district administrative entities is the sharp increase in public expenditures allocated to general government services. Economic inequality and the quality of growth Faced with growing inequality as a result of rising public demand for greater social protection, Indonesia launched a universal social protection/insurance scheme beginning in January 2014. This is an extraordinary step for a relatively new political system to take, and by and large has enjoyed backing across the political system. What makes Indonesia stand out, however, is that even before the recent universal social insurance initiative, it was well known for implementing an internationally acclaimed conditional cash transfer scheme following the Asian Financial Crisis. While Indonesia’s social protection measures helped to reduce vulnerability to absolute poverty, economic inequality—as distinct from poverty— remains a significant and growing problem in Indonesia as well as in the region.14 Indonesia’s Gini coefficients, based on household consumer surveys, continue to rise, and if the experience of other Asian countries is something to go by, these will only worsen. While the government is aware of this trend, it has yet to introduce a targeted policy for inequality containment, except in the form of cash transfers and community grants to poor households. Given the history of social conflicts, particularly around natural resource use,15 the possibility of state capture16 at the sub-national levels by dominant economic lobbies, and the robust analytical link between horizontal inequality and social conflict, urgent attention needs to be given to this inequality predicament. There is little evidence of this happening at present, especially since there is little research on the extent to which inequality between regions or between urban and rural areas is rising or falling, or if district GDPs and per capita incomes are converging or diverging. Human capital and tapping into the knowledge economy Human capital development remains a major policy challenge in Indonesia. Impressively, some 20 per cent of the total national budget is now constitutionally required to be allocated to the education sector, thus sharply raising the budgetary allocations to education. However, the country faces a series of problems regarding the quality of education across the archipelago, financial autonomy for its leading universities, the performance of private education in the form of over 3,000 of the country’s 3,200 higher education institutions, and the mismatch between its skill sets and demands from the labor market.17 The problem is complicated further by the plan to develop six economic corridors across Indonesia, each of which would concentrate on its own comparative advantage. This would require a


massive boost in Indonesia’s Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) program, and a more decentralized approach to education policy with much closer cooperation between educational institutions and private businesses. Human capital development is also of crucial importance to Indonesia in the near future if it is to reap a ‘demographic dividend’, as the McKinsey Report suggests.18 Without being able to train and employ Indonesia’s pool of youthful labor, the demographic dividend can easily become a demographic curse. That will undermine the dream of turning Indonesia into one of the world’s dominant economies and a major driving force in the economic engine of a post-2015 ASEAN.

Indonesia: Taking the economic pulse Growth, saving and investment Following the worst economic shock in its post-independence history, Indonesia’s economy began to recover with political stabilization and renewed consumer confidence. The result was a steady increase in its real GDP from around $165 billion in 2000 to $427 billion in 2012 (Figure 3.1). Indonesia suffered a growth shock, like much of the region in the wake of the 2007 Global Economic Crisis, but the consequent fall in output was short-lived. GDP growth fell from a peak of 6.2 per cent in 2007 to around 4.5 per cent in 2009, only to rise to 6.5 per cent two years later. Indonesian economic growth decelerated in 2013, the currency depreciated and the trade deficit rose sharply. Despite the growth slowdown there is considerable optimism that investment to GDP ratios—which fell in 2013—will rise

7

Real GDP trend line

% Growth

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Billions

Real GDP and GDP Growth

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 GDP growth (annual %)

Figure 3.1 GDP Indonesia from 2000 to 2012 Source: World Bank Development Indicators Online Database updated March 2014

Satish Mishra 47

6 Real GDP trend line

% Growth

5 4 3 2 1 0

2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0

USD Thousands

Per capita GDP and its Growth

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 GDP growth (annual %)

Figure 3.2 Growth of per capita GDP in Indonesia (2000–12) Source: World Bank Development Indicators Online Database updated March 2014

again with a new political mandate for the incoming President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in late 2014. Figure 3.2 depicts trends in per capita real GDP at 2005 prices. As expected, GDP per capita growth in Indonesia remained lower than total GDP due to population growth, but the rise in per capita income over the 12-year period was nevertheless significant. This helped to sustain Indonesian consumption-led growth for much of the last decade until investment flows rose to accelerate growth further. Figure 3.3 presents the sectoral composition of GDP growth. As in many other economies of the region, highest growth was recorded in the services sector, followed by industry and then agriculture. This is not unusual in the context of Indonesia’s very rapid urbanization. Currently over half of the country’s population live in urban areas: a proportion significantly higher than in other large economies such as India and China.19 Figure 3.4 depicts savings and investment trends. First, despite two economic shocks in less than a decade, savings to GDP ratios in Indonesia remained high, peaking at over 34 per cent of GDP in 2012. This was a considerable rise from a low of below 22 per cent in 2003. This is interesting, since with the rapid growth of a middle class and urbanization, consumption would be expected to rise and savings ratios to fall. This has clearly not happened and the reasons require economic research, as do the movements between gross domestic and gross national savings, a phenomenon important in the Philippines due to the large overseas workforce. A similar effect might be occurring in Indonesia, which has also been exporting labor to neighboring countries and the Middle East.


Sectoral Growth Rates in % GDP 1995–2012 13.0 8.0 3.0 –2.0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

–7.0 –12.0 –17.0 GDP

Agriculture

Industry

Services

Figure 3.3 Sector wise contributions in % GDP Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013

Second, the investment to GDP ratios have been growing closer to domestic savings to GDP ratios, ending at being almost identical in 2012. The mirror image is reflected in the very low budget deficit in that year. The state and public finance Figures 3.5 and 3.6 present trends in revenue and public expenditure in Indonesia between 1995 and 2012. Several aspects of Indonesia’s public finances are worth noting. The most obvious is the very low level of revenue to GDP ratios throughout the period. What is extraordinary is that

38.0 36.0 34.0 32.0 30.0 28.0 26.0 24.0 22.0 20.0 2000

2001 2002 2003 2004

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Gross domestic saving

2010

2011 2012

Gross national saving

Gross domestic capital formation

Figure 3.4 Savings and investment as % of GDP (2000–12) Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013

Satish Mishra 49

22.0 21.0 20.0 19.0 18.0 17.0 16.0 15.0 14.0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total revenue

Total expenditure

Figure 3.5 Revenue expenditure gap as a % of GDP from 1995–2012 Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013

despite sustained economic growth and growth in per capita income, the structure of revenue or of revenue collection needs considerable rethinking. For instance, the 2012 revenue to GDP ratio was around the same level as it was in 1996. Moreover, the rise in revenue to GDP ratios witnessed between 2000 and 2008 when it rose from a low of 14.5 per cent to a high of over 19 per cent went into reverse with the advent of the global financial shock. While the Indonesian economy and its growth or investment levels remained unaffected by, and may have even benefited from, the global financial crisis, revenue to GDP ratios were clearly creating a massive fiscal squeeze. This is not apparent in Figure 3.5, largely because Indonesia’s

Fiscal Balance % of GDP 0 2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

–0.5 –1 –1.5 –2 Fiscal Balance % of GDP

Figure 3.6 Fiscal balance in Indonesia 2000 to 2012 (% of GDP) Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013


public expenditure also fell in proportion due to its very conservative budget deficit stance. Nevertheless, it does constrain Indonesia’s large public investment requirements for infrastructure, human capital and social insurance, which would arguably help to consolidate its new democracy. Figure 3.6 summarizes Indonesia’s fiscal balance over the 2000 to 2012 period. It illustrates in sharp contrast to many other economies in the region—including the Philippines and Thailand, and such countries as India—the national preference for a low budget deficit. Macroeconomic policy is very much characterized by budget deficits ranging from almost zero (–0.1 per cent) to –1.8 per cent in 2012. Given the enormous dislocation brought about by political implosion, decentralization, and the need to contain poverty and raise education expenditure ratios to GDP, Indonesia’s resolute adherence to low budget deficits is remarkable. It is even more remarkable given the large share of public expenditure exhausted by energy subsidies on fuel and electricity. These have been reduced in recent years, but continue to occupy a lion’s share of total public expenditure. Anticorruption investigations and regulatory complexity have also contributed to many regional governments not being able to spend what they have been allocated by Central Government fiscal transfers. Trends in revenue Figure 3.7 presents government data on revenue and tax to GDP levels and trends. It brings out two key features of the Indonesian revenue system. First, as already noted, is the remarkably low tax to GDP ratio. Although this ratio has risen close to 50 per cent from 2000 to 2012, it still stands at

Tax revenue and non-tax revenue as % of GDP

% of GDP

20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Tax Revenue (% of GDP) Non-tax Revenue (% of GDP)

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

8.3

12.5

12.3

12.4

13.3

11.1

11.2

11.8

11.3

6.4

5.3

6.8

5.5

6.5

4

4.2

4.4

4.3

Figure 3.7 Tax and non-tax revenue share of GDP (2000–12) Source: Badan Pusat Statistik

Satish Mishra 51

11.3 per cent. Second, non-tax revenue, composed mainly of contributions from state enterprises, particularly in the energy and the commodity sector, is declining in importance as exports of oil vanish and state enterprises come under competitive stress with the end of monopolies. Tax collection and structure Indonesian taxation is based on Article 23A of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, where tax is an enforceable contribution imposed on all Indonesian citizens, foreign nationals and residents who have resided for 120 cumulative days within a 12-month period. Indonesia has a stratification of taxation including Income Tax, Local Tax (Pajak Daerah) and Central Government Tax. As Figure 3.8 shows, value-added taxes particularly have seen strong growth from a very low base in 2000 and are now the largest contributor to the overall revenue from goods and services (Figure 3.9). Since 2000, tax to GDP ratios have increased by four percentage points in Indonesia (9 to 13 per cent). Taxes on incomes and profits are particularly important in Indonesia, representing 44 per cent of tax revenues. This compares with 30 per cent in both Japan and Korea and 34 per cent for OECD countries. Consumption taxes represent 46 per cent of revenues in Indonesia owing to a smaller collection of social security contributions (Figure 3.9). The system is also characterized by a very low level of property taxation, arguably one of the lowest in developing countries.20 Recently, to boost tax revenue the tax directorate general has delivered solid reform in different areas of organization. Among several tax reform issues, the organizational issue is one of the most important. Most important among these are upgrading the placement of the tax office within the

Value added Taxes

Billion Rp

400000 300000 200000 100000 0 2000

2005

2009

Value added Taxes

2010 2011 Years Linear (Value added Taxes)

2012

Figure 3.8 VAT volume in Indonesia Source: OECD (2014) Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries: Trends in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1990–2012


Tax Revenue Composition 800000 700000

Billion Rp

600000

Other Taxes

500000 400000

Taxes on goods and services

300000

Taxes on property

200000 On income and profits and capital gain

100000 0

2000

2005

2009 2010 Years

2011

2012

Figure 3.9 Tax structure and composition, 2000–12 Source: OECD (2014) Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries: Trends in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1990–2012

overall government structure, combining tax and customs offices, assigning the responsibility for collecting social security contributions to the tax office, introducing a functional organizational structure within the tax office, creating data processing centers (DPCs), establishing large tax payer units (LTUs) and establishing a tax administration organization. Out of these, Indonesia has only incorporated three agendas: the tax office already has both DPCs and LTUs, and the office has also introduced a functional organizational structure.21 Apart from organizational reform, Indonesia requires a review of the fuel subsidy in Indonesia and the GST (goods and services tax), particularly as the economy continues to grow and experience structural transformations, such as the expanding middle classes. Trends in expenditure Indonesia’s public expenditure as a percentage of GDP remained more or less stable. It was at around 20 per cent of GDP during 2006–08 and then declined to around 18 per cent of GDP. The reduction in public expenditure as a proportion of GDP did not translate into a reduction in absolute terms (Figure 3.10). Figure 3.11 and Table 3.1 show the distribution of government expenditure by sectors. Figure 3.11 covers general public services, defense, education, health, social security and welfare; economic affairs (agriculture, industry, transportation and communications and other economic services) and other sectors, over a period of nine years from 2005 to 2013. Total government expenditure over this period grew dramatically, from 266,220 billion Rupiahs in 2005 to 1,154,381 billion Rupiahs in 2013.

Satish Mishra 53

Total Government Expenditure (% of GDP) 30 10 –10

1990

1995

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total Government Expenditure (% of GDP)

Figure 3.10 Public expenditure as % of GDP, 2000–12 Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013

Government expenditure in sectors such as general public services, education and economic affairs registered increases of more than 300 per cent between 2005 and 2013, largely as a result of decentralization. The expenditure allocation to education grew by more than 355 per cent. The allocation to economic services (agriculture, industry, transportation, communications and other economic services) registered one of the highest increases, growing by 338 per cent from 28,000 billion Rupiah (2005) to 122,888 billion Rupiah (2013). Most of the public expenditure in the years between 2005 and 2012 went to general public services, with the highest allocation recorded in 2012 of 590,841 billion Rupiah, and to education, which in 2012 accounted for 103,667 billion Rupiah. The public expenditure for the health sector was 7,038 billion Rupiah in 2000. This value

Central Government Expenditure by Function 1400000

Social protection

1200000

Education Religion

1000000

Tourism and culture 800000

Health Housing and community amenities

600000

Environment 400000

Economic affairs

200000

Public order and safety Defense

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 3.11 Source: BPS

General public services


2006 263421 28278 25294 39644 4477 6049 12730 1025 1104 43287 2289 427598

General public services 158559 Defense 22001 Public order and safety 15586 Economic affairs 28016 Environment 3105 Housing and community amenities 2280 Health 7038 Tourism and culture 920 Religion 691 Education 25988 Social protection 2036 Total 266220

296828 32722 29211 51250 5478 10659 17467 1676 2208 54067 3210 504776

2007


2005

Table 3.1

372497 13986 15237 63672 6734 14129 17270 1430 922 64029 3525 573431

2008 494766 12279 14451 56853 7035 18135 17302 1490 830 89918 3318 716376

2009 495320 20968 14926 57359 7889 20907 18002 1416 913 84086 3457 725243

2010 517167 47419 22067 101414 11070 23425 13649 2901 1397 91483 4586 836578

2011

2013 590841 720060 72473 81769 30196 36487 102734 122888 11451 12446 26477 30722 15564 17493 2454 2509 3562 4100 11037 118467 5578 7440 964997 1154381

2012

54

Satish Mishra 55

Social Protection, 1%

Public Order and Tourism and Culture, 0% Safety, 3% Religion, 0%

Housing and Community Amenities, 3%

Environment, 1% Defense, 7%

Education, 11% Health, 2% Economic Affairs, 11%

General Public Services, 61%

Figure 3.12 Percentage expenditure by function year 2012 Source: Badan Pusat Statistik

grew by 121 per cent in 2012, reaching a peak of 15,564 billion Rupiah. Overall government expenditure during the period 2000–12 grew by almost 262 per cent. Figures 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 give a clear understanding of how the government allocated public spending among different sectors. The common element in these allocations is their relative constancy: • Expenditure on the general public sector increased from 60 per cent of the total public expenditure in 2005 to 61 per cent in 2012; • Expenditure on education increased from 10 per cent in 2005 to 11 per cent in year 2012; • Expenditure on economic affairs constituted 10 per cent of the total expenditure in 2005 and 11 per cent in 2012. Notable has been the money allocated to defense, representing the 7–8 per cent of the total expenditure during this period. Government funding allocated to the health sector is still very low, accounting for only 2 per cent of the total public expenditure. An overview of the overall allocation of the budget across different sectors is given in Figure 3.14. Other key macroeconomic indicators besides the fiscal balance relate to financing the budget deficits. This is reflected in Figure 3.13 which presents Indonesia’s current account deficit over time. It shows the fall in the current account surplus, with considerable volatility since 2000 turning from a surplus to a deficit by 2012.


Current account balance [% of GDP] 6 4 2 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

–2 –4 Current account balance [% of GDP]

Figure 3.13 Current account balance as % of GDP Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2014

Indonesia’s public debt is depicted in Figure 3.15, while the net external debt as a percentage of GDP is presented in Figure 3.14. Indonesia has managed to bring down the burden of public debt from over 70 per cent in 2003 to just over 21 per cent in 2012, a remarkable achievement helped by the high economic growth over the period. The external debt to GDP ratio shows a similar downward trend. Taken together they demonstrate both Indonesia’s fiscal conservatism and lessons from the harsh Asian Financial Crisis, which badly affected the Indonesian economy and society. The external debt (total) of Indonesia in 2012 was $251 billion with a global rank of 32. Indonesia’s external debt (total) had a positive growth of 91.8 per cent in the last ten years (2002 to 2012). Indonesia had an average external debt (total) of $163 billion in the last ten years (2002 to 2012).

Public debt (% of GDP) – Indonesia 80 60 40 20 0 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

public debt (Percentage of GDP) (% of GDP) – Indonesia

Figure 3.14 Public debt as % of GDP Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2014

2011

2012

Satish Mishra 57

Net external debt [% of GDP] 100 80 60 40 20 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Net external debt [% of GDP]

Figure 3.15 Net external debt as % of GDP Source: UNESCAP Data Explorer http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/statdb/ DataExplorer.aspx

Overseas development assistance has also seen a steep fall ever since 2005 after the Tsunami reconstruction in Aceh had taken place. Indonesia spent IDR164.7 trillion (US$18.1 billion) subsidizing fuel products in 2011, of which IDR76.5 trillion (US$8.4 billion) was spent subsidizing petroleum. The rising cost of subsidies is placing a huge burden on limited public resources and presents a fiscal liability, vulnerable to increases in the international price of oil. Following the 2005 and 2008 reforms, reductions in fuel subsidies were recorded. The level of fuel subsidies dropped from 26 per cent to 15 per cent of total public expenditure from 2005 to 2006, and from 20 per cent to 7 per cent from 2008 to 2009 (Figure 3.17). The reduction in 2005 reportedly saved

ODA received [% of GDP] 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

ODA received [% of GDP]

Figure 3.16 Overseas development assistance – Trends as % of GDP Source: UNESCAP Data Explorer http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/statdb/DataExplorer.aspx

2011

2012

Energy subsidies (Billion IDR)

300,000

35%

32% 29%

29%

30%

250,000 26%

200,000

21%

24%

23% 19%

17%

15%

20% 15%

13%

12%

100,000

25%

19%

15%

17%

150,000

20%

20%

7%

10%

50,000

5% 0%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Energy subsidies as a % of total expenditure


2013

Year Fuel subsidy

Electricity subsidy

Energy subsidies as a % of total expenditures

Fuel subsidy as a % of total expenditure

Figure 3.17 Indonesia: Energy subsidies, 2005–13 Source: Fuel Subsidy Reform in Indonesia, Chung UNESCAP (2014)

USD16 billion in 2005–06. Both reforms, however, were followed by reappearances of fuel subsidies, except in 2012. Fuel subsidies still constituted a large proportion of government expenditure. The amount spent on energy subsidies (fuel subsidy and electricity subsidy) has been substantially larger than such public expenditure items as education, environmental protection, health, housing and social production combined. With growing public deficits and decreasing overseas development assistance, it is time Indonesia has to re-prioritize and reform both taxation and subsidies. Overall macroeconomic direction While Indonesia continues to register robust growth, it has experienced some growth deceleration from 6.3 per cent on average, between 2010 and 2012 to around 5.8 per cent in 2013.22 There are clear signs of emerging macroeconomic imbalances, with rising inflation, widening current account deficit, and the depreciation of the Rupiah. Gross capital accumulation fell from an average of 9 per cent per annum between 2010 and 2012 to 4.7 per cent in 2013. Fixed investment that had reached a record high at 32.7 per cent of GDP in 2012 also fell to 31.7 per cent in 2013. Part of the reason for a slowdown in investment was the rise in interest rates and currency depreciation, which made imports more expensive. Government policy contributed to supporting consumption growth, which stood at 5.3 per cent in 2013 as a result of cash transfers to the poor and tax reductions for lower-income earners. Government consumption also grew by around 4.9 per cent. From the output side growth slowed across the board: 7.1 per cent in services; 5.6 per cent in industry; 3.5 per cent in

Satish Mishra 59

agriculture. After the boom years and the confidence build-up in 2010–12, the growth slowdown is troubling, especially in the context of increasing public debate regarding economic nationalism. The economy also encountered a surge of inflation due to the reduction of fuel subsidies and a sharp increase in the price of selected food products. As a consequence inflation climbed from 3.8 per cent at the beginning of 2013 to 8.2 per cent. Fiscal policy countered some of the growth deceleration. The budget deficit rose from 1.9 per cent in 2012 to 2.3 per cent of GDP in 2013. This is not a surprise, since Indonesia has historically been a fiscally conservative economy. The current account deficit also grew as a result of lower export prices in Indonesia’s exports such as coal, copper and palm oil. Meanwhile, import growth slowed due to currency appreciation and decreasing investment rates. The result was a widening of the current account deficit to 3.3 per cent of GDP. Indonesia’s trade surplus fell to $6.1 billion, the lowest in a decade. An important consequence of the growth slowdown is a weakening of the labor market. Indonesia has lost over 10,000 jobs in the 12 months to August 2013. What is more significant is that it is the first decline in employment since 2005. It is still unclear whether falling employment will be reversed due to pre-election spending in the second half of 2014. The overall macroeconomic picture is thus of declining GDP growth, rising unemployment, increases in the budget and current account deficits, and depreciation of the Rupiah. However, the numbers as yet are not alarming. There is policy uncertainty on issues such as public expenditure, on the regulations governing mines and energy, and the fiscal implications of the newly adopted social insurance law at the beginning of 2013. A new government associated with an acceleration of economic, governance and regulatory reform might well reverse the negative investment sentiment of recent months. However, warning signs continue to be signaled by several international financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF argues that Indonesia’s fiscal policymakers continue to face pressures from slower revenue growth and high energy subsidy spending, which in combination could push up the 2014 fiscal deficit to 2.6 per cent of GDP in the absence of further, needed reforms that would broaden the revenue base and limit fuel subsidy costs. According to World Bank estimates, the current de jure mineral export ban policy will reduce the net trade balance by USD12.5 billion and generate a total loss in fiscal revenues (royalties, export taxes and corporate income tax) of USD6.5 billion during 2014–17, including a USD5.5 to 6.5 billion drag on the trade balance in 2014. While the quantum remains uncertain, negative impacts of this order arising from the ban, along with the broader economic issues the policy raises, suggest it is worthwhile to evaluate a wider set of policy options to ensure that Indonesia benefits to


the maximum extent possible from its considerable mineral wealth in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner.

Post-election development policy in Indonesia A.

Economic and structural questions and policy priorities

Indonesia confronts many of the economic challenges above as it tries to accelerate its overall growth of GDP and increase employment.23 Top in this list are the elimination of the fuel subsidy and enlarging fiscal space for much-needed infrastructure and human capital-related investment. Further issues are: diversifying the economy by expanding the share of the manufacturing sector in the total output; promoting new investment by regulatory reform, legal certainty and revision of the labor law in line with other countries; raising competitive advantage by developing new growth poles along the lines suggested in the Economic Master Plan; promoting the conclusion of public–private partnerships in key areas of infrastructure, especially transport and energy; and raising the momentum on poverty reduction as the economy reaches historical growth rates of over 7 per cent by employment promotion, conditional cash transfers, and improved access to health insurance. While one should be wary of reading too much into fears of Indonesian protectionism, there is much need to learn from economic trends and policy experiences in the developing world as well as in neighboring Asia. These reveal a string of structural and development issues that need to be closely integrated into the political and economic agenda of the President, as opposed to the Planning Agency or the Ministry of Finance. Here is a very brief flavor of some of the most pressing of these lessons and their implications for Indonesia’s future: • First, the most critical development challenge in the near future is how to combine economic growth with the containment of inequality. Education has often been proposed as an instrument with which to rein in inequality, but cross-country studies suggest that as much as one-third of inequality increase can be attributed to the skill and wage differentials in the labor market. In general the policy space seems to be shrinking to moderate and even contain the rise in consumption inequality, with the possibility that FDI might even make wage differentials even greater than at present. On the growth end of the spectrum, policy space for the government is limited due to the high dependence on foreign financing, either through FDI or foreign aid. The latter is declining, partly due to the Indonesian middle-income status, and FDI can be footloose and demand fiscal and other incentives that a President sensitive to public opinion might not want to grant.

Satish Mishra 61

• Providing jobs to Indonesia’s growing population is another key economic concern. Employment absorption in high-technology international firms is decreasing by the day, such that even high-growth economies are facing the phenomenon of ‘jobless growth’. As in the case of poverty reduction, the employment elasticity of growth is falling, signifying the need to diversify the economy and promote new start-ups and SMEs as a way to counterbalance this trend. Rising capital–labor ratios also spell rising labor productivity and real wages, and will be beneficial for those workers who have retained jobs. But it will leave a large pool of workers who find it increasingly difficult to secure decent jobs and who might have to be retrained and relocated. This might in turn require heavy investment in fostering a future knowledge economy in Indonesia, giving greater priority to higher education and vocational training and fostering new innovation networks with the private sector and science and technology research centers. Much is made of Indonesia’s sharply rising middle class as well as the demographic dividend that is within its reach. In terms of policy, the implication of the latter is clearer than that of the former. To attain the demographic dividend Indonesia’s youth has to be skilled and employed. Moreover, given the long lags in education and skill formation, policy changes have to be initiated today. The rapid growth of the middle class is often used as bait for foreign investors who might be attracted by the large domestic market this implies as well as the pressure that this might generate for governance reform and in the improvement of public services. B.

Governance and political stabilization

Despite its shortcomings Indonesia has laid the foundations of a new political system, begun a sustained economic recovery, and generated optimism at home and abroad. The ripples of the big bang decentralization are still felt across the Indonesian political system, yet it remains in the formative stage of establishing the necessary instruments and institutions. Whether this will improve public services and financial and political accountability is yet to be seen. Indonesia’s decentralization represents a mosaic of widely differing regions, most of which are dependent on the center for money and technical support, united only in their suspicion that the government—and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in particular—is engaged in an effort to recentralize the state by giving greater powers to provincial governments. Systemic corruption continues to define Indonesia’s image abroad and confounds its citizens at home. Yet, there is little evidence that all the focus on anti-corruption has changed public perception of Indonesia being a corruption-ridden polity, with the worst offenders in those very branches of government—the courts, police, and the public prosecution services—that


are supposed to uphold the law and protect citizens. Another necessity must be the creation of an effective Office of the President and the establishment of an effective and accountable policymaking process. It is not simply the person of the President but the Office of the Presidency that has in the end to deliver the policy goals of the future. It is the office that will be tasked with providing the cutting edge of future public policy within a constitutional democracy. Finally, there is the often-ignored question of the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia and finalizing the systemic transition that began in 1998. Two issues are critical here. The first relates to the rights and responsibilities of the citizenry. The second is the provision of public goods to the whole population regardless of ethnicity, income, or location. There is room for debate and building a national consensus here, as there is room for different cultural elements to define variations across democratic states. The determination and supply of public goods is crucial to a new democracy. If the New Order imploded as a consequence of a loss in political legitimacy, the new democracy has to ensure that its own legitimacy— begun with open and fair elections—is underscored by public services for the general citizen. It is a fallacy that democratic states are small states, despite what proponents of the small, ‘night watchman’ state might claim. Mature democracies register much higher public expenditure to GDP ratios than even the most ardent dictatorships, and in general one would expect the state to increase in size rather than shrink as democracy is consolidated, its governments keen to ensure a steady supply of public services and to plan to meet the long-term challenges that a volatile globalized world produces. Natural disasters and the impact of global warming in the vast Indonesian archipelago add to the range of new services and investments that the state will have to either deliver or manage. Indonesia will need to plan for this enlarged state and higher social entitlements.

Conclusion The 2014 presidential election in Indonesia and the inauguration of President Jokowi, marked a major watershed in its systemic transition from an authoritarian and centralized form of government, buttressed by a crony driven market economy, into a multi-party, decentralized and competitive economy. To understand Indonesian economic trends and future potential we need to see it not through a linear, segmented lens of economic theory, but by means of the political and social context in which both its systemic transition and its economic development continue to evolve. Seen in this light, Indonesia continues to face two sets of inter-related problems. The first is the pressing need to consolidate a democratic state such that both its formal and its political legitimacy are assured. Formal

Satish Mishra 63

legitimacy is a function of constitutional rules, the division of labor across different branches of the state, and the freedom of expression and association that help mature democracies to continue the business of government on a daily basis. Political legitimacy is constituted by the ability of the democratic state to supply necessary public goods including health, education, food and physical security. Arguably, Indonesia has come a long way in the procedural consolidation of democracy. Turning this into long-term political legitimacy will require reaping a democratic dividend. Raising the supply, access and quality of public services across such a vast and politically diverse archipelago is a daunting task, since it involves not only investment and additional resources, but also the public monitoring and participation that are needed to ensure a transparent and effective allocation process. Yet to a large extent that would be what it takes to ensure that Indonesia’s young electorate appreciates the core benefits of democracy and begins to be persuaded that it is the preferable, most viable means of ensuring Indonesia’s future prospects. It is for this reason that two interconnected strands in the interpretation of Indonesia’s development story are interwoven in this chapter. First is the question of political and systemic stability, with the conclusion that Indonesia needs to both reform its policymaking processes on the one hand and the operation of its decentralized government on the other. That involves the creation of a permanent Office of the President, perhaps by turning its present planning board into the technical support needed for this new office. It also requires self-adjusting mechanisms, which make politics less ethnically polarized, for instance, by the creation of a new Boundaries or Fiscal Commission to balance inter-regional fiscal and investment claims. The second is to find the resources to make government more responsive to demands of a democratic electorate, including safeguarding core civic rights, provision of required public goods, and the institutional mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Narrow fiscal space continues to be a major economic problem for Indonesia, especially in the context of its systemic transition. This requires the enlargement of the tax base, elimination of subsidies, and a transparent and easily understood process of public expenditure allocation and management decisions. It also means working closely with private business in joint ventures and programs, in ensuring that foreign investment works to the good of both the enterprise and the host country, and helps to deepen the human resource and the technological pool of skills in Indonesia. Indonesia also faces a new era in its international relationships. The ASEAN Common Market after 2015, its membership of the G-20, its growing trade and investment flows with India and China, and its ambition to emerge as a major archipelagic state with enhanced connectivity across its islands and waterways all require some detailed thinking and


policy development. This is still at an early stage, more discussed and anticipated than understood and implemented. Indonesia’s democratic consolidation, its enlargement of its fiscal space and its involvement in the central nerves of the new ASEAN common market will all help to shape a new era of domestic economic and political development and international relationships in the coming decade. The sum of these challenges amount to laudable circumstances for a country that only 15 short years ago seemed on the precipice of both economic collapse and political chaos. Indonesia could well emerge as a major role model not only for the polarized military dominant regimes of the Arab Spring countries, but also for nearby Myanmar, Cambodia, and to a lesser extent Thailand, which might realize the need to confront their national confusions and dilemmas as they work through their own large-scale development transformations.

Notes 1 See Colin Crouch (2004) Post-Democracy, Polity Press for an interesting discussion of 21st century democracy where a sharp increase in the number of recent established democracies is being counterbalanced by structural problems in mature democracies. To appreciate the problems of stabilizing nascent democracies see Samuel Huntington’s classic Political Order in Changing Societies (1968). Huntington put forward a rather controversial rule of thumb that democratic systems are likely to be sustainable only once they pass a per capita income level of US$6,000. Both India and now Indonesia tend to prove that this is too hasty a generalization. For a comprehensive discussion about democracy in Indonesia see Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (2010) Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 2 Satish Mishra (2000) ‘History in the Making: A Systemic Transition in Indonesia’, UNSFIR Working Papers Series No. 01/02, UNDP. 3 The income range used to measure the middle class of around 3,000 dollars per capita per annum is highly elastic. This is especially a problem given the fact that income distribution data are derived from household rather than individual expenditure surveys and the fact that they do not take into account remittances or asset distribution. Another problem is the fact that a very large percentage of non poor households are located just above the poverty line with the result that any price shock in food or other essential consumer items can the non-poor into the ranks of the poor. It is not clear how far the lower end of the middle class is similarly vulnerable. 4 USAID (2009) Democratic Decentralization Strategic Assessment Indonesia, February, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ231.pdf 5 UNESCAP (2013) Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific: Forward Looking Macroeconomic Policies for Inclusive and Sustainable Development, http:// www.unescap.org/publications/survey/surveys/survey2013.pdf 6 Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht (2000) Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective, Cambridge University Press; UNDP (2013) Human Development Report: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, http://hdr.undp. org/en/2013-report 7 Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge University Press; Satish Mishra (2009), Economic Inequality in

Satish Mishra 65

8

9 10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Indonesia: Trends, Causes, and Policy Response, Strategic Asia and UNDP, March, http://www.strategic-asia.com/pdf/Economic%20Inequality%20in %20Indonesia%20Trends,%20Causes,%20and%20Policy%20Response %20-%20March%202009.pdf; Mushtaq Khan and K. S. Jomo (eds) (2000) Rent, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, Cambridge University Press. UNESCAP (2013) op. cit.; Frances Stewart (2008) Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, Palgrave Macmillan; Satish Mishra (2009) Is Indonesia Vulnerable to Conflict? An Assessment, Strategic Asia and USAID, July, http://www.strategic-asia.com/pdf/Is%20Indonesia%20 Vulnerable%20to%20Conflict%20An%20Assessment%20-%20July%202008.pdf OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) International Aid Statistics various issues, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ Public expenditure to GDP ratio is the usual measure of the size of the State. See Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht (2000), op. cit. Government of South Africa (2013), A Framework for Strengthening CitizenGovernment Partnerships for Monitoring Frontline Service Delivery, August, The Presidency: Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation; GTZ (2009) ‘Local Governance: Accountable Public Services in Indonesia’, http://www.institut-fuermenschenrechte.de/uploads/tx_commerce/promising_practices_local_ governance_accountable_public_services_in_indonesia.pdf; Michael Buehler (2011) ‘Indonesia’s Law on Public Services: Changing State-Society Relations or Continuing Politics as Usual?’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47: 1, 65–86; World Bank (2004) World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5986 Government of Australia (2007) Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective, Australian Public Service Commission, http://www.apsc.gov.au/ __data/assets/pdf_file/0005/6386/wickedproblems.pdf UNDP (2013) op. cit.; UNESCAP (2013) op. cit.; Asian Development Bank (2012) Asian Development Outlook: Confronting Rising Inequality in Asia, https://www. tcd.ie/iiis/assets/doc/ADO%202012%20Book_13April2012.pdf; Satish Mishra (2014) Memo to the President. Asian Development Bank (2013) ‘Deepening Divide: Can Asia Beat the Menace of Rising Inequality?’ Development Asia, April, http://www.adb.org/ publications/deepening-divide-can-asia-beat-menace-rising-inequality; Satish Mishra (2009) Economic Inequality in Indonesia: Trends, Causes, and Policy Response, Strategic Asia and UNDP, March. See Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank and Oxford University Press; Satish Mishra (2009) Is Indonesia Vulnerable to Conflict? An Assessment, Strategic Asia and USAID, July and Frances Stewart (2008) op. cit. amongst many others. Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann (2000) ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition’, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, The World Bank Institute, September, https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19784/multi_page.pdf? sequence=1 For a comprehensive assessment of Indonesia’s higher education sector see Harris Iskandar and Nizam (eds) (2010) A Strategic Assessment of the Higher Education Sector in Indonesia, Strategic Asia and AusAid. Raoul Oberman, Richard Dobbs, Arief Budiman, Fraser Thompson and Morten Rossé (2014), The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential, McKinsey


19 20

21

22 23

Global Institute, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/asia-pacific/the_archipelago_economy. The idea of the demographic dividend has now entered into the development policy discussions in many South East Asian countries as outlined in UNESCAP (2011) Population Distribution, Urbanization, Internal Migration and Development: An International Perspective; Asian Development Bank (2014) Asian Development Outlook: Fiscal Policy for Inclusive Growth, http://www.adb.org/publications/asian-development-outlook-2014-fiscal-policy-inclusive-growth; David E. Bloom, David Canning and Jaypee Sevilla (2003) The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change, Rand; Satish Mishra (2014) ‘The Economic Foundations of Security’, National Security College Issue Brief No. 2, National Security College, Australian National University, May, pp. 12–19, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/indonesia-briefs-final.pdf ADB ‘Asian Development Outlook’, various issues. World Bank (2013) ‘Pressures Mounting’, Indonesia Economic Quarterly, March, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/Indonesia/I EQ-MARCH-2013-English.pdf See John Brondolo, Carlos Silvani, Eric Le Borgne and Frank Bosch (2008) Tax Administration Reform and Fiscal Adjustment: The Case of Indonesia (2001–07), IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08129.pdf Figures referred to here are taken from the ADB (2014) Asian Development Outlook. Satish Mishra (2010) ‘Constraints on Policy Making towards the Informal Economy in Indonesia: Lessons of the Current Decade’, Working Paper, International Labour Organisation, October, http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/ whatwedo/publications/WCMS_145782/lang—en/index.htm; Emanuela di Gropello, Aurelien Kruse and Prateek Tandon (2011) Skills for the Labor Market in Indonesia: Trends in Demand, Gaps, and Supply, World Bank, http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/14027186/skills-labor-marketindonesia-trends-demand-gaps-supply; Indonesia Investments (2014) ‘Youth Unemployment in Indonesia: A Demographic Bonus or Disaster?’, http:// www.indonesia-investments.com/news/news-columns/youth-unemployment-inindonesia-a-demographic-bonus-or-disaster/item2005

Bibliography Asian Development Bank (2012) Asian Development Outlook: Confronting Rising Inequality in Asia, https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/assets/doc/ADO%202012%20Book_ 13April2012.pdf Asian Development Bank (2013) ‘Deepening Divide: Can Asia Beat the Menace of Rising Inequality?’ Development Asia, April, http://www.adb.org/publications/deepening-divide-can-asia-beat-menace-rising-inequality Asian Development Bank (2013) Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific: Framework of Inclusive Growth Indicators, Special Supplement, 3rd edition, http://www.adb. org/mn/publications/framework-inclusive-growth-indicators-2013-key-indicatorsasia-and-pacific Asian Development Bank (2014) Asian Development Outlook: Fiscal Policy for Inclusive Growth, http://www.adb.org/publications/asian-development-outlook-2014-fiscalpolicy-inclusive-growth Aspinall, Edward and Mietzner, Marcus (eds) (2010) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Satish Mishra 67 Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) Central Board of Statistics Indonesia Bloom, David E., Canning, David and Sevilla, Jaypee (2003) The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change, Rand. Brondolo, John, Silvani, Carlos, Le Borgne, Eric and Bosch, Frank (2008) Tax Administration Reform and Fiscal Adjustment: The Case of Indonesia(2001–07), IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08129.pdf Buehler, Michael (2011) ‘Indonesia’s Law on Public Services: Changing State-Society Relations or Continuing Politics as Usual?’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47: 1, 65–86. Chung, Rae Kwong (2014) Fuel Subsidy Reform in Indonesia, UNESCAP, https://www.kdevelopedia.org/mnt/idas/asset/2013/11/14/DOC/SRC/04201311140 129007012943.PDF Collier, Paul, Elliott, V. L., Hegre, Håvard, Hoeffler, Anke, Reynal-Querol, Marta and Sambanis, Nicholas (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank and Oxford University Press. Crouch, Colin (2004) Post-Democracy, Polity Press. Government of Australia (2007) Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective, Australian Public Service Commission, http://www.apsc.gov.au/__data/assets/ pdf_file/0005/6386/wickedproblems.pdf Government of South Africa (2013) A Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships for Monitoring Frontline Service Delivery, August, The Presidency: Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. Gropello, Emanuela di, Kruse, Aurelien and Tandon, Prateek (2011) Skills for the Labor Market in Indonesia: Trends in Demand, Gaps, and Supply, World Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/14027186/skills-labormarket-indonesia-trends-demand-gaps-supply GTZ (2009) ‘Local Governance: Accountable Public Services in Indonesia’, http://www.institut-fuermenschenrechte.de/uploads/tx_commerce/promising_ practices_local_governance_accountable_public_services_in_indonesia.pdf Hellman, Joel S., Jones, Geraint and Kaufmann, Daniel (2000) ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition’, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, The World Bank Institute, September, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19784/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1 Huntington, Samuel, P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press. Indonesia Investments (2014)’Youth Unemployment in Indonesia: A Demographic Bonus or Disaster?’ http://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/news-columns/ youth-unemployment-in-indonesia-a-demographic-bonus-or-disaster/item2005 International Labour Organisation (2012) ‘Report V: The Youth Employment Crisis: Time for Action’, The 101st International Labour Conference, March, http://www. ilo.org/washington/areas/youth-employment/WCMS_175421/lang—en/index.htm Iskandar, Harris and Nizam (eds) (2010) A Strategic Assessment of the Higher Education Sector in Indonesia, Strategic Asia and AusAid. Khan, Mushtaq H. and Jomo, K. Sundaram (eds) (2000) Rent, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, Cambridge University Press. Mishra, Satish (2000) ‘History in the Making: A Systemic Transition in Indonesia’, UNSFIR Working Papers Series No. 01/02, UNDP. Mishra, Satish (2009) Economic Inequality in Indonesia: Trends, Causes, and Policy Response, Strategic Asia and UNDP, March, http://www.strategic-asia.com/

68 The Economy in Indonesia’s Ascent: Making Sense of it All pdf/Economic%20Inequality%20in%20Indonesia%20Trends,%20Causes,%20and %20Policy%20Response%20-%20March%202009.pdf Mishra, Satish (2009) Is Indonesia Vulnerable to Conflict? An Assessment, Strategic Asia and USAID, July, http://www.strategic-asia.com/pdf/Is%20Indonesia%20 Vulnerable%20to%20Conflict%20An%20Assessment%20-%20July%202008.pdf Mishra, Satish (2010) ‘Constraints on Policy Making towards the Informal Economy in Indonesia: Lessons of the Current Decade’, Working Paper, International Labour Organisation, October, http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/whatwedo/publications/ WCMS_145782/lang—en/index.htm Mishra, Satish (2014) ‘The Economic Foundations of Security’, National Security College Issue Brief No. 2, National Security College, Australian National University, May, pp. 12–19, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/indonesia-briefs-final.pdf Mishra, Satish (2014), Memo to the President. Oberman, Raoul, Dobbs, Richard, Budiman, Arief, Thompson, Fraser and Rossé, Morten (2014) The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential, McKinsey Global Institute, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/asia-pacific/the_archipelago_economy OECD (2014) Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries: Trends in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1990–2012, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/revenue-statistics-in-asian-countries-2014_9789264210691-en OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) International Aid Statistics various issues, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999) Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge University Press. Stewart, Frances (2008) Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, Palgrave Macmillan. Tanzi, Vito and Schuknecht, Ludger (2000) Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global Perspective, Cambridge University Press. UNDP (2013) Human Development Report: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report UNESCAP (2011) ‘Population Distribution, Urbanization, Internal Migration and Development: An International Perspective’, http://www.un.org/esa/population/ publications/PopDistribUrbanization/PopulationDistributionUrbanization.pdf UNESCAP (2013) Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific: Forward Looking Macroeconomic Policies for Inclusive and Sustainable Development, http://www. unescap.org/publications/survey/surveys/survey2013.pdf UNESCAP Data Explorer, http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/statdb/DataExplorer.aspx USAID (2009) Democratic Decentralization Strategic Assessment Indonesia, February, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ231.pdf World Bank (2004) World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5986 World Bank (2013) ‘Pressures Mounting’, Indonesia Economic Quarterly, March, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/Indonesia/IE Q-MARCH-2013-English.pdf World Bank World Development Indicators 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/sites/ default/files/wdi-2014-book.pdf World Bank Development Indicators Online Database updated March 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators

4 Yudhoyono’s Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National Stability, and Economic Development in Indonesia Mark S. Williams

Introduction Conceptualizing Indonesia’s ascent toward great power status in Asia requires consideration of the role Islam will play in shaping Indonesian politics. Although the identities of Islam in Indonesia remain as varied as ever, since the final decade of Suharto’s rule there has been a general increase in the level of religiosity expressed in the public sphere. How these dynamics will shape Indonesia’s ascent is a source of concern to some observers. Some cite the rise of the transnational jihadist movement and probable Indonesian connections as a threat to both the secular Indonesian constitution, and to regional and international order.1 Others are more worried about governments of Muslim majority nations compensating for economic and political weaknesses through a rhetorical depiction of themselves as ‘defenders of the faith’, appealing to crass populist sentiments of xenophobia, intolerance, and authoritarianism.2 Since the discontent of the Asian Financial Crisis swept away the institutions of dictatorship, ushering in demokrasi and reformasi, the political culture of Islam in Indonesia has not embraced the revolutionary Islamic movements that have arisen, nor has this political culture of Islam acquiesced to the temptation to cloak aggressive and violent politics of the state in the language of Islam. During the early 21st century, as well as historically, Islamic ethics and Islamic identity have instead been embedded within the twin Indonesian goals of stabilitas nasional (national stability) and pembangunan ekonomi (economic development). While the political culture of Islam in the Republic has, for the most part, recognized a resonance between Islam and the two seminal goals of the state, the continued coexistence of Islam and the state is not assured indefinitely. Developmental setbacks, financial volatility, and even trends in global politics have the potential to delegitimize an Indonesian government that is cooperative with international society. Such threats to the development of Indonesia’s economy and its domestic stability might yet alter prevailing interpretations of Islam among 69

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the major Islamic organizations and parties over the next 20 years, placing these organizations in tension with the Indonesian government. However, the early experiences of a democratic Indonesia suggest that Islam will continue to act as an important social force that is pushing the Republic toward greater national stability and the development of its economy. This chapter will first briefly outline some of the dominant trends found in the political culture of Islam in Indonesia during the late colonial period, including the experiences of parliamentary democracy during the 1950s, Sukarno’s Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy), and then the Orde Baru (New Order) of Suharto. After this context is provided, the chapter will focus on the period of demokrasi and reformasi to show that while Islam has been invoked by some revolutionary organizations that espouse social and political change through violent confrontation, and even by the Indonesian state to justify its own violent actions, the dominant expression of Islam has been both an affirmation of stabilitas nasional and of pembangunan ekonomi. The political stability of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration during the tumultuous years of the early 21st century was, in part, achieved through his appeal to an Islamic ethics on the social foundations of Indonesia’s economic engagement and upon national democracy.

Islam in the republic: National stability and economic development The Indonesian ‘national revival’ that occurred during the early 20th century in opposition to Dutch colonial rule was deeply connected to a simultaneous ‘Islamic revival’ that was occurring amongst the abangan (Indonesian Muslims who accept the relationship between Islam and the cultural traditions of the archipelago) merchant class, which was discontented over the interference of the colonial state in regional trade.3 In an attempt to garner legitimacy among the peoples of the archipelago for its deeply repressive colonial state, the Dutch instituted a putative ‘Ethical Policy’ whereby a small proportion of the profits extracted from the exploitative relationship was to be invested into colonial infrastructure and human capital. What the Dutch did not count on was the rise of social organizations that further pressured the colonial government through collective action. Organizations dominated by abangan Muslims, desperate to engage in regional trade without interference from Batavia, included Budi Utomo (Highest Endeavour), founded in 1908, followed a year later by Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah (Islamic Commercial Union—SDI). SDI inspired a number of Islamic–socialist organizations, even the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party—PKI), which formed in 1924. SDI became Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union—SI) and had as many as two million members by 1912, the same year Muhammadiyah (the Way of the

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Prophet) was founded to inspire Muslims in the archipelago to embrace modernization as a method of emancipation for the Muslim people of the world. A number of traditionalist Islamic organizations mobilized to challenge the message of modernism preached by Muhammadiyah, the most significant being Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival/Awakening of Religious Scholars—NU) in 1926. Although divided on the particulars regarding the role of Muslims in society, this diverse milieu of Islamic groups was united in a spirit of national revival. Despite these auspicious developments in Indonesian organizational capacity, the national revival was unable to cast off Dutch colonial government. In the aftermath of strikes organized by SI and the PKI, the Dutch dissolved any pretense to representative government that the ‘Ethical Policy’ might have begrudgingly recognized. Nationalist and Islamic organizations did persist; some new ones were founded (Partai Islam Indonesia—The Indonesian Islamic Party) alongside entirely nationalist organizations, such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party—PNI). The return to increasing levels of Dutch repressiveness, combined with the contraction of international trade during the Great Depression, amounted to a crushing destitution throughout the archipelago during the final phase of Dutch rule (1927–42) that preceded the arrival of the Empire of Japan. The Japanese occupation (1942–5) represented a profound betrayal for many Javanese, who anticipated abolition of colonial government under the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ Instead, a brutal corvée system corralled Indonesians into supplying the Empire’s war materials. The Japanese sought not only to rule through direct coercion, but also by some measure of social consent. Imperial policy involved pressuring Islamic clerics to declare the Pacific War a jihad (holy war) thereby seeking to coopt the Muslims of the archipelago, establishing organizations such as the Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims). Though the council was banned by the Japanese before the war came to its apocalyptic conclusion, it continued in Indonesia as the political party known as Masjumi. Anticipating their defeat, the Japanese occupation forces permitted political mobilization in Java to thwart European and American attempts to rebuild colonial government. With Japanese consent, the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence—BPUPK) was formed in March of 1945.4 The BPUPK acted as a forum between the golongan nasional (national group) in Indonesian society, which included Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, and the golongan Islam (Islamic group), represented by Masjumi and its party chairman Mohammad Natsir. Natsir had pushed for constitutional inclusions prioritizing the importance of Islam at the BPUPK conferences, such as eligibility for president being restricted to Muslims,


and an obligation to carry out Sharia. Sukarno and Hatta—abangan Muslims themselves—harbored deep reservations on the specific inclusion of Islam in the constitution. Their fear was rooted in the failure of the strikes of the 1920s and that Islamic discourse might alienate non-Muslims as well as abangan Muslims with nationalist, socialist, or communist affiliations. The Islamic content was rejected by the Sukarno and Hattacontrolled Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) in August of 1945. Fearful that Muslim support for an insurgency against the returning Dutch colonizers might waiver, Sukarno and the Hatta offered establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) as a constitutional concession to Muslim groups.5 The most prominent Islamic organization to denounce the new constitution was Darul Islam (House of Islam—DI). DI, like Masjumi, represented a coalition of Muslim militias formed by the Japanese to fight the Allied forces in the event that Java or Sumatra became a theater of operations. Distrusted by Sukarno and Hatta for their intransigence on Islamic law as the foundation of government, DI existed outside the emerging Indonesian body-politic. Alternatively, Masjumi accepted the new constitution, choosing to support the decisions made by Sukarno and Hatta in August of 1945 for the sake of national stability and independence. Natsir even defended the pancasila—Indonesia’s official creed of a non-sectarian, democratic and unified nation—by focusing on the congruencies between the text and Islamic teachings.6 He argued that pancasila’s keadilan sosial (social justice), global humanism, and deliberative democracy are all in the same spirit as Islam’s teachings of adala Ijtimaya (social justice), islahu baina’nnas (reconciliation between peoples), and denunciations of istibdad (despotism). Crucially, pancasila’s first principle of Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa (belief in one God) was argued by Natsir to reflect the Islamic doctrine of tawhid, belief in the indivisibility and oneness of God. After the bloody, but ultimately successful, war for Indonesian independence against the Dutch (1945–49), DI carved out a sphere of influence in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Never achieving reconciliation with Jakarta over the lack of Islamic law in the constitution, DI was drawn into protracted conflict with the Indonesian military. Rejecting the revolutionary politics of DI, Natsir steered Masjumi toward a much different set of politics, one of peaceful engagement in the affairs of the Republic. The liberal era that followed independence, known as ‘Parliamentary Democracy’ (1950–57), ushered in a hopeful, if chaotic, era in Indonesia. Although the Republic struggled to achieve a semblance of economic and political independence, Natsir campaigned on a platform of national stability and engagement with international society to facilitate development. In ‘The Aims of the Masjumi’, Natsir outlined the party’s ‘ideals of Islam’ as representing a host of social justice issues, such as the abolition of tyranny and exploitation, and, above all, the abolition of poverty.7 Of particular

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concern to Natsir was the faction of Indonesians, primarily the PKI, whom he identified as ‘fanatics’, calling for an end to Indonesia’s relations with the United States and for revolutionary action domestically and internationally. Natsir rejected revolutionary politics in favor of working toward a ‘harmonious social relationship’ between classes, and to resolve political–economic tensions in accordance with the Islamic teaching of ‘mutual understanding between peoples’.8 Natsir’s speech at the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952 defended a conciliatory approach to international relations during decolonization for the Islamic world. Instead of deriding Western countries and institutions, Natsir called upon Muslims to act magnanimously, embracing the ‘peace and liberty’ of Islam.9 He denied that Western–Islamic tension is inherent to either party, but argued that it is a product of historical encounters. Muslim societies, according to Natsir, were suspicious of Western intentions because of their colonial encounters in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The West was described by Natsir as experiencing difficulties adapting to the profound changes occurring in the composition of an international society, the western mindset must be relaxed in order to foster conditions for universal self-determination. Natsir expressed optimism that the Cold War might draw the West and Islamic societies closer together, though he also cautioned against a union born entirely out of Realpolitik. The West and Islam must move beyond ‘such weak grounds’, acknowledging both their commonalities and their differences, and build a new international framework of respect and cooperation, rather than merely out of fear of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. This discourse of national stability and international cooperation struck a chord with Indonesians during the parliamentary democracy of the 1950s. Masjumi was appointed more seats than any other single party when the People’s Representative Council (PRC) was appointed in 1950. Five years later, when Indonesians went to the polls to elect the PRC, Masjumi increased this number, finishing with as many seats as frontrunner PNI. It was during the campaign for the 1955 election that the US State Department identified Masjumi as the party best positioned to encourage foreign investment, develop regional trade relations, and transform Indonesia into ‘an important Asiatic power’.10 Masjumi’s hoped-for influence in government was not tolerated by Sukarno. Two years after Indonesia’s first election, the PRC was suspended, replaced by a Dewan Nasional (National Council) appointed by Sukarno under the pretext of martial law. In May of 1957, parliamentary democracy was over and the era of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) had begun. Charging Masjumi, among others, with attempting to ‘build up capitalism’ in Indonesia led to the party being banned and a ‘Guided Economy’ became the order of the day, ostensibly designed to break the perceived dependencies of the colonial economy.11


While Sukarno set Indonesia on a radicalized course of economic nationalism and the divisive and turbulent revolutionary philosophy of romantik, dialektik, and dynamisme (romanticism, dialectic conflict, and a spiritedness), Masjumi, forced out of meaningful government despite popular support, also underwent a process of radicalization. Following the suspension of the PRC, Masjumi and Natsir were to develop an ambiguous relationship with the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia—PRRI), an insurgent group threatening to force the secession of Sumatra and challenging Sukarno’s rule in the country.12 Masjumi and other prominent Islamic organizations became increasingly radicalized during Guided Democracy as Sukarno tightened his alignment with the PNI and, especially, the PKI. Few could have predicted the extent of the violence that marked the end of Guided Democracy and the beginning of the New Order between September 1965 and March 1966, and fewer still could have predicted the role Islamic organizations played in the accompanying brutality. It was during the purge of the PKI—the scapegoat for the attempted coup against the military command in Jakarta in 1965—when the army, working with Islamic militias, killed approximately 500,000 civilians. The killings defy easy characterization: the violence spiraled out of Java and into Bali, Sumatra, and Kalimantan. Those targeted included the PKI, the leftists of the PNI, the Balinese, and ethnic Chinese. A clear dynamic of the purge involved the targeting of the abangan by the santri—typically urbanized orthodox Muslims—and the culpability of some of the most important Islamic organizations in the Republic. Tempted by vague offers to return to government, as well as the petty and hard-hearted offer of settling old scores, NU, the Muhammadiyah, and remnants of Masjumi collaborated with the army in the horrific massacre of their fellow Indonesians.13 Headed by the obscure reserve army general Suharto, the New Order (1966–98) that replaced Guided Democracy had little intention of allowing Islamic organizations a direct role in the politics of national government. However, the New Order regime did not want to alienate Islamic organizations or to offend Islamic sensibilities the way that Sukarno did. Instead, Suharto tried to manage a religious dirigisme of state-controlled Islam. It represented an attempt to extract legitimacy from civil society for the New Order, as well as a wary act of containment to prevent Islam aligning itself against the government in Jakarta. To foment national stability in domestic politics, Suharto relied on two dominant social forces.14 The first constellation of social forces that the New Order was built upon has been described as the ukhuwah wathaniyah, or, ‘national brotherhood’. This included the secular–nationalist fixtures of Indonesian society and state institutions such as the army, the remnants of PNI, and the freshly empowered technocrats the New Order deployed to

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direct economic development. The second constellation of social forces used by the New Order was the ukhuwwah Islamiyah, the Islamic brotherhood.15 Islamic organizations were tolerated by the state as long as they held the 1945 pancasila as their asas tunggal (sole foundation). Though Partai Golkar, representing the ukhuwah wathaniyah, easily won majorities in the rigged parliamentary elections of Suharto’s 30-year reign, the party that always came in second was the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party—PPP), a moderate Islamic party affiliated with NU until the 1980s. Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, NU, accepted pancasila, and the organization’s chairman and future president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), much like Natsir before him, defended the religious basis of pancasila. MORA—the concession to Islamic representation created by Sukarno and Hatta—was to become a major source of Islamic support for the New Order, as was the affiliated Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council—MUI). The Islamic Students Organization, or Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), based in the region of Yogyakarta, argued on behalf of the regime that political passivity was a requirement of Sunni Islam. Its proponents even generated one of the quintessential slogans of the New Order, which still resonates in Indonesia today: ‘Islam, yes, Partai Islam, no’. In 1969 Suharto also ensured that Indonesia was a founding member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), despite the Republic not being an Islamic state. Sensing an increasing Islamization underway in Indonesia during what was to be the final decade of the New Order, Suharto enacted a number of laws and commenced several projects to enhance the role of Islam in society. These laws covered education, religious courts, charities, headscarves, gambling, banking, preaching, and the promotion of Islamic festivals. The religious dirigisme of the New Order was not entirely successful at co-opting Islam. Established in 1990, the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI), or Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, was interpreted as being too embedded within the state’s political institutions to garner much credibility among Muslims.16 Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s oldest Islamic organization, thought that the continued ban on Masjumi constituted a serious betrayal of the revolution that swept Sukarno from power. It maintained a cool détente with the New Order: the regime did not dare to act aggressively toward Muhammadiyah, and in turn Muhammadiyah was careful not to antagonize the regime.17 Some observers note that the chief expression of passive resistance toward the New Order was through Islamic discourse.18 The twin goals of the New Order—national stability and economic development—were substantially achieved by a regime that lasted for three decades. However, Suharto’s grip on power could not withstand the economic catastrophe of the Asian Financial Crisis. In the ensuing political


instability, Indonesia’s Islamic organizations—which had previously been pacified by the New Order—now mobilized into a revolutionary fervor that ushered in a new political era for the Republic.

Islam as a revolutionary force and the discourse of a revisionist state President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) reflected on how the events surrounding the Asian Financial Crisis posed a palpable ‘ancaman disintegrasi’ (threat of disintegration) in the history of the Republic. Constituting ‘terjadi guncangan politik’ (political shocks) and ‘guncangan sosial’ (social shocks), with the possibility of ‘keamanan dan ketertiban’ (security and order) becoming totally lost.19 Outside observers similarly forecasted a possible turn to anarchy as the Republic broke down, prompting one prominent commentator on Indonesia to declare that the Republic was potentially ‘in Flames’.20 The general consensus is that the Islamic world began to experience an ‘Islamic revivalism’ by the late 1970s that has continued into the early 21st century, and that the same general trend has been identified in Indonesia.21 During this time, Suharto tried to convince a skeptical public on the role of Islam in his policies, as noted above, but he also tried to convince the public of the centrality of Islam in his private life, such as undertaking the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and adopting the honorific title of Haji. Regardless of this, Suharto’s religious dirigisme did not enable him to escape the outpouring of anger and discontent in the spring of 1998, much of it mobilized by formerly passive Islamic organizations. The heads of NU, Muhammadiyah, and even MUI and the ICMI demanded Suharto’s resignation, while protests swept throughout secular and Islamic civil society alike, with much of the organization occurring at universities and mosques.22 Suharto finally resigned on 20 May and was succeeded by his VicePresident, B. J. Habibie, who served as President between May of 1998 until October 1999. Sensing the new salience of Islam in the politics of the Republic, Habibie approached the 1999 election in a re-branded Golkar that was to represent a merger between the New Order’s ukhuwah wathaniyah and the ukhuwwah Islamiyah. Golkar was now to feature a number of leaders from the Islamic HMI in key roles, and to appeal to an Islamic identity in addition to Suharto’s historic national identity.23 The months surrounding the Asian Financial Crisis also witnessed a revisionist state attempt to appropriate Islam as a vehicle for justifying militarism and expansionist policies. In 1999, while fighting against a secessionist movement in Ambon, an aide to a minister in the Habibie administration used the pro-Suharto Islamist group Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World—KISDI) to call for a jihad against Christians in the islands.24

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In East Timor, the revolutionary events on Java encouraged nationalist leaders once again to push for independence, something that was almost achieved in the mid-1970s. After the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces—TNI) were deployed by President Habibie, some of the state discourse took an Islamist turn, bitterly deriding the predominately animist and Catholic Timorese. Abilio Soares, the Indonesian governor of East Timor, ordered the killing of religious community leaders, including priests and nuns.25 The Indonesian public remained unconvinced of Jakarta’s propaganda to cloak the attacks in East Timor in the language of Islam, and Habibie was pressured into allowing for a referendum on independence, thus alienating even his sole remaining supporters, the TNI. The state’s attempts to co-opt Islam for a revisionist agenda have been mostly limited to the period immediately following the Asian Financial Crisis, as the Muslim public have been largely unpersuasive. The greater threat to Indonesian public safety was the rise of extremist Islamic parties and organizations. These organizations sought to use violence to achieve transformation of the nation’s political institutions, or to capitalize on the emergent political liberalization by attaining electoral victory and rewriting pancasila to mandate fundamentalist Islamic culture. One such Islamic organization that attempted to expand its power and influence over the period of reformasi was Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Congregation—JI). The ideological successor to DI, JI was founded in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in the 1990s when Abdullah Sungkar met with al-Qaeda leadership, including Osama bin Laden, and made a ‘bay’a’ (pledge of allegiance).26 Inspired by contemporary jihadists such as bin Laden and al Zawahiri, and especially by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, JI committed itself to transforming Indonesian society, which the group derided as wallowing in jahiliyya (the age of ignorance). In seeking to accomplish this goal, JI created both clandestine cells of jihadists, as well as a public NGO, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Mujahideen Council of Indonesia—MMI). Another prominent group formed during the reformasi period is the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defense Front—FPI), also Islamic revisionists who disdain the influence of liberalism in the country, and are intolerant of the Ahmadiyya of Indonesia. JI was responsible for the Bali bombing of 2002, which claimed over 200 lives, as well as a series of other much smaller bombings, and FPI has been responsible for thuggish violence directed at some of the more vulnerable religious and ethnic minority groups of Java, in addition to attacking socialists and religious rights activists. Despite the political and economic volatility of the late 1990s and early 2000s, groups such as JI and the FPI were kept to the margins of Indonesia’s political culture, and proved to be inconsequential in the coming elections. Over 50 parties participated in the 1999 parliamentary election: 21 parties won seats in the MPR and five parties in particular won a


significant number of seats. The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle—PDIP) secured the most seats (153), with Golkar claiming 120 seats. The PPP finished third with 58 seats, while the NU-backed Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party—PKB) and the Muhammadiyah-inspired Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party—PAN) won 51 and 34 seats respectively. The frontrunner in 1999, the PDIP, was headed by Megawati Sukarnoputri, and was one of the most definitively secular parties competing for seats. The runner-up, Golkar, had attempted to re-badge itself with linkages to some of the late New Order Muslim organizations, but remained a secular party. The most politically successful Islamic parties appealed to an Islamic ethics of cooperation and development rather than revolution. The PPP, no longer under the watchful gaze of New Order dirigisme, became a much more overtly Islamic party under Hamzah Haz. Although the PPP did publicly question pancasila as the sole foundation of any recognized organization in Indonesia, it continued to defend pancasila as the ideological foundation of the state.27 PAN and the PKB rooted their politics in Islamic ethics, but rarely used a populist version that appealed to anger or xenophobia.28 Instead, both parties emphasized the central importance of democracy for the future of the Republic and cautioned against an overtly Islamicized state. The PKB made special note of tolerance in Indonesian society and Islam, and PAN warned Indonesian society not to reject capitalism blindly in response to the Asian Financial Crisis. An Indonesian branch of the Ikhwan known at the time as the ‘Justice Party’ campaigned on a platform of Sharia: it performed miserably, winning less than 2 per cent of the popular vote and losing its party status. The MPR’s election of Abdurrahman Wahid, or, ‘Gus Dur’, as he is popularly known, was secured through an alliance between Golkar and the Islamic parties, but only lasted from October 1999 to July 2001. As former chairman of NU and leader of the PKB, Gus Dur brought to the presidency an understanding of Islam that far surpassed Habibie, Suharto, or Sukarno. Gus Dur’s political legitimacy was more intrinsically linked to his status as a Muslim than any of his predecessors since Natsir in the early 1950s. For two decades Gus Dur had publicly aired his skepticism regarding those who ascribed social perfection to Sharia. He had become convinced that Sharia had been corrupted by the political ambitions and interests of Middle Eastern jurists and had departed from the moral and ethical teachings of the Quran, justifying heinous institutions such as slavery. Rather than introducing Sharia into the formal legal institutions of Indonesia, Gus Dur propounded that the substance of Islam can be integrated into the Republic through policies of social justice.29 Investigations into Gus Dur’s cabinet—as well as allegations surrounding unrecovered millions from the National Food Logistics Agency and the revelation of a $2 million campaign donation from the Sultan of Brunei—

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caused a precipitous decline in legitimacy for his presidency. This loss of legitimacy quickly swelled into betrayal when Gus Dur demanded that SBY declare a state of emergency, which SBY prudently refused to do, and SBY was subsequently fired for his lack of cronyism. After Gus Dur attempted to dissolve parliament, the MPR enthusiastically passed a vote of impeachment. After a final defiant standoff with parliament, Gus Dur resigned and left the country for medical treatment in the United States. Gus Dur’s successor, Megawati, was able to retain the presidency for a longer period (July 2001–October 2004). However, she was similarly unable to bring political stability to Indonesia. She earned the confidence of the MPR primarily through the ‘tenang’ (quiet/soft) style of politics she had built around herself and the PDIP. However, subsequent events in late 2001 made it a very challenging environment for a quiet style of politics to govern a Muslim-majority country. The American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the public debate over the legitimacy of jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda represented a significant crisis over the political culture of Islam in Indonesia. Megawati aligned herself very closely with the United States in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (9/11). She was the first head of state from Southeast Asia to visit Washington and pledged Indonesian support for what was eventually to be known as the Global War on Terror. Megawati’s discursive support did nothing to translate into material support for the Global War on Terror. Furthermore, it did not appear to affect existing Indonesian public opinion, as US foreign policy already had a deeply radicalizing effect on Indonesian Muslim extremist groups. Megawati’s adversarial vice-president, PPP leader Haz, depicted the 9/11 hijackers as martyrs and expressed a sense of joy in the attacks. Not surprisingly, some Islamist groups, such as the FPI, pronounced fatwas (decrees) of jihad against the United States. Even the MUI pronounced an ambiguous fatwa on defending Islamic territory.30 In late 2001, and then again a year later, the Center for the Study of Islam and Society at the State Islamic University polled Indonesian public opinion on the extent to which they supported Islamic government for Indonesia. They also polled Indonesian society on the extent to which Islamist groups who believe in the introduction of Sharia should be supported. The polling revealed that approximately two-thirds of respondents agreed that Islamic government would be best for Indonesia, and approximately half of the respondents agreed that Islamist groups (such as JI) attempting to implement Sharia should be supported.31 It is important to note that this discontent, expressed through Islamic discourse, was not entirely a reaction against the perceived injustices of the Bush administration. It also arose from profound disillusionment with the discernible lack of economic fairness in Indonesian society, and a sense that the institutions of the state were arrayed against the common people.


The afflictions of ‘Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme’ (Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism—KKN) radicalized Indonesia after the Asian Financial Crisis and caused distrust between Indonesian society and a combination of the state, multinational corporations, and even world order. During a threeyear period between 2001 and 2003, during which approximately 80 per cent of respondents identified either high prices or lack of employment as the largest problems facing society, KKN proved an effective framing of what was not working during a time of democracy and reform.32 It was this discontent over KKN that caused Indonesia’s Muslims to turn toward Sharia as an alternative model rooted in Islamic social justice.33 Despite the rising sentiment of Islamic identity and the trend to express discontent through an Islamic alternative to the status quo, the PPP, PKB, and PAN refrained from running an overtly Islamic campaign on Sharia in 2004. These parties instead continued to run on a campaign of Islamic ethics, including pluralism and social justice. The Islamic parties, however, did begin to question Indonesia’s relationship with global capitalism and foreign influences that did not share the same Islamic ethics. The Ikhwaninspired Justice Party resurfaced as the newly constituted Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party—PKS); but, having learned its lesson in 1999, it avoided discussion of Sharia and instead focused on the message of social justice expressed by its Egyptian founder, Hasan al-Banna. During the years between 2001 and 2004, the most significant Islamic organizations not only refrained from tapping into the ‘clash of civilizations’ sentiment that was influencing mainstream public debate in Indonesia, but they actively opposed it. Both Muhammadiyah and NU worked aggressively to denounce the xenophobia of the FPI and the violent ideology of JI. NU went furthest in establishing a new organization, the Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network—JIL), that could speak directly to alienated Muslim youth. JIL articles from the period recognized the various injustices the ummah are experiencing around the world, but urged Indonesians not to allow the policies of the Bush administration to cause bigotry toward the American public, recognizing that Western and Islamic traditions overlap significantly. Above all, groups such as JIL warned Indonesia’s Muslims against betraying Islam itself by accepting the use of violence against people, or in promoting the overthrow of a state. The 2004 elections saw Golkar and the PDIP become the two major parties, followed by the Islamic parties (PPP, PKB, PAN, and the reinvented PKS). Added to the typical milieu of post-Suharto Indonesian politics was the Demokrat party, a secular–centrist party headed by SBY that was founded upon a mixture of progressive conservatism and commitment to cooperation with the liberal international order. In the first direct elections for president since reformasi began, SBY and his running mate Jusuf Kalla won the most votes after the first round of voting in 2004 (33.6 per cent of the popular vote), and then secured a second-round majority (60.6 per cent

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of the popular vote). SBY was able to maintain his legitimacy enough to serve his entire first term (2004–2009) and he won a second term in 2009, bringing a period of relative political stability to Indonesia not experienced since the New Order.

Democratic stability, economic development, and an Islamic ethics during the SBY era, 2004–14 The national stability of the SBY era in Indonesia has been unique in postreformasi Indonesia. His first term in office was bookended by two crises that threatened to radicalize society. First was the insurgency in Iraq against the US occupation that had escalated into ethnic cleansing and civil war by February of 2006; and secondly, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. During this tumultuous period, the two central goals of the SBY administration had been ‘pembangunan ekonomi’ and national stability achievable through ‘benar membangun demokrasi’ (building a strong democracy).34 Underlying both of these policies has been an appeal to Islamic ethics, first on international engagement to facilitate economic development, and secondly, on the link between the foundations of democracy and Islam. SBY’s policies for economic development have been one of engagement with the international economy. SBY has stated that his administration had been ‘determined to make foreign direct investments the engine of our economic growth’ and to make Indonesia into a ‘more active participant in international cooperation and partnership building’.35 In addition to encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI), SBY also cooperated extensively with international institutions, such as ASEAN and, especially after the Global Financial Crisis, the G-20. The public has not been naïve about Indonesia’s relationship with external market forces after the Asian Financial Crisis, or more recently with the Global Financial Crisis. In polling conducted in 2005, over 60 per cent of respondents recorded that they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with SBY’s policies on development, and over 70 per cent of respondents were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with his policies on inflation and employment.36 In 2008 and again in 2010, over 80 per cent of Indonesians identified inflation or unemployment as the greatest problem facing the country.37 SBY’s message to Indonesians to convince them of the benefits of integrating with economic globalization represented an appeal not only to realpolitik, but also to identity. The defining benchmark for Indonesian foreign policy is Hatta’s 1948 speech ‘Mendayung di antara Dua Karang’ (Rowing between Two Reefs), in which he affirms that a republican Indonesia free of colonial control will be guided in its foreign relations by a framework that is ‘bebas dan aktif’ (independent and active). The context of bebas dan aktif was one of a


commitment to the anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch, but also an assurance that an independent Indonesia would engage peacefully in diplomatic relations with international society. The Cold War rivalry was also an important dimension to the context of bebas dan aktif, with the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acting as the two reefs threatening to sink Indonesia.38 SBY updated the doctrine of bebas dan aktif for the early 21st century. No longer should Indonesia fear superpower reefs, but instead, it must navigate the ‘bergolak’ (turbulent) waters of globalization.39 The volatilities of economic globalization are the new challenges to Indonesia’s economic growth and national stability. Though Indonesia came out of the 2008 Financial Crisis relatively unscathed, this turbulent ocean had an earlier devastating impact on Indonesian society during the late 1990s. The consequences of another financial crisis will persist as a cause of worry for any Indonesian government. Indonesia, cautioned SBY, ‘must resist and prevent the pernicious effects of globalization, which is against our national interest, which is against our values’.40 SBY argued that Indonesia’s navigation of the turbulent waters of globalization is, at least partially, facilitated by virtue of its Islamic values. Foreign policy is an extension of Indonesia’s ‘kepentingan nasional’ (national interests), but also its ‘nilai-nilai dasar’ (basic values), ‘prinsip-prinsip’ (principles), ‘falsafah’ (philosophy) and ‘sejarah’ (history).41 Echoing Suharto, SBY described an Islamic ‘jiwa dan semangat’ (soul and spirit) of the nation that encourages Indonesia toward foreign relations. Although Indonesia, and the Islamic world more broadly, is struggling with a ‘challenge of peace’ brought on by globalization, SBY has attempted to instill in Indonesians a sense of confidence rooted in their religious identity. In a speech to open an NU-sponsored conference in Jakarta, he posited that the ‘fellowship through zakat (the obligation of charity as stipulated by the pillars of Islam), shadaqah (charity for a return or protection), infaq (charity without any expectation of return), and waqf (donation of land for charitable purposes)’, are evidence that Islamic values can mitigate the injustices and the inequities that globalization can bring. SBY observed that historically, Muslims were ‘among the first globalizers’ and declared his belief ‘that Muslims can learn to be at the forefront of globalism’.42 This expression of Islam as a domain of both international cooperation and a filter for managing social justice in a context of economic globalization is not simply a product of the SBY administration. Suharto tried to articulate a similar discourse, and so did Masjumi during the period of Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy. Another prominent example of this political culture of Islam is found in the ‘Jakarta Declaration Upholding Islam as Rahmatan lil Alamin’, released at the 2004 International Conference of Islamic Scholars. The document propounded Islam to represent ‘blessings for the universe’ and its ‘norms and teachings oblige all the ummah to deem peace (salam), justice (adalah), freedom (hurriyyah), moderation

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(tawassuth), tolerance (tasamuh), balance (tawazun), consultation (shura) and equity (musawah) as fundamental to our way of life’.43 The majority of the 21 articles of the declaration stress the importance of international cooperation, and seven of the articles specifically discuss the economy. One article includes the obligation of Muslims to ‘work hard’ in the ‘pursuit of prosperity’ and ‘the obligation to eradicate poverty’. Another article emphasizes ‘the promotion of Islamic economic practices and international cooperation so that they can actively participate and effectively compete in the current and future global economy’.44 The second pillar of national stability during the SBY era has been the administration’s appeal to the democratic values of the Indonesian people finally becoming manifest in state institutions. SBY communicated that democracy represents the ‘kebenaran atas pilihan rakyat kami’ (the truth that is the choice of people) and its ‘mekarnya’ (flowering) in Indonesia will bring both ‘kebebasan’ (freedom) and ‘pemenuhan hak-hak asasi manusia’ (the fulfilment of human rights). Democracy, much like Indonesia’s interdependence in relation to FDI and the international political economy, is not a dimension of Indonesian political culture that should be taken for granted. Indonesia underwent an unsuccessful early experiment with democracy after independence, and then experienced approximately four decades of authoritarian rule under which political rights and civil liberties were restricted. Democracy is not a condition that can inherently provide stabilitas politik (political stability). Acknowledgment of this sentiment occurs not only in Indonesian political culture, but also throughout the Global South, SBY admitted during a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that ‘democracy is meaningless to the eight million human beings who will die’ each year during the early 21st century.45 But he added that democracy, linked with economic development and ‘good governance’, might be the most important responsibility that developing countries assume.46 It is an interdependent relationship between economic development and democracy in Indonesia that is fundamental to national stability. Degradation of one will inherently degrade the other and compromise national stability. Just as Islamic ethics are said to underpin international cooperation to facilitate economic development, Islamic ethics have been articulated by SBY to be foundational for the strength of democracy in Indonesia, and the role of Indonesia as a model to the world of the compatibility between Islam and democracy. A number of examples from the SBY administration demonstrate the centrality of democracy as the context for national stability in Indonesia, as well as a model for the international community. The success of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in carrying out democratic elections demonstrates to Western countries and the international community that the values of democracy, Islam, and modernity can coexist peacefully and harmoniously.47


This sentiment on the relationship between Islam, democracy and the modern world is echoed by SBY: A clash of civilizations is not inevitable. A confluence of civilizations is entirely possible. For millennia, our archipelago has been home to many currents of civilization. This is why, in today’s Indonesia, democracy, Islam and modernity can go hand-in-hand—despite the occasional threats of extremism.48 There is a political culture in Indonesia that is convinced that the Muslims of the country can prove to the international community that Islam is ‘toleran dan menyejukkan’ (tolerant and soothing).49 The success of democracy in Indonesia, as well as its participation in the international political economy, is understood as having ramifications for the ‘image of Islam’ around the world.50 Indonesian democracy is not only depicted as a symbol of congruity between the principles of democracy and the political culture of the Islamic world, but it also equips the Republic to manage economic volatilities successfully. Ensuring the social protection of the most vulnerable segments of society, we also ensure that there are no social upheavals as we take the blows of any economic crisis. That is the beauty of democracy. A democracy also provides all the political incentives for a government to become an institutional partner of the market. That is why in Indonesia today we have a government that listens to the market, responds to the market and works with the market.51 Economic growth is best facilitated through democratic governance, and legitimate democratic governance is instrumental for national stability in the event of disruptions caused by economic globalization. While discussing the transformative events of both the Arab Spring and the financial instability that followed the 2008 Financial Crisis, SBY offered the following comments to the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC):52 In the wake of these changes and uncertainties, we have only two options. First, is to close our eyes and ignore or even resist these powerful signs of the times. And second, to anticipate them and adapt to them intelligently with the necessary courage. The events around the world serve as reminders not only of the changing world, but of the need to adapt to the forces that are sweeping the 21st century. It reminds us

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to avoid the lessons of previous centuries where Muslims were relegated to the sidelines of history as Muslims became complacent of emerging developments. It reminds us of the need to be forward looking as we tackle the issues of our time. Reminding Muslims of the ‘Golden Age’ of Islam that occurred during the first half of the Abbasid Caliphate, SBY encourages Muslims to adapt to the trends of the modern world, as Indonesia has sought to do. This requires Muslim governments to encourage democratization, and to engage with global markets. Later in the speech, SBY bemoans the lack of economic production in Muslim-majority countries and the high levels of indebtedness that plague many of the OIC member-states. On the demand for political rights and civil liberties, SBY proclaimed the following:53 Many people in the Muslim world are realizing that they have missed freedom of expression, participation in governance, and essential social services. Our governments and legislatures are therefore called upon to ensure the political empowerment and the economic and social welfare of our peoples. The failure to achieve economic development is understood by SBY as having the potential to degrade national cohesion and even lead to transnational violence. His fear is that ‘economic insecurity may lead to cultural insecurity and crisis of identity’.54 Drawing upon the ‘Jakarta Declaration’ of 2004, SBY reflected the following:55 We must project the teachings of Islam in its truest form; that Islam is a religion of peace. That Islam is rahmatan lil alamin … But this message is effective only if we Muslims exercise the Islamic values—the values that made Islam the world’s most advanced civilization in the 13th century. This means working in solidarity with all humankind, since we are all children of the same Divine Providence … This also means forging unity within the Islamic world … We must earnestly promote a culture of peace, mutual tolerance and harmony. At the same time, we must build a culture of social justice, mutual respect and adherence to democratic values. Ours is a democracy not only because we hold free and fair elections. Not only because we have a separation of powers as well as checks and balances. We are a democracy because our people can participate in the decision-making processes that affect their lives … We are pleased that Indonesia has evolved to be a country where Islam, democracy and modernity can thrive together … The core values of Islam and those of our diverse cultures have been harnessed to support our democracy.


Conclusion Since the national revival of the early 20th century, the politics of Islam in Indonesia have been associated historically with national stability and economic development. SBY continued in this tradition while updating the political discourse in relation to both economic and national stability. On the economy, SBY has been pressured by the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis to confront the volatilities of the global economic structure and Indonesia’s exposure to it. His appeal to Islam has been a means of calling upon an Islamic ethics of international cooperation as well as a framework of social justice capable of withstanding the instabilities of economic globalization. On national stability, SBY articulated a vision of Indonesia as a model to the world of the synergy possible between democracy and Muslim society. It is a mistake to assume lasting permanence in the role of Islam as a social force ensuring Indonesia remains an active democratic participant in international society. Just as Islam is invoked to encourage participation with the international political economy and to support the democratic institutions of the Republic, so can developmental setbacks and political crises potentially radicalize the discourse of Islam in Indonesia. The authoritarian actions taken by Sukarno against the Islamic pillar of Indonesian political culture, and the revolutionary actions that overthrew Sukarno, profoundly radicalized a significant sector of Islamic society. The Asian Financial Crisis transformed a once politically passive network of Islamic organizations that had tolerated the New Order for decades into a force that was instrumental in removing Suharto from office. There are five critical pressures that have the potential to further the path of radicalization for the political culture of Islam in Indonesia over the coming decades. The first is the anger and resentment that KKN creates. It is an anger that is acute and damaging to Indonesian state–society relations because it is associated with both Indonesia’s foreign economic relations and its democratic political system. KKN is connected to the FDI and the resource extraction sector, which serves international markets. It is also a product of the political privileges bestowed on a select class that the postreformasi institutions have been incapable of severing. KKN must be confronted by the next administration in order to establish its own legitimacy, and for Indonesia to maintain a peaceful ascent in international society. The second critical pressure that can radicalize Indonesia’s Muslim communities is the prospect of another financial crisis. Indonesia must continue to work within the G-20 framework to push for a regulatory framework that can reduce capital volatilities. Third, there is no greater source of discontent in Indonesia than the general malaise of poverty. Indicators have shown that the proportion of Indonesians subsisting on less than $2 a day have decreased during the SBY years from over 60 per cent in 2006 to less

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than 45 per cent in 2011.56 For Indonesia to ascend it must continue to encourage reductions in absolute poverty without causing increases to Indonesia’s Gini coefficient. Fourth, inter-island conflict has a destabilizing effect on the politics of the Republic, and typically contributes to the radicalization of Islam, either by means of the government using violence against non-Muslims in the outer islands, or by Muslim groups against the government, as is the case in Sumatra. Finally, international crises, such as the Global War on Terror, have the potential to radicalize Indonesia’s Muslim groups. It has been estimated in 2013 that JI continues with a membership of approximately 15,000. Further outbreaks of violence around the world between Muslims and non-Muslims contribute to the sentiment that a ‘clash of civilizations’ is occurring. However, so too can fitna (i.e. conflict between Muslims) – such as the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – radicalize a country of over 200 million Muslims, many of whom hold a variety of disparate interpretations of Islam and divergent expectations concerning Muslim society in the 21st century. It is clear that the next Indonesian administration will not be able to master all of the sources that can radicalize the political culture of Islam in the Republic. However, the ballast of history will do much to ensure that Islam will continue to act as a social force justifying Indonesia’s engagement with democracy and international society. Perhaps a determination of the extent to which the political culture of Islam will contribute to national stability over the next few decades is intrinsic to the question of whether Indonesia is able to continue its ascent.

Notes 1 Muhammad Sirozi, ‘Indonesian Responses to September 11, 2001’, in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought (Oxford, 2006), pp. 390–5. 2 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York, 2004), pp. 119–60. 3 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200 (New York, 2008), pp. 196–215. 4 Saifuddin Anshari, The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution (Kuala Lumpur, 1979). 5 Moch. Nur Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966–2004 (Tilburg, 2006). 6 Mohammad Natsir, ‘Apakah Pantjasila Bertentangan dengan Adjaran Al-Quran?’ [Is the Pancasila in Conflict with the Teachings of the Quran?], in Joke Moeliono (ed.) Capita Selecta, II (Jakarta, 1957), pp. 144–50. 7 Mohammad Natsir, ‘The Aims of the Masjumi’, in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds) Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–65 (Ithaca, NY, 1970 [1956]). 8 Ibid., pp. 137–40.

88 Yudhoyono’s Third Way 9 Natsir, Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs (Ithaca, NY, 1954 [1952]), p. 1. 10 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–7: Southeast Asia, John P. Glennon (ed.) [cited 10 May 2010]; available from http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195557v22 11 J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963–66 (Kuala Lumpur, 1974), p. 276; Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Winchester, Mass, 1986), pp. 73–4. 12 Jan M. Pluvier, Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics (Kuala Lumpur, 1965), p. 56. 13 B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague, 1971). 14 François Raillon, ‘The New Order and Islam, or the Imbroglio of Faith and Politics’, Indonesia, vol. 57, 1993, p. 200. 15 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore, 2003), p. 113. 16 William R. Liddle, ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation’, Journal of Asia Studies, vol. 55, no. 3, 1996, p. 631. 17 Howard M. Federspiel, ‘The Muhammadijah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia’, Indonesia, vol. 10, 1970, pp. 76–9. 18 Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (New York, 2005), pp. 169–96. 19 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Paparan Presiden RI Mengenai Perkembangan Tanah Air kepada Kalangan Diplomatik di Indonesia, 15 Februari 2012’ [The President of the Republic of Indonesia on Developing the Exposure of Diplomatic Circles in the Indonesian Country, 15 February 2012], Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2012 [cited 10 September 2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/ Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP= 751&l=id. 20 Theodore Friend, ‘Indonesia in Flames’, Orbis, vol. 42, no. 3, 1998. 21 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York, 1999), pp. 74–6; Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (New York, 2002), pp. 822–35; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, 2000), pp. 16–18; Robert W. Hefner and Horvatich, Patricia, Islam in an Era of NationStates: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu, 1997). 22 Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (New York, 2002), pp. 193–210. 23 Gordon P. Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO, 2009), p. 292. 24 Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, p. 210. 25 John Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom (London, 1999), p. 98. 26 Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 169–71. 27 Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore, 2009), p. 181. 28 An important exception to this was the sentiment expressed by the leadership of the PPP and the PKB that attacked Megawati’s fitness to govern because of her sex. 29 Mujiburrahman, ‘Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 10, no. 3, 1999. 30 Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 301. 31 R. William Liddle, ‘New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia’, Woodrow Wilson International Center: Asia Special Report, vol. 10, p. 5.

Mark S. Williams 89 32 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Public Opinion Survey Indonesia, 2005 (Jakarta, 2005), p. 16. 33 This argument on support for Sharia and alienation from government that is perceived as unjust has also been made regarding similar findings in public opinion collected on the Middle East. Leonard Sebastian, ‘Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali Bombings and the War in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 16, no .3, pp. 434–5. 34 Yudhoyono, ‘Paparan Presiden RI Mengenai Perkembangan Tanah Air kepada Kalangan Diplomatik di Indonesia, 15 Februari 2012’ [The President of the Republic of Indonesia on Developing the Exposure of Diplomatic Circles in the Indonesian Country, 15 February 2012]. 35 Yudhoyono, ‘Gedung Pancasila: Sambutan Acara Foreign Policy Breakfast dalam Rangka HUT ke-63 Deplu’ [Building Pancasila: Foreign Policy Breakfast for the 63rd Anniversary of the Department of Foreign Affairs], Presiden Republik Indonesia 2008 [cited 1 June 2009]; available from http://www.presidensby. info/index.php/pidato/2008/08/19/983.html 36 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Public Opinion Survey Indonesia, 2005, p. 16. 37 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Jajak Pendapat Pemilu 2010 [Electoral Survey 2010] (Jakarta, 2010), p. 11. 38 Connected to this message of distancing Indonesia from foreign entanglements was also a domestic dimension. Bebas dan aktif was also certainly a message sent to elements of Indonesian society, such as the PKI, the PNI, and Masjumi, to not attempt any revolutionary takeover of the Sukarno-Hatta negotiated balance of power directed at the Dutch. 39 Yudhoyono, ‘Gedung Pancasila: Sambutan Acara Foreign Policy Breakfast dalam Rangka HUT ke-63 Deplu’ [Building Pancasila: Foreign Policy Breakfast for the 63rd Anniversary of the Department of Foreign Affairs]. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Shared Responsibility for Common Prosperity: Statement by H. W. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 14th NAM Summit at Havana, 15 September 2006’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2006 [4 September 2013]; available from http://www. kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Pre siden&IDP=264&l=id 43 Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia [Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia] ‘Jakarta Declaration Upholding Islam as Rahmatan lil Alamin’, 2004 [3 September 2013]; available from www.kbri-canberra.org.au/press/press040225jkt.htm 44 Ibid. 45 ‘Shared Responsibility for Common Prosperity: Statement by H. W. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 14th NAM Summit at Havana, 15 September 2006’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2006 [4 September 2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscription Display.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=264&l=id 46 Ibid.

90 Yudhoyono’s Third Way 47 Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia], Diplomasi Indonesia 2010 [Indonesian Diplomacy 2010] 2010, p. 104 [3 September 2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/ Forms/AllItems.aspx 48 Yudhoyono, ‘How to Let Islam and the West Live in Harmony’, The Economist: The World in 2010, 2009 [29 January 2010]; available from http://www.economist.com/node/14742423?story_id=14742423&d=2010 49 Muhammad Yusuf, ‘KTM OKI di Djibouti: Dari Isu Palestina, Suriah, Hingga Penistaan Agama’ [The KTM OKI in Djibouti: On the Issues of Palestine, Syria, and Religious Defamation], Diplomasi Multilateral [Multilateral Diplomacy], vol. 2, no. 1, 2013, p. 6. 50 Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia], Diplomasi 2011 [Diplomacy 2011] 2011, p.29 [03 Sept 2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/Forms/AllItems.aspx. 51 Yudhoyono, ‘Pidato Politik Presiden RI Terpilih untuk Masa Jabatan 2004–2009’ [Political Speech of the President Elect for the 2004–2009 Term], Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia [National Library of Indonesia], 2004. 52 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, ‘Remarks by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Opening of the Seventh Conference of the Parliamentary Union of OIC Member States (PUIC), Palembang, 30 January 2012’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2012 [3 September 2013]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx? Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=749&l=id. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 The World Bank, ‘Poverty Headcount Ratio at $2 a Day (PPP) (% of Population)’ [7 September 2013]; available from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SI.POV.2DAY

Bibliography Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim M. ed. (2006) The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing). Anshari, Saifuddin (1979) The Jakarta Charter 1945: The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM). Boland, B. J. (1971) The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). Effendy, Bahtiar (2003) Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS). Esposito, John L. (1999) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press). Federspiel, Howard M. (1970) ‘The Muhammadijah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia’, Indonesia, 10, 57–79. Feith, Herbert and Castles, Lance, eds (1970) Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–65 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Friend, Theodore (1998) ‘Indonesia in Flames’, Orbis, 42: 3, 387–407. Glennon, John P. ed. (2010) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–7: Southeast Asia, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195557v22 Hefner, Robert W. (2000) Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Mark S. Williams 91 Hefner, Robert W. and Horvatich, Patricia (1997) Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press). Ichwan, Moch. Nur (2006) Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966–2004 (Tilburg: UvT Press). International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) (2010) Jajak Pendapat Pemilu 2010 [Electoral Survey 2010] (Jakarta: IFES). International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) (2005) Public Opinion Survey Indonesia, 2005, Survey 2005] (Jakarta: IFES). Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia [Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia] ‘Jakarta Declaration Upholding Islam as Rahmatan lil Alamin’ 2004 [3 September 2013], www.kbri–canberra.org.au/press/press040225jkt.htm Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia], Diplomasi Indonesia 2010 [Indonesian Diplomacy 2010] 2010 [3 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/Forms/AllItems.aspx Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia], Diplomasi 2011 [Diplomacy 2011] 2011 [3 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Books/Forms/AllItems.aspx Lapidus, Ira (2002) A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press). Liddle, William R. (2003) ‘New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia’, Woodrow Wilson International Center: Asia Special Report, 10, 4–13. Mackie, J. A. C. (1974) Konfrontasi: The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute, 1963–66 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press). Means, Gordon P. (2009) Political Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Moeliono, Joke, ed. (1957) Capita Selecta, II (Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis). Mujiburrahman (1999) ‘Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 10: 3, 339–52. doi: 10.1080/09596419908721191 Natsir, Mohammad (1952) Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program). Platzdasch, Bernhard (2009) Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: ISEAS). Pluvier, Jan M. (1965) Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press). Porter, Donald J. (2002) Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon). Raillon, François (1993) ‘The New Order and Islam, or the Imbroglio of Faith and Politics’, Indonesia, 57, 197–217. Ricklefs, M. C. (2008) A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200, 4th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Robison, Richard (1986) Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Winchester, Mass: Allen & Unwin). Sebastian, Leonard (2003) ‘Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali Bombings and the War in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16: 3, 429–46. Taylor, John (1999) East Timor: The Price of Freedom (London: Zed Books). The World Bank (2013) ‘Poverty Headcount Ratio at $2 a Day (PPP) (% of Population)’ [7 September 2013]; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV. 2DAY

92 Yudhoyono’s Third Way Vickers, Adrian (2005) A History of Modern Indonesia (New York: Cambridge University Press). Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2009) ‘Gedung Pancasila: Sambutan Acara Foreign Policy Breakfast dalam Rangka HUT ke-63 Deplu’ [Building Pancasila: Foreign Policy Breakfast for the 63rd Anniversary of the Department of Foreign Affairs], Presiden Republik Indonesia 2008 [cited 1 June 2009]; http://www.presidensby. info/index.php/pidato/2008/08/19/983.html Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2009) ‘How to Let Islam and the West Live in Harmony’, The Economist: The World in 2010 [29 January 2010]; http://www.economist.com/node/14742423?story_id=14742423&d=2010. Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2004) ‘Pidato Politik Presiden RI Terpilih untuk Masa Jabatan 2004–2009’ [Political Speech of the President Elect for the 2004–2009 Term], Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia [National Library of Indonesia]. Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2012) ‘Paparan Presiden RI mengenai Perkembangan Tanah Air kepada Kalangan Diplomatik di Indonesia, 15 Februari 2012’ [The President of the Republic of Indonesia on Developing the Exposure of Diplomatic Circles in the Indonesian Country, 15 February 2012], Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] 2012 [cited 10 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay. aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=751&l=id Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2012) ‘Remarks by H. E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Opening of the Seventh Conference of the Parliamentary Union of OIC Member States (PUIC), Palembang, 30 January 2012’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] [3 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/ SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=749&l=id. Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2006) ‘Shared Responsibility for Common Prosperity: Statement by H. W. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 14th NAM Summit at Havana, 15 September 2006’, Kementerian Luar Negeri, Republik Indonesia [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia] [4 September 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay. aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Presiden&IDP=264&l=id Yusuf, Muhammad (2013) ‘KTM OKI di Djibouti: Dari Isu Palestina, Suriah, Hingga Penistaan Agama’ [The KTM OKI in Djibouti: On the Issues of Palestine, Syria, and Religious Defamation], Diplomasi Multilateral [Multilateral Diplomacy], 2: 1, 4–6. Zakaria, Fareed (2004) The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton & Company).

5 Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and New Challenges Bob Lowry

Introduction For the purposes of this book ‘security fault lines’ are defined as political cleavages that have the propensity at the extremes to be expressed violently. The focus is on the use of premeditated and systematic violence for political ends while acknowledging that criminality is an inevitable companion. Outbreaks of cathartic violence, such as that following regime change in Indonesia, are mentioned only peripherally as they flow primarily from frustration or grievance rather than from a willful attempt to overthrow a government or split the nation. The key security fault lines in Indonesia have been religious, ideological, social, racial, ethnic, and regional.1 Since independence was declared Indonesia has struggled to define itself and reconcile the competing tensions inherent in and across these fault lines.2 In the midst of the war of independence (1945–49) the nascent state had to combat two internal rebellions; one by the communists and another by Darul Islam promoting an Islamic state. Having achieved independence, Indonesia endured a number of rebellions, many involving mutinous military officers and units, and other conflicts, until the Aceh peace agreement was signed in 2005.3 The annexation and liberation of East Timor was unique because it was never part of the colonial inheritance or recognized by the United Nations. The two current intractable fault lines are Papua and Islamic extremism. Papua’s incorporation within Indonesia in the 1960s has been contested by some Papuans ever since, both peacefully and by sporadic acts of violence. Islamic extremists have fought episodically for the adoption of Islamic law in Indonesia since 1949. The Darul Islam insurgency was defeated by 1962 and, with minor exceptions, the New Order (1966–98) effectively suppressed its remnants and other extremist organizations.4 Nonetheless, there remained extremists who had gone underground or into exile, and who

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94 Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and New Challenges

emerged soon after the fall of the New Order, most notably with the Bali bombings of October 2002. The ongoing contest for the right to define what Indonesia is in ideological, social and geographic terms is expressed in constant references to the need to uphold the four pillars of the state. These are: the Constitution; Pancasila or the five principles underlying the Constitution—particularly monotheistic belief; the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI, Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia); and Unity in Diversity.5 No new fault lines are evident, but some old ones could become more attractive or be revived. For example, should modernization falter or exacerbate structural inequalities, support might grow for alternatives that could include the adoption of an Islamic state, or of Sharia law, populist nationalism, or separatism, or some combination thereof. In this context a political revival by the army—the only organization to usurp the state successfully—could not be ruled out, unlikely as it now seems.

The utility of violence Violence is used for different reasons, sometimes deliberately, sometimes instinctively, but there is always some underlying cause or reason. In some cases violence is used where there is no other way of defending or gaining support for a cause; such as the Darul Islam revolt and PKI participation in the coup d’etat of 1965. Sometimes sudden changes in the political environment or communal compacts allow or promote a release of pent-up frustrations or revenge such as occurred in the aftermath of the 1965 coup and following the fall of Suharto. Sometimes it is a combination of both. However, in neither case does violence emerge from a vacuum. Competing interests and identities have to be framed and agents and foot soldiers activated and motivated to pursue individual and collective goals through the use of intimidation and violence.6

Militant Islam Although 90 per cent of Indonesians profess Islam, adoption of an Islamic state or Islam as the official religion of the state was rejected by the founding fathers, fearing that it would alienate non-Muslims and incite separatist movements.7 The Muslim community was also divided on the issue depending on how orthodox or syncretic their adherence was to the tenets of the faith.8 Consequently, some groups resorted to violence to force the adoption of Islamic law, even though there was a democratic outlet for their program in the early 1950s.9 Darul Islam was the most prominent expression of this type of movement. When its demands for an Islamic state were rejected in 1949 it launched a guerrilla campaign that persisted until its leader, Kartosuwiryo,

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was captured and executed in 1962. In the early years, defeating Darul Islam was impeded by tensions between the government and the military and sympathizers in the Islamic parliamentary parties who shared its demand for Islamic law.10 Nevertheless, in the constitutional debates curtailed by the declaration of Guided Democracy in 1959, Islamic parties could only muster 43 per cent of the vote in the Constituent Assembly for the inclusion of Islamic law in the constitution. Thereafter, the major Islamic parties were outlawed or corralled during Guided Democracy and the New Order, and after 1998 they abandoned the quest for Islamic law, leaving the field to smaller, more radical parties.11 Consequently, the Constitution has remained unchanged in this regard and Islamic parties openly promoting Islamic law in the 1999 elections garnered only 16 per cent of the vote; by the 2009 elections, even these parties were not openly campaigning on the issue in the hope of broadening their appeal.12 Therefore, proponents of Indonesia becoming an Islamic state have the option of continuing to pursue it via the ballot box, or by using violence in the hope of forcing its adoption, or a combination thereof. A small number of extremists, not without broader sympathy, have chosen to use violence to this end.13 The internationalization of Islamic extremism, especially since the 1980s, and the broadening of its agenda by some groups to include a Caliphate, has added another dimension to the challenge of countering extremism in Muslim communities. Real and perceived injustices at home and abroad, combined with the siren call of extremist interpretations of the Koran, makes a powerful rationale for the use of violence. Advances in social media have also made it easier to disseminate their messages and to conduct operations. Consequently, although the perpetrators of violence have been suppressed and their doctrinal justifications broadly discredited, periodic acts of violence are likely to continue for many years to come. Because of its historical origins in Indonesia, this conclusion is unlikely to be affected by the reduction of United States forces in the Middle East and Central Asia or democratization in these regions, should they succeed in breaking the shackles of authoritarianism.

Communism Communism has exited the political stage, but Indonesia has yet to revisit and reconcile the history of 1965 and the massacres that followed, although there have been some significant community moves in this direction.14 However, it is worth noting that in so far as the PKI was party to the coup, it was driven in that direction only after access to the ballot box had been denied by Sukarno’s declaration of Guided Democracy and the likelihood that he would be succeeded by their mortal enemy, the army.15


The trauma of 1965 and continuing suspicion of leftist politics has also prevented the rise of a broad-based social democratic alternative. Some of the existing political parties would claim to represent this constituency, but none of them are particularly noted for their leadership on issues such as workers’ rights, land rights, economic policies that would accelerate poverty relief, or the environment.

Separatism There have only been two serious and prolonged secessionist movements in Indonesia: one in Aceh and the other in Papua. An earlier separatist revolt in Maluku was quickly defeated, although ineffectual remnants hid away until the early 1960s.16 This issue was revived when Maluku exploded in sectarian violence after the fall of Suharto, but it was a peripheral phenomenon raised for political advantage by both sides. After the fall of Suharto there were other murmurings of possible independence movements, but the advent of democracy and genuine decentralization of government functions and revenue along with the proliferation of regional governments quickly defused these.17

Aceh The revolt in Aceh erupted in 1953 in support of Sharia law, respect for local leaders, and recognition of Aceh as a Province. Compromises eventually resulted in a settlement by the early 1960s, but the centralizing impulse of the New Order and its failure to involve the locals in resource exploitation sparked a renewed rebellion in 1976—this time demanding independence.18 The rebellion by the Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) was quickly contained and the leaders forced into exile, but the movement adapted and endured despite repressive measures taken by the New Order.19 When Suharto fell, the rebels and their sympathizers thought their hour had come and reinvigorated the campaign for independence. However, when it became evident that Indonesia was not going to fall apart, that they could not win militarily, and that the international community was not coming to their assistance, under the pall of the tsunami in 2005, GAM accepted the compromise of regional autonomy that Suharto had not been prepared to offer.20

Papua Papua is the only other case where a serious long-term independence movement emerged and continues to wage a low-key but persistent struggle for independence.21 Papua was part of the Netherlands East Indies, but

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its accession to the new state of Indonesia was delayed by Dutch politics. The Dutch finally acceded when Sukarno, under pressure from the PKI and the military, mounted a concerted diplomatic offensive backed by the infiltration of guerrilla forces and the threat of invasion. United States pressure was crucial in avoiding military conflict. A Dutch victory would have discredited the Indonesian military and advanced the cause of the PKI; and a Dutch defeat would have demoralized a NATO ally even further. The agreement brokered by the United States involved face-saving measures for the Dutch that included an interim nominal United Nations administration for six months before Indonesia took over in May 1963, and a plebiscite to be held within five years to gauge Papuan support for incorporation within Indonesia. The 1969 plebiscite produced an almost unanimous vote for incorporation from the representative body set up for that purpose. Although all parties, except Indonesia, conceded that the Act of Free Choice had in fact not been free, the results were accepted by the UN and the international community. The newly arrived Indonesian administration swept aside Papuan political and economic interests and the military plundered the province, setting the tone of the years to follow.22 Small-scale armed resistance quickly emerged and has continued sporadically at a low scale ever since. There is no doubt that an act of free choice would result in almost unanimous support from the Papuans for independence, but Indonesia has repeatedly rejected this option. Successive governments have tried to mollify the Papuans in various ways, none of which have succeeded.23 The Papuans do not have the political cohesion to mount an effective challenge to Indonesian authority and their small numbers, divided allegiances, and geographic fragmentation make it unlikely that they will be any more successful in the future.24 Meanwhile, the proportion of migrants in Papua is increasing, which inevitably and simultaneously weakens the political and economic clout of the Papuans and strengthens their sense of exclusion and neglect while weakening their racial and religious identity.25 This can only compound the challenge of pacifying Papuan grievances.26 Consequently, it is unlikely that Indonesia can eliminate periodic bouts of armed resistance, so it confronts the continuing challenge of managing the modernization of Papua in a way that will incorporate Papuan political, economic and social aspirations and perhaps blunt the demand for independence.27 While this conflict in itself is unlikely to threaten national unity, it is a continuing reminder of the tensions in the national construct and diminishes Indonesia’s international credentials accordingly.

Cathartic violence Cathartic violence occurs intermittently across the archipelago but by definition it is localized and generally short-lived although, in some cases,


such as Poso, unresolved tensions periodically simmer and explode. Poso’s problems are also exacerbated by outside Islamic extremists lending support to local compatriots or seeking a haven to conduct training or escape the clutches of the law.28 Across the archipelago such violence often arises from seemingly minor incidents such as accidents, the eviction of squatters, fights between individuals over rents, gambling, or access to women, but then it takes on larger dimensions because of underlying ethnic or religious tensions or conflicting economic interests resulting from land disputes, access to surface mining resources, electoral competition, or inequality. In many cases national political and economic interests are engaged and the police and military are sometimes compromised. Individually such incidents do not represent a direct challenge to the state unless their frequency and intensity is sufficient to worry investors or undermine the government’s legitimacy.29 The issuing of Presidential Instruction Number 2 of 2013 relating to the management of communal disturbances is an indication that such incidents have reached this threshold, especially in the lead-up to the 2014 elections, and that better leadership and coordination is needed to deal with them and their causes. In the end, those elections were conducted with little violence despite the presidential elections ending in a close contest.

TNI The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia) has been a pivotal political actor since the revolution and the only organization to usurp the authority of the state successfully. It conducted a staged withdrawal from formal politics between 1998 and 2004 but continues to play an informal political role and has yet to complete the transition to full democratic control.30 It also maintains a legislated supporting role in internal security and counterterrorism under police direction. Issuance of the presidential instruction mentioned above was necessitated by deficient political and institutional leadership and coordination in pre-empting and overcoming incidents of violent political and social unrest. It was also made necessary, in part, by the refusal of parliament over several years to pass a draft bill on national security designed to outline the division of responsibilities between the various departments, levels of government, and agencies for maintaining national security. The bill has been rejected by community groups fearful that it allows the army to return to national politics; and by the police, who fear that the army will try to usurp its responsibility for internal security. The purposes of the bill could be achieved by identifying shortcomings in existing legislation and instituting specific amendments, rather than by pushing for an umbrella law. However, delays in passing the bill are as

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much about competition for resources—public and private—between the police and the military as they are about fears of a political revival by the army.31 Until this problem is resolved and the funding for both forces is provided solely by the state, fundamental reform of the police and the military will remain stalled. The future In their book Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson posit that it is the absence of inclusive political and economic institutions that entrenches poverty and tyranny.32 Their thesis is that plural inclusive political and economic institutions, accompanied by effective government, are essential to fostering the ‘creative destruction’ that unleashes the genius of the people to create and sustain prosperity. They refute other explanations for entrenched tyranny and poverty related to geography, climate, religion, culture, ignorance, or race. Acemoglu and Robinson warn that the predictive power of their theory is limited because of the variability of ‘small differences’ and ‘contingencies’, small differences being the evolving nature and distribution of political and economic power in nations, even of the same regime type, which explains why one will succeed and another fail; and contingencies constitute events that challenge the status quo, whether natural or human-induced. This thesis will be used to explore where Indonesia stands in this regard and what its current condition might tell us about its future prospects for sustaining peace and security. Indonesia began its journey back to democracy in 1998 and has recovered from the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis, posting growth rates of over 6 per cent in recent years. However, it has yet to clear many stubborn structural obstacles before it can be said to have created sustainable and inclusive political and economic institutions supported by effective government. Globally, Freedom House has expressed concern about a decline in the quality of democracy, and although this does not apply to Indonesia, its rating has not improved since 2007.33 Access to politics remains restricted by the way in which political parties function as personal fiefdoms or private companies, rather than as open organizations reliant upon membership in which aspiring leaders can emerge based on merit.34 The source of party finances is often unclear, and becoming a party candidate and running for election requires resources that are often obtained with strings attached. The only way such debts can be repaid is by corruption or by supporting policies inimical to the public interest.35 On the positive side, the requirement that political parties have broad geographic representation restricts their ability to represent particular sectional interests and forces them to adopt more centralist policies.36 There are numerous parties—12 contested the 2014 elections—none of which is likely to win a majority of parliamentary seats, forcing governments to


form coalitions in order to have legislation passed and to secure representatives of the coalition in the executive. This ensures that governments at the national level will be broadly representative of the country, but does not in itself ensure good government. Economic institutions also still show traces of their past ‘extractive’ functions. In general terms the economy comprises a large state enterprise sector, large Chinese conglomerates, large indigenous conglomerates, a mixed small and medium business sectors, and a broad micro informal and subsistence farming sector. Only the first three have decisive political impact, but the others have political connections, especially outside Jakarta, and the micro informal sector is an index of those living on the margins. State enterprises retain many active business functions that create opportunities to siphon off funds, either directly or through outsourcing arrangements, for the benefit of individuals or political parties. In addition, such corruption often leads to the acquisition of defective and inefficient public goods, which undermines public respect for the political structures and processes.37 The presence of a range of trade restrictions, quotas and permits also raises the need for facilitation, with consequent economic benefits to those involved. Some of these regulations are legitimate social goods, but the multiplicity of them and the absence of transparency leads in many cases to corruption that entangles the institutions of state and contributes to institutional lethargy in reform.38 Although Indonesian Chinese represent less than 4 per cent of the population, they are over-represented in the large private sector economy and are subject to discrimination, extortion and, in the past, periodic pogroms.39 The advent of democracy has seen most of the restrictions on their cultural and religious life lifted, although their economic dominance continues to feed economic nationalism and contributes to the retention of 141 state enterprises, many of which are inefficient loss-making entities, obliging Chinese businesses to pay protection money to the police, military, politicians and other state agencies to keep their businesses running.40 Foreign investment remains a hot political issue and any investment that seems to benefit the Chinese disproportionately in particular, especially that flowing from China, could lend itself to manipulation for other reasons, although currently much of this investment is directed through governmentto-government arrangements or through indigenous conglomerates.41 Like the rest of the business sector, indigenous business conglomerates were badly hit by the Asian Financial Crisis; even more damaging, they suffered the loss of political patronage when Suharto was forced from office. Many of them have since been revived or restructured and have established new political patronage networks linking the elite through political parties, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, state enterprises, and the security services.

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The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) has shone a light on many of these illicit practices and jailed some senior offenders.42 Although an anti-corruption strategy was released in December 2012, it has so far had little impact on what is an endemic problem.43 For such a policy to be effective it would need to be accompanied by measures designed to open up the political parties, eliminate unnecessary restrictions on business competition, provide public employees with a living wage, apply more resources to tackling contemporary corruption, and include a process for dealing with past corrupt practices. A telling cipher for the myriad deficiencies in the political and economic spheres is that members of the TNI are not subject to civil law for civil offences, are not subject to investigation by the KPK, and are effectively immune to charges of abuse of human rights. Unsurprisingly this bastion of the authoritarian past will not subject itself to democratic norms until it can be fully funded by the state, freeing it from the necessity of competing with the police and others to obtain illicit funding to close the gap between what the state provides and what its members think they need.44 Although the TNI no longer maintains formal business structures beyond that associated with its cooperatives, many of its members rely on other sources of income, some of which are illicit, and kept secret or shared sufficiently to ensure envy does not lead to exposure. Meanwhile, entanglement in illegal funding has retarded institutional reform. Although the TNI has undertaken much reform, including of its doctrine, it has yet to produce a blueprint defining and linking the purpose, development and structure of its forces to its budget projections, mainly because of the perceived need to retain outmoded structures that illicitly secure funds to meet its informal personnel needs.45 Should Indonesia be unable to complete its transition to more open and inclusive political and economic structures, the TNI is well positioned—in collusion with other elements of the elite—to step back into the political spotlight if from its perspective conditions so demand. Apart from tensions arising from these transitional obstacles, there are a number of contingent factors that could see a breakdown of social order some of which are beyond human control, such as natural cataclysms and pandemics, and others that are embedded in the social structure or might arise as a consequence of modernization. Fortunately, Indonesian Islam is overwhelmingly Sunni, so intra-Muslim violence is not a major fault line. Nonetheless, the violence inflicted on its small minorities is a measure of continuing intolerance, political cynicism, and ineffective law enforcement. Within the Sunni mainstream there are different streams of interpretation of the Koran and how it should be applied to the contemporary world. These differences are expressed


through various religious traditions and organizations—notably Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhamadiyah—and result in the fragmentation of political allegiance. In the absence of a challenge to domestic Islam there is little impetus for the Islamic community to unite. It can also afford to be tolerant of other minorities, although this is too often seen in the breech rather than the observance.46 In addition, although there is no formal hierarchy in Sunni Islam, there is a de facto hierarchy apparent in the major religious organizations mentioned above, as well as the Islamic Scholars/Leaders Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesian or MUI), and the Ministry of Religion. The MUI issues Fatwas (decrees) on matters of religious observance and what is considered acceptable behavior for Muslims. Some of its rulings contravene basic human rights and reveal a degree of intolerance; even though its day-to-day political influence is minimal, there is some concern that the state is abrogating its responsibilities in regard to this unelected and unaccountable body. The Ministry regulates all authorized religions and dispenses state assistance, which includes partial funding of education, facilities, and administration of the annual Hajj. The Hajj is administered on a governmentto-government basis, giving the central government, when its funding for other matters is added, significant power of patronage in the Muslim community. When combined with the relative homogeneity of the Muslim community, there would appear to be little fear of any major fracturing of the community. However, as mentioned above, violence will continue to be used by fringe organizations and individuals who see democracy as an obstacle to achieving their politico-religious aims. Should economic modernization falter or for whatever reason fail to resolve glaring inequalities, then the political reaction could be to seek alternatives.47 Economic nationalism continues to have some attraction across the political spectrum, despite grudging surrender to a more liberal trading and investment climate since the beginning of the New Order. Although it will be difficult for any political party or presidential candidate to claim ownership of economic nationalism, some will try forcing others to follow.48 In the absence of class-based parties it is unlikely that a leftist party of the Hugo Chavez variety will arise. However, economic nationalism could be combined with calls for a more Islamic agenda to galvanize support for the more radical Islamic parties, or nationalist parties claiming the mantle of both. Such combinations might gain favor as a way of dealing with endemic corruption, or Indonesia’s inability to compete in a more open trading and investment environment, or a failure to increase employment opportunities, especially for the young.49 Such alternatives can be pursued through democratic means, but if this entails mass communal mobilization it might raise the potential for politically motivated violence on the fringes.

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Separatism could be revived either by rebellion or, as Robert Cribb has canvassed, by Java declaring independence from the rest of Indonesia.50 Cribb was not suggesting that the latter option is imminent. Rather, he sought to outline the costs and benefits of running a geographically fragmented, racially and ethnically diverse empire and the conditions under which elites might decide the costs are not worth the benefits. There are no signs of this point approaching and there are no signs, apart from Papua and possibly Aceh, of a revival of historically-based separatist movements.51 Although at first glance Indonesia’s geographic fragmentation and ethnic diversity appears to make it a prime candidate for separatist movements, this is illusory. Indonesia’s strength is that it has only one large geographically confined ethnic group, the Javanese (41 per cent of the population), located in Central and East Java. The next largest is the Sundanese of West Java (15 per cent). All the other large islands comprise large numbers of much smaller ethnic groups. Consequently, no other group has the strength to compete with the Javanese, but their geographic concentration, despite domestic migration, means that the Javanese have to give due quarter to all the minorities if Indonesia is to remain united. The founding fathers recognized this from the outset when adopting a national language other than Javanese, sharing power with the outer islands, and embracing ethnic diversity within their national institutions. There are no indications of the potential for more potent large-scale movements that could represent a threat to the Unitary Republic, such as the notion of a Sumatra for the Sumatrans. The larger islands beyond Java have no history of political unity and comprise such a multiplicity of ethnic groups, resources and interests that it is difficult to see how they could find a common cause of sufficient gravity to threaten national unity. Indonesia’s ethnic composition is reflected in the fact that every president, except for Habibie, has been Javanese, although there have been several non-Javanese vice-presidents.52 Electoral arrangements also privilege the outer islands while ensuring that their aspirations are channeled through national rather than ethnically based parties. Non-Javanese have also commanded the armed forces, the military services, the police, and been prominent in the bureaucracy. As related elsewhere, this power relationship is reinforced by the relative religious homogeneity of the archipelago, and the pervasive spread of religious minorities throughout the archipelago; where percentage concentrations do occur, they are in thinly populated areas, except for Bali. Overlaying this is a strong sense of nationalism inculcated through the education system and the national institutions. Moreover, none of the separatist movements have had any real prospect of success, and in all cases emerged as a consequence of the failure of the central government to appreciate the political and economic interests of


the regions concerned, rather than from any innate passion to secede. Aceh constituted a prolonged problem only because in Round One (1953–62) the government failed to honor its undertakings, while in Round Two (1976–2005) it refused to make the necessary compromises. Papua will be much more difficult to reconcile, but it does not have the capacity to fracture national unity. There is no indication that generational tensions, urbanization or labor militancy will produce major fault lines in themselves, although they could give rise to occasional episodes of cathartic violence and add to other pressures promoting political reform or alternatives. Even with the advent of social media, which has the capacity to increase the frequency and intensity of these events, it is likely that people will become more discriminating and cautious in responding to such incitement, and governments more adept at countering them.53 Given that Indonesia’s scores for political and civil rights have barely moved since its return to democracy in 1999, is it poised to improve or regress? On the positive side, the level of civil violence in Indonesia has abated since the Aceh revolt, and the state has conducted several rounds of peaceful elections and seen several changes of executive power that would on some measures classify it as having consolidated its democratic transition.54 Although corruption and money politics is endemic, election results are generally accepted—despite frequent dubious legal appeals—and intraelite violence is negligible. From this perspective it would be reasonable to expect that Indonesia would improve its standing on political and civil rights over the long term as voters punish governments that fail to improve their welfare. If this analysis is correct, why is there such concern in the elite about the potential for national disintegration and separatism? This concern is evidenced by the assiduous promotion of the four pillars mentioned in the introduction, and by the widespread establishment of civic organizations devoted to promoting national unity—often inspired by retired senior military officers and their associates, and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). For example, in a speech to the National Resilience Institute (LEMHANNAS) he said: ‘My message is that education must also contribute to maintaining social harmony, our nation is very diverse, the roots of conflict are everywhere, see our history since 1945, even before 1945, conflict, clashes, horizontal violence’.55 The perpetuation of this sense of fragility is, in part, a residual response to the mantra of the New Order that justified authoritarian rule and, in part, calculated to buttress the status quo and the continuing need for strong national leadership in politics, for which former military officers are implicitly best suited. While this is not to deny their right to a post-military career, the implication that only military officers can hold the nation together needs to be challenged. More cynically, such threat perceptions

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also justify a whole range of measures, from restricting media access to Papua to retaining outmoded military organizations. The absence of objective historical works for the teaching of history, especially concerning the New Order and its legacy, is one of the impediments to the revision of such assessments. Although civilians and the young are less attracted to formulaic rituals such as monthly flag-raising ceremonies and mindless recitations of the Pancasila, there are no indications that the current generation would compromise Indonesian sovereignty or unity. Moreover, the fact remains that no previous rebellion has seriously threatened the unity of the nation, and there is no reason to think that it will face greater challenges in the future. Nevertheless, it could be said that various interest groups have reached an impasse that will restrain further progress on improving political and civil rights and economic policy, and could even see it regress. This could be portrayed as oligarchs or the ‘super-rich’ cozying up to officeholders to protect their wealth.56 Or it might be that a much broader informal elite coalition composed of party leaders, senior civil servants, senior police and military officers wary of the potential for mass unrest have reached an implicit consensus that also binds the business elite that there have to be constraints on the potentially destabilizing effects of populist politics, especially at the national level. Consequently, dismantling the system of corruption that partially finances the political parties, safeguards the wealth of the elite, and captures new entrants would not be to their collective advantage at present. Indonesia’s fate also depends on the extent to which the current political stasis can be attributed to structure or to leadership. An example of how good leadership could challenge the structural status quo is the recent political renaissance in Jakarta, where the new gubernatorial team elected in 2012, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), opened the budget and contracts to public scrutiny and greatly accelerated improvements in public administration, social services, and public works. Whether the newly elected President Jokowi can carry such programs nationwide is yet to be seen, but it will inevitably encounter greater resistance. Whether attempts to break the strangle-hold of the oligarchs or the broader elite consensus would be grudgingly accepted, or lead to intra-elite violence and support other disaffected groups that might be inclined to use violence, cannot be foretold. Insofar as it leads to levels of violence that the police cannot alone manage, the TNI could be called in more frequently to assist. If it is, we will see whether the TNI uses the pretext of its historical legacy as a guardian of the Constitution and its aversion to being treated as a political fire brigade to reassert itself. 57 Perhaps the best measure of when Indonesia has completed its democratic consolidation is not when power can be handed over peacefully after


free and fair elections, which has happened, but when the government can subject the TNI to civil law for civil offences, open it to investigation by the KPK, and end its de facto immunity from prosecution for contemporary, if not past, human rights abuses. That can only occur when the military is totally funded by the government and the justice sector is known to be effective, fair, and impartial. Until that time there is always the potential for the siren call of the authoritarian past to be heard again. In conclusion, Indonesia’s time might have come and the security fault lines of the past relegated to history. However, reinvigorating the democratic reform agenda, managing Papua, containing terrorism, and safeguarding national representation in national institutions will be continuing challenges. Until Indonesia completes its democratic transition and provides the services that open and sustain inclusive political and economic institutions, the potential for various forms of civil unrest, including violent fringes accompanied by the resurgence of authoritarian retaliation, are possibilities that cannot be ignored.

Notes 1 For a recent iteration of this see ‘Perkembangan Lingkungan Strategis Tahun 2012’ (Jakarta: Lemhannas, April 2012). 2 For a historical perspective on the creation of Indonesian identity and its inherent tensions see R. E. Elson, ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the World’, in Anthony Read, ed., Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012). 3 See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Cornell: Ithaca, 1988) and Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010). 4 Although a degree of military ‘engineering’ of incidents is acknowledged the perpetrators were not without their own motives and objectives. See Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), pp. 86–91. Darul Islam was formed in 1948 but fighting between it and government forces did not breakout on a significant scale until the following year. 5 Author’s emphasis. At a ceremony attended by the President and other dignitaries Taufik Kiemas, Chairman of the Peoples Representative Consultative Assembly (MPR), received an honorary doctorate for promoting these four pillars. ‘Taufik Kiemas dapat Doktor Kehormatan dari Trisakti’, Antara, 10 March 2013. 6 Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999 (ASAA: Singapore, 2006), p. 31 discusses this in relation to violence directed against the Chinese in Indonesia. 7 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200, Third Edition (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2001), p. 262 and Azyumardi Azra, ‘Islam, Indonesia and Democracy’, Strategic Review, vol. 1, no, 1, August 2011, pp. 73–80. 8 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Cornell: Ithaca, 1962), p. 31. 9 Personal ambition and regional issues were also interwoven with the declared aims in these revolts.

Bob Lowry 107 10 Feith, The Decline, p. 412. 11 Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia, p. 341. 12 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratization’, in Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt, eds, Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking ‘Civil Society’, ‘Region’, and ‘Crisis’ (Yogjakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, April 2004), p. 44. Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Defective System, Resilient Democracy’, in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds, Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), p. 67. 13 Azyumardi, ‘Islam, Indonesia and Democracy’, pp. 74 and 79. 14 Keith Loveard, ‘Partial Atonement for a Legacy of Violence’, Strategic Review, vol. 3, no. 1, January–March 2013, pp. 11–15. There have been some community moves in this direction, see for example, Nina Pane et al., The Children of War (Jakarta: Kompas, 2013). 15 See Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Chapter 4 for a discussion of the theories of who was behind the coup and their motivations. 16 Ramadhan, K. H., A.E. Kawilarang: Untuk Sang Merah Putih (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1988), p. 241. 17 The resource rich provinces of Riau and East Kalimantan were mentioned but Riau was quickly split into two provinces and North Kalimantan was split from East Kalimantan in 2013. 18 For a full account of the revolt in Aceh see Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 19 Robin Simanullang, Sutiyoso the Field General: Totalitas Prajurit Para Komando (Jakarta: Pustaka Tokoh Indonesia, 2013), pp. 153–165 gives a first-hand account of the hunt for the GAM leadership in 1978. 20 Aceh, like Jogjakarta, previously had ‘special’ status but no meaningful autonomy. 21 See Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985) and various International Crisis Group reports for the background and current assessments of the problems of managing Papua. 22 Jusuf Wanandi, Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965–98 (Jakarta: Equinox, 2012), p. 99. 23 Eddie Walsh, ‘Peace and Stability in Papua Requires a Comprehensive Policy Approach’, Strategic Review, vol. 2, no. 2, April–June 2012, pp. 68–77. 24 For a description of the effects of political fragmentation see Cillian Nolan, ‘Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble’, IPAC Report No. 3, Jakarta, 9 October 2013. 25 Walsh, ‘Peace and Stability in Papua Requires a Comprehensive Policy Approach’, p. 72. 26 Walsh, ‘Peace and Stability in Papua Requires a Comprehensive Policy Approach’, p. 73. 27 For proposals in this regards see, Bambang Darmono, ‘Solving Papua’s Problems’, Strategic Review, vol. 2, no. 2, April–June 2012, pp. 78–84. Also see Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, ‘Otsus Plus: The Debate over Enhanced Special Autonomy for Papua’, IPAC Report No. 4, Jakarta, 25 November 2013. 28 ‘Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia’, IPAC Report No. 5, Jakarta, 2 December 2013. 29 The Wahid Institute reported that there were 274 incidents of religious intolerance in 2012 compared to 121 cases in 2009. ‘Public Blames Yudhoyono for Rising Religious Intolerance’, Jakarta Post, 11 November 2013.

108 Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and New Challenges 30 Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia, p. 380 and Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto, p. 177. 31 Passage of the draft law was also complicated by the inclusion of provisions for establishing a National Security Council. It should have been the subject of a separate bill or administrative arrangements. 32 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile Books, 2012). 33 Freedom in the World 2013, www.freedomhouse.org. This assessment is also consistent with those of the Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit. 34 A recent court ruling relating to the allocation of votes within parties might help loosen the grip of party bosses. 35 Mahfud MD, a rejected 2014 presidential hopeful, has described the process of political recruitment as being based on ‘dirty politics’. ‘Pemimpin Indonesia lahir dari system transaksional’, Antara, 21 January 2013. 36 Jon Fraenkel and Edward Aspinall, ‘Comparing Across Regions: Parties and Political Systems in Indonesia and the Pacific Islands’, CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance, 2013/02 (Canberra: ANU, 2013). 37 A good example is a crash program to boost electricity generation that saw the acquisition of a batch of shoddy Chinese generators that quickly broke down and proved difficult to repair leading to extended blackouts especially in Sumatra. ‘Kapok Pembangkit Cina’, Tempo, 14 October 2013. 38 Hajriyanto Y. Thohari, Deputy Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) has said that ‘the root of all problems that occur in Indonesia is corruption’, ‘MPR: korupsi akar masalah di negeri ini’, Antara, 18 November 2013. Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perception Index gave Indonesia a score of only 32 out of a possible 100 for freedom from corruption. 39 See Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–99 for analysis of the ambiguous status of Chinese-Indonesians and the origins of violence against them. 40 ‘Laba bersih 141 BUMN tidak capai target’, Antara, 28 December 2012. For a description of the contemporary forms of extortion see Jacqueline Baker, ‘The Parman Economy’, Indonesia, Cornell, vol. 96, October 2013. 41 There is no systematic study of PRC investment in Indonesia however some trends have been identified by Peter Gammeltoft and Lepi T. Tarmadi, ‘Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia: Trends, Drivers and Impacts’, International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and Development, vol. 6, no. 1/2, 2013. 42 Since 2002 ‘At least 360 Indonesians jailed for corruption: VP’, Jakarta Post, 31 October 2013. 43 ‘Indonesia ranking 118 negara bebas korupsi’, Antara, 9 December 2013. 44 General Moeldoko surprised many when he freely disclosed his personal wealth to be about $US3.5 million in parliamentary hearings examining his suitability to be promoted chief of the TNI in 2013. This included contributions from businesses during the New Order arranged by one of his former superiors. ‘Selamat Datang, Panglima Tajir’, Tempo, 2 September 2013. 45 The TNI’s generic doctrine is codified in Tri Dharma Eka Karma (Tridek) 2010. National security white papers were produced in 2003 and 2008 but do not make the links between policy, strategy, force structure and resources that would inevitably see major changes. Its current acquisition plan for an ill-defined

Bob Lowry 109

46 47

48

49 50

51

52 53

54 55 56 57

Minimum Essential Force (MEF) is widely regarded as little more than a shopping list that might or might not be relevant to Indonesia’s defence requirements. Also see, Satish Chandra Mishra and Agus Widjojo, Memo to the President: Agenda untuk Pemerintahan Baru 2014 (Jakarta: Lingkar Bina Prakasa Foundation, 2014). ‘Indonesia: Defying the State’, International Crisis Group Asia Brief No. 138, Jakarta/Brussels, 30 August 2012. For example, a Centre for Strategic and International Studies economist has warned of increasing disparities and relatively low employment creation despite high growth rates. Pande Radja Silalahi, ‘Pertumbuhan Semu’, Suara Karya Online, 4 March 2013. For example, the Deputy Chairman of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) has urged the government to restrict foreign ownership in the mining industry. ‘Government told to restrict foreign ownership in mining industry’, The Jakarta Post, 20 February 2013. The Minister for Trade has warned – ‘Indonesia “not ready” for ASEAN free-trade area, minister Says’, Jakarta Globe, 4 January 2013. Robert Cribb, ‘Independence for Java? New National Projects for an Old Empire’, in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today: Challenges of History (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), pp. 298–307. The International Crisis Group has cautioned against complacency in Aceh. ‘How will Partai Aceh govern?’, Tempo, 19 April 2012. For the challenges in Papua see ‘Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua’, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 232, Jakarta/Brussels, 9 August 2012. Habibie only became president when Suharto was forced to step down in 1998 and failed to win re-election 1999. David Clemente, Compelled to Control: Conflicting Visions of the Future of Cyberspace (Canberra: ASPI, Special Report, October 2013) discusses various views on the utility and control of cyberspace. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 266–7. ‘President harap peta pendidikan bantu ciptakan kerukunan’, Antara, 1 November 2013. Dan Slater, Indonesian Study Group talk, Canberra, 13 March 2013. The causes of military intervention in politics in the Indonesian context are canvassed in the conclusion to Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982) among others.

Bibliography Books Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile Books). Aspinall, Edward (2009) Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Cribb, Robert (2001) ‘Independence for Java? New National Projects for an Old Empire’, in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today: Challenges of History (Singapore: ISEAS).

110 Key Security Fault Lines—Unresolved Issues and New Challenges Crouch, Harold (1988) The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel). Crouch, Harold (2010) Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto (Singapore: ISEAS). Elson, R. E. (2012) ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the World’, in Anthony Read (ed.), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS). Feith, Herbert (1962) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell). Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), pp. 266–7. Mietzner, Marcus (2009) Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation (Singapore: ISEAS). Mishra, Satish Chandra and Widjojo, Agus (2014) Memo to the President: Agenda untuk Pemerintahan Baru 2014 (Jakarta: Lingkar Bina Prakasa Foundation). Osborne, Robin (1985) Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin). Pane, Nina et al. (2013) The Children of War (Jakarta: Kompas). Purdey, Jemma (2006) Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press). Ramadhan, K. H. (1988) A. E. Kawilarang: Untuk Sang Merah Putih, Pengalaman 1942–1961 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan). Riecklefs, M. C. (2001) A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200, Third Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Simanullang, Robin (2013) Sutiyoso the Field General: Totalitas Prajurit Para Komando (Jakarta: Pustaka Tokoh Indonesia). Sukma, Rizal (2010) ‘Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Defective System, Resilient Democracy’, in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: ISEAS), p. 67. Sundhaussen, Ulf (1982) The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press). van Bruinessen, Martin (2004) ‘Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratization’, in Samuel Hanneman and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds), Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking ‘Civil Society’, ‘Region’, and ‘Crisis’ (Yogjakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, April 2004), p. 44. Wanandi, Jusuf (2012) Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965–1998 (Jakarta: Equinox).

Research reports and articles Azyumardi Azra (2011) ‘Islam, Indonesia and Democracy’, Strategic Review, 1: 1. Baker, Jacqueline (2013) ‘The Parman Economy’, Indonesia, Cornell, vol. 96, October. Clemente, David (2013) Compelled to Control: Conflicting Visions of the Future of Cyberspace (Canberra: ASPI). Darmono, Bambang (2012) ‘Solving Papua’s Problems’, Strategic Review, 2: 2 (April–June). Fraenkel, Jon and Aspinall, Edward (2013) ‘Comparing Across Regions: Parties and Political Systems in Indonesia and the Pacific Islands’, CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance, 2013/02. Gammeltoft, Peter and Tarmadi, Lepi T. (2013) ‘Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia: Trends, Drivers and Impacts’, International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and Development, vol. 6, no. 1/2.

Bob Lowry 111 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2013a) ‘Otsus Plus: The Debate over Enhanced Special Autonomy for Papua’, IPAC Report No. 4, Jakarta, 25 November. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2013b) ‘Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia’, IPAC Report No. 5, Jakarta, 2 December. International Crisis Group (2012a) ‘Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua’, Crisis Group Asia Briefing (Asia Report), 232, Jakarta/Brussels, 9 August, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/232-indonesia-dynamicsof-violence-in-papua.pdf. International Crisis Group (2012b) ‘Indonesia: Defying the State’, Crisis Group Asia Briefing (Asia Report), 138 Jakarta/Brussels, 30 August, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/b138-indonesia-defying-the-state.pdf. Loveard, Keith (2013) ‘Partial Atonement for a Legacy of Violence’, Strategic Review, vol. 3, no. 1, January–March, pp. 11–15. Nolan, Cillian (2013) ‘Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble’, IPAC Report No. 3, Jakarta, 9 October. Slater, Dan (2013) Indonesian Study Group talk, Canberra, 13 March. Walsh, Eddie (2012) ‘Peace and Stability in Papua Requires a Comprehensive Policy Approach’, Strategic Review, 2: 2 (April–June).

Newspaper articles ‘At least 360 Indonesians jailed for corruption: VP’ (2013) Jakarta Post, 31 October. ‘Government told to restrict foreign ownership in mining industry’ (2013) Jakarta Post, 20 February. ‘How will Partai Aceh govern?’ (2012) Tempo, 19 April. ‘Indonesia ranking 118 negara bebas korupsi’ (2013) Antaranews, 9 December. ‘Kapok pembangkit Cina’ (2013) Tempo, 14 October. ‘Laba bersih 141 BUMN tidak capai target’ (2012) Antaranews, 28 December. ‘Pande Radja Silalahi, Pertumbuhan Semu’ (2013) Suara Karya Online, 4 March. ‘Pemimpin Indonesia lahir dari system transaksional’ (2013) Antaranews, 21 January. ‘President harap peta pendidikan bantu ciptakan kerukunan (2013) Antara, 1 November. ‘Public blames Yudhoyono for rising religious intolerance’ (2013) Jakarta Post, 11 November. ‘Selamat datang, panglima Tajir’ (2013) Tempo, 2 September. ‘The minister for trade has warned – ‘Indonesia “not ready” for ASEAN free-trade area, minister says (2013) Jakarta Globe, 4 January.

Official papers ‘Perkembangan Lingkungan Strategis Tahun 2012’ (2012) (Jakarta: Lemhannas).

6 Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis: Implications for Indonesia’s Continued Ascent Stephen Sherlock

Introduction Indonesia has experienced an astonishing transformation over the last 15 years. Once among the political laggards of Southeast Asia under the regime of Suharto, it has turned itself into the best-functioning democracy in the region. Compared with Malaysia and Thailand’s political logjams and one-party rule in Cambodia, Vietnam and Singapore, Indonesia is a home for vigorous and healthy political competition. Indonesia has experienced four peaceful transfers of power in mostly well-organized and fair elections, and free expression and the media are flourishing; nongovernment organizations and social movements such as organized labor are increasingly prominent. Furthermore, there are signs of growing political awareness and assertiveness on the part of the electorate, exhibiting a number of interesting examples of the use of new media to campaign around issues and grievances.1 These changes were facilitated and strengthened by major institutional reforms, including direct presidential election, which helped to clarify the respective powers of the legislature and the executive. The withdrawal of the military from national politics was successfully negotiated, and the introduction of direct election for the heads of regional governments required the enormous task of transferring administrative authority from the central government in Jakarta to the regions. Indonesia has undergone a simultaneous process of central regime change and geographic decentralization of power. Other reforms strengthened mechanisms to enforce the transparency and accountability of government, and to strengthen the legal system and legislative review. The country’s political metamorphosis, along with successive years of healthy economic growth, has created a new sense of self-confidence, even assertiveness, among the Indonesian political elite. Indonesia has resumed a leading role in ASEAN, has become a member of the G-20, and is pushing for greater prominence in the Islamic world. These developments have 112

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drawn international attention to the country and created a feeling that Indonesia is a new rising power which could, in time, join the ranks of world leaders. For the world’s fourth most populous country, Indonesia’s profile until now has been remarkably low and, apart from the tourism of the island of Bali, its international image is virtually non-existent. International recognition of its achievements is not before time, and a widening of that awareness beyond political and policy circles is well overdue. But we are apparently witnessing early signs that ‘this is at last Indonesia’s moment on the world stage’.2 Amid the general optimism, however, the objective of this paper is to sound a warning about serious underlying political problems that could jeopardize the progress of recent years. We should not forget the reality that countries do not become heavyweights in the global political economy because of a sound democratic record, but from the brute force of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), international trade and finance. Democratic India was marginalized in global affairs until its economy began to grow, while China under one-party rule is being talked about as a new superpower because its economy is beginning to rival that of the United States. Likewise, Indonesia is gaining respect because projections of its recent economic growth into the next decade would make it one of the world’s larger economies.3 This chapter argues, however, that Indonesia today is in danger of losing momentum because the institutional, political and policy underpinnings of future growth have been neglected. While the political hardware of a reformed constitution, democratic competition, rule of law, and institutions of accountability have been firmly established, the software of democratic institutionalism retains many bugs. The groups of people that cause these institutions to function have changed very little, and the mentality of the political class remains locked in the politics of patronage and the division of spoils among an entrenched oligarchy. This chapter concentrates on one particular aspect of weakness in the democratic software: the problematic role of political parties. Specifically, it asks whether political parties are equipped to play their role in recruiting a viable choice of presidential candidates. It concludes that democratic decisionmaking processes in the parties are being overwhelmed by money politics, dynastic and clan infighting, and the incapacity to accommodate political and personal differences in order to build inclusive internal party coalitions. The 2014 elections have thrown a spotlight onto a critical weakness of political parties in Indonesia, and onto the limitations of the process by which the country transformed itself from autocracy to democracy. Indonesia has a great deal to show the world about how political change can be brought about peacefully, and the means by which institutions of democracy can be established and consolidated in a manner that is inclusive of a divergent range of social, cultural, religious and regional interests.

114 Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis

However, there is a danger that the country may also become a salutary lesson in how the people who take power in a new order can fail to tackle the prosaic but crucial policy questions—questions that will ensure the economic and social stability necessary to underpin a continuing democratic future.

A decade of democratic achievement Indonesia’s achievements in democratic reform in the decade following the fall of the New Order regime were truly impressive and are worthwhile briefly revisiting. The process was begun almost immediately after Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 by his successor as President, B. J. Habibie, who moved to consolidate his shaky legitimacy by freeing up all restrictions on civil liberties, allowing the formation of new parties, and beginning negotiations with all leading political players towards holding free elections. In a little over a year, a whole range of new political organizations had emerged, from parties to non-government organizations and advocacy groups, and successful elections in June 1999 transformed Indonesia from the stultifying atmosphere of an aging dictatorship to a vibrant if still half-formed democracy. One of the first issues raised after the fall of Suharto was the need to amend or rewrite the Constitution of 1945, upon which the old authoritarian regime had based itself. While there were those who argued that the Constitution itself was not faulty, only its application, four successive sets of amendments to the document were effected from 1999 to 2002. The amendments thoroughly rebuilt the infrastructure of the Indonesian state. First, the reforms strengthened the power of the legislature, the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: DPR) in relation to the previously dominant presidency by explicitly placing the power to make laws in the DPR’s hands—albeit in a joint process with the executive4—limiting the president’s formal veto powers and barring the president from dissolving parliament. Secondly, the reforms explicitly recognized the role of regional government and provided for the election of regional legislatures and executive heads. This provided the basis for the huge devolution of power to the regions and the decentralization of government administration to the provinces and districts. Many commentators have credited this process with heading off the growth of separatist forces that briefly appeared to threaten the unity of the diverse Indonesian archipelago.5 Thirdly, the amendments provided for the creation of new institutions of accountability and strengthened existing ones. The State Audit Agency (Badan Permeriksa Keuangan: BPK) already existed in the old version of the Constitution, but its independence was affirmed by amendments providing for its selection through parliamentary vote and through specifying its working relationship with the DPR. The changes at the constitutional level


have been given practical effect by successive administrations, which have greatly increased the funding for BPK, a key accountability agency that had been starved of resources as well as powers under the Suharto administration. A further major reform was the creation of the Constitutional Court, which was empowered to review the constitutional validity of legislation, to give rulings on disputes between state institutions, disputes related to election results, and on the dissolution of political parties. The Court was also assigned the authority to be the final arbiter on parliamentary impeachment proceedings against a president. The Constitutional Court has proved to be a very powerful body, making a range of rulings against the validity of legislation passed in the DPR that have had far-reaching implications in areas as diverse as the creation of new provinces in Papua, electricity policy, and the design of the voting system for parliamentary elections. In fact, suggestions have been raised that the Court has taken upon itself an overly interventionist interpretation of its powers, making decisions that cross far beyond questions of constitutionality into the realm of policymaking and even usurping the powers of the legislature.6 There is a danger that executive government will ignore its more activist decisions.7 Most controversial has been the application of the Court’s power to rule on regional executive election disputes, with its methodology and standards of evidence being brought into critical question.8 The Court has been severely embarrassed by charges brought against one its judges in 2013, following revelations of damning evidence that he had taken bribes to rule in favor of particular candidates in election disputes.9 The constitutional provision for the establishment of a Judicial Commission aimed both to create a system of accountability for the Supreme Court and to protect its independence from the executive. Following its creation in 2005, however, the role and powers of the Commission have been the subject of uncertainty and controversy, its authority suffering a major blow from a 2006 Constitutional Court ruling that it did not have the power to discipline senior judges. The empowerment of accountability and transparency mechanisms over all institutions of government and their officials has also been greatly enhanced by the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi: KPK) and Ombudsman. The KPK has been responsible for the investigation, prosecution and imprisonment of a large number of legislators, office-holders and officials at the national and regional level—including ministers—and businesspeople for corrupt activities. The Commission has wielded major blows against the culture of impunity that reigned among officials of most Indonesian state institutions and the business interests with which they connive, although the continuing identification of new targets for its investigations indicates that the systemic nature of corruption has not been overturned. The KPK has become an extremely popular institution in the court of public opinion, a standing


which was important in protecting the body against attempts to undermine its effectiveness when amendments to its legislative basis were first proposed and then abandoned by some legislators in the DPR. The Ombudsman’s office has not been at the center of the same degree of media and public attention, but its establishment, first with limited powers under a Presidential Decree in 2000, and then with greater powers under its own legislation in 2008, has become a potentially important mechanism for the redress of public complaints of maladministration, and to empower citizens against arbitrary decisionmaking by government officials. Finally, it could be argued that the most consequential reform to the political architecture in the post-Suharto period was the 2004 introduction of a process of direct election for the position of President. The first presidential election in the democratic era had taken place on the basis of a majority vote in the special parliamentary chamber, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR-RI), a procedure that led government to operate as an effectively semi-presidential system whereby the president had to maintain parliamentary support to remain in office. The election, in 1999, of a president (Abdurrahman Wahid) from a minority party who had a tumultuous relationship with the politicians in parliament revealed the inherent weakness of this system and ultimately led to the removal of Wahid by parliamentary vote in 2001 and his replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri. During the confrontation between the two branches of government, the President even attempted to dissolve parliament, a decision that was of highly questionable constitutionality and which caused local and international concern about a repeat of the unrest and violence of 1998. The disruption and uncertainty caused by that experience persuaded the political elite to respond to popular calls for the introduction of direct popular election for the presidency. The 2004 election, with separate popular votes for the DPR and the president, led to the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). The result of this change was that Indonesia moved from a hybrid parliamentary–presidential system to a more conventional presidential system. This provided for greater clarity in the separation of powers between a reformed presidency and a legislative branch with enhanced authority. The DPR is now an increasingly assertive center of power in Indonesian politics, to the apparent surprise and dismay of some observers, a fact that suggests that many in the Indonesian intellectual and policymaking elite did not fully understand the implications of the constitutional and legislative choices made during the reforms of 1999–2004. In the realm of electoral competition, the introduction of separate elections for the two branches of government also had profound effects on the nature of the parties that would contest the elections. Direct presidential elections created the incentive for aspiring presidential candidates to form their own parties. Whereas the previous system of parliamentary vote


encouraged candidates to remain loyal to the parties with a proven capacity to win legislative seats, there was now the opportunity to strike out alone with the backing of one’s own political machine. The literature on presidential system has repeatedly observed the tendency of presidential systems to proliferate a greater number of parties with weak institutionalization and a personalized rather than programmatic character, especially in new democracies.10 It is no accident that all the parties formed in the post-2004 period have been formed around the campaign needs of presidential aspirants. Accounting for this commonly observed tendency in the Indonesian context forms an important part of the background to the weaknesses in the party system that will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

Indonesia’s third transition: A time of uncertainty Indonesia today is facing its third historic transition since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998. The first was the transition to democratic elections in 1999 and the second occurred with the change to a directly elected presidency in 2004. The third transition in 2014 represents the end of the first entire cycle of a two-term directly elected presidency and the transition to a new popularly elected administration. The first two post-New Order Presidents were elected through parliamentary vote, so the 2014 election brought the first handover of power between two directly elected Presidents. In a conventional presidential system with fixed terms such as Indonesia’s, the constitutional process relies on the political class to produce the choices for a changeover of leaders according to a strict—and arbitrary—timetable, rather than allowing it to occur in response to the tide of political events, as tends to be the case in a parliamentary system such as in the United Kingdom or Australia. Linz has observed that fixed presidential terms ‘mean that the political system must produce a capable and popular leader every four years or so’.11 If the choice of voting citizens is to be genuinely democratic, the option to choose between leaders ought to be presented to the voters. This creates expectations that the conduit for the recruitment process—the party system—will be able to fulfil this role in consonance with the election cycle. In Indonesia, the centrality of parties in the process is reinforced by legislation that makes it impossible to enter the presidential race outside the framework of the party system. In the US case, a highly institutionalized two-party system with broad coalition parties has evolved over many decades within the framework of a presidential constitution. The preselection process of the US primaries allows a modicum of public input into an otherwise internal party mechanism. Even assuming the best intentions on the part of the political elite, Indonesia has not had sufficient time to


test and refine the political mechanisms of its particular version of presidentialism, nor to nurture the informal practices, unspoken agreements and conventions that develop with usage and experience. The question is: how well will the Indonesian party system cope with its role in managing the transition to the next five- or ten-year cycle?

Stalled reform and policy paralysis The need for a successful transition of power is especially urgent because, in political and policy terms, the last few years have not been encouraging. Despite growing international standing, feelings about the domestic political scene in Indonesia are markedly downbeat. The excited talk of reformasi (reform) has largely evaporated and been replaced by disappointment over lack of further progress, entrenched corruption, and the continuing stranglehold of the self-serving political elite. Recent academic analyses of Indonesian politics have talked of ‘stagnation’,12 ‘regression’,13 ‘missing … political accountability’14 and obstruction by ‘anti-reformist elites’.15 To some extent the ebbing tide of euphoria reflects the fact that Indonesia is now a ‘normal’ country,16 no longer a place of exciting hopes and fears, but a country where politics has assumed the prosaic reality of coalition-building,17 division of the spoils of office, and wrangling over policy differences. In other words, politics as played out in what are regarded as ‘advanced’ democracies. The era of political and constitutional reformasi has passed: for this reason there is a need to shift attention to the stalled progress in implementing policy to address the increasing gamut of urgent national problems. The SBY administration was marked by policy paralysis and its apparent incapacity to respond to the long agenda of unfinished business. Issues on this agenda include: the distorting effects of oil price subsidies on the state budget and foreign exchange; the dilapidated state of roads, rail, seaports, and airports; poor-quality government services such as health and education; unemployment; lack of development in remote regions; environmental degradation; and urban pollution and congestion. An especially alarming development was the indecisive and ineffectual response by the SBY administration to the rise of religious intolerance and persecution of minorities, which threatens the pluralist compact on which the stability of the post-independence Indonesian state has been based. Many studies have considered the sources of policy paralysis and deficiency in service delivery in terms of problems caused by decentralization, the need for civil service reform and the overhaul of government administration. Particular blame is usually apportioned to national and regional parliaments, as well as to ministerial and cabinet decisionmaking and, of course, to corruption and waste of state resources. It is generally agreed that the most telling weakness of Indonesian democracy today is a


lack of transparency and accountability in decisionmaking. Politicians understand that they must be popular if they are to be elected, but act as if achievement of office confers carte blanche to distribute resources without accountability. Government officials resent having to make and implement policy under new levels of scrutiny from the media, the public and the parliament.

Failings of the party system and the 2014 election The presidential election of 2014 entailed the previous regime handing over power to a new set of national leaders; it thereby represented both an opportunity and a burden of great responsibility. The rest of this chapter is devoted to the particular question of the capacity of the political elite to produce new leadership possessing the capacity to grasp the initiative on the agenda of urgent policy issues. Observation of the first 15 years of electoral politics reveals a very mixed picture of the capacity of the parties to foster and produce successive lineups of candidacy for national leadership. The major problem appears to be that the parties have a ‘winner takes all’ attitude to party leadership and to presidential candidacy. The corollary of this is that losing contenders conclude they have no alternative but to leave and form their own party. In the first transition of 2004, for example, the eventual winner, SBY, did not emerge into the first rank of political choices until quite late in the process. This was in part because his obvious choice of party, PDIP, was unable to accommodate him without threatening the prospects of the entrenched leaders of the party, Megawati and her husband Taufik Kiemas. This led him, apparently reluctantly, to relent to pressure from ex-PDIP supporters and join forces with the new Democrat Party, which had been created as a vehicle for SBY’s candidacy.18 A succession of new parties has been formed by presidential candidates who could not find a place within the existing parties. Hanura was created by former general Wiranto after he split with Golkar following his weak performance as Golkar’s presidential candidate in the 2004 election. Prabowo Subianto had also originally been with Golkar, until he left the party to form his own party, Gerindra, as a vehicle for his candidacy in the 2009 election. A further ‘presidential’ party established by a former Golkar leader was added to the list in 2013 with the creation of the National Democrat Party (Nasdem) by media tycoon Surya Paloh in order to support his (unrealized) ambitions for the presidency in 2014. As observed in an earlier section of this chapter, the construction of new parties around presidential aspirants has been the result of the introduction in 2004 of direct presidential elections. This has led to the emergence of what could be described as a ‘two-track’ party system in Indonesia: one track followed by a group of parties with a more enduring existence and


identity emerging from roots in social groupings or particular historical circumstances, and a second track formed by parties mainly identified with a leader aiming to occupy the presidential palace. The first track is represented by parties such as PDIP, PKB, PPP, Golkar, PAN and PKS: PDIP has its historical inheritance of Sukarnoism and connections in the ‘imaged communities’ of the abangan (nominal or syncretic Muslims in rural areas) and wong cilik (little people); PPP, PAN, PKS and PKB have historical and social roots in particular Islamic communities and subscribe to a variety of ideas concerning the role of Islam and the state; and Golkar retains electoral support bases—especially in eastern Indonesia—from its days as the governing party under Suharto, as well as from an ill-defined but politically useful ersatz ideology of ‘development’ (pembangunan). The second track is represented by all the major parties that have been established since 2004— Democrat, Hanura, Gerindra, and Nasdem—and which are electoral machines for presidential candidates. The fact that the first track comprises parties who have had a long-standing presence in both the parliamentary and presidential arenas of politics means that they could be described as ‘parliamentary-presidential’ parties, while the second track parties can most appropriately be labeled ‘presidential’ parties. Whatever their place in the tracks of political party development, the parties generally maintain a poor record in two important respects: first, producing credible candidates for national office; and second, maintaining inclusive and cohesive internal coalitions, both of which are necessary for attracting winning levels of voter support over a succession of elections. As will be discussed below, however, the more enduring parliamentary– presidential parties have sometimes had a better record in achieving these goals than the more ephemeral presidential parties. Golkar achieved remarkable success in transforming itself from the political machine of a discredited regime to a leading party in the democratic era. But it was unable to maintain anything like the level of voter support it reached during the Suharto era, in large part because of the obvious problem that it could no longer rely on the support of the state apparatus. But its post-Suharto success has also been greatly limited by the fact that a succession of leaders—Wiranto, Akbar Tandjung, Jusuf Kalla—seemed determined to take monopoly control of the party and were unable to work in effective internal coalition with other prominent leaders. Their instinct has always been to drive rival figures from the ranks of the leadership, an approach that damaged the public image of the party and restricted the breadth of talent and resources on which it could draw. The same approach has been taken by the current leader and failed presidential aspirant, the enormously wealthy businessman Aburizal Bakrie, who reportedly spent huge sums to win the leadership, but who never had a realistic prospect of election in 2014. This is a clear sign of the fatal weakness in Golkar’s political culture: it has produced a leader who can win internal elections


through the power of money, but whose credibility as a vote-winner among the people is extremely low. Even a party as apparently youthful as Democrat—having been formed in 2003 with none of the historical baggage carried by Golkar and PDIP— has foundered over the task of establishing a post-SBY leadership. The problem of money politics has overwhelmed all of the figures who were touted as successors to SBY. The rising stars of the party, Anas Urbaningram, Muhammad Nazaruddin, Angelina Sondakh, and Andi Mallarangeng have each been politically destroyed by convictions for corrupt use of funds for political purposes or by equally damaging allegations. SBY himself seems to have fallen for the fatal temptation of dynastic politics, pushing his son, Edhie Baskoro, into leading party positions in apparent disregard for voter perceptions of such practices. The Islamic parties have been afflicted by their own range of similar problems. PKB is a sad story of a party with a loyal voter base—adherents of NU and other traditionalist Muslims in East and Central Java—but which has been dominated by one extended family and has found it difficult to resolve the tensions produced by competing ambitions that inevitably arise in politics. With the death of Abdurrahman Wahid, the party lost its one dominant national figure. The party repeatedly split, with each splinter appearing to believe that the party’s electoral base would automatically adhere to it. In reality, the party’s supporters also divided and, especially in the 2009 elections, its vote was scattered amongst a number of rival factions all claiming the party’s original mantle. By rebuilding bridges within the NU community in the period leading up to the 2014 elections, the current leadership under Wahid’s nephew, Muhaimin Iskander, recovered a considerable part of the party’s vote, but it was still well short of the support it received in 1999. PAN was strongly identified with its prominent founder, Amien Rais, who for a short time after the fall of Suharto was seen as a leading presidential contender. But in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections the party failed to win a significant slice of the vote—6 per cent and 7 per cent respectively—and Amien’s presidential bid attracted only 15 per cent, well behind the leading contenders, SBY and Megawati. The party has survived Amien’s subsequent retirement from politics, but it has failed to produce any outstanding national leaders. In fact, the party has become notorious for its propensity to select celebrity candidates in national and regional elections, few of whom perform effectively in office.19 PAN’s vote has remained at about the same level of support over the four elections since 1999. In the lead up to the 2014 election, the parties that showed at least some capacity to recruit new prospective national leaders and to allow them to emerge in the front ranks of the organization were PKS and PDIP. These two parties are the clearest examples of parties in the first track of the party


system—socially and historically rooted, with some ideological orientation and an enduring base in parliament. Interestingly, they are at the two ends of the ideological spectrum that Mietzner has convincingly re-emphasized is still important in the Indonesian party system.20 PKS is an interesting and unusual case because it has captured a loyal following without the attractions of a charismatic leader. This is usually regarded as due to internal organizational strength; however, the party did not acquire this capacity simply by hiring a particularly effective political consultancy firm, but rather because its social roots are in educated middleclass, pious, modernist Muslims who learned the arts of political organization in Islamic student organizations during the Suharto era. As well as being influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the party can also trace a philosophical tradition back to Masjumi, the Islamist party of the 1950s, which was banned under Sukarno and Suharto. During that time the only possible organized expression of that tradition could be found in campus organizations ostensibly focused on religious and social issues. While PDIP, PKB and PAN had both a well-defined social/religious base and prominent leaders—Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Amien Rais respectively—PKS has built itself behind stolid figures such as Hidayat Nur Wahid. The party has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention.21 The literature has focused on issues such as PKS’s organizational capacity and the dilemmas the party faces in trying to broaden its base beyond its Islamic constituency while retaining its core support. Studies of the party have almost ignored the personal qualities and electoral appeal of its leaders. The party rose from obscurity in 1999 and continues to argue a relatively well-articulated view of politics, but its very character as a cadre-based party limits its capacity to produce a compelling leadership choice in the presidential race. Its strengths in organizational and ideological terms means that PKS is less likely to suffer the personality based schisms that weaken other parties, but these features also discourage the emergence of a figure capable of capturing the wider electorate’s imagination. Moreover, the party lost its ‘clean’ image after a number of its leaders were revealed to be involved in corrupt activities. In February 2014 it announced a list of its potential presidential candidates—DPR party caucus leader Hidayat Nur Wahid, party chairman Anis Matta, and West Java Governor Ahmad Heryawan. Reflecting the party’s relatively systematic mode of operation, the choice was the result of an internal party ballot and reflected a balance between its various factions. While being long-standing party loyalists, none of these figures had significant electoral appeal and quickly became irrelevant as Jokowi and Prabowo emerged as the leading figures in the 2014 campaign.22 In the case of PDIP, its problem with nurturing ranks of new leaders has been dynastic politics. The figures who gained favor from the dominant Sukarno clique were members of their own family, such as the uninspiring


Puan Maharani. A new generation of talented potential leaders committed to the party’s ideals of pluralist nationalism has languished in frustration behind an immovable front rank that retains the franchise on the dynastic name. As mentioned, PDIP could not find a place for SBY, the man who went on to win two elections and, until recently, still seemed to be backing Megawati as candidate, a person who failed election three times, under both the indirect and direct electoral systems. PDIP has been very fortunate that at least one new figure from its ranks has managed to achieve national prominence largely by his own abilities, rather than through sponsorship by the party. Joko Widodo—popularly known as Jokowi—who rose to prominence with his election to the position of Governor of Jakarta in September 2012, attracted attention in his previous position as Mayor of Solo, Surakarta, in Central Java. In that position he gained a reputation for non-corrupt, effective government and for his popularity among the people of the city. In his campaign for the Governorship of Jakarta he was seen as a fresh uncorrupted figure opposed to the old circles of entrenched power represented by his main contender, the incumbent Governor, Fauzi Bowo. With his election as Governor of Jakarta and his populist, unorthodox style in that office—including publicly embarrassing obstructionist senior bureaucrats—he achieved national attention and became touted in the media as a presidential candidate. From early 2013 he began to appear in many polls as one of the leading contenders for public support. It is notable that despite Jokowi’s nationwide reputation, PDIP took a long time to accept that he was the party’s only hope of winning in 2014. Just as SBY’s ascent in 2003–04 was seen by some within PDIP as a threat, the party was initially divided about whether to support Jokowi’s candidacy for Jakarta Governor in 2012. Although Megawati reportedly championed his candidacy, her husband Taufik Kiemas was deeply opposed. From the time of the 2012 gubernatorial election Taufik was also vocal in his attempts to disparage any suggestion that Jokowi was an appropriate candidate for the 2014 presidential election. He instead advocated Puan Maharani. Taufik’s influence in the election ceased with his death in June 2013. Meanwhile, Jokowi’s support in opinion polls continued to rise and, with Megawati’s position languishing in relation to the other main contender, Prabowo, many within the party saw that it had little option but to back Jokowi. The first clear sign that Megawati was committed to Jokowi came at the September 2013 national working meeting (Rakernas) of the party, when she effusively praised Jokowi, declaring he possessed the ‘vibrations’ of her father, President Sukarno.23 Jokowi himself rejected suggestions that he would stand, expressed annoyance at being diverted from attention to his job as Governor24 and continued to act with great public deference to Megawati. Many interpreted this as a clear sign that Jokowi understood the importance of not upsetting the highly sensitive Megawati


by appearing too self-assured about her support for him. The party for Megawati is a family legacy and could not be endowed on anyone who is not sufficiently respectful of that fact. It was not until March 2014 that Megawati finally gave her official support to Jokowi’s candidacy. Her endorsement both severely limited the time available for the Jokowi team to build up the momentum of its electoral campaign and handed free ammunition to Prabowo’s claims that Jokowi was Megawati’s plaything and a political lightweight.

Conclusion In the 2014 election the party system failed to put forward a spectrum of candidates that offers a breadth of choice to the electorate. Until mid-2013, most polls were topped by Megawati (reflecting the resilience of a core PDIP social base25), Prabowo (testimony to voter recognition, if not charisma) and, increasingly as 2013 wore on, by Jokowi. Support levels varied widely in different polls, indicating their limited reliability, but none of the three often exceeded 20 per cent. The other possible contenders were deeply problematic: Bakrie and Surya Paloh were seen as greedy capitalists; Wiranto a relic of the past; and both Jusuf Kalla’s and Hatta Rajasa’s names evoked a combination of the two: none registered more than 10 per cent support in public opinion polls. A few relatively newer figures such as former Chief of the Constitutional Court and defense minister in the Abdurrahman Wahid administration, Mahfud MD, state enterprises minister Dahlan Iskan, prominent academic Anies Baswaden, and dynastic figures such as Puan Maharani, Edhie Baskoro, and SBY’s wife, ‘Ani’ Kristiani Herrawati, never reached beyond single figures. Jokowi does not carry any negative baggage and has not made any obvious mistakes as Governor of Jakarta. But his slight political experience as mayor of a middling provincial city and his short period of service as Governor of Jakarta does not seem sufficient for a position of such immense responsibility as President of Indonesia. There has been a strong sense that Jokowi’s appeal derived from a sense of desperation—in both his party and in popular opinion—that there was no other viable figure, with the only alternative being Prabowo. Jokowi will have major problems with his limited connections and authority within PDIP itself. He holds no formal office in the party and as president might find it difficult to assert his control over the dominant figures in the party grouped around Megawati. Prabowo represented a very different choice in the sense that he presented an image of a strong statesman who would lead the government in a more effective manner than the chaos characterizing the post-Suharto era, with its corrupt lazy parliament and ill-disciplined cabinet of party politicians. Prabowo was seen as the very embodiment of disillusionment


and yearning in the wake of the failings of the party politicians, a man who would return the discipline and decisive leadership supposedly shown during the old order. Prabowo was the ultimate insider, but his temporary exile allowed him to play the game of being an outsider who would oppose the powerful elites, both domestic and foreign. His rise in popularity in the presidential campaign perhaps had its origin in the same mood that saw the election of a parliament in which none of the parties were able to capture the loyalty of a plurality or majority of voters, leaving a fragmented DPR with ten parties, none of which is likely to provide inspiration or leadership in the legislative branch of government. The choice that was presented to the voters in 2014 was thus one fresh but inexperienced neophyte with a difficult relationship with his own party and a figure from the old regime campaigning on the basis of demagogy and ultranationalism. After 15 years of democracy, it should be a point of concern that the party system as a whole could not produce a new generation of leaders. The only new figure was an inexperienced provincial leader who was promoted before his time because of the absence of an alternative. The one encouraging element in this scenario is that the rise of Jokowi could constitute the beginning of a trend in which national leaders are recruited from the ranks of provincial executives and/or legislatures. Significantly, it has been PDIP that has produced more than one such figure, others including the Governor of Central Java, Ganjar Pranowo, and the Mayor of Surabaya, Tri Rismaharini, both of whom have achieved national prominence as PDIP figures in key regional government offices. This chapter is not alone in raising concerns about the choice of contenders for the 2014 election. But much previous writing has concentrated on the personal qualities of the leaders. What this chapter has shown is that the problem is not merely an unfortunate coincidence of personalities, but rather the product of structural weakness within a party system that appears incapable of performing the vital role of recruiting a choice of leaders in whom a majority of the electorate can place its confidence. A fixed-term presidential system demands that parties produce leaders according to a precise electoral schedule, but the selection processes within Indonesian parties necessary to achieve this have been subverted by money politics, dynastic ambitions, and a systemic neglect of the task of developing policy alternatives. The problem with the party system is possibly the most critical example of the limitations of post-Suharto political reforms. As mentioned above, the hardware of constitutional and institutional structures are in place and there is no significant anti-regime or anti-democratic sentiment—inchoate or organized—but the software of the system is still beset by operational problems. The people who make institutions work have become very adept at manipulating the system for short-term and sectional gain, and the old autocratic players have ‘reorganized’ themselves to survive and prosper in


the new democratic environment.26 Despite institutional reform, the informal rules of the political game as played out under the New Order regime remain essentially unchanged. The Suharto method was collusive but also sufficiently inclusive of potential oppositional forces to ensure they did not openly challenge the status quo.27 Today there is a continuing tendency towards collusive consensus among the political elite rather than open competition and debate, especially over questions of policy. As Aspinall has argued, ‘the legacies of a political transition that kept the old Suharto regime’s ruling elite and patrimonial governing style largely intact continue to bedevil democratic governance’.28 Coalition-building has been random, ‘promiscuous’, opportunistic, and determined by division of the spoils of office rather than reflecting coalitions of interests committed to policy outcomes.29 During his entire decade in power, SBY remained determined to govern with all-inclusive coalition cabinets, regardless of the cost to effective decisionmaking. Ministerial posts, and the resources attached to them, continue to be treated by ministers as their personal fiefdoms. In these circumstances, policy development and coordination is extremely difficult and the possibility of reform of government administration seems remote. And, as has been argued here, the parties through which the political elite operates have been exceedingly poor at fostering generational renewal within their own ranks, and thus have been very slow in producing a spectrum of new leaders from which the electorate can choose. Unless these tendencies are overcome, the policy paralysis of the last few years will continue and the economic progress that has drawn attention to Indonesia’s ascent will stagnate or even regress. Conditions are nowhere near so dire as to threaten the basis of Indonesian democracy, but if democratic institutions are seen as failing to deliver prosperity and opportunity to a young growing population, there could be dangers of instability ahead. There are positive lessons and salutary warnings to be taken from the example of Indonesia.

Notes 1 Stephen Sherlock, ‘The parliament in Indonesia’s decade of democratization: People’s forum or chamber of cronies?’, in E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner (eds) Problems of Democratisation: Elections, Institutions and Society, Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010, p. 171. 2 Anthony Reid, ‘Indonesia’s new prominence in the world’, Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, 2012, p. 1. 3 Joshua Keating, ‘The Indonesian tiger’, Foreign Policy, December 2010. 4 Sherlock, ‘The parliament in Indonesia’s decade of democratisation’, op. cit. 5 David Armstrong, ‘The next Yugoslavia?: The fragmentation of Indonesia’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 15, 4, 2004, pp. 783–808.

Stephen Sherlock 127 6 Simon Butt, ‘Indonesian constitutional court decisions in regional head electoral disputes’, Centre for Democratic Institutions Policy Paper on Political Governance, No. 1, 2013, Canberra. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Tempo, 27 January–2 February 2014. 10 Juan Linz, ‘The perils of presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy, 1, 1, 1990, pp. 51–69. 11 Ibid. 12 Dirk Tomsa, ‘Indonesian politics in 2010: The perils of stagnation’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 46, 3, 2010, pp. 309–28. 13 Greg Fealy, ‘Indonesian politics in 2011: Democratic regression and Yudhyono’s regal incumbency’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47, 3, pp. 333–53. 14 Sandra Hamid, ‘Indonesian politics in 2012: Coalitions, accountability and the future of democracy’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 48, 3, pp. 325–45. 15 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Indonesia’s democratic stagnation: Anti-reformist elites and civil society resilience’, Democratization, 19, 2, 2012, pp. 209–29. 16 Andrew McIntyre and Doug Ramage, Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country: Implications for Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2008. 17 Hamid, op. cit., ‘Indonesian politics in 2012’. 18 Jun Honna, ‘Inside the Democrat Party: Power, politics and conflict in Indonesia’s presidential party’, South East Asia Research, 20, 4, 2012, p. 475. 19 ‘PAN feels heat after two of its celebrity politicians in drug arrests’, Jakarta Post, 28 January 2013. 20 Marcus Mietzner, Money, Power and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, ASAA & NUS Press, Singapore, 2013, pp. 167–91. 21 Najwa Shihab and Yunuar Nugroho, ‘The ties that bind: Islamisation and Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)’, Australian Journal of Asian Law, 10, 2, 2008, pp. 233–67. Sunny Tanuwidjaja, ‘PKS in post-reformasi Indonesia: Catching the catch-all and moderation wave’, South East Asian Research, 20, 4, 2012, pp. 533–49. Michael Buehler, ‘Revisiting the inclusion-moderation thesis in the context of decentralized institutions: The behaviour of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party in national and local politics’, Party Politics, November 2012, pp. 1–20. 22 The poor performance of Hidayat Nur Wahid in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election is an illustration of how difficult it is for one of the party’s established parliamentary leaders to perform well in the more personality-based direct executive elections at the national and regional level. With 12 per cent of the vote in the first round, Hidayat captured the support of only about half of the voters who identified themselves as PKS supporters (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Exit Poll Pilgub Jakarta, 2012, p. 35). 23 ‘Megawati: Jokowi punya getaran seperti Bung Karno’ (Megawati: Jokowi has Sukarno’s vibrations), Kompas Online, 6 September 2013. http://nasional.kompas. com/read/2013/09/06/1536589/Megawati.Jokowi.Punya.Getaran.seperti.Bung. Karno 24 ‘Jokowi: Jangan tanya-tanya masalah itu lagi’ (Jokowi: Don’t keep asking about that issue), Kompas Online, 15 March 2013, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/ 2013/03/15/18033254/Jokowi.Jangan.Tanya-tanya.Masalah.Itu.Lagi. 25 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Ideology, money and dynastic leadership: The Indonesian democratic party of struggle, 1998–2012’, South East Asia Research, 20, 4, 2012, pp. 511–31.

128 Democratic Achievement and Policy Paralysis 26 Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, Routledge Curzon, 2004, London and New York; Vedi Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective, Stanford University Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011. 27 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia, Stanford University Press, 2005. 28 Edward Aspinall, ‘The irony of success’, Journal of Democracy, 21, 2, April 2010, p. 33–4. 29 Hamid, op. cit., ‘Indonesian politics in 2012’.

Bibliography Armstrong, David (2004) ‘The Next Yugoslavia?: The Fragmentation of Indonesia’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 15, 4, 783–808. Aspinall, Edward (2005) Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia, Stanford University Press. ______ (2010) ‘The Irony of Success’, Journal of Democracy, 21, 2, April 2010, pp. 33–4. Butt, Simon (2013) ‘Indonesian Constitutional Court Decisions in Regional Head Electoral Disputes’, Centre for Democratic Institutions Policy Paper on Political Governance, No. 1, Canberra. Buehler, Michael (2012) ‘Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralised Institutions: The Behaviour of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics’, Party Politics, November, 1–20. Croissant, Ariel and Merkel, Wolfgang (2004) Political Party Formation in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Manila. Fealy, Greg (2011) ‘Indonesian Politics in 2011: Democratic Regression and Yudhyono’s Regal Incumbency’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 47: 3, 333–53. Hadiz, Vedi (2011) Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective, Stanford University Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Hamid, Sandra (2012) ‘Indonesian Politics in 2012: Coalitions, Accountability and the Future of Democracy’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 48: 3, 325–45. Honna, Jun (2012) ‘Inside the Democrat Party: Power, Politics and Conflict in Indonesia’s Presidential Party’, South East Asia Research, 20: 4, 473–89. Jakarta Post ‘PAN Feels Heat after Two of Its Celebrity Politicians in Drug Arrests’, 28 January 2013. Keating, Joshua (2010) ‘The Indonesian Tiger’, Foreign Policy, December. Kompas Online ‘Jokowi: Jangan Tanya-Tanya Masalah Itu Lagi’ (Jokowi: Don’t Keep Asking about that Issue), 15 March 2013, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/ 03/15/18033254/Jokowi.Jangan.Tanya-tanya.Masalah.Itu.Lagi Kompas Online ‘Megawati: Jokowi Punya Getaran Seperti Bung Karno’ (Megawati: Jokowi Has Sukarno’s Vibrations), 6 September 2013, http://nasional.kompas.com/ read/2013/09/06/1536589/Megawati.Jokowi.Punya.Getaran.seperti.Bung.Karno Lembaga Survei Indonesia (2012) Exit Poll Pilgub Jakarta [Jakarta Gubernatorial Election Exit Poll], 2012. Linz, Juan (1990) ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy, 1: 1, 51–69. McIntyre, Andrew and Ramage, Doug (2008) Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country: Implications for Australia, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra.

Stephen Sherlock 129 Mietzner, Marcus (2012a) ‘Ideology, Money and Dynastic Leadership: The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, 1998–2012’, South East Asia Research, 20: 4, 511–31. ______ (2012b) ‘Indonesia’s Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Civil Society Resilience’, Democratization, 19: 2, 209–29. ______ (2013) Money, Power and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, ASAA & NUS Press, Singapore. Reid, Anthony (2012) ‘Indonesia’s New Prominence in the World’, Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore. Robison, Richard and Hadiz, Vedi (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, Routledge Curzon, London & New York. Sherlock, Stephen (2012) ‘Made by Committee and Consensus: Parties and Policy in the Indonesian Parliament’, South East Asian Research, 20: 4, 511–31. _____ (2009) ‘SBY’s Consensus Cabinet – Lanjutkan?’ Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 45: 3, 342–3. _____ (2010) ‘The Parliament in Indonesia’s Decade of Democratisation: People’s Forum or Chamber of Cronies?’ in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds) Problems of Democratisation: Elections, Institutions and Society, Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore. Shihab, Najwa and Nugroho, Yunuar (2008) ‘The Ties that Bind: Islamisation and Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)’, Australian Journal of Asian Law, 10: 2, 233–67. Tanuwidjaja, Sunny (2012) ‘PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Catching the Catch-All and Moderation Wave’, South East Asian Research, 2: 4, 533–49. Tomsa, Dirk (2010) ‘Indonesian Politics in 2010: The Perils of Stagnation’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 46: 3, 309–28.

7 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia: The Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy Iis Gindarsah with Adhi Priamarizki

Introduction Indonesia is likely to face a complex and dynamic strategic environment in the future. Despite the country’s political reforms and economic development, domestic security problems including communal tensions, religious radicalism, and terrorism continue to pose dangers to the wellbeing of the Indonesian people. Meanwhile, the rise of China and changing relationships among great powers have been the dominant theme in East Asia in recent years. In this regard, Indonesia is concerned with the implications of long-standing territorial disputes, their attendant military threats to regional stability, and cohesion within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Given this strategic context, the following discussion will consider the means by which the Indonesian government preserves the country’s strategic autonomy and international security. In the foreign policy realm, it seeks to maintain the balance of power at both regional and global levels through engagements in multilateral cooperative mechanisms and the development of bilateral strategic partnerships. In an effort to attain a level of self-reliance in national defense, Indonesia is striving to modernize its military capabilities and rebuild its indigenous defense industrial base. In the following sections this chapter will discuss the contemporary nature of Indonesia’s security outlook and its implications in strategic policymaking.

Indonesia’s ongoing security landscape Indonesia remains susceptible to domestic and external pressures. In recent years, the country has undergone major structural reforms leading to increasingly active legislative bodies and democratic elections, ongoing decentralization, and the expansion of a market-oriented economic system. Regardless of these achievements, communal tensions and regional dissent continue to occur in many parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Local 130

Iis Gindarsah with Adhi Priamarizki 131

elections have often been marred by violent incidents committed by the proponents of competing candidates. A recent example is the series of violent acts perpetrated in the months prior to the Aceh gubernatorial election in 2012; a trend which also occurs in conflict-prone areas such as the Moluccas, Sulawesi and Papua. Although democratization and decentralization have taken root in Indonesia, maintaining public order remains a major challenge at the local level. Aceh appears relatively stable in comparison with Papua, where there have been a string of shootings against non-Papuans, soldiers, and police officers.1 The peaceful resolution of ongoing conflict eludes Papua, despite the adoption of new political and economic policies intended to establish amity in the region. In recent years, the Indonesian government has granted special autonomy rights and dedicated a significant amount of funds to improve infrastructure and social welfare in Papua. To date, these efforts have not been successful in meeting expectations due to rampant corruption and mismanagement issues at the local level. This lack of success further deepens the long-standing mistrust and perception gap between the government and pro-independence movements. Religious radicalism has also grown in recent years. Religious minorities, including Ahmadiyya and Shia communities have suffered from frequent attacks, while Christian churches continue to experience intimidation by Islamist groups.2 Despite ongoing investigations, the Indonesian government appears to lack a coherent strategy with which to address what are multidimensional ethnic, religious, economic, and political problems. With extensive diversity within Indonesian society, communal conflict will continue to occur if the root causes remain unresolved. Hence, impartial law enforcement, improving economic welfare and public services are critical to contain or prevent the escalation of communal tensions and preserve social resilience at national and local levels. The increasingly blurred line between religious vigilantism and terrorist groups is also likely to complicate Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy. Terrorist groups, which enjoy indirect support from radical Muslim clerics, have been known for their violent actions as a means of enforcing a fundamentalist agenda. Recent developments indicate that terrorist groups seek to exploit vigilante attacks against religious minorities as a way of recruiting new operatives. Nowadays, they also seek to gain financial support through various sources, including the misuse of religious charities (zakat, infaq) and criminal activities such as robbery and drugs trafficking. Despite a significant reduction in terrorist attacks in recent years, the Indonesian government continues to seek innovation in its counterterrorism strategy to better anticipate future threats. Consequently, it passed a new law on anti-terrorism funding to improve the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. Indonesian authorities have also been working on deradicalization and counter-radicalization strategies. A recent report

132 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia

suggests that many convicted Indonesian terrorists are due for release after serving time in prison.3 Given the grave danger of terrorist recidivism, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights seeks to reform the correction system and improve the physical condition of many prisons in Indonesia as part of its deradicalization program for terrorist inmates. Indonesia’s external environment is by no means less complicated. While the navy and other maritime authorities are deeply concerned over maritime disputes with neighboring countries, they are struggling to cope with the substantial problem of natural resources theft. According to some estimates, every year Indonesia loses US$2–3 billion from illegal logging and US$8 billion from illegal fishing.4 Due to poor mechanisms for monitoring and oversight, the country’s border areas are also vulnerable to transnational crime, such as arms smuggling, drugs and human trafficking. Moreover, incidents of maritime piracy have increased in recent years. In 2012, a total of 71 cases of actual and attempted attacks against commercial vessels took place in Indonesian waters. This number represents an 80 per cent increase from the 19 incidents occurring in 2009.5Indonesia’s capacity to maintain order within its archipelagic boundaries is critical in avoiding any justification for a foreign maritime military presence. As the future relationship among major powers remains uncertain, Indonesia will have to face a number of geopolitical challenges in East Asia. First, the rise of China has transformed the power structure in the region. In the past few years, it maintained a rapid pace of economic growth and became the engine of economic development in the region. This achievement has enabled the Chinese government not only to expand the country’s military power, but also to strengthen its diplomatic role and influence in East Asia. The Chinese Navy, for instance, is projected to become the paramount regional power by the 2020s and the predominant global naval power by the 2050s.6 Second, despite its pivotal position, the capability gap between the United States and regional powers has been declining in recent years. In an effort to maintain its regional primacy, the US government announced its pivot back to Asia that some analysts believe is an attempt to balance against the growing power and role of China in East Asia.7 For that purpose, Washington has restructured its regional military presence, including the rotation of 2,500 marines in Darwin and up to four littoral combat ships in Singapore. While revitalizing its alliances and strategic partnerships with key regional countries, the US is also undertaking initiatives to enhance its economic presence in the region, including negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership.8 Third, territorial disputes continue to undermine maritime security and stability in East Asia. Despite ongoing talks over the implementation of the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, recent tensions between China and the Southeast Asian claimants have complicated the


ASEAN–China relationship. While maintaining a formal position of neutrality over territorial conflicts in the region, the US government is deeply concerned about any potential escalation and its implications to free and safe navigation through the disputed region.9 Meanwhile, Japan and China maintain a mutual hostility regarding their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. The ongoing conflict has also strained the bilateral relations between China and the United States as the Japanese-controlled disputed islands are covered in the US–Japan security treaty. Fourth, the major powers potentially favor strategic competition for primacy over the formation of any cooperative relationship. The future trajectory of China–US relations remains uncertain as their strategic rivalry grows along with bilateral economic ties. Despite a significant volume of Japanese investments in China, territorial disputes and residual historical memories will continue to haunt their diplomatic relations in the future. Besides the long-standing border disputes in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions, India and China will potentially engage in maritime competition over the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Both countries consider the two seas are not only rich in natural resources, but also vital for commercial purposes. As the level of competition among the major powers rises, Indonesia is aware that East Asia will become a theater for the pursuit of primacy, leading to a polarization of regional country alignment. The different responses of ASEAN members to the repositioning of the US military presence illustrate the divergence of their strategic perceptions and interests. Moreover, persisting territorial disputes over the South China Sea continue to test the level of cohesion within ASEAN. Although Indonesia had secured consensus on the principles for drafting a Code of Conduct regarding the disputed region, diplomatic differences among the members of the regional grouping re-emerged in late 2012 over the means of resolving the overlapping claims.10 In summary, Indonesia has become increasingly exposed to multifaceted security challenges in recent years. While confronting huge domestic problems, the Indonesian government must maintain stability and security across the country’s maritime domain. With ongoing structural changes to the balance of power in East Asia, Indonesia’s foreign and defense policymaking is likely to become increasingly complicated over time.

Indonesia’s core interest and strategic approaches Indonesia’s core interests are primarily founded on four building blocks— namely geostrategic location, strategic vulnerabilities, geopolitical aspiration, and constitutional mandate. First, it is the world’s largest archipelagic country and geostrategically located at the crossroads between two


oceans—the Indian and the Pacific—and two continents—Asia and Australia. Indonesia’s ‘Archipelagic Outlook’ (Wawasan Nusantara) has long been a normative guideline for its people to visualize their identity and geographical environment as a nation. It envisages the Indonesian archipelago as an integral entity, in which the seas and straits are natural bridges, instead of barriers, to connect numerous islands and regions, and unify diverse ethnic groups. In that sense, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been instrumental for the Indonesian government in preserving the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Second, Indonesia’s vast land and maritime domain is vulnerable to multiple threats ranging from natural disaster to military incursion. Despite huge economic and natural resource potential, the Indonesian people remain subject to one of the world’s most active seismic regions—the notorious Pacific Ring of Fire and Alpide Belt, where a large number of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions occur. Given its tremendous economic, geographic and sociocultural diversity, the country has long been driven by insurgencies at the fringes of the archipelago. While combating rampant illegal fishing and transnational organized crime, it has a number of unresolved border issues that neighboring countries struggle against. The Indonesian government also struggles to ensure free and safe passages through the country’s strategic sea lanes of commerce, thereby avoiding increased extra-regional military presence in nearby areas. Third, Indonesia has a long geopolitical tradition of independence in foreign policy direction, known as a ‘free and active’ approach. Emerging from the traumas of colonialism and World War II, the Indonesian people often point to a history of exploitation by foreign powers as the cause of their country’s problems. Hence, the national constitution prohibits the Indonesian government from entering into any alliances.11 During the Cold War, Indonesia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of developing countries that refused to take side with either the United States or the Soviet Union. This independent approach continues to guide many national leaders and foreign policymakers in Indonesia today. The country’s experiences under authoritarian rule have further showcased the grave danger of over-dependence on external sources of defense materials. President Sukarno’s adventurist policies—including the ‘Confrontation’ campaign against the creation of the Federation of Malaya—resulted in domestic instability and an economic catastrophe. His leniency toward the Soviet Union for its provision of munitions in order to reunify West Papua strained Indonesia’s relationship with the United States.12 Unlike his predecessor, President Suharto stressed the importance of domestic security and economic development. He also preferred to forge close defense ties with the United States and its allies, rather than with the communist bloc. However, given the changing geopolitical priorities after


the end of the Cold War, the US government suspended all military ties and arms sales to Indonesia following its repressive counterinsurgency operation in East Timor. Last, but not least, Indonesia’s constitution mandates that each successive administration contribute to world peace and social order. Hence, it maintains an active presence in key multilateral organizations, from ASEAN and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. With a rich history of moderation and consensusbuilding, Indonesia has played a crucial mediation role regarding the responsible management of global and regional problems. This constitutional aspiration is also reflected in the country’s ‘all directions foreign policy’ aimed at building amity among nations.13 To date, Indonesia has managed to maintain friendly relationships with a diverse set of countries including North Korea, Iran, China, and members of the European Union. The combination of these dynamics is strongly manifested in Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook today. The Law No. 17/2007 highlights that the country’s core interest is the maintenance of its ‘strategic autonomy’ in its external relationships.14 For that purpose, the post-authoritarian Indonesian government seeks to recalibrate its strategic approach. It favors a balance of power in the international system to avoid the rise of a preponderant state and rejects the unilateral use of force in resolving interstate disputes.15 Indonesia also seeks to downplay the implications of great power competition for geopolitical and economic primacy.16 A stable external environment is critical for the preservation of the country’s internal cohesion and sovereignty. That said, the Indonesian government prefers a cooperative approach in international relations, rather than strategic rivalry among the major powers. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s core interest and external relations are increasingly susceptible to geopolitical changes. In recent years, East Asia has been the center of the international political economy. Agreements for free trade and economic cooperation, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, have become the prevailing instruments for regional integration. However, without a shared vision, these economic frameworks will likely deepen the divide in the region’s perceptions and interests. Meanwhile, the rise of China has not only fostered regional economic development, but has also become a source of instability in the region. Given the changing power structure in East Asia, the United States seeks to maintain its regional primacy through a rebalancing strategy involving both military and economic measures. In response to these strategic developments, Indonesia has adopted two policy approaches aimed at preserving its strategic autonomy and international balance of power. First, it engages in ‘soft balancing’ mechanisms to promote cooperative relations among countries and develop a cohesive international order. While ASEAN remains a cornerstone for Indonesia’s


foreign policy in East Asia, Jakarta also seeks to promote its national interests through bilateral strategic partnerships with extra-regional powers as well as global multilateral frameworks—for example, the United Nations (UN), Group of Twenty (G-20), and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). Second, given its past experience with arms embargoes, the country undertakes a process of ‘internal balancing’ by modernizing the country’s military capabilities and rebuilding indigenous defense industries. Today these strategic approaches permeate Indonesia’s foreign and defense policy outlook.

Fundamental trends of Indonesia’s foreign policy ‘Free and active’ remains the sacrosanct principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Nowadays, the principle has evolved into two prevalent policy phrases: ‘a million friends and zero enemies’ and ‘dynamic equilibrium’. The former principle reiterates the country’s commitment to building amity and cooperation in the international order. Meanwhile, the dynamic equilibrium, also known as ‘Natalegawa Doctrine’, seeks to restrain strategic competition for dominance among the major nations in an attempt to avoid a preponderance of political, economic or military power. Indonesia then stresses the importance of confidence-building, peaceful conflict resolution, and cooperative security mechanisms as a means to enhance peace and stability at both global and regional levels. Given the above considerations, ASEAN remains the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. Despite being the largest country in the region, Indonesia seeks to maintain a low and nonthreatening profile by deliberately undertaking a process of consensusbuilding.17 The key to this approach is to cultivate solidarity among regional countries and strengthen the country’s leadership in the regional Association. In an effort to enhance regional integration, Indonesia strongly commits to the realization of a cohesive ASEAN Community, comprising three pillars—namely political-security community, economic community, and socio-cultural community by 2015.18 On the political-security community blueprint, for instance, the Indonesian government seeks to promote the principles of democracy, good governance, and human rights protection, while enhancing regional peace and stability through a comprehensive security approach. For that purpose, Indonesia upholds the existing ASEAN political instruments. Under the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, it promotes the renunciation of the threat or use of force and a reliance on the pacific settlement of regional disputes while maintaining mutual respect and non-interference in each country’s domestic affairs. To date, the Indonesian government


continues to play a central role in mediating ongoing conflicts in Southeast Asia, including the border tensions between Cambodia and Thailand, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and Rohingya repression in Myanmar.19 Through ASEAN-centered multilateral forums, it also explores potential areas of cooperation with regional and extra-regional partners, such as disaster relief, navigation safety, fishery management, combating transnational crimes, and counterterrorism. Amid the uncertain trajectory of relations between the great powers, Indonesia believes that Southeast Asia should remain ‘free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers’.20 Jakarta has strongly embraced this belief since the ZOPFAN Declaration in 1971. At one level, Jakarta recognizes the usefulness of US bilateral alliances and a regional military presence to keep the rise of China in check. At another level, Indonesian leaders are also aware of the deficiencies in the regional order regarding the preservation of regional stability and how they, in turn, reinforce a security dilemma for China. The instability of the US–China relationship is not only detrimental to peace and security in East Asia, but also diminishes the level of cohesion in relations between the Southeast Asian countries. For that reason, Indonesia seeks to build a norms-based regional order that allows inclusive security cooperation in Southeast Asia and beyond. It also emphasizes the central role of ASEAN in shaping strategic initiatives for the construction of the region’s security architecture.21 From Jakarta’s perspective, the best strategy is to support and use ASEAN-driven multilateral mechanisms—including the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN plus Three—as the regional platforms to build a cooperative relationship among the major powers. Hence, the Indonesian government welcomes the participation of extra-regional powers—including China, India, Russia and the United States in the East Asia Summit (EAS)—thereby restraining the likelihood that one power will dominate the regional order. Under the so-called Bali Principles, Indonesia and other participating countries reiterate their commitment for peaceful and mutually beneficial interactions.22 Notwithstanding the above, great power competition continues to intensify in East Asia, and Indonesia will ultimately face greater challenges to preserve ASEAN centrality in the region’s security architecture. In recent years, the rifts within the regional association have been increasingly evident, particularly regarding the negotiations to draft a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.23 Moreover, the growing role of China and the US rebalancing strategy potentially sharpens the existing division of perceptions and interests among Southeast Asian countries. While Cambodia and Laos traditionally lean on China for certain economic gains, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines seek to forge closer bilateral ties with the United States for diplomatic leverage and defense materials with regard to their claims over the disputed region. Without the unity of


Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN is unlikely to be effective in the promotion of regional peace and stability. In other words, the capability of the regional association as a manager of regional order depends on its ability to maintain internal cohesion. The transformation of geopolitics and geoeconomy has led the Indonesian government to redefine the way it views the country’s role in a rapidly evolving region. As the Indian and Pacific Oceans are increasingly interconnected—in both economic and security terms—Jakarta promotes the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept to reassert its position as the diplomatic hub of the two vast maritime regions. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa, also called for an Indo-Pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation. The idea behind the proposal is to address the significant challenges—namely trust deficit, unresolved territorial disputes, and the impact of strategic change—to the development of a ‘peace dividend’ in the IndoPacific region.24 In an effort to sustain regional security and stability, Indonesia aspires to the peaceful management of strategic change. Amid the competitive nature of international relations, it has to take into account the different perceptions and regional interests of each great power. Therefore, in an effort to strengthen a power equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific region, Jakarta has forged closer ties with both China and the United States by entering into respective strategic and comprehensive partnerships in 2005 and 2010. Jakarta has also developed bilateral relationships with other strategic partners, including Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea. The primary purpose of this approach is to enhance the country’s access to foreign investment and technologies for national development, while increasing its diplomatic leverage on many strategic issues. Indonesia has also expanded its diplomatic engagement in other multilateral frameworks beyond ASEAN. As the chair of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in 2013, Jakarta sought to complete the realization of the Bogor Goals for free trade and investment by 2020 while injecting two other priorities—namely sustainable growth with equity and connectivity.25 In line with its aspiration for inclusive regionalism, the Indonesian government invited leaders from the economies of the Pacific Islands to participate in an informal session of the summit.26 Through its upcoming chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Rim Association in 2015–17, the country will intensify its maritime cooperation with regional countries—including India and Australia. The areas of mutual interest include maritime safety and security, fishery management, trade and investment facilitation, science and technology cooperation, and disaster risk management.27 As the country’s national capacities grow, Indonesian leaders seek to cultivate its role as a ‘middle power’ in the international stages. By bringing both democracies and non-democracies into the Bali Democracy Forum, Indonesia demonstrates a unique and non-confrontational way to promote


political development and enhance good governance capacity in order to strengthen democratic institutions.28 In an effort to build global connectivity for international community development, Indonesia has recently joined a new grouping of middle power countries—called MIKTA comprising Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia. These countries share a similar background including: democratic governance, a fast-growing market economy, membership of the G-20, and a propensity to play a constructive role of ‘bridge-builder’ among countries with diverse views and interests on global issues.29 Indonesia has begun to show its global leadership in recent years. Under the country’s chairmanship in 2013, the World Trade Organization (WTO) succeeded in sealing a global trade deal after dramatic and tense negotiations.30 The deal, dubbed as the Bali package, comprises three deliverables —namely trade facilitation, agricultural subsidies, and capacity-building for the least-developed countries. While developed nations are benefiting from simplified customs procedures for commercial goods and services, developing nations enjoy the positive impact of the package, including concessions on farm subsidies for domestic food security and capacity-building programs from donor members.31 In an effort to use global diplomacy to combat poverty and achieve sustained prosperity, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presented the final report of the UN panel of eminent persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda at the 68th session of the UN General Assembly. The report sets out a universal agenda to eradicate extreme poverty across the globe by 2030 and deliver the promise of sustainable development.32 The Indonesian government was also advocating the 12 goals of the post-2015 Development Agenda at the G-20 Summit in September 2013.33 Indonesia has also been a leader in ongoing global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The country’s nuclear policy is founded on the three pillars of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—namely non-proliferation; disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear technology; and nuclear security assurances—including the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The country’s recent ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has further highlighted its commitment to refrain from the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Indonesian leaders have been actively urging states with a nuclear arsenal to adopt the obligations of the SEANWFZ treaty and renounce the use or threat to use nuclear weapons against any nation party to the treaty or within the zone. As the coordinator of the Non-Alignment Movement’s working group on disarmament, it consistently voices the group’s concerns regarding the slow progress of nuclear disarmament, while calling on the nuclear weapons states to dismantle their nuclear arsenal based on the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verifiability.34 Indonesia has thus far maintained a view that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a critical role in upholding the global nuclear


non-proliferation regime and facilitating cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA safeguards and additional protocols are therefore instrumental in monitoring and verifying the compliance of the world’s nuclear activities and facilities of states party to the NPT.35 The Indonesian government has long placed its civilian nuclear program under the agency’s safeguards; this way Jakarta has negated any suspicion about its nuclear activities. In addition, Indonesia has been a party to most international agreements related to nuclear security and safety—including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste Management. These moves are certainly in line with the country’s energy development plans, which include the construction of nuclear power plants. Despite its strong commitment to the international non-proliferation regime, Indonesia consistently defends the right of all NPT members to access peaceful nuclear technologies. In principle, the Indonesian government supports Iran’s nuclear program provided it is intended for peaceful purposes and carried out in a transparent manner under IAEA supervision and verification.36 The country is also unsupportive of counter-proliferation initiatives outside the universal legal framework. It opposes the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative because of a concern that it contravenes the established marine laws—particularly UNCLOS—and potentially compromises Indonesia’s national sovereignty.37 While disapproving the expansion of the IAEA’s role at the expense of ‘its utmost responsibility on safeguards, safety and peaceful uses of nuclear energy,38 Indonesia criticizes the implementation of nuclear security in ways that undermine the rights of all NPT members to access peaceful nuclear technology. It regards multilateral export-control mechanisms—including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia Group—as part of global cartels that seek to restrict technological transfer to developing countries. As Indonesia’s military capabilities grow, it aims for a greater role in international peace operations. While increasing its current troop contribution to 4,000 personnel, the Indonesian government has explored additional peacekeeping missions. Recently, the country dispatched warships to join in the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and transport helicopters to assist the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Indonesian government also encourages increased roles for civilian personnel in supporting development and rehabilitation programs in the post-conflict areas. Along with its growing role in peace operations, Jakarta’s leaders have aspired to make Indonesia the hub of a network of peacekeeping centers in Southeast Asia.39 While cooperative security mechanisms and peaceful conflict settlement remain central in its foreign policymaking, peacekeeping is regarded by Indonesia as a crucial tool and responsibility in international affairs.


As Indonesia continues to value its independence and envision an autonomous regional order in Southeast Asia, it is unlikely to align with one great power. Given the transformation of geopolitics and its growing national capabilities, the Indonesian government will seek a greater role in international multilateral frameworks beyond ASEAN. These trends naturally extend to the country’s defense policy and military relationships as well.

Indonesia’s defense policy direction When the post-authoritarian Indonesian government initiated a process of military reforms in the early 2000s, the armed forces were chronically underfunded. Amid arms embargoes imposed by the US and some European countries, the average readiness of the TNI’s weapon systems was measured to be between 30 and 80 per cent.40 These operational shortcomings compromised the military’s ability to respond to a wide array of dangers to national security, ranging from external aggression to natural disasters. Thus, the Aceh tsunami disaster in 2004 revealed a blatant dependence on foreign militaries for air and sea-lifts to deliver aid and evacuate victims in the affected areas. Based on these experiences, the Indonesian government began to rethink its defense strategy.41 Given recent trends, Jakarta seeks to retain Indonesia’s strategic autonomy through five policy outlets. First, the reconstruction of the country’s defense posture through a process of military modernization. Based on Indonesia’s long-term development plan, the primary purpose of defense planning is to develop the armed forces with ‘a respectable deterrence effect’ to serve the nation’s diplomatic agenda.42 Between 2010 and 2024, the defense ministry aims to build a ‘minimum essential force’ (MEF)—a force structure with indispensable military capabilities and an adequate level of operational readiness in order to achieve the country’s immediate interests and defense objectives.43 For the purpose of its MEF, the armed forces have been conducting organizational reforms and arms modernization programs. The latter includes the formation of new commands and units within the military establishment and the adoption of a ‘right-sizing’ policy aimed at defining the adequate size of military units for specific missions. As most of the TNI’s weapon systems are now outdated, the defense ministry selectively purchases new weapon systems, including guidedmissile frigates, diesel-electric submarines, battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, anti-air defense systems, and multi-role jet-fighters. Second, with a positive economic outlook, the Indonesian government seeks to allocate more resources for national defense. This commitment has been reflected in the steady increase of Indonesia’s defense budget from US$2.5 billion in 2003 to US$8.1 billion in 2014. This has enabled the defense ministry to improve the salary of the military personnel and cover


the cost of arms procurement programs. From 2010 to 2014, for instance, the defense ministry is expected to spend approximately US$16 billion for arms acquisition and maintenance programs. A recent forecast suggests that Indonesia’s defense budget could reach US$12.3 billion by 2017.44 This budget projection corresponds with the objective of Indonesia’s defense planning to establish a minimum essential force structure by 2024. The country’s top leadership has also pledged to boost the country’s defense spending from 0.8 per cent to 1.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).45 The defense minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro is even optimistic that the country’s defense planning goals could be completed earlier than the initial timetable.46 Assuming Indonesia continues to maintain an average economic growth rate of 6 per cent and the minimum defense budget requirement is approximately US$20 billion, then the defense ministry will have to triple the current level of spending in order to complete the MEF planning by 2020. However, the political commitment for military modernization remains to be seen, as Indonesia has to deal with a ‘guns-versus-butter’ dilemma in the management of its defense economy. Third, due to the past experience of arms embargoes, Indonesian defense officials seek to diversify the country’s offshore source of military hardware. It has recently turned to Russia for necessary weapon systems, including Su27/30 jet-fighters, Mi-35P attack helicopters, Mi-17V5 transport helicopters, and BMP-3F amphibious infantry fighting vehicles. Similarly, it now sees China as an alternative supplier for missile technologies, particularly C-705 and C-802 anti-ship missiles. South Korea and Brazil are also the beneficiaries of Indonesia’s expanded procurement strategy. Having acquired LVT-7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, it purchased Korean-made T-50 multirole supersonic trainers to replace the existing Hawk Mk-53 fleet.47 Brazil has recently signed arms contracts to supply a squadron of Emb-314 light attack aircraft and two battalions of Astros-II multiple launcher rocket systems.48 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Indonesia will overlook its traditional arms suppliers. The changing power structure in East Asia and notable progress of Indonesia’s democracy have paved the way for the lifting of arms embargoes. It has made a number of arms deals with the United States since 2010 after signing a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement in 2010. These contracts include the ongoing acquisition of 24 upgraded F-16 jetfighters, FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles, the potential sales of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and UH-60 Black Hawk medium-lift utility helicopters.49 In addition to four Sigma-class corvettes, Indonesia has contracted the Netherlands’ naval ship-builder for the construction of a 2,400-ton frigate.50 Moreover, it has signed arms deals to procure the German Army’s surplus Leopard-2 main battle tanks, French-made Caesar


155-mm self-propelled artillery systems, and British-built F2000-class corvettes.51 Fourth, the Indonesian government seeks to reduce its reliance on arms imports by rebuilding its defense industrial base. In recent years, it has undertaken a number of policy initiatives, including restructuring programs and financial assistance packages.52 These initiatives were critical in resolving mismanagement issues lingering for more than a decade in the state-owned defense firms. Another significant step was the approval of new legislation covering the defense industry in 2012. It outlines a range of requirements, including a commitment to prioritize local sources in any state acquisitions, the potential for partial privatization of state-owned defense firms, and the provision of offset-structured industrial collaboration in all defense imports. The law also underlines that the government is committed to procure from domestic defense firms unless the required defense article is not resident in Indonesia.53 In the past few years, domestic defense industries have taken advantage of Indonesia’s major arms imports through defense offset programs. The benefits include subcontracting activity for maintenance and production of parts and components, local assembly, and the transfer of knowledge, facilities and technology. The purchase of nine C-295 air-cargoes, for instance, has benefited PT DI (Indonesia Aerospace Industry) through the offset program provided by Airbus Military.54 Through the procurements of Sigma-class offshore patrol vessels and Type 209/1300 submarines, PT PAL (Indonesia Shipbuilding Industry) has acquired the relevant know-how and technologies necessary for manufacturing surface and undersea naval combatants.55 Under a technological transfer agreement, Indonesia could now indigenously manufacture Chinese-developed anti-ship missile systems to equip the Navy’s fast missile boats and frigates.56 Having developed its knowledge and experience of weapons procurement and manufacture, in April 2014 the defense ministry launched a formal defense offset policy to spur the development of Indonesia’s defense industrial base. It obliges a minimum 35 per cent offset of the value of major defense contracts, with an emphasis on technological transfer to enable localized production of military equipment. The new policy also includes a requirement for the defense offset portion to increase by 10 per cent every five years until it reaches the full 85 per cent in 2039.57 This offset program is clearly designed to facilitate the gradual development of indigenous defense industries over the next two decades in line with Indonesia’s expanding economic and strategic ambitions. In order to gain a higher level of self-reliance in defense manufacturing, the Indonesian government has made a list of technologies that it regards as vital to national defense, including naval vessels, jet-fighters, armored vehicles, missiles, radars, propellants and communication devices.58 Besides joint and licensed production projects, the defense ministry actively


promotes defense industrial collaboration on research and development of new military platforms. Indonesia and South Korea, for instance, have recently launched a joint development project of the 4.5th-generation jetfighter.59 PT PINDAD (Pindad Industry – government-owned defense manufacturer) is also developing a medium tank with Turkish company FNSS Defense System.60 Having signed the strategic partnership in 2005, Indonesia and China are now planning to establish a collaborative defense industrial facility for the development of surveillance and electronic warfare systems.61 Fifth, Indonesia expands its military-to-military ties with multiple strategic partners. Under the framework of ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM+, it engages in multilateral security dialogues and develops practical cooperation on areas of mutual concern. In 2013, the Indonesian military conducted a number of field exercises with regional and extra-regional militaries on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, military medicine, counterterrorism and maritime security.62 Moreover, Indonesian defense officials are currently working together with their Southeast Asian counterparts on the establishment of defense industrial collaboration, peacekeeping center networks, and logistics support frameworks for non-traditional security missions.63 Bilaterally, the Indonesian military cultivates extensive personnel exchange and joint training programs to develop capabilities and enhance operational effectiveness. With its Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand counterparts, it has regularly conducted bilateral exercises for a number of military maneuvers and combat support services. The result has been improved interoperability and professional contacts among the regional militaries. On maritime security, for instance, Indonesia develops a network of coordinated sea patrols to ensure safe passage through essential commercial sea-lanes. In cooperation with other littoral countries, it has recently expanded the scope of the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol with the inclusion of hotline communication and aerial surveillance. The Indonesian Navy also conducts coordinated patrols with Philippines and Vietnam counterparts on their respective maritime borders in the Celebes and South China Seas. Indonesia has a great interest in a military-to-military relationship with the United States. For the Indonesian armed forces, this bilateral cooperation enables it to access advanced military technologies and top-class professional military education. After the normalization of its military relations in 2005, the US government revived personnel exchanges and joint training with Indonesia under the umbrella of International Military Education and Training (IMET).64 Even when the military embargoes were still in place, Indonesian military personnel continued to take part in USsponsored Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program and Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET).65 Moreover, the two armed forces regularly conduct joint military drills—including Cooperation Afloat


Readiness and Training (CARAT) and ‘Garuda Shield’ military exercises. These exercises cover essential areas of operations such as airborne and amphibious assaults, undersea warfare, maritime interception, naval gunnery and maneuvering, mines neutralization, and disaster response. Despite growing diplomatic and economic relations, Indonesia remains uncertain about China’s future intent in the region. The Indonesian defense establishment is aware that China’s nine-dashed line claim over the South China Sea potentially overlaps with a segment of its exclusive economic zone adjacent to the Natuna Islands.66 Indonesia may also walk a tightrope in balancing its interests between the rise of China and the US pivot position in East Asia. In order to downplay uncertainties in its bilateral and regional relationships, it develops military-to-military interactions with its Chinese counterpart for confidence-building measures. Besides port visits and personnel exchanges, both militaries have been conducting special forces exercises on counterterrorism and discussing the potential of conducting coordinated maritime patrols and joint naval exercises. In an effort to preserve a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, the Indonesian government also enhances the country’s military engagements with other extra-regional powers. With India, it has regularly exchanged military personnel and conducted joint activities, including coordinated sea patrol and undersea warfare exercises.67 The navy-to-navy ties among the two countries are likely to develop along with their strategic concerns over China’s increased naval projection capabilities beyond the ‘second island chain’. Meanwhile, military cooperation between Indonesia and Australia is largely based on a shared interest to preserve regional peace and stability. Under the framework of a new defense cooperation agreement, they develop military-to-military interactions covering issues related to disaster response, peacekeeping, cyber-defense, maritime security, search and rescue, and the defense industry.68 However, as demonstrated by recent events, the military ties between Indonesia and Australia remain uncertain due to the continuation of contentious issues in their diplomatic relationship.69 The policy measures above demonstrate the strong commitment of the Indonesian defense establishment to upgrade its military capabilities and support Jakarta’s foreign policy agenda. While steadily increasing military expenditure, Jakarta aims to rebuild indigenous strategic industries through defense offset programs. As Indonesia will continue to depend on multiple external sources of advanced military technologies for the foreseeable future, the military must develop proper logistical knowledge and skills for maintaining a complex set of weapon systems. Moreover, as an instrument of foreign policy, the Indonesian military seems committed to develop professional contacts and cooperative engagements with regional and extraregional militaries for a confidence-building purpose. The country’s military-to-military ties will continue to grow along with the expansion of its diplomatic interests and international role.


Conclusion While Indonesia is likely to enjoy steady economic growth for the foreseeable future, Jakarta will have to confront a new and less predictable strategic environment. Under a democratic climate, domestic security problems will also complicate the country’s decisionmaking processes. Externally, unresolved territorial conflicts and trust deficits remain the biggest challenges to Indonesia’s aspiration for a peaceful management of ongoing geopolitical change in the Indo-Pacific region. As signs of rivalry among the major powers are increasingly evident, Indonesia begins to ponder the future direction of regional politics. Given its geostrategic location, strategic vulnerabilities, geopolitical tradition, and constitutional mandate, Indonesian policymakers place a great deal of importance on the preservation of the country’s strategic autonomy. Indonesia’s strategic outlook suggests that it requires a coherent policy framework. The Indonesian government has given preference to two sets of strategic approaches—namely a ‘liberal-institutionalist’ foreign policy and a ‘classical-realist’ defense policy. In an effort to build a cohesive international order, it stresses confidence-building measures, cooperative security mechanisms, and peaceful means of conflict settlement. Hence, Indonesian foreign policy officials remain committed to ASEAN-centered regional processes and maintain a strong presence in the global multilateral frameworks. In the context of its relations with major powers, the country has entered into bilateral strategic partnerships with regional and extra-regional countries including China and the United States. In this way it seeks to preserve a dynamic equilibrium among the great powers, thereby avoiding the emergence of a dominant power at global or regional levels. In the defense and security realms, Indonesian defense officials maintain a realistic, if not pessimistic, view of the future geostrategic environment. Indonesia’s long-term defense planning suggests that the armed forces will need to increase the acquisition of sophisticated military technologies for an adequate power projection within the country’s region of influence. Through military-to-military ties with multiple strategic partners, the Indonesian armed forces can learn new sets of skills and enhance its operational effectiveness. In addition, the defense ministry’s ongoing plans to rebuild its domestic base will contribute to lessening Indonesia’s reliance on arms imports. For that purpose, attaching defense offset programs to the country’s major arms imports is essential as it provides relevant knowledge and technology transfer to domestic defense firms. Overall, the adoption of cooperative security approach and defense modernization strategies represents Indonesia’s strategic thinking and is aimed at preserving international peace and stability. At one level, arms modern-


ization programs strengthen the country’s deterrence capabilities to avert and defeat an external military aggressor. At another level, defense cooperation and military-to-military ties are a critical instrument in the country’s diplomacy and foreign policy in building confidence among neighbor states. Only through the effective combination of these two strategies will the country be adequately prepared for the unlikely event of major international conflict.

Notes 1 See ‘Political Violence Affects Stability in Indonesian Papua’, Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 24 August 2011. 2 See ‘Intimidation of Ahmadis Escalates in West Java’, The Jakarta Post, 25 April 2014; Al Makin, ‘The Scenarios of Shia Persecution’, The Jakarta Post, 29 April 2014. 3 See ‘Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia’, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Report, No. 2, 2 September 2013. 4 See Alda Chan, Illegal Logging in Indonesia: The Environmental, Economic and Social Costs (Washington, D.C.: Blue Green Alliance, 2010), p. 9; ‘Forest Groups Call on Oz to Ban Illegal Timber Import’, The Jakarta Post, 16 August 2010; ‘RI Seeks Ties to Fight Illegal Fishing’, The Jakarta Post, 5 March 2008; ‘RI Forms New Courts to Fight Illegal Fishing’, The Jakarta Post, 18 October 2007. 5 See ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Annual Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Asia: January-December 2012, 2013, p. 12. 6 See E. H. Veen, ‘The Sea: Playground of the Superpowers’, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Report, 13 March 2012, p. 38. 7 See Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 3, 2012, pp. 29–43. 8 See Bernard Gordon, ‘Trading Up in Asia: Why the United States Needs the Trans-Pacific Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, 2012, pp. 17–22. 9 See Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, November 2011, p. 58. 10 See ‘RI Finds Common ASEAN Ground in Sea Dispute’, The Jakarta Post, 23 July 2012. 11 See Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Indonesia and America: A 21st Century Partnership’, 14 November 2008 [cited 21 February 2014]; available from http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2008/11/15/1032.html 12 The U.S. government at that time was alleged to conduct a clandestine campaign to undermine the legitimacy of Sukarno’s administration. See Audrey R. Kahin and George M. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995). 13 See Yudhoyono, ‘Indonesia and America’, 2008. 14 See Law No. 17/2007 on Long-term Development Planning, 2005–2025, p. 44. 15 See Ibid., p. 15. 16 See Ibid., p. 76.

148 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia 17 See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), pp. 218-32; Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), pp. 21–2. 18 See Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, 2009–2014 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), p. 1. 19 See Brendan Brady, ‘Deadly Clashes as Thai-Cambodian Temple Tensions Reignite’, Time, 25 April 2011; Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Beyond the Six Points: How Far Will Indonesia Go?’, East Asia Forum, 29 July 2012; ‘Jakarta Pressing Burma on Rohingya Legal Rights’, Voice of America, 10 July 2013. 20 See ‘1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration’, 27 November 1971 [cited 29 March 2013]; available from http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1971 %20Zone%20of%20Peace%20Freedom%20and%20Neutrality%20Declarationpdf.pdf 21 See Marty M. Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia’, 4 January 2012 [cited 29 March 2012]; available from http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/PPTM%202012/PPTM%202012%20%20English.PDF 22 See ‘Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations’, 19 November 2011 [cited 23 January 2014]; available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/eas/pdfs/declaration_1111_2.pdf 23 See Rizal Sukma, ‘ASEAN dan Sengketa Laut China Selatan’, Kompas, 11 April 2012. 24 See Marty Natalegawa, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific’, 16 May 2013 [cited 21 February 2014]; available from http://csis.org/files/attachments/130516_MartyNatalegawa_Speech.pdf 25 See ‘Indonesia to Take APEC Out of the Ivory Tower’, The Jakarta Post, 17 June 2013. 26 See ‘SBY Opens Informal Session with Pacific Nations’, The Jakarta Post, 8 October 2013. 27 See ‘RI Elected as Vice-Chair of Indian Ocean Rim Association’, The Jakarta Post, 5 November 2013. 28 See ‘RI to Launch Bali Democracy Forum’, The Jakarta Post, 8 November 2008. 29 See Rizal Sukma, ‘MIKTA: What Does It Want?’, The Jakarta Post, 24 October 2013. 30 See ‘WTO Inks Historic Deal’, The Jakarta Post, 8 December 2013. 31 See ‘WTO Deal Forces Customs Reform, Keeps Farm Subsidies Intact’, The Jakarta Post, 9 December 2013. 32 See A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development (New York: United Nations, 2013). 33 See Yayan G. H. Mulyana, ‘Assessing President Yudhoyono’s Foreign Policy in 2013’, The Jakarta Post, 3 March 2014. 34 See ‘Statement by H. E. Dr R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty’, 3 May 2010 [cited 15 March 2013]; available from http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/nam_en.pdf 35 See ‘Statement by Mr Febrian A. Ruddyard, Representative of the Indonesian Delegation at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, 9 May 2007 [cited 15 March 2013]; available from http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/npt/prepcom07/statements/9mayIndonesia_afternoon.pdf

Iis Gindarsah with Adhi Priamarizki 149 36 ‘The Clarification of the Indonesian Government’s Approval to the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1747 in the Plenary Session of the Indonesian Parliament’, 10 July 2007 [cited 15 March 2013]; available from http://www.presidensby.info/index.php/fokus/2007/07/10/2005.html 37 See ‘Indonesia Rejects US Request for Proliferation Security Initiative’, Xinhuanet, 7 March 2006 [cited 15 March 2013]; available from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2006-03/17/content_4313679.htm 38 See ‘Statement by H. E. Mr Suharna Supratna, Minister for Research and Technology of the Republic of Indonesia at the 54th Annual Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Agency’, 20 September 2010 [15 March 2013]; available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/ GC/GC54/Statements/indonesia.pdf 39 See ‘Annual Press Statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia Dr R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa’, 4 January 2011 [cited 29 March 2012]; available from http://kemlu.go.id/Documents/Annual%20Press%20Statements%202011 %20Final.pdf 40 See Leonard C. Sebastian and Iis Gindarsah, ‘Assessing Military Reform in Indonesia’, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2013, p. 301. 41 See ‘Military Spending in South-East Asia: Spending Spree’, The Economist, 24 March 2012. 42 See Indonesia’s Law No. 17/2007 on Long-Term Development Plan 2005–2025. 43 See Minimum Essential Force ‘Komponen Utama’ (Jakarta: Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense, 2010), p. 7. 44 See ‘Russia, Indonesia Agree to Expand Cooperation’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 30 January 2013. 45 See ‘Presiden: Saatnya Anggaran Pertahanan Naik Signifikan’, Kompas, 5 May 2010. 46 By the end of 2014, the defense ministry is said to have accomplished nearly 40 per cent of its military procurement programs. See ‘SBY: Teruskan Pembangunan Pertahanan’, Kompas, 13 March 2014; ‘Akselerasi Militer’, Kompas, 6 September 2013. 47 See ‘RI Gets 16 New Korean Trainer Jets’, The Jakarta Post, 14 February 2014. 48 See ‘Super Tucanos Arrive in Indonesia’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 5 September 2012; ‘Astros II, Alutsista Baru TNI’, Media Indonesia, 24 May 2014. 49 See ‘Indonesia Approves Bid to Buy at Least Two F-16 Squadrons’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 26 October 2011; ‘Indonesia Asks US for Javelin Missiles’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 21 November 2012; ‘Hagel Confirms Apache Sale to Indonesia’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 28 August 2013. 50 See ‘Indonesia and Damen Finalise Delayed Frigate Construction Programme’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 6 June 2012. 51 See ‘Indonesia Turns to Germany in Bid to Acquire Leopard 2A6 Tanks’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 4 July 2012; ‘UK Ministerial Visit to Indonesia Furthers Defense Ties, Opens OPV Opportunities’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 16 January 2013. 52 In 2011, the Indonesian parliament approved legislation to commit US$1 billion for the country’s aerospace manufacturer (PT DI), naval shipbuilder (PT PAL), and land system manufacturer (PT PINDAD). See ‘Resuscitating the Longneglected State Defense Industries’, Jakarta Post, 5 October 2011. 53 See Indonesia’s Law No. 16/2012 on Defense Industry. 54 See ‘Indonesia and Airbus Military Reach C-295 Production Agreement’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 26 October 2011. 55 See ‘Ministry, Daewoo Sign $1B Contract for 3 Submarines’, The Jakarta Post, 21 December 2012.

150 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia 56 See ‘Indonesia and China Confirm C-705 Missile Production Collaboration’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 28 September 2011. 57 See ‘Indonesia Announces Offset Programme’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 9 April 2014. 58 See ‘Consistency, Planning Needed in Defense Policy, Say Analysts’, The Jakarta Post, 21 February 2014. 59 In the KFX/IFX program, Indonesia contributes 20 per cent of the overall costs in return for technologies and licences to procure the aircraft. See ‘South Korea and Indonesia Launch Joint Fighter Aircraft Programme’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 3 August 2011. 60 ‘Local Weapons Ramped Up’, The Jakarta Post, 20 February 2014. 61 See ‘Indonesia, China Plan Joint C4ISR Military Electronics Facility’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 9 May 2012. 62 See ‘Batam to Host Komodo Naval Joint Exercise’, The Jakarta Post, 15 June 2013. 63 See ‘Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network’, 19 May 2011 [cited 18 June 2014]; available from https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/10.%20ANNEX%209-%20Concept%20Paper%20on%20The%20 Establishment%20of%20ASEAN%20PKC%20Network%20-.pdf; ‘Concept Paper on Establishing ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration’, 19 May 2011 [cited 18 June 2014]; available from https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/12.%20ANNEX %2010-%20Concept%20Paper%20on%20Establishing%20ADIC.pdf; ‘Concept Paper on the Establishment of Logistics Support Framework’, 7 May 2013 [cited 18 June 2014]; available from https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/ConceptPaper-ADMM-2013-2.%20Concept%20Paper%20on%20Establishment%20of%20 Logistics%20Support%20%20Framework.pdf 64 See ‘What You Really Need to Know about the U.S.-Indonesian Security Relationship’, USINDO Brief, 26 August 2010. 65 See John Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, The U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship: The Next Steps (Washington, D.C.: USINDO, 2009), pp. 47–8; Abraham Denmark, ‘Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Era of U.S.-Indonesia Relations’, Center for a New American Security Report, June 2010, p. 15. 66 See Moeldoko, ‘China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea’, The Wall Street Journal, 24 April 2014. 67 See ‘Indian Ambassador Witnesses India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol Naval Exercise at Medan’, The Jakarta Globe, 31 May 2014. 68 See ‘Joint Communiqué – The President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Australia’, 30 September 2013 [cited 18 June 2014]; available from http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-09-30/joint-communiqu-presidentrepublic-indonesia-and-prime-minister-australia-jakarta 69 See Gregorius Sri Nurhartanto, ‘Penyadapan dan Pasang Surut RI-Australia’, Kompas, 21 November 2013; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, ‘Jika Garuda Murka’, Kompas, 22 November 2013.

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Iis Gindarsah with Adhi Priamarizki 151 ‘Annual Press Statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa’, 4 January 2011 [cited 29 March 2013], http:// kemlu.go.id/Documents/Annual%20Press%20Statements%202011%20Final.pdf ‘Annual Press Statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia’, Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa’, 4 January 2012 [cited 29 March 2013], http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/PPTM%202012/PPTM%202012%20%20English.PDF Annual Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Asia: January–December 2012 (2013), ReCAAP Information Sharing Center, Singapore. Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (1994) Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS). ‘Astros II, Alutsista Baru TNI’, Media Indonesia, 24 May 2014. ‘Batam to Host Komodo Naval Joint Exercise’, The Jakarta Post, 15 June 2013. Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa (2013) ‘Jika Garuda Murka’, Kompas, 22 November. Brady, Brendan (2011) ‘Deadly Clashes as Thai–Cambodian Temple Tensions Reignite’, Time, 25 April. Chan, Alda (2010) Illegal Logging in Indonesia: The Environmental, Economic and Social Costs (Washington D.C.: Blue Green Alliance). Clinton, Hillary (2011) ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, November. ‘Concept Paper on Establishing ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration’ (2011) 19 May [cited 18 June 2014], https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/10.%20 ANNEX%209-%20Concept%20Paper%20on%20The%20Establishment%20of%20 ASEAN%20PKC%20Network%20-.pdf ‘Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network’ (2011) 19 May [cited 18 June 2014], https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/10.%20ANNEX%209-%20Concept%20Paper%20on%20The%20 Establishment%20of%20ASEAN%20PKC%20Network%20-.pdf ‘Concept Paper on the Establishment of Logistics Support Framework’ (2013) 7 May [cited 18 June 2014], https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/Concept-PaperADMM-2013-2.%20Concept%20Paper%20on%20Establishment %20of%20Logistics%20Support%20%20Framework.pdf ‘Consistency, Planning Needed in Defense Policy, Say Analysts’, The Jakarta Post, 21 February 2014. ‘Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations’, (2011) 19 November [cited 23 January 2014], http://www.mofa.go.jp/ region/asia-paci/eas/pdfs/declaration_1111_2.pdf Denmark, Abraham (2010) ‘Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Era of US–Indonesia Relations’, Center for a New American Security Report, June. Emmerson, Donald K. (2012) ‘Beyond the Six Points: How Far Will Indonesia Go?’, East Asia Forum, 29 July. ‘Forest Groups Call on Oz to Ban Illegal Timber Import’, The Jakarta Post, 16 August 2010. Gordon, Bernard (2012) ‘Trading Up in Asia: Why the United States Needs the TransPacific Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, 91: 4. ‘Hagel Confirms Apache Sale to Indonesia’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 28 August 2013. Haseman, John and Eduardo Lachica (2009) The US–Indonesia Security Relationship: The Next Steps (Washington, D.C.: USINDO). Indyk, Martin, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael O’Hanlon (2012) ‘Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History’, Foreign Affairs, 91: 3.

152 Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia ‘Indian Ambassador Witnesses India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol Naval Exercise at Medan’, The Jakarta Globe, 31 May 2014. ‘Indonesia and Airbus Military Reach C-295 Production Agreement’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 26 October 2011. ‘Indonesia and China Confirm C-705 Missile Production Collaboration’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 28 September 2011. ‘Indonesia and Damen Finalise Delayed Frigate Construction Programme’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 6 June 2012. ‘Indonesia Announces Offset Programme’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 9 April 2014. ‘Indonesia Approves Bid to Buy at Least Two F-16 Squadrons’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 26 October 2011. ‘Indonesia Asks US for Javelin Missiles’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 21 November 2012. ‘Indonesia, China Plan Joint C4ISR Military Electronics Facility’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 9 May 2012. ‘Indonesia Turns to Germany in Bid to Acquire Leopard 2A6 Tanks’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 4 July 2012. Indonesia’s Law No. 16/2012 on Defense Industry. Indonesia’s Law No. 17/2007 on Long-term Development Planning, 2005–2025. ‘Indonesia Rejects US Request for Proliferation Security Initiative’, Xinhuanet, 7 March 2006 [cited 15 March 2013], http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200603/17/content_4313679.htm Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2013) ‘Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia’, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Report, 2: 2 (September). ‘Intimidation of Ahmadis Escalates in West Java’, The Jakarta Post, 25 April 2014. ‘Jakarta Pressing Burma on Rohingya Legal Rights’, Voice of America, 10 July 2013. ‘Joint Communiqué – The President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Australia’, 30 September 2013 [cited 18 June 2014], http://www. pm.gov.au/media/2013-09-30/joint-communiqu-president-republic-indonesia-andprime-minister-australia-jakarta Kahin, Audrey R. and George M. Kahin (1995) Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press). ‘Local Weapons Ramped Up’, The Jakarta Post, 20 February 2014. Makin, Al, ‘The Scenarios of Shia Persecution’, The Jakarta Post, 29 April 2014. ‘Ministry, Daewoo Sign $1B Contract for 3 Submarines’, The Jakarta Post, 21 December 2012. ‘Military Spending in South-East Asia: Spending Spree’, The Economist, 24 March 2012. Minimum Essential Force ‘Komponen Utama’, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense, Jakarta, 2010. Moeldoko, ‘China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea’, The Wall Street Journal, 24 April 2014. Mulyana, Yayan G. H., ‘Assessing President Yudhoyono’s Foreign Policy in 2013’, The Jakarta Post, 3 March 2014. Nurhartanto, Gregorius Sri, ‘Penyadapan dan Pasang Surut RI–Australia’, Kompas, 21 November 2013. Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, 2009–2014, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 2009. ‘Political Violence Affects Stability in Indonesian Papua’, Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 24 August 2011. ‘Presiden: Saatnya Anggaran Pertahanan Naik Signifikan’, Kompas, 5 May 2010.

Iis Gindarsah with Adhi Priamarizki 153 ‘Resuscitating the Long-Neglected State Defense Industries’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October 2011. ‘RI Elected as Vice-Chair of Indian Ocean Rim Association’, The Jakarta Post, 5 November 2013. ‘RI Finds Common ASEAN Ground in Sea Dispute’, The Jakarta Post, 23 July 2012. ‘RI Forms New Courts to Fight Illegal Fishing’, The Jakarta Post, 18 October 2007. ‘RI Gets 16 New Korean Trainer Jets’, The Jakarta Post, 14 February 2014. ‘RI Seeks Ties to Fight Illegal Fishing’, The Jakarta Post, 5 March 2008. ‘RI to Launch Bali Democracy Forum’, The Jakarta Post, 8 November 2008. ‘Russia, Indonesia Agree to Expand Cooperation’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 30 January 2013. ‘SBY Opens Informal Session with Pacific Nations’, The Jakarta Post, 8 October 2013. ‘SBY: Teruskan Pembangunan Pertahanan’, Kompas, 13 March 2014. Sebastian, Leonard C., and Iis Gindarsah (2013) ‘Assessing Military Reform in Indonesia’, Defense and Security Analysis, 29: 4. Smith, Anthony L. (2000) Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS). ‘South Korea and Indonesia Launch Joint Fighter Aircraft Programme’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 3 August 2011. ‘Speech by Dr. R. M. Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia’ at the Conference on Indonesia in Washington D.C. ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific’ (2013) 16 May [cited 21 February 2014], http://csis.org/files/attachments/130516_MartyNatalegawa_Speech.pdf ‘Speech by Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of Republic of Indonesia’, at USINDO Luncheon in Fairmount, Washington D.C. ‘Indonesia and America: A 21st Century Partnership’, (2008) 14 November [cited 21 February 2014], http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2008/11/15/1032.html ‘Statement by H. E. Dr R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty’ (2010) 3 May [15 March 2013], http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/nam_en.pdf ‘Statement by H. E. Mr Suharna Supratna, Minister for Research and Technology of the Republic of Indonesia at the 54th Annual Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Agency’ (2010) 20 September [cited 15 March 2013], http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/Statements/indonesia.pdf ‘Statement by Mr Febrian A. Ruddyard, Representative of the Indonesian Delegation at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty of the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (2007) 9 May [cited 15 March 2013], http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/npt/prep com07/statements/9mayIndonesia_afternoon.pdf Sukma, Rizal (2012) ‘ASEAN dan Sengketa Laut China Selatan’, Kompas, 11 April. Sukma, Rizal (2013) ‘MIKTA: What Does It Want?’, The Jakarta Post, 24 October. ‘Super Tucanos Arrive in Indonesia’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 5 September 2012. ‘The Clarification of the Indonesian Government’s Approval to the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1747 in the Plenary Session of the Indonesian Parliament’, (2007) 10 July [cited 15 March 2013], http://www.presidensby. info/index.php/fokus/2007/07/10/2005.html ‘UK Ministerial Visit to Indonesia Furthers Defense Ties, Opens OPV Opportunities’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 16 January 2013.

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8 The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values and Identity Avery Poole

Introduction Indonesian foreign policy has changed substantially since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Early post-Suharto governments were preoccupied with the business of democratic transition—establishing democratic institutions, withdrawing the military from politics, and resisting the various threats to reform. In more recent years, however, foreign policy has become a higher priority; the government has tried to improve Indonesia’s international image, and to enhance its role in Southeast Asia and in the world. Its foreign policy goals emphasize peace, prosperity and stability—in both the immediate region and globally—and Indonesia’s role in pursuing these goals. What explains the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy? There is an instrumental dimension to Indonesia’s growing focus on foreign policy, given the material benefits of a greater influence on the world stage. There are obvious benefits from developing strategic relationships with major powers and seeking stability in the immediate region. Moreover, a higher international profile may boost economic growth through foreign investment and negotiated trading arrangements. However, the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy also reflects shifting domestic political roles and interests. The changes associated with Indonesia’s democratic transition have broadened the range of voices in the foreign policymaking process. The ‘democratization’ of this process has revealed a genuine desire by many actors—parliamentarians, activists, representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—to advance democracy and human rights as central political values in contemporary Indonesia. To what extent, then, is Indonesian foreign policy shaped by these various factors? What impact does Indonesia’s emerging democratic identity have on its foreign relations, and does this represent a shift in political values? Moreover, to what extent might its foreign policy ambitions be constrained by continuing domestic challenges, such as corruption, terrorism, and social tensions? This chapter explores these questions by reviewing the 155

156 The Foreign Policy Nexus

recent evolution of Indonesian foreign policy, and analyzing the roles of different actors and interests. It argues that Indonesia’s ‘democratic identity’— reflecting a set of democratic values—is certainly an important factor in its foreign policy, and thus influences Indonesia’s changing role in the world. The democratization of foreign policymaking itself—reflecting a democratic process—also shapes Indonesia’s role, as a broader range of domestic actors are able to express their views and to influence the decisions of political elites. However, domestic constraints are likely to continue to hinder Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions, and remind us that while Indonesia’s democratic transition bodes well for its future, there are segments of the population who are not engaged in the democratic project, or who do not benefit from the country’s rising international status.

A ‘more activist’ foreign policy Indonesia’s foreign policy has become an increasing priority to the government in recent years. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—first elected in 2004, and due to end his second, and final, term in 2014—the government has developed what some call a more ‘activist’ approach to foreign relations.1 The Foreign Minister’s annual press statement provides an indication of Indonesia’s foreign policy directions. At the time of writing, the most recent annual statement was made on 7 January 2014 by current Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.2 He argues that ‘the most fundamental and basic challenge in front of us must be the maintenance of the region’s peace and security’.3 As such, Indonesian foreign policy must ‘vigorously address’ what Indonesia sees as the ‘triple challenges’ of the Asia-Pacific region: ‘trust deficits, territorial disputes and geo-political and geo-economic shifts’.4 Tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula are of particular concern, and thus Indonesia seeks to facilitate a ‘cooperative framework for the wider Asia-Pacific or Indian and Pacific Oceans region’.5 Natalegawa also emphasizes Indonesia’s diplomacy ‘beyond the region’, noting that ‘as a regional power with global interests, Indonesia will continue to speak forcefully in favor of diplomatic means in addressing various disputes or conflict situations’.6 In particular, Indonesia plans to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Syria, and the realization of rights for the Palestinian people. The statement thus sets out Indonesia’s vision as a positive force for regional stability, but also as an increasingly vocal player in global issues, such as violent conflict and economic problems. Natalegawa refers to Indonesia’s role in ‘high-level forums’ such as ASEAN, APEC—which Indonesia chaired in 2013—the G-20, the WTO, and the UN.7 He argues that Indonesian diplomacy is at the forefront of addressing issues which require international cooperation, such as food security, energy security, environmental sustainability, national disasters,

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and transnational crime.8 Clearly the Indonesian Foreign Ministry seeks to position Indonesia as an important actor in multilateral diplomacy. In addition to these various security and economic concerns, Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook includes what we may refer to as a ‘democracy agenda’. According to Natalegawa, Indonesia’s national interests include the intention ‘to consolidate democracy’.9 This underpins Indonesia’s foreign policy objective of promoting democracy in its neighbors; for example, Indonesia encourages democratization in Myanmar.10 Under SBY, Indonesia has been ‘eager to share its experiences on democratic transition with other leaders of aspiring democracies’.11 For example, it initiated the annual Bali Democracy Forum in 2008, which is seen as a platform for states in the Asia-Pacific region to ‘exchange lessons learnt and experiences on democracy’.12 Similarly, Indonesia emphasizes the role of diplomacy in ‘advancing the promotion of human rights’, and encourages the strengthening of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).13 Outside its immediate region, Indonesia also advocates for the rights of the Palestinian people and encourages democratic transition in the Middle East following the Arab Spring. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a prominent political advisor and analyst, notes that ‘Indonesia has worked to promote democracy …. Indeed, various Arab countries, notably Egypt and Tunisia, are seeking Indonesian leaders’ advice on balancing Islam and politics’.14 Indonesia promotes democracy as a value, as well as a particular regime type. What explains the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy to include an emphasis on democracy?

‘Democratic identity’ in foreign policy This democracy agenda in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy must be seen in the light of the state’s profound political changes since 1998. Since the fall of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime in 1998, competitive elections have been held in 1999, 2004, 2009, and in 2014. There is now a separation of powers among the executive, legislature and judiciary, and the military is under civilian rule—albeit with some continued political influence—and no longer holds seats in parliament. There is a genuine multi-party system in which many political parties engage in free and fair contests. A series of changes—four since 1999—to the 1945 Constitution have increased the power of the House of Representatives (DPR) and introduced a number of checks and balances. Robust debate among parliamentarians indicates the desire of recent reformers to encourage debate within the DPR—in contrast with its previous ‘rubber stamp’ role under Suharto. In terms of civil liberties, Indonesians now enjoy a free press and relative freedom of assembly and organization, and civil society organizations have flourished.15 These changes have contributed to the promotion of a democratic identity based on democratic values. While there is little scholarship that


precisely defines the concept of ‘democratic identity’, Jarrod Hayes notes that ‘the norms that inform democratic identity are agreed to include nonviolent conflict resolution, rule of law, compromise, and transparency’.16 Similarly, in relation to Indonesia specifically, R. E. Elson argues that the strengthening of Indonesia’s democratic identity … should become evident in the non-arbitrary exercise of the rule of law, a gradual decline in official corruption, an acceptance that universal norms of human rights are to be taken seriously and enforced, and the growth of a more vibrant civil society.17 Thus, the—still developing—features of a democratic political system provide a basis from which the Indonesian government can project a democratic identity. Hassan Wirajuda was Foreign Minister during the period 2001–09 and is thus seen by many observers as having been crucial in shaping Indonesia’s post-Suharto foreign policy. He informed the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2009 that ‘we made our transition from a highly centralized authoritarian regime to a decentralized, more fully democratic system. We reformed our military, our bureaucracy and justice system. We modernized our economic infrastructure’. As such, he said, ‘We in Indonesia are great believers in democratic reform’.18 At this and other addresses to the UNGA, Indonesian officials promote the democratic changes that have taken place in the country, and emphasize the role that Indonesia can play in promoting democracy outside its own borders.19 This burgeoning democratic identity is seen by political elites as beneficial to Indonesia’s international image. As Don Emmerson notes, President Yudhoyono seeks to ‘leverage his country’s stature as the world’s third largest democracy’ in its foreign affairs.20 Indonesia is often seen as the most ‘successful’ democratizing state in Southeast Asia.21 Further, it is the most populous Muslim state in the world, and the fourth most populous state overall. Thus, some officials and analysts claim, Indonesia demonstrates that—contrary to a widespread assumption—secular democracy and Islam are not incompatible.22 Indeed, the fact that Indonesia is a secular democratic state with a majority Muslim population has placed it in a rare position in international relations. Hassan Wirajuda has emphasized this as ‘an important asset for Indonesia’s foreign relations’.23 He told the UNGA in September 2009 that: [W]e have come to be known as the land where democracy, Islam and modernization not only go hand in hand but also thrive together. We intend to keep on earning and deserving that recognition—by, among other ways, learning from others and sharing with them our own experiences in political development.24

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Wirajuda’s successor, Marty Natelagawa, echoed these words in his own address to the UNGA in September 2010, stating that ‘as the world’s third largest democracy, Indonesia is proof that Islam, democracy and modernization can go hand in hand’.25 This ‘asset’ provides a basis for Indonesia’s growing international and regional roles.

International role In international organizations and regional forums, post-New Order Foreign Ministers have advanced the notion that democratic values in Indonesia contribute to its growing international role. For example, the inclusion of democratic values in foreign policy bodes well for its involvement in multilateral dialogues.26 This is reflected in the establishment of Indonesia-led forums and bodies focused on democracy, such as the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), which Natalegawa notes is ‘the only intergovernmental forum for sharing of experience and cooperation in political development in Asia’.27 The BDF is an annual intergovernmental forum involving foreign ministers from many Asia-Pacific states, some of which are decidedly non-democratic. Indonesia has also established the Institute for Peace and Democracy, described as ‘a state-sponsored think tank to promote Indonesia’s democracy experience abroad’, and more specifically to implement the themes and priorities of the BDF.28 Indonesia has thus become more active in multilateral initiatives ostensibly designed to advance dialogue about democracy. Further, Indonesia’s international role has, on occasion, included explicit support for democratic transitions in other states. For example, Natalegawa told the UNGA in September 2011 that Indonesia supported the democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa: A decade or so ago now, Indonesia too went through a tumultuous process of democratic change. Today, as the third largest democracy, Indonesia is reaping the democratic dividends of such change. That is why we believe that political development, democratization, should constitute a priority item on our agenda.29 This suggests that Marty sees Indonesia as providing an example to other states as a democratic state with a majority Muslim population. Indonesia is, notes Rizal Sukma, ‘projecting itself as a moderating voice in the Muslim world, and as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West’.30 Moreover, President Yudhoyono argues that Indonesia acts as a ‘problemsolver’ and a ‘peace-builder’.31 These roles are exercised in diplomatic positions taken on political and humanitarian crises involving Muslims. For example, Geoffrey C. Gunn argues that Natalegawa ‘played the Islamic card’ by raising the issue of violence against the Rohingya Muslims in


Myanmar at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Extraordinary Summit in August 2012. The following month, Natalegawa ‘called upon nations to consider reviewing diplomatic ties with Israel and to mount a boycott in solidarity with Palestine’—part of a long-running campaign of Indonesian support for Palestine.32 In his 2014 press statement, Natalegawa asserted that the year would be ‘marked by a further strengthening of Indonesia’s support for Palestine … through support for Palestine’s institutional capacity building’.33 This is scheduled to take place under the auspices of the New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership (2014–19) and the Conference among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development, which Indonesia hosts. Nevertheless, in some cases Indonesian observers feel that the government is failing to respond to political crises—which involve questions about democracy—in other Muslim-majority states. For example, Mochammad Faisal Karim, an Indonesian academic, assesses Indonesia’s (lack of) response to the coup against the democratically elected Morsi government in 2013. He argues that ‘as the third largest democracy and the most populous Muslim country in the world, Indonesia should take a greater role in shaping and consolidating democracy in Egypt’. Indonesia’s support for the civilian government ‘remains relatively low key’, but it has a moral obligation to support Egypt’s transition toward a stable democracy, ‘given that the promotion of democracy and democratic values are a key characteristic of Indonesia’s foreign policy’. Moreover, according to Karim, Indonesia [C]ould be a pivotal partner for the United States in promoting good governance and democracy throughout the developing world, especially in the Muslim world where the US has failed to do so.34 Thus, the projection of Indonesia’s democratic identity in foreign policy statements leads to expectations that it will be actively engaged in international issues where democratic principles are at stake, by making diplomatic statements and by sharing its own experience of political transition and civil–military reform. Aside from the issue of whether these expectations are met, they suggest that a vibrant dialogue about Indonesia’s role in ‘promoting’ democratic principles is developing.

Regional role Indonesia’s democratic values are also promoted as part of its regional role. For example, in Natalegawa’s statement at the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review for Indonesia in May 2012, he argued that it was

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‘not without coincidence’ that Indonesia’s democratic transformation had been paralleled by change within ASEAN: In 2003, while undergoing internal reform, Indonesia, as then Chair of ASEAN, introduced the concept of an ASEAN Community that is fully committed to democratic values and the promotion and protection of human rights. Since then, ASEAN has adopted its Charter, by virtue of which the member states committed themselves to democratic values and to the promotion and protection of human rights.35 Despite the political diversity of the ASEAN states—among them democratic, ‘soft authoritarian’, socialist, and quasi-military regimes—Wirajuda asserted in 2006 that ‘we must envision an ASEAN that is democratic and respects human rights’.36 As noted in other chapters from this volume, Indonesia sees itself as the natural leader of ASEAN—given that it is the largest, most populous state and one of the founding member-states—and seeks to promote its values at the regional level. Indonesia also represents the region to an extent through its increasingly prominent roles in multilateral forums. For example, as the only ASEAN state to be a member of the G-20 Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-20), Indonesia can potentially represent its neighbors on certain issues, especially during the years when it is acting as chair of ASEAN. Thus, Indonesia’s foreign ministers have advanced the notion that Indonesia’s democratic transition and democratic values directly contribute to both its regional and international roles. Motivations and constraints in the foreign policy nexus There has, then, been a profound change in Indonesia’s international image since the fall of Suharto. However, one may ask to what extent the projected ‘democratic identity’—perhaps motivated in part by the desire for material benefits through trade and investment—reflects ‘genuine’ political values in Indonesia? This section considers motivations for the promotion of democratic identity, and the extent to which it reflects public opinion on democracy; democratization of the foreign policy process itself; and the economic situation in Indonesia. The motivations for promoting Indonesia’s status as a Muslim-majority democracy reflect both a ‘constructed’ image and genuine change in political values. Particularly since the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and the Bali bombings in 2002, the Indonesian government has sought to resist the negative stereotypes of political Islam. In demonstrating its commitment to counterterrorism, for example, by attempting to eradicate terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, the Yudhoyono government has sought to improve Indonesia’s international


image and capitalize on its positive example. The projection of its democratic identity is also partly an attempt to overcome the damage to Indonesia’s international image caused by the actions taken by the Indonesian military and militias following the independence vote in East Timor in 1999, and in other sites of separatist turmoil such as Papua. The Indonesian government has sought to demonstrate that the military has now come under civilian rule through the creation of democratic institutions.37 When we consider Indonesia’s projection of a democratic identity in its own region, it seems even clearer that it is being motivated by more than mere instrumentalism. The political diversity of the ASEAN states has traditionally underpinned a regional norm of non-interference, including refraining from commenting on or criticizing each other’s political circumstances. It is difficult to conceive of clear material gains vis-à-vis Indonesia’s relations with its neighbors from advancing democratic ideas within ASEAN. It seems that political values and beliefs in regard to democracy and human rights—at least at the elite level—are behind Indonesia’s recent ‘norm entrepreneurship’ in the region.38 Rizal Sukma, a prominent Indonesian analyst and advisor in foreign policy, argues that ‘Indonesia now views its own regional neighborhood through the lens of democracy’.39 It promotes the inclusion of references to democracy and human rights in ASEAN’s core documents, such as the Charter, despite the tensions that this has caused at times with other ASEAN states.40 This reflects Indonesia’s new political identity. Christopher Roberts notes that, according to a Foreign Ministry official: A further motivation … was that, at the domestic level, the Indonesian government wanted to institutionalize ASEAN in a manner that would protect Indonesia’s newfound democracy, together with the governments in other ASEAN members, from illegitimate transitions of government, including military coups.41 This highlights the strategic aspect of promoting democracy in ASEAN for a government which seeks to avoid ‘backsliding’ away from its own democratization. Such goals also reflect a broader point where the projection of a democratic identity for Indonesia may have pre-empted the growth of a belief in democratic values generally, and the worth of a democratic political system more specifically. Sukma argues that the initial embrace of democracy was driven by ‘image’ considerations, but as matters stabilized and reformasi began to produce more positive results, the levels of national conviction and confidence behind the ‘democracy talk’ began to grow.42 Thus, while Wirajuda, Natalegawa, and Yudhoyono have advanced the notion that Indonesia’s democratic transition could benefit its international

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image, the political value of democracy was, according to Sukma, gaining traction internally. This contention can be more deeply explored through an examination of relevant empirical data regarding public opinion.

Public opinion and democracy While democratic identity may be perceived as constructed by political elites, researchers find that the underlying values resonate with the majority of the Indonesian public. For example, a 2012 poll undertaken by the Lowy Institute finds that ‘Indonesians overwhelmingly believe in core democratic values’. The Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll reports that: Almost every Indonesian adult (97%) agrees that ‘the right to a fair trial’ is important for them in Indonesia. There is similar near-universal agreement over ‘the right to freely express yourself’ (96%) and ‘the right to vote in national elections’ (95%). Notably, these views are powerfully held, with considerable majorities saying they ‘strongly agree’ with these rights. Of the four democratic values presented, the only one over which Indonesians are split is ‘the right to a media free from censorship’ (52% agree and 43% disagree), perhaps owing to some concerns over media integrity in Indonesia picked up in other polling.43 They have also embraced the opportunities afforded by greater political freedoms and participation; for example, civil society organizations increased sevenfold in the decade following the fall of Suharto.44 Another poll conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in 2010 found that 75 per cent of those surveyed believed that Indonesia is a democracy, and 72 per cent preferred democracy as a system of government. Further, ‘a sizeable majority of Indonesians strongly (74%) or somewhat (4%) agree that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making in Indonesia’.45 These polls suggest that the majority of the Indonesian public support the democratic project. This does not necessarily mean that they support the promotion of democracy internationally. According to the Lowy Poll, only 34 per cent of Indonesians believe that ‘promoting democracy in other countries’ is a ‘very important’ foreign policy goal.46 In contrast, Karim claims that ‘Indonesia’s domestic audience wants Indonesia to have a more active role in supporting legitimate civilian control in Egypt’s democratic transition’.47 Perhaps the public does not support democracy promotion as an official foreign policy priority, but instead sees Indonesia as having a role in regard to specific political crises, particularly in countries with majority Muslim populations. In any case, while this research suggests that the projection of a democratic identity in foreign policy reflects a belief in democratic values and the worth of democracy as a political system, it does not tell us whether, or to what extent, public opinion


influences the formulation of foreign policy. Here we turn to the ‘democratization’ of the foreign policy process itself.

‘Democratizing’ foreign policy The nexus among domestic factors and foreign policy is thus complex and multifaceted. In large part, this is because of the ‘democratization’ of policymaking itself. Domestic politics has opened up to a wider range of views, and the number of actors participating outside government has increased. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar—prominent Indonesian analyst and, at the time of writing, advisor to Vice President Boediono48—notes, the political changes in Indonesia since 1998 have led to a re-structuring of relations between state and society, between the central government and the regional governments, and between the various institutions of the state, which in turn has transformed the ways that decisions are made.49 More specifically, democratization has ‘opened both the conduct of international relations and foreign policymaking to a larger number of actors’ than were involved when Indonesia was authoritarian.50 Since the advent of democratization, a wider range of voices now seeks to influence foreign relations. As Rizal Sukma notes, ‘Indonesia’s post-authoritarian governments can no longer ignore the aspirations and views of the people when formulating and executing foreign policy’. As such, foreign policy is ‘no longer the exclusive domain of a few members of the policy-making elite’.51 This creates a challenge in that the larger number of stakeholders have diverse and sometimes competing interests, not all of which can be satisfied. In the 2000s, elites recognized the need for wider public consultation and participation in the foreign policymaking process. Then Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda made a conscious effort ... to democratize the process of foreign policy making by actively consulting and engaging with think tanks, academics, religious groups, the media, and civil society organizations as well as with members of Parliament.52 Marty Natalegawa, in one of his early speeches as Foreign Minister, reiterated that he would continue this effort to ‘democratize’ the foreign policymaking process, and incorporate the interests of various stakeholders.53 During the ASEAN Charter process, for example, Indonesia was apparently the only member-state that conducted extensive consultations with civil society groups, academics and politicians. Dian Triansyah Djani, the

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Indonesian representative to the ASEAN High Level Task Force that drafted the Charter, argues that these consultations shaped Jakarta’s position that democracy and human rights must be included in the Charter.54 While the degree of such influence is difficult to validate, Indonesian officials have demonstrated a recognition that democratic transitions need to involve greater receptiveness to a broad range of voices and views.

Challenges to the democratic image Of course, democratic reforms mean that the Foreign Ministry is more open not only to public contributions, but also to public scrutiny. Moreover, democratic transition inevitably gives way to some instability as communal tensions and intolerance are able to gain leeway. Further, the establishment of democratic institutions and civil liberties may enable the expression of anti-reform views. Thus, democracy as a ‘process’ may actually undermine democracy as a set of values. Attacks against religious minorities, such as Shiite Muslims, Baha’is, Sufis, Christians, and members of the Ahmadiyya faith, undermine the image of a tolerant democratic society. Moreover, ‘while Indonesia’s Constitution protects freedom of religion, regulations against blasphemy and proselytizing are routinely used to prosecute’ these religious minorities.55 Thus, civil liberties such as religious freedom and freedom of speech—which come into tension with each other—are being undermined. Indonesian journalist and human rights activist Andreas Harsono argues that, while Indonesia has made progress in achieving a stable, democratic government, ‘the country is by no means a bastion of tolerance’.56 He points to the violence against religious minorities and other actions by Islamic militants, such as the burning down of three Christian churches in Sumatra in August 2011, and argues that the Indonesian government has failed to intervene to stop such acts. Indeed, ‘Mr Yudhoyono’s government is reluctant to take them on because it rules Indonesia in a coalition with intolerant Islamist political parties’. Thus, Harsono criticizes the notion that ‘it is fashionable these days for Western leaders to praise Indonesia as a model Muslim democracy’. Instead, they ‘should publicly demand that Indonesia respect religious freedom, release political prisoners and lift restrictions on media and human rights groups in Papua’.57 Endy Bayuni, a senior editor at The Jakarta Post, argues that the government should remove Article 64 of the 2004 Civil Administration Law, which requires religious affiliations to be declared on Indonesian identification cards—and only six religions—Islam, Christianity, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism—are officially recognized. Citizens can otherwise state ‘other’. This, he argues, amounts to institutionalized discrimination, and is a ‘dark spot in Indonesia’s march toward democracy’.58


The above analysis highlights the diverse perspectives on Indonesia’s democratic transition. From outside the country, the political changes in Jakarta suggest that significant progress has been made, relative to the previous New Order regime. Memories of episodes of state repression and violence, such as the events in East Timor in 1999, bolster an image of contemporary Indonesia as democratic and tolerant. Indonesian leaders have, to an extent, successfully promoted this image in foreign relations: as Gunn notes, ‘Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa have raised Indonesia’s international profile to a new high’.59 Thus, it is possible to project a democratic image in foreign policy even if there are deficits in democracy—or, perhaps more accurately, in the process of democratic transition. However, this causes concern among analysts such as Harsono, who seek to temper international praise by highlighting some persistent issues that undermine democratic principles in Indonesia. Democracy in Indonesia is also challenged by issues such as corruption, problems with law enforcement, lack of transparency, and other governance problems. Yudhoyono has identified the eradication of corruption as a high priority, but has been criticized for failing to provide sufficient political and financial support for the anti-corruption agency.60 Gunn argues that ‘despite the arrest and conviction of many high-profile officials, there remains a widespread domestic and international perception that corruption is a part of daily life in Indonesia, including within the legal system’.61 The electoral system is also in question. While much progress has been made in moving from a centralized authoritarian system to a decentralized electoral democracy, the complex logistics and regulations of the electoral process—as well as persistent clientelism—lead some analysts to argue that ‘the principles underpinning Indonesian democracy have begun to fray’.62 Nehru argues that the choice between competing ideas is ‘shrinking, the distinctions between parties are blurred, and voters find it difficult to hold politicians accountable for their actions’. It is more difficult for parties to compete in national elections given increasingly restrictive rules, and as a result parties often seek coalitions ‘with little concern for ideological compatibility’.63 This does not bode well for the evolution of Indonesian democracy from minimal—electoral—democracy to a more substantive democracy. As such, Indonesia’s democratic credentials have been challenged by such problems as corruption, religious intolerance, and communal tensions, as well as narrowing electoral choices and weak law enforcement. Rizal Sukma argues that ‘these domestic challenges often threaten to undermine the democratic identity that Indonesia has carefully tried to project to the international community’.64 Again, while a more stable political scene in recent years has enabled the government to focus more on foreign policy,65 it should not be assumed that democratization in Indonesia is a linear process. In ‘transitional’ democracies generally, we should critically

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assess the notion of ‘democratization’—notwithstanding the fact that most or all democracies exhibit at least some ‘undemocratic’ characteristics or events. As Fukuoka points out, analysts are divided over whether Indonesia is in transition to liberal democracy. While some assume that Indonesia is being propelled ‘in a more liberal democratic direction’, others point out that there are ‘deficits that need to be overcome in Indonesia’s new democracy’.66 It is certainly important to avoid teleology in the analysis of any democratic transition. Moreover—and more importantly for this chapter— while it is possible to project a democratic image in foreign policy despite democratic deficits, this may be undermined if problems with the Indonesian democracy become increasingly prominent.

Economic growth and inequality Another important factor in the foreign policy nexus is Indonesia’s economic situation. Indonesia’s economic growth and increasingly visible role in economic diplomacy are enhancing its international profile and providing incentives for other states to engage with Indonesia. In recent years, strong economic growth rates (at more than 5 per cent since 2004 and 6.2 per cent in 2012),67 together with expanding trade have underpinned claims that Indonesia is an emerging economic power. This growth has facilitated Indonesia’s economic recovery from regional and global financial crises. As in other areas of foreign policy, there is an increasing number of actors with an interest in advancing economic diplomacy.68 There is greater interest in participating in multilateral economic forums. For example, President Yudhoyono ‘has made it clear to his ministers that he wants Indonesia to be an effective player in the G-20’.69 He also is promoting Indonesia’s role in economic diplomacy by nominating ministers for key positions in international organizations.70 For example, in 2010, Yudhoyono successfully nominated his then Minister for Finance, Dr Sri Mulyani, for the position of Managing Director in the World Bank group. In December 2012, he unsuccessfully nominated Dr Mari Pangestu, a former Trade Minister and current Minister for Tourism and Creative Economy, as a candidate for the position of Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, widespread poverty and infrastructure problems persist, causing a challenge to Indonesia’s future growth and to the equitable distribution of its growing wealth. The World Bank estimates that 12 per cent of the population were living below the national poverty line in 2012. This represents the continuation of a steady decline in poverty rates since 2003 (17.4 per cent), but remains high relative to developed countries.71 This is based on a low national poverty line, at $US22 per month; the more sobering figure is that approximately 40 per cent of Indonesians live on less than


$2 per day.72 Moreover, income equality is not narrowing as poverty rates decline. While there is a growing middle class in Indonesia, employment growth is slower that population growth, and around 6.2 per cent or 7.24 million people were unemployed in 2012.73 These issues cause both challenges to economic diplomacy and domestic political discontent—for instance, the aforementioned Lowy Institute poll found that 55 per cent of Indonesians believe that life was better under Suharto.74 President Yudhoyono reiterated in January 2013 that alleviating poverty and narrowing the wealth gap are priorities for his government.75 From the perspective of some scholars of democratic transition, such as Rueschemeyer, democracy is not truly achieved where economic inequality persists.76 Even if one sees this emphasis on substantive outcomes in the definition of democracy as overstated, it does raise the issue that the success of the projection of Indonesia’s democratic identity may be undermined by evidence of entrenched economic inequality. Of course, trade partners and investors may stimulate growth in Indonesia on the basis of their perceptions of the potential for a democratic, modern Indonesia, and this can become a self-reinforcing phenomenon. As Emmerson points out, ‘Indonesia’s perceived ascent is largely a product of its interaction with, and its portrayal by, the outside world’. Enthusiasts who are ‘encouraging investment in Indonesia because they believe it has a promising future … help to ensure the very rise that they anticipate’.77 Thus, perceptions play an important role in Indonesia’s foreign policy nexus and prospects for its ascent. But questions remain about how Indonesia’s new wealth is shared; for some, the persistence of oligarchic structures fundamentally challenges the assumption that Indonesians are collectively moving to a brighter future, in terms of liberal democracy and economic prosperity.78

Post-2014 foreign policy As Indonesia moves into a new phase of governance following the 2014 elections, the foreign policy nexus will no doubt continue to evolve. At the time of writing, it is unclear how foreign policy will develop under new President Joko Widodo (known as ‘Jokowi’). There has been much discussion in the Indonesian news media about possible foreign policy directions, but this is of course difficult to predict on the basis of pronouncements made during an election campaign. However, some preliminary observations about post-SBY foreign policy can be made. In his campaign, Jokowi discussed the importance of international diplomacy, but did not specifically outline views on the role of democracy in Indonesia’s foreign policy, or the promotion of democracy or human rights

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in other states. More broadly, a crucial question is whether SBY’s ‘globalmindedness’ in foreign policy will be sustained in the next administration.79 While he is relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs, Jokowi seems relatively outward-looking, referring in his policy platform submitted to the Election Commission at the beginning of June to participation in international forums and strengthening regionalism.80 However, some Indonesian analysts suspect that foreign policy will be a lower priority under Jokowi. For example, Hikmahanto Juwana from the University of Indonesia argues that ‘It looks like the [future] presidential institution won’t be one that is actively involved in international affairs’.81 Bantarto Bandoro from the Indonesian Defense University agrees that ‘this is the path we’re heading to’—unless the new President retains Natalegawa as Foreign Minister.82 Predictions of a downgrading of foreign affairs relative to other policy areas reflect not only Jokowi’s background, but also whether he might respond to public perceptions that SBY has focused too much on regional and international diplomacy.

Conclusion Since democratization, Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy has become influenced by an increasingly broad range of actors, some of whom are advancing a ‘democratic identity’ as a crucial aspect of Indonesia’s international image. Democratic transition and economic growth have contributed to Indonesia’s self-confidence in its foreign policy, and to perceptions that it is a rising power—potentially even the ‘first Muslim and democratic superpower’.83 The objectives of Indonesia’s ‘activist’ foreign policy are more likely to be achieved as a result, demonstrating the benefits of promoting democracy as a set of values. However, we must also consider the impact of Indonesia’s evolving democratic processes, which shape foreign policymaking. The projection of Indonesia’s ‘democratic identity’ faces possible constraints. Some Indonesians seek to challenge the domestic democratic project as many have not yet benefited from its economic growth or rising international status. It is unclear whether the increased salience of democratic values in the polity can counteract the effect of these constraints in the long term. Alternatively, the democratic identity projected in foreign policy may be undermined by challenges to liberal democratic principles. Those who hold aspirations for democracy to underpin Indonesian foreign policy will need to work to overcome political and economic challenges so that Indonesia’s democratic identity is grounded in reality. However, in future democracy as a feature of foreign policy may simply be de-emphasized, depending on the priorities of the next administration and the President’s foreign policy outlook.


Notes 1 For example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s Cautious Confidence’, Project Syndicate, 16 July 2013, available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asean-and-indonesia-s-foreign-policy-priorities-by-dewi-f—anwar; and The Jakarta Post, ‘Editorial: RI’s activism on Syria’, 9 January 2013. 2 Marty M. Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa, 2014’, Jakarta, 7 January 2014, available at http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/PPTM%202014/Annual %20Press%20Statement%20Minister%20for%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf 3 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 2. 4 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 3. 5 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 6. 6 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 6. 7 He also mentions Indonesia’s roles in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), ASEANEU relations, the forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG): Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, pp. 4–5 & 8. 8 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 10. 9 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 12. 10 Bagus BT Saragih, ‘Marty will use remainder of term to cement RI’s global role’, The Jakarta Post, 8 January 2014. 11 Ted Piccone and Bimo Yusman, ‘Indonesian Foreign Policy: ‘A Million Friends and Zero Enemies’, The Diplomat, 14 February 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/indonesian-foreign-policy-a-million-friends-and-zeroenemies/ 12 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 9. 13 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, pp. 1 and 9. 14 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s Cautious Confidence’, Project Syndicate, 16 July 2013, available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/aseanand-indonesia-s-foreign-policy-priorities-by-dewi-f—anwar 15 See, for example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy’, Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 2010, 2010, pp. 126–41. 16 Jarrod Hayes, ‘Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran’s Nuclear Programs’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, 2009, p. 982. 17 R. E. Elson, ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the World’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s Third Giant (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), p. 183. 18 Hassan Wirajuda, ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 29 September 2009’, available athttp://www. un.org/en/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/ID_en.pdf 19 See also Marty Natalegawa, ‘Statement By H.E. Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa Minister For Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia at the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, New York, 26 September 2011, available at http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay. aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=725&l=ent

Avery Poole 171 20 Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s Third Giant (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), p. 59. 21 For example, Larry Diamond, ‘Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy’, in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 23–4. 22 For example, Greg Barton, ‘Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam’, Politics & Policy, vol. 38, no. 3, 2010, pp. 471-96. Barton also refers to Turkey as challenging this assumption. 23 Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, p. 113. 24 Hassan Wirajuda, ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda’. 25 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 28 September 2010’, available at http://kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Nam e2=Menteri&IDP=681&l=en 26 Michael J. Green and Daniel Twining, ‘Democracy and American Grand Strategy in Asia: The Realist Principles behind an Enduring Idealism’, vol. 30, no. 1, 2008, p. 18. 27 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’. 28 Mochammad Faisal Karim, ‘Indonesia should Promote Democracy Globally, Starting with Egypt’, East Asia Forum, 22 August 2013, available at http://www. eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/22/indonesia-should-promote-democracy-globallystarting-with-egypt/ 29 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’. 30 Rizal Sukma, ‘Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s Third Giant (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 81–2. 31 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Indonesia and the World’, keynote address to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), Jakarta, 19 May 2005, available at http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html 32 Geoffrey C. Gunn, ‘Indonesia in 2012: An Electoral Democracy in Full Spate’, Asian Survey, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 123. 33 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Annual Press Statement’, p. 7. 34 Mochammad Faisal Karim, ‘Indonesia should Promote Democracy Globally, Starting with Egypt’, East Asia Forum, 22 August 2013, available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/22/indonesia-should-promote-democracy-globally-starting-with-egypt/ 35 Marty Natalegawa, ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the 13th Session of the Working Group Meeting on the Universal Periodic Review for Indonesia’, Geneva, 23 May 2012, available at http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay. aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=769&l=en

172 The Foreign Policy Nexus 36 Hassan Wirajuda, quoted in Sinar Harapan (Jakarta), 22 August, 2006, cited in Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, p. 113. 37 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy’, pp. 126–7. 38 Avery Poole, ‘Institutional Change in Regional Organizations: The Emergence and Evolution of ASEAN Norms’, PhD dissertation, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 2013. 39 Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, p. 113. 40 Avery Poole, ‘Institutional Change in Regional Organizations’. 41 Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Co-operation, Values and Institutionalisation (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 120. 42 Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, p. 113. 43 Fergus Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll 2012 (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2012), available at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesiapoll-2012-shattering-stereotypes-public-opinon-and-foreign-policy 44 Alan Collins, ‘A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organisations’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 2, 2008, p. 320. 45 For example, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems found in 2010 that International Foundation for Electoral Systems, ‘IFES Indonesia: Electoral Survey 2010’, Washington, D.C., pp. 15 and 34, available at http://www.ifes.org/ Content/Publications/Survey/2011/~/media/Files/Publications/Survey/2010/ 20110119_Indonesia_Electoral_Survey.pdf 46 Fergus Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes’. 47 Karim, ‘Indonesia should Promote Democracy Globally’. 48 Dewi Fortuna Anwar was also an advisor to former President Habibie during his administration (1998-99). At the time of writing, she had various roles in Indonesian foreign relations, research and academia. 49 Ibid., p. 127. 50 Jörn Dosch, ‘Sovereignty Rules: Human Security, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Reform’, in Donald K. Emmerson (ed.), Hard Choices: Security, Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein AsiaPacific Research Center, 2008), pp. 59–90 [emphasis added]. 51 Rizal Sukma, ‘Domestic Politics and International Posture’, pp. 84–5. 52 Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes’, p. 131. 53 Ibid. 54 Dian Triansyah Djani, ‘A Long Journey’, in T. Koh, R. G. Manalo and W. Woon (eds) The Making of the ASEAN Charter (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009), pp. 141–2. 55 Andreas Harsono, ‘Indonesia is No Model for Muslim Democracy’, New York Times, 21 May 2012. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Endy Bayuni, ‘Commentary: Religious Intolerance in Indonesia Officially Goes up a Notch’, The Jakarta Post, 2 December 2013. 59 Geoffrey C. Gunn, ‘Indonesia in 2012’, p. 123. 60 For example, Reuters, ‘Indonesia president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono under pressure as corruption investigators arrest top judge’, 3 October 2013, available a http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/indonesia-president-susilobambang-yudhoyono-under-pressure-as-corruption-investigators-arrest-topjudge-8856225.html

Avery Poole 173 61 Geoffrey C. Gunn, ‘Indonesia in 2012’, p. 120. 62 For example, Vikrum Nehru, ‘Indonesian Democracy is in Need of Reform’, Carnegie Endowment, 12 September 2013, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/12/indonesian-democracy-is-in-need-of-reform/gmz6 63 Ibid. 64 Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, p. 118. 65 Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising?’, pp. 60–1; Anwar, ‘The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes’, pp. 126–7. 66 Yuki Fukuoka, ‘Oligarchy and Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia’, Political Science Review, vol. 11, 2013, p. 57. 67 The World Bank, ‘Indonesia’, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/indonesia 68 I. B. Made Bimanta, ‘Seizing the year of economic diplomacy, now or never’, The Jakarta Post, 13 March 2013, p. 6. 69 Peter McCawley, ‘Indonesia’s WTO Candidate’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 January 2013, available at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/01/16/Indonesias-WTO-candidate.aspx 70 Peter McCawley, ‘Indonesia’s WTO Candidate’. 71 The World Bank, ‘Indonesia’. 72 Geoffrey C. Gunn, ‘Indonesia in 2012’, p. 119. 73 Geoffrey C. Gunn, ‘Indonesia in 2012’, p. 119. 74 Fergus Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes’. 75 Ezra Sihite, ‘SBY turns to KEN for advice on wealth gap’, The Jakarta Globe, 23 January 2013. 76 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ‘Addressing Inequality’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 4, 2004, pp. 76–90. 77 Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising?’, pp. 49 and 58. 78 For example, Yuki Fukuoka, ‘Oligarchy and Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia’. 79 Emirza Adi Syailendra, ‘Indonesia’s Post-Election Foreign Policy: New Directions?’, RSIS Commentaries, No. 113/2014, 13 June 2014, available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1132014.pdf 80 Awidya Santikajaya, ‘Indonesia: Foreign Policy under Jokowi and Prabowo’, The Diplomat, 5 June 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/indonesiaforeign-policy-under-jokowi-and-prabowo/ 81 Quoted in Erwida Maulia, ‘Presidential Hopefuls Shy Away from Global Affairs’, The Jakarta Globe, 4 June 2014. 82 Quoted in Erwida Maulia, ‘Presidential Hopefuls Shy Away from Global Affairs’. 83 Joshua E. Keating, ‘The Stories You Missed in 2010’, Foreign Policy, December 2010, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_ stories_you_missed_in_2010

Bibliography Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (2013) ‘Indonesia’s Cautious Confidence’, Project Syndicate, 16 July, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asean-and-indonesia-sforeign-policy-priorities-by-dewi-f—anwar ——— (2010) ‘The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy’, Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 2010, pp. 126–41. Barton, Greg (2010) ‘Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam’, Politics & Policy, 38: 3, 471–96.

174 The Foreign Policy Nexus Bayuni, Endy (2013) ‘Commentary: Religious intolerance in Indonesia officially goes up a notch’, Jakarta Post, 2 December. Collins, Alan (2008) ‘People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organisations’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30: 2, 313–31. Diamond, Larry (2010) ‘Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy’, in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 21–49. Djani, Dian Triansyah (2009) ‘A Long Journey’, in T. Koh, R. G. Manalo and W. Woon (eds) The Making of the ASEAN Charter (Singapore: World Scientific), 137–50. Dosch, Jörn (2008) ‘Sovereignty Rules: Human Security, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Reform’, in Donald K. Emmerson (ed.) Hard Choices: Security, Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), 59–90. Elson, R. E. (2012) ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the World’, in Anthony Reid (ed.) Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s Third Giant (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 170–85. Emmerson, Donald K. (2012) ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’, in Anthony Reid (ed.) Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s Third Giant (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 49–76. Fukuoka, Yuki (2013) ‘Oligarchy and Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia’, Political Science Review, 11, 57. I. B. Made Bimanta (2013) ‘Seizing the year of economic diplomacy, now or never’, Jakarta Post, 13 March, 6. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2011) ‘IFES Indonesia: Electoral Survey 2010’, Washington, D.C., http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/ Survey/2011/~/media/Files/Publications/Survey/2010/20110119_Indonesia_Elector al_Survey.pdf Green, Michael J. and Daniel Twining (2008) ‘Democracy and American Grand Strategy in Asia: The Realist Principles Behind an Enduring Idealism’, 30: 1, 1–28. Gunn, Geoffrey C. (2013) ‘Indonesia in 2012: An Electoral Democracy in Full Spate’, Asian Survey, 53: 1, 117–25. Hanson, Fergus (2012) ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll 2012 (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International Policy), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-poll-2012-shatteringstereotypes-public-opinon-and-foreign-policy Harsono, Andreas (2012) ‘Indonesia is no model for Muslim democracy’, New York Times, 21 May. Hayes, Jarrod (2009) ‘Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran’s Nuclear Programs’, International Studies Quarterly, 53, 977–99. Jakarta Post (2013) ‘Editorial: RI’s activism on Syria’, 9 January. Karim, Mochammad Faisal (2013) ‘Indonesia should Promote Democracy Globally, Starting with Egypt’, East Asia Forum, 22 August, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/ 2013/08/22/indonesia-should-promote-democracy-globally-starting-with-egypt/ Keating, Joshua E. (2010) ‘The Stories You Missed in 2010’, Foreign Policy, December, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_stories_you_missed_in_2010 Maulia, Erwida (2014) ‘Presidential Hopefuls Shy Away from Global Affairs’, Jakarta Globe, 4 June. McCawley, Peter (2013) ‘Indonesia’s WTO Candidate’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 January, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/ 2013/01/16/Indonesias-WTO-candidate.aspx

Avery Poole 175 Natalegawa, Marty M. (2014) ‘Annual Press Statement, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, 2014’, Jakarta, 7 January, http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/PPTM%202014/Annual%20Press%20Stateme nt%20Minister%20for%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf Natalegawa, Marty M. (2012) ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the 13th Session of the Working Group Meeting on the Universal Periodic Review for Indonesia’, Geneva, 23 May, http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1= Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=769&l=en Natalegawa, Marty M. (2011) ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,’ New York, 26 September, http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato& Name2=Menteri&IDP=725&l=en Natalegawa, Marty M. (2010) ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 28 September 2010’, http://kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2 =Menteri&IDP=681&l=en Nehru, Vikrum (2013) ‘Indonesian Democracy is in Need of Reform’, Carnegie Endowment, 12 September, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/12/indonesiandemocracy-is-in-need-of-reform/gmz6 Piccone, Ted and Bimo Yusman (2014) ‘Indonesian Foreign Policy: “A Million Friends and Zero Enemies”’, The Diplomat, 14 February 2014, http://thediplomat. com/2014/02/indonesian-foreign-policy-a-million-friends-and-zero-enemies/ Poole, Avery (2013) ‘Institutional Change in Regional Organizations: The Emergence and Evolution of ASEAN Norms’, PhD dissertation (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia). Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (2004) ‘Addressing Inequality’, Journal of Democracy, 15: 4, 76–90. Reuters (2013) ‘Indonesia president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono under pressure as corruption investigators arrest top judge’, 3 October, http://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/asia/indonesia-president-susilo-bambang-yudhoyono-underpressure-as-corruption-investigators-arrest-top-judge-8856225.html Roberts, Christopher B. (2012) ASEAN Regionalism: Co-operation, Values and Institutionalisation (London: Routledge). Santikajaya, Awidya (2014) ‘Indonesia: Foreign Policy under Jokowi and Prabowo’, Diplomat, 5 June, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/indonesia-foreign-policyunder-jokowi-and-prabowo/ Saragih, Bagus B. T. (2014) ‘Marty will use remainder of term to cement RI’s global role’, Jakarta Post, 8 January. Sihite, Ezra (2013) ‘SBY Turns to KEN for Advice on Wealth Gap’, Jakarta Globe, 23 January. Sukma, Rizal (2012) ‘Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities’, in Anthony Reid (ed.) Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Indonesia’s Third Giant (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 77–92. Sukma, Rizal (2011) ‘Indonesia Finds a New Voice’, Journal of Democracy, 22: 4, 110–23. Syailendra, Emirza Adi (2014) ‘Indonesia’s Post-Election Foreign Policy: New Directions?’, RSIS Commentaries, 113/2014, 13 June, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1132014.pdf

176 The Foreign Policy Nexus Wirajuda, Hassan (2009) ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, at the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 29 September 2009’, http://www.un.org/en/ga/ 64/generaldebate/pdf/ID_en.pdf World Bank, ‘Indonesia’, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2005) ‘Indonesia and the world’, keynote address to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), Jakarta, 19 May, http://www. presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html

9 Indonesia and International Institutions: Treading New Territory Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir

Introduction Since gaining national sovereignty in 1949, Indonesia has been actively engaged in international institutions. It joined the United Nations (UN) in 1950 and was an early and instrumental participant in its provision of peacemaking forces. It was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, and in 1992 chaired the NAM Summit in Jakarta, which was credited for revitalizing the Movement.1 In 1967, Indonesia was a founding member of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), created to maintain security and stability in Southeast Asia, with the ASEAN Secretariat headquartered in Jakarta. In the post-Cold War period, Indonesia was a founding member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 and hosted the APEC Summit in 1994, which resulted in the Bogor Goals, that measured objectives for reducing barriers to trade and investment. In 1999, after the onset of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, Indonesia was invited to join the Group of Twenty (G-20), a select assembly of advanced and emerging economies that has become a critical forum for global economic governance. This chapter focuses on how in the last decade Indonesia has regarded its role in three global international institutions, the UN, NAM, and the G-20, in light of its emergence as a rising power, and how the nation has reconciled this role with its traditional ‘independent and active’ policy framework. The chapter relies on an ideational perspective that primarily analyzes the public statements of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) during his two-term administration (2004–09, 2009–14), as well as the statements of other major Indonesian foreign policy figures. Throughout this period, the Yudhoyono government has not only preserved essential elements of the traditional narratives of Indonesian foreign policy in its relationships with international institutions, such as 177

178 Indonesia and International Institutions

the bebas dan aktif (‘independent and active’) framework, but has also reshaped these narratives in the contexts of the changing global environment and Indonesia’s economic and political ascent. The three international organizations featured in this chapter also face the need to change in light of fast-paced, fluctuating global conditions. Failing to meet international standards such as representation, accountability, and participation could weaken their political legitimacy.2 The United Nations (UN) has undertaken many attempts at reform with mixed results. A notable failure has been continuing efforts to reform the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the veto power entrusted to the five permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. The NAM has struggled to maintain its relevance, while in order to increase representation from emerging economies, the Group of Twenty (G-20)—itself an expansion of the Group of Seven—continues to be criticized for its exclusive membership. However, this is not to say that such organizations are not capable of changing for the better, or at least of attempting to do so. Within those efforts, Indonesia and its representatives can be said to have acted as policy entrepreneurs3 in introducing new ideas and approaches. The UN is the world’s universal organization in terms of its membership. However, partly because of its large membership, it has not always been an effective international governance institution. Calls for UN reform have been made for many decades, but very little fundamental progress has been achieved, particularly in regard to UN Security Council reform.4 The NonAligned Movement (NAM) began in 1961 and was active, at least at the rhetorical level, in campaigning for decolonization and establishing a more just and fair global governance system. For example, in the most recent 2012 NAM Summit in Tehran, Iran, NAM leaders highlighted the fundamental role of the UN as the universal and inclusive multilateral body in the institutional and legal framework of global governance.5 As a member of the UN and as a founding member of NAM, Indonesia has generally aligned with other developing countries and frequently stood in opposition against major powers. Through the UN and NAM Indonesia has been critical of the major powers for preserving the current UN structure. It has also called for support for Palestinian independence, in contrast to the strong military, economic, and ideological support the United States provides Israel. However, as a member of the G-20, Indonesia is working in alignment with the major powers and other emerging economies, and is required to comply with its commitments at the G-20 forums. The first section of this chapter looks at the genesis of the ‘independent and active’ orientation of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the 1955 Asia–Africa Conference in Bandung, both of which laid the ideological foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The idea of the ‘independent and active’ foreign policy has been a constant theme throughout Indonesia’s

Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir 179

history. The next section examines Indonesia’s membership and role in the three international institutions, beginning with the UN as the universal international institution, the NAM as inspired by the Bandung Conference and Indonesia as a founding member, then, in contrast, the G-20 as a select assembly of industrialized and emerging nations. Specifically, it will examine Indonesia’s perceptions of its ideal role in these institutions. The third section will touch on the realization of those roles. Finally, the conclusion considers likely future prospects of Indonesia as a rising middle power.

Independent and active foreign policy When Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, nationalist leaders had already envisioned a nation-state active in fostering global order. This was not surprising, as many of those leaders of pre-independent Indonesia were members of a small, Western-educated, multilingual elite that shared a cosmopolitan outward orientation.6 Their idealism was reflected in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which stated that Indonesia must take responsibility for contributing to establishment of a world order in accordance with the principles of independence, eternal peace, and social justice.7 In what was to become a landmark speech, in 1948 Vice-President Mohammad Hatta advocated the ‘independent and active foreign policy’ that remains the bedrock of Indonesia’s foreign policy today.8 To cite one of the many instances of the policy’s currency, in his maiden foreign policy speech delivered to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), President Yudhoyono emphasized the foreign policy as his major theme and referred to the title of Hatta’s speech—the enduring image of Indonesia as a vessel ‘Rowing between Two Reefs’ (Mendayung di antara Dua Karang). The reefs represented the growing Cold War antagonism between Eastern communism and Western capitalism. Vice-President Hatta argued strongly that Indonesia must avoid choosing sides between the two alternatives. In doing so he was not advocating a policy of neutrality, but rather passionately reasoned that Indonesia must strive to be a ‘subject, not an object’ in international affairs, determining its own path.9 The first Asia–Africa Conference, held in Bandung in 1955, widely considered as a historical milestone, was a manifestation of this foreign policy philosophy. Five countries, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma initiated the conference. Twenty-nine countries from Asia and Africa participated in the conference.10 Representing Africa were Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, the Sudan, and the Gold Coast. Despite disagreements during the course of the conference, caused in part by the fissures of the prevailing Cold War, the conference participants united in a final communiqué that incorporated the ten Bandung Principles.11


As Shimazu argues: This diplomatic performance lent legitimacy symbolically to the twentynine participating states as a new collective ‘actor’ in international relations. What is striking about Bandung is that it was an act of confident assertion vis-à-vis the ruling elite international society, and not a passive act of seeking acceptance. Symbolically, not a single ‘white’ or ‘Western’ state was present. Thus, it was a daring act, proud and defiant, borne out of the political momentum created by the global process of decolonization.12 The Bandung Conference today still retains its almost mythic stature in the history of Indonesia. Yet it was as much a reflection of the vulnerability felt by Indonesian leaders as it was about the intrinsic strengths of the size and resources of the country. Being active in multilateral international institutions such as the United Nations was a means to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity.13

The roles of the G-20, NAM, and the UN: The Indonesian perspective Indonesia and the United Nations Indonesia became a member of the UN on 28 September 1950 and has been active in the organization since that date. Indonesia chaired the UN General Assembly in 1971, the second Asian representative to chair the Assembly. The nation was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1974, 1995 and in 2007. In 1970 and again in 2000 Indonesia was elected for presidency of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the largest of the UN’s six organizations. It was VicePresident of the ECOSOC in 1969, 1999 and 2012. The country has been a member of the UN Human Rights Council since the Council was established in 2006, and in 2009 was chosen to become Vice-President of the Council. Besides being active in the UN organizations, Indonesia has contributed actively to the UN peacekeeping forces since 1957, sending troops as part of UN missions to the Congo, Vietnam, Iran, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kampuchea, the Philippines, and Lebanon.14 Since its inception, the UN has frequently been a target of criticism from different quarters. One important organizational aspect of the UN that has perennially come under attack has been the role of the Security Council.15 As an increasing number of countries play important roles on the world stage—whether economically, politically, or both—the limit of the number of Security Council members to five and their composition—the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France—have become increasingly anachronistic to many member-states.


In a speech addressed to the UN General Assembly in September 2012, President Yudhoyono emphasized the importance of UN Security Council reform in reflecting the reality of the 21st century: We have moved from the era of the Cold War to an era of warm peace. In this ‘warm peace’, the world remains stuck with an outdated international security architecture that still reflects 20th century circumstances; in contrast with the global economic architecture that has done much better to adjust to the 21st century.16 He went on to say: ‘This, of course, is what the UN is all about: to end the scourge of war, and to create a peaceful and equitable world order based on international cooperation.’17 Ending the ‘warm peace’ would require a new strategic mindset that would end the Cold War mentality still prevalent in the geopolitical landscape, including in the United Nations, ‘where rigid, dogmatic, zero-sum calculations sometimes still come into play’.18 At the opening of the fifth Bali Democracy Forum in November 2012, the President reiterated the need for Security Council reform: We need to ensure a harmony between the aspirations of the Security Council Members and members of the General Assembly. Such harmony requires the promotion of multilateralism and rejection of unilateralism.19 He went on to say that ‘an effective Security Council must be one that better represents contemporary global realities (and serves as) an intergovernmental forum for exchanging ideas and sharing experiences on democracy.’20 In pushing for a seat as a permanent member of the Security Council, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa stated: ‘If you are keen to ensure the Security Council is more representative, I can think of no better way than seeing Indonesia … become a permanent member.’21 Indonesia has been elected three times as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, a respectable record of Indonesia’s capability in exercising its role as a permanent member. Marty Natalegawa’s predecessor, Hassan Wirajuda, had also expressed similar confidence that Indonesia was deserving of a permanent UNSC membership. He argued that Indonesia had participated in more than 30 peacekeeping forces since 1957, and that this was in addition to Indonesia’s status as the world’s third largest democracy, the fourth largest population, and the largest Muslim country in the world.22 The appointment in 2012 of President Yudhoyono to co-chair a joint panel of experts with Prime Minister David Cameron and President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was also regarded as an important step


towards a higher profile in the UN. The panel consists of 26 international experts and is tasked with constructing strategies to promote post-MDG global development in alleviating poverty, achieving universal basic education, promoting women’s rights, reducing the child death rate, overcoming disease, and protecting the environment.23 Indonesia hosted the HighLevel Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda in Bali in March 2013 as a demonstration of its readiness to support international efforts to promote ‘a transformative, people centered and planetsensitive development agenda’.24 While calls for Security Council reform has had little impact, whether from Indonesia or otherwise, it has not prevented Indonesia from intensifying its peacekeeping involvement in the UN, at least in part to strengthen its claim for a seat as a permanent member of the UNSC. In 2013, Indonesia was the 16th largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping forces, totaling 1,815 personnel deployed in six UN operations. The increased involvement is an indication of the growing national confidence arising from recent economic growth and political stability. Increased resources have allowed the country greater scope to contribute to UN operations. A case in point was the establishment of a Peacekeeping Mission Education and Training Facility at the Indonesia Peace and Security Center (IPSC) in West Java in 2011.25 Indonesia and the Non-Aligned Movement The 1955 Bandung Conference inspired the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.26 At the Belgrade Summit in September of that year, 25 countries declared their commitment to maintain independence in the context of the Cold War between the Western and Eastern blocs. When Indonesia chaired NAM in 1992, there were 113 member-states. In 2012, NAM had 119 member-states, equivalent to two-thirds of the UN members. However, the Non-Aligned Movement represented diverse interests and political orientations that created serious obstacles to establishing consensus. Nevertheless, with the dramatic increase of membership the movement has been able to claim a continuing legitimacy. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relevance of the movement to the world’s post-Cold War politics came into question.27 Amidst skepticism concerning its significance, Indonesian leaders optimistically held to the conviction that NAM remained relevant in the contemporary world. Indonesia was elected to chair NAM in the year following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in December 1991. The first responsibility of the country was to assure world leaders that the movement remained pertinent in the absence of the Cold War. Under Indonesia’s leadership, NAM leaders agreed on the Jakarta Message and a Final Document of the Tenth Summit, with a realistic, inclusive and non-confrontational approach. These documents highlight the revised definition of NAM’s roles: from an


advocate of decolonization in the context of the West–East confrontation to the promotion of North–South dialogue, aimed at mitigating increasing polarization between developed and underdeveloped nations. The new NAM focuses more heavily on poverty alleviation, population policy and foreign debt. The Jakarta message clearly defines the new objectives of NAM: to increase constructive cooperation between nations, focus on economic cooperation, and increase South–South cooperation to develop the economic potential of member-states.28 President Suharto ended Indonesia’s term as chair in 1995 with a declaration of confidence in NAM. He delivered the speech at the Eleventh NAM Summit in Cartagena, Columbia on 18 October 1995: The tenth Summit Meeting of our Movement has indeed been a watershed. It established beyond doubt the continuing relevance of NonAlignment in the post-Cold War era as validated by subsequent events. Just as important, our Movement emerged from that Summit with a new orientation and a new approach in its relationships with the developed countries and with international institutions …29 After Suharto, Indonesia continued to maintain its optimistic vision of the significance of NAM to 21st century global and regional politics. President Yudhoyono and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa co-hosted the commemoration of the golden jubilee of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 2005 to demonstrate the significance of NAM. Indonesia also hosted the commemorative meeting of the 50th anniversary of NAM in Bali in 2011. At the Sixteenth Ministerial Conference and Commemorative Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali in 2011, President Yudhoyono highlighted the complex challenges of the 21st century while stressing the same theme as President Suharto several decades earlier: how to maintain NAM’s relevance in contemporary global politics. His speech defines three major roles that NAM can play to safeguard its relevance in the global agenda: Firstly, the Non-Aligned Movement must contribute to the achievement of global culture of peace and security. Secondly, our Movement must be a vigorous advocate of political development and social justice; the spread and strengthening of democratic values; and the achievement of good governance. And thirdly, our movement must be a force for equitable global prosperity—so that no nation will be left behind in economic development.30 Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, echoed the President in asserting that NAM should play the role of inspiring the maintenance of global peace.31


Indonesia and the Group of Twenty The Group of Twenty (G-20) was established in 1999 as a forum for finance ministers and central bank governors from major economies32 to deal with the global impact of the Asian Economic Crisis, and to prevent similar crises in the future. However, the group became prominent in 2008 when the first G-20 Leaders’ Summit was convened in Washington DC to stabilize the global economy in the aftermath of the American economic crisis.33 There have been eight Summit meetings since the first Washington Summit in 2008, each continuing to concentrate on global economic growth, job creation, and open trade.34 Indonesia’s engagement in the G-20 was a breakthrough in the history of Indonesian diplomacy. On one hand, its membership in the G-20 provides an opportunity to contribute to establishing a new form of global governance—an agenda with which NAM, the UN, and the industrialized countries harbor grave concerns. On the other hand, Indonesia needs to ensure that the new architecture of global governance benefits developing countries in order to assure both an international and a domestic public audience that Indonesia’s membership, engagement and compliance with commitments to the G-20 remain compatible with its commitment to other international institutions, such as the UN and NAM. NAM reflects the expectations Indonesia has for the G-20. As expressed by President Yudhoyono, the G-20 is a ‘civilization powerhouse’, not only an economic one: The G-20 for the first time accommodates all the major civilizations— not just Western countries, but also China, South Korea, India, South Africa, and others, including significantly, three countries with large Muslim populations: Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Indonesia. The G-20 is representative of a multi-civilization global community. Perhaps this is why the G-20 has been successful in arresting a global meltdown.35 At the same time, with its diplomatic history and tradition taken into account, Indonesia’s notion of membership in international institutions extends beyond the national focus. It also defines its international role in terms of representing the interests of the developing world: For long, within the Non-Aligned Movement as well as the Group of 77 (G77), Indonesia has regarded the needs and interests of developing nations as a priority in its global diplomacy. We pioneered the discussion on the right to development and exerted concerted efforts to promote its global support. Therefore, Indonesia with other emerging economies in the G-20 leads the way in the discussion on the issue of development in the G-20


forum. We promote financial inclusion in the forum, an issue which is increasingly critical to the economy of developing countries.36 At the 2012 Los Cabos Summit in Mexico, Indonesia joined with Mexico and Chile in the initiative for a reciprocal learning program on financial inclusion to increase access to credit for the poor. Indonesia also proposed the funding scheme for infrastructure development, a global infrastructure initiative aimed at overcoming bottlenecks in economic development.37 The initiative is in line with Indonesia’s major policy initiative on the Master Plan for Planning, Extension and Accelerating Economic Development (MP3EI). It is also compatible with the interests of emerging economies, an important matter given the frequent opposition to G-20 positions from civil society organizations (CSOs) both domestic and international.38

Challenges in implementing vision and policy Indonesia and challenges in UN reform Indonesia is just one of many countries calling for urgent UN reform, including UNSC reform. Steps toward UN reform face many difficulties, not least because it includes many members with disparate objectives. Proposals for the extension of permanent and non-permanent membership of the UNSC and the question of the abolition of the veto right remain subjects of continuing debate between UN member-states. There is little likelihood UNSC reform will occur unless the UNSC permanent members’ perspective on global security and peace maintenance changes. That perspective has altered little; the five permanent members uphold the view that global peace can be secured if the great powers are united: ‘the great powers had every reason to exercise the requirement of unanimity for high and noble purposes, because they would not want again to expend millions in wealth and lives in another war’.39 In their perspective, veto rights assist in exercising an unquestionable mandate to maintain global security. The amendment of the veto rights is thus regarded as a threat to world security; as the United States’ UN representative once argued, abolishing the veto would destroy the purpose of the Charter.40 Delegations of the Soviet Union, France and China to the UNSC share this perspective.41 Holding the right to veto, the five permanent members of the UNSC can abort any substantive and binding decision in accordance with Article 25. The Security Council also maintains other rights of veto: the UNGA’s recommendation for the UN General Secretary candidacy; the application for UN membership; and proposals for amendment of the UN Charter.42 It is consequently difficult to conceive of any likely reform of the UNSC and UN in the foreseeable future, even though the structure of the international


system has changed since the end of the Cold War and the members of the UN have expanded from 50 in the 1950s to 193 members. Another important constraint on efforts to reform the UN is the weight of vested interests behind proposals for UN reform. Proposals for UNSC reform are invariably embedded in the interests of the initiators. The socalled Group of Four (Germany, India, Brazil and Japan) has proposed a format that will secure UNSC permanent seats for those four nations. Changes in the five permanent members’ perspective will also be influenced by the pattern of relationships between the permanent members and the countries wishing to become UNSC permanent members. The Chinese government, for instance, will not consider the Group of Four change unless there is an accompanying change in the current Sino–Japan relationship. Given these constraints, President Yudhoyono is circumspect regarding the chances for reform: what Indonesia and other nations can do is to live with the so-called warm peace and attempt to lower the temperature of this warm peace, as expressed at the recent UNGA debate session.43 The post-Cold War NAM: A promoter of North-South dialogue and an actual political movement With its large membership, transforming NAM into an effective force entails challenges. The Non-Aligned Movement has been vocal in mobilizing support for worldwide recognition, but with little effect. Indonesia has played an active role in this advocacy. At the Summit in Teheran in August 2012 the head of the Indonesian delegation, Vice-President Boediono, called on NAM members to be more proactive in supporting Palestinian independence by taking action with regards to five pressing issues: First, how to respond effectively to Israeli illegal activities. Second, how to support and promote Palestinian bid [sic] for UN membership. Third, how to promote and support the institutional capacity building of Palestine. Fourth, how to support reconciliation among Palestinians; and finally, how to effectively engage the media to raise public awareness on the Palestinian cause.44 The Vice-President also pointed out the need for NAM to build an effective organization, arguing that ‘having 120 members means nothing if we do not have the power of collective influence, a power that we can only earn through hard work and a reputation for being reliable partners’.45 The Indonesian government’s position in NAM was the subject of speculation since President SBY delegated Vice-President Budiono to attend the Summit on his behalf. The absence of President Yudhoyono in the NAM Summit raised doubts about the extent to which the government prioritized NAM in Indonesian foreign policy.46


The G-20 as a civilization powerhouse Being active in the G-20 in shaping the global economic government requires that Indonesia complies with its own commitments as expressed at the G-20 Forum. The G-20 advocates an open economy as the best approach to promoting strong, sustainable and balanced economic growth. Indonesia’s membership can indicate support for the dominant G-20 members’ moves to institutionalize their liberal perspective on the international financial architecture and national economic structure. Similarly, Indonesia’s engagement has helped to strengthen the legitimacy of the main international financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as that of the market economy generally. Indonesian CSO activists have been very critical about this question since 2008.47 There is also a domestic constraint that limits the Indonesian government’s activities in the G-20 process. Compliance becomes a demanding task for the government because the ministerial offices responsible for implementing the commitments have coordination difficulties in dealing with broad non-financial issues. Inter-ministerial coordination is necessary, particularly since the G-20 included the development agenda in addition to the existing financial and banking agenda. Compliance is also difficult if it involves political processes that necessitate broad domestic consensus and new national policy implementation. For example, the Indonesian government eventually had to cancel its commitment to phase out its inefficient fossil fuel subsidy because there emerged nation-wide resistance against the plan in 2012. The commitment to phase out the subsidy was expressed at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh (2009). However, the Indonesian government took four more years before it managed to reduce fuel subsidies in mid-2013.

Indonesia and international institutions: Beyond symbolism This chapter has described Indonesia’s increasing engagement in three international institutions: the UN, the NAM, and the G-20, as demonstration of confidence in its diplomatic role on the global stage. As Hurrell48 points out, foreign policy can derive from an ‘embedded guiding narrative’, an ideology born out of a country’s history shaped from domestic and international trends. As this paper illustrates, Indonesia’s guiding narrative has been its ‘independent and active’ foreign policy—the legacy of the first Vice-President Mohammad Hatta—and the 1955 Bandung Conference, which became a symbol of that policy. That narrative has guided Indonesia’s policy in its involvement in the NAM, the UN, and the G-20, for example, in its role in re-establishing ties between NAM and the industrialized countries in its calls for Security Council reform; in its UN peacekeeping activities; and in joining coalitions in the G-20 to reorient the Group toward development concerns.


And if, as Hurrell also suggests, ‘sovereignty may be increasingly defined not by the power to insulate one’s state from external influences but by the power to participate effectively in international institutions of all kinds’,49 then history suggests that Indonesia has not acquitted itself poorly in this respect. Whether it can continue to do so in the future raises a pivotal question: are economic success and social per capita magnitude in terms of global rankings—as typified by the mantra of being the third-largest democracy, the largest Muslim country, the fourth largest population, and the third Asian economic giant—sufficient to shape the direction and agenda of the international institutions? Assuming the necessary link between internal national strength and international power, Indonesia will face both external and internal constraints to the translation of its power into influence in world politics. Internally domestic issues that require attention include rampant corruption, communal and sectarian tensions, and poor law enforcement, all within an evolving democracy.50 An economy based on commodities is also vulnerable to global economic uncertainty. Externally, Indonesia faces greater powers unwilling to respond to demands for fundamental and progressive changes in international institutions. Indonesia has repeatedly expressed its idealistic views on the roles of international institutions as agencies that can deliver shared benefits for both industrialized and emerging countries. Calling on other nations to realize its vision of fair and just global governance will no longer be sufficient. To emerge as a middle power, Indonesia will have to play an increasingly assertive, broader role in international institutions: to be a subject, as envisioned by Mohammad Hatta, and not an object. To do so, political and economic strengths emanating from the Indonesian domestic front will be needed in order to strengthen Indonesia’s systemic influence in the NAM, the UN, and the G-20, or indeed in future international institutions. As Ruslan Abdulgani, former foreign minister, said in 1957, ‘Our foreign policy must be in accordance with our own internal strength.’51

Notes 1 ‘Non-Aligned Movement’, Indonesian Foreign Ministry website, available at http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=MultilateralCooperation &IDP=3&P=Multilateral&l=en 2 Ramesh Thakur, ‘The United Nations in Global Governance: Rebalancing Organized Multilateralism for Current and Future Challenges’, 65th General Assembly-Thematic Debate on UN in Global Governance, p. 2 available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/initiatives/GlobalGovernance/Thakhur_ GA_Thematic_Debate_on_UN_in_GG.pdf 3 Daniel Beland and Mitchell A. Orenstein, ‘International Organizations as Policy Actors: An Ideational Approach’, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2165514.l, p. 3.

Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir 189 4 See for example, Edward C. Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers, No. 1, 2003 and Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations: Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013 (eds) Lydia Swart and Estelle Perry, Center of UN Reform Education, New York, September 2013. 5 The Declaration of the XVI Summit of Heads of State or Government of the NonAligned Movement, 30–31 August 2012, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran available at http://www.voltairenet.org/article175765.html 6 Elson, R. E., ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the World’, in Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Anthony Reid (ed.) Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2012. 7 The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia: as amended by the First Amendment of 1999, the Second Amendment of 2000, the Third Amendment of 2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002, available at www.embassyofindonesia.org/about/pdf/IndonesianConstitution.pdf 8 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Speech before The Council on World Affairs (ICWA), Jakarta, 19 May 2005 available at http://www.presidenri.go.id/ index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html 9 Ibid. 10 Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China (People’s Republic), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen. 11 The principles are (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small, (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, (6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers and Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries, (7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country, (8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, (9) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation, (10) Respect for justice and international obligations. 12 Naoko Shimazu, ‘Diplomacy as Theatre: Recasting the Bandung Conference of 1955 as Cultural History’, Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series No. 164, October 2011. 13 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia: Building Norms and Consensus on the World Stage’, Global Asia, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2013, available at http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/539/indonesia-building-norms-and-consensus-on-theworld-stage.html 14 Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, ‘Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa’, http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=MultilateralCooperation& IDP=12&P=Multilateral&l=id; Indonesia Permanent Mission to the United States New York, ‘Indonesia and the United Nations’, http://www.indonesiamissionny.org/menu_atas/a2_indo_un/indonesia_unitednations.php

190 Indonesia and International Institutions 15 Richard Butler, ‘Reform of the United Security Council’, Penn State Journal of Law & International Affair, Vol. 1, No. 1, available at http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/ vol1/iss1/2, 2012, pp. 23–39; See also Sahar Okhovat, ‘The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Reform’, CPACS Working Paper No. 15/1, December 2011, available at http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/ working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf 16 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Speech at the General Debate of the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 25 September 2012 available at http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2012/09/26/1970.html 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 President SBY’s speech delivered at the opening of the Fifth Bali Democracy Forum in Bali 8 November 2012; ‘SBY Reiterates Urgency for UN Security Council Reform’, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/sby-reiterates-urgencyfor-un-security-council-reform/555029 20 Ibid. 21 Mustaqim and Abdul Khalik RI, ‘Optimistic about UNSC Permanent Seat’, The Jakarta Post, 28 December 2010, available from http://www.thejakartapost. com/news/2010/12/28/ri-optimistic-about-unsc-permanent-seat.html 22 Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, Press Release, No. 63/PR/IX/2004, Minister of Foreign Affairs speech, delivered at the 59th UN General Assembly, 27 September 2004, available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ ga/59/statements/indoeng040927.pdf 23 See Communiqué Meeting of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post2015 Development Agenda in Bali, Indonesia, 27 March 2013, available from http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/Final%20Communique%20Bali.pdf 24 Ibid. 25 Natalie Sambhi, ‘Indonesia’s Push for Peacekeeping Operations’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 17 September 2013, available at http://www. aspistrategist.org.au/indonesias-push-for-peacekeeping-operations/ 26 The initiators of the formation of NAM were President Soekarno (Indonesia), President Joseph Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), President Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), President Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egypt) and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (India). Among the five, only Tito was not at the Bandung conference. 27 Antoinette Handley, ‘Non-Aligned Against What? South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement’, SAIIA Report No. 10, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1998, p. 1. 28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, ‘Non Aligned Movement’, available from http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=Multilateral Cooperation&IDP=3&P=Multilateral&l=en 29 President Soeharto’s Address as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement of the inaugural session of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Cartagena Columbia, 18 October 1995. 30 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s speech delivered at the inaugural address at the 16th Ministerial Conference and Commemorative Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali, 25 May 2011. 31 Marty Natalegawa, ‘GNB Harus Jadi Inspirator Perdamaian Dunia’, available from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/global/12/05/10/m3s9l0marty-gnb-harus-jadi-inspirator-perdamaian-dunia.

Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir 191 32 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. 33 Yulius Purwadi Hermawan et al. (2011) The Role of Indonesia in the G-20: Background, Role and Objectives of Indonesia’s Membership (Jakarta: FES, 2011), pp. 4–10. 34 ‘A Short History of the Group of Twenty’, 3 September 2013 available at http://g20.org.thebricspost.com/a-short-history-of-the-group-oftwenty/#.UwA_SIVQM-M 35 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2009) ‘Towards Harmony among Civilizations’, speech delivered at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Boston 29 September 2009, http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/ eng/pidato/2009/09/30/1228.html 36 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2012) ‘Indonesia’s Role as a Regional and Global Actor’, speech at the 2nd Annual Address at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 2 November 2012 available at https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/ president-yudhoyonos-speech-at-our-annual-address/ 37 Maria Monica Wihardja, ‘Indonesia and the G-20: A Door Left Half Open’, East Asia Forum, 29 June 2012, available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/ 06/29/Indonesia-and-the-g20-a-door-left-half-open/ 38 Hermawan et al. Op. cit., pp. 99–127. 39 As expressed by the representative of the United States, at San Francisco, quoted in Richard Butler A. C. ‘Reform of the United Nations Security Council’, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, vol. 1, issue 1, 2012, p. 28, available from http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=jlia 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., pp. 28–29. 42 Ibid. 43 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Speech at the General Debate of the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly, op. cit. 44 Statement by H. E. Dr. Boediono Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia at XVI Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement available at http://wapresri.go.id/index/preview/pidato/158 45 Ibid. 46 The Summit was attended by 27 presidents, 2 kings and emirs, 7 prime ministers, 9 vice presidents, 2 parliament spokesmen and 5 special envoys. 47 Hermawan et al., ‘The Role of Indonesia in G-20’, pp. 99–127. 48 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions’, in Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States, Andrew Hurrell, Andrew F. Cooper, Guadalupe Gonzalez Gonzalez, Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes, Srini Sitaraman (eds), Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 2000, p. 1. 49 Ibid., p. 4. 50 Rizal Sukma, ‘Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities’, in Indonesia Rising, The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Anthony Reid (ed.) (ISEAS: Singapore, 2012), pp. 82–90. 51 R. E. Elson, op. cit., p. 184.


Bibliography Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, ‘Indonesia: Building Norms and Consensus on the World Stage’, Global Asia, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2013, available at http://www. globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/539/indonesia-building-norms-and-consensuson-the-world-stage.html Beland, Daniel and Mitchell A. Orenstein, ‘International Organizations as Policy Actors: An Ideational Approach’, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2165514.l, p. 3. Boediono (2012) ‘Statement by H.E. Dr. Boediono Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia at XVI Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement’, http://wapresri.go.id/index/preview/pidato/158 Butler, Richard (2012) ‘Reform of the United Security Council’, Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 1: 1, 23–39, http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol1/iss1/2 Communiqué Meeting of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda in Bali, Indonesia, 27 March 2013, available from http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/Final%20Communique%20Bali.pdf Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (2002), 1945: as amended by the First Amendment of 1999, the Second Amendment of 2000, the Third Amendment of 2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002, www.embassyofindonesia.org/about/ pdf/IndonesianConstitution.pdf Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, Press Release, No. 63/ PR/IX/2004, Minister of Foreign Affairs speech, delivered at the 59th UN General Assembly, 27 September 2004, available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/ statements/indoeng040927.pdf Elson, R. E. (2012) ‘Problems of Identity and Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the World’, in Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Anthony Reid (ed.), Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 2012. Handley, Antoinette (1998) ‘Non-Aligned Against What? South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement,’ The South African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Report No. 10, Report on a conference held on 10 March 1998 Jan Smuts House Johannesburg. Hermawan, Yulius Purwadi et al. (2011) The Role of Indonesia in the G-20: Background, Role an Objectives of Indonesia’s Membership (Jakarta: FES). Hurrell, Andrew (2000) ‘Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions’, in Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States, Andrew Hurrell, Andrew F. Cooper, Guadalupe Gonzalez Gonzalez, Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes and Srini Sitaraman (eds) , No. 244 (Washington, D.C.: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), March, 1–11. Luck, Edward C., Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers, No. 1, 2003 and Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations: Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013 (eds) Lydia Swart and Estelle Perry, Center of UN Reform Education, New York, September 2013. Mustaqim and Abdul Khalik, RI, ‘Optimistic about UNSC Permanent Seat’, The Jakarta Post, 28 December 2010, available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2010/12/28/ri-optimistic-about-unsc-permanent-seat.html Natalegawa, Marty, ‘GNB Harus Jadi Inspirator Perdamaian Dunia’, available from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/global/12/05/10/m3s9l0-martygnb-harus-jadi-inspirator-perdamaian-dunia

Yulius P. Hermawan and Ahmad D. Habir 193 ‘Non-Aligned Movement’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, http://www.deplu .go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=MultilateralCooperation&IDP=3&P= Multilateral&l=en Okhovat, Sahar (2011) ‘The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Reform’, CPACS Working Paper, 15: 1, December, http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_ conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United States, New York (accessed 2014) ‘Indonesia and the United Nations’, Indonesia Permanent Mission to the United States, New York, http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/menu_atas/ a2_indo_un/Indonesia_unitednations.php ‘Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa’ (United Nations) Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia), http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/ IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=MultilateralCooperation&IDP=12&P=Multilateral&l=id Sambhi, Natalie (2013) ‘Indonesia’s Push for Peacekeeping Operations’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 17 September, http://www.aspistrategist. org.au/indonesias-push-for-peacekeeping-operations/ Shimazu, Naoko (2011) ‘Diplomacy as Theatre: Recasting the Bandung Conference of 1955 as Cultural History’, Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series, 164, October. ‘A Short history of the Group of Twenty’ (2013) BRICS Post, 3 September, http://G20.org.thebricspost.com/a-short-history-of-the-group-of-twenty/ #.UwA_SIVQM-M Suharto (1995) ‘Suharto, President: Address as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement of the inaugural session of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Cartagena Columbia’, 18 October. Sukma, Rizal (2012) ‘Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities’, in Indonesia Rising, The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Anthony Reid (ed.) (Singapore: ISEAS). Thakur, Ramesh (n.d.) ‘The United Nations in Global Governance: Rebalancing Organized Multilateralism for Current and Future Challenges’, http://www. un.org/en/ga/president/65/initiatives/GlobalGovernance/Thakur_GA_Thematic_ Debate_on_UN_in_GG.pdf The Declaration of the XVI Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, 30-31 August 2012, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran available at http://www.voltairenet.org/article175765.html Wihardja, Maria Monica (2012) ‘Indonesia and the G-20: A Door Left Half Open’, East Asia Forum, 29 June, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/29/Indonesiaand-the-G20-a-door-left-half-open/ Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2005) Speech before The Council on World Affairs (ICWA), Jakarta, 19 May, http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/ 05/19/332.html Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2009) ‘Towards Harmony among Civilizations’, Speech before The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 29 September, http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2009/05/30/1228.html Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2011) ‘Fighting for Peace, Justice and Prosperity in the 21st Century’, Speech delivered at the inaugural address at the 16th Ministerial Conference and Commemorative meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali 25 May, http://www.setkab.go.id/berita-1836-fighting-for-peace-justice-and-prosperity-in-the-21st-century.html

194 Indonesia and International Institutions Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2012) ‘Speech at the General Debate of the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 25 September 2012’, http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2012/09/26/1970.html Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2012) ‘Opening Statement at the Bali Democracy Forum V, Bali, 8 November’, http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/ pidato/2012/11/08/1999.html Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2012) ‘Indonesia’s Role as Regional and Global Actor’, Speech at the Wilton Park Annual Address, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 November, www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2012/11/02/2001.html

10 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir

The Australia–Indonesia relationship has often been characterized by both sides as a roller-coaster ride.1 As Colin Brown put it, ‘… nothing so characterizes the phenomenon [of Australia–Indonesia relations] as a car on a roller-coaster. Any rise is followed inevitably by a fall. The ride is never boring, and in a bizarre kind of way it is predictable. But sometimes you might wish for a little more stability, a few more moments of calm.’2 However, as argued by Jamie Mackie,3 looking back at the history of Australia–Indonesia, it was in fact quite stable for long periods of time, even though fluctuating sharply at certain points, such as the early high point in 1948–49 when Australia supported the independence of Indonesia against the Dutch, and a low point during Indonesia’s Konfrontasi (confrontation) during 1963–66 against the United Kingdom and Malaysia. Nonetheless, since the post-New Order reformasi (reform) period, and its relatively high turnover of presidents, fluctuations in the relationship have been more evident. Meanwhile, throughout the bilateral relationship, Indonesia has for the most part been viewed by both major Australian parties to be the weaker partner. The present relationship is now shifting as Indonesia is growing into a regional power, which will change the future dynamics of the relationship. At 244.5 million people, Indonesia is now ten times more populous than Australia. Moreover, Indonesia’s middle class is larger than Australia’s entire population and Indonesia’s economy is now over 30 per cent larger than Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Purchasing Power Parity terms (PPP). While scholars continue to debate whether Indonesia will rise to become a major power,4 for the first time in the history of the relationship, Indonesia is almost destined to become the more powerful partner in the Indonesia–Australia relationship. Importantly, the separation of Australia’s mainland from Indonesia by only 240 kilometers of ocean means that the two countries share strong security interdependencies. However, such proximity also delivers added efficiencies and potential for future economic relations. 195

196 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential

While much analysis has focused on specific relational problems, such as the situation in West Papua, there has been very little recent literature on the broader relationship. Given these factors, this chapter assesses the current state of affairs in the relationship and the significant challenges that need to be addressed in the future. Consequently, the first section examines developments concerning cooperation in the political and security sphere and some pivotal political developments that have challenged such cooperation—including the actions of Australian intelligence agencies as revealed through the unauthorized disclosure of classified material by whistleblower Edward Snowden. At the outset, this section is also contextualized through a brief synopsis of historical trends in the relationship. Some of the causal dynamics behind these issues are examined in the second section in the context of the socio-cultural and economic dimensions of the relationship. The section demonstrates that a lack of mutual understanding and affinity between the people of the two countries has been compounded by weak trade links, together with a lack of investment by Australia in Asian education at all levels—primary, high school, and tertiary—and in all fields— history, culture, politics, and language. The chapter concludes by arguing that as the democratically elected leaders of both countries are influenced by mass public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy, addressing the socio-cultural and trade dimensions will be critical for the long-term future of the relationship. The conclusion also examines the main implications of this analysis for future policy formulation.

The evolution of political and security relations Often overlooked in the current erratic period of Australia–Indonesia relations is that the first 60 years of the relationship was stable despite some relatively brief interruptions to what were largely cooperative and mutually beneficial relations. Important exceptions include Indonesia’s Konfrontasi against Malaysia during the years 1963–66, and the 1999 referendum and subsequent independence of Timor Leste. Consequently, Jamie Mackie5 has depicted four distinct phases in the relationship. The first phase concerned Indonesia’s struggle for independence between 1945 and 1949, which was ‘warm’ due to Australia’s support for Indonesia’s aspirations for independence. In the second phase, between 1950 and 1966, relations deteriorated as a consequence of West Irian, Konfrontasi, and the associated polarization between the ideological perspectives of President Sukarno and Prime Minister Menzies—the first being the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) while the latter was a staunch supporter of the Western bloc. The White Australia policy during this period also undermined relations. Third, the long period of the Suharto era, 1966–98, saw improved relations, except over East Timor, and more incidentally the spat over David Jenkins’ Sydney Morning Herald article in April 1986 on the Suharto family, which angered

Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir 197

Suharto. However, the post-Suharto era has seen sharp fluctuations in the relations as Indonesia struggled to recover from the worst effects of the Asian Economic Crisis. Historical shifts in the nature of the bilateral relationship can be seen, and can be better understood, in the context of a search to consolidate a national identity in Indonesia and Australia as each country interacts with the world. In Australia, the search has spanned from its earliest time as a colonial outpost of the British Empire to an alliance-based relationship with a new ‘great and powerful friend’6 and, in more recent decades, the additional debate about the extent to which Australia should be a part of Asia and the ‘Asian century’.7 Within a shorter historical span, Indonesia has undergone sharper shifts, from the obtainment of independence from the Dutch and the establishment of a constitutional democracy to Sukarno’s authoritarian ‘Guided Democracy’—which leaned toward the Eastern Bloc—to a shift towards the Western Bloc during Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime. Moreover, since the fall of Suharto in 1999, the country went through the reformasi period of rapid reforms to become a burgeoning democracy. Yet, in the international relations of both countries, there have been underlying themes and perspectives that have not changed over time. For Indonesia, there have been significant nationalistic forces and a continued commitment to non-alignment, while Australia has retained its commitment to a close alliance with the United States (US) and, recognizing the geo-economic realities of a growing Asia, has also sought constructive engagement with the region.8 A shift in these national perspectives could bring about a strong foundation for a stable and, perhaps, even closer relationship. For Indonesia, a positive change would be a less insular and reactive form of nationalism that would be more open to accepting and meeting international political and economic challenges. It could also entail increased recognition that attention to domestic conditions would foster a stronger foreign policy. For example, improved economic and human rights conditions in Papua would strengthen the level of acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty in Papua by the Australian public.9 Meanwhile, as argued by Richard Woolcott, ‘… Australia needs to change its national psyche, focused less on our 20th century links with the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States and more on Asian neighbors sharing the region in which we live’.10 Despite some historically alarmist voices in Australia’s public sphere,11 and some correspondingly alarmist sentiments in Indonesia, 12 neither Indonesia nor Australia pose a traditional security threat for the other. Rather, both the academic and policy communities of Australia have increasingly recognized Indonesia’s strategic role as a buffer against future aggression and that, more broadly, ‘a positive relationship with Indonesia contributes profoundly to Australia’s overall security’—a


contention that was explicitly recognized in Australia’s ‘National Security Strategy’ and ‘Asian Century White Paper’.13 In this vein, Australia and Indonesia negotiated the Lombok Treaty in 2006 (ratified in 2008), which commits the two countries to support each other’s unity and territorial integrity and to refrain from the threat or use of force. This has since been reinforced by the September 2012 Defense Cooperation Arrangement, which provides, in the words of then Minister for Defense Stephen Smith, a ‘formal framework for practical Defense cooperation under the Lombok Treaty’.14 Moreover, the relationship was elevated to a ‘strategic partnership’ in March 2010.15 As a partial consequence of these developments, by 2013 the extent of bilateral defense engagement had reached its highest level in over 15 years. Examples include a third Coordinated Maritime Patrol of the joint maritime borders by the Indonesian and Australian navies; Indonesia’s firsttime participation in the multi-nation Exercise Pitch Black;16 the first bilateral peacekeeping exercise (May 2013);17 the strengthening of searchand-rescue coordination;18 and continued officer and English language training through the Bilateral Defense Cooperation Program.19 Following the devastating 2004 tsunami, Australia’s military worked alongside Indonesia’s military in the emergency relief effort, and the Australian government responded through the provision of more than $1 billion in aid. More recently, Australia donated four C-130H Hercules transport aircraft to Indonesia and, in April 2013, Australia agreed to sell a further five of these aircraft on a discounted basis.20 Discussions have been held concerning ‘possible defense industry cooperation’ and Jane’s Defense Weekly suggested that this is likely to include the joint development of patrol boats in addition to Australian exports of naval systems and military electronics.21 Critically, should Indonesia continue to ascend, the next few decades will witness a paradigm shift in its capacity not only to participate in joint exercises, but also to lead them. Heightened collaboration between the two countries has been rendered all the more important due to the shifting strategic order of Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. The future of this order is becoming increasingly uncertain due to the continuation of various disputes, such as the South China Sea, and an associated increase to great power rivalry—for instance, between China and the US; China and Japan; China and India; and Russia and the US.22 Consequently, Australia and Indonesia have sought to hedge against such rivalry, and Australia has particularly benefited from Indonesia’s strong support of its inclusion in the East Asia Summit (EAS). While there are a number of limitations to this institution, the 18-member EAS is now the premier leaders’ forum in which to discuss a broad range of security issues.23 Moreover, Indonesia is central to Australia’s diplomacy through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and sound relations will be mutually beneficial for multilateral


diplomacy in APEC, the Group of Twenty (G-20), and various United Nations forums.24 While the political systems in Indonesia and in Australia are far from perfect, the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia has led to a convergence of certain social and political values. For example, Indonesia now has a multi-party presidential system with a parliament that exercises strong checks and balances, a flourishing civil society and a highly active media.25 Meanwhile, the country’s political elite—particularly within the President’s office, Foreign Ministry (Kemlu), and segments of the military26—have also firmly embraced Indonesia’s new identity as a democratic nation. This identity has significantly affected the nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the political and social values that implicitly underpin it. Nonetheless, as articulated in a previous chapter by Avery Poole, and in line with threelevel game theory,27 the consolidation of democratic institutions and values also presents a number of challenges as the political leadership now have to take into account the interests and perspectives of a broader range of actors and social movements. For example, the many different parties in the parliament represent a range of political and ideological perspectives. Indonesia’s nationalistsecular parties include Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDIP), The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) and the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD). The nationalist-religious parties include the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) and the Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB, while the Islamic parties include the Prosperous and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and the Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). The president now has to take these differing perspectives into account when conducting foreign policy, including Indonesia–Australia relations,28 and the interests of this complex mix of minority parties can just as easily detract from or contribute to rational and optimal foreign policy decisions. The many autonomous religious, social, cultural, economic, and political organizations in Indonesia make for a civil society in Indonesia that also wields influence in the conduct of foreign policy. In this respect, the government regularly consults with two influential Islamic organizations—the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, established before the independence of Indonesia—particularly on issues related to the Islamic world. Other civil society organizations, such as think-tanks, are also able to influence views related to foreign policy issues, such as bilateral relations. While the Indonesian media now enjoys a freedom that is, in many respects, equal to that of Western democracies, a significant number of Indonesians are highly critical of the media’s quality and neutrality. Nonetheless, the country’s media outlets reflect a range of differing


viewpoints that the government also takes into account when faced with issues concerning Jakarta’s relationship with Canberra. For example, the ever present sense of nationalism makes it difficult for the government to be seen to be lenient in its dealings with Australia. Consequently, this has influenced the Indonesian government’s strong response to the wiretapping case, which included, for an extended period, the recall of the Indonesian ambassador to Australia in November 2013.29 Australia’s international relations have been similarly influenced by domestic politics and the different orientations of the Liberal and Labor Parties.30 For example, Maley traces the policy on asylum-seekers of the current Abbot Coalition government to the rise of the xenophobic One Nation political party led by Pauline Hanson. The party, established in 1997, peaked during the 1998 federal elections when it received over one million votes in the Senate and 8.43 per cent of the votes in the House of Representatives.31 Shortly after the party declined, then Prime Minister John Howard captured the vote of former One Nation supporters by exploiting the issue of irregular migration, and this contributed to his electoral victory in 2001.32 Tony Abbot also manipulated the same issue with his promise to ‘stop the boats’ which, in turn, contributed to his party winning the 2013 federal election. His subsequent refusal to apologize for the alleged wiretapping program in Indonesia was influenced, in part, by his attention to the views of his right-wing constituency.33 More positively, the consolidation of democracy has had an impact on Indonesia’s interests and priorities in that today Indonesia is a like-minded partner in many regional and global affairs, including concerns of rising strategic competition, environmental activism (during the Rudd and Gillard governments), the promotion of interfaith dialogue, transnational crime and irregular migration (for example, the Bali Process), the promotion of democracy and human rights (for instance, the Bali Democracy Forum), and Jakarta’s active and constructive diplomacy over highly volatile issues such as Iran.34 The extent to which an intersection of interests has emerged was exemplified when the Indonesian government requested that Australia ask the United States, on its behalf, whether it would be interested in receiving a battalion of Indonesian peacekeepers in Iraq. While President Bush imprudently declined the offer, Jakarta’s approach provides an example of how Australia’s alliance with the United States has been interpreted, in some quarters, as expedient for Indonesia.35 Jakarta had also been appreciative of broader Australian support for closer relations between the United States and Indonesia, a strategy that Australia had promoted based on Indonesia’s rise as a democracy and its stature as the world’s largest Muslim nation.36 These developments reflect the fact that, in practice, it has been difficult for Indonesia to adhere to its official policy of non-alignment.37 While Indonesia has also been pursuing closer relations with China,38 progress in the security sphere will be difficult so


long as its democratic identity renders its values and interests more compatible with Western and other democratic powers. Cooperation over a range of non-traditional security issues has also become increasingly strong. For example, Australia views cooperation with Indonesia on terrorism as vital to the security of its people at home and abroad, while Indonesia shares similar perceptions together with concern over the nexus between terrorist acts and anti-government and insurgency movements.39 Consequently, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Counterterrorism—with cooperation between Australia’s Special Air Services (SAS) and Indonesia’s Detachment 88 within Kopassus—was proposed just a few months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and was reaffirmed within days of the October 2002 Bali bombings.40 Counter-terrorist (CT) cooperation continues to be consolidated and there are now ‘wide ranging partnerships’ between Indonesian and Australian agencies in intelligence, defense, transport and border security, CT financing, criminal justice, legal framework development, and law enforcement.41 In the case of law enforcement, a crucial development has been the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). Here, Australia’s Federal Police have been working alongside Indonesia’s police in the development and provision of intensive law enforcement training regarding terrorism and transnational crime. By 2012, the center had trained more than 13,000 officials from 618 countries through 540 courses.42 The increased capacity of Indonesia to combat both domestic and international terrorist threats is reflected in the fact that there has been more than 800 terrorist-related arrests and over 600 convictions since 2002.43 The continuation of Australia’s comprehensive support through inter-agency collaboration and aid—discussed below—will further strengthen Indonesia’s capacity to respond to these challenges in the future. Notwithstanding these positive achievements, much more needs to be done before the two countries’ political relations can reach their full potential. Here, Sabam Siagian and Endy Bayuni argue that Australia’s own efforts have not been reciprocated by Jakarta, and this is demonstrated by the absence of a comprehensive policy on its relationship with Canberra together with its tendency to take Australia for granted until intermittent incidents when flashpoints occur.44 Aside from the socio-cultural dimension discussed below, this tendency has also been reinforced by Indonesia’s preoccupation with nation-building, a historical focus on security to the north and, in more recent times, increased competition by the great powers who have been vying for influence and improved relations with an ascending Indonesia.45 Nonetheless, Australia’s role in East Timor did demonstrate, for better or worse, the significance of Australia for Indonesia, and there have been subsequent signs that Jakarta is starting to adopt a more proactive role in the relationship.


A further problem concerns the nature of political discourse in Australia. During the Howard government, some particularly provocative announcements included Australia’s self-proclaimed right to launch pre-emptive strikes against terrorists in other countries, and the projection of a 1,000 mile Maritime Identification Zone into Indonesian territorial waters.46 The subsequent Labor government made comparably provocative announcements, such as Prime Minister Gillard’s determination that East Timor would process asylum-seekers; the later ‘PNG solution’; trade issues including bans on logging and cattle exports;47 and the stationing of US marines in Darwin;48 Foreign Minister Carr’s comments concerning the killing of activists in West Papua;49 and Prime Minister Rudd’s statement that the opposition’s rhetoric to ‘turn back the boats’ could result in ‘conflict’.50 Given the 2013 Australian Federal election, a further challenge concerns the perception of some Indonesians that, in the words of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry website, the Australian Labor Party ‘tends to be more liberal and hold a positive view toward Indonesia’.51 While the socio-cultural dimension is addressed in the next section, a lack of understanding together with a perceived lack of consultation and respect for Australia’s northern neighbor has contributed to many bilateral flare-ups as well as other problems raised in this section. Thus, one government official in Jakarta referred to the announcement that Timor Leste would process asylum-seekers, stating that the Australian government should know that Timor Leste does not agree to arrangements such as this without first consulting Indonesia.52 Given these challenges, the combined leadership of both President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa had been a fortunate coincidence, as both demonstrated a sense of affinity with Australia and actively pursued closer relations.53 For example, at the inaugural annual leader’s forum, President Yudhoyono quashed a diplomatic row when he declared that Prime Minister Julia Gillard had convinced him that the stationing of US marines in Darwin did not represent a problem for Indonesia.54 The intervention by President Yudhoyono demonstrates the benefits of increased dialogue and consultation. Cognizant of this, Jakarta and Canberra have also institutionalized the annual Australia–Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministers’ 2+2 meeting, while an annual Law and Justice Ministers’ meeting has also been proposed.55 At the second 2+2 meeting, Indonesia’s Defense Minister reflected on recent consultation by Australia over its 2013 Defense White Paper and made a corresponding pledge to consult with Australia in the development of Indonesia’s own White Paper and a delegation was subsequently sent to Canberra in November 2013.56 Furthermore, from 2007 to 2012, over 130 ministerial visits took place between the two countries.57 Jakarta also appears to be devoting more energy to the relationship, with a recent example being its April 2013 initiation of the Australia–Indonesia High Level Committee.58


Nonetheless, the relationship continues to sit on fragile pillars. The causal dynamics behind such fragility were particularly evident in the wake of a series of leaks by whistleblower Edward Snowden about intelligence intercepts by the Australian Signals Directorate—formerly the Defense Signals Directorate. Between October and November 2013 there were widespread media reports concerning intelligence gathering via Australian embassies and consulates in Asia, as well as a specific incident of phone tapping of Indonesian officials by Canberra and Washington at the 2007 United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Bali.59 Then, the ABC and the Guardian published leaked intelligence concerning a sustained campaign to monitor the phone activities of President Yudhoyono, his wife, and several ministers.60 While Indonesia has likely accepted and benefited from Australian intelligence during the course of the aforementioned cooperation against terrorist threats, the Australian government failed to explain how monitoring the wife of Indonesia’s President, for example, could be justified on the grounds of ‘Australian security’ or ‘Australia’s national interest’. The disconcerting nature of the possible motives behind some Australian intelligence intercepts was reinforced during a further scandal in February 2014 when leaked documents indicated that Australia offered to share information with Washington about a trade dispute it had with Jakarta. Foreign Minister Natalegawa responded that he found ‘it mindboggling, … how can I reconcile discussions about shrimp and the impact on Australian security?’61 Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott did publicly apologize over revelations that Australian naval and coast guard vessels had ‘unintentionally’ entered Indonesian waters.62 However, the advanced nature of modern global positioning systems calls into question the veracity of the Prime Minister’s statement and this, together with the manner by which the Australian government has responded to the nature of its intelligence intercepts from Indonesia, failed to satisfy Jakarta. As a consequence of these developments, Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia was recalled on 19 November 2013 and Jakarta formally suspended military and law enforcement cooperation a day later.63 However, in reality the impact on bilateral cooperation has been much broader, as most Indonesian ministries and agencies delayed action and awaited further developments before investing resources in the advancement of cooperation with Canberra.64 A resolution to the impasse had been hamstrung by Australia’s highly politicized and populist policies concerning irregular migration and this, in turn, has been interdependent with the unnecessary but deliberate securitization of irregular migration. The causal dynamics underpinning these challenges are linked to the weak socio-cultural and trade linkages between the two countries—the subject of the next section below. At the same time, and aside from Jakarta’s legitimate anger, domestic outrage, expressed over the wiretapping, including demonstrations, the


burning of the Australian and US flags, and demands to expel Australian diplomats, contributed to the Indonesian government’s reluctance to improve relations too quickly.65 Nonetheless, as a goodwill gesture designed to steady the relationship, Jakarta returned the Indonesian ambassador to Canberra on the face-saving basis that plans for a code of conduct regarding future intelligence gathering activities had moved forward sufficiently to warrant his return.66 Nonetheless, the episode soon provided a reminder of significant domestic constraints when the return of the ambassador was met with criticism from the parliamentary commission overseeing foreign affairs (Commission One) that, in contrast to the government’s prior consultation, it had not been consulted regarding the decision.67 Critically, President Yudhoyono’s final term in office concluded in October following the July 2014 round of Presidential elections. Interlocutors from both government and academia, in Canberra and in Jakarta, have generally all agreed that the new leadership is unlikely to devote anywhere near as much energy to improving—or even maintaining—relations with Australia.68

Causal dynamics: The roles of perceptions, knowledge, and trade The earlier-mentioned reference to a more compatible set of political and social identities is not meant to imply the emergence of a collective identity.69 Given the numerous sources of tension outlined in the previous section, such an outcome has yet to be consolidated between the two countries’ political elite and, taking into account the lack of mutual understanding currently extant, not even the seeds of a collective identity have been sown at the societal level. Both countries are well aware of this problem: the associated challenges were aptly articulated by President Yudhoyono when he addressed both houses of the Australian parliament in 2010: … the most persistent problem in our relations is the persistence of ageold stereotypes—misleading, simplistic mental caricature that depicts the other side in a bad light. Even in the age of cable television and the internet, there are Australians who still see Indonesia as an authoritarian country, as a military dictatorship, as a hotbed of Islamic extremism or even as an expansionist power. On the other hand, in Indonesia there are people who remain afflicted with Australiaphobia—those who believe that the notion of White Australia still persists, that Australia harbours ill intention toward Indonesia and is either sympathetic to or supports separatist elements in our country.70 The focus of Australia’s political rhetoric and associated media coverage has either continued to reinforce misperceptions or failed to correct them.


Thus, one 2013 survey commissioned by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicated that as many as 53 per cent of Australians believe that Indonesia is not a democracy, 70 per cent think that Bali is not part of Indonesia, and 72 per cent believe that Indonesian law-making is based on ‘Islamic codes’.71 Particularly troubling was a separate survey indicating that 54 per cent of Australians believe ‘Australia is right to worry about Indonesia as a military threat’ and 54 per cent believe that ‘Indonesia is a dangerous source of Islamic terrorism’.72 In an earlier 2011 survey, only 5 per cent indicated ‘a great deal of trust’ that ‘Indonesia would act responsibly in the world’.73 Given this climate, Prime Minister Rudd’s comment that the Coalition’s ‘turn back the boats’ rhetoric could lead to conflict, together with his reference to konfrontasi,74 was more problematic for the damage it caused to Australian perceptions than it was to Indonesian perceptions of Australia.75 Indonesians are also well aware of Australian attitudes, with 55 per cent agreeing that ‘Australia is a country suspicious of Indonesia’.76 However, while Indonesians have maintained relatively positive perceptions of Australia, a significant minority continue to believe that Australia ‘masterminded’ the independence of Timor Leste; that the independence of West Papua remains high on the Australian government’s agenda;77 and that ‘Australia poses a threat to Indonesia’ (31 per cent).78 At the worst end of the spectrum, outright anger has been voiced: a recent commentary by the senior managing editor of the Jakarta Post argued that Australia ‘is perceived as an arrogant neighbor with a strong sense of superiority towards Indonesia’.79 As President Yudhoyono has stated, such misperceptions must be expunged ‘… if we are to achieve a more resilient partnership’.80 As noted in the previous section, the foreign policies of democracies are significantly influenced by societal perspectives. Distrust and the lack of understanding between the two countries have already resulted in a number of practical ramifications for the strengthening of relations. For example, a senior Australian defense official noted that defense cooperation had been evolving as fast as the Australian people will permit it.81 The Australian embassy in Jakarta has played a leading role in responding to such challenges by building societal interest and people-to-people connections between the two countries. These activities include invitations to media editors and journalists to visit each country, and a greater emphasis on cultural exchanges and art.82 More broadly, Jakarta and Canberra have already been working together to promote tourism and the idea that Indonesia is far more than just ‘Bali’.83 Many of the above proposals had been brought together in a single document by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade titled the ‘Indonesia Country Strategy’. While the document highlighted the positive achievements in bilateral relations to date, it problematically did not support its prescriptions with tangible funding commitments.84 Further, a


substantial decline in the level of Australian bipartisanship regarding foreign affairs was evident when this document, together with the Asian Century White Paper, was ‘archived’ by the Liberal-national government.85 These actions—namely, that Australia has recalled crucial policy documents relevant to Asia—have sent mixed signals to the region about the Australian government’s commitment to future engagement and cooperation. Despite the above efforts, bilateral relations will be increasingly challenged by Australian misperceptions and indifference to Indonesia due to a decline in education about Indonesia and Asia more broadly. In 2011, there were only 87 Year 12 students studying the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) in New South Wales, and current trends indicate that the study of the Indonesian language at high school will end by 2018.86 A similar decline has occurred in the tertiary sector, as less than 1,100 university students were studying the Indonesian language in 2010, and since 2004 six universities have discontinued their Indonesian language courses.87 The collapse of Australian education in Asian languages is one of the key multigenerational challenges for Australian engagement with Indonesia and broader Asia. Evidence of archaic and outdated perspectives on this issue is still visible within certain quarters of the Australian government. For example, during a 2011 presentation to Australian government officials on ‘Australian engagement’, a co-presenter and senior official from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade strongly objected to the idea that Australia should regalvanize efforts to promote Asian languages at high school. He argued that ‘everyone knows that all you have to do is pay for a translator’.88 The rapid deterioration of Asian language education followed the Howard government’s early termination of the National Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program in 2002.89 Despite a host of high-level government declarations since—including the 2008 re-establishment of the $62.4 million National Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program (concluded in 2012) and the rhetoric of the Asian Century White Paper (2012)90—Asian language offerings and enrolments have not yet rebounded. Problematically, the Australian government’s financial commitments regarding the study of Asian languages, cultures, and histories have become increasingly inadequate and this has resulted in the loss of relevant educational capacity. A reversal of this trend will require significant and long-term reinvestment together with other practical measures such as the easing of visa restrictions for qualified teachers from Indonesia.91 Beyond language education, it will also be critical to build capacity for general education concerning Indonesia and Asia at the high school and tertiary levels.92 Here, a 2009 study found only 2 per cent of final-year Victorian high school students undertook history courses with any Asian content.93 Moreover, through to 2013, only 100–150 students from


700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2001–02

2003–04 AusAID

Figure 10.1

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Other Government Department

Australian ODA to Indonesia, 2001–02 to 2013–14 ($m)94

Australia studied in Indonesia each year; however, this number increased to 400 per year from 2014 under the AsiaBound program.95 Here, Jakarta can also assist by streamlining the visa system for Australian students.96 While the AsiaBound program is a very positive initiative, in some ways it is ‘putting the cart before the horse’ as Australian students will not be able to make full use of their time in Indonesia (or elsewhere) in the absence of any significant proficiency in Bahasa Indonesia. A positive counterbalance to the above challenges has been provided by Australia’s extensive and long-term aid program. For the year 2014–15, it is anticipated that 525 scholarships will be awarded to Indonesians for study in Australia.97 This is in addition to more than 17,000 Indonesian students who currently study in Australia each year.98 Within Indonesia, Australia funded nearly half of Indonesia’s school-building program between 2006 and 2009, and in 2010 announced a further $500 million to construct an additional 2,000 schools that will lead to 300,000 new school places.99 Beyond education, Australia has provided an average of $472.3 million in aid each year for the last five years, and this is scheduled to increase to $646.8 million during the 2013/14 financial year.100 Australia is in fact Indonesia’s largest aid donor, and Australia now provides more aid to Indonesia than to any other country. Aside from the aforementioned initiatives in the security and policing spheres, it has used this aid to strengthen, inter alia, Indonesia’s long-term capacity including health, agriculture, governance, and humanitarian and disaster response.101 Nonetheless, it is ironic that the Australian government has invested heavily in aid to Indonesia, including funding Indonesian students to study in Australia, but has overtly neglected its duty to educate Australians about Indonesia and broader Asia.


Both Australia and Indonesia should be key trading partners. The proximity of the two countries reduces transportation costs and they both have a complementary mix of natural resources, opportunities for investment, and products for export.102 In the case of Indonesia, consistent economic growth and positive demographics—including a relatively young workforce—also reinforce the potential for and benefits from trade and investment.103 However, a key issue raised by interlocutors in both Jakarta and Canberra was the need to expand bilateral trade: in 2012 Indonesia was only Australia’s 12th largest trading partner.104 Further, only about 250 Australian companies maintain a presence in Indonesia.105 Yet, as argued by Australian Ambassador Greg Moriarty, strong trade relations provide a critical foundation to a stable and close long-term relationship; this is a necessary pillar that is missing in relations between Indonesia and Australia.106 A stronger trading partnership will also naturally boost the level of inter-societal interaction and knowledge. The level of bilateral trade will also be strengthened through the commencement of the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area, which has significantly reduced tariffs and provided greater certainty to businesses from both countries. Australia and Indonesia have also proposed the establishment of an Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) and a preliminary round of negotiations were held in March 2013.107 The successful conclusion of this agreement would result in even greater liberalization in trade, heightened foreign direct investment, and strengthened economic cooperation more broadly. Nonetheless, further challenges remain. Mounting economic nationalism in Indonesia combined with a vexed record of resource exploitation by Australian firms threatens to undermine long-term commitments for investment.108 These challenges compound the lack of mutual understanding between the societies of the two countries and the various politicians and ministries whose portfolios do not necessitate or drive strong international, regional, and bilateral understanding. Indonesia will also need to maintain progress in tackling corruption and to improve its own business and investment climate before Australian businesses will redirect their trade and investment from alternative destinations.109

Policy implications and the ways forward Through to October 2013, the combined leadership of President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Natalegawa had contributed to the best political climate yet for advancing relations between Indonesia and Australia. This had also been reinforced by the prudent policies and actions of AusAID—now part of DFAT—and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, together with the two countries’ police and defense forces. Nonetheless, recent episodes such as Australian territorial intrusions and the spy scan-


dals demonstrate that these hard-won gains should not be taken for granted. Elite-level dynamics are all too often an extension of broader societal perspectives, and vice versa. In other words, for states that are both democratic, but which otherwise exhibit significant societal and political differences, their interactions are likely to be complicated by the increased interdependence and influence of those societal interests. Therefore, a fundamental challenge lies in identifying an effective means of improving the relationship framework so that the flashpoints that inevitably occur do not affect sound policy formulation. As a first step, the recent change of governments in both Australia and Indonesia means that Jakarta and Canberra will need to be particularly cautious if they are to avoid statements that could offend, be misinterpreted or hijacked by domestic politics. In this regard, the institutionalization of increased multi-level dialogue between the elite of the two countries has been a critically important development. However, more needs to be done and this includes improving coordination between various Australian departments and their subsections. For instance, recent events indicate that some intelligence officers are operating under an inappropriate and narrowly defined mandate whereby they consider ends to justify the means. In reality, they and their supervisors have failed to consider adequately the broader long-term costs for Australia’s soft power and moral authority. Therefore, the Australian government needs to: (a) improve inter-agency coordination and oversight—possibly through enquiry or review, and; (b) do more than is currently the case to mend relations with Jakarta. Meanwhile, the continuation of unnecessary political rhetoric that is perceived to be disrespectful to Indonesia, together with the failure of Canberra to consult regarding matters relevant to Indonesian interests, provides further evidence of a need to continue to reconfigure perceptions and attitudes in certain quarters of Australian politics and the media. In line with the prioritization accorded to Indonesia in Australia’s ‘Asian Century White Paper’, such a reconfiguration will be demonstrated when Australian leaders act with the same level of respect and considered assessment as they would for China, India, South Korea, and Japan. A step in this direction would involve mandatory training on regional cultures, diplomacy, and the international affairs of the region for, in the very least, politicians, senior bureaucrats, and officials posted to Australian embassies, whether in Jakarta or elsewhere. Given a range of competing demands, such training could be achieved through intensive short courses or a possible web-based interface designed to provide a more flexible and efficient learning experience. An increased focus on developing the economic and socio-cultural spheres of interaction will also reinforce the political–security and military dimensions of the relationship. This will require heavy investment in both language and broader Asian studies education that, in real terms, exceeds


the funding commitments provided under the Hawke and Keating administrations. As an interim measure, the development of special programs to support the quality of journalism reporting on Indonesia and Asia will also have a positive impact on broader societal knowledge and perceptions. Such programs could build on the recent media tours coordinated by the Australian embassy to comprise longer-term exchange and education programs, with the latter including an emphasis on education concerning opportunities for trade and investment. Nonetheless, these strategies will require a multi-decade approach in order to consolidate a strong and robust bilateral relationship; the challenge for the democratic governments of Australia and Indonesia will be the acquisition of the political will to implement them. Should Indonesia’s current pace of ascent be maintained, then Australia will increasingly become the smaller partner in this bilateral relationship. This, in turn, will entail increased dependence by Australia on Indonesian support to secure its economic, political and security interests—both bilaterally and in terms or its broader engagement with Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Nonetheless, as detailed in other chapters within this book, Indonesia’s current trajectory is anything but assured. Several complicated elements of state frailty remain, including ethnic and religious divides as well as the continued potential for rapid loss of a future government’s legitimacy should it fail to perform—particularly in the economic sphere. Any significant regression in Indonesia’s security environment could potentially lead to dire consequences for Australia. Consequently, Australia’s bilateral aid program remains critical if it is to support Indonesia’s democracy, good governance, equitable development, and stability. Regardless of Indonesia’s future trajectory, now is the time to consolidate, as far as is possible, the relationship between the two countries.

Notes 1 See for example, ‘RI-Australia’s roller coaster relation’, The Jakarta Post, November 14, 2013 and a few days later Allan Behm, ‘Off we go again on the Indonesia rollercoaster’, Sydney Morning Herald, November 20, 2013. Both were referring to the latest ‘plunge’ in relations, the alleged Australian wiretapping program in Indonesia. 2 Colin Brown, ‘“Spying Scandal”: Another Challenge to the Australia-Indonesia Relationship?’, November 7, 2013, http://theconversation.com/spying-scandalanother-challenge-to-the-australia-indonesia-relationship-19909 3 Jamie Mackie, ‘Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects’, Lowy Institute Paper 19, 2007, p. 44. 4 For example, the following provides informative analysis: Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’, in Anthony Reid, ed., Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012), pp. 77–92. 5 Jamie Mackie, op. cit., p. 44.

Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir 211 6 Former Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, once argued: ‘[b]ut if, in spite of all effort to live at peace, a war comes, the business of foreign policy is to see that we enter it with great and powerful friends’. Robert G. Menzies, ‘Pacific Policy’, Measure of the Years (1970), pp. 79–80. 7 Gregory John de Somer, The Redefinition of Asia: Australian Foreign Policy and Contemporary Asian Regionalism, unpublished dissertation, University College of University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, February 2003, See also David Walker and Agnieszka Sobocinska, eds, Australia’s Asia: From Yellow Peril to Asian Century, UWA Publishing, 2012. For the Indonesian story, see Jamie Mackie, op. cit., pp. 48–64. Also see Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, ‘Pasang Surut Hubungan Indonesia Australia: 1945–2013’ (Ebbs and Flows of IndonesiaAustralia Relations) 22 November 2013, http://pustakadigitalindonesia. blogspot.com/2013/11/pasang-surut-hubungan-indonesia.html 8 While a common policy theme, in practice the push-and-pull between the US and Asia has paradoxically created an impression of Australian inconsistency as an Asian neighbor. See Aleksius Jemadu, ‘Kebijakan Politik dan Keamanan Australia di Kawasan Asia Pacific’ (Australian Political and Security Policies in the Asia Pacific Region), Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Vol. 10, No. 2, November 2006, pp. 144–5. 9 Aleksius Jemadu, p. 160. 10 Richard Woolcott, ‘Indonesia and Australia in the Asian Century’, GlobeAsia, September 2012. 11 For a detailed account on this subject, see: Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’. 12 Sulistiyanto labels the fears as ‘the breakup of Indonesia syndrome’, suggesting that these fears arise at times when Australia is perceived to be meddling in the domestic affairs of Indonesia, for example, in the then East Timor and in Papua: See Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, ‘Indonesia-Australian Relations in the Era of Democracy: The View from the Indonesian Side, Australian Journal of Political Science, 45: 1, p. 121 (2010). 13 Emphasis by authors. ‘Australia’s National Security Strategy’ (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013), p. 12. ‘Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper’ (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012), p. 25. See also: Hugh White, ‘Northern Exposure: What the Rise of Indonesia Means for Australia’, Monthly (2013). 14 Stephen Smith, ‘Australia and Indonesia: Strategic Partners’. Australian Department of Defence, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/04/minister-for-defence-australia-and-indonesia-strategic-partners/. The previous treaty between Australia and Indonesia was unilaterally revoked by Jakarta in 1999 due to tensions over Australia’s support for East Timor’s independence from Indonesia. See also: ‘Indonesia, Australia Consent to Enhance Defence Cooperation’, Indonesia Government News, 4 April 2013. ‘Australia-Indonesia Annual Leaders’ Meeting’. Commonwealth of Australia, www.pm.gov.au/ press-office/joint-communique 15 ‘Indonesia Country Brief’. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html 16 Other participants included Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand and the United States. ‘Exercise Pitch Black 12 Begins’. Australian Department of Defence, http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2012/jul/0727.htm

212 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential 17 ‘Australia and Indonesia Militaries Participate in the Inaugural Bilateral Peacekeeping Exercise, Garuda Kookaburra’. Australian Department of Defence, http://news.defence.gov.au/2013/05/17/australia-and-indonesia-militariesparticipate-in-the-inaugural-bilateral-peacekeeping-exercise-garuda-kookaburra/ 18 ‘Minister for Defence, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport and Minister for Home Affairs—Joint Media Release—Strengthening Australia-Indonesia Search and Rescue Coordination’. Australian Department of Defence, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/04/minister-for-defence-ministerfor-infrastructure-and-transport-and-minister-for-home-affairs-joint-mediarelease-strengthening-australia-indonesia-search-and-rescue-coordination/ 19 ‘Defence Minister Completes Indonesia Visit’. Australian Department of Defence, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/05/defence-ministercompletes-indonesia-visit/ 20 ‘Jakarta to Buy More Hercules’, Flight International, 6 August 2013. 21 ‘Australia and Indonesia Signal Intent to Collaborate in Defence Industry’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 September 2012. 22 For an overview, see: Christopher Roberts, ‘The Future of East and Southeast Asian Regionalism’, in Andrew Tan, ed., East and Southeast Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013). 23 Its membership also includes India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and all ten of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations members. 24 Ramesh Thakur, ‘Australia, Indonesia Moving as Close as Perceptions Allow’, The Japan Times, 2 May 2013. For an in-depth analysis of Indonesia’s significance in ASEAN, see Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012). 25 For an overview of how Indonesia’s democratic transition has affected its political values and foreign policy see: ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, pp. 102–26; ‘State Weakness and Political Values: Ramifications for the ASEAN Community’, in Ralf Emmers, ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012), pp. 11–26. 26 Interviews by Christopher Roberts in Jakarta during the course of seven field trips between 2006 and 2012. In the context of the military, see also Jorn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (London: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 39–40. 27 The theory argues that political leaders must engage in political games at the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, a liberal democracy renders a government more vulnerable and sensitive to domestic forces. Here, the political elite engage in two games where (a) they seek to build an adequate coalition of power necessary to commit to a particular course in foreign policy; and (b) they formulate foreign policies in a manner that is calculated (in part) to maintain, or build, sufficient support from their constituencies—including pressure groups and the like—to maintain power. At the international level, government leaders engage in a third game where they seek to pursue national interests in a manner that simultaneously limits ‘the harmful impact on foreign relations’ and satisfies ‘domestic pressures’; thus, foreign policy behavior is primarily constrained by the nexus between satisfying international actors and domestic constituencies. Joe D. Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 4–5. See also Jorn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (London: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 21–2. As Skidmore and Hudson argue, ‘[f]oreign policy deci-


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sion-makers are not simply agents of the national interest but political animals who must worry about their survival in office and the viability of their overall set of political goals, domestic and foreign’. David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, The Limits to State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 3. Priambudi Sulistiyanto, op. cit., p. 123. See for example, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s hardline statements in ‘Hubungan dengan Australia “Nyaris Tak Bisa Diperbaiki”’ (Relations with Australia ‘Almost Irreparable’), 20 November, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/11/131120_martyaussieirreparable.shtml and ‘Menlu RI: Australia Harus Tentukan Jadi Teman atau Lawan Indonesia’ (Foreign Minister RI: Australia Has to Choose to be a Friend or Enemy of Indonesia), 17 February, 2014, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/02/17/ 1940137/Menlu.RI.Australia.Harus.Tentukan.Jadi.Teman.atau.Lawan.Indonesia. While there was more than enough in the wiretapping revelations to anger the Indonesia government and to respond accordingly, others, such as the academic, Hikmahanto Juwana, demanded a stronger response, such as expelling Australian and US diplomats, ‘Usir Diplomat Australia dan AS!’ (Expel Australian and US Diplomats! Koran SINDO, 20 November 2013, http:// nasional.sindonews.com/read/808018/usir-diplomat-australia-dan-as For a cogent discussion on how domestic and foreign policy are intertwined in the Australian context with an illustration, among others, of the response of the Howard government to the refugee issue and its impact on relationships with Indonesia, see Mark Beeson, ‘Issues in Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2002), pp. 226–40. William Maley, ‘The Tyranny of Parochialism’, Jakarta Post, 27 November 2013. Ibid. Ibid. For example, Indonesia offered to mediate on the deadlock between Iran, the United States, and the European Union concerning the alleged development of nuclear weapons. Ellen Nakashima, ‘Indonesia Offers to Mediate Talks with Iran’, The Washington Post, 11 May 2006. Alexander Downer, ‘Australia Retreats from Asia’, Asialink, 3, no. 4 (2011), p. 2. Ibid. The US and Indonesia have since entered into discussions concerning a comprehensive partnership with the potential for six agreements concerning oil and gas exploration, energy, forestry, agriculture and natural resources more broadly. Hanson, op. cit., p. 4. Donald K Emmerson, ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’, in Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, ed., Anthony Reid (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012), pp. 65–8. See also: Ristian A. Supriyanto, ‘Rebalancing and Indonesia: US Pacific Presence Will Force Jakarta to Choose’, Defence News International, 8 July 2013. This goal has been symbolized by the joint declaration on ‘Building a Strategic Partnership’ in April 2005 and reinforced by other developments including the first joint exercise between the special forces of Indonesia and China in June 2011. ‘External Affairs, Indonesia’, Jane’s Intelligence, 2013. Sidney Jones, ‘Papuan “Separatists” Vs Jihadi “Terrorists”: Indonesian Policy Dilemmas’, International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/jones-papuan-separatists.aspx ‘Australia, Indonesia Agree to Joint Probe’, ABC, 16 October 2002; Ian Henderson and Don Greenlees, ‘Megawati, PM Frame Pact on Terrorism’,


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Australian, 7 February 2002. However, due to concerns about human rights abuses, it was not until 2005 that Australia lifted its ban on joint training and military cooperation with Kopassus. Peter Alford, ‘Anti-Terrorism Role for Indonesian Army’, Ibid., 19 October 2010. ‘Indonesia Country Brief’. Ibid. ‘Australia’s National Security Strategy’, p. 12. Sabam Siagian and Endy Bayuni, ‘RI-Australia Ties — It’s More Important to be Nice’, Jakarta Post, 14 November 2012. Peter Jennings, ‘Indonesia: Priorities, Politics, Perceptions and Papua’, Strategist, www.aspistrategist.org.au Ali Alatas, ‘Different Societies, Shared Futures’, Jakarta Post, 6 July 2006. Rosemarie Lentini, ‘Julia Gillard Halts Live Cattle Exports to Indonesia’, Telegraph, 8 June 2013. See ‘Sour Times with a Big Neighbour’. There were also allegations of an associated proposal to station US drones at Christmas Island. Mark J. Valencia, ‘Us Pivot Making Waves in the Region’, Straits Times, 3 April 2012. Michael Bachelard, ‘Indonesia Rebukes Carr over West Papua Call’, Age, 30 August 2012. Alberto Gomes, ‘Beyond Boats, Beef, and Bali: Reassessing Australia’s Relations with Indonesia’, Conversation, 3 July 2013. Despite assurances from Julie Bishop that Indonesia would cooperate with Australia when if it forcibly sends asylumseeker boats back to Indonesia, Indonesia’s Vice-President, Foreign Minister, and Ambassador to Australia have all publically declared that the policy is unacceptable. In relation to the subject, Vice President Boediono stated that the ‘most important thing for the two next door neighbours would be trust. That is key, mutual understanding, mutual respect’. Lenore Taylor, ‘Indonesia “Would Co-Operate” with Coalition on Boats’, Guardian, 3 June 2013. George Roberts, ‘Indonesia Rejects the Coalition’s Asylum Seeker Policy’, ABC News, 14 June 2013. ‘Australia’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu), http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/ IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=BilateralCooperation&IDP=56&P=Bilateral&l=en Interview with Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry (Kemlu), Jakarta, February 2013. According to Indonesia expert from the Australian National University, Greg Fealy, ‘SBY constantly hoses things down [on Australia’s account] … When Commission 1 in Parliament looks like winding up for a big attack on Australia, SBY makes calming statements and takes the heat out of certain issues’; Peter Hartcher, ‘Dogs of Boat War Must Learn Value of Silence’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July 2013. Abdul Khalik, ‘US Base No Threat to Indonesia’, The Jakarta Post, 21 November 2011. ‘Australia-Indonesia Annual Leaders’ Meeting’, Commonwealth of Australia, www.pm.gov.au/press-office/joint-communique Jennings, ‘Indonesia: Priorities, Politics, Perceptions and Papua’. Indonesia’s defence delegation met with both Australian government agencies as well as academics and analysts from the ANU and ASPI. ‘Indonesia Country Brief’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html Alan Dupont, ‘Indonesian Ties Much Tighter’, Australian, 8 April 2013.

Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir 215 59 ‘Leaked NSA Report Reveals Australia-US Spying Operations during Bali Conference’, ABC News, 3 November 2013; Charles Hutzler, ‘Australian Spying Report Stirs Anger in Asia; China, Indonesia Demand Explanations for Allegations of Aid in U.S. Spy Effort’, The Wall Street Journal, 2 November 2013. 60 Michael Brissenden, ‘Australia Spied on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Leaked Edward Snowden Documents Revealed’, ABC News, 18 November 2013. 61 Catriona Croft-Cusworth, ‘Spying Row: Why Indonesia is Tougher on Canberra than on Washington’, The Interpreter, 21 February 2014. 62 Brendan Nicholson and Peter Alford, ‘Back Off, Jakarta Tells Australia’, The Australian, 18 January 2014. 63 ‘Jakarta in No Hurry to Fix Ties with Australia: Indonesian Ambassador Will Not Return to Australia until Relations Have Improved’, Today (Singapore), 20 February 2014; ‘Biweekly Update: Indonesia’, Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th and K Streets, CSIS Vol. 4, No. 24 (26 November 2013), p. 7. 64 Discussions with Indonesian embassy, Canberra, March 2014. 65 Rod McGuirk, ‘Spying Furor Exposes Fragile and Uneven Relationship between Indonesia and Australia’, 22 November 2013, http://www.nanaimodailynews. com/news/spying-furor-exposes-fragile-and-uneven-relationship-betweenindonesia-and-australia-1.706283 66 ‘Yudhoyono Reinstates Australia Ambassador to Regain Bilateral Ties’, Jakarta Globe, 20 May 2014. 67 ‘Marty Natalegawa Criticised over Indonesian Ambassador’s Return’, The Guardian, 4 June 2014. 68 There was mounting belief in certain Indonesian policy circles that Australia’s leadership was waiting until the election of the next administration in Indonesia but this would be a mistake. As has been raised during discussions with Indonesian policymakers, any new President would not share the same level of affinity with Australia as that shared by President Yudhoyono. 69 A collective identity exists where people consider themselves to be, at some level, part of the same group and this translates into a collection of positive images that are projected towards others within the group. James Cotton, ‘Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific’ (paper presented at the UTS-Guadalajara Workshop, Guadalajara, January 2004), p. 7. 70 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ‘Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia’. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 2010. At an earlier conference, a former Indonesian ambassador to Australia, S. Wiryono, also highlighted the problem of public ignorance on both sides but added that this was in contrast to a relatively better understanding between officials. Wiryono, S., ‘An Indonesian View: Indonesia, Australia and the Region’, in Montries, John, ed., Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region, Indonesia Update Series (ISEAS, 2006). 71 ‘Australian Attitudes towards Indonesia’. Canberra: Newspoll, 2013. This 91 page report was commissioned by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. See also, ‘Australia Has Just Trashed the Perception of Indonesia’, Scoop, 29 June 2013. 72 Alex Oliver, Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Sydney: Lowy Institute Poll, 2013), pp. 12–13.

216 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential 73 While 41 per cent believed that they could ‘somewhat’ trust Indonesia to act responsibly in the world, this was below China, Russia and Egypt. Moreover, 15 per cent answered ‘not at all’ in terms of ‘trust’ to the same question. Fergus Hanson, Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Sydney: Lowy Institute Poll, 2011), pp. 15–18. 74 Konfrontasi was a policy that was launched by President Sukarno during the 1960s and was primarily directed against the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, which Sukarno viewed as a ‘neo-colonialist plot to perpetuate British influence’. As a member of the Five Powers Defence Agreement, Australia’s military was also involved in the highly ‘limited’ conflict. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, p. 35. 75 These comments resulted in a broad range of hostile statements on the internet. Once example including the following: ‘[w]e are a sovereign state and our policies will not be dictated to by a jumped up corrupt Country like Indonesia. If they were to try it on with Australia the U.S. would pound their sorry arses into oblivion’. ‘Australia Has Just Trashed the Perception of Indonesia’. 76 Fergus Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, in Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2012), p. 8. 77 Ibid., p. 26; Kornelius Purba, ‘Patronising Approach Won’t Impress Indonesia’, The Australian, 5 July 2013; Peter, ‘Indonesia: Priorities, Politics, Perceptions and Papua’. On this issue, Hajrijanto Y. Thohari stated that ‘I am always suspicious of the NGOs as well as the governments of Australia and the United States in responding to the separatism issue in Papua. On the one hand, the governments showed their support to Indonesia’s integrity, but on the other hand their NGOs support separatists groups … Who knows [sic] all kinds of political tricks are intentionally launched under a good plan or design, so that they will eventually gain benefits from the situation’, ‘Australian Govt, Their NGOs Collude in Responding to Papua’, Antara News, 13 October 2006. 78 However, 63 per cent indicated that Malaysia posed a ‘threat’. Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, p. 11. 79 Purba, ‘Patronising Approach Won’t Impress Indonesia’. 80 Yudhoyono, ‘Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia’. 81 Interview, Australian Department of Defence, Canberra, April 2013. 82 One example includes the coordination of a visit to Indonesia by Australian art directors who had no idea how vibrant the contemporary arts scene is in Jakarta. The Australian embassy is also bringing Indonesian journalists and Islamic leaders to Australia and Australian journalists, in turn, have been brought to Indonesia. 83 Still more can be done in order to promote greater awareness about and strong relations with Australia as the Lowy Institute Poll indicated that the Indonesian public is now warmer towards the US than Australia and that most Indonesians do not know that Australia is its largest donor of aid. Hanson, ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, p. 11. 84 ‘Indonesia Country Strategy’, in Australia in the Asian Century (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013). For a concise assessment of this strategy, see Michelle Ford, ‘An Indonesia Strategy in Search of a Commitment’, Australian, 10 July 2013. 85 See: http://asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/white-paper, accessed 10 July 2014. 86 Olivia Cable, ‘Indonesia: Australia’s Gateway into the Asia-Century’. Australian Institute of International Affairs, http://www.aiia.asn.au/access-monthly-


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access/ma-issue-19. Meanwhile, only 300 non-Chinese heritage students studied Mandarin at year 12 level in 2009. Jenny McGregor, ‘Australian Students in the Dark as Asia’s Century Dawns’, Age, 13 April 2011. David Hill, ‘Indonesian Knowledge is Dying-Just When We Need It Most’, 2 March 2012, http://theconversation.com/indonesian-knowledge-is-dyingjust-when-we-need-it-most-5630 Presentation by Christopher Roberts, National Security College (ANU), March 2011. Louise Milligan, ‘Government Drops $30m Asian Language Program’, Australian, 3 May 2002. This includes the $47 million AsiaBound grants program, which is very similar to the Australian coalition’s ‘reverse Colombo plan’ that had been announced in June 2012. Cable, ‘Indonesia: Australia’s Gateway into the Asia-Century’. Following a series of education cuts during the late 1990s, only a handful of specialized Asian studies departments now exist in the tertiary sector. McGregor, ‘Australian Students in the Dark as Asia’s Century Dawns’. ‘Overview’, AusAid website, cited at: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/home.aspx Julie Bishop, ‘Address to Australia/Indonesia Dialogue’. http://www.juliebishop. com.au/speeches/1223-address-to-australia-indonesia-dialogue.html. John Hearn, ‘Seeking Good RI-Australia Relations’, Jakarta Post, 1 May 2010. The AsiaBound Program was announced by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in July 2013. There remains an open question as to whether this funding will be maintained by the new coalition government beyond 2014. Ross Tapsell, ‘Friendship between Leaders Is Not Necessarily the Key to Good Relations’. Ibid., 22 March. ‘Indonesia: Information for Awards Commencing in 2014’. AusAid, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/australia-awards/documents/indonesia.pdf ‘Indonesia Country Brief’. ‘Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia (2011–2016)’. AusAid, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/educationinit1.aspx Calculations based on figures provided at the AusAid, see: ‘Funding’, AusAid, cited at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/home. aspx Ibid. Shaun McGushin, ‘Australia-Indonesia: Time for a Closer Future’, Mondaq Business Briefing, 28 August 2013. A rising middle class (now larger than Australia’s entire population) has been responsible for much of the domestic demand, in addition to an abundance of natural resources that has underpinned such growth: ‘Risks that may Hinder Boom in Indonesia’, Straits Times, 15 January 2013 reprinted in Jakarta Globe, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/risks-that-may-hinder-boom-inIndonesia/565796. Indonesian tourism has also been another major growth industry for Australia: ‘Queensland Tourism Targets Indonesia on Trade Tour’, Mena Report, 19 February 2013. For a view on the tendency for more rhetoric than action on Indonesia-Australia trade, see Benjamin Fullarton, ‘Untapped Potential in Indonesian Relationship’, 25 November 2013, http://www.abc. net.au/news/2013-11-25/fullarton-indonesia/5111334

218 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential 104 Interviews with government officials and academics in Canberra and Jakarta between October 2012 and March 2013. See also ‘Australia-Indonesia: Time for a Closer Future’. 105 Despite this, Australia’s trade in services increased by an average of 22 per cent per year between 2007 and 2010. David T. Hill, ‘Indonesian Knowledge is Dying – Just When We Need It Most’. Conversation, https://theconversation.com. 106 Interview with Ambassador Greg Moriarty, Jakarta, 21 January 2013. See also Alan Oxley, ‘Beyond the Boats Lies Indonesia’s Rising Power’, Financial Review, 2 July 2013. 107 ‘Joint Communique: Indonesia-Australia Leaders’ Meeting’. Australian Embassy, Indonesia, http://www.indonesia.embassy.gov.au/jakt/JC13_001. html. The Directorate General for International Trade Cooperation’s website has more detail on the proposed Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, see ‘Hubungan Indonesia-Australia: Menuju Peningkatan Perdagangan yang Komprehensif Melalui Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA)’ (IndonesiaAustralia Relations: Towards Increasing Comprehensive Trade Through the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Partnership Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA), http://ditjenkpi.kemendag.go.id/website_kpi/index. php?module=news_detail&news_content_id=1091&detail=true 108 Zakir Hussain, ‘Indonesia’s Politicians Play “Protectionist” Card’, Straits Times, 4 July 2012. 109 In 2012, Indonesia was ranked number 128 out of 185 countries with a ranking of 1 being the best place to do business. ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’, The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ

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Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir 219 ‘Australia Looks Inward as Conservatives Take Over’ (2013) Channel News Asia, 8 September. ‘Australia, Indonesia Agree to Joint Probe’ (2002) ABC, 16 October. ‘Australian Attitudes towards Indonesia’ (2013) Canberra: Newspoll. ‘Australian Govt, Their NGOs Collude in Responding to Papua’ (2006) Antara News, 13 October. Bachelard, Michael (2012) ‘Indonesia Rebukes Carr over West Papua Call’, Age, 30 August. Beeson, Mark (2002) ‘Issues in Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 48: 2, 226–40. Behm, Allan (2013) ‘Off We Go Again on the Indonesia Rollercoaster’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November. Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa (2013) ‘Pasang Surut Hubungan Indonesia Australia: 1945–2013’ (Ebbs and Flows of Indonesia–Australia Relations), 22 November, http://pustakadigitalindonesia.blogspot.com/2013/11/pasang-surut-hubunganindonesia.html Bishop, Julie (2013) ‘Address to Australia/Indonesia Dialogue’, http://juliebishop. com.au/address-to-australia-indonesia-dialogue/ ‘Biweekly Update: Indonesia’ (2013) Southeast Asia from the Corner of 18th and K Streets, CSIS, Vol. 4, No. 24 (26 November). Brissenden, Michael (2013) ‘Australia Spied on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Leaked Edward Snowden Documents Revealed’, ABC News, 18 November. Brown, Colin (2013) ‘Spying “Scandal”: Another Challenge to the Australia–Indonesia Relationship?’, 7 November, http://theconversation.com/ spying-scandal-another-challenge-to-the-australia-indonesia-relationship-19909 Burke, Anthony (2008) Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press). Cable, Olivia (2011) ‘Indonesia: Australia’s Gateway into the Asia–Century’, Australian Institute of International Affairs, http://www.aiia.asn.au/accessmonthly-access/ma-issue-19. Cotton, James (2004) ‘Regional Order and the over-Determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia–Pacific’, Paper presented at the UTS–Guadalajara Workshop, Guadalajara, January. Croft-Cusworth, Catriona (2014) ‘Spying Row: Why Indonesia is Tougher on Canberra than on Washington’, The Interpreter, 21 February. de Somer, Gregory John (2003) ‘The Redefinition of Asia: Australian Foreign Policy and Contemporary Asian Regionalism’, unpublished dissertation, University College of University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, February. ‘Defence Minister Completes Indonesia Visit’ (2012) Australian Department of Defence, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/05/defence-minister-completes-indonesia-visit/ Dosch, Jorn (2007) The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics (London: Lynne Rienner). Downer, Alexander (2011) ‘Australia Retreats from Asia’, Asialink, 3: 4 (12 April), p. 105. Dupont, Alan (2013) ‘Indonesian Ties Much Tighter’, Australian, 8 April, 10. ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’. The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ

220 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential Emmerson, Donald K. (2012) ‘Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends’, in Anthony Reid, ed., Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS), 77–92. ‘Exercise Pitch Black 12 Begins’ (2012) Australian Department of Defence, http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2012/jul/0727.htm ‘External Affairs, Indonesia’ (2013) Jane’s Intelligence, 2 January. Fealy, Greg ‘SBY constantly hoses things down [on Australia’s account] … Ford, Michelle (2013) ‘An Indonesia Strategy in Search of a Commitment’, Australian, 10 July. Fullarton, Benjamin (2013) ‘Untapped Potential in Indonesian Relationship’, 25 November, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-25/fullarton-indonesia/5111334 Gomes, Alberto (2013) ‘Beyond Boats, Beef, and Bali: Reassessing Australia’s Relations with Indonesia’, Conversation, 3 July. Hagan, Joe D. (1993) Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), 4–5. Hanson, Fergus (2011) ‘Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, (Sydney: Lowy Institute Poll). ——— (2012) ‘Shattering Stereotypes: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll (Sydney: Lowy Institute). Hartcher, Peter (2013) ‘Dogs of Boat War Must Learn Value of Silence’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July. Hearn, John (2010) ‘Seeking Good RI–Australia Relations’, Jakarta Post, 1 May. Henderson, Ian and Don Greenlees (2002) ‘Megawati, PM Frame Pact on Terrorism’, Australian, 7 February. Hill, David T. (2012) ‘Indonesian Knowledge Is Dying – Just When We Need It Most’, Conversation, https://theconversation.com ‘Hubungan dengan Australia “Nyaris Tak Bisa Diperbaiki”’ (Relations with Australia ‘Almost Irreparable’) (2013) 20 November, http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/ berita_indonesia/2013/11/131120_martyaussieirreparable.shtml Hubungan Indonesia–Australia: Menuju Peningkatan Perdangangan yang Komprehensif Melalui Indonesia–Australia (IA–CEPA) (Indonesia–Australia Relations: Towards Increasing Comprehensive Trade Through the Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Partnership Economic Partnership Agreement (IA–CEPA), Direktorat Jenderal Kerja Sama Perdagangan Internasional, 27 September 2012, http://ditjenkpi.kemendag.go.id/website_php? module=news_detail&news_content_id=1091 &detail=true Hussain, Zakir (2012) ‘Indonesia’s Politicians Play “Protectionist” Card’, Straits Times, 4 July. Hutzler, Charles (2013) ‘Australian Spying Report Stirs Anger in Asia; China, Indonesia Demand Explanations for Allegations of Aid in U.S. Spy Effort’, The Wall Street Journal, 2 November. ‘Indonesia Country Brief’ (n.d.), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html ‘Indonesia Country Strategy’ (2013), in Australia in the Asian Century (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). ‘Indonesia, Australia Consent to Enhance Defence Cooperation’ (2013) Indonesia Government News, 4 April. ‘Indonesia: Information for Awards Commencing in 2014’, AusAid, http://www. ausaid.gov.au/australia-awards/documents/indonesia.pdf ‘Jakarta in No Hurry to Fix Ties with Australia: Indonesian Ambassador Will Not Return to Australia until Relations have Improved’ (2014) Today (Singapore), 20 February.

Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir 221 ‘Jakarta to Buy More Hercules’ (2013) Flight International, 6 August. Jemadu, Aleksius (2006) ‘Kebijakan Politik dan Keamanan Australia di Kawasan Asia Pacific’ (Australian Political and Security Policies in the Asia Pacific Region), Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, 10: 2, November, 143–63. Jennings, Peter (2013) ‘Indonesia: Priorities, Politics, Perceptions and Papua’, Strategist, www.aspistrategist.org.au ‘Joint Communique: Indonesia–Australia Leaders’ Meeting’ (n.d.), Australian Embassy, Indonesia, http://www.indonesia.embassy.gov.au/jakt/JC13_001.html Jones, Sidney (2013) ‘Papuan “Separatists” Vs Jihadi “Terrorists”: Indonesian Policy Dilemmas’, International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publicationtype/speeches/2013/jones-papuan-separatists.aspx. Khalik, Abdul (2011) ‘US Base No Threat to Indonesia’, Jakarta Post, 21 November. ‘Leaked NSA Report Reveals Australia–US Spying Operations during Bali Conference’ (2013) ABC News, 3 November. Lentini, Rosemarie (2013) ‘Julia Gillard Halts Live Cattle Exports to Indonesia’, Telegraph, 8 June. Mackie, Jamie (2007) ‘Australia and Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects’, Lowy Institute Paper 19. Maley, William (2013) ‘The Tyranny of Parochialism’, Jakarta Post, 27 November. ‘Marty Natalegawa Criticised over Indonesian Ambassador’s Return’ (2014) Guardian, 4 June. McGregor, Jenny (2011) ‘Australian Students in the Dark as Asia’s Century Dawns’, Age, 13 April. McGuirk Rod (2013) ‘Spying Furor Exposes Fragile and Uneven Relationship between Indonesia and Australia’, 22 November, http://www.nanaimodailynews.com/ news/spying-furor-exposes-fragile-and-uneven-relationship-between-indonesiaand-australia-1.706283 McGushin, Shaun (2013) ‘Australia–Indonesia: Time for a Closer Future’, Mondaq Business Briefing, 28 August. ‘Menlu RI: Australia Harus Tentukan Jadi Teman atau Lawan Indonesia’ (Foreign Minister RI: Australia Has to Choose to be a Friend or Enemy of Indonesia) (2014), 17 February, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/02/17/1940137/Menlu.RI. Australia.Harus.Tentukan.Jadi.Teman.atau.Lawan.Indonesia Menzies, Robert (1970) The Measure of the Years (Melbourne: Cassell). Milligan, Louise (2002) ‘Government Drops $30m Asian Language Program’, Australian, 3 May. ‘Minister for Defence, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport and Minister for Home Affairs—Joint Media Release—Strengthening Australia–Indonesia Search and Rescue Coordination’, Australian Department of Defence, http://www.minister. defence.gov.au/2012/09/04/minister-for-defence-minister-for-infrastructure-andtransport-and-minister-for-home-affairs-joint-media-release-strengtheningaustralia-indonesia-search-and-rescue-coordination/ Nakashima, Ellen (2006) ‘Indonesia Offers to Mediate Talks with Iran’, Washington Post, 11 May. Nicholson, Brendan and Peter Alford (2014) ‘Back Off, Jakarta Tells Australia’, Australian, 18 January. Oliver, Alex (2013) ‘Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’ (Sydney: Lowy Institute Poll). ‘Overview’, AusAid website, cited at: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/eastasia/ indonesia/Pages/home.aspx

222 Indonesia–Australia Relations: Progress, Challenges and Potential Oxley, Alan (2013) ‘Beyond the Boats Lies Indonesia’s Rising Power’, Financial Review, 2 July. Purba, Kornelius (2013) ‘Patronising Approach Won’t Impress Indonesia’, Australian, 5 July, 10. ‘Queensland Tourism Targets Indonesia on Trade Tour’ (2013) Mena Report, 19 February. ‘RI–Australia’s roller coaster relation’ (2013) Jakarta Post, 14 November. ‘Risks That May Hinder Boom in Indonesia’, Straits Times, 15 January 2013 reprinted in Jakarta Globe, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/risks-that-may-hinderboom-in-Indonesia/565796 Roberts, Christopher (2013) ‘The Future of East and Southeast Asian Regionalism’, in Andrew Tan, ed., East and Southeast Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives, 279–90 (London: Routledge). ——— (2012) ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge). ——— (2012) ‘State Weakness and Political Values: Ramifications for the ASEAN Community’, in Ralf Emmers, ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, 11–26 (Milton Park: Routledge). Roberts, George (2013) ‘Indonesia Rejects the Coalition’s Asylum Seeker Policy’, ABC News, 14 June. Siagian, Sabam and Endy Bayuni (2012) ‘RI-Australia Ties — It’s More Important to Be Nice’, Jakarta Post, 14 November. Skidmore, David and Valerie M. Hudson (1993) The Limits to State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder: Westview), 3. Smith, Stephen (2012) ‘Australia and Indonesia: Strategic Partners’, Australian Department of Defence, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/09/04/ministerfor-defence-australia-and-indonesia-strategic-partners/ ‘Sour Times with a Big Neighbour’. Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (2010) ‘Indonesia-Australia Relations in the Era of Democracy: The View from the Indonesian Side’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 45: 1, 117–32. Supriyanto, Ristian A. (2013) ‘Rebalancing and Indonesia: US Pacific Presence Will Force Jakarta to Choose’, Defence News International, 8 July. Tapsell, Ross (2010) ‘Friendship between Leaders is Not Necessarily the Key to Good Relations’, Jakarta Post, 22 March. Taylor, Lenore (2013) ‘Indonesia “Would Co-Operate” with Coalition on Boats’, Guardian, 3 June. Thakur, Ramesh (2013) ‘Australia, Indonesia Moving as Close as Perceptions Allow’, Japan Times, 2 May. Valencia, Mark J. (2012) ‘US Pivot Making Waves in the Region’, Straits Times, 3 April. Walker, David and Agnieszka Sobocinska, eds (2012) Australia’s Asia, from Yellow Peril to Asian Century (Crawley, WA: UWA Publishing). White, Hugh (2013) ‘Northern Exposure: What the Rise of Indonesia Means for Australia’, Monthly, June, 30–7. Wiryono, S. (2006) ‘An Indonesian View: Indonesia, Australia and the Region’, in John Montries, ed., Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region, Indonesia Update Series, ISEAS. Woolcott, Richard (2012), ‘Indonesia and Australia in the Asian Century’, GlobeAsia, September.

Christopher B. Roberts and Ahmad D. Habir 223 ‘Yudhoyono Reinstates Australian Ambassador to Regain Bilateral Ties’ (2014) Jakarta Globe, May 20. Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2010) ‘Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia’ (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates), 2136–40.

11 The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation between Indonesia and Australia? Mark Beeson and Will Lee

Middle powers have suddenly become fashionable again. The economic and strategic problems currently being experienced by the United States (US) and China’s still limited ability to shape the international system, suggest that there are currently opportunities for non-great powers to influence international affairs.1 Indeed, there is a growing literature that focuses on the role that might be played by those states that are neither superpowers nor failing, but which are seeking to play a more prominent role in the international system. Australia has been at the forefront of this process, but its most immediate neighbor and the principal focus of the following discussion—Indonesia—is also increasingly described as a significant regional middle power. Just as important, Indonesia has been experimenting with some aspects of middle power diplomacy, even if it does not always use this term widely. It is an opportune moment, therefore, to revisit middle power theory, explain its recent resurgence and see whether Indonesia actually measures up. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s statement that ‘in any international forum, including ASEAN and the G-20, Indonesia will bridge different visions between nation-states and show Indonesia’s moderate and strong views’, captures the predilection of middle powers for multilateral cooperation and playing the sort of role that the superpowers possibly cannot, for all their more obvious strengths.2 Although there is no complete agreement on what precisely makes a middle power, its position in the international hierarchy of states and its diplomatic behavior are, as we shall explain, generally thought to be pivotal—especially by states such as Australia and Canada, which have employed both the language and the underlying rationale for middle power activism. Both of these states are comfortably in the world’s top 20 economies, have a significant strategic capacity, and a track record of activist, multilateral diplomacy. The key initial question, therefore, is whether Indonesia has both the capacity and the will to fulfil the type of role that middle power theory suggests it might. 224

Mark Beeson and Will Lee 225

Indonesia is especially important in this regard because it has not only joined Australia in the world’s economic top 20—and may soon overtake it, many think—but it is an increasingly prominent member of the international community. Like the idea of middle powers, this phrase is less illuminating than we might wish,3 but it is suggestive of those states that aspire to greater foreign policy prominence. In this context, the possible importance of the middle power label is potentially even more significant for Indonesia than it is for Australia: no longer—quite so—preoccupied with maintaining internal stability, newly enriched, and internationally recognized as the first among notional equals in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has begun to assume a more prominent international profile.4 One marker of its transition from a Southeast Asian power to one with greater international influence is, like Australia, its accession to the Group of Twenty (G-20). Consequently, Indonesia’s relationship with Australia provides an illuminating case study of Indonesia’s changing foreign policy priorities and the factors that might allow middle powers to play a more prominent and influential international role. Before trying to decide whether this will change Indonesia’s relationship with Australia—or the rest of Southeast Asia, for that matter—it is useful to say something about the historical context in which the bilateral relationship has evolved. Our discussion is organized in the following way. First, we provide a brief overview of middle power theory and some of its key assumptions. Second, we provide a snapshot of Indonesia’s capacities, capabilities and some of the key changes that have happened in that country which have encouraged observers to consider it as an emerging middle power. Third, we consider Indonesia’s relationship with Australia in particular because Australia is a self-styled middle power. This relationship provides a crucial test of both the efficacy of the theory and the practical impact of both countries’ evolving foreign policies. Finally, we assess the prospects for middle power diplomacy in the region more generally. We argue that despite the fact that some regional states, Indonesia included, consider themselves as middle powers, translating this into cooperative activities and/or more cordial relations remains a challenge—as the recent deterioration in Australia’s Indonesian ties reminds us. In other words, national interests and sensitivities may continue to distinguish and complicate relations between otherwise similarly positioned states.

Middle power theory and practice The scholarship on middle powers is increasingly germane to Indonesia for two related reasons. First, there have been a number of changes within Indonesia itself, particularly as a consequence of post-Suharto democratization, that have led to a reappraisal of its overall significance in the international system. For example, Jakarta has been at the forefront of efforts to

226 The Middle Power Moment

introduce some semblance of a ‘rules-based’ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by proposing an ASEAN peacekeeping force and a ‘security community’ that is less accepting of unconstitutional governmental changes. Nabbs-Keller attributes this diplomatic activism to the changing balance in Indonesia’s civil–military relations, as the military rescinds its formal involvement in domestic politics.5 There have been longstanding constraints on Jakarta’s ability to play a prominent role in multilateral institutions because of its well-known sensitivity about questions of sovereignty. There are, however, signs that, since it has resolved problems such as East Timor’s status, Indonesia may be able to play a more prominent international role. It is important to recognize that such a role would not be unprecedented. For example, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Jakarta successfully lobbied to preside over the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and it was also instrumental in shaping APEC’s Bogor Goals that sought to substantially reduce trade tariffs.6 No doubt, these are instances of rules-based behavior, but what is significant about Jakarta’s latest bout of diplomatic activism is that it is occurring in a context of greater democratization. Indonesia’s successful democratic transition is not only a noteworthy achievement in itself, but it gives greater credibility and legitimacy to its foreign policy initiatives. It also means that it is much more similar to and potentially able to cooperate with other established middle powers such as Australia and Canada. The second reason why middle powers have suddenly become muchdiscussed in an Indonesian context is that there have been major changes in the international system itself over the last few decades, which have led some observers to believe that the ‘middle power moment’ may be at hand.7 It is important to recognize that middle power theory has come in waves. At different times, there has been heightened interest in the concept and this has undoubtedly reflected changes in the structure of the international system. It is no coincidence that the first major wave of middle power theorizing and commentary occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War’s sudden and almost entirely unexpected ending. The sudden shift of analytical and policymaking attention from geopolitics to geoeconomics not only seemed to define the post-Cold War era,8 but it also raised major questions about the continuing efficacy of some of the most influential assumptions of International Relations (IR) scholarship.9 After all, for decades IR theory had been predicated on the idea that the basic structure of the international system was bipolar. This structure was unlikely to change, it was thought, because of the nature of contemporary weapons systems and the irreconcilable nature of ideological competition. And yet, Southeast Asians played a surprisingly creative role even in the challenging strategic environment of the Cold War. The Bandung conference of non-aligned nations was important symbolically, and the creation


of ASEAN was a significant and enduring expression of institutional innovation in a part of the world not known for independence of action.10 And yet ASEAN was an essentially defensive response to a range of internal and especially external security challenges: its primary purpose was to reinforce a still fragile sovereignty, rather than playing any sort of larger, more creative and independent role on the regional—much less the world— stage.11 Middle powers, by contrast, are generally thought to enjoy both a certain material weight and institutional capacity, but also a desire to act as an independent source of policy innovation and creative diplomacy. Despite fulfilling some of the criteria of middle powerdom, ASEAN has not been noted for its contribution to international problem-solving or policy innovation. On the contrary, for most of its existence, ASEAN has been preoccupied with internal affairs and constrained by the politics of the lowest common denominator and the need to maintain regional solidarity. Even ASEAN’s finest diplomatic hour—the resolution of the Cambodian crisis— strongly depended on a coincidence of interests with the superpowers.12 Expectations of what constitutes effective middle power diplomacy, by contrast, are set rather higher. In their seminal and influential treatise on middle powers that has recently enjoyed renewed attention, Cooper et al. suggested that middle powers are ‘defined primarily by their behavior’, especially their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide diplomacy.13 The emphasis on behavior is important and illuminating because it helps to overcome one of the key criticisms of middle power theory—that it is potentially so generalized as to be analytically meaningless—and places an emphasis on agency rather than structure. In other words, if the concept of middle powers is to be useful at all, it is because it captures something important about the actions of states that occupy broadly similar, structurally embedded positions in the international system. What this suggests, therefore, is that while a number of states may have the requisite attributes of economic, strategic and political power, their status as middle powers depends on their ability and willingness to act in particular ways that set them apart from both their similarly endowed peers and from the great states that have traditionally dominated the international system.14 In this regard, Australia can lay claim to being the quintessential case in point, and it is no coincidence that considerable analytical attention has been focused upon it as a consequence.15 Australia’s hyperactive former foreign minister, Gareth Evans, authored a book which made the case for the sort of innovative ‘niche diplomacy’ that


has become the aspirational hallmark of middle power diplomacy.16 There is no doubt that Australia has performed admirably in this regard, as its contributions to the establishment of the Cairns group of agricultural producers and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum demonstrate.17 The Australian exemplar also demonstrates the limits and constraints that may afflict middle powers, and consequently provides a useful point of comparison for the Indonesian case. Significantly and somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, Indonesia may not be as constrained as Australia in its foreign policy options. The primary consideration for generations of Australian foreign policy officials has been national security. A preoccupation with national security is equally true for Indonesia, of course, but Indonesia has not sought to secure this via a formal alliance relationship that—in the minds of Australian policymakers, at least—periodically obliges Australia to go to war to shore-up its strategic credentials. True, Indonesia is enmeshed in a series of institutionalized strategic relationships, but these are much looser and carry far fewer obligations. Indeed, one of the frequent criticisms of ASEAN-inspired security architecture is that it is not influential enough.18 The point to emphasize about Australia, by contrast, is that it has chosen not to exercise independent options in the strategic sphere, and this inevitably limits the scope for what the former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd calls ‘creative’ middle power diplomacy. What these preliminary theoretical and comparative remarks suggest, therefore, is that middle powers are defined by their potential to behave in distinctive ways that are frequently at odds with much of the conventional theorizing in IR. Even if putative middle powers sometimes fall short of realizing the expectations of the theory because they choose not to exercise independent agency, the model provides a useful basis for thinking about both the distinctive qualities that characterize the not-so-great powers, and the sorts of behaviors that might make middle powers potential allies and collaborators. As we saw in the Australian case, however, an assessment of the utility of this model, together with the assumptions it makes, necessitates a need to look closely at the contingent circumstances that shape individual state behavior. This claim is equally apposite in the case of Indonesia.

Is Indonesia a middle power? Defining middle powers by their capabilities rather than their behavior has its pitfalls. So many countries fall in the gap between great powers and failing states that the category of middle powers threatens to become meaningless. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that Indonesia has


recently experienced a fairly rapid rise up in the international pecking order—particularly as a consequence of its recent post-Asian crisis economic development. Hugh White has argued that Australian policymakers need to recognize and adjust to Indonesia’s economic rise, rather than be fixated with ‘second order issues’ such as asylum-seeker arrivals.19 Indonesia’s GDP currently places it in 16th position in a comparative ranking of states, between South Korea and the Netherlands—also quintessential candidates for middle power status. Indeed, South Korea in particular has also begun to position itself rhetorically as a middle power to describe its evolving diplomatic efforts.20 This merits emphasis because the East Asian region contains a number of other potential middle powers, such as Japan and Thailand, with which Indonesia might be expected to cooperate to promote issues of common concern, if such issues could be identified. Indonesia’s rapidly expanding middle class and its conduct of a number of successful democratic elections over the last decade or so, in which power changed hands peacefully between rival political parties, also suggests that it has acquired some of the internal political structures and values to underpin some of the behavioral aspects of middle powers.21 Middle powers are, after all, frequently associated with the championing of ‘progressive’ international causes, and their invariable status as democracies gives such normative agendas greater potential credence. The fact that selfidentifying middle powers are democracies also provides a basis for cooperation that may transcend some of the constraints of existing forums, especially those imposed by sovereignty. The principal manifestation of this possibility is Indonesia’s relationship with ASEAN, which has become increasingly complex. Indonesia has traditionally been the leader of the ASEAN grouping and a major influence on its trajectory. While Suharto was president, ASEAN suited Indonesian interests: ASEAN has been primarily concerned with reinforcing domestic sovereignty, reducing intra-regional tensions, and giving legitimacy to various ruling elites—all goals that suited the Suharto regime. However, what had previously been seen as ASEAN’s strengths—its collegiality, consensus and willingness to compromise—are now seen as impediments to action. A number of ASEAN’s more progressive members, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, are becoming increasingly frustrated by the difficulty of acting through ASEAN’s auspices.22 While the celebrated—or reviled—‘ASEAN Way’ may have had its uses when Indonesia was an authoritarian state in the early stages of political and economic development, it increasingly looks like an organization that Indonesia may be beginning to outgrow. Rizal Sukma, the Executive Director at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, calls for Indonesia to embrace a ‘post-ASEAN’ foreign policy if it is not to continually yield to the preferences of its authoritarian neighbors in ASEAN.23


Plainly, membership of multiple formal political groupings or even conceptual frameworks is possible—Indonesia is, after all, increasingly referred to as a prospective ‘BRIC’,24 as well as a middle power. In Indonesia’s case, the fact that it has not only begun to act like a middle power in playing a more prominent part in various multilateral organizations, but has also begun to use the language of middlepowerdom is especially significant. For example, Santo Darmosumarto, an advisor on international relations to former President Yudhoyono, argues that Indonesia’s conception of itself as a middle power ‘ensures it has a role in mediating and linking the small and great world powers’.25 In many ways, Indonesia’s evolving internal political debate and the increasing sophistication and external orientation of its foreign policies is putting itself at odds with some of the more conservative, authoritarian members of ASEAN. As Jürgen Rüland points out, Indonesia’s self-styled role as ASEAN’s ‘normative power’ is regarded by fellow ASEAN members as a dual threat: it nurtures apprehension about Indonesian hegemony in ASEAN and, especially in the non-democratic ASEAN member states, fears of an erosion of domestic political stability.26 But what is a problem for a number of Indonesia’s ASEAN partners may be an opportunity for a fellow middle power such as Australia. For years the relationship between Australia and Indonesia has been characterized by misunderstandings and tensions at the political level and a lack of integration in the economic sphere. If Indonesia’s status as a middle power is to amount to anything, its relationship with Australia consequently provides an important test case.

The evolving relationship The bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia is becoming increasingly significant for both countries and provides an important insight into relations between middle powers, whether they think of themselves in this manner or not. In part, this reflects Indonesia’s growing economic and strategic weight in the region as its most populous state, and an Islamic one at that. For Australian policymakers in particular—especially in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) and Bali bombings—a key concern has been that Indonesia’s rather relaxed version of Islam might become radicalized. Thus far, there are few signs of this happening, at least in the realm of foreign policy. The security cooperation between Australia and Indonesia and the success of counterterrorism operations is testimony to the deepening of the relationship, even if it reinforces unfortunate stereotypes about Australia coming to the aid of its fragile neighbor.27


However, things have not always been as cordial and there is no guarantee that they will remain so. It is important to remember that for most of Indonesia’s relatively brief history as an independent state, middle power status looked unlikely. Although it is not clear whether aspiring middle powers need to be democratic, it plainly adds a degree of legitimacy that greases diplomatic wheels for those that are.28 Indonesia had until recently been ruled by Suharto, a leader with whom Australian policymakers had considerable difficulty convincing a skeptical public about the merits of close ties. Nevertheless, a key part of former prime minister Paul Keating’s ‘engagement’ with Asia was the attempt to ‘throw in Australia’s lot with Indonesia in a more committed and unreserved way than ever before’.29 The rejection of the Keating agenda in the 1996 election is a reminder of the difficulty of translating major foreign policy initiatives into saleable elements of domestic public policy. In other words, Australia provides a sobering reminder of the potential disconnect between an activist and ambitious foreign policy agenda and a public with little interest in foreign affairs. The great hope now, of course, is that a democratic Indonesia will prove to be a more reliable and acceptable partner, especially as its economic significance continues to grow. While this may eventually prove to be the case, it is important to remember that for many strategic thinkers in Australia, the old Indonesia was not without its merits—at least when judged from a rather self-interested calculus of realpolitik. Unattractive as the Suharto regime may have been in many ways, it had two great redeeming features as far as Australian policymakers were concerned: predictability and stability. For decades, Suharto maintained domestic order and thus minimized the potential threat posed by a chaotic, destabilized Indonesia. While the direct military threat posed by Indonesia may have been modest, even this could be discounted in the knowledge that its primary strategic focus was internal. Keating pragmatically noted that ‘Suharto is the best thing in strategic terms that had happened for Australia; by bringing stability to the archipelago he has minimized the Australian defense budget’.30 From a pragmatic policy perspective, therefore, one question that remains unanswered is whether—Australia’s progressive middle power rhetoric notwithstanding—some aspects of the relationship with Indonesia may actually have been easier to manage under the authoritarian Suharto regime than they are currently, where many more voices may demand a say in defining bilateral ties.31 The potential difficulty Indonesia’s more liberal political system could pose for bilateral relations is made painfully clear by the revelations about Australian intelligence gathering in Indonesia. Not only were Australia’s indiscretions widely publicized in the Indonesian media, leaving the government little diplomatic room for maneuver, but it was also clear that the Australian government’s position


at the heart of regional spying activities severely constrained its foreign policy options also.32 In addition to these spying allegations, post-Suharto Indonesia is also more vocal about the treatment of its citizens abroad; for example, Australia’s detention of Indonesian youths who skipper asylumseeker boats. From the perspective of Canberra, one of the disadvantages of Indonesia’s democratic transition is that policymaking in Indonesia has become more complex. More actors and potential ‘veto players’ are involved in the construction of foreign policy in democratic Indonesia, and as a consequence this necessarily makes it less predictable.33 Authoritarianism in Indonesia was not without its attractions, for it dovetailed with Australia’s anxiety about Asia. It is not necessary to become bogged down in relatively arcane debates about the construction of national identities to recognize that Australia’s Western social and political heritage is a potential source of friction when juxtaposed to some of Asia’s. The focus of such tensions has often been human rights issues, about which—critics argue—successive Australian governments have maintained a studious silence.34 ‘National interests’, the argument goes, routinely trump ethical principles. The newly-installed Abbott government has been at pains to assure the Indonesian government about both the importance it attaches to the relationship and its intention not to be sidetracked by second-order issues, such as the ‘grandstanding’ of West Papuan independence activists.35 Yet, the calculus of national interests is equally complex in Indonesia.36 While Indonesia was an authoritarian regime, such differences were not always observed or important. Now, however, views about Australia generally and the best way to conduct bilateral ties reflect the underlying reality of greater political contestations in Indonesia. Kai He argues that different calibrations of international pressure combine with the political legitimacy of the relevant post-Suharto administration to determine patterns of state behavior across policy issues.37 Key bilateral issues such as managing the problem of asylum-seekers consequently reflect a diversity of opinion about possible policy responses. In this regard, Southeast Asian states are no different to their counterparts elsewhere, and reflect contingent struggles for power and the expression of competing interests.38

Competing interests For Indonesia and especially Australia, relations with other countries are more important than relations with each other. Despite all the talk about the commonalities that supposedly exist between, if not actually unite, middle powers, the reality is more prosaic and raises questions about how much the international system has actually changed. Although there is much animated discussion about the rise of the BRICs and the possible


inclusion of Indonesia in an expanded BRIIC,39 at this stage much about the international system looks surprisingly familiar, and the foreign policies of Australia and Indonesia continue to reflect this. For Australia in particular, its principal economic and strategic relations lie elsewhere. China has rapidly become Australia’s main trade partner and the United States remains its principal security guarantor. Indeed, relations with the United States dominate all other foreign policy concerns, including how it manages its relations with China and the rest of the region.40 The recent decision to station troops in Darwin was part of Australia’s longrunning policy of strategically binding itself to the dominant Western power of the era. It was not only the Chinese who predictably expressed indignation at this turn of events,41 but Indonesia also expressed surprise about the development of a major military base on its doorstep,42 even though its primary intent was to curb Chinese, rather than Indonesian influence. The point to emphasize is that many of Australia’s most important bilateral relationships remain subordinate to those with the US, circumscribing Australia’s policymaking autonomy as a consequence. But for Indonesia, too, relations with other states and institutions complicate bilateral relations. In Indonesia’s case the primary independent variable is ASEAN. For all the Southeast Asian states, ASEAN has had historical importance as a vehicle with which to manage sometimes fractious intraregional relations, reinforcing domestic sovereignty, and generally raising the international profile and significance of the entire Southeast Asian region.43 Even though the famed ASEAN consensus has begun to unravel and the organization itself appears increasingly unable to respond to a rapidly changing regional environment, Jakarta still attaches much importance to ASEAN as a vehicle for its diplomatic ambitions. Kevin Rudd’s proposal for an Asia Pacific Community was jettisoned because, to quote the former head of the foreign affairs committee of the Indonesian parliament, Theo Sambuaga, ‘rather than create a new body in the Asia-Pacific, why don’t you push the development of ASEAN?’44 In light of diverging foreign policy directions posed by Indonesia’s democratic identity and the path-dependency of the ‘ASEAN Way’, what can be safely concluded is that there are inconsistencies in Indonesia’s contemporary foreign policy. When thwarted by its more authoritarian neighbors, Jakarta has advocated internationalism in the form of a peacekeeping force in an ASEAN Security Community underpinned by liberaldemocratic norms. However, its reticence in ratifying the ASEAN Transboundary Pollution Agreement, citing ‘national interests’, is a reminder of the continuing domestic constraints on policy.45 This is making Australia’s increasingly important neighbor less predictable in some ways. For admirers of middle power theory, this may come as something of a surprise, but it is a reminder of the extent to which conceptions


of ‘national interests’ can differ, and just how much parochial concerns can shape national priorities.

Still strange neighbors? One of the problems facing both Indonesia and Australia is that it is often assumed that there is a relatively clear sense of ‘the national interest’ when it comes to international relations. And yet, whether we consider specific bilateral ties or a more general international role, there is often an intense national debate about the content of foreign policy and the best venues for prosecuting it. In Australia’s case, this was most evident during the Howard era, when the former prime minister and his foreign minister Alexander Downer displayed a marked preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral relationships.46 In part, this reflected heightened skepticism about the role and value of institutions such as the United Nations. In part, it was also a continuation of the Howard government’s intense strategic loyalty to and ideological affinity with the administration of George W. Bush. But even if we acknowledge that this was an especially controversial geopolitical period, the idea that Australia might have had particular interests that flowed primarily from its position as a middle power looked inherently implausible. Subsequent governments have continued the Howard government policy of cultivating close strategic ties with the US, a policy that is likely to enjoy renewed emphasis under Tony Abbott. But even in an arena where we might expect Australia to take a more independent line and unambiguously establish its middle power credentials, the reality looks rather different. Australia’s successful campaign to obtain a temporary seat on the UN Security Council might mark an important vote of confidence in one of the world’s premier multinational organizations, but it is unlikely to result in policies that are out of kilter with an established pattern that reflects strategic and even ideational dependency.47 The idea that Australia would take a position at odds with the US or its key allies such as Israel is almost unthinkable. The significance of such policies and attitudes here is not their intrinsic merit, but their impact on possible independent middle power action: because much of Australia’s foreign policy is non-negotiable, the prospects for developing collaborative positions with the likes of Indonesia are more remote. Indeed, there are signs that newly democratic Indonesia may be more capable of assuming an independent position on key issues than Australia. In some ways Indonesia is fortunate that it is not as directly involved in the growing territorial disputes with China as are some of its fellow ASEAN members, such as the Philippines and Vietnam.48 But as noted, this has only served to highlight the differences between ASEAN members and heighten Indonesia’s growing frustration with the Westphalian underpin-


nings of ASEAN. Indonesia is also unconstrained by a long-term strategic dependence of the sort that Australia has with the US. Although this confers some notional freedom of action, in reality Indonesia must also take the actions and preferences of the great powers inside and outside its region seriously.49 Even where we might expect the greatest potential for collaboration to exist, hegemonic priorities and expectations continue to impose limitations. The G-20, which potentially brings together a number of traditional great powers and other ‘systemically important’ emerging economies,50 is a new institution of which both Australian and Indonesian policymakers are delighted to be a part. Schirm’s analysis of the internal politicking within the G-20 suggests that new thinking and alignments may be able to overcome divisions between industrialized and emerging states, auguring well for Australia–Indonesia cooperation if true.51 Their joint convening of the ‘Growth with resilience’ chapter of the G-20 development working group during 2011, which focused on ‘social protection’, is illustrative of this possibility. Likewise, the G-20 potentially offers a venue in which Indonesia in particular can escape the frustrations and limited scope of ASEAN. But as far as the Group’s ostensible rationale of reforming the international financial system is concerned, little of consequence has changed— something that reflects the continuing influence of the US, Wall Street, and the sheer difficulty of achieving consensus on needed reforms.52 As Australian officials have also discovered, while it may be gratifying to have a seat at the ‘big table’ and to have the chance to air one’s views, this is no guarantee that they will be taken seriously or make a difference.53 There are a number of other emerging multilateral organizations that have the potential to influence the development of the region in which both Australia and Indonesia are members. In some ways, Australia has more at stake in a regional context than does Indonesia. After all, Indonesia is securely embedded in, if not the de facto leader of, the region’s most established regional grouping: ASEAN. Australia, by contrast, is potentially an outsider, which makes the very definition of the ‘the region’ and its putative membership far more consequential.54 Although Australia has abandoned Kevin Rudd’s brainchild—the Asia Pacific Community—the consolidation of the East Asian Summit (EAS) achieves essentially the same goals: not only is Australia in, but so, too, is the US. Indonesia’s policy towards the EAS, especially in retaining Washington’s external balancing role, is remarkably similar to Australia’s, despite a notionally independent ‘free and active’ (bebas dan aktif) foreign policy. Indeed, Canberra and Jakarta have a broadly similar view of the possible benefits of continuing American dominance and engagement in underpinning regional order. Nevertheless, they struggle to act in concert to bring this about. It can be argued that Jakarta places more importance on Washington’s—diminishing—role as a provider of global public goods,


while Canberra is more closely aligned with the US’s strategic priorities.55 This helps to explain what Hugh White calls Australia’s ‘strategic ambivalence’ in relation to Indonesia.56 The notion of ‘strategic ambivalence’ conveys something important about Australian policymakers’ historical attitudes towards its most immediate and consequential neighbor: whether Indonesia is strong or weak, it is a source of concern for many in Canberra. Despite Paul Keating’s recent call for much closer ties with Indonesia,57 therefore, there are still significant limits to the degree of cooperation that is possible, either bilaterally or through multilateral auspices.

Concluding remarks Despite their possible status as middle powers, Australia and Indonesia maintain quite different priorities and foreign policy goals. Such a possibility should come as no surprise, of course, to observers with a sense of the distinctive histories of the two countries. For all the fashionable talk about the possibilities of policy ‘convergence’,58 which is often implicit in discussions of middle powers, it is also plain that the contemporary policymaking context and dynamics in Australia and Indonesia remain very different— the latter’s transition to democracy notwithstanding. Democracies may not fight each other as often as they do other regimes,59 but this is not necessarily because their leaders subscribe to identical world views. Much the same can be said of middle powers. Indeed, it is striking that Australia—a democracy and middle power of some standing—retains what Edward Luttwak describes as ‘the Anglo-Saxon trait of bellicosity.’60 In other words, Australia’s participation in every recent war of note and Indonesia’s relative quiescence cannot be simply read off their respective international circumstances. On the contrary, the foreign policies of middle powers—like those of any others—continue to reflect a complex, contingent amalgam of historical and contemporary influences. What distinguishes them as a group is their relatively limited ability to implement them. Similarly positioned and endowed states could collaborate; whether they will is more an expression of agency than structure. In this context, one of the most important and counterintuitive possibilities that emerges from a comparative examination of Australia and Indonesia is that, despite Australia’s history as an advocate of the merits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy, it may be Indonesia rather than Australia that is better-placed to put such potential into practice. Not only has Indonesia rapidly acquired the material prerequisites of middle power status, but unlike Australia it is not encumbered by the self-imposed strategic constraints that continue to determine the course of Australian foreign policy. True, relations with ASEAN remain a major consideration for Indonesia’s policymakers, but there are signs that Indonesia is beginning to outgrow an organization that has failed to exert the leadership and


influence that many of its admirers hoped. Of course, a role beyond the region may not be incompatible with a continuing role in ASEAN, but the very fact that Indonesia is increasingly seen as a state with the potential to play a role beyond Southeast Asia suggests it will be an important test case of the theoretical and practical utility of middle power diplomacy.

Notes 1 Layne, Christopher (2012) ‘This time it’s real: The end of unipolarity and the Pax Americana’, International Studies Quarterly, 56(1), 203–13; Beeson, Mark (2013) ‘Can China lead? Third World Quarterly, 34(2), 235–52. 2 Hermawan, Y. et al. (2011) The Role of Indonesia in the G-20: Background, Role and Objectives of Indonesia’s Membership, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Available at: (Accessed on 15 December 2012). 3 David, C. E. (2009) ‘On the possibility of “international community”’, International Studies Review, 11(1): 1–26. 4 Laksmana, E. A. (2011) ‘Indonesia’s rising regional and global profile: Does size really matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32(2): 157–82. 5 Greta Nabbs-Keller (2013) ‘Reforming Indonesia’s foreign ministry: Ideas, organization and leadership’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 35(1): 56–82. 6 Leo Suryadinata (1996) Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership (Singapore: Times Academic Press). 7 For a more detailed exploration of this literature and the evolution of the international system, see Beeson, M. and Higgott, R. (2014) ‘The changing architecture of politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia’s middle power moment?’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 14(2): 215–37. 8 Luttwak, E. (1990) ‘From geopolitics to geo-economics’, The National Interest (Summer): 17–23. 9 Lebow, R. N. (1994) ‘The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism’, International Organization, 48(2): 249–77. 10 Acharya, A. (2012) The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region, 2nd edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 11 Narine, S. (2002) Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). 12 Jones, D. M. and Smith, M. L. (2001) ‘The changing security agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, new terror, and the delusions of regionalism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24: 271–88. 13 Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R. A. and Nossal, K. R. (1993) Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press), p. 19. 14 See Beeson and Higgott ‘The changing architecture of politics in the AsiaPacific’. 15 Ungerer, C. (2007) ‘The “middle power” concept in Australian foreign policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 53(4): 538–51; Carr, A. (2014) ‘Is Australia a middle power? A systemic impact approach’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(1): 70–84. 16 Evans, G. and Grant, B. (1991) Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press).

238 The Middle Power Moment 17 Higgott, R. and Cooper, A. (1990) ‘Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round’, International Organization, 44(4). 18 Yuzawa, T. (2012) ‘The ASEAN regional forum: Challenges and prospects’, in Beeson, M. and Stubbs, R., The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge), pp. 338–49. 19 White, H. (2013) ‘What Indonesia’s rise means for Australia’, The Monthly, June, No. 90. 20 Kim, W. (2008) ‘Korea as a middle power in the Northeast Asian security environment’, in Ikenberry, G. J. and Moon, C. (eds) The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 123–41. 21 However, it is important to note that significant problems of patronage and corruption remain and these may make the construction of ‘good’ policy, let alone its effective implementation, problematic. See Brooks, K. (2011) ‘Is Indonesia bound for the BRICS? How stalling reform could hold Jakarta back’, Foreign Affairs, 90(6): 109–18. 22 Dosch, J. (2008) ‘ASEAN’s reluctant liberal turn and the thorny road to democracy promotion’, Pacific Review, 21(4): 527–45. 23 Sukma, R. (2009) ‘Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy’, Jakarta Post, available from: (accessed 1 December 2013). 24 Vaswani, K. (2013) ‘Should Indonesia be the I in the BRICS?’, BBC News, 27 March, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21921593 (accessed 1 December 2013). 25 Darmosumarto, S. 2009, ‘Indonesia: A new “middle power”’, Jakarta Post, available from: (accessed 1 December 2013). 26 Rüland, J. (2009) ‘Deepening ASEAN cooperation through democratization? The Indonesian legislature and foreign policymaking’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 9, p. 379. 27 Chauvel, R. (2006) ‘Australia and Indonesia: Living in different strategic worlds’, in McDougall, D. and Shearman, P. (eds) Australian Security After 9/11: New and Old Agendas (Hampshire: Ashgate), pp. 145 and 159. 28 Chapman, T. L. (2009) ‘Audience beliefs and international organization legitimacy’, International Organization, 63(04): 733–64; Hall, R. B. (1997) ‘Moral authority as a power resource’, International Organization, 51(4): 591–622. 29 Dalrymple, R. (2003) Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate). 30 Boyle, M. (2002) Policy-making and Pragmatism: Australia’s Management of Security Cooperation with Indonesia during the New Order Period, UNSW/ADFA PhD thesis, 334. 31 Indonesia’s publically expressed unhappiness about alleged Australian spying is one example of an issue that has assumed a very high profile, in part because of evident outrage among various interest groups in Indonesia. See, Alford, P. and Nicholson, B. (2013) ‘Furious Jakarta to haul in Australian ambassador over spying claims’, The Australian, 1 November. 32 Dorling, Philip (2013) ‘Australian outback station at forefront of US spying arsenal’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 July. 33 Ruland, J. (2009) ‘Deepening ASEAN cooperation through democratization? The Indonesian legislature and foreign policymaking’, International Relations of the


34 35 36 37

38

39 40 41 42

43 44

45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Asia-Pacific, 9: 373–402; Sulistiyanto, P. (2010), ‘Indonesia-Australia relations in the era of democracy: The view from the Indonesian side’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 45(1): 117–32. Burke, A. (2010) ‘Questions of community: Australian identity and Asian change’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 45(1): 80. Sheridan, G. (2013a) ‘Abbott in Indonesia: The adventure begins’, The Australian, 3 October. On the construction of national interests, see Weldes, J. (1996) ‘Constructing national interests’, European Journal of International Relations, 2(3): 275–318. He, K. (2008) ‘Indonesia’s foreign policy after Soeharto: International pressure, democratization, and policy change’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 8(1): 49. Jones, L. (2009) ‘Democratisation and foreign policy in Southeast Asia: The case of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22(3): 391. Brooks, K. (2011) ‘Is Indonesia bound for the BRICS? How stalling reform could hold Jakarta back’, Foreign Affairs, 90(6): 109–18. Beeson, M. (2011) ‘Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 65(5): 563–77. Sainsbury, M. (2012) ‘Chinese grilling has Stephen Smith on defensive over US ties’, The Australian, 7 June. McDonald, S. and Brown, H. (2011) ‘China, Indonesia wary of US troops in Darwin’, ABC News, available at: , accessed 15 December 2012. Narine, S. (2002) Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Frost, F. (2009) ‘Australia’s proposal for an “Asia Pacific Community”: Issues and prospects’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper, no. 13, available from: (accessed 1 December 2013). Acharya, A. (2009) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd edition (Oxon and New York: Routledge), pp. 254 and 265. Wesley, M. (2007) The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996–2006 (Sydney: ABC Books). Sheridan, G. (2013b) ‘Unstinting support for Israel back in place’, The Australian, 26 September. Storey, I. (2012) ‘ASEAN is a house divided’, Wall Street Journal, 14 June. Novotny, D. (2010) Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). Soederberg, S. (2010) ‘The politics of representation and financial fetishism: The case of the G-20 summits’, Third World Quarterly, 31(4): 529. Schirm, S. (2013) ‘Global politics are domestic politics: A societal approach to divergence in the G-20’, Review of International Studies, 39(3): 685–706. Beeson, M. and Bell, S. (2009) ‘The G-20 and international economic governance: Hegemony, collectivism, or both?’, Global Governance, 15(1): 67–86. Wade, R. H. (2011) ‘Emerging world order? From multipolarity to multilateralism in the G-20, the World Bank, and the IMF’, Politics & Society, 39(3): 347–78. See Beeson, M. (2006) ‘American hegemony and regionalism: The rise of East Asia and the end of the Asia-Pacific’, Geopolitics, 11(4): 541–60; Higgott, R. and


55 56

57 58 59 60

Nossal, K. (2008), ‘Odd man in, odd man out: Australia’s liminal position in Asia revisited–a reply to Ann Capling’, Pacific Review, 21(5): 623–34. Beeson, M. (2003) ‘Australia’s relationship with the United States: The case for greater independence’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38(3): 387–405. White, H. (2006), ‘The new Australia-Indonesia strategic relationship: A note of caution’, in Monfries, J. (ed.) Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), p. 45. Keating, P. J. (2012) Asia in the New Order: Australia’s Diminishing Sphere of Influence, The Keith Murdoch Oration, State Library of Victoria, 14 November. Xun, C. (2012) ‘Global networks and domestic policy convergence: A network explanation of policy changes’, World Politics, 64(03): 375–425. Russett, B. M. (1995) Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Luttwak, E. N. (2012) The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press), p. 107.

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav (2009) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd edition (Oxon and New York: Routledge). Acharya, Amitav (2012) The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region, 2nd edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Alford, Peter and Nicholson, Brendan (2013) ‘Furious Jakarta to haul in Australian ambassador over spying claims’, Australian, 1 November. Beeson, Mark (2003) ‘Australia’s relationship with the United States: The case for greater independence’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38: 3, 387–405. ——— (2006) ‘American hegemony and regionalism: The rise of East Asia and the end of the Asia-Pacific’, Geopolitics, 11: 4, 541–60. ——— (2011) ‘Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 65: 5, 563–77. ——— (2013) ‘Can China lead?’ Third World Quarterly, 34: 2, 235–52. Beeson, Mark and Bell, Stephen (2009) ‘The G-20 and international economic governance: Hegemony, collectivism, or both?’, Global Governance, 15: 1, 67–86. Beeson, Mark and Higgott, Richard (2014) ‘The changing architecture of politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia’s middle power moment?’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 14: 2, 215–37. Boyle, Michael (2002) Policy-making and Pragmatism: Australia’s Management of Security Cooperation with Indonesia During the New Order Period, PhD thesis, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. Brooks, Karen (2011) ‘Is Indonesia bound for the BRICS? How stalling reform could hold Jakarta back’, Foreign Affairs, 90: 6, 109–18. Burke, Anthony (2010) ‘Questions of community: Australian identity and Asian change’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 45: 1, 75–93. Carr, Andrew (2014) ‘Is Australia a middle power? A systematic impact approach’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68: 1, 70–84. Chapman, Terrence (2009) ‘Audience beliefs and international organization legitimacy’, International Organization, 63: 4, 733–64. Chauvel, R. (2006) ‘Australia and Indonesia: Living in different strategic worlds’, in Derek McDougall and Peter Shearman (eds) Australian Security After 9/11: New and Old Agendas, 143–60 (Hampshire: Ashgate).

Mark Beeson and Will Lee 241 Cooper, Andrew, Higgott, Richard and Nossal, Kim (1993) Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Carlton: Melbourne University Press). Dalrymple, Rawdon (2003) Continental Drift: Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate). Darmosumarto, Santo (2009) ‘Indonesia: A new “middle power”’, Jakarta Post, 30 October, http://www. thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/30/indonesia-a-newmiddle-power039.html (accessed 1 December 2013). David, C. E. (2009) ‘On the possibility of “international community”’, International Studies Review, 11(1): 1–26. Dorling, Philip (2013) ‘Australian outback station at forefront of US spying arsenal’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 July. Dosch, Jörn (2008) ‘ASEAN’s reluctant liberal turn and the thorny road to democracy promotion’, Pacific Review, 21: 4, 527–45. Ellis, David (2009) ‘On the possibility of “international community”’, International Studies Review, 11: 1, 1–26. Evans, Gareth and Grant, Bruce (1991) Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Carlton: Melbourne University Press). Frost, Frank (2009) ‘Australia’s proposal for an “Asia Pacific Community”: Issues and prospects’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper, No. 13, http://www.aph.gov.au/ binaries/library/pubs/rp/2009-10/10rp13.pdf (accessed 1 December 2013). Hall, Rodney (1997) ‘Moral authority as a power resource’, International Organization, 51: 4, 591–622. He, Kai (2008) ‘Indonesia’s foreign policy after Soeharto: International pressure, democratization, and policy change’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 8: 1, 47–72. Hermawan, Y. et al. (2011) The Role of Indonesia in the G-20: Background, Role and Objectives of Indonesia’s Membership, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Available at: (Accessed on 15 December 2012). Higgott, Richard, Cooper, Andrew (1990) ‘Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round’, International Organization, 44: 4, 589–632. Higgott, Richard and Nossal, Kim (2008) ‘Odd man in, odd man out: Australia’s liminal position in Asia revisited–a reply to Ann Capling’, Pacific Review, 21: 5, 623–34. Jones, David and Smith, Mike (2001) ‘The changing security agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, new terror, and the delusions of regionalism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24: 4, 271–88. Jones, Lee (2009) ‘Democratisation and foreign policy in Southeast Asia: The case of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22: 3, 387–406. Keating, Paul (2012) Asia in the New Order: Australia’s Diminishing Sphere of Influence, The Keith Murdoch Oration, State Library of Victoria, 14 November. Kim, Woosang (2008) ‘Korea as a middle power in the Northeast Asian security environment’, in G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (eds) The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order, 123–41 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield). Laksmana, Evan (2011) ‘Indonesia’s rising regional and global profile: Does size really matter?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33: 2, 157–82. Layne, Christopher (2012) ‘This time it’s real: The end of unipolarity and the Pax Americana’, International Studies Quarterly, 56: 1, 203–13.

242 The Middle Power Moment Lebow, Richard (1994) ‘The long peace, the end of the Cold War, and the failure of realism’, International Organization, 48: 2, 249–77. Luttwak, Edward (1990) ‘From geopolitics to geo-economics’, The National Interest, Summer, 17–23. Luttwak, Edward (2012) The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge: The Belknap Press). McDonald, Stephen and Brown, Helen (2011) ‘China, Indonesia wary of US troops in Darwin’, ABC News, 17 November, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-17/chinaindonesia-wary-of-us-troops-in-darwin/3675866 (accessed 15 December 2012). Nabbs-Keller, Greta (2013) ‘Reforming Indonesia’s foreign ministry: Ideas, organization and leadership’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 35: 1, 56–82. Narine, Shaun (2002) Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner). Novotny, Daniel (2010) Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). Rüland, Jürgen (2009) ‘Deepening ASEAN cooperation through democratization? The Indonesian legislature and foreign policymaking’, International Relations of the AsiaPacific, 9: 3, 373–402. Russett, Bruce (1995) Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Sainsbury, Michael (2012) ‘Chinese grilling has Stephen Smith on defensive over US ties’, Australian, 7 June. Schirm, Stefan (2013) ‘Global politics are domestic politics: A societal approach to divergence in the G-20’, Review of International Studies, 39: 3, 685–706. Sheridan, Greg (2013a) ‘Abbott in Indonesia: The adventure begins’, Australian, 3 October. ——— (2013b) ‘Unstinting support for Israel back in place’, Australian, 26 September. Soederberg, Susanne (2010) ‘The politics of representation and financial fetishism: The case of the G-20 summits’, Third World Quarterly, 31: 4, 523–40. Storey, Ian (2012) ‘ASEAN is a house divided’, Wall Street Journal, 14 June. Sukma, Rizal (2009) ‘Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy’, Jakarta Post, http://www. thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/30/indonesia-needs-a-postaseanforeign-policy.html (accessed 1 December 2013). Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (2010) ‘Indonesia-Australia relations in the era of democracy: The view from the Indonesian side’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 45: 1, 117–32. Suryadinata, Leo (1996) Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership (Singapore: Times Academic Press). Ungerer, Carl (2007) ‘The “middle power” concept in Australian foreign policy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 53: 4, 538–51. Vaswani, Karishma (2013) ‘Should Indonesia be the I in the BRICS?’, BBC News, 27 March, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21921593 (accessed 1 December 2013). Wade, Robert (2011) ‘Emerging world order? From multipolarity to multilateralism in the G-20, the World Bank, and the IMF’, Politics & Society, 39: 3, 347–78. Weldes, Jutta (1996) ‘Constructing national interests’, European Journal of International Relations, 2: 3, 275–318. Wesley, Michael (2007) The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996–2006 (Sydney: ABC Books).

Mark Beeson and Will Lee 243 White, Hugh (2006) ‘The new Australia-Indonesia strategic relationship: A note of caution’, in John Monfries (ed.) Different Societies, Shared Futures: Australia, Indonesia and the Region, 41–53 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). White, Hugh (2013) ‘What Indonesia’s rise means for Australia’, Monthly, 90, June. Xun, Cao (2012) ‘Global networks and domestic policy convergence: A network explanation of policy changes’, World Politics, 64: 3, 375–425. Yuzawa, Takeshi (2012) ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: Challenges and prospects’, in Beeson, M. and Stubbs, R. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, 338–49 (London: Routledge).

12 Key Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships: Opportunities and Challenges Yongwook Ryu

Introduction As the ‘first among equals’, Indonesia has been a critical player in managing intra-ASEAN relations, thereby shaping a role and identity for itself that has increased its leadership status in the region and beyond. This chapter examines the opportunities and challenges for security cooperation between Indonesia and three of its significant ASEAN neighbors: Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. As the three countries differ in important aspects ranging from size, economic development, religion, ethnicity, and the timing of their entry into ASEAN, an examination of Indonesia’s policy toward these three countries will shed much light on how Indonesia intends to approach its fellow ASEAN member-states. One of the key foreign policy goals of Indonesia was to take on a more significant leadership role in ASEAN by establishing the ASEAN Community. Complementing its prominent role in promoting ASEAN unity, Indonesia’s bilateral relationships with neighboring countries also impact on the attainment of its foreign policy goals. The era when personalities—Suharto, Mahathir, Lee Kuan Yew—were the most significant factor in managing relations between Southeast Asian nations are long gone, and Indonesia’s engagement with these three countries today is largely a function of three factors: their mutual historical experiences, domestic politics, and strategic calculations. The challenges Indonesia and its neighboring countries face in their bilateral relations are by no means trivial, but they also provide new grounds for bilateral cooperation. Hence, if managed well, the process of overcoming bilateral challenges will strengthen pivotal bilateral relationships in the region and, by extension, deepen ASEAN unity. In addition, Indonesia’s policy of ‘a thousand friends and zero enemies’,1 coupled with the web of various bilateral and ASEAN mechanisms and the regionalist project of the ASEAN Community, will exert a positive influence on how Indonesia interacts with Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam—and vice versa. 244

Yongwook Ryu 245

Indonesia–Malaysia relations Historically, Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia have fluctuated wildly. When Sukarno was in power, bilateral relations were severely constrained. Indonesia took an anti-colonialist and imperialist stance. Sukarno showed some interest in forming the Maphilindo (the Greater Malayan Confederation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia) in order to hold together the Malay world in the region, but when Malaysia was formed, Jakarta quickly launched a confrontation policy toward Kuala Lumpur, and Maphilindo was abandoned soon after. Sukarno perceived the newly formed Federation of Malaysia as a vehicle through which Western countries could exert their influence and intervene in the region. This suspicion was also the main reason that Sukarno rejected the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which he also perceived as serving the interests of Western imperialists. In the aftermath of a hard-fought independence struggle, Indonesia was not ready to tolerate any potential for external intervention in the region. When Suharto replaced Sukarno, socio-cultural relations between the two countries were restored. A symbol of the restoration of relations was the unification of the Malay language and Bahasa Indonesia by a common spelling system in 1972.2 With the shift of political focus to domestic socioeconomic development under Suharto, Indonesia sought a stable and peaceful external environment by improving its relations with neighboring countries. As a result, Indonesia brought an end to its konfrontasi with Malaysia and as a way to promote regional cooperation it joined the five non-communist countries of Southeast Asia to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. In addition, with Suharto’s anticommunist stance, bilateral security cooperation became easier to achieve. Joint security exercises were launched in order to combat Communist activities in Sabah and Sarawak, and an agreement on the Straits of Malacca was signed by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The convergence of external threat perceptions and establishment of a common security purpose were the main reasons for deepening bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia during this period. Despite the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1974, Kuala Lumpur’s (KL) relations with Beijing were less than cordial. China was still considered a major threat to the security of Malaysia because of its support for the Malayan Communist Party.3 Under Suharto, Indonesia also harbored suspicions of Beijing and considered China a major threat to its security because of its support for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia) . When China invaded Vietnam, Jakarta strengthened its security cooperation with Kuala Lumpur. Initially, cooperation was confined to the Joint Border Committee (JBC), which was established in 1972 to deal with communist insurgency

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along the borders of East Malaysia. Later, bilateral cooperation expanded to other areas, including intelligence exchange, joint exercises, and exchange of officers to attend military colleges. In 1984, the 1972 security arrangement was revised to include joint naval and air patrols along the common borders of Indonesia and Malaysia. Tun Razak’s reorientation of Malaysia’s foreign policy to advocate neutralization also accorded well with Indonesia’s desire to keep the region free of external intervention. Subsequently, a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was established in 1971 and, when three Indochinese countries became communist in 1975, ASEAN leaders held the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976, during which the Treaty of ASEAN Concord and Bali Declaration were signed. Today, the bilateral relationship rests on several important mechanisms besides the ASEAN-related forums and meetings. The most notable highlevel event is the Annual Consultation between the leaders of the two countries. In 2013, the Annual Consultation convened for the tenth time and produced two memoranda of understanding, including an agreement on student pass or stay permits and visas for higher education programs.4 In addition, the two countries have initiated other bilateral mechanisms such as the Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation Meetings, the General Border Committee (GBC), and the Joint Trade Investment Committee, to name but a few, with the purpose of enhancing mutually beneficial collaboration. The GBC needs a special mention here: as the forum for bilateral cooperation covering military and defense collaboration, its meetings are alternated between the two countries each year. Since 1971, the two countries have met 38 times, helping to ensure a professional relationship between the two military forces while maintaining the ability to act in a proportional manner when responding to any contentious bilateral issues. Bilateral security cooperation, especially in maritime patrols and counterterrorism activities, has also developed in recent years. Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam have cooperated on patrolling the Malacca Straits, an important sea lane where a quarter of the world’s commerce and almost a half of the world’s oil shipments transit. Initially, the three countries deployed up to seven naval vessels each and formed a task force of security personnel, which would patrol the straits in a coordinated manner, falling short of joint patrols. Today, the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP), which consist of the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols (MSSP), the ‘Eyes in the Sky’ air patrols, and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG),5 represent the set of practical cooperative security measures undertaken by the littoral states of Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Under the arrangement, the participating states conduct coordinated naval and air patrols while sharing information between ships and the Monitoring and Action Agency. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

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record indicates a dramatic improvement in maritime security, as the number of piracy attacks in the Malacca Strait dropped from 112 in 2000 to 2 in 2009.6 In addition, bilateral trade, investment and exchange have grown significantly. Indonesia is Malaysia’s third largest trading partner within ASEAN, with the 2012 bilateral trade value of approximately US$20 billion. Furthermore, in 2012 approximately 2.3 million Indonesian tourists visited Malaysia. There is much potential for the expansion of maritime security cooperation in related areas, as well as scope for cooperation that extends well beyond the region. Indonesia and Singapore have signed a submarine rescue pact in July 2012, constituting a pioneering move amid the increased procurement rate for submarines in Southeast Asia. Indonesia and Malaysia could attempt to emulate a similar pact in the future. Moreover, maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia could extend into Northeast Asia with the cooperation of Japan and South Korea, as both countries have interests in maintaining secure sea lanes for the import of oil and other natural resources. Another example of bilateral security cooperation has been the decision to resolve the disputed islands of Sipadan and Ligitan through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Initially there was disagreement over the most appropriate institution to submit the dispute for resolution, with Malaysia preferring the ICJ, and Indonesia favoring the ASEAN High Council. Ultimately the parties referred the dispute to the ICJ, which ruled in 2002 that both islands belonged to Malaysia. Indonesia accepted the decision despite much domestic protest. While the outcome was no doubt disappointing to Indonesia, the action taken by the two parties set an important precedent in the region on how best to deal with seemingly intractable territorial disputes, allowing resources to be directed toward other issues of bilateral cooperation and development. Bilateral disputes such as territorial disputes and maritime boundary demarcation are seeds for potential conflict, and their existence is a hindrance to bilateral and regional cooperation. Indonesia’s willingness to refer the dispute to the ICJ and to accept the Court’s decision as binding has done much to remove a key stumbling block in the Indonesian–Malaysian cooperation. It reflects the liberal orientation of a more democratic, secure and responsible Indonesian foreign policy after the advent of the Reformasi period.7 But, more importantly, it also emphasizes Indonesia’s desire to place ASEAN matters at the center of its foreign policy. Indonesia is fully aware that only by resolving key disputes among ASEAN member-states can the region progress toward the construction of a genuine ASEAN Community, and is demonstrating its leadership by peacefully settling the dispute with Malaysia. There are three challenges, however, and their salience could adversely affect bilateral relations and security cooperation. Nonetheless, they are not


insurmountable problems and can provide new grounds for bilateral cooperation. The first challenge concerns the maritime border issue and tensions over the oil and gas-rich waters located within the Ambalat block. In February 2005, the Malaysian state oil company, Petronas, granted a concession for oil and gas exploration in the Ambalat Block of the Sulawesi Sea, an Indonesian–Malaysian overlapping maritime zone where Jakarta had earlier granted similar exploration concessions to different companies. Indonesia’s protest to Malaysia was quickly followed by a military build-up on both sides, even as each country spoke of diplomatic solutions. Since then, the two nations have been embroiled in a series of disputes, often flexing their military muscles and exchanging harsh diplomatic missives. The dangers of a serious incident occurring were illustrated by the collision of Malaysian and Indonesian naval ships during manoeuvers off the coast of Karang Unarang in April 2005. Malaysia objected to the Indonesian border claim and—following KL’s successful ownership claim of Sipadan and Ligitan—insisted that Ambalat also lay within its jurisdiction. Due to the border dispute, anti-Malaysian demonstrations broke out in Jakarta in 2009. The differing claims over maritime territory highlight the potential risks of conflict between the two nations. It is unlikely that the Ambalat dispute will be resolved any time soon, as the political space of both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur is heavily constrained by nationalist politicians and military institutions refusing to take a conciliatory approach (Weatherbee 2009: 142). In particular, Indonesia is unwilling to go through the ICJ process again after losing its legal battle against Malaysia over Sipadan and Ligitan. But if national leaders of both countries demonstrate the political will and courage to move toward the resolution of the issue, as their predecessors have done, it would go a long way to eliminate a major stumbling block in bilateral security cooperation and remove a potential source of tension in the bilateral relationship. The Ambalat dispute concerns a limited maritime area, and as such is not as significant as the island territories of Sipadan and Ligitan. Regardless of this, no one party will emerge as a clear winner in the case, and neither Malaysia nor Indonesia will be awarded all of the disputed area by the ICJ. This is because, unlike sovereignty issues over physical territories, the principle of equity and fairness is the guiding norm for the ICJ’s ruling in cases concerning the jurisdiction and demarcation of maritime boundaries. Hence, no one will gain an unfair portion of the Ambalat Block, and both will benefit from the clarity of demarcation. It also means that there is greater room for bilateral negotiation to determine an equitable and fair demarcation of the area. Another challenge for both countries concerns the rights and protection of migrant Indonesian workers in Malaysia. There have been unfortunate incidents of discrimination and mistreatment involving mainly unskilled

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Indonesian female laborers working in the informal sector, such as in employment as household workers. It is estimated that there were more than 500,000 Indonesian workers in West Malaysia in 1990, and the total number reached close to 1.2 million by 1994. By late 2000s, the number of Indonesians working legally in Malaysia reached 1.1 million, in addition to around 600,000 to 800,000 illegal Indonesian workers.8 In 2009, following several high-profile abuse cases, the Indonesian government placed a moratorium on its citizens taking up employment in Malaysia as domestic workers. These issues can quickly translate into a matter of national pride, and there is a deep-seated perception in Jakarta that Malaysia often does not treat Indonesia with respect. Indeed, there is a general sense among Indonesians that Malaysians look down upon them,9 and these deep-rooted negative perceptions can quickly erupt into anti-Malaysian protests, as has been demonstrated by public reaction after the alleged mistreatment of the Indonesian model Manohara in 2009 by her Malaysian husband, the Prince of Kelantan, and the controversial decision of the Indonesia SEA Games Organizing Committee (INASOC) in the 2011 Southeast Asian Games to remove women’s football from the competition at the stage of the finals. As Indonesia’s sense of self-esteem grows in the wake of continued economic and political success, such perceptions are likely to abate. The last challenge relates to the haze problem, which is the single most important trans-boundary environmental issue in Southeast Asia. What has become an annual event is caused by slash-and-burn activities by several agricultural firms operating in Kalimantan (Borneo) provinces and Sumatra, particularly in the Riau province. The smoke caused by the fires spreads to Malaysia, which has demanded proper measures to be taken by the Indonesian authorities to handle the situation. Since the 1990s, several incidents of severe haze blanketed Malaysia and resulted in economic costs of tens of millions of dollars. In 1997, smoke from Indonesian fires blanketed nearly two million square miles for seven months, covering Singapore, parts of Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and, of course, Indonesia. Economic loss from business and tourism was estimated at more than $9 billion. Some of the worst air pollution was evident in June 2013, with the cities of Malacca, Port Klang and Muar worst hit by the haze. To take one example, on 23 June 2013, the Air Pollution Index (API) in Muar, Johor spiked to 746, resulting in the declaration of a state of emergency in Muar and Ledang, and leaving both towns in virtual shutdown.10 The haze problem first occurred more than two decades ago, and in 1995 the environment ministers of ASEAN member-states endorsed an ‘ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution’, with the assumption that Indonesia would improve its domestic capabilities in the prevention, monitoring and mitigation of forest burning. However, the agreement did very little to change the situation. In June 2002, an ‘ASEAN Agreement on


Transboundary Haze Pollution’ was signed, which included provisions on monitoring, assessment, prevention, technical and scientific cooperation, mechanisms for coordination, and lines of communication. It also sought to establish a regional coordinating center that could react quickly to the haze caused by Indonesian plantation owners and farmers. But the main culprit of the problem, namely Indonesia, is yet to ratify the agreement (Weatherbee 2009: 283–4). As Indonesia’s foreign minister Marty Natalegawa has stated, ‘the approach [to the resolution of the haze problem] must be one of collaboration and partnership, not one of apportioning blame here and there’,11 but more concrete actions must be taken by Indonesia if it is to avoid blame and criticism from neighboring countries. Indonesia is the only ASEAN member that has not yet ratified the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Once the Agreement is ratified, bilateral as well as regional cooperation on the haze problem can progress, providing new opportunities for interstate cooperation. In addition to this, Indonesia should also make greater efforts to improve the monitoring and sanctioning of illegal burning by agricultural firms so as to lessen and eventually eliminate slashand-burn activities. Despite the challenges, the bilateral relationship is set to expand in the near future. During the 2013 ASEAN Summit meeting in Brunei, ASEAN leaders on the recommendation of their environment ministers agreed to adopt a transboundary haze monitoring system. During the Summit meeting, President Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Najib agreed to support a plan to bring together ASEAN countries to counter alleged surveillance operations conducted by Singapore, Australia and South Korea on Indonesia and Malaysia. In terms of trade ties, both leaders agreed to increase trade cooperation to reach the mark of US$30 billion by 2015 from US$23 billion in 2012.

Indonesia–Singapore relations Unlike Malaysia, which shares the common ethnicity and the conception of the ‘Malay brotherhood’ with Indonesia, Singapore lacks a similar cultural and ethnic connection with Indonesia. According to some authors, this ethnic difference, in addition to Singapore’s control over trade flows in and out of Indonesia, was the main reason for distrust and resentment that characterized the bilateral relationship in the 1950s and the 1960s.12 The provision of foreign aid through Singapore to the rebels involved in the PRRI-Permesta revolts in the 1950s added to this negative Indonesian perception of Singapore’s role in the region. One contemporary example of ethnicity-based bilateral misunderstanding relates to the issue of the role of Singapore’s Malay citizens in the military and their commitment and loyalty to Singapore’s defense. While debate on this issue in Singapore has

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not been directed against Indonesia—or Malaysia for that matter—it was nevertheless often perceived by Indonesia as such. Similarly, reports of resentment against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia typically arouse concerns among Singaporeans.13 Two factors have been significant in stabilizing and developing Indonesia–Singapore relations. First, the change of leadership in Indonesia from Sukarno to Suharto marked a fundamental transformation of bilateral relations. Formal visits and contacts between Suharto and Lee Kuan Yew deepened their personal relationship and led to an improvement in bilateral cooperation in politics and economics as well as in military and sociocultural areas.14 As Lee Kuan Yew recalled, ‘in retrospect, no event has had a more profound influence on the development of the region than the character and outlook of President Suharto of Indonesia’.15 As another high-ranking official of Singapore opined, ‘the good relations between Indonesia and Singapore have been significantly influenced by the close personal rapport between President Soeharto and PM Lee Kuan Yew’.16 Secondly, the development of ASEAN has played a positive role in improving the bilateral relationship. As part of ASEAN, both Indonesia and Singapore have been able to influence global political decisions to a greater degree than individually, and both have sought to support each other in dealings with other external powers. For example, Singapore supported Indonesia in the latter’s efforts to prevent a European Community attempt to impose a levy on oils and trans-fats, which would have adversely affected Indonesia’s export of palm oil. In addition, ASEAN has provided an important forum for regional interactions among officials. The increased frequency of contact and fostering of informal communications networks has helped to strengthen mutual understanding among the ASEAN member-states. Singaporeans now understand that Pancasila is Indonesia’s national ideology and that there is strong opposition to the revival of communism as well as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The increasing contacts between the defense establishments of both countries have also led to greater mutual understanding and cooperation between the SAF and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia). According to Desker, such interactions have also resulted in a qualitative change in bilateral defense relations since 1983, lifting SAF–ABRI interactions from the phase of establishing goodwill and confidence at the top political and military echelons to increased cooperation at the working levels, leading to a series of biennial naval and air exercises between the SAF and ABRI.17 Despite the ethnic differences, the two countries have become meaningful partners within ASEAN, and their shared interests override any differences. The bilateral relationship is based on some common interests and shared outlooks: the non-communist constitution of both countries, external factors of common concern, and the similarity of many of their


critical national issues. All these factors could lend impetus in the search for more productive means of cooperation. Ideologically, the Pancasila and the Five Principles of Singapore’s ‘Rugged Society’ can easily be compatible in their roles as national philosophies. Singapore has become an important trading partner for Indonesia. The bilateral trade volume reached approximately $70 billion in 2010, and Singapore was consistently ranked as the top foreign investor in Indonesia. Human interactions have also flourished, and both countries are the number one source of visitors for each other. In 2010, almost 1.4 million Singaporeans visited Indonesia, while close to 2.6 million Indonesians visited Singapore in the same year. As part of the five founding members of ASEAN, both Indonesia and Singapore share the common purpose of deepening regional integration and constructing the ASEAN Community based on the three pillars: political-security community; economic community; and socio-cultural community. The two countries are deeply embedded in the institutional web of ASEAN, which sustains regular governmental meetings at various levels covering a wide range of issue areas. Indonesia and Singapore have also cooperated recently on demarcating their maritime boundaries, which has led to greater economic cooperation. After almost four years of negotiation, they agreed on a new maritime boundary in 2009. The two countries had earlier agreed on the central segment of their territorial sea boundary in the early 1970s, but little progress was made until the newly agreed median line established a new boundary on the western segment. The demarcation agreement is expected to boost economic ties between Indonesia and Singapore, as Nipah will be integrated into the development of the inter-provincial Batam, Bintan and Karimun (BBK) free trade zone as well as the development of the Sijori (Singapore, Malaysia’s Johor and Indonesia’s Riau Islands) Growth Triangle. Singapore has also opened a consulate in Batam in 2009, in order to enhance economic ties and cooperation between the two countries. Following the successful conclusion of border demarcation on the western segment, both countries have begun talks to determine the eastern border between Changi and Batam in 2010. As for security cooperation, the armed forces of Indonesia and Singapore regularly hold joint exercises and run exchange programs for military officials. They also cooperate closely to combat terrorism by sharing intelligence, and operate joint patrols in the Malacca Strait. The Malacca Strait is vulnerable to terrorist attacks due to a profusion of targets and relatively high rates of piracy, as illustrated by the bombing of Superferry 14 in February 2004.18 As a result, national maritime surveillance and policing units were established as well as multilateral arrangements such as the ‘Eye in the Sky’ initiative; and agreements on ‘hot pursuit’ have resulted in reduced insecurity, and in 2011, only three major incidents of piracy were reported in the Malacca Strait.

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Other areas of bilateral cooperation include a joint effort to fight against the spread of avian influenza in Tangerang, Java, and the training of some 4,000 Indonesian officials under the Singapore Cooperation Programme to enhance their skills and knowledge in areas such as port management, banking and finance. In 2010, Prime Minister Lee and President Yudhoyono witnessed the signing of two Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). Singapore’s Civil Service College and Indonesia’s National Institute of Public Administration (LAN) signed an MoU on capacity-building for public officials, and Singapore’s Ministry of Education and Indonesia’s Ministry of Education and Culture signed an MoU on education cooperation. The leaders also welcomed the renewal of the 1988 MoU on youth and sports cooperation by Singapore’s Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports and Indonesia’s Ministry of Youth and Sports Affairs. All these agreements promote social interactions among the government officials as well as private individuals of both countries, and deepen the bilateral relationship. There is ample scope for improved cooperation. As former Indonesian ambassador to Singapore Rais Abin noted, Singapore can readily lend positive support to develop investments in Indonesia.19 For example, in the field of human resource development, deepening cooperation would allow Indonesia to benefit from Singapore’s progress in industry and technology. Regular access could also enable Indonesians to benefit from Singapore’s institutions involved in education. There are several unresolved issues between the two countries. The first issue relates to the airspace over the Riau Archipelago. The issue is whether Singapore should return the airspace over the region to Indonesia. The airspace had been under Singaporean control for around ten years due to the limited capacity of Indonesia’s radar systems. In May 2012, Singapore announced that it was ready to return the airspace to Indonesian control, provided that International Civil Aviation Organization approval was granted. Second, both countries have attempted without success to sign an extradition deal that would allow both countries to extradite criminal suspects. An extradition treaty with Singapore is important for Indonesia because of allegations that many corrupt individuals from Indonesia have fled to Singapore and concealed their stolen assets in the neighboring country. Indonesia claims that it is extremely difficult to apprehend corrupt individuals hiding in Singapore due to the absence of an extradition agreement. The crucial difficulty relating to signing an extradition deal is that Singapore wanted a quid pro quo arrangement whereby the extradition agreement and the defense cooperation agreement would be signed in tandem, while the House of Representatives of Indonesia would prefer to see extradition and defense related matters detailed in two separate agreements. The House Speaker Marzuki Ali said, ‘We [the House] do not agree with the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) agreed by the two


governments. This can cause losses for Indonesia because Singapore wants to build a defense base in Sumatra’.20 In 2007, the DCA was signed by the two governments, but was later annulled by Indonesian lawmakers, who rejected it because of the inclusion of a provision that could allow the Singapore Armed Forces to conduct exercises on Indonesian territory in return for Indonesia being allowed to force the return of Indonesian economic criminals residing in Singapore. While there are some differences between the two countries, they share a common interest in cooperating on extraditing criminals and deepening defense interactions. Thus the two countries should strive to achieve cooperation on these two issues in the future, as both stand to gain substantial benefits from bilateral cooperation. Third, the two countries have disagreed over the admittance of TimorLeste into ASEAN. The issue emerged during the 2011 ASEAN leaders’ retreat, and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong sought to defer Timor-Leste’s bid for ASEAN membership, lest the addition of a new member would slow down the progress of ASEAN’s development into an Economic Community by 2015. Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono differed from Lee and pushed for the admittance of Timor-Leste to the regional grouping. While there is disagreement between the two nations, the issue is unlikely to constrain bilateral cooperation adversely, as it is a relatively minor issue. In any case, one compromise could be that ASEAN postpones its approval of membership for Timor-Leste until the newly independent country acquires enough bureaucratic capacity to meet a range of ASEAN obligations, particularly the requirement to host and chair ASEAN meetings. Fourth, similar to Malaysia, Singapore also suffers from the haze problem originating in Indonesia. In June 2013, air quality in the city state deteriorated to the worst level in 16 years, with the Pollutant Standards Index reaching 155, well above the healthy range of 100. This prompted a health alert from the Singaporean government, which also protested against Indonesia’s slow response in resolving the issue. But the above-mentioned four challenges are relatively minor, and both countries are willing to work with each other to achieve bilateral cooperation on these issues in the future. Overall, the shared outlook and goals of the two countries far outweigh any issues that may divide them. Indeed, when the leaders of both nations met at the 2013 ASEAN Summit, they expressed satisfaction with the positive state of bilateral relations and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation further. The seven working groups that were established in May 2010 during the leaders’ retreat have resulted in improvement in the quality and quantity of bilateral cooperation, and will likely continue to do so in the future.21

Indonesia–Vietnam relations Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were part of the original five founding members of ASEAN, along with Thailand and the Philippines, and have

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thereby benefited from increased opportunities to interact with one another at various official levels. This has resulted in considerable agreement among the five on the future vision of what ASEAN should become. In contrast, Vietnam is a late joiner of ASEAN, along with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, securing formal accession only in 1995. As a consequence, the Indonesia–Vietnam bilateral relationship is less firmly grounded in shared values and purpose than Indonesia’s bilateral relations with either Malaysia or Singapore. Indeed, with less time to be socialized into ASEAN norms and purposes, Vietnam appears to regard ASEAN rather differently than the original five founding members do. To share my own experience, several years ago when I attended the ASEAN Investment Summit held in Singapore, the prime ministers of the three Indochinese countries—Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—all came and spoke at the public forum, encouraging regional investors to choose their countries for investment, whereas the leaders of the original five were more ASEAN-centric in their orientation, seeking to promote ASEAN as a regional investment destination. This observation illustrated to me how the late joiners perceived ASEAN—mainly as a means to their socio-economic development and less as a cohesive grouping based on a common identity and shared values and social purposes. Gates supports this point of view and argues that Vietnam has tended to regard ASEAN as a ‘means to accelerate economic reform, modernization and convergence with this dynamic region’.22 Vietnam’s accession into ASEAN represented a win-win situation for both Vietnam and the original five founding members of ASEAN. For Vietnam, ASEAN membership represented the success of its new foreign policy outlook in the Doi Moi era. For ASEAN’s original five, it was an important step toward the realization of the founding vision of uniting all Southeast Asian nations under the institutional framework of ASEAN. Soon after its accession, Vietnam also played an important role in pushing for the three remaining Southeast Asian states—Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia—to become members of ASEAN. The two countries have traditionally held each other in high esteem due to their common historical experience, having both achieved their independence through revolution. From time to time the leaders of both countries have emphasized this point. Indonesia’s policy toward Vietnam has been a delicate balancing act, adhering to ASEAN’s collective position on the one hand, and on the other advancing its own desire to lure Vietnam away from close relations with the external great powers. During the Sukarno era, Indonesia’s relations with Hanoi were close, while its relations with Saigon were far from cordial. Sukarno perceived the South Vietnamese as American puppets. When he decided to upgrade diplomatic relations with Hanoi from consulate to ambassadorial level, Saigon decided to close the Indonesian consulate. It was not until the fall of Sukarno after the 1965 coup and the rise of Suharto’s anti-communist government that Indonesia


adjusted its foreign policy toward Vietnam.23 Nevertheless, diplomatic ties between Jakarta and Hanoi were maintained during the Suharto era, while Jakarta’s relations with Saigon were never re-established. Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea under Soviet patronage provided a challenge to Indonesia’s relations with Vietnam. Even though Indonesia tolerated ASEAN’s collective stance on the Kampuchea issue, criticizing Vietnam for the violation of state sovereignty and the norm of nonintervention—a core principle of the ASEAN Way—Indonesia never shared the same degree of threat perception of Vietnam as other ASEAN members such as Singapore and Thailand. As the interlocutor of ASEAN on the Kampuchea issue, Indonesia was mainly concerned that the conflict might divide the region into two clusters: maritime ASEAN and Indochina under Vietnamese domination. Indonesia feared that a bipolar Southeast Asia could pit the communist against the non-communist states, thereby opening the door to intervention by external great powers. In March 1990, Suharto met with Hussein Onn and produced what was known as the Kuantan doctrine. The doctrine assumed that Vietnam was under Chinese pressure and, as a result, it was moving closer to the Soviet Union, which would be dangerous for regional stability. Hence Indonesia offered to assist the Vietnamese and aimed to lure Vietnam away from the Soviet Union. However, Thailand and Singapore—maintaining a divergent strategic assessment of the Kampuchea conflict—resisted, and the Kuantan doctrine subsequently created friction within ASEAN.24 Indonesian–Vietnamese relations under Suharto were heavily influenced by Jakarta’s policy toward both Beijing and ASEAN. Indonesia saw Vietnam as a buffer against China, but also assigned much importance to ASEAN, and hence went along with the other ASEAN states to present a common stance on Kampuchea.25 Jakarta’s policy toward Vietnam aimed at transforming a well-armed but poor neighbor into a cooperative and economically-oriented country in South East Asia. At the same time, the growing rift between Hanoi and Beijing compelled Hanoi to work closer with Indonesia to gain support for its struggle against China over Kampuchea. There are areas of potential cooperation and dispute between Indonesia and Vietnam. First, unlike Singapore and Malaysia, Vietnam is not yet a major trading partner of Indonesia. When the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Indonesia in 2011, he agreed with Indonesian President Yudhoyono to elevate their bilateral ties to the level of a strategic partnership. Overall this would include more intense and institutionalized functional cooperation and communication between the two countries, and this bodes well for the future trajectory of the bilateral relationship. For instance, the action plan for strategic partnership calls for an increase in bilateral trade from $2 billion to $5 billion by 2015. In 2012, Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa led an Indonesian delegation to participate in the first Indonesia–Vietnam Joint

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Commission Assembly, which stemmed from the 2012–15 Strategic Partnership Action Plan signed in 2011. The assembly was intended to provide a regular and systematic mechanism by which to study and evaluate the countries’ bilateral cooperation in all sectors, including trade and investment as well as maritime and defense issues.26 With the newly launched Ho Chi Minh–Jakarta route for Vietnam Airlines, bilateral interactions are set to grow both in quantity and quality. Another area of potential cooperation relates to maritime boundary demarcation. While the two countries do not have territorial disputes with one another, their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims do overlap. A small milestone was achieved in 2003 when both governments signed an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary. The agreement defined the continental shelf of the two countries as the imaginary straight line located between the two terminal points of the 1969 continental shelf agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia. Although located in the vicinity, the border is not located in the Spratly Islands area, over which Indonesia does not hold any claim. Indonesia attaches importance to the conclusion of the negotiations because of concerns over Chinese intervention and expansion in the region. The two countries also agreed to establish joint patrols of their overlapping maritime borders, and have already conducted several joint naval patrols with the aim of reducing and eliminating illegal fishing and other maritime criminal activities. China looms large in the strategic calculations of both countries, and the issue of engagement with China is the single most important security issue the two countries can cooperate on. Vietnam, which has a direct territorial dispute with China, would like to have Indonesia on its side to strengthen its own claims or, at least, to weaken China’s relative power and influence over the Spratlys and Paracels disputes. Indonesia, which has always maintained a policy of non-interference by external powers in regional affairs, is also concerned with China’s growing influence in the region, but is unwilling to balance directly against China in cooperation with Vietnam. Both countries, along with other ASEAN states, can cooperate to set the guidelines on what is permitted and what is not permitted in the South China Sea. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed a non-binding political statement known as the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). However, it did very little to prevent tensions from escalating, nor did it prevent the claimants from intensifying sovereignty claims over disputed areas. Progress on implementation of the DOC has been painstakingly slow, partly because China objected and insisted that the disputes be resolved bilaterally, and partly because several ASEAN states have conflicting interests and claims over the disputed islands among themselves. In July 2011, the Guidelines to Implement the DOC were finally adopted, along with agreement to promote dialogue and consultation among the parties. A new point was added that activities and projects carried out


under the DOC should be reported to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting. The first discussions were held in Beijing, January 13–15 2012, and agreement was reached to set up four expert committees on maritime scientific research, environmental protection, search and rescue, and transnational crime. The initial hope of an enforceable multi-party agreement turned out to be much harder to realize in reality, and the final ASEAN Proposed Elements of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was a heavily diluted version of the original Philippine Working Draft, representing considerable internal disagreement among the ASEAN member-states.27 For example, the final document eliminated the references to ‘the principles and norms of international law applicable to maritime space, in particular the principles on the peaceful uses and cooperative management of the oceans’ and to ‘the need to preserve the region from any form of increased militarization and intimidation’. Indonesia occupies a unique position in the issue of the Spratlys and Paracels, because it is not a direct party to the territorial claims, but has close interests in the resolution of the disputes. As it has done in the past, it could play an intermediary role in alleviating the tensions by hosting workshops. More importantly, it could exercise its leadership role within ASEAN to exert pressure on the ASEAN member-states, who are parties to the disputes, to reach an agreement. Doing so will not only consolidate ASEAN unity, but it will also significantly improve ASEAN’s bargaining power vis-àvis China and apply a great deal of pressure on Beijing to engage in serious negotiation over the issue with ASEAN. On the other hand, any internal fissure between ASEAN member-states can and will be exploited by Beijing, as illustrated by the 2012 ASEAN meetings in Cambodia, where ASEAN failed to produce a joint statement for the first time in its history. Another potential challenge in the bilateral relationship relates to the pace and extent of regional integration and community-building. Indonesia, on the one hand, is the most active ASEAN member-state in pushing for a more cohesive, integrated and even interventionist ASEAN, and is often frustrated with what it feels is the slow pace of ASEAN’s development as a regional community, especially in the political-security area. On the other hand, Vietnam prefers to cling to the traditional ASEAN Way norms, especially non-interference and non-intervention, as well as noninvolvement of ASEAN in unresolved bilateral disputes between ASEAN member-states.28 Their disagreement concerning the regional norms and the extent and pace of regional integration was illustrated vividly during the intra-ASEAN negotiation over the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The establishment of a regional human rights mechanism was stated in the 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) and later approved by the national leaders of ASEAN in the ASEAN Charter. However, disagreement persists on the

Yongwook Ryu 259

precise mandate and contents of the human rights mechanism. One camp consisting mainly of Vietnam and other Indochinese countries did not see much need for creating such an institution and opposed giving much power to it even if established. On the other hand, another camp led by democratic members of ASEAN such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand pushed for a human rights organization with a strong mandate and the power of investigation and prosecution. In the end, what the ASEAN member-states agreed on was a regional human rights mechanism that embraced a liberal notion of human rights, including individual sociopolitical rights and freedoms, but which had very little institutional power.29 The experience of establishing the AICHR revealed a deep fissure between the democratic member-states and non-democratic member-states of ASEAN over the vision and future development of ASEAN and regional integration. Indonesia belongs to and represents the former, while Vietnam leans toward the latter. This intra-ASEAN fissure and tension can slow down ASEAN’s progress in many fields and makes a frustrating middle-road compromise the best outcome in many situations. The challenge for Indonesia and other founding members of ASEAN is how fast and deeply to integrate the CLMV countries into ASEAN’s shared vision, norms and values. Failure to achieve this is certain to weaken ASEAN unity and adversely affect the progress of the regionalist project. In addition, such internal fissures provide an opportunity for external powers to drive a wedge between ASEAN members, as the 2012 ASEAN meeting in Cambodia amply demonstrated.

Conclusion Indonesia’s bilateral relationships with the three neighboring countries— Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore—are not without challenges. If not managed properly, they could result in mutual mistrust and suspicion, thereby hindering bilateral and regional cooperation. The magnitude of the problem could become greater in an era of a rising Indonesia that seeks to assert its leadership role within ASEAN. Despite the challenges, however, a sense of optimism should prevail. There are two reasons favoring this outcome. First, although an ascending Indonesia is likely to become more assertive, the general direction and tone of its foreign policy has been decisively liberal and accommodating thus far—as shown by the resolution of a critical territorial dispute with Malaysia—and is likely to continue in the near future. The consolidation of democratic governance in Indonesia is the pivotal point here, as it will have a major impact on the liberal orientation of its foreign policy in the future. Provided that Indonesia’s democratic governance is consolidated, its increased power—and, by implication, leverage over neighboring countries—can exert a positive influence on the


way Indonesia’s bilateral relationships develop with other ASEAN memberstates. Indonesia can exercise its leadership role to push the liberal political agenda within ASEAN, promote intra-ASEAN cooperation on security and territorial disputes, and function as a significant actor in keeping Southeast Asia relatively autonomous and free of external intervention by great powers. And second, the institutional web of ASEAN will sustain engagement and regular meetings among regional elites, thereby deepening their mutual understanding and personal connections. These connections will prevent potential conflict from becoming a reality, preserving peace and stability in Southeast Asia. After a series of regional crises in the 1990s during which ASEAN proved to be a rather ineffective actor, the institution has successfully formulated a new vision for itself in the form of the ASEAN Community and based on the ASEAN Charter. To be sure, some of the goals and aims stated in the project are too ambitious for a group of states whose identification and connection has not yet reached the level required for deep and close cooperation. But the ASEAN Community project provides a roadmap for the ASEAN member-states to follow in the years to come and, as a result, bilateral cooperation is expected to increase meaningfully, albeit slowly, in the future. Thus, Indonesia’s expression of its enhanced power will take place within the institutional framework of ASEAN, and its leadership role will develop in conjunction with bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries, which bodes well for the successful management of the challenges present in Indonesia’s bilateral—and multilateral—relations with its neighboring states.

Notes 1 Irfa Puspitasari, ‘Indonesia’s New Foreign Policy – “Thousand Friends, Zero Enemies”’, IDSA Issue Brief, August 23 2012 available at http://www.idsa.in/ system/files/IB_IndonesiaForeignPolicy.pdf 2 For more details, see Leo Suryadinata, Times Comparative Dictionary of MalayIndonesia Synonyms: With Definitions in English (KL: Times Editions, 1991). 3 Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 122. 4 ‘RI, M’sia to work on counterspying, haze’, The Jakarta Post, 20 December 2013, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/20/ri-m-sia-workcounterspying-haze.html (accessed on 3 January 2014). 5 For more details, see the Ministry of Defence of Singapore website. The url is http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/malacca-strait-patrols (accessed on 10 April 2013). 6 For the trend in the frequency of piracy in the Malacca Strait, see Ada Suk Fung Ng, ‘A Maritime Security Framework for Fighting Piracy’, Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies Working Paper, November (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2011), p. 2.

Yongwook Ryu 261 7 For a detailed discussion of the impact of democratization on Indonesia’s foreign policy, see Jorn Dosch, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics by (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 2007), chapter 2. 8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, ‘Bilateral CooperationMalaysia’, at http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=Bilateral Cooperation&IDP=196&P=Bilateral&l=en (accessed on 3 January 2014). 9 Marshall Clark, ‘Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Cultural Heritage and the Politics of Garuda vs Harimau’, 28 August 2012, unpublished conference paper at Australian National University available at http://indonesiasynergy.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/m_clark_2012_is_indonesiamalaysiarelation.pdf 10 ‘Malaysia Declares State of Emergency in Muar and Ledang’, Channel News Asia, 23 June 2013 (retrieved 23 June 2013). 11 ‘RI dodges haze blame game’, Jakarta Post, Friday 21 June 2013 p. 8. 12 For more details, see Terence Lee Chek Liang, ‘Explaining Indonesia’s Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy’, IDSS Working Paper Series #10 2001. 13 Barry Desker, ‘Developments in Indonesia-Singapore Bilateral Relations: Politics’, Indonesia-Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects, 1991, p. 100. 14 Lau Teik Soon and Bilveer Singh (eds) Indonesia-Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1991). 15 Lee Kuan Yew Speech 16 April 1986 cited in Lee, ‘Explaining Indonesia’s Relations with Singapore during the New Order Period’, p. 12. 16 Barry Desker, ‘Developments in Indonesia-Singapore Bilateral Relations: Politics’, Indonesia-Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects, p. 101. 17 Barry Desker, ‘Developments in Indonesia-Singapore Bilateral Relations: Politics’, Indonesia-Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects, p. 109. 18 ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Threat and Response’, p. 8. Report on an International Conference organized by IDSS and Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, US Department of State, 12–13 April 2006, Singapore. 19 Rais Abin, ‘Developments in Indonesia-Singapore Bilateral Relations: Politics’, Indonesia-Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects, 1991, pp. 99–100. 20 ‘RI highlights S’pore extradition treaty at int’l meeting’, Jakarta Post, Oct 23 2013, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/10/23/ri-highlights-s-pore-extradition-treaty-int-l-meeting.html (accessed on 7 January 2014). 21 The seven working groups refer to the following issues: (1) Batam, Bintan, and Karimun (BBK) and other Special Economic Zones (SEZs); (2) investments; (3) tourism; (4) air connectivity; (5) manpower; (6) agri-business; and (7) counterterrorism. For more details, see the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/jakarta/press_statements_speeches/2012/201203/press_201203131.html (accessed on 2 February 2014). 22 Carolyn L. Gates, ‘Vietnam’s Economic Transformation and Convergence with the Dynamic ASEAN Economies’, Comparative Economic Studies, 42: 4 (2000), p. 7. 23 Trinh thi Ngoc-Diep, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy toward Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), pp. 199–202. 24 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 288. 25 For a good analysis, see Ngoc-Diep thi Trinh, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy toward Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1995).

262 Key Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships 26 Donald Weatherbee, ‘Global Insider: Indonesia-Vietnam Relations’, World Politics Review, 26 September 2011. 27 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?’ The Asia-Pacific Journal, 10: 4, August 2012. 28 For a good discussion of ASEAN norms, see Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development, and Prospects (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 29 For more details as well as an explanation of the emergence of AICHR, see Maria Ortuoste and Yongwook Ryu, ‘Democratization, Regional Community-Building and Human Rights: The Case of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights’, The Pacific Review, forthcoming.

Bibliography Abin, Rais (1991) ‘Developments in Indonesia-Singapore Bilateral Relations: Politics’, Indonesia-Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects, 99–100. Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (1994) Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). Clark, Marshall (2012) ‘Indonesia–Malaysia Relations: Cultural Heritage and the Politics of Garuda vs Harimau’, unpublished conference paper, 28 August, Australian National University, http://indonesiasynergy.files.wordpress.com/2012/ 08/m_clark_2012_is_indonesiamalaysiarelation.pdf Desker, Barry (1991) ‘Developments in Indonesia-Singapore Bilateral Relations: Politics’, Indonesia-Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects, 100. Dosch, Jorn (2007) The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics by (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), chapter 2. Gates, Carolyn L. (2000) ‘Vietnam’s Economic Transformation and Convergence with the Dynamic ASEAN Economies’, Comparative Economic Studies, 42: 4, 7–43. Haacke, Jurgen (2003) ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development, and Prospects (London: RoutledgeCurzon). Lee Chek Liang, Terence (2001) ‘Explaining Indonesia’s Relations with Singapore during the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy’, IDSS Working Paper Series, 10. Chinyong Liow, Joseph (2004) The Politics of Indonesia–Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (New York: Routledge). Suk Fung Ng, Ada (2011) ‘A Maritime Security Framework for Fighting Piracy’, Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies Working Paper, November, University of Sydney. Ortuoste, Maria and Yongwook Ryu (forthcoming) ‘Democratization, Regional Community-Building and Human Rights: The Case of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights’, The Pacific Review. Puspitasari, Irfa (2011) ‘Indonesia’s New Foreign Policy – “A Thousand Friends, Zero Enemies”’, IDSA Issue Brief, 23August, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_ IndonesiaForeignPolicy.pdf Suryadinata, Leo (1991) Times Comparative Dictionary of Malay–Indonesia Synonyms: With Definitions in English (Kuala Lumpur: Times Editions). Teik Soon Lau and Singh, Bilveer (eds) (1991) Indonesia–Singapore Relations: Problems and Prospects (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs). Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012) ‘ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?’ The Asia-Pacific Journal, 10: 4.

Yongwook Ryu 263 Ngoc-Diep, Trinh thi (1995) Indonesia’s Foreign Policy toward Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawaii). ‘RI Dodges Haze Blame Game’ Jakarta Post, Friday 21 June 2013 p. 8 ‘RI Highlights S’pore Extradition Treaty at Int’l Meeting’ Jakarta Post, 23 October 2013, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/10/23/ri-highlightss-pore-extradition-treaty-int-l-meeting.html (accessed on 7 January 2014). ‘RI, M’sia to Work on Counterspying, Haze’, The Jakarta Post, 20 December 2013, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/20/ri-m-sia-work-counterspying-haze.html (accessed on 3 January 2014). ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Threat and Response’, p. 8. Report on an International Conference organized by IDSS and Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, US Department of State, 12-13 April 2006, Singapore. Weatherbee, Donald E. (2011) ‘Global Insider: Indonesia–Vietnam Relations’, World Politics Review, 26. Weatherbee, Donald E. (2009) International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, 2nd ed. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield).

13 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN: Mediation, Agency and ExtraRegional Diplomacy Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih

Indonesia has long been said to be the ‘natural born leader’ or ‘first among equals’ within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ‘leadership’ role of Indonesia dates back to the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. The end of konfrontasi (confrontation) and Indonesia’s willingness to join ASEAN were critical to ASEAN’s creation. This, in turn, served President Suharto’s goal to portray Indonesia as a constructive neighbor.1 As Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues, following ASEAN’s formation, ‘Indonesia’s restraint, plus its substantial contribution to the regional cooperation, … earned the country the respect and recognition of the other members as a primus inter pares’ or ‘first among equals’.2 However, the establishment of ASEAN has also been interpreted as an effort to constrain Indonesian hegemony in Southeast Asia. Therefore, as a form of consent to this, Suharto’s policy towards the organization was also influenced by a desire to reassure its regional partners.3 While Indonesia became somewhat introverted following the 1997–98 East Asian Financial Crisis and associated collapse of President Suharto’s New Order regime, the consolidation of stability, economic growth, and democratic values saw Indonesia once again emerge as an active leader in ASEAN. Given these considerations, this chapter assesses the evolution of Indonesia’s role in ASEAN together with the implications of a more powerful and robust Indonesia for the future of ASEAN. While Indonesia’s leadership also encompasses economic and socio-cultural dimensions, this chapter focuses on the political and security spheres. The analysis is undertaken in three sections: the first section examines Jakarta’s role as a manager and mediator of crises and conflicts; the second assesses the evolving nature of Indonesia’s ideational leadership (i.e., agency in relation to norms and values); while the final section investigates the implications for ASEAN of Indonesia’s rising international power and prestige. The chapter argues that Indonesia has developed a critical role in the mediation of conflict and the management of regional crises. As ASEAN would largely be non-existent, or at least irrelevant, in the absence of Indonesia’s presence, 264

Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih 265

the assessment within this chapter leans on the side of being largely positive. Nonetheless, as will be highlighted, there are a number of significant limitations to Indonesia’s leadership, including the continued challenges of regional disunity and instability—issues that are also considered in greater detail by other chapters in this volume.

Indonesia in intra-ASEAN conflict mediation and management Indonesia holds a special status in the economic, political, and strategic dynamics of Southeast Asia and ASEAN due to a broad array of factors. Geographically, Indonesia represents a vast archipelago stretching over 5,350 square kilometres from its Eastern and Western points, while encompassing 17,508 islands (6,000 of which are inhabited).4 Moreover, Indonesia’s surface area comprises 1.9 million square kilometres, or over 42 per cent of the total land mass covered by the ASEAN states. In the context of ASEAN, Indonesia is also significant for its population, which reached 244.5 million in 2012—nearly 40 per cent of ASEAN’s total population.5 Importantly, Indonesia has one of the region’s younger workforces, with a median age of 28.9 years,6 and this has reinforced a strong rate of economic growth averaging 5.5 per cent for the years 2008 through to 2013.7 While Indonesia has the largest number of armed forces personnel in Southeast Asia,8 its budget has wisely prioritized economic growth, health, and education, with only 0.67 per cent of its official government expenditure going to the military in 2011.9 Indonesia’s importance in ASEAN is also reinforced by its wealth in natural resources, including oil and gas as well as rubber and timber.10 Given these factors—together with the chaos associated with konfrontasi prior to ASEAN’s formation11—the original ASEAN members12 knew that the Association could not function or be influential in the absence of Indonesia’s participation. Consequently, and in order to reinforce such participation, a pragmatic realization emerged that they would need to defer to Indonesia as the ‘natural born leader’ or ‘first among equals’.13 Critically, such recognition also depended on the prioritization Indonesia accorded to ASEAN in its foreign affairs. An example of this two-way interdependence is reflected in the support both Indonesia and its ASEAN counterparts provided in their agreement to fund the location of the Secretariat in Jakarta. Moreover, Indonesia has undertaken an important role in almost all the conflicts and crises that have had the potential to jeopardize the region’s stability. For instance, when diplomatic relations faltered between Malaysia and the Philippines in 1968 over allegations that Manila had been plotting to fund a separatist rebellion in Sabah (known as the Corregidor Affair), Indonesia’s President Suharto intervened at an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting with a proposal for a cooling-off period.14

266 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN

Indonesia again demonstrated its utility as mediator during the Cambodian conflict between 1979 and 1991. For example, Indonesia worked with Malaysia in formulating the March 1980 Kuantan statement. This conciliatory statement drew on the philosophy of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and sought to find common ground for further dialogue. Thus, it recognized the security concerns of Vietnam (for example, previous border incursions and Beijing’s support for the Khmer Rouge), but also called for an end to the influence of the Soviet Union in Vietnam.15 While the statement was engineered outside ASEAN’s formal framework, its key concerns and principles were repeated in the ‘Joint Communique’ from the June 1980 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM).16 When other attempts to resolve the crisis failed—such as the Malaysian ‘five plus two formula’17—Indonesia sent its military chief to negotiate directly with Hanoi, and ASEAN later appointed Indonesia as its official interlocutor for these negotiations.18 By positioning itself as a soft-liner, Indonesia was able to acquire Vietnam’s trust, and this led to an agreement to hold two informal meetings between Hanoi and ASEAN.19 While the negotiations during these meetings stalled, the resolution at the Paris Conference on Cambodia—chaired by Indonesia—was strongly supported by the multilateral framework created by ASEAN and Indonesia’s leadership within it.20 Then, in 1997, the East Asian Financial Crisis devastated Indonesia’s economy, and Suharto’s autocratic New Order regime subsequently collapsed. This domestic turmoil distracted Indonesia from its leadership in ASEAN and, according to Rizal Sukma, left the Association ‘floating without a sense of purpose’.21 However, Indonesia’s subsequent success with its democratic reforms (reformasi) meant that by the early 2000s it was able to restore a new form of leadership. As detailed in the next section, the foreign policy of democratic Indonesia has been far more active on issues of human rights and human security. In the process, Indonesia has also been more willing to engage in the domestic affairs of other ASEAN states. As Indonesia’s Director-General for ASEAN Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (Kemlu) acknowledged, ‘I believe on this issue [non-interference] we are more open now … Indonesia is more open, more flexible because of the democratisation process’.22 A prime example of this ‘openness’ occurred in the wake of the devastation that Cyclone Nargis struck in Myanmar in 2008. An estimated 120,000 to 200,000 people perished as a consequence of the cyclone, and a further 800,000 were displaced. Despite the inability of the Myanmar junta to respond adequately to a natural disaster of this size, the government initially refused to allow international aid workers to the stricken Ayeyarwady Delta area and thereby caused the loss of countless more lives. In an effort to persuade the junta to reverse its position, Indonesia reinforced the diplomatic carrots offered by ASEAN’s SecretaryGeneral, Surin Pitsuwan, with some rather pointed diplomatic sticks. For


example, according to an Ambassador from a Singapore Embassy, at an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Indonesia’s Foreign Minister: Leaned across the table and asked the Foreign Minister of Myanmar what he thought ASEAN membership meant to Myanmar and what—at that time and in those circumstances—Myanmar’s membership meant to ASEAN—in terms of ASEAN’s internal coherence—international profile—and its membership’s shared vision for the future.23 The context of this question demonstrated a degree of frustration where Indonesia’s Foreign Minister was willing to question the utility of Myanmar’s continued membership in ASEAN in front of his ASEAN counterparts. Moreover, having specifically outlined the stakes for Myanmar, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers explained ‘that the crisis offered Naypyidaw a final opportunity to allow the Association a role in facilitating the military’s relations with the international community’.24 Consequently, the combined approaches of Indonesia and ASEAN resulted in Myanmar’s agreement to receive international aid and aid workers into the country. The assistance that followed was partly facilitated by the formation of a Tripartite Core Group (TCG), and here Indonesia also retained a leading role wherein three of the seven officials that served on the TCG were Indonesian.25 Moreover, Indonesia was one of the first countries to deliver assistance and the amount of this aid was the highest after Thailand and Singapore.26 Armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple dispute also resulted in the exercise of Indonesian leadership. Immediately after the initial eruption of hostilities in early 2011, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, travelled to and negotiated with the leaders of both countries and attended a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Following the meeting, a UNSC spokesperson stated that it preferred the problem to be handled through Indonesia as the then chair of ASEAN.27 Indonesia then convened an Informal ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting (IAMM) in Jakarta on 22 February 2011. During this meeting, the two disputants agreed to accept Indonesian military and civilian observers along the border to monitor a ceasefire agreement. However, following protracted negotiations, Thailand failed to accede to the final terms of reference for the agreement.28 Both parties then returned to the ICJ, where they presented their arguments between 15 and 19 April 2013. On 11 November 2013, the ICJ provided its ruling and unanimously declared that Cambodia’s territory encompassed the whole of the promontory where the temple was located—approximately 1 square km.29 Thus, in the absence of any binding mechanisms for conflict resolution, neither Indonesia nor ASEAN could resolve the dispute without the assistance of global institutions. Nonetheless, the last


hostilities occurred in February 2011 and it is likely that the collective pressure of the ICJ and of Indonesia and ASEAN contributed to this state of affairs. According to a senior official from the President’s Office, Dr Yayan Mulyana, Indonesia’s ability to persuade other countries to overcome their disagreements has led to recognition that Indonesia serves as a critically important ‘consensus builder’ in ASEAN.30 Thus, while Indonesia is not officially a disputant regarding the conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea, it has also been active in easing tensions between the South China Sea claimants—Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and China. A recent example of Indonesia’s role as a mediator and consensus builder involved the diplomacy of Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, in 2012. At the July ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, tensions quickly escalated when Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, representing ASEAN as the then Cambodian Chair, refused to issue a joint communiqué on behalf of the members. While a key point of objection concerned the insistence of the Philippines and Vietnam to include reference to recent instances of Chinese assertiveness,31 revelations that Hor Namhong had been simultaneously consulting with Beijing during the discussions sparked outrage in some of the ASEAN countries.32 ASEAN had never previously failed to issue a joint communiqué. Foreign Minister Natalegawa spoke to the seriousness of the incident when he stated that ‘I think it is utterly irresponsible if we cannot come up with a common statement on the South China Sea’.33 Natalegawa then sought to resolve the impasse by travelling to Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, where he held meetings with the leaders of all three countries in less than 72 hours. Based on these discussions, Natalegawa personally drafted the ‘six-point principles’ that were publicly released in July 2012. Here, all the ASEAN members provided their ‘approval to the six principles of “ASEAN’s Common Position” on the South China Sea’, in particular a commitment to the DOC and an ‘early adoption of a Code of Conduct’. While this outcome falls far short of a resolution to the dispute, Indonesia was again pivotal in reducing tensions. Nonetheless, Jakarta is acutely aware that more needs to be done. As stated by its foreign minister, Following the AMM and shuttle diplomacy, what we are focusing on now is how to keep the momentum alive in drafting the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. We have agreed on the main elements and what we have to do now is to put them into details and ensure that the process is rolling along.34 Since 1990, Indonesia has proposed several formulations with regard to the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. Besides the Six-Point Principles, these formulations include the Zero Draft on a COC proposed at a IAMM (Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting) in New York (27 September


2012) as well as the 3 plus 1 formula at the AMM Retreat in Hua Hin (13–14 August 2013) and the Special ASEAN–China Foreign Ministers Meeting in Beijing (29 August 2013). The 3 plus 1 formula involves the COC objectives of (i) promoting trust and confidence; (ii) preventing incidents, and; (iii) managing incidents when they occur. The ‘Plus One’ objective involves the creation of conditions conducive to peace including ‘early harvest initiatives’ such as the institutionalization and maintenance of communication hotlines and the establishment of procedures for search and rescue.35 ASEAN’s modus operandi—including the practice of consensus-based decisionmaking and the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs—have hampered Indonesia’s leadership. For example, given the rapid escalation of tensions between the South China Sea claimants through to the time of writing, particularly between Vietnam and China, Indonesia has proposed a Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers. However, because of consensus, one member objected and the meeting was not held. From Jakarta’s perspective, this meeting would have provided an important opportunity for Vietnam and the Philippines to update ASEAN, with the hope that ASEAN could voice a consensual view to the rest of the world.36 Such failures in regional unity contributed to the decision of the Philippines to go beyond the diplomacy of ASEAN and seek recourse to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague over its dispute with China in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the willingness of Indonesia to maintain an active role in mediating disputes or crises remains a positive contribution in regional affairs because ASEAN cannot expect this role to come from weaker members such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, or Brunei Darussalam. As Pek Koon Heng states, ‘[i]t’s like flying geese. The lead goose goes ahead and the others follow. So, it’s a matter of how quickly or how slowly the others are flying and this is very much an ASEAN process. I think that the weaker will always be helped by the stronger in ASEAN’.37 Nonetheless, the continued necessity for Indonesia’s ad hoc diplomacy demonstrates that ASEAN has not yet developed an effective set of dispute or crisis settlement mechanisms. While a number of provisions for dispute settlement have been agreed through the High Council and the ASEAN Charter,38 such dispute settlement requires voluntary recourse by all parties to the dispute and the outcomes are not binding. Moreover, such mechanisms continue to be undermined due to a continued lack of trust in the ASEAN Secretariat and/or other ASEAN members to rule appropriately over a dispute. Thus, Indonesia’s leadership has generally been limited to the mitigation of disputes rather than their resolution.

Indonesia as an agent of institutional and normative change Since the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia has also actively led and developed ASEAN’s norms and institutions. Early examples include


Indonesia’s role in the creation of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the first Bali Concord. However, following the East Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98) and the subsequent collapse of President Suharto’s autocratic New Order regime, Indonesia embarked on a substantial process of democratic reforms (reformasi) that—as noted in Avery Poole’s chapter—has positively affected its identity, norms, and associated foreign policy.39 Accordingly, democratic Indonesia viewed the aforementioned considerations, together with a proliferation of new non-traditional security challenges, in a very different light and this contributed to a reassessment by Jakarta about the utility of the region’s norms and institutions. For example, from the perspective of Umar Hadi, Indonesia’s former Director of Public Diplomacy (current Indonesian Consul-General in Los Angeles), the ASEAN Way represented ‘a solution to a given problem in a given time, but today we need to reflect on whether this solution is still valid or is still workable for another set of problems’.40 Consequently, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister drafted a policy document entitled ‘Towards an ASEAN Security Community’. According to the document, ASEAN should commit to the creation of a regional order in which its members ‘share dependable expectations of peaceful change’ and ‘rule out the use of force as a means of problem solving’.41 The central tenets of the proposal were then endorsed by all the ASEAN members through the second Bali Concord in October 2003.42 The Bali Concord II also provides complementary visions for the creation of an ‘economic community’ and a ‘socio-cultural community’. For the purpose of reshaping the regional order, the document declared that the level of ‘ASEAN’s political and security cooperation’ would need to move ‘to a higher plane’ and also referred to ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘post conflict peace building’.43 While the second Bali Concord received significant international attention, the full extent of Indonesia’s vision for change was encapsulated in its ‘Draft Plan of Action for a Security Community’. This document contained 75 concrete steps for the realization of a security community, including a regional commission for human rights and a regional peacekeeping force (standby arrangement). For reasons explained later in this chapter, some of the more significant aspects of the draft were either tempered or removed entirely. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of the earlier Bali Concord II and later Vientiane Plan of Action did indicate a commitment to significant normative change, including ‘human rights’ and a ‘democratic environment’. The 2007 ASEAN Charter represented a key outcome for these negotiations. The Charter was a significant achievement in that it provided ASEAN with a legal personality and, through its ratification into domestic law, bound the ASEAN members to a more formalized structure of regional governance—particularly in the economic sphere. Here, some noteworthy aspects included an agreement to proceed with certain economic initiatives even where the Association is short of a complete consensus (for example,


the ASEAN-X principle) as well as the consolidation of conflict resolution procedures in the economic sphere. However, while the Charter also referred to principles such as democracy and human rights, it contained a number of contradictory components, including a reaffirmation of ASEAN’s long-stated principle of non-interference and the continuation of consensus-based decisionmaking in the political–security sphere. Further, the Charter did not provide any binding commitments regarding ‘dispute settlement mechanisms’ or ‘conflict resolution’. Therefore, Ambassador Barry Desker, then Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, argued that the ‘Charter was a disappointment because it codifies existing norms and maintains its historical identity as an inter-governmental organisation’.44 As with its diplomacy in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, Indonesia has also been willing to act over human security and/or human rights issues. While Indonesia’s proposal for a human rights commission was initially rejected, in July 2007 ASEAN announced that its members had agreed to create what was then termed a ‘human rights body’ and that its specific structure and purpose would be addressed in the Charter.45 However, the ASEAN members could not agree about the final ‘terms of reference’ before the delivery of the ASEAN Charter at the Singapore Summit (2007). Nonetheless, Indonesia persisted and the terms of reference for what is now known as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) were concluded in October 2009. Through Indonesia’s leadership, ASEAN has established a formal schedule of AICHR programs for the period 2012 to 2015 that are designed to advance the goals of the ASEAN Charter.46 Since the establishment of the AICHR, ASEAN has also conducted several dialogues with the ASEAN Commission of the Promotion and the Protection of the Rights of Women and Children to synergize the steps toward the promotion of human rights in the region.47 These achievements notwithstanding, the commission’s purpose has been said to ‘promote’ rather than ‘protect’ human rights and, consequently, it does not have the power to investigate any breaches of human rights.48 Since the establishment of the AICHR, ASEAN has also adopted an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. This demonstrates the strong commitment of some of the ASEAN states to promote and protect human rights.49 However, there are still some very strong limitations regarding the protection of human rights and Indonesia’s leadership in this regard. For example, the 2014 Freedom House report did not rank any ASEAN country as being ‘free’ in terms of the combined categories of ‘political rights’ and ‘civil liberties’. With a score of 2 (1 being the best), Indonesia performed well in the context of ‘political rights’ but performed relatively poorly in the category of ‘civil liberties’ where it scored 4.50 Nonetheless, the positive assessment by Freedom House regarding political liberties in Indonesia helps to explain why Jakarta has continued to demonstrate the type of agency to be expected from a democratic entity.


Indonesia’s consolidation of more robust institutions for governance, including its foreign policy, means that it is also now better equipped to step in and exercise a leadership role should the chairmanship of other members, such as Myanmar, be less than desirable. Here, Indonesia’s broad success in democratization also provides a model and enticement for reform in other countries such as Myanmar—a process known as a zeitgeist effect.51 Consequently, Indonesia has also been discreetly promoting political reforms and, in the process, hosting visits by the country’s presidential advisory team while also sending military reformers (for example, Agus Wijoyo) to share Indonesia’s experience of democratic transition. In this regard, some non-ASEAN states have shown their interest in assisting Myanmar to prepare for its chairmanship. For example, in cooperation with Indonesia, Germany has convened several seminars in Indonesia and in Myanmar for Myanmar officials to learn from Indonesia’s experience in exercising chairmanship. 52 Furthermore, two Myanmar officials undertook internships in Brunei Darussalam during the chairmanship of Brunei Darussalam in 2013.53 Indonesia’s role as an ideas architect has made ASEAN a more dynamic organization that has been able to adjust to, or at least mitigate against, many intraregional and extra-regional challenges. The above achievements notwithstanding, Jakarta has been operating in an environment of great strategic, political, economic, and socio-cultural diversity. Because of this, the ambitious nature of Indonesia’s leadership during the past decade has led to some difficulties in the context of both acceptance and implementation. For example, Indonesia’s attempts to forge a security community by redesigning the structures and purposes of ASEAN met with considerable opposition. Some ASEAN elite viewed Jakarta’s diplomacy in this sphere as little more than an attempt to strengthen its power and leadership within ASEAN, while some in the ASEAN Secretariat believe that Indonesia was seeking an ‘excuse to walk away from ASEAN by demanding agreement over something that Jakarta knew the other member-states would reject’. Regarding the issue of ‘implementation’, the problem is that only 30 per cent of agreements in ASEAN have ever been realized, and Indonesia’s attempts to address this also met with opposition where several foreign ministry spokespeople from other ASEAN countries unreasonably complained that Indonesia’s initiatives were rushed through and imposed in a very ‘un-ASEAN like manner’.54 Nonetheless, Indonesia has persisted and, in line with the 2009 ASEAN Political–Security Community Blueprint, Indonesia lobbied for the creation of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) that was also launched at the November 2012 Summit in Phnom Penh. According to Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, ‘the Institute will not involve a military element and limit participation to institutions from ASEAN members’.55 The AIPR has completed its nominations for the Governing Council and


Advisory Board, and more recently Indonesia convened the second meeting of the Governing Council of AIPR on 21 April 2014 in Bali.56 The establishment of the AIPR can be seen as another entry point for engagement and participation from non-governmental elements in ASEAN mechanisms. Due to potential high-intensity conflicts in the region, the AIPR is expected to develop both research and practical ‘direct-result’ activities; for example, mediation and training.57 Nonetheless, substantial progress beyond confidence-building measures will take decades, as it will not be possible to do more until democratic governance has been consolidated throughout the ASEAN member-states. During Brunei’s chairmanship in 2013, Indonesia also proposed a further four initiatives. First, at the 22nd ASEAN Summit in April 2013, President Yudhoyono proposed ASEAN Development Goals that included the doubling of ASEAN’s combined GDP by 2030—from US$2.2 trillion to US$4.4 trillion. Second, he committed to halving the percentage of people in the ASEAN states that were living under the poverty line—from 18.6 per cent to 9.3 per cent by 2030. A further initiative came from Foreign Minister Natalegawa and concerned a post-2015 vision for the ASEAN Community. The vision involves action on four fronts: the consolidation of the ASEAN Community; stronger regional leadership; progress in the resolution of global issues; and a promotion of regional prosperity.58 The third and fourth initiatives concerned the aforementioned 3+1 formula and the ‘early harvest initiatives’,59 while the final idea was the establishment of an IndoPacific Treaty. However, Brunei Darussalam also seemed unenthusiastic in regard to promoting Indonesia’s global vision for ASEAN. Consequently, during its chairmanship Brunei failed to organize an ASEAN meeting with nuclear weapons states on their accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty; a failure that has led to the postponement of their accession.60

The global nexus between Indonesia’s ascent and ASEAN Indonesia’s size, together with the pace of its economic growth, means that it is increasingly well-placed to represent ASEAN’s interests in the broader Indo-Pacific region—as has been the case regarding President Yudhoyono’s diplomacy in the G-20 forum. President Yudhoyono was selected to coChair the High-Level Panel of the post-2015 Development Agenda together with the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron. The High-Level Panel consisted of 27 members and was tasked by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to advise on the global development framework beyond 2015, the target date for the Millennium Development Goals. The Panel submitted its report on 21 May 2013.61 Here, Jakarta has been eager to represent the interests of the ASEAN countries and the developing world.62 However, Indonesia can be more active in seeing the inclusion of non-G-20 states, including other ASEAN


member-states in international G-20 activities to avoid beggar-thy neighbor situations arising.63 A further opportunity to strengthen the profile and pursue the interests of ASEAN occurred in 2014 when it was the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Meanwhile, the proposal for an Indo-Pacific treaty is intended to maintain ASEAN centrality by extending and consolidating the Association’s norms concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force into the broader Indo-Pacific region. Key outcomes of its realization would be: a shift from the current ‘trust deficit’ to a ‘reservoir of strategic trust’; a commitment to peaceful settlements of disputes; and the capacity to respond appropriately to geopolitical change. Given recent increases to the level of strategic competition and tension, Indonesia’s belief is that a post2015 ASEAN will need a treaty-based arrangement that is more legally binding for Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific.64 The Indo-Pacific treaty proposal is in line with Natalegawa’s vision to establish a dynamic equilibrium whereby the expanded ‘regional architecture’ would more actively involve a broader range of middle and great powers including Australia, South Korea, Japan, India, Russia and the United States. According to a 2010 speech by Natalegawa at the Council on Foreign Relations, he sees a dynamic equilibrium as [N]ot quite in a classic balance-of-power situation where not one country is preponderant in our region, but in a more holistic and a more hopefully positive sense, in the sense that we don’t wish to see our region dominated by one country, whoever that country is, but we wish to see inclusivity, more countries, … and for countries to be engaged in multi-sectoral issues, not only security but also political and also environment, economic, socio-cultural, et cetera.65 Thus, while the vision for a dynamic equilibrium pragmatically recognizes the role of power,66 it acknowledges that the regional order can be enhanced through multi-sectoral enmeshment—that is, complex interdependence—and the normative constraints provided by the Indo-Pacific treaty. Further, rising strategic competition between Japan and China, India and China, and the United States and China; continued economic instability; mounting resource scarcity; and rising challenges to the legitimacy of the Chinese regime in particular, raise significant question marks against the prospects for converting these visions into reality. This is all the more the case given the continued possibility that the ‘long peace of ASEAN’ may, in the words of Mark Beeson, ‘owe as much to the widely noted general decline in the level of inter-state conflict as it does to anything ASEAN itself may have done’.67


Nonetheless, Indonesia was also critical to the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS), and in pushing for its initial membership to include Australia, New Zealand, and India followed by, in 2011, the United States and Russia. In line with some of the motives behind the TAC, Indonesia helped to persuade countries such as Australia and the United States to accede to the TAC as a precondition to becoming a member of the EAS. At the extra-regional level, Indonesia is also the pivotal driver behind the consolidation of ASEAN’s norms and principles, including those enshrined in the TAC. In turn, Indonesia’s leadership and involvement was also a key factor behind the willingness of the United States to engage with the forum. Indonesia’s ascent, combined with its demographics, location, and historical role in ASEAN, has led the United States, China, and India to increasingly view enhanced relations with Jakarta as the ‘giant prize’. Consequently, they have invested significant time and resources in the military, security, political, and economic spheres.68 For example, in September 2010, China formalized a defense industrial relationship and the United States followed, two months later, with a comprehensive partnership with Jakarta on military affairs. Economically, Indonesia is also a key emerging market for the United States and China, in 2013 strengthening a five-year program for economic and trade cooperation designed to increase bilateral trade with China to US$80 billion by 2015.69 The consolidation of Jakarta’s democratic image abroad has further strengthened Indonesia’s relations with non-ASEAN countries such as Australia and the United States. Aside from removing obstacles to cooperation with military institutions such as Kopassus or the sale of lethal military equipment, Indonesia’s contemporary image and role has also enhanced ASEAN’s image. For example, Hillary Clinton (then Secretary of State), praised Indonesia’s efforts in security cooperation on the part of the ASEAN states in regard to the South China Sea, observing: ‘[t]hat show of unity is very important for us’.70 The United States has also turned to Indonesia to assist with issues such as the democratization process in Myanmar. These developments have provided Indonesia with the status and legitimacy to act as an intermediary between ASEAN and extra-mural actors, a role that was evident in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. Given the above factors, Kenneth Henry, the leader of the writing commission for the ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ white paper, stated that Indonesia was the first country he consulted during his preparations.71 Moreover, in Australia’s white paper, Australia placed Indonesia as the most critical regional partner after China and India.72 As noted in the chapter by Roberts and Habir, Indonesia also serves as a crucial medium for Australian diplomacy in ASEAN. Such utility is also recognized by other countries, including China. For example, after the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China and aspects of its nine-dash-line claim to the South


China Sea, Chinese officials (senior official and ministerial levels) recognized this and deferred to Indonesia’s leadership by asking Jakarta, ‘as a big brother in ASEAN’, to convince Manila to withdraw the arbitral proceedings and return to bilateral negotiations.73 The rise of Indonesia’s influence beyond the territorial borders of Southeast Asia has led some analysts to depict it as a pivot state that possesses the ‘resilience’ and ‘flexibility’ to reposition itself to adapt to shifting strategic needs; that is, ‘the flexibility to pivot among potential partners’.74 Such capacity is strengthened by its long-standing policy of ‘nonalignment’ (‘free and active’) and associated status as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).75 Indonesia’s leverage and voice is also influenced by its membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), APEC, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the G-20 economic forum. Nonetheless, Indonesia will need to develop its policies further regarding how to make such an equilibrium work in practice. This challenge is compounded by the fact that the United States views China’s military build-up as a challenge to American supremacy—and security— while China sees Washington’s international economic agenda as an effort to diminish the relevance of the China-dominated ASEAN Plus Three (APT).76 Thus, Indonesia’s success will require a cohesive ASEAN position vis-à-vis the members’ respective economic and security interests for the purpose of managing great power relations and their interplay with ASEAN. However, given the developments outlined in this chapter, such unity is becoming increasingly difficult to marshal. The challenge of such regional unity is also reinforced by certain negative implications stemming from Indonesia’s rising global profile and activism. For example, within certain branches of the ASEAN elite, one perspective gaining increasing attention is that Jakarta prefers ‘to go it alone’ and is ‘acting in its own interests, not those of ASEAN’.77 Such perspectives are inevitable given the continuation of intra-ASEAN distrust and concerns about the risk of conflict. Here, in an elite-level survey involving 100 participants from throughout the ASEAN nations, only 40.2 per cent of interviewees said that they could trust other countries in Southeast Asia ‘to be good neighbors’. Interestingly, in a separate communal-level survey of 819 ASEAN citizens, only 37.5 per cent responded ‘yes’ to the same question, and only 26.5 per cent of the 108 Indonesian participants indicated that they could trust their neighbors.78 The challenge of trust is reinforced by historical animosities (for example, konfrontasi), ethnic rivalries (for example, Singapore as a ‘Chinese state’), religious division (both within Indonesia and between ASEAN states such as Malaysia and Thailand), and more contemporary sources of tension including territorial issues, such as Ambalat and the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands.79 The trust deficit in ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific is strongly interdependent, with conflicting strategic alignments,80 contending identities,


and/or divergent political values.81 This mix of factors has impeded ASEAN’s progress and Indonesia’s leadership. Consequently, segments of the elite in Jakarta have become increasingly frustrated and this has led to calls for a ‘post ASEAN foreign policy’82—as elaborated by See Seng Tan in his chapter. This perspective has at times found traction within Indonesia’s leadership. For instance, when Singapore objected to Indonesia’s proposal to admit East Timor as a member of ASEAN at the 1999 informal ASEAN Summit, President Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur) later suggested that ASEAN could be replaced with a new ‘West Pacific Forum’, with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines at its heart.83 While this was a relatively isolated perspective at the time, such calls have become increasingly prevalent within Indonesia’s parliament and other sectors of the political elite. These perspectives have been reinforced by continued diplomatic battles over the treatment of Indonesian migrant workers, especially with Singapore and Malaysia. In such contexts, Indonesian nationalism has been recently easy to trigger.

Conclusion Indonesia has performed an important role in ASEAN as a manager of crises and a mediator of disputes, proposing new ideas to enhance the Association, and strengthening the Association’s global profile. Each role has positive and sometimes negative implications for Indonesia and ASEAN. Jakarta’s function as a mediator has often helped to resolve, or at least mitigate, ASEAN’s problems; however, it simultaneously demonstrates that ASEAN has not instituted effective dispute or crisis settlement mechanisms. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s role as a creator of ideas is beneficial to the evolution of the Association if it is to become more effective as a coordinating and decisionmaking body capable of protecting the citizens of ASEAN’s member states. While much remains to be done in this regard, this chapter has provided several examples whereby Indonesia has made a tangible difference—for instance, the management of responses to Cyclone Nargis; the Preah Vihear Temple; and Indonesia’s lead in developing ASEAN’s institutions. The nature of Indonesia’s ascent has also provided a model for other ASEAN members; it has improved ASEAN’s international profile and enhanced the opportunities to promote ASEAN’s interests in global forums. Nonetheless, there is still much more for Indonesia to do within both ASEAN and beyond. For example, Indonesia should forge formal structural arrangements that ensure better coordination and continuity for its agenda in the G-20. For this purpose, Indonesia should exercise stronger leadership in the strategic coordination between the ASEAN G-20 contacts consisting of Indonesia, the revolving ASEAN Chair, and the ASEAN SecretaryGeneral. However, such leadership may face additional challenges in the foreseeable future. First, the level of prioritization that will be accorded to


ASEAN by the new president—Joko Widodo (Jokowi)—is difficult to predict. Presidents Habibie and Gus Dur, for example, did not maximize Indonesia’s relations with ASEAN. Meanwhile, with the exception of Megawati’s Security Community initiative, Indonesia’s ASEAN policy during her leadership was also suboptimal. Second, Indonesia is still riddled with some domestic issues, such as religious intolerance, corruption, and Papua. If Indonesia wants to enhance its leadership in ASEAN and ASEAN’s profile internationally, Indonesia should be able to handle its domestic issues, particularly the issue of Papua. Doing so will give substance and legitimacy to Indonesia’s model of democracy. Despite Indonesia’s utility for ASEAN, some quarters within ASEAN have resented or competed against Indonesia’s leadership—or, arguably, hegemony—within ASEAN, while others have resisted its new form of leadership since its consolidation of democracy. Such resistance has been strongest over the proposals that that are seen to impinge on sovereignty and regime security—for example, the creation of a human rights body, a peacekeeping force, a changed decisionmaking system, and formalized conflict resolution mechanisms. Further, there have also been significant difficulties regarding the transformation of vision into reality due to an associated aversion to legally binding institutions. This is because of the divide between the political systems in ASEAN. Should other countries follow the lead of Indonesia, and more recently Myanmar, in moving towards the consolidation of democracy, then the challenge of trust and contradictory strategic alignments will be far easier to resolve. Such dynamics were evident following the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia and how this enabled a rapprochement between Indonesia and the United States. In this context, while Indonesia’s ambition to maintain ‘dynamic equilibrium’ for itself and ASEAN is, in a material sense, the optimal option, such a policy may become impossible should the actions of a major power be irreconcilable with its identity and values, for example, China in the South China Sea. These caveats notwithstanding, there are many opportunities ahead for Indonesia and ASEAN, including Indonesia’s continued membership in the G-20, the openness of some of the weaker ASEAN countries to work with and learn from Indonesia (for example, Myanmar), and the multifaceted benefits for ASEAN should Indonesia’s economy continue to grow. As revealed in some of the early chapters from this volume, Indonesia’s continued ascent faces many uncertainties. Nonetheless, and regardless of the pace by which Indonesia grows or declines, one thing is certain: ASEAN’s future is inseparable from Indonesia’s future. Therefore, it is in the interests of all the ASEAN members to do whatever possible to aid Indonesia’s continued growth and stability while also trying to ensure that Jakarta remains actively engaged in Southeast Asia. The continuation of such engagement will require more than mere face-saving gestures of rhetorical support;


rather, other ASEAN countries will need to look beyond short-term political and economic gains with major powers and actively work within Indonesia to develop a common and united diplomatic voice regarding the rising economic, political and security issues that currently confront Southeast Asia.

Notes 1 Anthony L. Smith, ‘ASEAN’s Ninth Summit: Solidifying Regional Cohesion, Advancing External Linkage’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 3, no. 26, December 2004, p. 419. 2 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘ASEAN and Indonesia: Some Reflections’, Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 5, no. 1, 1997, p. 33. 3 Indonesia also played a leading role in supporting ASEAN’s ambition to develop the Association in a manner that reinforced its resilience from external influence. Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 62–3. 4 ‘Indonesia’, CIA World Factbook, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html [accessed 18 January 2014]. 5 ‘Indonesia and ASEAN Economic Fact Sheets’, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013, www.dfat.gov.au [accessed 15 October 2013]. 6 ‘Indonesia’, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/id.html [accessed 18 January 2014]. 7 ‘Indonesia Economic Fact Sheet’, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013, www.dfat.gov.au [accessed 15 October 2013]. 8 ‘Armed Forces Personnel, Total’, World Bank, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1 [accessed 15 December 2013]. 9 ‘Military Expenditure (% of GDP)’, United Nations Data 2013, http://data.un.org [accessed 14 December 2013]. 10 ‘Indonesia’, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/id.html [accessed 18 January 2014]. 11 See Chapter 1 by Sue Thompson. See also Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012), pp. 40-4. 12 There are Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. 13 For a detailed review of Indonesia’s historical role, see: Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN (Institute of SEA Studies, 2000). 14 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 16. 15 Justus M. van der Kroef, ‘ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Conflict: Between “Kuantan” and a “Third Alternative”’, Asian Survey, 21, no. 5 (1981), p. 516. 16 ‘Joint Communique of the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur)’, ASEAN Secretariat, 1980, http://www.aseansec.org/3679.htm [accessed 16 April 2007]. 17 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 88, Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 127. 18 Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 52.

280 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN 19 Kroef, ‘ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Conflict: Between “Kuantan” and a “Third Alternative”’, p. 528. 20 Jürgen Rüland, ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, vol. 33, no. 1, 2011, p. 84. 21 Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, p. 119. 22 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p. 254. 23 Email Correspondence between Christopher Roberts and Ambassador to Singapore, January 2009. 24 Jurgen Haacke, ‘ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30, no. 3 (2008), p. 371. 25 ASEAN, Charting a New Course (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010), p. 31. 26 ASEAN, The Story of the ASEAN-led Coordinator in Myanmar: Compassion in Action (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010), p. 31. Indonesia provided US$1,800,000, of funds to Myanmar, while Singapore contributed US$ 5,634,900 and Thailand offered US$29,713,688 of funds. Ibid. 27 ‘ASEAN Envoy Seeks to End Thai-Cambodia Clashes’, Voice of America, 7 February 2011. 28 Jonathan Prentice, ‘Analysis: Waiting for the Indonesians’, Phnom Penh Post, 21 March 2012. 29 However, the final decision by the ICJ on 11 November 2013 only provided a determination over the promontory where the temple was located but left the broader 4.3 square kilometres to be resolved through negotiations between Cambodia and Thailand. Consequently, the court directed the disputants to resolve this remaining issue through negotiation. Hui Yee Tan, ‘Analysis: Vihear Verdict Boosts Thai-Cambodia Relations’, Straits Times, 13 November 2013, ‘ICJ Ruling Likely to Lead to Intensified and Disruptive Opposition Protests against Thai Government’, IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, 12 November 2013. 30 Presentation by Dr. Yayan Mulyana, ANU National Security College Workshop: ‘Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership and Asia’s Security’, Jakarta, 23 January 2013. 31 Donald K. Emmerson, ‘ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh’, PacNet, 23 July 2012. 32 Vietnam and the Philippines wanted specific references to Chinese aggression such as the Scarborough Shoal incident and Beijing’s award of hydrocarbon exploration leases within Vietnam’s EEZ. Ibid. In relation to Cambodia’s consultations with China, see: ‘Cambodia’s Foreign Relations: Losing the Limelight’, The Economist, 17 July 2012. Moreover, Cambodia’s Secretary of State for Finance has publically acknowledged that it financially benefited from Beijing ‘in appreciation for the part played by Cambodia as the chair of ASEAN to maintain good cooperation between China and ASEAN’. ‘Brunei Carefully Pursues Binding Code to Settle South China Sea Dispute’, IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, 3 April 2013. These events were further reaffirmed by political elite from Cambodia during fieldwork in April 2013. 33 ‘ASEAN Struggles for Unity over South China Sea’, Agence France Presse, 12 July 2012. 34 Ibid. 35 ‘The First Senior Officials’ Meeting between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Discusses COC and Indonesia Formula 3 in 1’, Kemlu, 2014, www.kemlu.go.id [accessed 2 July 2014].

Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih 281 36 At the time, the meeting would have also provided an opportunity for Thailand to discuss recent developments in the country and for ASEAN to formulate a future course of ASEAN in this regard at the Ministerial level. 37 Sophat Soeung, ‘As Summit Opens, ASEAN Faces Test of Leadership’ [cited 27 December 2012]; available from http://www.voacambodia.com/content/as summit-opens-asean-faces-test-of-leadership-145000845/1356 38 For example, Article 23 of the ASEAN Charter provides that ‘parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation’. ASEAN, ASEAN Charter (Jakarta: Directorate General for ASEAN Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, 2009), p. 23. 39 Norms are the standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity. 40 Christopher B. Roberts, ‘The Future of East and Southeast Asian Regionalism’, in Andrew Tan, ed., East and Southeast Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 286. 41 Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, p. 3. 42 ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)’, ASEAN Secretariat, 2003, http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm [accessed 14 October 2003]. 43 Ibid. 44 Barry Desker, ‘Where the ASEAN Charter Comes Up Short’, The Straits Times, 18 July 2008. 45 ‘ASEAN Overcomes Resistance, Will Set Up Regional Human Rights Commission’, Associated Press Newswires, 30 July 2007; Jim Gomez, ‘ASEAN Agrees to Human Rights Commission’, The Irrawaddy, 2007, www.irrawaddy.org [accessed 30 July 2007]. 46 I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, ‘Developing Cooperation with Dialogue Partners’, Paper presented at the Centre for Training and Education of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 13 October 2012. 47 Ibid. 48 Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN in the Twenty-first Century: A Sceptical Review’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22, no. 3 (2009), p. 370, ‘ASEAN’s “Human-Rights” Council: Not Off to a Great Start’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2009. 49 Mohamad Zakaria Al-Anshori, ‘RI Leadership amid ASEAN’s Challenges’, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/29/ri-leadership-amidasean-s-challenges.html, accessed on 3 June 2014. 50 ‘2014 Freedom in the World’, Freedom House, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U8S5bfmSwwo 51 In the democratic context, the zeitgeist effect suggest that the more successful a democratic transition is, then the more likely it is to spread to other countries in close proximity. December Green and Luehrmann, Comparative Politics in the Third World: Linking Concepts and Cases (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 187–224. 52 ‘Germany Supports Myanmar in its Efforts to Meet the Challenges of Chairing ASEAN in 2014’, German Embassy, 2013, http://www.rangun.diplo.de/Vertretung/ rangun/en/03-aussen-und-EU-politik/bilaterale-beziehungen/ASEAN-Seite.html [accessed 21 May 2014]. 53 ‘Capacity Enhancement of Myanmar Diplomats toward ASEAN Chairmanship’, The Sasakawa Pan Asia Fund, 2012, http://www.spf.org/spaf/projects/project_ 8172.html [accessed 12 February 2014]. 54 Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, p. 121.

282 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN 55 Alexandra, Lina, ‘Bridging Peace and Reconciliation in ASEAN’ [cited 11 June 2011]; available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/31/ bringing-peace-and-reconciliation-asean.html 56 Summary Record of the Second Meeting of the Governing Council of AIPR, 21 April 2014, Bali. 57 Alexandra, ‘Bridging Peace and Reconciliation in ASEAN’. 58 Highlights of Discussion of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, 13–14 August 2013, Hua Hin, Thailand, p. 3. 59 Ibid. 60 A meeting on SEANWFZ Executive Commission Working Group was only revived in July 2014 during Myanmar’s chairmanship 61 The proposal of Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was announced at the Conference on Indonesia in CSIS, Washington DC on 16 May 2013 but was first officially recorded on the Chairman’s Statement of the 23rd ASEAN Summit, Bandar Seri Begawan, 9 October 2013. 62 Winfried Weck, ‘ASEAN and G-20–Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Representatives’, Kas International Reports, No. 2 (2011), p. 22, pp. 22–35. 63 Ibid., p. 34. 64 ‘Indonesian Foreign Minister Receives Honorary Doctorate Degree’, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Canberra, 29 August 2013. 65 ‘A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/ conversation-marty-natalegawa-minister-foreign-affairs-republic-indonesia/ p22984 [accessed 22 August 2013]. 66 Rizal Sukma, ‘Friendship and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Will a Treaty Help?’, The Jakarta Post, 28 May 2013. 67 Mark Beeson, ‘Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power’, Review of International Studies, 35 (2009), p. 339. See also Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation. 68 Brad Nelson, ‘Can Indonesia Lead ASEAN’, The Diplomat, 5 December 2013. 69 ‘External Affairs, Indonesia’, Jane’s Intelligence, 2013. 70 Ismira Lutfia, ‘Clinton Applauds Indonesia’s ASEAN Role’, The Jakarta Post, 4 September 2012. 71 Kenneth Henry, ‘Australia in the Asian Century White Paper’, presentation sponsored by the National Australian Bank, Sydney, 22 October 2012. 72 ‘Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper’ (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012). 73 Meeting between officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and Political Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, 20 February 2013. 74 Irar Nusa Bhakti and Leng C. Tan, ‘Presidential Hopefuls’ Checklist 2014: Resilience’, The Jakarta Post, 12 November 2012. 75 For a contemporary example of the role of Indonesia in NAM together with the continued relevance of the NAM block in the UNGA, see Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), pp. 150-1. 76 Weatherbee, ‘Southeast Asia and ASEAN: Running in Place’, pp. 4-5. 77 Luke Hunt, ‘Indonesia capitalizes on ASEAN Divisions’ (cited 2 January 2013); available from http://thediplomat.com/asean-beat/2012/07/25/indonesiacapitalizes-on-asean-divisions/. Similar perspectives were also raised by Tang Siew Mun and Ralf Emmers. Interview with Tang Siew Mun, Director of Foreign


78 79 80

81

82

83

Policy and Security Studies at the ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 2011. Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011. Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation, pp. 155–66. Ibid., pp. 74-87. Here, the aforementioned survey also indicated that Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN and beyond is further challenged by the diversity of strategic alignment where the political and academic elite from four of the ASEAN member countries listed China as one of their country’s three most important strategic allies while three other countries selected the United States for the same question. Ibid., p. 163. Christopher B. Roberts, ‘State Weakness and Political Values: Ramifications for the ASEAN Community’, in Ralf Emmers, ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012), pp. 11–26. ‘A Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy for a Post-G8 World’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October 2009; Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘Indonesia to Boost Human Rights, Doubts Support from ASEAN’, The Nation, 19 January 2011. Gus Dur initially made this call during a speech at the Indonesian embassy in Singapore but the idea was then repeated and escalated to formal discussions with other pacific countries such as Australia. John McBeth, ‘Indonesia – Wahid and Sukarno’s Gold’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 December 2000; Amit Baruah, ‘Australia Backs W. Pacific Forum’, The Hindu, 9 December 2000.

Bibliography ‘2014 Freedom in the World’, Freedom House, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U8S5bfmSwwo ‘Armed Forces Personnel, Total’ (2013) World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1 [accessed 15 December 2013]. ‘ASEAN Envoy Seeks to End Thai–Cambodia Clashes’ (2011) Voice of America, 7 February. ‘ASEAN Overcomes Resistance, Will Set up Regional Human Rights Commission’ (2007) Associated Press Newswires, 30 July. ‘ASEAN Struggles for Unity over South China Sea’ (2012) Agence France Presse, 12 July. ‘ASEAN’s “Human Rights” Council: Not Off to a Great Start’ (2009) The Wall Street Journal, 25 October. ‘Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper’ (2012) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia). ‘Brunei Carefully Pursues Binding Code to Settle South China Sea Dispute’ (2013) IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, 3 April. ‘Cambodia’s Foreign Relations; Losing the Limelight’ (2012) Economist, 17 July. ‘Capacity Enhancement of Myanmar Diplomats toward ASEAN Chairmanship’ (2012) Sasakawa Pan Asia Fund, http://www.spf.org/spaf/projects/project_ 8172.html [accessed 12 February 2014]. ‘A Conversation with Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia’ (2010) Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/conversation-marty-natalegawa-minister-foreign-affairs-republic-indonesia/p22984 [accessed 22 August 2013].

284 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord Ii (Bali Concord Ii)’ (2003) ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm [accessed 14 October 2003]. ‘External Affairs, Indonesia’ (2013) Jane’s Intelligence, 4 September. ‘The First Senior Officials’ Meeting between ASEAN and The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Discusses COC and Indonesia Formula 3 in 1’ (2014) Kemlu, www.kemlu.go.id [accessed 2 July 2014]. ‘Germany Supports Myanmar in Its Efforts to Meet the Challenges of Chairing ASEAN in 2014’ (2013) German Embassy, http://www.rangun.diplo.de/Vertretung/ rangun/en/03-aussen-und-EU-politik/bilaterale-beziehungen/ASEAN-Seite.html [accessed 21 May 2014]. ‘ICJ Ruling Likely to Lead to Intensified and Disruptive Opposition Protests against Thai Government’ (2013) IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, 12 November. ‘Indonesia’ (2014) CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/id.html [accessed 18 January 2014]. ‘Indonesia and ASEAN Economic Fact Sheets’ (2013) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, www.dfat.gov.au [accessed 15 October 2013]. ‘Indonesia Economic Fact Sheet’ (2013) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, www.dfat.gov.au [accessed 15 October 2013]. ‘Indonesian Foreign Minister Receives Honorary Doctorate Degree’ (2013) Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Canberra, 29 August. ‘Joint Communique of the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur)’ (1980) ASEAN Secretariat, http://www.aseansec.org/3679.htm [accessed 16 April 2007]. ‘Military Expenditure (per cent of GDP)’ (2013) United Nations Data, http://data. un.org [accessed 14 December 2013]. ‘A Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy for a Post-G8 World’ (2009) Jakarta Post, 5 October. Alexandra, Lina (2011) ‘Bridging Peace and Reconciliation in ASEAN’ [cited 11 June 2011]; http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/31/bringing-peace-and-reconciliation-asean.html Amitav, Acharya (2009) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge). Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (1997) ‘ASEAN and Indonesia: Some Reflections’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 5: 1, 20–34. APEC (2012) ‘Promoting Blue Economy Initiatives to Strengthening Food Security Linked to Climate Change in the Asia Pacific Region’ (Singapore: ASEAN Secretariat). ASEAN (2009) ASEAN Charter (Jakarta: Directorate General for ASEAN Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia), p. 23. ASEAN (2010) Charting a New Course (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat). ASEAN (2010) The Story of the ASEAN-led Coordinator in Myanmar: Compassion in Action (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat), p. 31. Baruah, Amit (2000) ‘Australia Backs W. Pacific Forum’, Hindu, 9 December. Beeson, Mark (2009) ‘Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power’, Review of International Studies 35: 95–112. Bhakti, Irar Nusa and Leng C. Tan (2012) ‘Presidential Hopefuls’ Checklist 2014: Resilience’, Jakarta Post, 12 November. Chachavalpongpun, Pavin (2011) ‘Indonesia to Boost Human Rights, Doubts Support from ASEAN’, Nation, 19 January. Emmers, Ralf (2003) Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon).

Christopher B. Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih 285 ——— (2011) ‘Interview at the RSIS – Singapore’, Singapore, 15 March. Desker, Barry (2008) ‘Where the ASEAN Charter Comes Up Short’, The Straits Times, 18 July. Emmers, Ralf (2003) Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon). Emmerson, Donald K. (2012) ‘ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh’, PacNet, 23 July. Gomez, Jim (2007) ‘ASEAN Agrees to Human Rights Commission’, The Irrawaddy, www.irrawaddy.org [accessed 30 July 2007]. Green, December and Luehrmann, Laura (2007) Comparative Politics in the Third World: Linking Concepts and Cases (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Haacke, Jurgen (2008) ‘ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30: 3, 351–78. Henry, Kenneth (2012) ‘Australia in the Asian Century White Paper’, presentation sponsored by the National Australian Bank, Sydney, 22 October. Highlights of Discussion ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, 13–14 August 2013 Hua Hin, Thailand, p. 3. Hunt, Luke (2011) ‘Indonesia Capitalizes on ASEAN Divisions’ [cited 2 January 2013]; http://thediplomat.com/asean-beat/2012/07/25/indonesia-capitalizes-onasean-divisions/ Interview (2011) Senior-Level Officer, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (requested anonymous), at Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta, 16 February. Kroef, Justus M. van der (1981) ‘ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Conflict: Between “Kuantan” and a “Third Alternative”’, Asian Survey, 21: 5, 515–35. Laksmana, Evan (2011a) ‘Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Matter’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33: 2, 159. ——— (2011b) ‘Jakarta Eyes South China Sea’, Diplomat [cited 5 June 2012]; http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/02/23/jakarta-eyes-south-china-sea/. Leifer, Michael (1989) ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge). Lutfia, Ismira (2012) ‘Clinton Applauds Indonesia’s ASEAN Role’, The Jakarta Post, 4 September 2012. ——— (2012) ‘Indonesia Leads from the Front on ASEAN’, Jakarta Post, 8 August. McBeth, John (2000) ‘Indonesia–Wahid and Sukarno’s Gold’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 December. McKinsey Global Institute (2012) ‘The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s potential’ [cited 12 January 2013]; www.mckinsey.com/-media/ McKinsey/dotcom/Insights per cent20economy/MGI-Unleashing_Indonesia-potential_ Full_report.ashx Meeting (2013) officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia and Political Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, 20 February. Mohamad Zakaria Al-Anshori, ‘RI Leadership amid ASEAN’s Challenges’, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/29/ri-leadership-amid-asean-schallenges.html (accessed 3 June 2014). Mulyana, Yayan (2013) Jakarta, 23 January 2013. ‘Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership and Asia’s Security’ (workshop presentation). Mun, Tang Siew (2011) Interview at the ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 March. Narine, Shaun (2002) Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner). ———. (2009) ‘ASEAN in the Twenty-First Century: A Sceptical Review’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22: 3, 369–86.

286 Indonesian Leadership in ASEAN Nelson, Brad (2013) ‘Can Indonesia Lead ASEAN’, Diplomat, 5 December. Prentice, Jonathan (2012) ‘Analysis: Waiting for the Indonesians’, Phnom Penh Post, 21 March. Roberts, Christopher B. (2010) ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community (Singapore: ISEAS). ———. (2012) ‘State Weakness and Political Values: Ramifications for the ASEAN Community’, in Ralf Emmers, ed., ASEAN and the Institutionalization of East Asia, 11–26 (Milton Park: Routledge, 2012). ———. (2012) ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (Milton Park: Routledge). ———. (2013) ‘The Future of East and Southeast Asian Regionalism’, in Andrew Tan, ed., East and Southeast Asia: International Relations and Security Perspectives, 279–90 (London: Routledge). Puja, I Gusti Agung Wesaka (2012) ‘Developing Cooperation with Dialogue Partners’, paper presented at the Centre for Training and Education of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 13 October. Rüland, Jürgen (2011) ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 33: 1, 83–112. Smith, Anthony L. (2000) Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN (Institute of SEA Studies). _______. (2004) ‘ASEAN’s Ninth Summit: Solidifying Regional Cohesion, Advancing External Linkage’, 3: 26 (December), pp. 416–33. Soeung, Sophat (2012) ‘As Summit Opens, ASEAN Faces Test of Leadership’, http://www.voacambodia.com/content/as summit-opens-asean-faces-test-of-leadership-145000845/1356 (accessed 27 December 2012). Sukma, Rizal (2013) ‘Friendship and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Will a Treaty Help?’, Jakarta Post, 28 May. Tan, Hui Yee (2013) ‘Analysis: Vihear Verdict Boosts Thai–Cambodia Relations’, Straits Times, 13 November. Weatherbee, Donald E. (2012) ‘Southeast Asia and ASEAN Running in Place’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 3–22. Weck, Winfried (2011) ‘ASEAN and G-20 – Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Representatives’, Kas International Reports, 2, 22–35. White, Hugh (2012) ‘A Great Power on Our Doorstep’, Speech at the Australian National University, 21 May.

14 Indonesia among the Powers: Will ASEAN Still Matter to Indonesia? See Seng Tan

Introduction If members cannot solve their issues within ASEAN, what’s the importance of maintaining it as the corner stone [sic] of [Indonesia’s] foreign policy?1 If other ASEAN countries do not share Indonesia’s passion for and commitment to ASEAN, then it is indeed time for us to start another round of debate on the merits of a post-ASEAN foreign policy. We have many other important foreign policy agendas to attend to other than just whining and agonizing over ASEAN’s failures.2 Our involvement in ASEAN is not optional. We want to establish relations with both ASEAN and other countries. It is important for us to make sure that we establish good relations with our own neighbors before we embark on new cooperations [sic] with countries beyond the region.3 Admittedly, I have heard some worries that since Indonesia has a new club, new home, namely G-20, it will no longer make ASEAN its main home …. [It] is not true that since Indonesia joins [sic] the G-20, it will no longer consider ASEAN important. ASEAN is very important.4 Recently, within Indonesia’s strategic circles there has emerged a growing perception—and with it, a sense of frustration—over the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), long a cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy, as an impediment to Indonesia’s evolution from a regional power to becoming a major player in global affairs. With episodes such as the border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, which erupted in violence in 287

288 Indonesia among the Powers

2011, and ASEAN’s first-ever failure to produce a joint communiqué at its annual ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012, denting ASEAN’s internal cohesion and hampering the organization’s efforts to become a ‘political-security community’ by 2015,5 Indonesia has worked valiantly, if at times in vain, to mediate between the offending parties and salvage the reputation of ASEAN. Yet such experiences have led some Indonesians to question the viability of their country’s longstanding regional policy, not least when it appears as if Jakarta’s position as the de facto leader of ASEAN is no longer accepted, in practice at least, by all of the organization’s member-states. Moreover, that all this has occurred even as Indonesia is being courted by and included among the world’s most economically and diplomatically influential powers has only exacerbated Indonesia’s sense that its fellow ASEAN states neither acknowledge its regional leadership nor appreciate its contributions to regional conflict management sufficiently. In view of the allusions by some Indonesian strategic thinkers to an Indonesian foreign policy no longer bound by an abiding commitment to ASEAN—the institution that has ostensibly played such a crucial part in Indonesia’s regional and, in some ways, extra-regional relations—what has in fact been President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the extra-regional world, and, more specifically, the great powers? Does the concept of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ propounded by Indonesia’s foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, at all constitute Jakarta’s new vision—and, for our purposes, a ‘post-ASEAN’ vision—of Indonesia’s relations with the major powers, or does it reflect an inherent consistency with a more established outlook? Ultimately, how has ASEAN mattered historically in Indonesia’s foreign relations, and how, if at all, might it matter in the foreseeable future? This chapter argues that for all intents and purposes, ASEAN will remain relevant to Indonesia’s pursuit of its national interests for three reasons. First, Indonesia’s propensity to hedge strategically against great powers and regional powers external to Southeast Asia suggests that ASEAN—created by Indonesia and the other founding members in part for this purpose— remains highly useful to Indonesia’s foreign policy aims. In today’s regional security environment, in which China’s fast-growing power and influence and America’s rebalancing towards Asia are forcing East Asian states to adopt confrontational foreign policies, it is arguable that Indonesia and ASEAN need each other even more than at any time in the past to ensure their shared ability to hedge continues unaffected.6 The second reason follows from the first: the evolving regional architecture in East Asia will as such remain useful to Indonesia, constructed and maintained by ASEAN and its dialogue-partner countries to facilitate engagement of external powers and global actors. Third, while ASEAN and its ‘ecosystem’ of regional institutions7 will likely remain important to Indonesia, as with other ASEAN states, ASEAN regionalism has never been

See Seng Tan 289

Indonesia’s sole option in its diplomatic toolkit. As the ostensible cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy, ASEAN has hitherto mattered significantly, but it has by no means been the exclusive forum through which Indonesia has sought to ensure its own security. Before I elaborate on these arguments, a look at Indonesia’s contemporary rise, its domestic developments, and their implications for its foreign policy is in order.

Indonesia rising: Domestic and external challenges In recent times a gush of compliments have flowed from pundits concerning the prospects of Indonesia—‘Asia’s third giant’ according to a recently released anthology on Indonesia8—as a rising economic and diplomatic power.9 As the only Southeast Asian country granted membership in the Group of Twenty (G-20), a member of the ‘BRIICS’ club of emerging economic titans,10 and long-time leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with bragging rights as the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia appears to be on the cusp of assuming a prominent place not only in Asia but indeed in the world at large.11 As one analyst has observed, Indonesia is determined to play not just a role in regional leadership, but rather aspires to be ‘an increasingly vocal player in global issues’.12 This has coincided with the country’s democratic transition—a difficult one, by most counts—in the post-Suharto era.13 Coupled with its historical leadership, Indonesia’s transformation has served notice to major and regional powers alike that Jakarta deserves to be courted and welcomed into the ranks of the world’s most powerful and privileged nations. As an Indonesian insider has explained, ‘Indonesia’s activist foreign policy is supply-driven, with domestic opinion demanding that Jakarta stand up and be counted in the region and beyond; it is also demand-driven, as Indonesia’s partners are asking that it take on greater regional and even global responsibilities’.14 That said, although Indonesia is keen to position itself as a mouthpiece for ASEAN countries and as a representative of developing nations within the G-20,15 it is not immediately apparent that other ASEAN member-states believe that Indonesia could be relied on to represent their interests in the G-20, particularly given the longstanding mutual distrust some of them have maintained.16 Regardless of this, Indonesia’s self-awareness of its growing importance has led it to pursue what one pundit has termed ‘confidence diplomacy’, as embodied in its enhanced role in ASEAN, increased engagement with the great powers, active use of multilateral diplomacy, and embrace of peace and democracy as values worth pursing and advocating.17 Examples of Jakarta’s heightened awareness and considerably broadened perspective of its place and role beyond Southeast Asia abound, not least Natalegawa’s call for a more expansive understanding of the region in which Indonesia is located—specifically, the ‘Indo-Pacific’—and the establishment of ‘an


Indo-Pacific wide treaty of friendship and cooperation’—not unlike the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia—as a code of interstate conduct for the proposed Indo-Pacific region.18 Indeed, the leading role played by Indonesia in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) has spurred one analyst to opine that ‘Southeast Asia no longer remains perhaps the appropriate analytical geopolitical category to capture appropriately the evolving dynamics of Indonesia’s relations with major powers of the region’.19 At the same time, Indonesia’s longstanding role as ‘first among equals’ in ASEAN has increasingly been frustrated by the perceived obduracy of some member nations of the organization which resist efforts by Jakarta and others to deepen regional integration and strengthen institutional cohesion. This has led a number of Indonesia’s leading policy intellectuals and political pundits to remonstrate ASEAN countries openly that, in the words of a leading academic-practitioner, ‘do not share Indonesia’s passion for and commitment to ASEAN’, and to urge their national leaders to pursue a ‘post-ASEAN’ foreign policy for Indonesia.20 Take, for instance, the following contention by Jusuf Wanandi, quite possibly Indonesia’s most influential policy intellectual today: If ASEAN cannot move beyond its lowest common denominator, as defined by Laos or Myanmar, it is likely that Indonesia will seek to become more independent from ASEAN. In the last 40 years, Indonesia has become too dependent on ASEAN as the instrument of its foreign policy, and has constrained its freedom of action and use of other vehicles to implement its free and independent foreign policy. This was right in the first decades of ASEAN, to enable Indonesia to get the trust back from its neighbours. And Indonesia has achieved that.21 The frustration felt by Indonesian policy elites such as Wanandi over perceived restraints placed on their nation’s regional aspirations through being tethered to a divided and ineffective ASEAN is by no means new. Commenting on the contrast between Indonesia’s regional vision and its limited role as ‘regional spectator’, Michael Leifer wrote in the 1980s about Indonesia’s sense of frustration at ‘not being able to influence events in the region [which has been] reinforced by the fact that individual members went their own way in foreign policy’, which led President Suharto to ‘express disappointment at ASEAN’s limited progress’.22 Indeed, Suharto’s emphasis on ASEAN regionalism as the ostensible cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy earned him the ire of some of his countrymen for having perceptibly held Indonesia back from playing a larger global role. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar has observed: Suharto’s foreign policy was more pragmatic and low profile, and aimed at ensuring a safe and stable regional environment within which

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Indonesia could develop, while also gaining international support in the form of access to other markets, foreign investment and technical assistance. Suharto’s focus was on South East Asia and relations with the United States, Japan and key European countries. He came in for criticism internally, though, for betraying the spirit of the preamble to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, which exhorts Indonesia to play an active role in fostering world peace.23 However valid Indonesian criticisms about ASEAN are, they clearly do not stem from one whose commitment to ASEAN regionalism has been exemplary. This is especially so in the area of intra-ASEAN regional economic cooperation and integration, where Indonesia’s strong economic performance has done little to assuage domestic concerns over what a more advanced form of integration could mean for Indonesia. As an analyst observed in 2011, ‘Indonesia was particularly wary of even the smallest efforts to create a common market. Even today there is the fear that the home market could be flooded with cheaper imported goods’.24 Arguably, this problem has worsened in the light of recent difficulties facing the Indonesian economy.25 ASEAN’s own slow progress towards forming the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)—Surin Pitsuwan, the former Secretary-General of ASEAN, has conceded that ASEAN’s aim to establish the AEC by 2015 is probably farfetched in light of the numerous constraints and impediments still in place26—is arguably the consequence of the collective anxieties of ASEAN economies, including Indonesia’s, over the risks posed by intra-ASEAN flows of cheap labor and even cheaper commodities to their domestic markets and indigenous industries. For Indonesia, the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has proved particularly challenging where dealing with the influx of inexpensive goods from China into the Indonesian market is concerned. According to a survey conducted by the Indonesian government in 2011, since the ASEAN–China FTA came into force in January 2010, China has reportedly ‘dumped’ nearly 40 different products in Indonesia, prompting Hatta Radjasa, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, to insist that the FTA could be reassessed if the Chinese were to continue their unfair trade practices.27 However, while Chinese dumping practices are clearly a legitimate concern, the reality is that Indonesia has yet to remove domestic labor laws and trade restrictions—the so-called ‘behind the border’ barriers—that stand in the way of the AEC’s formation.28 To be sure, Indonesia is not the only culpable ASEAN member whose ambivalence has contributed to the slowdown in ASEAN’s progress towards becoming a regional community. More fundamentally, even as Indonesia’s actions in the economic arena imply a problematic commitment no less from the primus inter pares of ASEAN itself to regional integration, they also suggest that Indonesia’s aspiration to become a global player is unlikely to be realized anytime soon.


Ironically, the very elements which today render Indonesia an attractive force for emulation worldwide—namely, its blend of Islam, democracy and modernity—are complicating Indonesian leaders’ formulation and implementation of their nation’s foreign policy. As an analyst has noted, foreign policymaking in Indonesia today is no longer the exclusive preserve of the foreign policy establishment in Jakarta, but is subject increasingly to inputs, welcomed or otherwise, from society at large, the political parties, and religious mass organizations.29 This situation differs markedly from the 1980s, when the Indonesian government would likely not have lost much sleep over the interests of domestic actors, as Jörn Dosch has noted. However, with Indonesia’s democratization following Suharto’s abrupt departure in 1999, the policy process has ‘opened up to the extent that groups from outside the executive branch have forced [the Indonesian government] to pay more prominent attention to issues such as human rights and environmental matters in foreign affairs and blocked or significantly reshaped governmental initiatives toward other countries’.30 As Michael Leifer noted in 1983, ‘They have sought to avoid incautious engagement in international issues which might be exploited either to advance claims presented by Muslim groups or to enhance the political standing of Islam in the Republic’.31 However, as has often been observed, Indonesia’s traditional reputation for religious tolerance is today being undermined by the growing clout of Muslim extremists in Indonesia as well as the general perception that Indonesia, despite being the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation, lies at the periphery of the Islamic world.32 It is this concern that has put at risk the hopes pinned on Indonesia as a country where Islam, democracy, and modernity conceivably go hand-in-hand, and could serve as the alternative face of Islam amid global patterns of Islamist extremism and terrorism.33 Against this ambivalent backdrop, it is not immediately apparent that the enthusiasm of some of Indonesia’s most prominent strategic thinkers for a post-ASEAN foreign policy is necessarily shared by those within Kemlu, the Indonesian foreign ministry, or indeed by the executive branch of the Indonesian government. Arguably, it is not only instrumental reasons that matter to Indonesia, but equally ideational ones as well, not least Indonesia’s role as a founding member of ASEAN.34 Granted, the presidential elections in mid-July 2014 could prove a defining moment for Indonesia’s foreign policy in the post-Yudhoyono era. That said, as Meidyatama Suryodiningrat has noted, the present slate of presidential candidates lacks foreign policy credentials and none of them exhibit ‘the kind of keenness and strategic sophistication on global affairs exhibited by Yudhoyono during his decade in office’.35 If so, barring unexpected developments and changes to the challenges facing Indonesia’s efforts to play a prominent global role, a post-ASEAN foreign policy would seem out of the question for the time being. But as the following discussion will highlight,

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it is not only the continued relevance of ASEAN and its ancillary regionwide frameworks and mechanisms to Indonesia’s security goals that matter, but equally Indonesia’s adherence to a slew of diplomatic options—of which ASEAN is an important but not the only option—for achieving its foreign policy objectives.

Relevance of hedging in a time of rebalancing First, Indonesia will continue to hedge against the major powers, especially China and the United States. Jakarta’s perdurable concern that its regional environment should remain as secure and stable as possible—in short, conditions most suited for developing an Indonesia that is ‘sovereign, independent, just and prosperous’36 and, it might be added, democratic—has remained fundamentally unchanged. Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa’s concept of ‘dynamic equilibrium’,37 which urges peaceful coexistence among the great powers in Asia, is the most recent expression of that longstanding aspiration. Nor, as a consequence of its contemporary transformation, has Indonesia’s enduring predilection for strategic hedging been replaced by an explicit policy to bandwagon with or to balance against particular powers.38 According to Rizal Sukma, Indonesia’s primary function in securing strategic partnerships with extra-regional countries such as Australia, India, Japan and South Korea ‘clearly reflects Jakarta’s desire to see that the emerging regional order would not be dominated only by the US and China’.39 Going further, Leonard Sebastian has argued that ‘Indonesia does not want to be tied to a US or China-dominated security web. It wants an independent middle power role to assert itself both regionally and globally’.40 From Jakarta’s vantage, there is a very real risk of regional concerns being reduced purely to, for instance, the rise of China or rebalance by the United States. As one analyst has observed, ‘The big picture of China and the regional balance of power needs to be filled in with the detail of the other countries and their many different stories’.41 This implies that Indonesia’s long-held aim of having a ‘free and active’ (bebas dan aktif) foreign policy—first articulated by Vice-President Mohammad Hatta in a speech in September 1948 and originally designed to mitigate persistent domestic tensions between secular nationalism and religious nationalism—42 continues to guide the country’s approach to its external relations despite its democratic transition in the post-Suharto period. Jakarta has held firmly to the notion that the management of regional order in Southeast Asia is best left to the region’s countries themselves. As Adam Malik, the former Indonesian foreign minister, noted in 1971, The nations of Southeast Asia should consciously work toward the day when security in their own region will be the primary responsibility of


the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Not through big power alignments, not through the building of contending military pacts or military arsenals but through strengthening the state of respective endurance, through effective regional cooperation with other states sharing this basic view on world affairs.43 In other words, regional security is to be achieved through intramural cooperation within ASEAN rather than through dependence on external powers. At the same time, the realization of such an approach to regional security—‘regional solutions to regional problems’, as the mantra goes44— has always been subject to the competing preferences of individual Southeast Asian countries, on the one hand, and the limits of national capacity on the other.45 However, not unlike its Southeast Asian counterparts, Indonesia’s aspiration for regional autonomy did not prevent it from engaging, where it deemed necessary, in bilateral security relationships with select external powers. In that regard, Indonesia has pursued security ties with the United States since 1951—other than Washington’s suspension of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for much of the 1990s into the first half of the 2000s in protest against human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian military46—and with Australia since the 1990s. And while historical ties with China have in the past been complicated by Jakarta’s fears over Beijing’s political and ideological influence on Indonesia’s Chinese minority—indeed, the project of regional reconciliation, post-Confrontation, through ASEAN was arguably embraced by Indonesia as a prospective bulwark against the apparent threat posed by China47—bilateral relations have significantly improved since 1998, even though Indonesia normalized ties with China in 1990.48 Nor has Indonesian disdain towards collective defense systems prevented Jakarta from actively participating in wider regional security arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), whose membership includes external major powers. If anything, Indonesia’s support for the ARF is, as Rizal Sukma has argued, an indication of its willingness to accommodate the legitimate security interests of extra-regional powers in regional affairs.49 Thus understood, Indonesia’s opposition in 2005 to the idea of an East Asian Community comprising only the members of the ASEAN+3—that is, the ASEAN members together with China, Japan and South Korea—is therefore not a surprise. In this, Indonesia shared Japan’s concern that perceived Chinese dominance in the ASEAN+3 did not make for a stable regional order in East Asia, much less for the anticipated East Asian Community.50 Rather, Jakarta’s preference for the more inclusive East Asia Summit (EAS), which brings together leaders from ASEAN and its eight key Asia-Pacific partners—China, the United States, Japan, India, Russia, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand—underscores its aspiration to engage the great and

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regional powers and—crucially—to do it through ASEAN.51 All this suggests Indonesia has no interest in seeing the Southeast Asian region, much less the Indonesian archipelago, become a theater of great power competition. Nor would Indonesia seek to influence the regional balance of power by siding with either the Chinese or the Americans against the other.

Frameworks for engaging the great powers Second, ASEAN and its wider complex of institutions will likely remain relevant to Indonesia’s engagement of the great powers. Indonesia’s rise and its persistent frustration over the lack of cohesion and progress in ASEAN has led to renewed calls within certain Indonesian quarters for a postASEAN foreign policy—further buoyed by suggestions from particular Australians for a regional concert of powers which includes Indonesia but arguably marginalizes ASEAN, if not excluding it altogether.52 Even so, ASEAN remains crucial to Indonesia, not least as a convenient institutional platform through which it could proactively engage the great and regional powers that regularly enter into dialogue with ASEAN and participate in wider regional arrangements led by ASEAN. These arrangements include the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and—arguably less so as a consequence of this arrangement’s waning relevance53—the ARF. At the launch of a new Indonesian policy journal in New York in September 2012, President Yudhoyono took pains to highlight the ostensible achievements of the ASEAN-based regional architecture: … to further consolidate the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific, a regional architecture that is conducive to peace has to be built. We in ASEAN have been building that regional architecture, making use of building blocks that ASEAN developed over the decades. These include the ASEAN Plus processes between the regional organization and its individual dialogue partners, the ASEAN Plus Three process that brings together all the ten ASEAN members with the more mature economies of northeast Asia. A recent high-point in ASEAN’s network building is the expansion of the East Asia Summit (EAS) to include not only the ASEAN members and their northeast Asian partners, as well as Australia, India and New Zealand, but also two great Pacific powers, Russia and the United States.54 Unlike the 2008 Australian proposal for a revamped and streamlined regional architecture, or the 2009 Japanese proposal for a European Unionlike institution for East Asia,55 Indonesia has relied on—indeed, contributed significantly to—an ad hoc formation of various regional arrangements whose raison d’être was the furnishing of ‘meeting places’56 wherein the


great powers and regional countries can interact according to ASEAN’s terms.57 According to Jakarta’s reasoning, a single institution servicing East Asia could open the entire region up to excessive great power influence, whereas ‘a looser and more pluralistic arrangement … will not be under the sway of one or more powers, and so will continue to let ASEAN play the key role of convenor’.58 As Dewi Fortuna Anwar has argued: ASEAN is viewed as indispensable for managing relations with major powers. Policymakers in Jakarta believe that the bloc should be ambitious about spreading its code of conduct eschewing force to resolve conflicts to countries outside the region, and that ASEAN should be the primary driver in regional architecture initiatives in East Asia.59 Crucially, what critics of ASEAN see as its confusing ecosystem of relatively inefficient regional arrangements is not only the manner by which Indonesia and other ASEAN states create institutional arenas for counterbalancing, but equally neutral spaces in which regional powers can manage and hopefully resolve their mutual security dilemmas. What critics dismiss as a wasteful oversupply of institutions is seen by ASEAN as its provision of a multiplicity of venues from which contending states can opt to continue their deliberations should negotiations become deadlocked in any one institutional setting.60 Indonesia’s adamant stance on the centrality of ASEAN in the regional architecture stems equally from a concern highlighted in the preceding section, namely, its worry that, not unlike during the Cold War when the region was arguably reduced to a mere geopolitical front for Soviet–US rivalry, contemporary East Asia could suffer a similar fate should the region come to be viewed primarily through the lens of Sino–US competition and/or cooperation. As an analyst has noted, ‘From Jakarta’s perspective, the importance Washington attaches to Indonesia and ASEAN should not simply be derivative of China’s rise but instead be based on the intrinsic value of the country and sub-region’.61 Remarkably, for all its flaws, ASEAN continues to enjoy the support of major and regional powers, which regard ASEAN-based arrangements such as the EAS, despite persistent complaints about their inefficacy, as useful frameworks for regional dialogue and interaction. If anything, such regional cooperative frameworks enable Indonesia to pursue and conceivably realize its goal of dynamic equilibrium. Granted, Indonesia’s recent exertions at preventing meltdowns in ASEAN unity have no doubt frustrated Jakarta, but they also highlight the considerable lengths to which Indonesia is prepared to go to redeem the embattled organization. Marty Natalegawa’s frantic shuttle diplomacy in the wake of the apparent disharmony among the ASEAN member-states at the annual meeting of foreign ministers in Phnom Penh in July 2012, which produced the six-point ‘con-

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sensus’, and his work and that of his fellow ministers at the summit in November 201262 underscore the salience ASEAN still holds for Indonesia. Prior to the Phnom Penh fiasco, Indonesia had also served as mediator— and, subsequently, agreed to serve as monitor—when hostilities broke out between Cambodia and Thailand in February 2011 over the land surrounding the Preah Vihear temple near the Cambodian–Thai border.63 These efforts suggest that the Yudhoyono administration, contrary to advice urged by a number of Jakarta’s policy intellectuals, remains committed to ASEAN for the foreseeable future.64 If anything, the Indonesian leadership appears to hold the view that its nation’s rising power and influence notwithstanding, that without a strong and cohesive ASEAN, Indonesia’s quest to become a middle power would itself be seriously hindered. As one analyst has indicated, ‘A turbulent and weakened ASEAN will allow a vacuum leading to great power collision thereby leaving Indonesia on its own and vulnerable’.65 If Leonard Sebastian was correct about Indonesia’s desire to play a ‘middle power role’ in international affairs commensurate with its rising power and influence,66 then it makes more sense for Jakarta to see ASEAN and its wider complex of region-wide institutions as ready platforms through which Indonesia can fulfil its middle power ambitions. More often than not, middle powers rely on multilateral diplomacy to achieve their foreign policy goals,67 and there is little to suggest Indonesia will deviate from that norm.

Multiple paths to Indonesia’s security Finally, Indonesian foreign policy has never been ASEAN-centric to the exclusion of other pathways and pillars. The foregoing two points—the continued relevance of strategic hedging for Indonesia and of ASEAN-based frameworks and mechanisms for engaging the great powers—suggest that the appeal for a post-ASEAN foreign policy, though useful for clarifying Indonesia’s strategic interests and the appropriate modalities through which to achieve its interests, is rather misleading since, strictly speaking, Indonesia’s foreign policy has never been centered primarily on ASEAN. To be sure, the received wisdom has long presupposed the centrality of ASEAN to Indonesia’s foreign policy. In this regard, when Jusuf Wanandi argued that Indonesia need no longer rely solely on ASEAN, but should in the future ‘pursue its own national interests, on top of its loyalty and solidarity with ASEAN’,68 we could read his argument as less an appeal for a postASEAN foreign policy than an implicit affirmation for what the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy has been about all along, namely, a calculated appropriation of a number of diplomatic instruments and security strategies of which ASEAN regionalism is but one.


Nowhere is this sort of pragmatic reliance on multiple approaches more legitimated—ironically—than within ASEAN itself. ASEAN’s very success as a diplomatic community has long been predicated on its achieving the limited aim of ensuring the respect of member nations for one another’s sovereignty through their mutual adherence to the principle of noninterference. Put differently, the organization’s raison d’être, defined in this minimalist way, effectively legitimated recourse by member countries to their own devices—via the nebulous doctrine of ‘national resilience’ (ketahanan nasional) conceived by Indonesia—so long as their actions did not affect their fellow members’ national security and sovereignty in adverse ways. To that extent, the very formation of ASEAN in 1967 was made possible as a consequence of Indonesia’s assurance to the other founding member countries that they would be able to pursue their foreign policy goals in their own ways without interference from Indonesia, with each effectively minding its own business.69 With ASEAN regionalism treated by its participants as little more than a sort of insurance policy in the event that their preferred strategies fail, most of the ASEAN member countries have looked to a combination of self-help, alliance with the United States, or collective defense arrangements—such as the Five Powers Defense Arrangements—and world bodies—such as the United Nations—to guarantee their security.70 Not unlike its fellow ASEAN member-states, Indonesia has long relied on permutations comprising unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral strategies to its security, and has assiduously avoided placing all of its eggs in the regional basket. Granted, lingering Indonesian anger at the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) awarding of Ligitan and Sipadan islands to Malaysia has raised questions about whether Jakarta would again use the ICJ or other international tribunals to settle its territorial disputes.71 Arguably, any hint of ASEAN centricity in Indonesia’s past behavior, if indeed such existed, probably reflected its lack of national capacity, rather than will, for a more ambitious and expansive internationalism. It is for these reasons that commentators such as van der Kroef have argued that Indonesia’s ASEAN membership has in fact been an insignificant concern for Jakarta.72 Going further, Donald McCloud has suggested that historically, Indonesia’s regional actions did not reflect any ‘grand design [Indonesia might have had] for working through ASEAN to gain control of a broad segment of the region’.73 The academic debate over the importance of ASEAN to Indonesian foreign policy implies that Indonesia, despite its own political discourse about the centricity of ASEAN in Jakarta’s regional affairs, likely advanced—or at least sought to do so—its foreign policy goals through a number of strategies, of which ASEAN was but one. True, ASEAN has been and remains important to Indonesia, but not singularly and unequivocally so, as the contemporary debate about a post-ASEAN foreign policy for Indonesia has unwittingly sought to portray.

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Conclusion: Indonesia driving and suffering the region?74 This chapter has made three inter-related points about Indonesia’s contemporary engagement of the great powers in the midst of its own ascendancy. First, Indonesia’s longstanding concern that its regional environment should stay as secure and stable as possible has not changed. This raises the prospect that Indonesia is unlikely to alter its traditional reliance on a hedging strategy vis-à-vis China and the United States. Second, it has been observed that Indonesia’s contemporary rise has been concomitant with its persistent frustration over the lack of cohesion in, and progress by, ASEAN. While this is undeniable, ASEAN and its wider regional cooperative frameworks nonetheless remain useful as modalities for supporting Indonesia’s engagements with the great powers. Although Indonesia has long endured the frustration of dealing with fellow ASEAN countries that, in Jakarta’s eyes, lack commitment to the organization, the latter, for all its visible flaws, still remains the region’s closest approximation of a regional solution for regional challenges—an unfulfilled aspiration Indonesia has yet to abandon. Third, it has been argued, notwithstanding Indonesia’s tireless advocacy on behalf of ASEAN, that Jakarta’s foreign policy has relied on a host of strategies of which ASEAN regionalism has played a key part but is by no means the only modality nor the most critical one. In this regard, recent appeals for a post-ASEAN foreign policy—while perfectly understandable in light of Indonesia’s newfound pride as a regional powerhouse vigorously courted by the great powers—are misleading if they suggest Indonesia’s foreign policy has always been principally dedicated to ASEAN.

Notes 1 Andi Lolo, University of Hasanuddin (Makasar). Quoted in Lilian Budianto, ‘Benefit from ASEAN or leave it, experts say’, The Jakarta Post, 24 February 2010 (cited 3 January 2014); available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 2010/02/24/benefit-from%C2%A0asean-or-leave-it-experts-say%C2%A0.html 2 Rizal Sukma, ‘Insight: Without unity, no centrality’, The Jakarta Post, 17 July 2012. Also see Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy’, The Jakarta Post, 30 June 2009; Rizal Sukma, ‘A post-ASEAN foreign policy for a postG8 world’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October 2009; and Jusuf Wanandi, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN’, PacNet , No. 27, 15 May 2008. 3 Djauhari Oratmangun, director-general of ASEAN affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia. Quoted in Budianto, ‘Benefit from ASEAN or leave it, experts say’, op. cit. 4 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, quoted in ‘President: RI will never leave ASEAN’, Antaranews.com, 26 October 2009 (cited 3 January 2014); available from http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1256525105/presidentri-will-never-leave-asean 5 In November 2013, the International Court of Justice handed Cambodia a partial victory in its territorial dispute with Thailand over the land surrounding


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the Preah Vihear temple along the country’s border. Thomas Fuller, ‘U.N. court rules for Cambodia in temple dispute with Thailand’, The New York Times, 11 November 2013 (cited 6 January 2014); available from http://www. nytimes.com/2013/11/12/world/asia/un-court-rules-for-cambodia-in-templedispute-with-thailand.html?_r=0. Regarding the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2012, see Don Emmerson, ‘ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh’, PacNet, No. 45, 19 July 2012. As Pempel has argued, the East Asian region is defined neither by balance of power nor by a concert of powers. T. J. Pempel, ‘Soft Balancing, Hedging, and Institutional Darwinism: The Economic-Security Nexus and East Asian Regionalism’, Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May–August 2010), pp. 209–38. See also See Seng Tan, Facilitating China-U.S. Relations in the Age of Rebalancing: ASEAN’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy, EAI MPDI Working Paper No. 1 (Seoul: East Asia Institute, October 2013). The term stems from Pempel’s article, ibid. Anthony Reid, ed., Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012). Santo Darmosumarto, ‘Indonesia: A new “middle power”’, The Jakarta Post, 11 November 2012; Richard Dobbs, Fraser Thompson, and Arief Budiman, ‘5 Reasons to Believe in the Indonesian Miracle: Why This Amazing Archipelago is on Track to be the World’s Seventh Largest Economy’, Foreign Policy, 21 September 2012 (cited 12 January 2014); available from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/5_reasons_to_believe_in_the_indonesian_miracle? page=full; ‘Everybody’s friend: Indonesia deserves a better image’, The Economist, 11 September 2009; Hugh White, ‘Indonesia’s rise is the big story we’re missing’, The Age, 29 May 2012. BRIICS comprises Brazil, Russia, India, and China—the original BRIC economies—with South Africa and Indonesia, the latest addition. Eva Pereira, ‘World Bank: The Rise of the BRIICS A Harbinger of a New World Economic Order’, Forbes, 17 May 2011 (cited 6 January 2014); available from http://www.forbes.com/sites/evapereira/2011/05/17/world-bank-the-rise-of-thebriics-a-harbinger-of-a-new-world-economic-order/ As has been argued, Indonesia may interest investors for its economic growth, while its globally-oriented foreign policy and role as an international consensusbuilder has often been overlooked by analysts. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia: Building Norms and Consensus on the World Stage’, Global Asia, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2013). Avery Poole, ‘A “Democratic” Process? Change and Continuity in Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia’, prepared for Australian Political Science Association annual conference 2013, p. 2. See, for example, Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds, Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012). Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s Wary Thinking on Foreign Policy’, Europe’s World, 1 June 2013 (cited 3 January 2014); available from http://europesworld.org/ 2013/06/01/indonesias-wary-thinking- on-foreign-policy/#.UsYcxY_2NMs Winfried Weck, ‘ASEAN and G-20—Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Objectives’, KAS (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) International Reports, No. 2 (2011), p. 22. As Jörn Dosch has acknowledged, ‘Not all ASEAN member states trust each other, as there is a strong sense of nationalism’. Quoted in ‘The Reality of the

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30 31 32

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State of the ASEAN Economic Community’, Monash University Malaysia, no date (cited 5 January 2014); available from http://www.monash.edu.my/news/ researchers-say/the-reality-of-the-state-of-the-asean-economic-community Those elements are discussed in Jiang Zhida, ‘Indonesia’s “Confidence” Diplomacy under the Yudhoyono Government’, CIIS [China Institute of International Studies], 31 December 2012 (cited 2 January 2014), available from http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2012-12/31/content_5638110.htm ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific’, Keynote Address by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Foreign Minister, Republic of Indonesia, at the Conference on Indonesia, Washington, D.C., 16 May 2013, p. 4. Vibhanshu Shekhar, ‘Rising Indonesia and Indo-Pacific World’, ICWA (Indian Council of World Affairs) Issue Brief, 26 September 2012, p. 2. Rizal Sukma, ‘Insight: Without unity, no centrality’, The Jakarta Post, 17 July 2012. Also see Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy’, The Jakarta Post, 30 June 2009; Rizal Sukma, ‘A post-ASEAN foreign policy for a postG8 world’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October 2009; and, Jusuf Wanandi, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN’, PacNet No. 27, 15 May 2008. Wanandi, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN’, op. cit. Michael Leifer, quoted in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), p. 9. Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s Wary Thinking on Foreign Policy’, op. cit. Weck, ‘ASEAN and G-20—Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Objectives’, op. cit., p. 24. As Stephen Norris has argued, with national elections in 2014, policymakers are unlikely to take the tough fiscal and regulatory decisions needed to put the economy back on track. Stephen Norris, ‘Just Getting By: The Outlook for Indonesia’s Economy’, Global Asia, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2013). Yang Razali Kassim, ‘ASEAN Community: Losing Grip over Vision 2015?’, RSIS Commentaries, No. 87/2011, 2 June 2011 (cited 6 January 2014); available from http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0872011.pdf Esther Samboh, ‘Chinese goods hurt local producers’, The Jakarta Post, 12 April 2011 (cited 5 January 2014); available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2011/04/12/chinese-goods-hurt-local-producers.html See, Maria Monica Wihardja, ‘Second-Generation Reform in Asia’, East Asia Forum, 18 August 2011 (cited 6 January 2014); available from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/18/second-generation-reforms-the-key-to-deeperregional-cooperation/; and, ‘Splitting Stitches: China’s Textile Industry is Moving Abroad, but Politics Prevent Indonesia from Fully Reaping the Benefits’, China Economic Review, 1 May 2011 (cited 5 January 2014); available from http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/content/splitting-stitches Iisgindarsah, ‘Indonesia’s Democratic Politics and Foreign Policy-Making: A Case Study of Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2007–2008’, RSIS Working Paper, No. 236, 19 April 2012, p. ii. Jörn Dosch, ‘The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines’, Südostasien aktuell, Vol. 5 (2006), p. 48. Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. xvi. Syed Farid Alatas, ‘Is Religious Intolerance Going Mainstream in Indonesia?’, Global Asia, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2013); Giora Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), p. vii. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia’, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 3 (2010), p. 37.

302 Indonesia among the Powers 34 As an analyst has observed, ‘For Indonesia, “ASEAN solidarity above all” could inhibit its own aspiration for an independent foreign policy course. Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN has always forced it to compromise its own foreign policy interests. Yet, ASEAN has failed to provide an effective dispute-settling mechanism for Indonesia when it is needed most, such as over Sipadan-Ligitan. The territorial dispute was brought to the International Court of Justice instead. Nevertheless, any move away from ASEAN will cause a backlash to the idealist nature of Indonesia as one of the founders of the organization, and as the anchor of unity of ASEAN. Therefore, another pertinent foreign policy priority for Indonesia is how to pursue its own foreign policy agenda without decreasing its commitments to ASEAN’. Emirza Adi Syailendra, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Outlook: Challenges of 2013 and Beyond’, RSIS Commentaries, No. 019/2013, 4 February 2013 (cited 3 January 2014); available from http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ publications/Perspective/RSIS0192013.pdf 35 Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, ‘Preparing a post-SBY foreign policy’, The Jakarta Post, 6 January 2014 (cited 6 January 2014); available from Asia News Network, 6 January 2014, http://www.asianewsnet.net/Preparing-a-post-SBY-foreignpolicy—55778.html 36 Mohammad Hatta, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, April 1953. 37 ‘“Dynamic Equilibrium” in the Asia Pacific: Interview with Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia’s Foreign Affairs Minister’, Australia Network, 23 February 2012 (cited 1 March 2014); available from http://australianetwork.com/focus/s3440427.htm 38 See, Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2007/08), pp. 113–57; Jeongseok Lee, ‘Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China’, paper Prepared for the International Political Science Association XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain, 8–12 July 2012. 39 Rizal Sukma, ‘Regional Security Order in Southeast Asia: An Indonesian View’, paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR), 28–30 May 2012, p. 5. 40 Leonard Sebastian, ‘Indonesia’s Regional Diplomacy: Imperative to Maintain ASEAN Cohesion’, RSIS Commentaries, No. 132/2012, 23 July 2012. 41 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘A Problem of Mixed Messages: An Indonesian Insider’s View of the Australian Relationship’, The Asialink Essays 2012, Vol. 4, No. 6 (August 2012), p. 3. 42 See, Anak Agung Bany Perwita, Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007); and Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 43 Cited in Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 148–9. 44 Michael Leifer, ‘Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?’ in Gerald Segal and David S. G. Goodman, eds, Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 108–18. 45 Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security’, in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds, Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2004), p. 71. 46 Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, ‘Indonesia looks forward to reinstatement of IMET program’, The Jakarta Post, 30 November 2002.

See Seng Tan 303 47 Scholars such as Bernard K. Gordon and Sheldon W. Simon, among others, have emphasized this point. 48 Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-Engagement’, Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 4 (2009), pp. 591–608. 49 Sukma, ‘Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security’, op. cit., p. 72. 50 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 166. 51 Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s Wary Thinking on Foreign Policy’, op. cit. 52 I refer here to the idea for an Asian concert of powers purportedly suggested by leading Australian security intellectuals such as Michael Wesley, among others, at a Sydney conference in December 2009 dedicated to introducing Kevin Rudd’s proposal for an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ to policy practitioners and intellectuals from around the Asian region and soliciting their reactions to it. For a recent analysis of the Rudd proposal and its implications for the Asia-Pacific region, see, See Seng Tan, ‘Spectres of Leifer: Insights on Regional Order and Security for Southeast Asia Today’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2012), p. 316. 53 Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?’ Asian Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2011), pp. 44–60. 54 Keynote Speech by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the Launching of the Strategic Review Journal, New York, 26 September 2012, p. 4. 55 Tan See Seng, ‘Visions at War?: EAS in the Regional Architecture Debate’, The Straits Times, 12 November 2011. 56 The term is used in Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum and US-China Relations: Comparing Chinese and American Positions’, in Fifth China-ASEAN Research Institutes Roundtable on Regionalism and Community Building in East Asia (University of Hong Kong, 2002). 57 Tan, Facilitating China-U.S. Relations in the Age of Rebalancing: ASEAN’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy, op. cit. 58 Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s Wary Thinking on Foreign Policy’, op. cit. 59 Ibid. 60 This argument is also made in Victor D. Cha, ‘Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture’, Asia Policy, No. 11 (January 2011), pp. 27–50. 61 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the US Rebalancing Effort towards Asia’, NBR Commentary, 26 February 2013, p. 3. 62 Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Beyond the Six Points: How Far Will Indonesia Go?’ East Asia Forum, 29 July 2011 (cited 17 January 2013), available from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/29/beyond-the-six-points-how-far-will-indonesia-go/; Don Emmerson, ‘ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh’, PacNet, No. 45, 19 July 2012. 63 See, International Crisis Group, ‘Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict’, Crisis Group Asia Report, No. 215, 6 December 2011. 64 This point is emphatically made in Jiang, ‘Indonesia’s “Confidence” Diplomacy under the Yudhoyono Government’, op. cit. 65 Sebastian, ‘Indonesia’s Regional Diplomacy: Imperative to Maintain ASEAN Cohesion’, op. cit. 66 Ibid.

304 Indonesia among the Powers 67 The link between middle power diplomacy and the appropriation of multilateral institutions and initiatives through which to achieve its aims is often acknowledged. See, Sook-Jong Lee, South Korea as a New Middle Power: Seeking Complex Diplomacy, EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper (Seoul: East Asia Institute, September 2012); Mark Beeson, ‘Can Australia Save the World? The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power Diplomacy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 5 (2011), pp. 563–77. 68 Wanandi, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN’, op. cit. 69 The argument is made in See Seng Tan, ‘Herding Cats: The Role of Persuasion in Political Change and Continuity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2013), pp. 233–65. 70 See, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 71 Donald Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, second edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), pp. 39–40. 72 Justus Maria van der Kroef, Indonesia after Sukarno (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1971). 73 Donald G. McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia: The Evolution of a Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). 74 The phrase is borrowed from the title employed by Michael Leifer in his fifth chapter of his book on Singapore’s foreign policy. See, Michael Leifer, ‘Driving or Suffering the Region?’ Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000).

Bibliography Alagappa, M. ed. (2003) Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). ———. ed. (1998) Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). Alatas, S. F. (2013) ‘Is Religious Intolerance Going Mainstream in Indonesia?’, Global Asia, 8. Antara News (2009) President: RI Will Never Leave Asean’, Antaranews.com, 26 October, http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1256525105/president-ri-willnever-leave-asean, date accessed 3 January 2014. Anwar, D. F. (2013) ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the US Rebalancing Effort towards Asia’, NBR Commentary, 26 February. ———. (2013) ‘Indonesia: Building Norms and Consensus on the World Stage’, Global Asia, 8. ———. (2013) ‘Indonesia’s Wary Thinking on Foreign Policy’, Europe’s World, 1 June, http://europesworld.org/2013/06/01/indonesias-wary-thinking-on-foreignpolicy/#.UsYcxY_2NMs, date accessed 1 March 2014. ———. (2012) ‘A Problem of Mixed Messages: An Indonesian Insider’s View of the Australian Relationship’, The Asialink Essays 2012, 4, 1–4. ———. (2010) ‘Foreign Policy, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia’, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, 3, 37–54.

See Seng Tan 305 ———. (1994) Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS). Aspinall, E., and M. Mietzner (ed.) (2012) Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: ISEAS). Australia Network (2012) ‘“Dynamic Equilibrium” in the Asia Pacific: Interview with Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia’s Foreign Affairs Minister’, Australia Network, 23 February, http://australianetwork.com/focus/s3440427.htm, date accessed 1 March 2014. Beeson, M. (2011) ‘Can Australia Save the World? The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power Diplomacy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 65, 563–77. Budianto, L. (2010) ‘Benefit from ASEAN or leave it, experts say’, The Jakarta Post, 24 February. Cha, V. D. (2011) ‘Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture’, Asia Policy, 11, 27–50. China Economic Review (2011) ‘Splitting Stitches: China’s Textile Industry is Moving Abroad, But Politics Prevent Indonesia from Fully Reaping the Benefits’, China Economic Review, 1 May, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/content/splittingstitches, date accessed 5 January 2014. Darmosumarto, S. (2012) ‘Indonesia: A new “middle power”’, The Jakarta Post, 11 November. Dobbs, R., F. Thompson and A. Budiman (2012) ‘5 Reasons to Believe in the Indonesian Miracle: Why This Amazing Archipelago is on Track to be the World’s Seventh Largest Economy’, Foreign Policy, 21 September, http://www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/5_reasons_to_believe_in_ the_indonesian_miracle?page=full, date accessed 12 January 2014. Dosch, J. (2006) ‘The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines’, Südostasien aktuell, 5, 42–70. Dosch, J. (no date) ‘Not All ASEAN Member States Trust Each Other, as There is a Strong Sense of Nationalism’, The Reality of the State of the ASEAN Economic Community, Monash University Malaysia, http://www.monash.edu.my/news/ researchers-say/the-reality-of-the-state-of-the-asean-economic-community, date accessed 5 January 2014. Eliraz, G. (2004) Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press). Emmers, R. and S. S. Tan (2011) ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?’ Asian Security, 7, 44–60. Emmerson, D. K. (2012) ‘ASEAN Stumbles in Phnom Penh’, PacNet, 45, 19 July. Emmerson, D. K. (2011) ‘Beyond the Six Points: How Far Will Indonesia Go?’ East Asia Forum, 29 July, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/29/beyond-the-sixpoints-how-far-will-indonesia-go/, date accessed 17 January 2014. Fuller, T. (2013) ‘U.N. court rules for Cambodia in temple dispute with Thailand’, The New York Times, 11 November. Goh, E. (2007/08) ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, 32, 113–57. Goh, E. and A. Acharya (2002) ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum and US-China Relations: Comparing Chinese and American Positions’, in Fifth China-ASEAN Research Institutes Roundtable on Regionalism and Community Building in East Asia, University of Hong Kong. Hatta, M. (1953) ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 31, 441–52. Iisgindarsah (2012) Indonesia’s Democratic Politics and Foreign Policy-Making: A Case Study of Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2007–2008, RSIS Working Paper, 236, 19 April.

306 Indonesia among the Powers International Crisis Group (2011) ‘Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict’, Crisis Group Asia Report, 215, 6 December. Jiang, Z. (2012) ‘Indonesia’s “Confidence” Diplomacy under the Yudhoyono Government’, CIIS [China Institute of International Studies], 31 December, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2012-12/31/content_5638110.htm, date accessed 2 January 2014. Kassim, Y. R. (2011) ‘ASEAN Community: Losing Grip over Vision 2015?’, RSIS Commentaries, 87/2011, 2 June. Lee, J. (2012) ‘Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China’, paper prepared for the International Political Science Association XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain, 8–12 July. Lee, S.-J. (2012) South Korea as a New Middle Power: Seeking Complex Diplomacy, EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, Seoul: East Asia Institute. Leifer, M. (2000) ‘Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?’ in G. Segal and D. S. G. Goodman, ed., Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia (London: Routledge, 2000), 108–18. Leifer, Mi. (2000) Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge). Leifer, M. (1983) Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen and Unwin). McCloud, D. G. (1986) System and Process in Southeast Asia: The Evolution of a Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). Natalegawa, M. (2013) ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific’, Keynote Address by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Foreign Minister, Republic of Indonesia, at the Conference on Indonesia, Washington, D.C., 16 May. Norris, S. (2013) ‘Just Getting By: The Outlook for Indonesia’s Economy’, Global Asia, 8. Pempel, T. J. (2010) ‘Soft Balancing, Hedging, and Institutional Darwinism: The Economic-Security Nexus and East Asian Regionalism’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 10, 209–38. Pereira, E. (2011) ‘World Bank: The Rise of the BRIICS A Harbinger of a New World Economic Order’, Forbes, 17 May. Perwita, A. A. B. (2007) Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond (Copenhagen: NIAS Press). Poole, A. (2013) ‘A “Democratic” Process? Change and Continuity in Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia’, prepared for Australian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, 30 September–2 October. Reid, A. (ed.) (2012) Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant (Singapore: ISEAS) Samboh, E. (2011) ‘Chinese goods hurt local producers’, The Jakarta Post, 12 April. Samuels, R. J. (2007) Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press). Sebastian, L. (2012) ‘Indonesia’s regional diplomacy: Imperative to maintain ASEAN cohesion’, RSIS Commentaries, 132/2012, 23 July. Shekhar, V. (2012) ‘Rising Indonesia and Indo-Pacific World’, ICWA Issue Brief, 26 September (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs). Sukma, R. (2012a) ‘Insight: Without unity, no centrality’, The Jakarta Post, 17 July. ———. (2012b) ‘Regional Security Order in Southeast Asia: An Indonesian View’, paper presented at the Asia–Pacific Roundtable (APR), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 28–30 May.

See Seng Tan 307 ———. (2009a) ‘Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy’, The Jakarta Post, 30 June. ———. (2009b) ‘Indonesia–China Relations: The Politics of Re-Engagement’, Asian Survey, 49, 591–608. ———. (2009c) ‘A post-ASEAN foreign policy for a post-G8 world’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October. ———. (2004) ‘Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security’, in S. S. Tan and A. Acharya, ed., Asia–Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe), pp. 71–87. Sukma, R. (2003) Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: RoutledgeCurzon). Suryodiningrat, M. (2014) ‘Preparing a post-SBY foreign policy’, The Jakarta Post, 6 January. Syailendra, E. A. (2013) ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Outlook: Challenges of 2013 and Beyond’, RSIS Commentaries, 019/2013, 4 February. Tan, S. S. (2013a) Facilitating China-U.S. Relations in the Age of Rebalancing: ASEAN’s ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy, EAI MPDI Working Paper 1 (Seoul: East Asia Institute). ———. (2013b) ‘Herding Cats: The Role of Persuasion in Political Change and Continuity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13, 233–65. ———. (2012) ‘Spectres of Leifer: Insights on Regional Order and Security for Southeast Asia Today’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34, 309–37. ———. (2011) ‘Visions at War? EAS in the Regional Architecture Debate’, The Straits Times, 12 November. The Economist (2009) ‘Everybody’s Friend: Indonesia Deserves a Better Image’, The Economist, 11 September. Unidjaja, F. D. (2002) ‘Indonesia looks forward to reinstatement of IMET program’, The Jakarta Post, 30 November. Van der Kroef, J. M. (1971) Indonesia after Sukarno (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press). Wanandi, J. (2008) ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Meaning of ASEAN’, PacNet, 27, 15 May. Weck, W. (2011) ‘ASEAN and G-20–Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Objectives’, KAS International Reports, 2, 22–35 (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung). Weatherbee, D. (2009) International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, second edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield). White, H. (2012) ‘Indonesia’s rise is the big story we’re missing’, The Age, 29 May. Wihardja, M. M. (2011) ‘Second-Generation Reform in Asia’, East Asia Forum, 18 August, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/18/second-generation-reformsthe-key-to-deeper-regional-cooperation/, date accessed 6 January 2014. Yudhoyono, S. B. (2012) ‘Keynote Speech by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia’, Launching of the Strategic Review Journal, New York, 26 September.

15 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, Maritime Security and the Great Powers Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made Andi Arsana*

Introduction As the pivotal state1 in Southeast Asia, Indonesia seeks to use maritime diplomacy to establish cooperative regional relationships as a means of achieving two objectives: first, to ensure its security wellbeing, and second; by actively resolving its border disputes—demonstrating its leadership credentials to mediate in interstate boundary disputes in the region. Indonesia’s management of its border disputes is a classic example of the use of preventive diplomacy in the management of regional order, dealing with issues that have moved, or might otherwise move into the sphere of military conflict. Such an approach significantly embellishes its claim to regional leadership. This chapter analyzes how a rising Indonesia may redefine the security of its maritime domain in light of the growing assertive presence of major powers in the sea lanes of East and Southeast Asia. While much analysis on Indonesia’s maritime security is often viewed through the lens of the Archipelagic Outlook (Wawasan Nusantara), whereby the importance of national unity and territorial integrity is constantly reiterated, the current geopolitical situation in the region characterized by the rise of maritime powers in Asia and beyond has made Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes (ASLs) and its associated maritime choke-points—Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits—critical, and therefore consequential to its strategic planners. Not only are ASLs critical for the world’s seaborne trade, but even more so than in previous decades are becoming flashpoints for maritime force power projection. The consequences are that Indonesia will have no alternative but to take incremental steps to reorient its diplomatic, legal, and security attention toward meeting potential external maritime challenges. This is a fundamental issue to address, as it will shape and influence the evolution of Indonesia’s ascending power.

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Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made Andi Arsana 309

The research we embark upon is important for several reasons. First, while much of the literature has explained Indonesia’s inward-looking strategic psyche in descriptive terms, little attention has been given to the country’s outward-looking orientation. With the rise of China and India, compounded by the United States’ pivot to Asia with its aim of reinforcing its status as the region’s principal strategic actor, and a resurgent Japan no longer a passive security player, Indonesia’s geopolitical calculus has become more convoluted, especially in the maritime domain. Our research will be the first attempt to chart Indonesia’s strategic maritime environment in the post-Suharto era. Second, our study will critically explain the Archipelagic Outlook concept, especially to see the extent to which it applies within Indonesia’s external maritime settings. It will argue that while the Archipelagic Outlook remains an identity for Indonesia as a unitary state, it provides little, if any guidance for Indonesia to maneuver through the current geopolitical landscape characterized by competition between the major maritime powers. Third, the chapter will delve into Indonesia’s various maritime security concepts, and other concepts related to maritime security, by adopting a geopolitical perspective. This includes the concepts of Archipelagic Outlook and National Resilience, as well as its ‘Free and Active’ foreign policy principle. Fourth, we then discuss Indonesia’s views on archipelagic sea lanes and maritime choke-points. In light of an increasingly challenging maritime strategic environment, we then speculate how Indonesia may designate its East–West archipelagic sea lanes, particularly in terms of the opportunities and vulnerabilities they pose. Fifth, the chapter then goes on to describe Indonesia’s strategic maritime environment beyond the scope of the Archipelagic Outlook, with reference to the presence and role of major powers in the region and the implications of their maritime projections for the security of Indonesia’s ASLs and choke-points. In conclusion, we speculate how Indonesia may attempt to shape, influence, and adapt to the prevailing strategic environment, where its maritime domain is now increasingly intertwined with the interests of major powers.

Archipelagic Outlook: The evolution of a concept Indonesians often refer to their archipelago as the ‘crossroads location’ (posisi silang) between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and between the Asian and Australian continents,2 emphasizing that geographical position should be viewed not only in terms of physical location, but also in terms of perceptions of status, power and aspirations. The geopolitics of Indonesia is informed by its national identity and national aspirations. For example, considering its archipelagic nature, Indonesia is a maritime nation,

310 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook

although much less a seafaring one. Through its Archipelagic Outlook, the self-perceived identity of Indonesia is conceived based on territorial integrity stretching ‘from Sabang to Merauke’ (dari Sabang sampai Merauke).3 The Archipelagic Outlook is also constitutive of an obsession with national security, which is driven by the common perception that Indonesia is always vulnerable to stronger powers using strategies that divide and rule. This is evident in its articulation of the Wawasan Nusantara concept, which comprises a number of elements: the prevailing concern over the threat of national disintegration, and the resulting emphasis on unity; the need for economic development, particularly in the lessdeveloped provinces; economic nationalism; political stability and the absolute sanctity of national borders; and lastly, the importance Indonesia attaches to the Law of the Sea as the means to ensure the Wawasan Nusantara. In giving recognition to Indonesia’s concept of the archipelagic state, the Law of the Sea recognizes the pivotal element of Indonesia’s national outlook, namely, the concept of territorial and national unity, which regards Indonesia as an inseparable union of land and water (tanah-air or homeland), first mooted in 1957. Even more importantly, the extension of territorial seas to 12 nautical miles and the concept of archipelagic sea lanes that preserve international sea routes have given Indonesia greater control over the exploitation, use and security of her archipelagic waters.4 With the exception of the newly independent state of Timor-Leste, the archipelago that now encompasses the Republic of Indonesia was largely an artificial creation based on the Dutch colonial period, despite Indonesia’s current narrative proclaiming it as a single unified entity. The large ancient empires of the archipelago—such as Srivijaya and Majapahit, which once reigned over parts of the archipelago in the 7th and 15th centuries—based their core control on a single island—respectively, Sumatra and Java. Their controls over smaller kingdoms in other islands were loose and diffused, based on the mandala (concentric circles) concept of suzerainty, which granted semi-autonomous rule to each suzerain. Geography made largescale conquest and direct control a challenging task without superior power at sea and on land. Therefore, rules were often very diffuse and nuanced, especially along each empire’s frontiers. However, these empires still made a lasting impact, with their legacy becoming an inherited shared history among islanders. In the case of Majapahit Empire, for example, the tales of Javanese princes, its dynastic feuds and legends, and culture were often recited and admired by islanders located far from the Empire’s core dominion. When Europeans arrived in the 16th and 17th centuries, the archipelago was already internally connected in commerce and warfare. However, it was the Europeans who deepened and consolidated the conception of a collective whole for islanders previously foreign to each other. Furthermore, it was the Dutch, who having succeeded the Spanish and


Portuguese, used sea power as a means with which to govern the sprawling archipelago, and to pre-empt the emergence of indigenous maritime polities. With sea power, they recognized the maritime domain as an inseparable lifeline of their new Netherlands Indies. Thus, when the Australians travelled north in search of pearl shells in the late 19th century, they came into direct conflict with villagers and rulers who had long laid claim to riches found on the reefs where harvesters collected pearl shells.5 The Dutch colonial government understood this problem and immediately banned foreigners from collecting shells within their territorial waters. Following World War I, for purposes of security the Dutch colonial government sought to define its maritime territories more precisely through the 1935 Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts Ordnance, which was revised in 1939. The legacy of the ordnance was the fundamental principle that the territorial waters of the Netherlands East Indies were to be measured three nautical miles out from the low-tide line of each individual island, meaning nearly all of the sea between the islands making up the colonial entity had the status of international waters or high seas.6 This situation was not altered until Indonesian independence was proclaimed in 1945. The newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia, however, was a fragile state that had to cope with numerous secessionist rebellions and foreign intrusions, in addition to exploitative poaching within Indonesian waters perpetrated largely by Japanese fishermen in the 1950s and 1960s. For Hasyim Djalal, the pockets of high seas between Indonesian islands enabled foreign warships and submarines to traverse the archipelago unregulated. They frequently conducted maneuvers visible from the coast, provoking ‘domestic consternation and political upheaval’,7 and thereby constituting a concern for national security. Furthermore, Indonesia’s postcolonial experience also revealed that whenever there was a domestic secessionist movement, the group was likely to receive clandestine support from external sources via the unpatrolled high seas between the islands. From an economic perspective, Indonesia’s maritime industry, comprised largely of artisanal fishing, was also unfairly undermined by foreign fishermen plundering Indonesia’s marine resources. However, the greatest affront to Indonesian pride was the inability of the government to stop Dutch warships blithely sailing across the Java Sea to the Indonesianclaimed region of West Irian—then called Dutch New Guinea. In the late 1950s, there was general consensus among all domestic political parties and groups that the seas of the Indonesian archipelago should be better controlled. The solution was to draw baselines along Indonesia’s outermost islands, and claim the 12-mile territorial sea limit from those baselines. On 13 December 1957, Indonesia declared that all the waters within these baselines became ‘internal or national waters’ and were considered ‘integral parts’ of the Indonesian state. In these waters, foreign vessels, civilian or military, were only entitled ‘innocent passage’.


Part of the declaration was the creation of the Archipelagic Outlook or Wawasan Nusantara. The Archipelagic Outlook was essentially a political concept binding a geographically dispersed and socio-culturally diverse chain of islands together as a unified archipelago. On the one hand, the concept reflects a deep-seated concern bordering on paranoia toward any party—domestic or external—that could provoke, incite, assist, or endorse secessionist elements within Indonesia. On the other hand, it is indicative of Indonesia’s acute sense of vulnerability toward its maritime domain.8 The Archipelagic Outlook, therefore, has redefined the way Indonesia views its maritime domain. It has created a sense of entitlement9 and ownership in regard to its control of internal waters—territorial seas and archipelagic waters—while providing the political legitimacy necessary for Jakarta to unite the diverse archipelago. The reaction of maritime powers such as the United States and United Kingdom to the declaration was expeditious and resolute. Indonesia was accused of violating the sacrosanct principle of freedom of navigation and free transit whereby no single entity could ‘possess’ the sea, which— reflecting Grotian tradition—was regarded as a global commons. Regardless of this, Jakarta charted a lonely course, beginning a 25-year struggle for recognition as an archipelagic state. During these years, Indonesian diplomats lobbied the international community, at times confronting the great powers during negotiations, arguing that Indonesia as an archipelago should deserve special rights in International Law. The lobbying efforts finally bore fruit in December 1982, when the special provisions in Part IV dealing specifically with the unique requirements of archipelagic states in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force.10 According to Part IV, Indonesia is entitled to draw baselines around its archipelago but, in the process, should consult with neighboring states affected by them, and designate sea lanes for ships that normally transit Indonesian waters. The waters enclosed by the baselines would become archipelagic waters where Indonesia had full sovereignty, but ‘archipelagic sea lanes’ may be designated for foreign vessels for normal transit.

Archipelagic sea lanes, maritime boundaries, and choke-points An archipelagic state such as Indonesia is entitled to designate archipelagic baselines, the segments of which connect the outermost points of outer islands of the state. Consequently, the entire state is encompassed by a system of baselines, and waters enclosed within the baselines system are called archipelagic waters, which belong to the state. With this system, the breadth of territorial sea is no longer measured from the coast of each island, but rather from the archipelagic baseline.


Archipelagic waters fall within the sovereignty of a state regardless of the breadth of distance between islands.11 In the case of Indonesia, for example, there are no longer high seas between Java and Kalimantan. In other words, maritime areas, previously part of high seas and used for international navigation, now exclusively belong to Indonesia as part of its archipelagic waters. Such an interpretation hinders states that have previously enjoyed freedom of navigation in archipelagic waters. For this reason, it was necessary for Indonesia to designate archipelagic sea lanes (ASL). ASLs are the trade-off of a state in recognition for being granted archipelagic state status and for being able to exercise sovereignty over archipelagic waters. This is a compromise between coastal states with growing maritime jurisdiction over maritime areas adjacent to them and other maritime or user states insisting on retention of their historical freedom of the seas.12 Indonesia determined that the concept of archipelagic sea lanes would suit its maritime domain because the archipelago is located on the major shipping routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Designating archipelagic sea lanes in Indonesian waters would also permit the government to concentrate its efforts in providing navigational safety and security, particularly for foreign vessels. In addition, the archipelagic sea lanes would also permit the government to prevent foreign vessels transiting under the normal routes they used to navigate, following the promulgation of UNCLOS. From Indonesia’s perspective, the fact that vessels could still continue arbitrary transit meant that the security considerations of having archipelagic status were not sufficient. Foreign vessels, civilian or military, could continue to sail through Indonesian waters regarded sensitive to national security and safety, such as the Java Sea, located in close proximity to the vast majority of Indonesia’s population and main economic centers. Indonesian security elites have tended to view the designation of ASLs as a disadvantage since it provides foreign states easy access to and through Indonesian territory, which they contend may compromise national security. Indonesian scholarship on this issue has also stressed the need for East–West ASLs, including through the Java Sea, citing historical reasons, as the Java Sea has been an international waterway for foreign merchant ships trading in and transiting through Java. Yet Indonesian scholarship has also cautioned that any attempt to designate East–West ASLs could also bring on a new set of challenges for Indonesia. First, even if Indonesia designates these ASLs, there is no guarantee that its proposals would be legally binding and considered as a ‘full designation’. Designating a new ASL without being guaranteed its full recognition by the international maritime community, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the maritime user states, would equate to writing a blank check—this argument will be explained further in the next section. Second, there are technical questions on where precisely to establish the East–West ASLs, since the maritime user states—such as the United States, the United Kingdom,


and Australia—differ in their interpretation of UNCLOS Article 53(4) relating to ‘all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight’. Accommodating all ASL proposals from the maritime user states would create a ‘spaghetti bowl’ phenomenon, rendering all passages through archipelagic waters normal.13 Third, from a strategic perspective, East–West ASLs allow ships to transit through waters fronting highly populated coastal areas, such as northern Java and southern Kalimantan. Any incident involving ships with hazardous or toxic cargo would have serious environmental implications and severe economic and social repercussions for the people living along these coastlines. For these reasons, Jakarta has maintained its stance that it is not yet ready to designate the East–West ASLs, notwithstanding calls from maritime user states.14 Regardless of this, the foreign policy community maintains an alternative perspective of East–West ASLs. It is the contention of Hasyim Djalal that the plan to establish East–West sea lanes was primarily an Indonesian proposal viewed as necessary to secure its own interests, and that UNCLOS has detailed rules as to how such sea lanes could be established and Indonesia has applied these rules when establishing its North–South sea lanes. Dr Djalal further emphasizes that Indonesia needs to determine East–West shipping lanes to bear the brunt of shipping and other marine transit or confront consequences that ships will transit through any of the current shipping lanes, thereby compromising the safety and security of the country’s maritime corridors.15

How to designate East–West sea lanes The designation of ASLs is governed by Article 53 of UNCLOS. The Article does not oblige an archipelagic state to designate ASLs,16 but if a state chooses to do so, the designation is required to include all normal passage routes used for international navigation.17 The Article also states that the passage regime applicable to ASL is archipelagic sea lane passage (ASLP), which permits transiting vessels to operate in their normal mode for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and another part of the high seas or an EEZ.18 A critical provision regarding the designation of ASL is that if a coastal state chooses not to designate its ASLs, then the right of ASLP ‘may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation’.19 This apparently requires further clarification to determine the scope of ASLP in terms of normal usage and international navigation. UNCLOS does not provide clear and specific provisions on how to define such routes. This uncertainty leads to ambiguity regarding ASL implementation, since states may choose divergent interpretations to suit their interests.


Indonesia’s effort to implement ASLP in its archipelagic waters commenced immediately after its ratification of UNCLOS, which culminated in a National Working Group meeting in Cisarua in 1995. The meeting members managed to agree on a proposal of three North–South ASLs, which had been proposed during the Indonesian Navy Strategic Forum in 1991.20 According to Puspitawati, the proposal was submitted to the International Maritime Organization (IMO)21 in 1996 during the 67th meeting of Maritime Safety Commission (MSC-67). Three related institutions and 22 states provided their responses, with a majority of states commenting on the lack of East–West ASLs. To address these concerns, the proposal was reconsidered, but Indonesia did not respond with a proposal that included East–West ASLs. In its proposal to MSC-69 in London, Indonesia maintained its original position, designating only three North–South ASLs, which was approved by the IMO on 19 May 1998. However, Indonesia’s position was deemed as ‘partially designated’ since it did not include all normal passage routes used for international navigation and, in particular, excluded East–West ASLs.22 Indonesia’s original ASL submission did not specifically mention partial designations: this was deemed by the IMO because it did not include East–West ASLs. During consultation with other maritime user states prior to the submission, Australia and the United States specifically proposed possible East–West ASLs that Indonesia could consider in its submission to IMO. However, Indonesia opted not to incorporate the East–West ASL proposal in its submission. In making their proposal, Australia and the United States were motivated by their concerns regarding the application of innocent passage rules through the East–West route.23 In order for detailed rules to be applied regarding the ASLs, Indonesia, Australia and the United States first informally agreed on several points called the ‘19 rules’. The 19 rules specifically govern the rights and obligations of transiting vessels in Indonesia’s designated ASLs.24 An important point to deduce from the ‘19 rules’ is that in areas where ASLs have yet to be designated, the right of ASLP ‘may be exercised in the relevant archipelagic waters in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982’. This specifies Indonesia’s agreement to allow transiting vessels to navigate through its archipelagic waters where ASLs have yet to be designated by taking any routes normally used for navigation, as specified by Article 53 (12) of UNCLOS. However, Indonesian Government Regulation 37/2002 regarding the implementation of the ASL and ASLP does not accord with UNCLOS and the ‘19 rules’. In reality, the interests of Indonesia as a coastal state differ from maritime user states such as Australia and the United States, and this is reflected in the inconsistency of Indonesia’s government regulations. Government Regulation 37/2002 also fails to specify whether Indonesia has opted principally for partial ASL designation. An important point to


note from the regulation is that ASLP can be exercised in any part of Indonesia’s archipelagic waters ‘as soon as archipelagic sea lanes have been designated in those waters’.25 This is clearly inconsistent with the Law of the Sea Convention, which allows transiting vessels to navigate through normal routes used for navigation within archipelagic waters. In other words, UNCLOS prescribes that all foreign vessels can navigate through archipelagic waters with or without ASLs being designated, and a coastal state has neither the right to prevent foreign vessels from conducting transit, nor the authority to suspend the right of transit. By not designating its East–West ASLs, Indonesia has only partially designated the required complement of ASLs necessary to qualify under UNCLOS.26 Any complete designation of ASL requires careful study and consideration so that Indonesia can balance its national interests and international obligations. Elements within the security agencies have argued that the designation of East–West ASLs will place Indonesia in a vulnerable position, with foreign vessels enjoying freedom of transit in Indonesia’s archipelagic waters. Others have similarly contended that Indonesia’s national security may be compromised.27 Concerns are varied: the TNI refuses to establish sea lanes in the Java Sea because it is strategically the heart of Indonesia and also too close to Jakarta; sea lanes established in fishing grounds of the Java Sea will compromise the livelihoods of fishermen; the presence of adequate installations in the vicinity of Indonesia’s archipelagic waters mean that the Navy have the ability to monitor sea traffic; while proponents of the military maintain that establishing East–West sea lanes must wait until the Navy has taken the opportunity to study the matter adequately. The Navy remains the primary interested party in this debate, while the Air Force holds no opinion on the matter.28 However, the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) has raised concerns over the issue of maritime security in Indonesia’s archipelagic waters, and there have been instances of legislators making statements on Indonesia’s role as the host state in the process, raising concerns over its ability to monitor busy navigation activity and ensure safety and security for vessels in the ASLs.29 Such concerns are valid considering Indonesia’s lack of adequate equipment and facilities necessary to conduct comprehensive surveillance. Yet, our contention is that as Indonesia grows in confidence the issue of ASL will be viewed prevailingly from a perspective of benefit and obligation. As previously highlighted, the designation of ASLs is commonly regarded as compensation for Indonesia’s recognition as an archipelagic state with sovereignty over archipelagic waters. Even though coastal states do not have to designate ASLs, strategic planners of national and foreign policy in Indonesia may conclude that such an action is beneficial for the following reasons. First, coastal states can focus only on particular routes when it comes to ensuring the safety and security of foreign vessels using


transit routes. Should ASLs then not be designated, foreign vessels would then use a variety of possible routes normally used for international navigation. Such haphazard usage adds further complexity and the possibility of incidents at sea, adding to the already complicated situation of navigation in archipelagic waters. Second, the designation of East–West ASLs could enhance Indonesia’s diplomatic position, since maritime user states will view this as a collaborative and cooperative approach on the part of Indonesia, for example, in proposing to maritime user states potential collaboration initiatives that would benefit Indonesia. Third, although there will be consequences for Indonesia when developing a strategy on how to ensure that the designation of East–West ASLs does not compromise Indonesia’s national interest, future strategic planners may see such a situation not as a challenge but as a motivation for Indonesia to enhance its ability to ensure navigational safety in its archipelagic waters—a maritime zone considered as one of the most important waterways, not only for states in the region, but also for the world. East–West ASLs that Indonesia may consider could be derived from a combination of options: first, the proposals of Australia and the United States, subject to modifications and enhancements; and second, the informal proposal of an East–West ASL option produced by an Indonesian Navy working group. By combining these proposals—namely, Australia’s claim to ‘normal international sea passages’ and Indonesia’s own recommendations on East–West ASLs—it is possible to produce a relatively comprehensive proposal of East–West ASLs. Figure 15.1 illustrates a combination of all proposals, views and suggestions, while Figure 5.2

Figure 15.1

Combination of all proposals, views and suggestions


Figure 15.2 routes

Possible option of ASLs for Indonesia with an emphasis on East–West

depicts one possible option of ASLs for Indonesia, with an emphasis on the East–West routes. It has to be noted that this is not the only possibility and that this option is the consequence of using an approach that prioritizes the need to minimize the number of routes. Such an approach might be viewed as an appropriate option for Indonesia, as it balances competing interests of, on one hand, Indonesia’s concern to limit its exposure to foreign national threats and, on the other, maintaining the convenience of navigation by foreign vessels and Indonesia’s obligations as a consequence of ASL designation.

Sharing the ocean: Anticipating Indonesia’s completion of maritime boundary delimitation Due to its geographical location, Indonesia needs to settle its maritime boundaries with at least ten neighbors. Those neighbors in the area include India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and Timor-Leste.30 At the time of writing, Indonesia has managed to delimit maritime boundaries partially with eight of its neighbors.31 Negotiations with Palau and Timor-Leste are ongoing, hence the maritime boundary has yet to be delimited. Even though Indonesia has expended tremendous energy in producing maritime boundary agreements, with around 18 agreements set in place, there remain approximately 20 segments of maritime boundaries in several different locations to delimit.32 Figure 15.3 illustrates Indonesia’s ten neighbors with which maritime boundaries have been, or are yet to be, settled.

Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made Andi Arsana 319 VIETNAM

THAILAND THE PHILIPPINES

INDIA

South China Sea BRUNEI

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA

Borneo Sumatra Sulawesi

PNG Java TIMOR LESTE

AUSTRALIA

I Made Andi Arsana, 2013

Figure 15.3

Indonesia and its ten neighbors

Pending or non-delimited maritime boundaries have caused tension between Indonesia and its neighbors. Prominent cases include the dispute over the Ambalat Block in the Sulawesi Sea (February 2005 and 4 June 2009),33 incidents of seizure involving fishermen and patrol craft from Indonesia and Malaysia in waters off Tanjung Berakit in the Singapore Strait (18 August 2010),34 and an incident that occurred in the Straits of Malacca on 7 April 2011.35 On the one hand, delimitation incidents usually occur due to the absence of maritime boundaries as a consequence of unfinished or pending delimitation. On the other hand, each party or the state in question has its own claim or proposal of maritime delimitation which generates an overlapping maritime area claimed by both. The presence of one party—fishing or naval/coast guard patrols—in an overlapping area is usually considered a border crossing by the other party, eventually leading to tensions between the neighboring states. This is typical of cases or incidents taking place in the maritime boundary areas between Indonesia and its neighbors, and is onerous for fishermen who are perceived to be operating in these grey areas.36 To resolve this issue, Indonesia and Malaysia, for instance, have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Common Guidelines Concerning Treatment of Fishermen by Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies of Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia.37 With this MoU, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed with common rules to deal with fishermen operating in areas where maritime boundaries have yet to be settled amicably. Incidents at sea may occur in areas where maritime boundaries do not exist or even in areas where maritime boundaries have been settled. The incarceration of fishermen due to illegal fishing is common and prevalent


in the maritime areas between Indonesia and Australia. Such cases are not due to uncertainty regarding maritime boundaries, but rather to border management issues; for example, failing to disseminate information critical for fishermen operating around border areas. Lack of information on the precise location of maritime boundaries and the type of fish species that fishermen can catch in the area is one of the causes of border incidents. Such information needs to be part of a proper management regime for border regions, thereby ensuring that the border becomes a source of benefit rather than a hindrance to the communities residing around it. Indonesia and its neighbors may have been reasonably active in negotiating their maritime boundaries; however, the communities affected do not necessarily benefit from the outcomes of the negotiation process. The challenges Indonesia faces in relation to its maritime boundaries are delimitation for pending boundaries and administration or management of those already established.38 Indonesia has yet to delimit maritime boundaries in 15 different locations involving around 20 segments of territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. Consequently, greater attention and a concerted effort is required to accelerate the process of maritime delimitation. Another issue to contemplate is the need for Indonesia to reconsider its approaches to completing maritime delimitation with its neighbors. Maritime delimitation with Malaysia, for example, has adopted the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Considering that complete delimitation for all segments is not an easy task, it is likely that any further agreements between Indonesia and Malaysia may not be forthcoming for some time. Yet, significant progress in border delimitation has been achieved between Indonesia and Malaysia for particular segments, which is not public knowledge because under current principles such progress cannot be recorded via treaty or agreement. For example, both countries have agreed on a provisional territorial sea boundary in the Sulawesi Sea, which requires finalization for the agreement to be final and binding.39 For the sake of boosting bilateral relations and building confidence, Indonesia and Malaysia should reconsider the approach currently adopted and work towards a new methodology that would allow an agreement to be signed for each particular segment of maritime boundary delimited without waiting for the completion of the entire boundary delimitation exercise to be agreed.40 Regarding boundary administration, Indonesia has to contend with three main issues: 1) illegal activities in and around boundary areas; 2) geospatial/technical issues; and 3) information dissemination. The challenge regarding illegal activities revolves around the need to provide an adequate number of maritime patrol vessels and the personnel to staff them. Established maritime boundaries have to be monitored by officials—both military and civilian—with adequate knowledge, skills and equipment. To safeguard such a large maritime boundary area, Indonesia requires massive


resources; considering the scale of this task, Indonesia’s current commitment remains woefully inadequate.41 In addition to the commitment of materiel and personnel, coordination is also an essential challenge. There are various institutions that play an important role in guarding Indonesia’s maritime boundaries. Without proper coordination among those institutions, conflicts of interest will occur. Therefore, the role of the Maritime Security Coordinating Board (Bakorkamla, Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut)42 is vital in facilitating coordination among existing institutions. Should Bakorkamla fail in performing its coordinating role, it will become yet another institution complicating an already complex situation of competing agencies.43 For geospatial/technical issues, the primary challenge lies in providing adequate geospatial data for the purposes of boundary administration. A challenge for the Geospatial Information Agency (BIG, Badan Informasi Geospasial)44 and the Indonesian Navy’s Hydro-Oceanographic Office (Dishidros, Dinas Hidro-Oseanografi TNI-AL)45 is to provide charts that include adequate technical specifications. While there is no legal requirement on the duration or frequency with which charts depicting baselines and maritime boundaries should be updated, such charts need to be regularly updated to accommodate environmental changes to ensure reliable maps are available for safe navigation.46 This necessitates expensive field surveys and cartographic processes, which constitutes a considerable challenge. Another problem is determining how to define the right geodetic datum for maritime boundary treaties already concluded between Indonesia and its neighbors.47 This will require intensive geospatial research involving various parameters and assumptions. Furthermore, the fixing of datum may cause changes to existing treaties, thereby complicating the treaty process. The challenge of information dissemination relates to balancing the need to treat confidential information accordingly and the urgency to educate people and relevant parties by providing as much accurate information as possible. Following which, the next challenge to overcome is in expressing legal and technical matters related to maritime boundaries in accessible language in order to reach as broad an audience as possible. In this case, relevant parties in the government need to be aware that the way to convey the information is as equally important as its contents. Apart from the aforementioned challenges, opportunities also exist in the context of boundary administration. Disputes and incidents in relation to boundary issues may be viewed as opportunities to build awareness among relevant parties in both the government and public realms. By recognizing the consequences of how improper boundary administration can compromise safety and security, relevant parties involved should realize that managing boundaries is equally as important as establishing them. This can to an extent accelerate and improve Indonesia’s maritime boundary management


program. Similarly, greater awareness among citizens on the importance of boundary management can also generate sufficient public pressure on the relevant agencies concerned to approach the task in a serious and competent manner. The establishment of the National Agency for Border Management (BNPP, Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan) is the ideal recourse for the government of Indonesia in dealing with boundary administration issues. However, apart from its idealistic objectives, there remains significant room for improvement, particularly in optimizing its roles and coordination responsibilities. In this regard, capacity-building remains one of the most important means by which the agency can improve its performance.48

Maritime security and defense conundrums Charting Indonesia’s outward-looking orientation, however, would first require a clearer definition of its foreign policy and security interests. In 2007–08, the government published a number of documents outlining Indonesia’s security and defense guidelines.49 They include assessments of Indonesia’s strategic environment, its doctrine and strategy, force structure, and a Defense White Paper. Yet these documents elaborate very little new thinking on the type of framework the government would adopt to address Indonesia’s strategic environment and its defense and security needs. These documents provide some insight into current maritime strategic thinking. What they convey is that Indonesia responds to its strategic environment rather than seeks to shape or influence it. Active involvement in multilateral initiatives by Indonesia primarily compensates for its lack of strategic weight as a military power. Serious security concerns are only attributed to border disputes, terrorism, and separatism. No discussion whatsoever is evident regarding the strategic implications of Indonesia’s rise or ascending power. These documents continue to elaborate the military’s domestic security role. Despite elaborating on out-of-area deployments, such as interdiction beyond the exclusive economic zone, the army’s territorial role remains paramount in national defense. This means that the objective of the Archipelagic Outlook in forging national unity has still not been met. Instead, these documents further confirm that the Archipelagic Outlook remains an inward-looking concept. In making reference to maritime security issues, the documents only address incidents that occur within Indonesian waters, seeking to suggest that Indonesia’s most serious maritime security issues are maritime boundary disputes, piracy and terrorism, smuggling and poaching. Discussions regarding maritime interests and threats beyond Indonesia’s shores are not substantially explored. Consequently, it can be difficult to gauge, for example, Indonesia’s security interests in the Indian Ocean.


Next, Indonesia’s strategic assessments do not touch on the possibility of overseas force projection. Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations is the exception rather than the rule, as although it has been deployed in at least 23 operations, the country has been engaging in such deployments since the 1950s. Hence, what should warrant attention here is force projection to secure Indonesian interests unilaterally, or through a coalition. The lack of overseas force projection aspirations could mean either one or a combination of the following assumptions. First, Indonesia is still unable to deploy adequate resources for it. Second, Indonesia has not defined its overseas interests clearly and has not calculated how it intends to secure them. Third, Indonesia is too fixated on domestic security and therefore unable to comprehend its external security environment. Fourth, the nation’s inward-looking orientation is too deeply ingrained in the national psyche, and hence unable to comprehend new external strategic realities, thereby limiting its options for overseas force projection. However, the strategic environment and policy documents do provide some insights into Indonesia’s projected naval development.50 There are four main discernible trends evident from these documents. First, the distribution of its three naval fleet commands in Tanjung Pinang in Riau Islands, Makassar in South Sulawesi, and Sorong in West Papua is a reflection of the state’s concern with the security of its archipelagic waters. Supported by a growing defense budget and its strategic ‘minimum essential force’ (MEF) blueprint, the fleet redistribution plan should be much closer to fruition.51 The fleet disposition is also adjusted to the currently designated three North–South archipelagic sea lanes. However, there is as yet no authoritative report evaluating how the designation of East–West archipelagic sea lanes would alter fleet disposition and naval strategy. Second, the Indonesian Navy’s recognition that the archipelago is best defended not through general sea control, but rather by denying several maritime passages, referred to as ‘strategic funnels’ connecting Indonesia’s EEZ to its archipelagic waters.52 The strategic funnels occur where maritime forces can be easily concentrated to meet an adversary’s fleet. But they are also where potential flashpoints are located, including the Natuna Sea and Sulawesi Sea. Indonesia’s proximity to neighboring countries and abundant marine resources has made it a requirement for the Indonesian Navy to conduct its exercises primarily in the vicinity of these areas. Third, due to the exorbitant cost of sophisticated naval capabilities such as frigates and destroyers, Indonesia tends to rely on asymmetric maritime capabilities, such as submarines, land-based maritime strike aircraft, fast attack craft, and mine warfare; this strategy could allow Indonesia to meet the minimum requirements of its maritime security within its limited financial means. It is conceivable that Indonesia could successfully apply these minimal-cost capabilities in concert with a sea denial strategy against a stronger maritime adversary.


While limited financial means make sea denial the only feasible option, Indonesia still requires limited sea control capabilities to impose good order on its archipelagic waters. Non-traditional threats to the security and safety of navigation within the archipelago—such as piracy and periodic natural disasters—require Indonesia to maintain modest naval surface capabilities, such as corvettes, fast attack craft, and amphibious vessels. Fourth, interisland communication is likely to remain the Navy’s primary role through the military sealift command (Komando Lintas Laut Militer – Kolinlamil). Archipelagic geography entails that sea lanes constitute the nation’s interior lines of communication. Indonesia’s naval resources have therefore always concentrated on sealift mobility to facilitate the deployment of soldiers across the archipelago. The recent acquisition of amphibious assault ships and future plans to procure more landing ship tanks confirm continuation of this necessary strategy.53

Conclusion: Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook Although the Archipelagic Outlook provides Jakarta political legitimacy with which to exert a level of control over Indonesia’s internal waters and unite the archipelago, how is it relevant to the maritime environment beyond its shores? Despite its accolades, the Archipelagic Outlook is an inherently inward-looking concept. Its principal aim is to create national unity out of diversity as a consequence of being an archipelagic nation; this reflects a sense of fragility and vulnerability toward centrifugal forces capable of drawing the outlying islands away from Jakarta’s political control. However, the concept also ignores the fact that as Jakarta’s interests spread wider and expand overseas, more than just unity is required to safeguard the nation’s and the region’s interests. The rise of maritime powers, operating within and outside the region, has placed increased stress on Indonesia’s critical location at the maritime crossroads of Asia, particularly in relation to the choke-points and archipelagic sea lanes. In this context, the Archipelagic Outlook has little to offer for Indonesia if it is to keep pace with the regional maritime strategic environment, let alone to shape and influence it. We contend that in the coming decades Indonesia’s strategic planners will need to address the nation’s anomalous geographical and political situation by proactively managing their maritime environment. This is primarily because the future of Indonesia’s maritime environment will be characterized by several trends. First, the rise of Asian maritime powers will affect regional stability. The rapid economic growth of Asia has meant that states in the region have increased their strategic weight. For the first time in history, Asia has surpassed Europe in terms of defense expenditure.54 In Southeast Asia much of this budget is allocated to building a more capable and farther-reaching maritime force.55 This will create new opportunities


and challenges for regional security and stability. The opportunities afforded to Asian states should mean that regional states could be poised to provide maritime safety and good order at sea, engaging in enhanced intraregional maritime security cooperation, as well as the promotion of confidence-building measures through naval diplomacy. Nonetheless, this trend will also create new challenges. Asian economic growth has been greatly underpinned by seaborne trade, a circumstance that will cause the importance of sea lanes and choke-points to become increasingly critical in the future. Navies are generally deployed for the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and as such can enhance security perceptions and misperceptions on the part of neighboring states more than they can contribute to general maritime security. Part and parcel of SLOCs is energy security: major Asian economies, particularly those in Northeast Asia, will remain dependent upon supplies from the Middle East and Africa, which rely on reliable maritime security. While cooperative approaches among the maritime nations should be sought to ensure the free flow of seaborne traffic, the possibility of unforeseen incidents and the influence of zerosum mindsets are unlikely to vanish in the foreseeable future. Second, simmering regional tensions emerging from historical grievances and territorial disputes are increasingly compounded by rising nationalism and trust deficits. While the region has undergone rapid economic growth and interdependence, these trends have not reshaped the way regional states view sovereignty. On the contrary, and more than ever, regional states now direct growing military capabilities at entrenching their hold on sovereignty, making sensitive issues such as historical grievances and maritime disputes ever more complicated to resolve and manage. Nowhere is such a situation more contentious than in the sovereignty disputes along the Western Pacific rim. In the East and South China seas, states are locked in intractable maritime disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Spratly and Paracel islands. To prevent such clashes, efforts have been undertaken to enmesh the involved nations in multilateral security architectures, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit, although these alone are not adequate without more stringent enforcement of a code of conduct which regional states, especially China, are very hesitant to accept. Although Indonesia does not maintain any direct claims in the East and South China Seas disputes, it cannot afford to see conflict erupting in its vicinity. Indonesia’s reliance on seaborne and energy trade to Northeast Asia and the Middle East means that safety of navigation in the sea routes between the archipelago and these areas are a crucial part of its national interest. Moreover, Indonesia is also in possession of oil and gas infrastructure in the South China Sea, which could suffer collateral damage during conflict.56 Third, the rise of China and the role of the United States have complicated the regional stability equation. The rise of China has been welcomed


in the region, as it has brought with it new diplomatic and economic alternatives, providing options for regional states previously dependent on the West. This is particularly so in the case of Indonesia, whose ‘free and active’ foreign policy discourages any tendentious alignments toward major powers. However, regional states are equally wary about growing Chinese power and intentions, as China also displays ambitions for leadership and hegemony, being perceived as aggressive whenever it comes to protecting its ‘core interests’. Meanwhile, the United States, which has officially declared China as a ‘peer competitor’, gives the impression of exploiting the situation as an opportunity to pivot its security attention back to Asia after several decades of distraction in Middle East conflicts. The rise of Asian maritime powers and simmering regional tensions will in tandem decide the future role of the United States in the region. Fourth, the evolving nature of non-traditional security challenges will also affect the future of Indonesia’s maritime environment. While major power competition is certainly a defining feature in the current strategic landscape, new security challenges warrant attention. Threats of piracy and sea robbery, terrorism, smuggling, and pollution remain increasingly problematic throughout the region. Multinational and cooperative efforts have sought to address these issues, but due to their dynamic and evolving nature, new measures and initiatives must constantly be developed and implemented. For Indonesia, the efforts to address non-traditional maritime security threats have often led to previously unforeseen types of regional engagement. The ‘coordinated patrols’ with neighboring countries have multiplied regional naval diplomatic initiatives, which serve as another avenue in confidence-building measures as regional navies increase in size and strength. As a consequence, the Indonesian Navy is now also participating in out-of-area deployments to counter piracy and illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea.57 The last concern relates to Indonesia’s growing overseas interests. According to a recent McKinsey Report, Indonesia is projected to be the seventh largest economy in the world in 2030.58 It is currently the 16th largest economy in the world, and a member of the G-20. It is also one of the world’s largest exporters of natural resources, including coal, palm oil, and natural gas, exporting to nations including India and China.59 Indonesia, too, consumes more energy than in the past. It became a net oil importer in 2004, shipping the bulk of its oil from the Middle East. This is one among many instances of Indonesia’s economy becoming increasingly intertwined with seaborne routes; as a consequence, disruptions to seaborne trade would severely damage economic growth. These trends point to the outward-looking pressure of Indonesia’s developing maritime strategic environment. Such conditions exceed the scope of the Archipelagic Outlook. Although these trends persist, Indonesia is presently bereft of an outward-looking projection in its regional and inter-


national influence. One official has suggested the need for the adoption of an ‘archipelagic foreign policy’—such a policy would reflect both Indonesian geography and a desire to move beyond the inward-facing Archipelagic Outlook while remaining faithful to its ‘free and active’ foreign policy principle.60 The efficacy of archipelagic foreign policy can be seen in three ways. First, it would define priorities that meet the needs of the region relating to issues of development, climate change, and food and energy security. Second, it would define the choice of foreign policy instruments by reference to a maritime perspective, improving maritime connectivity in support of the development of Southeast Asian regional markets, and actively contributing to UN-sanctioned naval peace support operations. Third, by locating the meeting points between national security policy and foreign policy, it would recognize that Indonesia warrants defense and security arrangements peculiar to its archipelagic geography.

Notes * The Authors would like to record their thanks to Ambassador Arif Havas Oegroseno for his comments to an earlier draft of the chapter. 1 The qualities of the Republic of Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country, the largest democracy in the Muslim world, and geo-strategically, Southeast Asia’s most significant state give it the attributes of a ‘pivotal state’. According to the authors of an influential study, a ‘pivotal state’ is ‘geostrategically important state to the United States and its allies’ and its importance is attributed to its ability not only to ‘determine the success or failure of its region but also significantly affect international stability’. See Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, eds, The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), pp. 6 & 9. 2 Evan Laksmana, ‘The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesia’s Geopolitical Architecture’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011), p. 96. 3 Sabang and Merauke are respectively Indonesia’s westernmost and easternmost cities located in the Provinces of Aceh and Papua. 4 Leonard C. Sebastian, ‘Domestic Security Priorities, “Balance of Interests” and Indonesia’s Management of Regional Order’ in Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf Emmers, eds, Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 178. 5 John Butcher, ‘Becoming an Archipelagic State: The Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the “Struggle” to Gain International Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle’, in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, eds, Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 30–1. 6 Ibid., p. 33. 7 See, Hasyim Djalal, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995). 8 See Michael Leifer, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’ cited in Leonard C. Sebastian, Domestic Security Priorities, ‘Balance of Interests’ and Indonesia’s Management of Regional Order, op. cit., p. 54.

328 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook 9 Ibid. 10 See, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 11 UNCLOS, Article 49 (1). 12 Penny Campbell, ‘Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes’, in Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 16: Australian Maritime Issues 2005 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2005), p. 115. 13 Kresno Buntoro (critical reviews by Marsetio and Hasjim Djalal), Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI): Prospek dan Kendala [The Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes: Prospects and Challenges] (Jakarta: Sekolah Staf and Komando TNI AL, 2012), p. 149. 14 Ibid., pp. 176–9. 15 Interview with Dr Hasyim Djalal, 1 November 2013. 16 UNCLOS, Article 53 (1) states that ‘[a]n archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, [...]’. 17 UNCLOS, Article 53 (4). 18 UNCLOS, Article 53 (3). 19 UNCLOS, Article 53 (12). 20 N. P. Ello, ‘Hasil Sidang IMO dan Konsultasi IHO tentang ALKI dalam rangka implementasi UNCLOS 1982’[Results of IMO Assembly and IHO Consultation on Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes in relation to the Implementation of UNCLOS 1982], cited in D. Puspitawati, ‘The East/West Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage through the Indonesian Archipelago’, Maritime Studies, Vol. 140, January-February (2005), p. 3. 21 IMO is considered as the ‘competent international organization’ as governed by UNCLOS, Article 53 (9) for the purpose of the designation of ASLs. There are views however that question the legitimacy of IMO to be considered as ‘competent international organization’ in this matter. For further elaboration of this issue, see for example, Chris Forward, ‘Archipelagic Sea-Lanes in Indonesia – Their Legality in International Law’, Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2, November 2009, pp. 143–56. Puspitawati, on the other hand views that ‘the competence of the IMO as the organisation is appropriate’. See Puspitawati, 2005, op. cit., p. 4. 22 Puspitawati, 2005, op. cit., p. 4. 23 Puspitawati, 2005, op. cit., p. 6. 24 For a complete documentation of the ‘19 rules’, see Puspitawati, 2005, op. cit., pp. 9–10. 25 Government Regulation Number 37 of 2002, on The Rights and Obligations of Foreign Ships and Aircraft when Exercising the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage through Established Archipelagic Sea Lanes [hereinafter Government Regulation Number 37 of 2002], Article 3 (1). An English translation is available at http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/GovernmentRegulation No2.pdf 26 See above note 22. 27 During an informal discussion on 15 May 2013 in Sydney, Australia, retired Indonesian Air Marshal Eris Heryanto, a former Secretary General of Ministry of Defence stressed the point that the designation of east/west ASLs may compromise Indonesia’s national security. The discussion was in conjunction with the ‘Australian–Indonesian Next Generation Defence and Security Forum’ organized by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).

Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made Andi Arsana 329 28 Interview with Dr Hasyim Djalal, 1 November 2013. 29 Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Commission I of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), stated that the primary weapon defense system (alutsista) of the Indonesian Navy is in adequate to guard and protect Indonesia’s ASLs. See, Sindonews, 27 December 2012, Alutsista TNI AL minim, negara rugi Rp40 T [Navy’s Alutsista inadequate, Indonesia suffers IDR 40 trillion of loss], available at http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/2012/ 12/27/14/701229/alutsista-tni-al-minim-negara-rugi-rp40-t 30 A. H. Oegroseno, ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Boundaries’, in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, eds, Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 54. 31 The latest agreement was signed on 23 May 2014 with the Philippines regarding EEZ boundary in the Mindanao Sea and Sulawesi Sea. See ‘Philippines and Indonesia Sign Agreement on Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary’, available at 32 Ibid. 33 For a comprehensive discussion on the Ambalat block dispute, see, I.M.A. Arsana, ‘Penyelesaian Sengketa Ambalat dengan Delimitasi Maritim: Kajian Geospasial dan Yuridis’ [The settlement of the Ambalat block case through maritime delimitation; A geospatial and legal approach], Jurnal Ilmiah Widya Sosiopolitika, Vol. I, No. 1 (2010), pp. 46–58. 34 A detailed discussion on the Tanjung Berakit incident and a proposal for solution through maritime boundary delimitation can be found in I.M.A. Arsana, ‘Mending the Imaginary Wall Between Indonesia and Malaysia – The Case of Maritime Delimitation in the Waters off Tanjung Berakit’, Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 2011), pp. 1–28. 35 For a comprehensive discussion on the incident in the Strait of Malacca that took place on 7 April 2011, see, I.M.A. Arsana, ‘Good Fences Make Good Neighbours: Challenges and Opportunities in Finalising Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia’, Proceeding of The 2nd CILS Conference 2011: International Conference on ASEAN’s Role in Sustainable Development, 21–22 November (2011), Yogyakarta. 36 For a comprehensive discussion on how fishermen are disadvantaged by pending maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, see, IMA Arsana and F. Yuniar, ‘Kisah Nelayan di Kawasan Abu-abu: Kajian atas Nota Kesepahaman Indonesia-Malaysia dan Delimitasi Batas Maritim di Selat Malaka’ [A Tale of Fishermen in the Grey Areas: A Study on Indonesia-Malaysia MoU and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Strait of Malacca], National Seminar on Research and Policy of economic and social aspects of Ocean Affairs and Fisheries, 19 September 2012. 37 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia in Respect of the Common Guidelines concerning Treatment of Fishermen by Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies of Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia, signed on 27 January 2012. A copy of the MoU is available at treaty.kemlu.go.id/index.php/treaty/download/1273. For a comprehensive explanation of this MoU, see, ‘RI and Malaysia Agree to Solve the Fishermen Problem through Diplomacy’, Antara, 30 January 2012. Available at http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/79547/ri-and-malaysiaagree-to-solve-the-fishermen-problem-through-diplomacy

330 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook 38 S. B. Jones, Boundary-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. xv, 268. 39 See, Joint Statement between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia at the 9th Annual Consultation between Prime Minister Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak and President Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on 18 December 2012 in Putrajaya, Selangor. Available at https://www.kln.gov.my/archive/ content.php?t=3&articleId=2588590 40 In an interview with New Straits Times, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia acknowledged the difference between the two approaches and the possibility of Indonesia to make a change in its delimitation approach. See the recorded video of the interview at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zFSw_mKhOg 41 Defense Minister, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, admitted the need to improve facilities for the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). See, ‘Menhan akan Modernisasi Alutsista’, Jurnal Nasional, 22 August 2011 [Defense Minister will modernise main weaponry system (Alutsista)]. Available at . See also Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008 [Indonesia’s Defense White Paper 2008] (Jakarta: Ministry of Defense, 2008). 42 See vision, mission, tasks and functions of Bakorkamla in its official website: www.bakorkamla.go.id 43 Members of Bakorkamla are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Law and Human Rights Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Transportation, Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, General Attorney of the Republic of Indonesia, Commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), Indonesian National Police, Indonesian State Intelligence Agency, and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy. See the organizational structure of Bakorkamla at http://www.bakorkamla.go.id/index.php/ organisasi/struktur-organisasi 44 See official website of BIG: www.big.go.id 45 See official website of Dishidros: www.dishidros.go.id 46 C. Schofield and I. M. A. Arsana, ‘Imaginary Islands? Options to Preserve Maritime Jurisdictional Entitlements and Provide Stable Maritime Limits in the Face of Coastal Instability’, ABLOS Conference, Monaco, 2010. Available at . 47 For an example of technical analysis on maritime boundary geodetic datum, see for example, S. Lokita and A. Rimayanti., ‘The Solution Method for the Problem of the Geodetic Datum of the Territorial Sea Boundary between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore’. FIG Congress, Sydney (2010). Available at . 48 I. M. A. Arsana and S. Lokita, ‘Indonesia’s New Approach to Border Management’, in M. S. Zein and I. M. A. Arsana, Contribution Matters! 2.0: Insights of Indonesian Students in Australia (Canberra, Australia: PPIA, 2011), p. 168. 49 The documents are: Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Doktrin Pertahanan Negara [State Defense Doctrine] (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2007); Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Strategi Pertahanan Negara [State Defense Strategy] (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2007); Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan-Direktorat Analisa Lingkungan Strategis Perkembangan Lingkungan Strategis dan Prediksi


50

51

52

53 54 55

56

57

58

59

60

Ancaman Tahun 2008 [Development of Strategic Environment and Threat Prediction Year 2008], and Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008 [Indonesian Defense White Paper 2008] (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2008). See analysis in Indonesia Programme, Indonesia’s Naval Development and Maritime Cooperation, RSIS Policy Report, July 2012 in http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ Indonesia_Prog/resources/Policy%20Brief/Indonesia’s%20Naval%20Developmen t%20%20Maritime%20Cooperation_5%20July%202012.pdf ‘National Scene: Naval Fleets to be Made into Three’, The Jakarta Post, 28 December 2012 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/28/nationalscene-naval-fleets-be-made-three.html Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘Armada Jaya XXX/11 Naval Exercise: Indonesia’s Naval Strategy’, RSIS Commentaries No. 176/2011, 29 November 2011, http:// www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1762011.pdf Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘Indonesia’s Naval Modernisation: A Sea Change?’ http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0202012.pdf ‘Report: Asian Powers Beef up Military Spending’, Voice of America, 16 October 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/asia-defense-spending/1527336.html John O’Callaghan, ‘Southeast Asia Splashes out on Defense, Mostly Maritime’, Reuters, 7 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/07/us-defencesoutheastasia-idUSBRE8960JY20121007 Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘Indonesia’s South China Sea Dilemma: Between Neutrality and Self-Interest’, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/ RSIS1262012.pdf The Indonesian Navy sent a naval task force to the Gulf of Aden in April 2011 to rescue 20 Indonesian sailors held hostage by Somali pirates, while a permanent naval contingent is deployed in the Mediterranean Sea to support the UNIFILMaritime Task Force (UNIFIL-MTF) along the Lebanese maritime border. See, ‘Somali Pirates Release Indonesian Ship’, Voice of America, 1 May 2011, http://www.voanews.com/content/somali-pirates-release-indonesian-ship—— 121086654/158016.html and Priyambodo R. H., ‘KRI Hasanuddin-336 on Peace Mission to Lebanon’, Antara, 16 May 2012, http://www.antaranews.com/en/ news/82154/kri-hasanuddin-366-on-peace-mission-to-lebanon Raoul Oberman, Richard Dobbs, Arief Budiman, Fraser Thompson, and Morten Rosse, ‘The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential’, McKinsey & Company, September 2012, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/ asia/the_archipelago_economy ‘Indonesia to Lead Coal Export Growth Through 2020’, The Jakarta Globe, 31 May 2011, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/bisindonesia/indonesia-to-leadcoal-export-growth-through-2020/444341 Yayan Mulyana, ‘Developing an Archipelagic Foreign Policy’, The Jakarta Post¸ 9 January 2012.

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332 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook ———. (2011b) ‘Mending the Imaginary Wall between Indonesia and Malaysia – The Case of Maritime Delimitation in the Waters off Tanjung Berakit’, Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia, 13: 1 (April), 1–28. ———. (2010) ‘Penyelesaian Sengketa Ambalat dengan Delimitasi Maritim: Kajian Geospasial dan Yuridis’ [The Settlement of the Ambalat Block Case through Maritime Delimitation: A Geospatial and Legal Approach], Jurnal Ilmiah Widya Sosiopolitika, I: 1, 46–58. Arsana, I. M. A. and Lokita, S. (2011) ‘Indonesia’s New Approach to Border Management’, in M. S. Zein and I. M. A. Arsana, eds, Contribution Matters! 2.0: Insights of Indonesian Students in Australia, 163–86 (Canberra, Australia: PPIA). Arsana, I. M. A. and Yuniar, F. (2012) ‘Kisah Nelayan di Kawasan Abu-abu: Kajian atas Nota Kesepahaman Indonesia-Malaysia dan Delimitasi Batas Maritim di Selat Malaka’ [A Tale of Fishermen in the Grey Areas: A Study on Indonesia-Malaysia MoU and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Strait of Malacca], National Seminar on Research and Policy of economic and social aspects of Ocean Affairs and Fisheries, 19 September. Buntoro, Kresno (2012) Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI): Prospek dan Kendala [The Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes: Prospects and Challenges] (critical reviews by Marsetio and Hasjim Djalal) (Jakarta: Sekolah Staf and Komando TNI AL). Butcher, John (2009) ‘Becoming an Archipelagic State: The Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the “Struggle” to Gain International Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle’, in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, eds, Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, 30–1 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). Campbell, Penny (2005) ‘Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes’, in Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 16: Australian Maritime Issues 2005 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia). Chase, Robert, Hill, Emily and Kennedy, Paul eds (1999) The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company). Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia (2008) Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008 [Indonesian Defense White Paper 2008] (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia). Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia (2007) Doktrin Pertahanan Negara [State Defense Doctrine] (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia). Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia (2007) Strategi Pertahanan Negara [State Defense Strategy] (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia). Direktorat Jenderal Strategi Pertahanan-Direktorat Analisa Lingkungan Strategis (2008) Perkembangan Lingkungan Strategis dan Prediksi Ancaman Tahun 2008 [Development of Strategic Environment and Threat Prediction Year]. Djalal, Hasyim (1995) Indonesia and the Law of the Sea (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies). Ello, N. P. (1982) ‘Hasil Sidang IMO dan Konsultasi IHO tentang ALKI dalam Rangka Implementasi UNCLOS 1982’ [Results of IMO Assembly and IHO Consultation on Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes in Relation to the Implementation of UNCLOS 1982]. Forward, Chris (2009) ‘Archipelagic Sea Lanes in Indonesia – Their Legality in International Law’, Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, 23: 2, 143–56. Government Regulation Number 37 (2002), on The Rights and Obligations of Foreign Ships and Aircraft when Exercising the Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes

Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made Andi Arsana 333 Passage through Established Archipelagic Sea Lanes, Article 3 (1) translation, http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/GovernmentRegulationNo2.pdf ‘Indonesia to Lead Coal Export Growth Through 2020’, (2011) The Jakarta Globe, 31 May, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/bisindonesia/indonesia-to-lead-coalexport-growth-through-2020/444341. Indonesia Program (2012) ‘Indonesia’s Naval Development and Maritime Cooperation’, RSIS Policy Report, July, in http://www.rsis.edu.sg/Indonesia_ Prog/resources/Policy%20Brief/Indonesia’s%20Naval%20Development%20%20 Maritime%20Cooperation_5%20July%202012.pdf Joint Statement (2012) ‘Joint Statement between Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia at the 9th Annual Consultation between Prime Minister Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Abdul Razak and President Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on 18 December 2012 in Putrajaya, Selangor’, https://www.kln.gov.my/archive/ content.php?t=3&articleId=2588590 Jones, S. B. (1945) Boundary-Making (New York: Columbia University Press). Laksmana, Evan (2011) ‘The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesia’s Geopolitical Architecture’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 1: 1, 96. Lokita, S. and Rimayanti, A. (2010) ‘The Solution Method for the Problem of the Geodetic Datum of the Territorial Sea Boundary between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore’ (Sydney: FIG Congress), http://www.fig.net/pub/ fig2010/papers/ts01i/ts01i_rimayanti_lokita_4544.pdf Memorandum of Understanding (2012) ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia in Respect of the Common Guidelines Concerning Treatment of Fishermen by Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies of Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia’, signed 27 January, http://treaty.kemlu.go.id/index.php/treaty/download/1273 ‘Menhan akan Modernisasi Alutsista’ (2011) [Defense Minister will Modernise Main Weaponry System (Alutsista), Jurnal Nasional, 22 August, http://www.jurnas.com/ news/37982/Menhan_akan_Modernisasi_Alutsista/1/Nasional/Keamanan Mulyana, Yayan (2012) ‘Developing an Archipelagic Foreign Policy’, Jakarta Post¸ 9 January. ‘National Scene: Naval Fleets to be Made into Three’, The Jakarta Post, 28 December 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/28/national-scene-navalfleets-be-made-three.html O’Callaghan, John (2012) ‘Southeast Asia Splashes out on Defense, Mostly Maritime’, Reuters, 7 October, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/07/us-defence-southeastasia-idUSBRE8960JY20121007 Oberman, Raoul, Richard Dobbs, Arief Budiman, Fraser Thompson, and Morten Rosse, (2012) ‘The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential’, McKinsey& Company, September, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/ asia/the_archipelago_economy Oegroseno, A. H. (2009) ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Boundaries’, in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, eds, Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, 49–58 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies). ‘Philippines and Indonesia Sign Agreement on Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary’ (2014) Official Gazette, 23 May, http://www.gov.ph/2014/05/23/philippines-andindonesia-sign-agreement-on-eez-boundary/ Priyambodo, R. H. (2012) ‘KRI Hasanuddin-336 on Peace Mission to Lebanon’, Antara¸ 16 May, http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/82154/kri-hasanuddin-366on-peace-mission-to-lebanon

334 Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook Puspitawati, D. (2005) ‘The East/West Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage through the Indonesian Archipelago’, Maritime Studies, 140, January–February, 1–13. ‘Report: Asian Powers Beef up Military Spending’, (2012) Voice of America, 16 October, http://www.voanews.com/content/asia-defense-spending/1527336.html ‘RI and Malaysia Agree to Solve the Fishermen Problem through Diplomacy’ (2012) Antara, 30 January, http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/79547/ri-and-malaysiaagree-to-solve-the-fishermen-problem-through-diplomacy Schofield, C. and Arsana, I. M. A. (2010) ‘Imaginary Islands? Options to Preserve Maritime Jurisdictional Entitlements and Provide Stable Maritime Limits in the Face of Coastal Instability’, ABLOS Conference, Monaco, http://www.gmat. unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS10Folder/S2P1-P.pdf Sebastian, Leonard C. (2006) ‘Domestic Security Priorities, “Balance of Interests” and Indonesia’s Management of Regional Order’, in Joseph Chinyong Liow and Ralf Emmers, eds, Order and Security in Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer, 175–95 (London/New York: Routledge). ‘Somali Pirates Release Indonesian Ship’ (2011) Voice of America, 1 May, http://www.voanews.com/content/somali-pirates-release-indonesian-ship—— 121086654/158016.html Supriyanto, Ristian Atriandi (2012a) ‘Indonesia’s South China Sea Dilemma: Between Neutrality and Self-Interest’, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/ RSIS1262012.pdf ——— (2012b) ‘Indonesia’s Naval Modernisation: A Sea Change?’, http://www.rsis. edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0202012.pdf ——— (2011) ‘Armada Jaya XXX/11 Naval Exercise: Indonesia’s Naval Strategy’, RSIS Commentaries No. 176/2011, 29 November, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/ Perspective/RSIS1762011.pdf Sindonews (2012) Alutsista TNI AL Minim, Negara Rugi Rp40 T [Navy’s Alutsista Inadequate, Indonesia Suffers IDR 40 Trillion of Loss], 27 December, http:// nasional.sindonews.com/read/2012/12/27/14/701229/alutsista-tni-al-minimnegara-rugi-rp40-t United Nations (1983) ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, Publication No. E97.V10 (New York: United Nations).

16 ‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspirations Leonard C. Sebastian and Christopher B. Roberts

Why should we view Indonesia as an emerging power? There are a range of indicators supporting Indonesia’s status in international affairs. In the late 1990s analysts referred to Indonesia as a pivotal state.1 The McKinsey Report on Indonesia in 2012 predicted that by 2030, it will become the world’s seventh largest economy.2 In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, Indonesia even outperformed the BRIC countries, attracting investors searching for new emerging investment markets. A report released on 6 March 2013 by the Boston Consulting Group3 made a case for the archipelagic state of 242 million people as a prime investment destination. Memorable excerpts from the report noted that: 1) Indonesia’s middle income and affluent classes will double by 2020 from 74 million to 141 million people and more than half the population (53 per cent) will qualify as middle class or richer; 2) Indonesians feel more financially secure than people in other BRIC countries (Thirty-one per cent of Indonesians surveyed reported feeling secure, compared with only 14 per cent of Chinese, 19 per cent of Indians, 15 per cent of Russians and 13 per cent of Brazilians); and 3) Indonesia’s middle class will become more dispersed and consequently, new cities will emerge beyond Jakarta as centers of wealth. Here, the total number of cities with more than a million middle-income earners will roughly double, from 12 cities to 22 in seven years (see Chapter 3). A further expectation is that Indonesia will enjoy a demographic dividend during 2020–30 when its productive age group—people between 15 and 64 years of age—maximizes their economic productivity, and dependency ratios are at their lowest levels.4 Yet, these are not the only indicators. Outside its economic heft, the basis of Indonesia’s power is not completely understood. Indonesia’s size and power means that regional cooperation initiatives are doomed to failure without its participation. However, its vulnerability to internal instability from time to time threatens to destabilize the country and essentially restrains it from achieving its full potential. Nevertheless, 335

336 ‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspirations

whether through its pivotal regional role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or through its global role championing the southern coalition through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations (UN) and the Group of Twenty (G-20) major economies, Indonesia has never allowed its lack of material capabilities to hinder its regional and global ambitions. Indonesia’s ‘minimum essential force’ defense posture is aimed only at achieving an adequate level of military capabilities that would satisfy its immediate defense requirements (see Chapter 7). Such material shortcomings are no impediment for Indonesia in maintaining its contribution to international security through its long association with UN peacekeeping operations. Known as Garuda contingents, at the time of writing, Indonesia was participating in six UN operations and also contributing to an International Monitoring Team in Mindanao, the Philippines.5 Over and above the fact that it is the third largest democracy in the world and the Muslim world’s largest democracy (see Chapter 4, emphasizing the Indonesian synthesis of Islam, democracy and modernity), Indonesia’s leadership of ASEAN places it at the center of intensive security and economic dialogue with the major powers. Its active participation in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and participation in a wide range of international agreements on nuclear safety had firmly returned the country to the forefront of the international policymaking arena, with its global role further reinforced by its membership in the G-20. As the United States preponderance in Asian affairs is challenged by the emergence of China and India, states such as Indonesia, with its potential as an emerging market, will seek an increasingly influential role in regional affairs. As Andrew Hurrell correctly asserts, ‘power in international relations requires a purpose and project, and the cultivation of such a purpose can both galvanize national support and cohesion at home and serve as a power resource in its own right’.6 The factors highlighted above are primary indicators of Indonesia’s rise but, more importantly, the people of Indonesia have never wavered in sustaining support for the government’s initiatives in maintaining its contribution to the production of international order, both regionally and globally. Such support is ingrained in the Indonesian psyche and has its origins in Indonesian foreign policy activism from the 1950s. The people of Indonesia draw their inspiration from its activist foreign policy during the 1950s when Indonesia saw itself as a leader of a vanguard of forces united in a global struggle against imperialism. The Asian–African Conference in Bandung in 1955, which evolved into the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, remains deeply etched in memory of Indonesians. The struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, all forms of foreign aggression, domination, interference, hegemony, and great power

Leonard C. Sebastian and Christopher B. Roberts 337

politics has shaped Indonesian nationalism since the Sukarno era. While Indonesia had hoped that the Asian–African Conference would help to revise the established order and dominant norms of the time, the NonAligned Movement, the embodiment of the goals of the Asia–Africa Conference, only minimally achieved Indonesia’s goals. Perhaps the most relevant for Indonesia’s needs of the time was to become a voice of support for issues facing developing nations, particularly through its promotion of a New International Economic Order. The historical memory of the era was of an Indonesia, in a limited way, becoming a system challenger as Sukarno railed against western imperialism and sought to position Indonesia as a significant player representing the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS). After taking Indonesia out of the United Nations in 1965, Sukarno had ambitions to establish a rival institution, the Conference of the New Emerging Forces, which would promote the interests of the ‘oppressed peoples’ of Asia and Africa. A deteriorating economy, compounded by Sukarno’s decision to withdraw Indonesia from the International Monetary Fund, meant that Western donor countries were unable to underwrite the stabilization of Indonesia’s economy, paving the way for the ultimate collapse of his regime. The cataclysmic events surrounding the end of the Sukarno era with the anti-communist purge and the killings of 1965–66 may have left painful memories for most Indonesians; however, Sukarno gave them national pride and, more importantly, there was international recognition of Indonesia’s leadership of the Third World. Indonesia did not succeed as a system challenger; but, where it achieved immense success during the Suharto era was its role as a norm builder in ASEAN. In fact, it was ASEAN which became the primary vehicle through which its vision of regional order conformed to its norms in a way that reflected its own interests and values, particularly the use of Javanese culture and consensus-building in ASEAN decisionmaking. Furthermore, the manner in which Indonesia has shaped ASEAN norms accords with Hurrell’s perspective that the goal of international society is to promote ‘shared values and purposes rather than simply underpin coexistence and help to keep conflict to a minimum’.7 Indonesia’s ability to influence regional interactions allowed it not only to shape regional order but also to determine the degree of institutionalization within Southeast Asia and maintain the regional status quo. While the NAM remains an active lobby group within the United Nations General Assembly, its scope for collective action has diminished (see Chapter 2). If NAM’s global role may now be an anachronism, the agenda of the G-20 will provide Indonesia with the opportunity—and, more importantly, a high profile stage—to promote pluralism in global governance while enhancing its own links to a new southern coalition within the G-20 that may include like-minded second-tier countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa. While the NAM and UN


frameworks allow Indonesia to retain its ‘active and free’ foreign policy stance, it is in most circumstances the G-20 that provides Indonesia greater scope that will enable it not only to benefit from growing multipolarity, but also to profit from any fundamental changes brought about through systemic revision.8 Within the G-20 context, Indonesia’s leadership position is defined geographically—it is viewed by its global peers as the natural leader of Southeast Asia.9 Indonesia’s agenda in the G-20, however, does not as yet specifically reflect an ASEAN agenda. For the time being, its interests focus on developing world concerns (see Chapter 9) such as its work in tandem with Mexico and Chile on a financial inclusion scheme aimed at providing credit to the poor. Since its launch in 2011, The Master Plan for Planning, Extension and Accelerating Economic Development (MP3EI), aimed at revitalizing Indonesia’s archaic infrastructure in order to meet its economic development goals, has seen limited progress during the second term of the Yudhoyono presidency. However, a lack of infrastructure severely curtails Indonesia’s economic growth prospects and its ability to decrease inflation rates and secure a lower current account deficit. While the initiative was hailed as a breakthrough in stimulating infrastructure investments to reduce the development gap between the provinces and reduce unemployment, the realization of MP3EI has been low. Faced with such a conundrum, Indonesia’s representations through the G-20 appear to have succeeded in achieving two goals in a single action. Its promotion of a G-20 funding scheme for infrastructure development to boost economic growth in developing countries has also provided it with a platform to boost the image of a G-20 often attacked by civil society organizations for its poor record on social justice. In this context, Indonesia is able to tackle issues that impact on its own acute infrastructure and development need, but in the process promotes issues critical to the economies of developing states. As the third largest democracy in the world, Indonesia has organized its post-Suharto society to conform to international society, embodying a wide range of internationally agreed core principles relating to human rights and democracy.10 One of the earliest manifestations of this image was the decision by the Habibie administration to release all political prisoners incarcerated by the Suharto regime and, more significantly, on 30 August 1999 to permit a referendum for independence for the then province of East Timor. The government stood behind its decision to permit self-determination for the province despite significant opposition from strong sections of the Indonesian ruling elite and the Indonesian military—then still a formidable player in Indonesian politics. As a strong advocate to nurture a community of states in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has sought to promote Timor-Leste’s application for ASEAN membership. Part of the impact of sweeping away an authoritarian government was the introduction of major institutional reforms. These included the with-


drawal of the military from politics, the introduction of a direct presidential election, and the clarification of the respective powers of the executive and the legislature, a wide-ranging decentralization program for its provinces coupled with direct elections for the heads of regional governments, and the implementation of reform measures that have allowed for greater transparency and accountability of the government, especially in the area of legislative review and the legal system. While statist–nationalist coalitions have dominated the government and hindered the effectiveness of the anti-corruption drive, advocacy networks, NGO movements, and epistemic communities have been critical in reshaping understandings of state interests. The role of civil society in holding back the tide of illiberal political coalitions was evident in the defeat of Suharto’s former son in-law Prabowo Subianto in his 2014 bid for the presidency.11 With all the changes since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia is on the right track towards consolidating its democracy. The institutions underpinning its democracy are maturing, yet their competence and independence remain doubtful (see Chapter 6). Political parties in particular have supported a system in which the politics of patronage have sustained an entrenched oligarchy. Consolidating democracy remains a challenge if serious steps are not undertaken to address the weakness of political parties, the stalled process of police reform, and the unreliability of the judiciary: weaknesses which in turn provide the enabling conditions that exacerbate Indonesia’s often intractable security fault-lines (see Chapter 5). Indonesia may benefit more in terms of prestige if it recognizes the extent and potential of its soft power.12 While significant strides have been made to address its security fault-lines—be it the easing of tensions between indigenous Indonesian and Indonesians of ethnic Chinese descent and the resolution of a 30-year long conflict between the central government and the Aceh separatist movement through a peace accord in 2005— Indonesia’s record on religious intolerance highlights the limits of its soft power. The image of tolerance promoted by Yudhoyono as part of Jakarta’s foreign policy image is in stark reality to Indonesia’s domestic situation and the growing trend of religious intolerance, contradicting its advocacy that democracy, Islam, and modernity can co-exist. Though the Indonesian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and the freedom to worship, congregations of unrecognized religions including Ahmadiyya and Shiite Muslims, together with those of recognized minority religions such as Christians, have faced persecution by hard-line Islamists. Hard-line groups have taken advantage of Indonesia’s democratic environment to engage in acts of religiously motivated violence. In a YouTube age in which acts of violent extremists are graphically accessible on the internet, the ideal of Indonesia fostering soft power—as a tolerant democracy with an active foreign policy that promotes norms designed to prevent violence and intolerance—could be severely undermined.


The growing role of NGOs in policymaking has placed pressure on the government to address norms of environmental sustainability. The Yudhoyono government’s achievements on forestry protection, carbon emissions and coastal protection would not have been possible without significant NGO support. The Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve UN-REDD Project—the world’s largest REDD+ project—covering a 64,000-hectare forest carbon project in Indonesia’s Central Kalimantan Province in Borneo—is expected to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 119 million tons over its 30-year lifespan. The emissions reductions will come from avoiding drainage of the area’s carbon-dense peat lands and conversion of its forests to oil palm plantations.13 However, the record on the environment remains mixed. The fire-related air pollution that has occurred perennially in Southeast Asia since 1997 due to the burning of forests in Kalimantan and Riau does provide Indonesia’s critics with evidence that ‘the gap between rhetoric and reality remained wide, and that once again implementation lagged a long way behind promise’. The extraction of coal and the intensive cultivation of the palm oil crop will remain significant threats to the environment for as long as the Indonesian economy remains dependent on these two commodities.14 While Indonesia’s foreign policy has always comprised an activist tinge, the shift in political values since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 has resulted in the adoption of a democratic identity in foreign policymaking (see Chapter 8). The government has embraced the views of activists, parliamentarians, and representatives of NGOs who have sought to project Indonesia’s democratic image by advancing democratic values and human rights. No doubt Indonesia’s democratic transition has had a profound impact on attitudes in the country. Therefore it is not surprising that Indonesia’s agendas relating to political transformation and democracy are evident as part of its foreign policy goals—whether through the promotion of democracy and human rights as a priority in the ASEAN Political and Security Community, or via hosting of the Bali Democracy Forum. Promotion of democracy has not been limited to Southeast Asia—one of numerous examples is Indonesian input into Myanmar’s democratic transition—and Jakarta has also demonstrated a willingness to share its democratic transition experience, specifically with the countries of North Africa impacted by the Arab Spring. Over the course of the 15 years that Indonesia has built up its democracy, the character of international society has evolved immensely. In East Asia, the ASEAN plus three processes have deepened and the growth of new institutions such as the East Asian Summit (EAS) have worked to benefit Indonesia’s desire to promote a regional economic and security order that would increase the scope, range and intrusiveness of international rules and norms. For example, at the EAS in 2011, Indonesia proposed the adoption of the Bali Principles, aimed at moving Sino–US relations into a more constructive and less confrontational stance.


Indonesia’s status as a regional power can be related to notions of legitimacy and authority. As Hurrell contends, recognition as a regional power is a social category requiring acknowledgement by others, primarily your peers, but also smaller and weaker parties willing to accept your primacy.15 The original member-states of ASEAN have always considered Indonesia’s status in the organization as first among equals. In this regard, Indonesia has always viewed ‘the region as a means of aggregating power and fostering a regional coalition in support of its external negotiations’ when attempting to shape regional order. It does so by seeking to ‘play an assertive role in regional crisis management’ not only to buttress its own position as a regional power, but also to preclude being excluded from forms of crisis management that could be undertaken by outside actors— whether China, the United States, or the United Nations.16 Moreover, Indonesia has strongly resisted pressure by some countries— such as Malaysia and China—to limit ASEAN’s extra-mural institutions to the territorial confines of East Asia through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework—the plus three countries being South Korea, Japan, and China.17 Consequently, Indonesia took the lead in promoting ‘open regionalism’, which has ensured the continued engagement and role of other middle and great powers; this institutionalized ‘balance of power’ is in line with Natalegawa’s later vision of ‘dynamic equilibrium’. Therefore, as noted in Chapters 10 and 13, Indonesia took the lead in establishing the East Asia Summit (EAS) to not only include Australia, New Zealand, and India but, following its expansion in 2011, the United States and Russia as well. Through the enmeshment of middle and great powers in multiple overlapping institutions covering numerous domains,18 both Indonesia and ASEAN hope to maximize their influence beyond Southeast Asia in a manner that also constrains the Indo-Pacific powers from behaving in detrimental ways toward the interests of Southeast Asia. At the behavioral level, Evelyn Goh similarly talks about a process of omni-enmeshment where ASEAN’s preferred normative approach to international relations— for example, the ASEAN Way—is exported to the broader region so that, over time, it will become the Asian way.19 However, the nature of Indonesia’s contemporary identity and foreign policy means that Indonesia’s own normative projection no longer coincides with the traditional norms of ASEAN and, consequently, new normative and value-based coalitions may emerge in the future with countries such as Australia, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and India. Much of Indonesia’s power and influence derives from its ‘managerial or order producing role within its region’.20 For example, Indonesia’s intervention when diplomatic relations broke down between Malaysia and the Philippines in 1968; in 1980, when Indonesia cooperated with Malaysia to formulate the Kuantan statement; its mediatory work as host of the Jakarta Informal Meetings and as ASEAN’s interlocutor with Vietnam during the Cambodian conflict; Indonesia’s Chairmanship of the Paris Peace Conference, which brought


about a resolution to the Cambodian conflict; its role in cajoling Myanmar to accept foreign aid in the wake of Cyclone Nargis; and its mediation in the armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple. As the natural leader of the region, the changing balance of power in Asia is a source of immense concern, especially when it poses a significant challenge to ASEAN unity. Of primary concern are conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea, where Indonesia has sought a mediatory role as far back as the 1990s, when it convened the South China Sea Workshops. During the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting the Cambodian Chair refused to issue a joint communiqué reflecting the concerns of the Philippines and Vietnam over Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea; as tensions escalated, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa broke the impasse by conducting an intense round of shuttle diplomacy to secure the Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea for ASEAN, in the process overcoming the appearance of ASEAN disarray. Cambodia, the ASEAN Chair, had bowed to Chinese pressure by twice rejecting attempts by the Philippines, Vietnam and other ASEAN states to include a reference to recent developments in the South China Sea. The six principles on ASEAN’s common position reiterated a commitment to uphold the Declaration on Conduct of Parties (DOC) first agreed with China in 2002, plus a pledge to work toward the early adoption of a Code of Conduct (COC). In this context, Indonesia sought to reinforce its image as the region’s natural leader in the face of outside interference in ASEAN’s affairs. To bolster its credibility, Indonesia now seeks to engage in intensive maritime diplomacy to resolve its own border disputes with neighboring countries (see Chapter 15). In leading by example, Indonesia aims to protect its maritime interests, particularly as China’s ‘security dilemma’ now makes the proliferation of naval arms a distinct reality in Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s role as a neutral mediator has depended upon its status as a ‘non-disputant’ and has, to date, been a highly effective diplomatic tactic. However, a further challenge to this strategy is the recent escalation of Chinese assertiveness and subsequent statements by Indonesian defense officials that China’s maritime claims, via its nine-dash line, conflict with Indonesia’s Natuna gas field, continental shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zone.21 ASEAN still matters to Indonesia (see Chapter 13). However, the fiasco surrounding the July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting indicated to Indonesia that Laos, Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, Myanmar—with their deep and enduring ties with China—will make it extremely challenging to maintain ASEAN solidarity in the face of extra-regional relations and great power machinations (see Chapter 14). When attempting to project ASEAN solidarity and unity in the face of the challenge posed by China, the critical challenge now confronting Indonesia is the reality of ASEAN being split along the lines


of different regime types. Countries such as Cambodia and Laos are aligning with China not merely because of China’s infusions of benefits—aid, investment, trade with few conditions—but, more significantly, because their political system also means that it will become increasingly difficult for them to receive similar benefits from western great powers: this dynamic demonstrates a nexus between political affiliation (whether democratic or otherwise), economic matters, and strategic alignments. Indonesia cannot develop a relatively autonomous regional role if the United States and China prove constraining and overbearing. In this regard, Yudhoyono’s dictum of a thousand friends and zero enemies may need to be exploited across a wider range of foreign policy relationships, conceivably incorporating a post-ASEAN vision22 that would encompass strategic partnerships with like-minded middle powers such as Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea (see Chapter 11 on middle powers, and Chapter 10 on Australia). Such partnerships would ensure that the emerging regional order will not be dominated by either the United States or China, allowing Indonesia greater independence and scope for diplomatic maneuvering. Size increases Indonesia’s options, namely, an accepted right to an influential international role, but Indonesia nonetheless remains acutely aware of its vulnerabilities. As a second-tier state, hedging will remain an enduring characteristic of its foreign policy behavior, particularly when dealing with China and the United States. Foreign policy is a topic largely ignored during an Indonesian presidential election. Yet the 2014 presidential election proved the exception, with both presidential candidates making foreign policy a theme during the presidential debates and in their manifestos. During his presidential campaign, President Joko Widodo had sought to place his own imprint on Sukarno’s 1963 Trisakti principles, placing importance on three basic propositions: the freedom to assert proactively the right of self-determination on the international scene; economic self-sufficiency; and building a strong national identity.23 A strong nationalist stance taken during Joko Widodo’s presidential campaign will not prevent the new President from projecting Indonesian activism in the Asia-Pacific region. Several priorities have been set, namely: resolving border disputes in the region; expanding middle power diplomacy; building up the Indo-Pacific regional architecture; enhancing the diplomatic infrastructure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (particularly its research capacity); and enhancing public diplomacy with the aim of broadening public participation in foreign affairs. President Joko Widodo has also emphasized the importance of Indonesia’s maritime priorities. His vision is to support and prioritize Indonesia’s 2015 chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Rim of Association (IORA), bringing it in line with Indonesia’s strategic priorities.24 During the presidential debates, Joko Widodo presented for the first time his World Maritime Axis Doctrine,


which intends to optimize Indonesia’s role as a maritime state, emphasizing Indonesia’s continuing active role in international politics, and pointing out that the conflicts of the future and the most acute contests for power will occur in the Asia-Pacific region. During his presidency, the priority areas are likely to be: 1) protecting Indonesian citizens overseas; 2) securing Indonesia’s natural resources; 3) improving Indonesia’s trade competitiveness; and 4) focusing on maritime security and regional and global stability. During the presidential debates, Widodo also emphasized the primacy of diplomacy and the importance of working with and through international organizations as Indonesia’s primary instrument with which to solve the nation’s various international challenges. Additionally, he would like to transform the role of Indonesia’s ambassadors to become marketers for the country. Such initiatives emphasize a clear intent by the new administration to grow Indonesia’s economy by opening the door to foreign direct investment. As a further emphasis of the new administration’s aim to support a rules-based economic order, Widodo highlighted his support for Indonesia’s membership and role in the WTO. Accordingly, he aimed to improve Indonesia’s competitiveness in trade in order to maximize its membership in the organization. Indonesia will seek to adopt a higher profile stance when it comes to resolving regional conflict. Here, President Widodo stressed that he wanted to take a proactive stance in resolving the South China Sea dispute. The outcome would no doubt mark a significant improvement in China’s relations with Southeast Asia. Perhaps understanding the significance of China’s position in Asia, and its potential as a significant investor in developing Indonesian infrastructure, Widodo’s willingness to resolve the South China Sea dispute came with a caveat: that Indonesia would prefer not to be involved in resolving the dispute if the country’s involvement would be counterproductive. However, where Widodo has drawn the line is over the matter of its sovereignty. Although Indonesia is not a disputant party in the overlapping claims of the South China Sea, which have resulted in a raft of interstate disputes, it must take necessary steps to safeguard the country’s territorial integrity, even if that necessitates recourse to military means. Widodo’s stance emphasizes the difficulty Indonesia faces in leading the region; the contested nature of its leadership; and the requirement for support from regional followers where the ASEAN Way acts as a panacea in the absence of imposed disincentives for other states in the region to deviate from the course proposed by Indonesia (see Chapter 12). The definition of Indonesian leadership is similar to the Javanese concept sung tulodo ngarso ing, ing madyo Karso Mangun, tut wuri handayani (‘In the front leading by example, in the middle providing ideas and collaborating with others without overpowering them, and at the back, providing support and encouragement’) whereby Indonesia’s leadership is predicated


upon the desire to help the states of Southeast Asia realize their common regional goals. ASEAN remains centered around Indonesia as the region’s largest state. However, relative to larger powers such as China, Indonesian centrality is not due to a capacity to enforce its will or to determine the economic future of the region. Rather, the continuation of structural weaknesses within Indonesia primarily limits the projection of regional power to a form of ‘consensual hegemony’. Such hegemony is depicted not just by an ability to utilize ‘regional institutionalization and integration … [as] instruments of power aggregation’, but also an adeptness to ‘embody a particular set of values’ that are attractive to a region and to project a regional position that ‘is actively supported by those outside the region’.25

Notes 1 See Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, eds, The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), pp. 6 & 9. 2 Raoul Oberman et al., ‘The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential’ (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012) available at: http://www. mckinsey.com/insights/asia-pacific/the_archipelago_economy 3 See Vaishali Rastogi et al., Indonesia’s Rising Middle-Class and Affluent Consumers: Asia’s Next Big Opportunity, Boston Consulting Group, March 2013, https:// www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/center_consumer_customer_insight_ consumer_products_indonesias_rising_middle_class_affluent_consumers/ ?chapter=2 4 Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, ‘The Politics of a “Demographic Bonus”‘, The Jakarta Post, 24 September 2013. 5 A Peacekeeping Mission Education and Training Facility located at the Indonesia Peace and Security Center (IPSC) was established in West Java in 2011. The IPSC is the largest education and training facility in Southeast Asia training UN peacekeepers. 6 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers’, International Affairs, Vol. 82, Issue 1 (January 2006), p. 2. 7 Ibid., p. 2. 8 Ibid., p. 3. 9 Ibid., p. 8. 10 The issue of human rights and democracy is a good example of how ‘solidarist’ principles drawn from global practice have been successfully applied within Indonesia’s domestic setting. This example is adapted from the English School’s perspectives. See John Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 11 Soldiers under Prabowo Subianto’s command kidnapped and tortured at least nine democracy activists in the months leading to the May 1998 riots. 12 Hurrell, op. cit., p. 5. 13 See http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/may/31/worlds-largestredd-project-indonesia

346 ‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspirations 14 See Ditchley Foundation, ‘Indonesia–The Other Giant’, http://www.ditchley. co.uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-2019/2013/indonesia 15 Hurrell, op. cit., p. 4. 16 Ibid., p. 8. 17 Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir has argued that the APT has its origins in his proposal for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) which was later changed to an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC)—an acronym that some regional elite have facetiously referred to as ‘East Asia Excluding Caucasians’. Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Regional Autonomy, 2nd ed. (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p. 209. 18 Other institutions include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. Then President Suharto also provided critical support during the early stages of the establishment of APEC by hosting the second summit which Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohammad boycotted. 19 Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analysing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, 32, no. 3 (2007/2008), p. 121. 20 Hurrell, op. cit., p. 8. 21 General Moeldoko, ‘China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea: Indonesia will Strengthen its Military Forces in the Natuna Islands Now that Beijing Wants to Take Them Over’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 April 2014, ‘Indonesia’s Military Flexes Muscle as South China Sea Dispute Looms’, The Jakarta Globe, 13 March 2014. 22 Rizal Sukma, ‘A Post-ASEAN Policy for a Post-G8 World’, The Jakarta Post, 5 October 2009. 23 See Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla’s Vision, Mission and Action Programmes for the 2014 Presidential Election Campaign, ‘Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri dan Berkepribadian [A Way of Change for an Independent, Sovereign, and Strong Indonesia]’, May 2014, p. 3. 24 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 25 Andrew Hurrell, ‘One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society’, International Affairs, Vol. 83, Issue 1 (January 2007), pp. 140–1. See also, Linda Quayle, ‘Power and Paradox: Indonesia and the “English School” Concept of Great Powers’, International Relations of the AsiaPacific, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2013), pp. 301–30.

Bibliography Chase, Robert, Hill, Emily and Kennedy, Paul, eds (1999) The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company). Ditchley Foundation (2013) ‘Indonesia–The Other Giant’, http://www.ditchley.co. uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-2019/2013/indonesia Goh, Evelyn ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analysing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, 32, no. 3 (2007/2008): 113–57. Hurrell, Andrew (2007) ‘One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society’, International Affairs, 83: 1 (January), 127–46. ——— (2006) ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers’, International Affairs, 82: 1 (January), 1–19.

Leonard C. Sebastian and Christopher B. Roberts 347 ‘Indonesia’s Military Flexes Muscle as South China Sea Dispute Looms’, The Jakarta Globe, 13 March 2014. ‘Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri dan Berkepribadian’ [A Way of Change for an Independent, Sovereign, and Strong Indonesia] (2014) May. Moeldoko (2014) ‘China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea: Indonesia Will Strengthen Its Military Forces in the Natuna Islands Now That Beijing Wants to Take Them Over’, Wall Street Journal, 25 April. Oberman Raoul et al. (2014) ‘The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential’, (McKinsey Global Institute), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/asiapacific/the_archipelago_economy. Quayle, Linda (2013) ‘Power and Paradox: Indonesia and the “English School” Concept of Great Powers’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13: 2, 301–30. Rastogi, Vaishali et al. (2013) Indonesia’s Rising Middle-Class and Affluent Consumers: Asia’s Next Big Opportunity (Boston Consulting Group), March, https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/center_consumer_customer_insight_consumer_products_indonesias_rising_middle_class_affluent_consumers/?chapter= Sukma, Rizal (2009) ‘A Post-ASEAN Policy for a Post-G8 World’, Jakarta Post, 5 October. Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto (2013) ‘The Politics of a “Demographic Bonus”’, Jakarta Post, 24 September. Vincent, John (1986) Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Weatherbee, Donald E. (2010) International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Regional Autonomy, 2nd ed. (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield).

Index 9/11, 79, 161, 201, 230 see also counterterrorism Abbott, Tony, 200, 203, 232, 234 ABC see Australian Broadcasting Commission Abdulgani, Ruslan (former foreign minister), 188 Abdullah Sungkar, 77 Abdurrahman Wahid see Wahid Abin, Rais, 121, 122, 253 ABRI see Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Aceh, 57, 93, 96, 103, 104, 131, 141, 339 peace agreement, 93 revolt, 96 Aceh Liberation Movement see Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Acemoglu, Daron (Why Nations Fail), 99 àdâlah (justice), 82 àdâlah Ijtimaya (social justice), 72 see also social justice ADMM see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Defence Ministerial Meeting ADMM+ see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Defence Ministers Meeting Plus AFC see Asian Financial Crisis Afghanistan, 4, 77, 79, 87, 189n10 age of ignorance see jahiliyya Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, 77, 131, 165, 339 see also ethnicity; religious and ethnic minorities Ahok see Basuki Tjahaja Purnama AICHR see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights aid see foreign aid Aidit, D. N., 27 AIPR see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, 272, 273

air patrols, 246 air pollution, 249, 340 Air Pollution Index (API), 249 AK-47 (Automat Kalashnikova), 32 Akbar Tandjung, 120 Aksai Chin region, 133 al-Banna, Hassan, 80 al-Qaeda, 77, 79 Ali, Marzuki, 253 Ambalat Block, 248, 319 Ambon, Maluku province, Indonesia, 76 see also separatism American aid see foreign aid AMM see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Ministerial Meeting ancaman disintegrasi (threat of disintegration), 76 see also Asian Financial Crisis Anies Baswaden, 124 anti-Malaysian, 27, 248, 248–9 anti-reform, 118, 165 see also reformasi Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, 157, 164, 172n48, 264, 290–1, 296, 300n11 APEC see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation API see Air Pollution Index APT see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Plus Three Arab Spring, 64, 84, 157, 340 archipelagic sea lanes see sea lanes Archipelagic Outlook see Wawasan Nusantara ARF see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Regional Forum Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI: Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), 251 arms, 2, 4, 25, 32, 132, 135, 136, 141–3, 146, 342 imports, 143, 146 sales, 135 smuggling, 132 ASA see Association of Southeast Asia asas tunggal (sole foundation), 75, 78 348

Index 349 ascent, Indonesia, 1–3, 7, 9–14, 22, 34, 69, 86, 87, 113, 123, 126, 168–9, 177–8, 195, 200, 210, 228–9, 273, 275–6, 277, 278, 289, 295, 297, 299, 322, 326, 336 ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia–Africa Conference, Bandung (1955), 12, 178, 179, 337 members, 189n10 AsiaBound program, 207 Asian century, 197 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), 10, 40, 44, 45, 69, 75, 76, 78, 80, 86, 99, 100 see also Global Financial Crisis; economic policy Asia-Pacific, 5, 156–9, 177, 228, 233, 274, 294–5, 344 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 156, 177, 199, 226, 228, 274, 276 ASL (archipelagic sea lane) see sea lanes Aspinall, Edward, 64n1, 126 Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals see Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI) Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), 1, 130, 198, 226, 245, 264 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter, 164, 258, 260, 269, 270, 271 Common Market, 40, 63 Community, 136, 161, 244, 247, 252, 260, 273 Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM), 144, 295 Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), 144, 295 High Level Task Force, 165 Informal Ministerial Meeting, 267–8 Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), 272, 273 Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 157–9, 271 Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships 246, 248, 250, 252, 254, 256, 258, 260, 262 Ministerial Meeting (AMM), 265–9, 342 original members, 279n12

partners, 3, 230 peacekeeping, 226, 233, 270, 278 Plus Three (APT), 276, 295, 341 post-ASEAN foreign policy, 14, 229, 287–90, 292, 295, 297, 299, 343 Regional Forum (ARF), 20, 137, 294–5, 325 regionalism, 14, 288, 290, 291, 297, 298, 299 -X principle, 271 AusAID, 207, 208 Australia–Indonesia relations bilateral relations, 3, 12, 138–9, 195–210 (Ch. 10), 201, 197–9, 202, 204, 207–8, 210, 225, 229–30, 235–6, 249–50 diplomacy, 209–10, 224, 227–8, 231–2, 236 education, 196, 206–7 extra-ASEAN, 228–9, 233, 234, 237, 275, 295, 296, 343 GDP rank, 2, 195, 225, 229 Group of Twenty, 191n32, 199, 225, 235 Indo-Pacific treaty proposal, 274 see also dynamic equilibrium konfrontasi, 26–8, 195, 196, 216n75 middle power, 2, 5, 13, 139, 224–36 (Ch. 11) military control, eastern Indonesia, 23 military relations, Indonesia, 198, 201, 294 military support (1948–9), 25, 195, 196 national identity, 196, 197, 200, 204, 215n70 Nixon Doctrine, assessment, 33 Papua, 197 parliamentary/political system, 117, 199, 212n27, 234–5 perception, 205, 216n74 proximity, Indonesia, 2, 134, 195, 309, 311, 319–20; see also crossroads; Wawasan Nusantara security ties, 1, 145, 197–9, 201, 202, 205–6, 236, 293 security threat to Indonesia, 196, 197–8, 200, 202–4, 208–9, 211n12, 214n51, 233, 238n31 strategic ambivalence, 236 Timor-Leste, 34, 205, 211n14, 318

350 Index Australia–Indonesia relations – continued undeveloped trade relations, 12–13, 196, 207–8 US relations, 13, 200, 211n6, 211n8, 233, 234, 315, 317 White Australia policy, 196, 204 see also ‘Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper’; bilateral relations, Indonesia; East Asia Summit; sea lanes; Suharto; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Australia Group, 140 ‘Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper’, 198, 206, 209, 275 Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC), 203 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DEFAT), 205, 206 Australian Signals Directorate, 203 Australiaphobia, 204 see also Australia–Indonesia relations: national identity authoritarianism ASEAN way, 229–30, 233 Australian perception, 197, 204, 231–2 Islam, 69, 86, 95 military, 101, 104, 106, 204, 339 post-authoritarian administrations, 11, 135, 141, 158,164, 166, 338–9 regimes, 7, 62, 83, 114, 134, 232 Suharto, 231 Sukarno (Guided Democracy), 197 Ayeyarwady Delta, Myanmar, 266 Badan Informasi Geospasial (BIG), 321 Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan (BNPP: National Agency for Border Management), 322 Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence: BPUPK), 71 Badan Permeriksa Keuangan (BPK: State Audit Agency), 114, 115 Bahasa Indonesia, 207, 245 Bakorkamla (Maritime Security Coordinating Board: Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut), 321

Bakrie, Aburizal, 120, 124 balancing (power) arms race, 4 Asian, 1, 133 change, 133, 342 domestic policy/external capital interference, 10, 23, 34, 315 Dutch, 89n38 great powers, 5, 341 ‘internal’, 136 Islam/politics, 157 see also nationalism: secular/religious tension middle powers, 7, 341 regional and global levels, 130, 135, 145, 274, 293–6, 318 rising military capacity, 4, 9 ‘soft’, 136, 300n6 superpowers, 4–5, 132, 135, 137, 145, 235, 257, 293–6 US pivot, 132, 137, 145, 235, 288 Vietnam, 255–7 see also bebas dan aktif; checks and balances; dynamic equilibrium; fiscal balance; relational power, c.f.; tawazun Bali, 9, 74, 77, 94, 103, 113, 137–9, 157, 159, 161, 181–3, 200, 201, 205, 230, 246, 258, 270, 273, 340 Bali bombings, 161, 201, 230 Bali Concord II, 258, 270 Bali Democracy Forum (2008), 138, 157, 159, 181, 340 Bali Principles, 137, 340 see also East Asian Summit (EAS) Ban Ki-moon (UN Secretary-General), 273 Bandoro, Bantarto, 169 Bandung, Java, 25, 178–80, 182, 183, 187, 226, 336 Bandung Principles, 179, 189n11 see also Asia–Africa Conference (1955) basic values see nilai-nilai dasar Baskoro, Edhie, 121, 124 Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’), 105 Batam, Riau Islands Province, Indonesia, 252 Batavia (capital, Dutch East Indies, now North Jakarta), 70 ‘bay’a’ (pledge of allegiance), 77 Bayuni, Endy, 165, 201

Index 351 BBK Batam, Bintan and Karimun (free trade zone), 252 BDF see Bali Democracy Forum bebas dan aktif (independent/free and active), 81, 82, 89n38, 178, 235, 293 see also dynamic equilibrium; foreign policy; million friends and zero enemies; Non-Aligned Movement Beijing, 27, 29, 33, 245, 256, 258, 266, 268, 269, 294 Belgrade Summit see Non-Aligned Movement belief in the indivisibility and oneness of God see tawhid benar membangun demokrasi (building a strong democracy), 81 BIG see Badan Informasi Geospasial, 321 bilateral defense relations, 196–204, 251 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Program, 198 Operation Pitch Black, 198 bilateral relations, Indonesia ASEAN, 3, 10, 13, 31, 146, 244–60 (Ch. 12), 294, 298 asylum seekers, 214n51 Australia, 3, 12, 138, 195–210, 225, 230–6, 294 Brunei, 144 China, 133, 138, 145–6, 233, 275, 294 cooperative organizations, replacement, 30 extradition agreements, 253–4 India, 138 Japan, 138 Malaysia, 13, 31, 137, 144, 245–50, 259, 320 Philippines, 31, 137, 276 power, 10, 260 Singapore, 13, 144, 250–4, 259 South Korea, 138 strategic autonomy, 130, 136, 294, 298 Thailand, 144 United States, 137, 138, 144, 145–6, 294 Vietnam, 13, 137, 254–9 bilateral strategic partnerships, 130, 136, 146 see also bilateral relations bin Laden, Osama, 77 BNPP see Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan

Boediono (Vice President, Indonesia, 2009–14), 164, 186, 214n51 Bogor Goals, 138, 177, 226 bombing, 77, 252 Borneo, 2, 26, 27, 28, 31, 249, 319, 340 Bosnia, 180 Boston Consulting Group, 335 boundary administration, 320–2 Bowo, Fauzi, 123 BPK see Badan Permeriksa Keuangan Badan BPUPK see Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia Brazil, 7, 15, 17n25, 142, 186, 335n141, 337 Bretton Woods, 5 BRIC, 230, 335 BRIICS, 289 Britain, 23, 25–8, 30, 31 see also United Kingdom British territories, 23, 26 Brown, Colin, 195 Brunei, 26, 27, 144, 250, 268, 269, 272, 273 Brunei Darussalam, 269, 272, 273 Buddhism, 165 Budi Utomo (Highest Endeavor: abangan Muslim organization), 70 building a strong democracy see benar membangun demokrasi bureaucracy, 100, 103, 158, 254 Bush, George W., 79, 80, 200, 234 Caliphate, 85, 95 Cambodia, 32, 41, 64, 112, 137, 255, 258, 259, 266–9, 287, 297, 342, 343 Cambodian crisis, 227 Cameron, David, 181, 273 Canberra, 34, 200, 201–5, 208, 209, 232, 235, 236 Cape York, 2 capital, financial, 5, 23, 48, 52, 58, 61, 73, 86, 124 capitalism, 73, 78, 80, 179 CARAT see Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training carbon emissions, 340 see also global warming cathartic violence, 93, 97–8, 104 Catholic Timorese, 77 Celebes (Sulawesi), 144

352 Index Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 179 Changi, 252 see also bilateral relations, Indonesia: Singapore charity for a return or protection see shadaqah Chavez, Hugo, 102 checks and balances see democratic institutions China see People’s Republic of China choke-points, 14, 308–9, 312–14, 324, 325 Christian churches, 131, 165 CINC see relational power approach: indices Civil Administration Law, 165 civil liberties, 83, 85, 114, 157, 165, 271 civil society, 43, 74, 76, 157, 158, 163, 164, 185, 199, 338, 339 civil society organization (CSO), 157, 163, 164, 185, 187, 199, 338 Clinton, Hillary, 275 CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam), 259 COC see Code of Conduct Code of Conduct (COC), 133, 258, 268, 269, 342 coercive power see power Cold War, 14, 15, 22–3, 73, 82, 134, 135, 177, 179, 181–3, 186, 226, 296 collective identity see identity Composite Index of National Capability see relational power approach: indices Communism, 24–5, 30, 95 Commuri, Gitika, 8 ‘Comprehensive National Power’ index see power relations: indices Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, US (2010), 142 Conference among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development, 160 Confrontation, 30, 70, 116, 183, 195, 245, 264 see also konfrontasi Confucianism, 165 Congo, 180 consensual hegemony, 8, 15, 19n52, 326, 335–45 (Ch. 16) constraint, 18n46, 230, 235, 264, 278, 326

see also balancing; beban das aktif; hedging consensus-building, 136, 268, 300n11, 337 see also ASEAN Constitution, Indonesia (1945) anti-corruption, 62–3 establishment, 197 foreign policy, 135, 146, 179, 291 Islamic Shari’a law, 69–72, 95, 165 non-alliance, 133–4 non-Communist, 251 peace, 135, 179, 226, 291 Preamble, 179, 291 reform, 11, 15, 113–18, 125, 157 secular, 69, 71–2, 165 taxation, 51 see also Constitutional Court; education; four pillars of the state; freedom of religion Constitutional Court, Indonesia, 115, 124 consultation, 83, 164, 202, 204, 257, 315 Convention on Nuclear Safety, 140 Cooper, Andrew Fenton, 7, 227 Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), 145 cooperative hegemony see consensual hegemony Coordinated Maritime Patrol, 198 Correlates of War, 4, 20, 21 corruption extradition, 253 institutional, 115, 118, 158, 166, 339 international image, endemic, 61–2, 102, 104, 108n38, 118, 166, 188, 278 Papua, 131 political, 99–100, 104–5, 121–2 regional expenditure, c.f., 50 Sharia, 78 stability threat, 2, 42–3, 105, 155, 166, 188, 208, 238n21 Suharto, 33, 100 158 TNI, 101 Widodo contra, 124 Yudhoyono, 166, 172n60 see also Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi; Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme

Index 353 Corruption Eradication Commission see Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi cost-of-living-index, 29 counterterrorism (CT), 98, 131, 137, 144, 145, 161, 201, 230, 246 coup d’etat, 28, 29, 74, 94, 95, 160, 255 Crescent and Star Party see Partai Bulan Bintang Cribb, Robert, 103 cronyism, 62, 79 see also corruption crossroads location, 11, 14, 133, 146, 309, 324 CSO see civil society organization CT see counterterrorism cyber-defense, 145 Cyclone Nargis, 266, 271, 275, 277, 342 DAK see Dana Alokasi Khusus Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK), 44, 45 Dana Alokasi Umum (General Fund Allocation: DAU), 44 Darmosumarto, Santo, 230 Darul Islam (House of Islam), 70, 72, 77, 93, 94 Darwin, Australia, 132, 202, 233 data processing centers (DPCs), 52 DAU see Dana Alokasi Umum DCA see Defense Cooperation Agreement decentralization, 41, 44, 46, 50, 53, 61–3, 96, 112, 114, 118, 130, 131, 158, 166, 339 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002 (DOC), 257–8, 268, 342 defense ASEAN, 30, 227, 257, 298 asymmetric maritime capabilities, 323 Australia, 145, 198, 201–8, 230–1 China, 275, 294, 342 classical-realist, 146 cooperative security, 11, 13, 33–5, 130, 136, 137, 138, 140, 144–6, 198, 201–8, 211n14, 213–14n41, 230, 244–8, 251–4, 257–8, 260, 270, 272, 275, 294, 308, 317, 325 defensive territorial doctrine, 27–8 government expenditure, 52–5, 149n52

industry, indigenous, 130, 136, 143, 145–6 Malaysia, 31 maritime, 322–7, 329n29, 342 modernization, 11, 32, 130, 136, 141–6, 330n41 munitions, external sources, 134, 137, 149n46, 149n52, 275 policy see defense policy self-reliance, 11, 31–2, 130, 149n52; see also Nixon Doctrine Singapore, 31, 134, 250–54 Suharto, 29, 31 see also consensual hegemony; defense policy; Lombok Treaty Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA: Singapore–Indonesia), 253–4 defense industrial base, 130, 143 defense policy, 133–6, 141–6, 336 classical-realist, 146 direction, 141–6 military/industrial modernization, 130, 136, 143 see also defense Defense White Paper, 202, 322 democracy, Indonesia ASEAN, 14, 157, 161–2, 165, 230, 233, 236–7, 259, 264, 270–71, 273, 278, 289, 340 Australia, 197, 199, 209–10, 211n12, 234, 236–7 changing democratic theory, causative, 42 consolidation, 62–4, 64n1, 104–5, 157, 199, 200, 259, 264, 272, 278, 339 decentralization, political, 41, 96, 130, 131, 158, 166 economy, 10, 11, 40, 42–4, 50, 63–4, 83–5, 99, 161, 167–8, 196, 343 electoral, 11, 77, 103, 116, 119–26, 130, 163, 166, 196 foreign policy see democratization: foreign policy Guided see Guided Democracy; Demokrasi Terpimpin; Partai Komunis Indonesia; Sukarno human rights, 14, 83, 136, 155, 157–8, 160–3, 165, 168, 200, 232, 258–9, 266, 271, 278, 292, 338, 340, 345n10

354 Index democracy, Indonesia – continued Islam, coexistence, 2, 11, 70, 72, 78, 80, 81, 83–7, 158–60, 165, 169, 188, 200, 292, 327n1, 336, 339 Islam, militancy, 94–5, 292, 339 military, 98, 101, 106 multi-party, 41, 62, 117, 125, 157, 199 perception/projected image, 1, 6–7, 158, 161–6, 168, 205, 275, 340 promotion, 136, 138–9, 155, 157–8, 160, 161, 163, 166, 168, 200, 340 reform, consequence, 8, 118, 125–6, 162, 197, 247, 266, 270 success, 7, 83–4, 112–17, 142, 158, 166, 168, 226, 229, 266, 272, 281n52, 345n10 third largest, 1–2, 158–60, 181, 188, 336, 338 threats, 3, 11, 40, 63, 64n1, 81, 83, 99, 102, 104, 106, 113, 118–19, 126, 146, 155, 165–7, 188, 211n12, 339 urbanization/large middle class, 40–1, 64n3 see also Bali Democracy Forum; benar membangun demokrasi; democratic governance; democratic identity; democratic institutions; democratic values; democratization; pancasila; Parliamentary, Democracy democratic governance, 84, 126, 139, 259, 272, 273 see also democracy; democratization democratic identity, 6, 12, 155–9, 160–9, 199, 201, 233, 270–1, 340 democratic institutions, 11, 126, 139, 155, 199, 162, 165, 199, 272, 339 checks and balances, 85, 157, 199 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK: North Korea), 135, 156 Democratic Party see Partai Demokrat democratic values, 6, 12, 14, 83, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 169, 183, 212n25, 340 democratization foreign policy, 155, 157–9, 164–9, 181, 196, 200, 212n25, 212n27, 231–6, 247, 259–60, 261n7, 264, 266, 270, 272–3, 275, 281n52, 289, 292, 293, 340, 343; see also

Non-Aligned Movement; strategic autonomy human rights, 259, 262n29, 266, 270–2 Islam, 85 reformasi, 266, 270 security, 270 see also democracy, Indonesia demokrasi (democracy), 10, 69, 70 Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy), 24–6, 70, 73 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia (DFAT), 208 dependency see great power dependence; path dependency Desker, Barry, 251, 271 despotism see istibdad Detachment, 88 see Kopassus Dewan Nasional (National Council), 73 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR: People’s Representative Council), 114–16, 122, 125, 157, 316 DFAT see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia DI see Darul Islam digital technology see technology Dinas Hidro-Oseanografi TNI-AL (Dishidros: Hydro-Oceanographic Office, Indonesian Navy), 321 Diplomacy, 7, 13, 32, 139, 147, 156–7, 167, 168, 169, 184, 198–200, 209, 224–8, 236, 237, 268–75, 289, 296–7, 308, 325, 342–4 disaster response, 145, 207 Dishidros see Dinas Hidro-Oseanografi TNI-AL disputed islands (South China Sea), 198, 311 Senkaku/Diaoyu, 133, 325 Sipadan and Ligitan, 247–8 Spratlys and Paracels, 257 Djalal, Hasyim, 311, 314 Djani, Dian Triansyah, 164 DOC see Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea Doi Moi (Renovation, 1986), 255 see also economic reform donation of land for charitable purposes see waqf Downer, Alexander, 234 DPCs see data processing centers, 52

Index 355 DPR see Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat drugs see narcotics and human trafficking Dutch, 22–7, 34, 70–2, 82, 97, 195, 197, 310, 311 colonialism, 22 dynamic equilibrium, 136, 146, 274, 278, 288, 293, 296, 341 definition, 136 see also foreign policy, Indonesia EAS see East Asian Summit East Asian Financial Crisis, 266 see also Asian Financial Crisis; Global Financial Crisis East Asian Summit, 137, 198, 235, 275, 294, 295, 296, 325, 340, 341 East China Sea, 133 East Java, 103 East Timor see Timor-Leste East–West ASLs see sea lanes economic development, 7, 10, 24, 28, 30–3, 62, 69, 75, 81, 83, 85, 130–5, 185, 244, 255, 310, 338 economic globalization, 11, 82, 84, 86 Economic Master Plan see economic policy economic inequality, 42–5, 60, 94, 98, 102, 167–8 economic nationalism, 59, 74, 100, 102, 208, 310 economic policy, 8–10, 26, 29, 41–4, 50, 60, 105 Economic Master Plan, 60 macroeconomic policy, 42–3 wicked problems, 44 see also development; economic reconstruction; economic reform economic reconstruction, 23–4, 29–30 economic reform see reform: economic economic trajectory, 9, 15 see also ascent education Australian Asian language education, insufficient, 196, 206–7, 209–10 bilateral relations, 246, 253 capacity development, 10, 40, 43, 55, 58, 60–1, 63, 65n17, 118, 182, 265 constitutional budgeting, 45 expenditure, 45, 50, 52–5, 58 human capital, 43, 45–6, 60–1

Islam, 75, 102 military, 144, 294 nationalism, 103–4 Peacekeeping Mission Education and Training Facility, 182, 345n5 power, indicator, 3 technology, 41 see also Technical and Vocational Education and Training EEZ see exclusive economic zone Egypt, 7, 40, 157, 160, 163, 179 Election Commission, Indonesia, 169 Elson, R. E., 158 emerging power, 12, 14, 335–45 Emmerson, Donald K., 158, 168 environmental security expenditure, 53–5 haze problem, 249–50, 254, 340 illegal logging, 132 foreign relations, 249–50, 274, 292 political issue, 96, 118, 200, 249–50, 274, 340 protection, 58, 118, 182, 258, 340 sustainability, 60, 156, 314, 321, 340 see also environment equity, 83, 138, 167, 181, 183, 210, 248 see also economic inequality Ethiopia, 179 ethnicity Balinese, 74 Chinese, 74, 251, 276, 339 demographic, 103 diversity, 103, 131, 133–4, 210 ethnic cleansing, 81 Javanese, 103 Malay, 26, 250 security, 93, 98, 103, 131, 133–4, 210, 276 Sudanese, 103 see also ethnic and religious minority; killing: genocide ethnic Chinese see ethnicity ethnically Malay people see ethnicity exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 145, 257, 280n33, 314, 320, 322, 323, 329n31, 342 Exercise Pitch Black see bilateral defense relations external debt, 29, 56–7 extradition agreements see bilateral relations

356 Index falsafah (philosophy), 82 fatwa (decree), 79 Federation of Malaysia see Malaysia Fels, Enrico, 6 first among equals see primus inter pares fiscal/trade balances, 49, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 187 fiscal policy, 10, 32, 42–4, 49–52, 55–64, 301n25 fishery management, 137, 138 five dimensions see power: analysis ‘Rugged Society’, five principles, Singapore see Singapore food security, 10, 59, 63, 64n3, 139, 156, 327 Ford, Gerald, 34 foreign aid, non-military American, 23, 26, 28–30 Australian, 207, 210, 216n84 Chinese, 343 government space, 60 international, 41, 266–8 Myanmar (Cyclone Nargis), 342 Soviet, 25 see also military aid foreign investment, 33, 63, 73, 155, 291 foreign policy, Indonesia activism, 13, 200, 224, 226, 276, 336, 343 Constitution, 135, 146, 179, 291 democracy, effect, 155, 157–9, 164–9, 181, 196, 200, 212n25, 212n27, 231–6, 247, 259–60, 261n7, 264, 266, 270, 272–3, 275, 281n52, 289, 292, 293, 340, 343 Law No. 17/2007, Indonesia, 135 peace, 12, 135–6, 139–40, 146, 155–6, 179–82, 183, 185–6, 189n11, 245, 289, 342 World Maritime Axis Doctrine, 343–4 see also Association of South East Asian , Nations; balancing (power); bebas dan aktif; bilateral relations, Indonesia; consensual hegemony; dynamic equilibrium; hedging; million friends and zero enemies; Nixon , Doctrine; NonAligned Movement four pillars of the state, 94 see also Constitution; Pancasila; Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI: Negara

Kesatuan Republic Indonesia); Unity in Diversity FPI see Front Pembela Islam fragility see state fragility freedom of religion see freedom free market, 10, 42 free trade, 135, 138, 177, 208, 252 see also Bogor Goals free trade zone see Batam, Bintan and Karimun freedom assembly and organization, 157 expression, 63, 85, 165, 199–200 fiscal, 43 from coercion, 4 from corruption, 108n38 navigation, 312–13, 316 religion, 165, 339 see also bebas dan aktif; Freedom House; free trade; hurriyyah; kebebasan; strategic autonomy; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Freedom House, 99, 271 see also human rights freedom of expression see freedom Front Pembela Islam (FPI: Islamic Defense Front), 77, 79, 80 fuel subsidy, 58, 59, 60, 187 reform, 58 future trajectory see ascent G-20 see Group of Twenty GAM see Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Garuda contingents see UN Peacekeeping Gas, 16n21, 213n37, 248, 265, 325–6, 342 see also coal; natural resources; oil; palm oil GBC see General Border Committee GDP see Gross Domestic Product General Border Committee (GBC), 246 Geospatial Information Agency, 321 geostrategic location see crossroads location Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM: Aceh Liberation Movement), 96 Gerindra see Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya Gillard, Julia, 200, 202

Index 357 Gilley, Bruce, 5, 7, 9 Gilpin, Robert, 3, 16n17 Gini coefficient, Indonesia, 45, 87 Global Financial Crisis (2008), 49, 81, 86, 335 see also Asian Financial Crisis global governance, 178, 184, 188 globalism, 79, 82, 87, 273 Global South, 83 Global War on Terror, 79, 87 global warming, 62 Gold Coast, West Africa, 179 see also Asia–Africa Conference golongan Islam (Islamic group), 71 golongan nasional (national group), 71 goods and services tax (GST), 52 Google Public Data ‘Power Index’ see relational power: indices great powers ASEAN, 235, 255–6, 260, 276, 288–9, 295–7, 299 definition, 4–5, 7–9 competition, SE Asia, 1, 130, 135, 137, 198, 201, 295 Indonesia, ascent towards great power status, 69 Indonesia, freedom from interference, 137 Indonesia, relations, 9–10, 14, 135, 137–41, 146, 185–6, 235, 255–6, 260, 274, 276, 288, 293–7, 299, 312, 337, 341–3 list of great powers, 17n25 maritime security, 312 middle powers, relevance, 7, 228–9 open regionalism, 341 transition, 8 see also dynamic equilibrium; great power dependence; People’s Republic of China: great power; relational power approach; United Nations Security Council great power dependence, 10, 34–5 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 71 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2, 3, 46–62, 113, 142, 195, 229, 273 GDP Indonesia, 2000 to 2012, 46 Real GDP, 2, 46, 47 Group of Four, 186

Group of Twenty (G-20) ASEAN, relevance, 12, 14, 224, 235, 273, 274, 276–8, 287, 289 Australia–Indonesia relations, 191n32, 198–9, 225, 235 compliance, 187 economic governance, 81, 86, 161, 177–8, 184–5, 187, 338 establishment, 184 global leadership, 139, 156–7, 161, 167, 178, 224, 273–4, 276–7, 289, 326, 336, 337 global multilateral framework, 136 image, international, 112–13 MIKTA, 139 national interests, 12, 136, 188, 278, 336 People’s Republic of China, 184, 191n32 policy, 63–4, 81, 167, 177–9, 185, 187–8, 336, 338 see also middle power GST see goods and services tax Guardian, the, 203 Guided Democracy, 24–6, 70, 73, 74, 95, 197 see also Democracy; Demokrasi Terpimpin Gulf of Aden, 326 Gunn, Geoffrey C., 159, 166 Gus Dur see Wahid, Abdurrahman Habibie, B. J., 76–8, 103, 109n52, 114, 278, 338 Hadi, Umar, 270 Hague, 23–5, 269 Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), 76, 102 Hanoi, 29, 255, 256, 266 Harsono, Andreas, 165, 166 Hatta, Muhammad, 71–2, 75, 81, 89n38, 124, 179, 188, 291, 293 Hayes, Jarrod, 158 Haz, Hamzah, 78, 79 haze problem see environmental security health sector, 10, 44, 52–5, 58, 60, 63, 118, 207, 254, 265 hedging, 1, 9, 14, 198, 288, 293, 297, 299, 343 see also balancing; foreign policy, Indonesia; Non-Aligned Movement

358 Index He, Kai, 232 Heng, Pek Koon, 269 Henry, Kenneth, 275 Heryawan, Ahmad, 122 Higgott, Richard A., 7 Highest Endeavour see Budi Utomo Hikmahanto, Juwana, 169, 213n30 Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI: Islamic Students’ Organization), 75 Hinduism, 165 history see sejarah Holdridge, John H., 32 Holland see Dutch; Dutch colonialism; Netherlands; Netherlands East Indies holy war see jihad homeland see anah-air Hor Namhong (Foreign Minister), 268 House of Islam see Darul Islam human capital, 40, 45–6, 50, 60, 70 human rights, Indonesia abuse, 101, 106, 213–14n41, 249, 271, 294 ASEAN, 161–2, 165, 258–9, 266, 270–1, 278 Australia, 232 civil, 43, 62–3, 83, 104–5, 136 correctional system, 132 democratic values, 83, 104, 155, 157–8, 161–3, 168–9, 200, 266, 270–1, 278, 338, 340, 345n10 labor, 96 leadership, 3, 14, 96 Malaysia, 248 military, 101, 106 Myanmar, 157, 278 Papua, 131, 165, 197 Palestine, 156, 157 pemenuhan hak-hak asasi manusia, 83 political, 83, 85, 104–5, 155, 259, 271 religion, 77, 102, 292 social welfare, 43, 131 women and children, 182, 271 see also ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR); Bandung Principles; United Nations Human Rights Council human trafficking see narcotics and human trafficking

Hurrell, Andrew, 8, 9, 15, 187, 188, 336, 337, 341 hurriyyah (freedom), 82 Hydro-Oceanographic Office see Dinas Hidro-Oseanografi TNI-AL IAEA see International Atomic Energy Agency IAMM see Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Informal Ministerial Meeting ICJ see International Court of Justice ICMI see Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim seIndonesia ICWA see Indonesian Council on World Affairs identity ASEAN, 244, 255–60, 271, 277–8, 341 collective, 17–18n40, 204 (contra), 215n70 democratic see democratic identity human rights, 3 Islamic, 69, 76, 80, 82 national, 76, 81, 85, 106n2, 119–20, 134, 197, 199, 232, 244, 270, 309–10, 343 religion, 3, 97 relative, 18 social, 204 social identity theory, 6 see also Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelago Outlook) IEG see Intelligence Exchange Group Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI): (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), 75, 76 illegal logging see environmental security IMB see International Maritime Bureau IMET see International Military Education and Training program IMF see International Monetary Fund IMO see International Maritime Organization INASOC see Indonesia SEA Games Organizing Committee Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), 138, 290, 343 Indonesia see specific terms Indonesia Aerospace Industry, 143 Indonesia Country Strategy, 205

Index 359 Indonesian Archipelago, 1, 2, 14, 41, 44, 45, 62–3, 70, 71, 84, 97–8, 103, 114, 130, 134, 231, 265, 295, 308–13, 322–7 see also Wawasan Nusantara Indonesia in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), 290 Indonesian Chinese see ethnicity Indonesian Communist Party see Partai Komunis Indonesia Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), 179 Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle see Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 157 Indonesian Islamic Party see Partai Islam Indonesia Indonesian National Armed Forces see Tentara Nasional Indonesia Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut: TNI-AL), 144, 315, 321, 323, 326 Indonesia Peace and Security Center, West Java, 182 Indonesia SEA Games Organizing Committee (INSOC), 249 inequality see economic inequality infaq (charity without expectation of return), 82, 131 see also zakat Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting see Association of Southeast Asian Nations institutionalization, 117, 209, 337 Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG), 246 internal waters, 312, 324 see also Wawasan Nusantara International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 139, 140 International Court of Justice, 247, 248, 267, 268, 298 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 163 international institutions, 12, 81, 177, 179, 180, 183, 184, 187, 188 internationalism, 233, 298 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 246 International Maritime Organization (IMO), 313, 315

International Military Education and Training program (IMET), 144, 294 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 29, 42, 59, 187, 337 international navigation, 314, 315, 317 see also sea lanes international relations scholarship (IR), 3, 5, 226, 228 international security, 11, 130, 336 intolerance, 2, 69, 101, 102, 118, 165, 166, 278, 339 Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Relationships see Association of Southeast Asian Nations inward-facing, 327 see also Wawasan Nusantara IORA see Indian Ocean Rim of Association IOR-ARC see Indonesia in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation IPSC see Indonesia Peace and Security Center IR see international relations scholarship Iran, 7, 135, 140, 178, 180, 200 Iraq, 4, 79, 81, 87, 200 Iskan, Dahlan (state enterprises minister, Ind.), 124 Iskandar, Muhaimin, 121 Islam authoritarianism, 69, 86, 95 democracy, coexistence, 2, 11, 70, 72, 78, 80, 81, 83–7, 158–60, 165, 169, 188, 200, 292, 327n1, 336, 339 education, 75, 102 identity, 69, 76, 80, 82, 85, 120, 158 largest nation/Muslim majority, Indonesia, 1–2, 69, 79, 83, 85, 158–61, 163, 169, 181, 184, 188, 200, 289, 292, 327n1, 336 norms, 82–3 peace, 72–3, 82–6, 159–60 reform, 10, 70, 77, 69 Shari’a law, 69–72, 95, 165 see also Islamic ethics; Islamic extremism; Islamic organizations; Islamist groups; Majelis Ulama Indonesian; Muslim; Shia Islam; Sunni Islam; violence: Islamist extremism

360 Index Islamic brotherhood see ukhuwwah Islamiyah Islamic Commercial Union see Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah Islamic Defense Front see Front Pe˘mbela Islam Islamic ethics, 11, 69–71, 78–86 Islamic extremism, 93, 95, 204 see also violence: Islamist extremism Islamic organizations, 10, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 199 Islamic revival, 70, 76 Islamic Scholars/Leaders Council see Majelis Ulama Indonesian Islamic Union see Sarekat Islam Islamist groups, 76, 77, 79, 122, 131, 165, 292, 339 see also Islamic organizations; violence: Islamist extremism islands, 2, 23–5, 63, 76, 87, 103, 134, 247, 265, 298, 310–13, 324–5 see also disputed islands; Wawasan Nusantara Israel, 7, 160, 178, 234 istibdad (despotism), 72

jahiliyya (the age of ignorance), 77 Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), 201 Jakarta Post, 165, 205 Japanese occupation see Japan Japanese surrender see Japan Japan, 5, 17n25, 22–4, 133, 138, 186, 189n10, 191n32, 198, 209, 212n23, 229, 247, 274, 291, 293–5, 309, 341, 343 economy, 23–4, 33, 51 occupation, 22, 71, 72 surrender, 23 see also disputed islands; Group of Four; Masjumi; middle power Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL: Liberal Islamic Network), 80 Java, 23, 24, 25, 71, 72, 74, 77, 103, 121–3, 125, 182, 310, 311, 313, 314, 316, 319 Java Sea, 311, 313, 316 JBC see Joint Border Committee JCET see Joint/Combined Exchange Training

JCLEC see Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 77, 79, 80, 87, 161 Jenkins, David, 196 JI see Jemaah Islamiyah jihad (holy war), 69, 71, 76, 79 JIL see Jaringan Islam Liberal jiwa dan semangat (soul and spirit), 82 Johnson, Lyndon B., 28 Johnson Sirleaf, Ellen, 181, 273 Joint Border Committee (JBC), 245 Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET), 144 Jokowi see Widodo, Joko justice, 44, 79–80, 82, 95, 106, 158, 179, 201 see also adalah; adalah Ijtimaya Kalimantan, 74, 249, 313, 314, 340 Kalla, Jusuf, 80, 120, 124 Kampuchean conflict, 180, 256 see also United Nations peacekeeping; Vietnam Karim, Mochammad Faisal, 160, 163 Kartosuwiryo, Sekarmadji Maridjan, 94 keamanan dan ketertiban (security and order), 76 Keating, Paul, 210, 231, 236 kebebasan (freedom), 83 kebenaran atas pilihan rakyat kami (the truth that is the choice of people), 83 Kemlu (Indonesian Foreign Ministry), 199, 292 Kennedy, John F., 25, 26, 28 kepentingan nasional (national interests), 82 ketahanan nasional (national resilience), 298 Kiemas, Taufik (Chairman of the Peoples Representative Consultative Assembly, MPR), 106n5, 119, 123 killing, 28–9, 77, 202, 337 genocide, 74, 81 KISDI see Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam Kissinger, Henry, 32, 34 KKN see Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme knowledge economy, 45–6, 61, 143, 253 Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI: Supreme Operations Command, Indonesia), 28

Index 361 Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK: Corruption Eradication Commission, Indonesia), 101, 106, 115 Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI: Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World), 76 konfrontasi (confrontation), 205, 245, 264, 265, 276 concluded (August 1966), 29 Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus: Special Forces Command, Indonesia), 201, 213n41, 275 Detachment, 88 201 Koran, 78, 95, 101 Korea South see Republic of Korea (ROK) North see Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (KKN: Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism), 80, 86 KOTI see Komando Operasi Tertinggi KPK see Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Krushchev, Nikita, 25 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 245, 248 see also Malaysia Kuantan doctrine (March, 1980), 256, 266 see also bilateral relations, Indonesia: Malaysia Kuwait, 180 Laos, 137, 255, 269, 290, 342, 343 largest majority Muslim nation see Muslim large tax payer unit (LTU), 52 Law of the Sea, 308–27 (Ch. 15) Law of the Sea Convention see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Lebanon, 140, 180 Ledang District, Johor, Malaysia, 249 Lee, Hsien Loong, 254 Leifer, Michael, 290, 292, 303n52, 304n74 Liberal Islamic Network see Jaringan Islam Liberal Liberia, 179, 181, 273 Libya, 179 Linz, Juan, 117

Local Tax see Pajak Daerah Lombok, 14, 198, 308 Lombok Treaty, 198 Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll, 163 LTU see large tax payer unit Luttwak, Edward N., 236 macroeconomic policy see economic policy Madiun uprising see Papua Majapahit Empire (Java), 310 Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI: Mujahideen Council of Indonesia), 77 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakya – Republik Indonesia (MPR-RI: People’s Consultative Assembly), 116 Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), 71 Majelis Ulama Indonesian (MUI: (Islamic Scholars/Leaders Council), 75, 76, 79, 102 Makassar, South Sulawesi, 323 Makassar Straits, 14, 308 Malacca, 14, 144, 245, 246, 247, 249, 252, 308, 319 Malacca Strait Patrols/Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSP/MSSP), 144, 246 Malaya, 24, 26, 27, 134, 245 Malaysia ASEAN, 30–1, 244, 250, 254–5, 266, 268, 277, 298, 341 Annual Consultation, 246 bilateral relations, Indonesia, 13, 31, 137, 144, 245–50, 259, 320 border agreement, 257, 259 creation/Indonesian opposition, 24–9 Federation, 26, 27, 245 land border, Indonesia, 2 Malay ethnicity/culture, 26, 245, 250–1 maritime claims, 268, 298, 318–20, 329n34–7 military, 31, 144, 250 Philippines, 31, 265 relations, Indonesia, 24–31, 245–50, 257, 259 religion, 276 security relations, 249–50, 266 trade, Indonesia, 246–7, 250, 256

362 Index Malaysia – continued United States, 137 see also anti-Malaysian; Konfontasi; Kuantan Doctrine; Malaya; Sukarno: Malaysia; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Mallarangeng, Andi, 121 Maluku, 96 see also separatism mandala concept of suzerainty (concentric circles), 310 see also Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelago Outlook) manufacturing, 29, 40, 41, 60, 85, 143–4 Maoist policies see Communism Maphilindo (Greater Malayan Confederation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia), 245 maritime boundaries, 248, 252, 312, 318, 319, 320, 321 maritime choke-points, 14, 308, 309 maritime corridors see sea lanes maritime power, 309, 312, 324, 326 see also sea lanes Maritime Safety Commission (MSC-67: 67th meeting, 1996), 315 maritime security, 14, 132, 144, 145, 247, 308, 309, 316, 322, 323, 325 maritime zone, 202, 248, 317 Masjumi Party (Partai Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia: Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations), 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 82, 122 Master Plan for Planning, Extension and Accelerating Economic Development (MP3EI), 185, 338 Matta, Anis, 122 McCloud, Donald, 298 McKinsey Report, 326, 335 see also economic trajectory mediation, 135, 264, 265, 273, 342 Mediterranean Sea, 326 MEF see minimum essential force Megawati, Sukarnoputri, 78, 79, 116, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 278 mekarnya (flowering), 83 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 201, 253, 319 Mendayung di antara Dua Karang see Rowing between Two Reefs), 81, 179 see also strategic autonomy

Menzies, Robert, 196 Mexico, 7, 139, 185, 338 middle class, 41, 47, 52, 61, 168, 195, 229, 335 Middle East, 30, 47, 73, 95, 157, 159, 325, 326 middle power, 1–8, 13, 138, 139, 188, 224–37, 293, 297, 343 Mietzner, Marcus, 64n1, 106n4, 122 migration, irregular, 103, 200–3 illegal Indonesian workers, 249 securitization, 203 MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Australia: middle power countries), 139 military aid, 25, 31–3, 141, 198, 201, 230 Singapore, PRRI-Permesta revolts, 250 see also Guam doctrine military capabilities, 4, 5, 9, 130, 140, 141, 145, 325, 336 military sealift command, 324 military-to-military ties, 135, 144–7 Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 182 million friends and zero enemies, 136, 244, 343 see also foreign policy, Indonesia minimum essential force (MEF) minimum essential force, 141, 142, 323 Ministry of Finance, Indonesia, 60 Ministry of Internal Affairs, Indonesia, 61 Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Indonesia, 132 see also human rights Ministry of Religious Affairs, Indonesia (MORA), 72, 75 MMI see Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia moderation see tawassuth Mohamad, Mahathir, 244, 346n17–18 Moluccas, 25, 131 MORA see Ministry of Religious Affairs Moriarty, Greg, 208 Morsi, Mohamed, 160 MoU see Memorandum of Understanding MP3EI see Master Plan for Planning, Extension and Accelerating Economic Development

Index 363 MPR-RI see Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—Republik Indonesia MSP see Malacca Strait Patrols Muar, Johor (Malaysia), 249 Muhammadiyah, 71, 74–6, 78, 80, 199 MUI see Majelis Ulama Indonesian multilateral solutions, 7, 227 see also middle power Mulyana, Yayan, 268 Mulyani, Sri, 167 musawah (equity), 83 Muslim see Islam Muslim Brotherhood, 122 Muslim society, 86, 87 Myanmar, 41, 64, 137, 157, 160, 255, 266–9, 272, 275, 278, 290, 340, 342 junta, 266 Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival/Awakening of Religious Scholars), 71, 74–8, 80, 82, 121, 199 Najib (Mohammad Najib Abdul Razak), 250 NAM see Non-Aligned Movement NAM Summit see Non-Aligned Movement narcotics and human trafficking, 2, 131–2 narrative, nationalist, 177–8, 187, 310 see also bebas dan aktif; foreign policy Nasdem, 119, 120 Natalegawa, Mohammad Marty Muliana activist foreign policy, 156–60, 296 ASEAN policy, 273–4 Australia, 202, 203, 208, 224 democracy abroad, 156–69 expansive regional delineation, 274, 289–90 maritime boundary demarcation, 256–7, 268, 296, 342 Natalegawa Doctrine see dynamic equilibrium peaceful management of strategic change, 138 United Nations Security Council, 181–3 see also democratization: foreign policy; haze problem; Preah Vihear Temple dispute National Agency for Border Management see Badan Nasional Pengelolaan Perbatasan

national brotherhood see ukhuwah wathaniyah National Council see Dewan Nasional National Food Logistics Agency, Indonesia, 78 see also Wahid, Abdurrahman national group see golongan nasional national identity, 76, 197, 309, 343 see also nationalism national interests, 13, 15, 24, 28, 33, 82, 136, 155–69 (Ch. 8), 203, 212n27, 225, 232–4, 239n36, 288, 297, 316–17, 325 see also kepentingan nasional nationalism economic, 59, 74, 100–2, 208, 310 education system, 103 independence, 22–4, 26 insular, 197 legacy, dutch colonialism, 22, 26, 34, 336–7 modernization, threat, 94 pluralist, 123 power, intangible source, 7, 9, 16n20 robust, 34, 74, 103, 125, 200, 277, 300n16, 325 secular/religious tension, 293 ultranationalism, 125 see also internationalism; relational power National Mandate Party see Partai Amanat Nasional national resilience see ketahanan nasional National Security Council (NSC), 32, 108n31 national stability see stabilitas nasional Natsir, Mohammad, 71–5, 78 Natuna gas field, 342 Natuna Islands, 145 Natuna Sea, 323 natural disaster, 134, 266 natural resources, 2, 25, 26, 132, 133, 208, 247, 265, 326, 344 see also coal; oil; palm oil Nazaruddin, Muhammad, 121 NEFOS see New Emerging Forces Nehru, Jawaharlal, 190n26 Nehru, Vikram, 166 Netherlands, 22, 26, 33, 142, 229 see also Dutch; Dutch colonialism; Netherlands East Indies

364 Index Netherlands East Indies, 22, 23, 24, 96, 311 New Asia Africa Strategic Partnership, 160 New Emerging Forces (NEFOS), 337 New International Economic Order, 337 New Order see Orde Baru Nguyen, Tan Dung, 256 Nigeria, 7 nilai-nilai dasar (basic values), 82 nine-dashed line, 145, 275–6, 342 Nixon, Richard, 31–3 Nixon Doctrine, 31–3 NKRI see Unitary Republic of Indonesia Nolte, Detlef, 8 non-aligned see Non-Aligned Movement Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 12, 25, 30, 33, 83, 134, 136, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182–8, 196, 226, 276, 289, 336, 337 Belgrade Summit, 182 founding, 182 norms ASEAN, 3, 233, 255, 258–9, 262n28 264, 269–71, 274–5, 337, 341 see also consensus-building change, 15 definition, 281n40 democratic, 101, 158, 233 domestic developments, 9, 15 environmental sustainability, 340 global order, 9, 258 human rights, 158, 258 Islam, 82–3 regional leadership, 1, 3, 137, 258–9, 270 see also identity: social identity theory; soft power North Korea see Democratic People’s Republic of Korea northern Sulawesi, 25 northern Sumatra, 25 North–South dialogue, 183, 186 North–South sea lanes see sea lanes Nossal, Kim, 7 NPT see Nuclear Proliferation Treaty NU see Nahdlatul Ulama Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 139, 140 nuclear safety, 336 Nuclear Suppliers Group, 140 Nye, Joseph, 6 see also soft power

ODA see overseas development assistance OIC see Organization of Islamic Cooperation/Organization of the Islamic Conference oil, 33, 51, 57, 59, 118, 246, 247, 248, 251, 265, 325, 326, 340 oil embargo, 33 see also natural resources One Nation party, Australia, 200 see also xenophobia Onn, Hussein bin Dato’, 256 Orde Baru (New Order: 1966–98) centralizing, 96 collapse, 8, 44, 62, 114, 157, 264, 266, 270 corruption, 108n44, 126 see also Suharto economic nationalism, contra, 102 Islamic political groups, suppression, 93–5 goals, 75 history, 29–34 political change post-, 117, 126, 157–9, 166, 195, 197; see also reformasi political culture of Islam, 70, 74–8, 86, 93–5 violence, 74 see also Aceh; authoritarianism: military; Suharto Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 75, 160, 276 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 84, 85, 90n52, 135 overseas development assistance (ODA), 57–8, 207 Pacific Islands, 138 Pajak Daerah (local tax), 51 Pakistan Institute of World Affairs, 73 Palestine, 156, 157, 160, 178, 186 palm oil plantations, 59, 251, 326, 340 Paloh, Surya Dharma, 119, 124 PAN see Partai Amanat Nasional Pangestu, Mari, 167 Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence), 72 Papua see Papua New Guinea; West Papua

Index 365 Papua New Guinea (PNG), 2, 202, 318–19 see also Papua New Guinea; West Papua parliamentary democracy period (1950–57), 70–3, 82 Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN: National Mandate Party), 78, 80, 120–2, 199 Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB: Crescent and Star Party), 199 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP: Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle), 78, 79, 80, 119–25, 199 Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party: PD), 199 Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra: Great Indonesia Movement Party), 119, 120, 199 Partai Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party), 71 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS: Prosperous Justice Party), 80, 120, 121, 122, 199 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party: PKB), 78, 80, 120, 121, 122, 199 Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party: PKI), 24–9, 70, 71, 73, 74, 94, 95, 97, 245 Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party: PNI), 71, 73, 74 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party: PPP), 2, 75, 78, 79, 80, 120, 195, 199 path dependency, 10, 233 PBB see Partai Bulan Bintang PD see Partai Demokrat PDIP see Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan peace Aceh, 93, 104, 339 ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, 272 dispute resolution mechanisms, 63, 136, 146, 159–60, 189n11, 270, 295 foreign policy, Indonesia, 12, 135–6, 139–40, 146, 155–6, 179–82, 183, 185–6, 189n11, 245, 289, 342 freedom from coercion, 4

Islam, 72–3, 82–6, 159–60 management, democratic, 7, 99, 105–6, 112–13, 159–60, 179 middle powers, 7, 12, 211n6, 229 regional, 93, 131, 135–8, 145, 146, 156, 159–60, 245, 247, 260, 269–70, 274, 291, 293 settlement, 25–6, 247, 274, 339 warm peace, 186 see also bebas dan aktif; Non-Aligned Movement; Nuclear Proliferation Treaty; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality; United Nations peacekeeping pembangunan (development), 69, 70, 81, 120 pembangunan ekonomi (economic development), 69, 70, 81 pemenuhan hak-hak asasi manusia (fulfilment of human rights), 83 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI: Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), 74, 250 People’s Representative Council see Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat People’s Republic of China (PRC) ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 137, 276, 341, 342–3 Australia, 209, 213n39, 233, 275 balance, US, 1, 5, 113, 132–3, 137, 145, 256, 274, 276, 283n81, 288, 293, 309, 325–6, 336, 343 great power, 17, 25, 113, 145, 198, 224, 342, 343 Group of Twenty, 184, 191n32 Indonesia, foreign investment, 63, 100, 343 Indonesia, relations, 30, 135, 200, 245, 275, 294, 342–4 Indonesia, trade, 40–1, 63, 142, 144, 275, 291, 293, 326 internal instability, 15, 135, 245 international influence, 224 Malaysia, 245 maritime claims see disputed islands power as resources ranking, 5 regional power, 5, 7, 15, 132–7, 145 rise, 18n46, 41, 113, 130, 132, 135, 137, 145, 155, 293, 296, 309, 299, 325–6, 336

366 Index People’s Republic of China (PRC) – continued Russia, 5, 15n21, 73, 198 Singapore, 27, 31 territorial size, 2 urbanization, 47 Vietnam, 256–7, 268, 269 see also United Nations Security Council Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Hague, 269 Philippines ASEAN, 30–2, 229, 234, 254–5, 259, 277, 341–2 Indonesia, 2, 31, 50, 137, 180, 245, 249, 276, 318–19, 329n31, 336 Malaysia, 31, 265 maritime claims, 268–9, 275, 280n33 maritime security cooperation, 144 overseas labor, 47 United States, relations, 137 see also Asia–Africa Conference; Maphilindo philosophy, 74, 82, 179, 266 see also falsafah Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 272, 288, 296, 297 Phnom Penh fiasco, 297 pilgrimage to Mecca see Hajj piracy, 2, 132, 247, 252, 322–6 PKB see Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa PKI see Partai Komunis Indonesia PKS see Partai Keadilan Sejahtera plebiscite, 33, 97 see also West Papua; separatism pledge of allegiance, 77 PNI see Partai Nasional Indonesia policy paralysis, 11, 118 see also reform: stalled political shocks see terjadi guncangan politik political values, 6, 7, 12, 155, 161, 162, 199, 212n25, 276–7, 340 Port Klang, Malaysia, 249 Portuguese Timor, 33, 34 see also Timor-Leste posisi silang (crossroads location), 309 see also crossroads location Poso, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 98 Post-2015 Development Agenda, 139, 182 post-ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations

post-ASEAN foreign policy see Association of Southeast Asian Nations post-Suharto see Suharto postwar history, 10, 34 power analysis, five dimensions, 5–6 coercive, 4, 6, 7, 71 decentralization, 112, 114 Muslim patronage, 102 resources or capabilities, 5–6 structural power approach, 5 see also balance of power; dynamic equilibrium; great powers; middle power; superpowers PPP see Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Pranowo, Ganjar, 125 PRC See People’s Republic of China Preah Vihear Temple dispute, 267, 277, 297, 342 ceasefire agreement, 267 primus inter pares (first among equals), 244, 264, 265, 290, 341 principles see prinsip-prinsip prinsip-prinsip (principles), 82 Proliferation Security Initiative, 140 promotion of democracy see democracy Prosperous Justice Party see Partai Keadilan Sejahtera PRRI see Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia PRRI-Permesta revolts (1950s), 250 PT DI (PT. Dirgantara Indonesia: Indonesia Aerospace Industry), 143 PT PAL (PT. Penataran Angkatan Laut: Navy Upgrading Industry), 143 PT PINDAD (government-owned defense manufacturer) 144 Puan Maharani, 122–4 public services, 10, 43, 52, 53, 54, 61, 62, 63, 131 Puspitawati, D., 315, 328n21 Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 29 Quran see Koran Rahman, Tunku Abdul (First Prime minister, Malaya), 26 Rahmatan lil Alamin (blessings to all that exists), 82

Index 367 Rakernas (national work meeting), 123 Razak see Najib realism, 19n52 see also realist realist, 3–5 realpolitik, 73, 81, 231 reform ASEAN, 161–2, 255, 266, 272 constitution, 11, 113, 115 correctional services, 132 economic, 8, 10, 29, 41, 59, 74, 130, 235, 255; see also economic nationalism; economic policy electoral, 11, 80, 10, 112, 114, 130 fuel subsidy, 57–9 governance, 59, 61–3, 69–70, 80, 81, 86, 106, 112–16, 126, 130, 155, 157, 266, 339 institutional, 12, 52, 86, 99–101, 112–16, 125–6, 132, 338 judiciary, 60, 112, 115, 157, 339 Islamic organizations, 10, 70, 77, 69 labor, 60, 80, 104 military/police, 99, 101, 141, 155, 157, 160, 272, 339 policy, 11, 63 political values/norms, 12, 69, 70, 270 regulatory, 59, 60 stalled, 11, 118–19, 229, 232–3 tax, 43, 51–2, 58 United Nations, 178, 181–2, 185–7 see also decentralization; reformasi; transparency regional power, 7, 8, 132, 136, 137, 145, 156, 195, 287, 288, 294, 295, 296, 299, 341 regional security, 7, 9, 32, 35, 138, 288, 294, 325 regional stability, 30, 33, 130, 137, 156, 256, 324, 325 relational power approach, 5, 6, 7, 9–10 indices, 3–4 religious freedom see freedom religious and ethnic minorities, 77, 101–3, 118, 131, 165, 294, 339 Republic of Korea (ROK: South Korea), 2, 5, 51, 138–9, 142, 144, 156, 184, 191n32, 209, 212n23, 229, 247, 250, 274, 293–4, 341, 343 Riau Archipelago, 107n17 249, 252–3, 323, 340 rights see human rights

rise, Indonesia maritime powers in Asia, 14, 308, 324–6 middle class, 41 middle powers, 7, 18n46 Southeast Asia, 41 Islamism, 69–71, 251 see also ascent, Indonesia rise of China see People’s Republic of China (PRC): rise rising power see ascent, Indonesia Rismaharini, Tri, 125 Roberts, Christopher, 1–18 (Ch. 1), 195–210 (Ch. 10), 264–79 (Ch. 13), 335–45 (Ch. 16), 12–14, 162, 212n22, 212n24, 275 Robinson, James A., 99 Rohingya, 137, 159 Roman Catholicism, 165 Rowing between Two Reefs see Mendayung di antara Dua Karang Rudd, Kevin, 200, 202, 205, 228, 233, 235 Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, 168 Rüland, Jürgen, 230 rule of law, 9, 113, 158 see also democratic identity Russia, 5, 15, 21, 137, 142, 178, 180, 198, 274, 275, 294, 295, 341 Sabah, Malaysia, 31, 245, 265 Saigon, Vietnam, 255, 256 salam (peace), 82 Sarawak guerrillas, 27 Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah (SDI: Islamic Commercial Union), 70 Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), 70 SAS see Special Air Services SBY see Yudhoyono scholars, 5, 22, 168, 195 sea lanes (archipelagic sea lanes: ASLs), 1, 14, 134, 246–7, 308–18, 323–5 East–West, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317 North–South, 314–15, 323 sea routes see sea lanes SEANWFZ see Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone search and rescue, 145, 258, 269 Sebastian, Leonard C., 1–15 (Ch. 1), 89n33, 293, 297, 308–27 (Ch. 15), 335–45 (Ch. 16)

368 Index Second World War see World War II Security Council see United Nations Security Council sejarah (history), 82 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands see disputed islands separatism, 11, 94, 104, 322 see also West Papua September 2001 see 9/11 shadaqah (charity for a return or protection), 82 see also zakat Sharia, 72, 78–80, 89n33, 94, 96 Shia Islam, 131, 165, 339 see also ethnic and religious minorities shipping routes see sea lanes shura (consultation), 83 Siagian, Sabam, 201 Sijori (Singapore, Malaysia’s Johor, and Indonesia’s Riau Islands’ Growth Triangle), 252 Singapore ASEAN, 12, 30–2, 34, 244, 267, 271, 277 decolonization, 26–7 defense, 31, 134, 250–4 Indonesia, relations, 2, 13, 144, 250–5, 259 Indonesia, trade, 31, 250, 252 maritime disputes, 318–19 one-party rule, 112 People’s Republic of China, 27, 31 Rugged Society’, five principles, 252 see also Pancasila security cooperation, 245–7, 249–50 United States, 132 see also Defense Cooperation Agreement; Sijori Singapore Cooperation Programme, 253 Sipadan and Ligitan see disputed islands Sirleaf see Johnson Sirleaf small to medium enterprize (SME), 43 SME see small to medium enterprize Smith, Stephen (former Minister for Defense), 198 Snowden, Edward, 196, 203 social justice (àdâlah Ijtimaya), 72, 78, 80, 82, 85, 86, 183, 338 social relations, 3, 73 socialist, 23, 27, 70, 72, 82, 161 soft balancing, 135 soft power, 6–9, 209, 339

sole foundation see asas tunggal Sondakh, Angelina, 121 Sorong, West Papua, 323 soul and spirit see jiwa dan semangat South Africa, 7, 183, 337 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), 139, 273 South Korea see Republic of Korea (ROK), 2, 5, 51, 138–9, 142, 144, 156, 184, 191n32, 209, 212n23, 229, 247, 250, 274, 293, 294, 341, 343 South Sulawesi, 72, 323 Special Air Services, Australia (SAS), 201 Spratlys and Paracels see disputed islands stabilitas nasional (national stability), 10, 69, 70, 72–5, 81–7 State Audit Agency see Badan Permeriksa Keuangan state enterprise, 51, 100, 124 state fragility, 2, 9, 104, 203, 227, 230, 311, 324 strategic ambivalence see strategic autonomy strategic autonomy, 11, 135, 141, 146, 234–5, 290, 326, 343 strategic environment, 31, 130, 146, 226, 309, 322–6 strategic location see crossroads location strategic partnership, 144, 198, 256, 274, 293, 343 Subianto, Prabowo, 119, 122–5, 339 Sudan, 179 Suharto anti-communist, 25, 29, 245, 255–6 ASEAN way, 9, 229, 244, 264–5, 290–91, 337 Australia, relations, 25, 34, 196–7, 231–2 authoritarian, 231, 266, 270, 338 corruption, 33, 75, 100, 115, 124, 126, 157, 161 coup d’etat, 28–9 domestic security, 134, 231 economic development, 28–33, 74–5, 86, 134, 183, 229, 245, 255 era (1966–98), 196 Lee Kuan Yew, 251 Malaysia, 245

Index 369 opposition, 33, 126 post-Suharto, 8–9, 80, 116, 120, 124–5, 155, 158, 197, 225, 232, 289, 293, 309, 338 religion, 69, 74, 76, 82, 86, 122 resignation (1998), 8, 75–6, 86, 94, 96, 100, 109n52, 114, 155, 157, 197, 292, 339–40 US ties, 22, 28–9, 32, 34 Vietnam, 255–7 see also Golkar; Kuantan doctrine; Non-Aligned Movement; Orde Baru; Organization of Islamic Cooperation; regionalism Sukarno domestic suppression, 24–7, 122 dynastic politics, 122–3 Independence (17 August 1945), 23 Islam, 72–3, 75, 86, 122 Malaysia, 26–8, 134, 245, 251; see also Konfrontasi military succession, 29, 95, 97 Netherlands East Indies, 24 regime end, 29 Sino-Soviet relations, 24–5, 27, 134, 197, 255 Trisakti principles (1963), 343 US relations, 26, 28 see also Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia; Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy); economic, nationalism; Hatta; Konfrontasi; Masjumi; New Emerging Forces Sukma, Rizal, 159, 162, 163, 164, 166, 229, 266, 293, 294 Sulawesi Sea, 319, 320, 323 Sultan of Brunei, 78 Sumatra, 23, 27, 72, 74, 87, 103, 165, 249, 254, 310, 319 Sumitro (former General), 32 Sunda, 14, 308 Sunni Islam, 75, 101, 102 see also Islam; Muslim Superferry bombing (2004), 14, 252 see also piracy superpowers, 4, 5, 7, 82, 113, 169, 224, 227 Supreme Court, Indonesia, 115 Suryodiningrat, Meidyatama (Chief Editor, Jakarta Post), 292

suzerainty, 310 Syria, 87, 156 TAC see Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Taliban, 77 tanah-air (homeland), 310 Tangerang, Java, 253 Tanjung Berakit, 319 tasamuh (tolerance), 83 tawassuth (moderation), 82, 83, 135 tawazun (balance), 83 tawhid (belief in the indivisibility and oneness of God), 72 taxation, 29, 43, 50–2, 58, 59, 63 TCG see Tripartite Core Group Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), 46 technology, 3, 16n17, 41–3, 61, 63, 138–40, 142–6, 150n59, 253 Tehran, Iran, 178 tenang (quiet/soft), 79 Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI: Indonesian National Armed Forces), 11, 77, 98, 101, 105, 106, 141, 316 terjadi guncangan politik (political shocks), 76 territorial disputes, 130–3, 137–8, 156, 234, 247, 257, 260, 298, 325 territorial integrity, 134, 180, 198, 308 terrorist, 40, 79, 131, 132, 161, 201, 203, 252 see also counterterrorism Thailand, 5, 30, 32, 50, 64, 112, 137, 144, 229, 246, 249, 254, 256, 259, 267, 276, 287, 297, 318, 342 third largest democracy see democratization Third World, 33, 337 Thompson, Sue, 10, 22–39 (Ch. 2) thousand friends and zero enemies see million friends and zero enemies threat of disintegration see ancaman disintegrasi three-level game theory, 199, 212n27 see also Australia: parliamentary/political system Timor-Leste, 2, 34, 35, 77, 93, 135, 166, 196, 201, 202, 226, 254, 277, 310, 318, 338 independence vote (1999), 162

370 Index TNI see Tentara Nasional Indonesia tolerance, 3, 78, 83, 85, 165, 292, 339 trade colonial, 23, 70 democratic identity, 161, 168 extractive function, 100 Indonesia–Australia, 12–13, 196, 202–10, 217n104, 218n106, 233, 250 Indonesia–China, 40–1, 63, 142, 144, 275, 291, 293, 326, 343 Indonesia, competitiveness, 51, 60, 62, 344 Indonesia–India, 63–4 Indonesia–Japan, 23 Indonesia–Malaysia, 246–7 Indonesia–Singapore, 31, 250, 252 Indonesia, trade balance, 46, 59, 63 Indonesia–Vietnam, 256–7 international, 71, 113, 139, 167, 184 intra-ASEAN, 31 Muslim, 70, 73 Netherlands East Indies, 23 regional, 70, 73, 135, 138, 167, 177, 250 restrictions, 100, 291 see also Bogor Goals; free trade; sea lanes transnational crime, 137, 157, 201, 258 Trans-Pacific Partnership, 132, 135 transparency, 43, 63, 100, 112, 115, 119, 139, 140, 158, 166, 339 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), 136, 270, 275, 290 Tripartite Core Group (TCG), 267 see also Myanmar Trisakti principles, 343 tsunami, 96, 141, 198 Tunisia, 157 Turkey, 139, 184 TVET see Technical and Vocational Education and Training ukhuwwah Islamiyah (Islamic brotherhood), 75–6 ukhuwah wathaniyah (national brotherhood), 74–6 ultranationalism see nationalism UN General Assembly see United Nations General Assembly

UN operations see United Nations operations UN peacekeeping forces see United Nations peacekeeping forces UNAMID see United Nations Mission in Darfur UN Convention on the Law of the Sea see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNGA see United Nations General Assembly UNIFIL see United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI: Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia), 94, 103 United Kingdom (UK), 117, 178, 180, 195, 273, 313 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 134, 140, 312–16 Grotian tradition, 312 see also Law of the Sea United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 203, 336 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 34, 158, 159, 181, 185, 186 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 140, 331n57 United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 140 United Nations operations, 182, 336 United Nations peacekeeping forces international relations, 140, 144–5, 180–2, 187, 336, 345n5 c.f. international relations, 323 Garuda contingents, 336 see also Association of Southeast Asian Nations: peacekeeping; Exercise Pitch Black; Bilateral Defense Cooperation Program United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN REDD/UN REDD+ additional climate change implementation initiatives) 340 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 178, 180–7, 267, 234 see also reform: United Nations

Index 371 United States (US) Australia–Indonesia, relations, 13, 200, 211n6, 211n8, 233, 234, 315, 317 China, balancing, 1, 5, 113, 132–3, 137, 145, 256, 274, 276, 283n81, 288, 293, 309, 325–6, 336, 343 hegemony, 5 Indonesia, balancing (pivot), 132, 135, 137, 145, 235, 288 Indonesia, bilateral relations, 137, 138, 144, 145–6, 294 Malaysia, 137 military, 31, 133, 202 Philippines, 137 Singapore, 132 Suharto, 22, 28–9, 32, 34 see also 9/11; East Asia Summit; Nixon Doctrine; superpowers; TransPacific Partnership; United Nations Security Council UN REDD see United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation UNSC see United Nations Security Council Urbaningram, Anas, 121 urbanization, 41, 47, 74, 104 Vayrynen, Raimo, 4 veto players, 232 see also democratization Vietnam, 4, 7, 12, 13, 112, 137, 144, 180, 234, 244–6, 254–9, 266, 268, 269, 318, 341, 342 Vietnam War, 4, 7, 20n16, 245 violence ASEAN, 287–8 civic prevention, 104, 106, 116 diplomacy, resolution, 156, 158–60 elections, 116, 131 intra-elite, 104–5 Islamist extremism, 69–80, 87, 93–5, 98, 101–2, 131, 158–60, 165, 339 military, 98–9, 104–5 separatism, 96, 106, 166 state fragility, 2, 11, 85, 93, 116 state, preventive requirement, 42, 106, 116 see also killing: genocide; Orde Baru volatility, 55, 69, 77

Wahid, Abdurrahman (Gus Dur), 75, 78, 79, 116, 121, 122, 124, 277, 278, 283n84 Waltz, Kenneth, 4 Wanandi, Jusuf, 290, 297 waqf (donation of land for charitable purposes), 82 see also zakat Washington, 20, 23–34, 79, 132, 184, 203, 235, 276, 294, 296 Wawasan Nusantara (Archipelago Outlook), 14, 134, 308–10, 312, 309, 322, 324, 326, 327 weapon systems, 141, 142, 145 Weber, Max, 3 welfare, 9, 23, 43, 52, 85, 104, 131 Wendt, Alexander, 6, 16n16 West Irian see West Papua West New Guinea see West Papua West Papua establishment, 24–7 independence, 232 Madiun uprising (1948), 24 restrictions, media and human rights, 105, 165, 197; see also freedom: expression reunification, military action, 134, 162, 197, 202, 323 separatism, 2, 11, 93, 96–7, 103–6, 131, 162, 196, 205, 211n12, 278 self-determination plebiscite (1969), 33–4 see also Papua New Guinea Western aid see foreign aid Westphalian system, 13, 234 White Australia policy, 196, 204 White, Hugh, 5, 9, 229, 236 Whitlam, Gough, 34 Why Nations Fail (Acemoglu and Robinson), 99 Widodo, Joko (Jokowi), 12, 14, 47, 62, 105, 122–5, 168–9, 343, 344 Wirajuda, Hassan, 158–9, 161–2, 164, 181 Wiranto, 119, 120, 124 Woolcott, Richard, 197 World Bank, 46, 47, 56, 59, 167, 187 World Maritime Axis Doctrine see foreign policy, Indonesia World Trade Organization (WTO), 139, 156, 167, 344

372 Index World War I, 4, 311 World War II, 4, 22–4, 26, 134 WTO see World Trade Organization

xenophobia, 69, 78, 80

Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 75 YouTube, 339 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 10, 70, 76, 79–86, 104, 116–19, 121, 123–6, 156–7, 168, 169, 177, 186, 202, 254, 288

zakat (the obligation of charity, stipulated by the pillars of Islam), 82, 131 see also infaq; shadaqah; waqf zeitgeist effect, 7 see also democratization: human rights; soft power zero-sum, 181, 325 Zhou Enlai, 27 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN Treaty), 136, 137, 246, 266 ZOPFAN see Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality