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The Everyday Versus the Disaster Role of Local Officials: Citizen and Official Definitions Robert P. Wolensky and Edward J. Miller Urban Affairs Review 1981; 16; 483 DOI: 10.1177/107808748101600406 The online version of this article can be found at: http://uar.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/16/4/483

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This study examines the definitions of active citizens and local government officials regarding the everyday and disaster roles of local government. The principal finding is that citizens and officials agreed on the everyday but not the disaster role. Citizens expected a custodial orientation in the everyday situation, but an "active" one in disaster. Officials defined the everyday role as custodial and did the same for the disaster. The definitional incongruity in the disaster environment had consequences for at least two alterations in the postdisaster community structure: group emergence and political reorganization.

THE EVERYDAY VERSUS THE DISASTER ROLE OF LOCAL OFFICIALS Citizen and Official Definitions ROBERT P. WOLENSKY EDWARD J. MILLER University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point

In everyday community life, most citizens related minimally to local government as evidenced by low turnout in municipal elections (Hamilton, 1971: 1140). Local government officials are viewed as dealing with the routine concerns of fire protection, zoning, safety, water, garbage, and sewers. These mundane tasks of urban service delivery occupy the preponderance of local officials’ time but tend not to be salient to citizens until a crisis occurs (Morgan, 1979: 170). In a minor crisis, such as a municipal employees short-term strike, local government can adapt with minimal effort. But in a major crisis, such as a natural disaster, new and extraordinary demands are made. As Dynes (1974) has documented, most organizations cannot, in the short run, meet the -

,

.’ ,

AUTHORS’ NOTE: An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1977. Suggestions made by anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowl-

edged. URBAN AFFAIRS QUARTERLY, Vol. 16 No. 4, June 1981 483-504 @ 1981 Sage Publications, Inc.

483 Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

484

demands of a

major disaster.

Becasue of heightened demands and of local unavailability resources, government and its officials may encounter considerable demand stress (Morgan and Kirkpatrick, 1972: 15). In crisis environments, citizen passivity can change as local officials are looked to for need satisfaction (Abney and Hill, 1966). Not only is heightened demand stress likely, but normative definitions of officials’ roles can be radically altered. Citizens’ minimal relations with local government in everyday situations indicate that the officials’ role is perceived as limited. However, with the impact of a major disaster, normative definitions can change with new expectations. The main finding of this study is that citizens’ definitions of local officials’ everyday role were incongruous with definitions of their disaster role, while officials maintained the same definitions for both environments. Citizens’ disaster definitions were for a much more active role while they favored a custodial orientation in the everyday situation. Officials saw their roles as basically custodial in the disaster and everyday environments. The definitional incongruity in the disaster situation had consequences for two changes in the post disaster community structure. One was an immediate change, the emergence of ad hoc citizen groups, while the other-still being researched-was a longer-term change,

political reorganization.

,

PURPOSE AND METHODS OF RESEARCH

Despite the increasing cognizance of natural disasters as events with political implications (Abney and Hill, 1966; Angotti, 1977; Cobb and Elder, 1972: 84; Wittenhall, 1969; Wittenhall and Powell, 1975), local government response and the politics of recovery have not been the object of much systematic research (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977).. This study begins with three interrelated questions of political consequence. First, what were the definitions that local government officials brought to their disaster and everyday leadership roles? (What were their priorities? Were there consistencies across the two environments? How did behavior in one environment Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

485

relate to behavior in the other?) Second, what definitions did two groups of active citizens have regarding the disaster and everyday roles of local government officials? (What did they expect in each environment? Were expectations consistent? If changes occurred across environments, what were the reasons?) Third, what does a comparison of officials and citizens reveal? (Were there similaritities or differences in everyday and disaster role definitions? How did the disaster influence these?) THE RESEARCH SITE

~~ _

_

1972, Tropical Storm Agnes caused severe flood in several Eastern states, bringing a disaster which, at $3.5 damage billion in damage, stands as the most costly in U.S. history. Fifteen months after the disaster, research was conducted in four communities within the most severely damaged region of the catastrophe, the Wyoming Valley in Northeastern Pennsylvania. The four were selected from the Valley’s sixteen flooded communities as representative of population size and severity of damage. One was the area’s largest city, Wilkes-Barre, and the others were smaller towns; all had over 60% of their land area under water. Each city’s central business district was 100% flooded. WilkesBarre had council-manager government, while the three towns had a mayor-council form. Characteristics of the cities are presented in Table 1. In June

’

LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

~’

Officials were defined as those in the most important elective and appointive positions and thus included mayors, councilmen, the only city manager, and specially appointed disaster recovery coordinators.2 While the most active and/ or knowledgeable officials may not have been in these positions, it was assumed that high position was a good measure of involvement and knowledge. In Wilkes-Barre, the focal point of the disaster, the city manager, mayor, and five of six councilmen were interviewed. In the three smaller towns, interviews were limited to all three mayors, council presidents, and recovery coordinators. The total number interviewed was 16. Interviews consisted of structured, semistructured Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

486

TABLE 1

Characteristics of the Cities Studied: Population Size, Type of Government, Percentage of Area Flooded, and CBD Flooded

a.

Estimate based

on

interviews with local government officials.

and open ended items and were conducted most often at the city or town hall. Each interview lasted from one and one-half to two hours. Cooperation was excellent and many volunteered reports, personal notes, newspaper accounts, and other helpful materials. The 16 officials who were not interviewed (15 councilmen from the three small towns and one councilman from Wilkes-Barre) were mailed questionnaires in the study’s second phase. The questionnaires consisted of mostly structured but some semistructured and open ended questions. Most items were identical to those on the first-phase interview. Respondents totaled 13 (from the universe of 16 officials). Our findings were therefore based upon information from 29 of the 32 officials in the four

municipalities.33 CITIZENS

The citizens were members of two ad hoc groups which emerged within days of disaster impact. The Flood Recovery Task Force (FRTF) drew upon the area’s financial and industrial leaders and was primarily, but not exclusively, concerned with economic recovery. Led by a Federal Circuit Court Judge, a Nixon appointee with much political experience and access to the very highest levels of federal government, the FRTF had 10 subcommittees. Through active leadership and effective resources, Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

487

FRTF had a direct or indirect role in virtually every aspect of the recovery. It was viewed by federal agency representatives as one of the most important-and in some instances the most important-&dquo;spokesman&dquo; for the local community. The group’s power and influence were exceptional.44 Among its resources were expertise and a well-educated influential core membership consisting of most of the presidents from local banks and savings and loans, partners in major law firms, construction company executives, industrial executives, and other economic sector leaders. While it eventually sought the appearance of a broadbased citizens’ committee, this was achieved with limited success because of its private sector, Chamber of Commerce identity. The Flood Victim’s Action Council (FVAC) was a social action group chaired by a retired labor organizer. It drew upon workingand middle-class disaster victims who sought to protect personal interests in the recovery quagmire. By far the larger of the two committees with an eventual paid membership of 1200, it had only a small minority of active members. The FVAC’s social action approach placed it in an adversary relationship with local government, federal agencies, and the FRTF. Through its populist eyes, the recovery was viewed as a battle against uncaring bureaucrats, greedy local business interests, and incompetent politicians, all of whom had no real concern for &dquo;the little guy&dquo; or &dquo;the common man.&dquo; Its main concerns were the day to day problems of citizens, and while it had loosely organized subcommittees to deal with these problems, it was mainly an organization of one person, the chairwoman. For political reasons, the FVAC had considerable influence with the state government. The executive committee members of each group were interviewed. For the FRTF this number was 34; for the FVAC, 30. Data were collected through structured, semistructured, and open ended questions, supplemented by content analysis of minutes and other records. The interviews, which lasted up to two hours, were most often conducted at the respondent’s workplace. While these citizens did not represent a random sample of public opinion, they did represent citizen leaders active in two spheres of community life; the civic sphere (FRTF), consisting of financial and industrial leaders who traditionally exercise influence through voluntary civic associations (Rossi, 1961; Westby, Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

488

1966), and

the social action

sphere (FVAC), consisting of more

liberal, activist-oriented citizens (Rothman, 1979), who exercise influence through grass roots voluntary action. Such individuals can be classified as opinion leaders and often have been shown to exert considerable influence in community decision making

(Clark, 1969).6 CITIZENS’ DEFINITION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS’ DISASTER ROLE

FRTF and FVAC members were in agreement both on their high expectations for local officials and the perceived ineffective role that materialized. Citizens expected local officials to protect valued interests, and officials, for whatever reasons, did not fulfill this expectation. Several indicators alluded to high expectations and low performance. When asked to rate the leadership of five authorities during the immediate postimpact, local officials were given a very low rating (Table 2). When asked to rate the &dquo;strength&dquo; or &dquo;weakness&dquo; of local government officials, an appraisal of generally &dquo;weak&dquo; was made (Table 3). Perhaps the clearest evidence was obtained when citizens rated the leaders of ten groups on the leadership each ought to have provided during the first nine months of the recovery, and rated ; hem again according to the leadership each actually provided. In effect, this method compared views of what was done in relation to what was expected (Klassen, 1972). Analysis of the mean differences between the &dquo;actual&dquo; and &dquo;ought&dquo; evaluations showed the greatest discrepancy for local officials, defined as mayors, councilmen and, where appropriate, the appointed manager (Table 4). Among FVAC members, the mean difference was 6.80; it was 3.80 among FRTF members. These relatively large differences pointed to a sense of being &dquo;let down.&dquo; It is also important to note the very high &dquo;ought&dquo; rating local government officials received: FRTF members rated them at 8.15 with only three other groups rated higher; for FVAC members it was near the limit of 10 with only one other group receiving higher rating. Citizens clearly expected officials to play a dominant role. When compared to the &dquo;ought&dquo; evaluations of their own groups, citizens thought local government officials should have played a Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

489

TABLE 2

Citizen

Leadership Ratings of Five Authorities (Immediate Post-Impact Stage)

Means computed from responses to the question, &dquo;This is a list of groups in the were in positions of disaster leadership. Please rate each on the scale from one to ten (one being very weak, 10 being very strong) as to how you perceive the leadership each provided the first few days after the impact of the flood. Circle one number.&dquo; a.

Wyoming Valley who

TABLE 3

Citizens’ Evaluation of Local Officials’

Leadership

(Early Recovery Stage)

a.

Missing

data for one case.

stronger role than either of their respective committees. The difference between normative and empirical evaluations thus illustrate considerable demand stress in the local political system. What specifically did citzens expect from officials? They uniformly demanded a more rational, concerted, and what can be called an active role. Active role meant different things to the Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

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491

respective committees’ members. For the FRTF, officials should have provided more concerted efforts for business recovery and postdisaster economic development. For the FVAC, active role was defined in terms of cutting red tape, providing mechanisms to alleviate individual problems with loans, safety, access and demolition, coupled with advocacy for &dquo;the little guy.&dquo; In general, citizens’ expectations for officials called for an innovative, efficient, and rational leadership; protection of the interests of all local institutions; attention to, and solution of, citizens’ problems ; advocacy for economic recovery; a greater dexterity in facilitating extracommunity disaster aid; and professionalism in dealing with federal and state relief agencies. There was an expectation that officials possess greater resources and display considerable expertise in utilizing them. In virtually all these respects, officials were perceived as falling short.

THE DISASTER ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Officials’ disaster role was examined in three stages: (1) the immediate preimpact (the day before and the day of impact); (2) the immediate postimpact (the first two weeks following impact); and (3) the recovery (the first year after impact). During the first stage, custodial, emergency, administrative, and personal tasks were the main concerns. In the second and third stages, custodial, citizen-related, administrative, economyrelated, and personal tasks were cited. However, it was clear that in each stage whether custodial caretaker tasks (Kotter and Lawrence, 1974), those dealing with municipal caretaking and maintenance, were generally considered most important. Table 5 summarizes references and frequencies of officials’ task orientations. In the preimpact stage, custodial and emergency tasks were primary, with most references made to the former. Custodial tasks were mainly caretaker oriented, the most frequently mentioned being &dquo;sandbagging&dquo; to raise the levee. Other custodial tasks included controlling traffic, asuring public safety, maintaining order, and tending to fire and police dispatching. Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

492

TABLE 5

Task Areas of Local Officials

During

Three Disaster

Stagesa

Tabulations computed from content analysis of semistructured and open-ended interview questions. b. N = 29. a.

Emergency tasks were mainly people oriented and the one most often mentioned was &dquo;helping with evacuation.&dquo; Officials were personally involved with search, rescue, evacuation, and &dquo;helping out&dquo; at evacuation centers. Both emergency and custodial tasks were characterized by an intracommunity orientation. Moreover, officials participated in tasks as &dquo;ordinary citizens&dquo; rather than as individuals with formal authority. There was desire to &dquo;pitch in&dquo; and &dquo;help out wherever I could.&dquo; In the postimpact stage, custodial tasks were again top priority, receiving the largest average number of references. &dquo;Cleaning up&dquo; and its related activities were most often mentioned along with controlling traffic, directing pumping operations, cleaning streets,

removing debris, controlling fires, repairing levees, unclogging working with police to maintain order. Officials were often anecdotal in their descriptions of these tasks. Of all task areas, the economy received the least mention despite complete sewers, and

Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

493

destruction of central business districts. Citizen-centered tasks included emergency aid to victims in evacuation centers. During the recovery stage, administrative tasks received the largest percentage of references with custodial tasks following close behind. As the recovery progessed, administrative tasks became more important. However, the interviews revealed that because of more than two dozen state and federal agencies functioning in the area, and because most local officials were part time and did not possess the administrative expertise, professional and semiprofessional staff assumed most of the administrative responsibility. In this stage, officials continued to give considerable attention to custodial matters such as debris removal, public safety, sanitation, fire, and the care of streets and roads. As with other stages, scant reference was made to economy-related tasks. Thus, officials tended to emphasize custodial tasks in all three stages. Although there were a few individual exceptions, the modal orientation to roles and priorities was a custodial one. The findings support those of Prince (1920: 120), who, some years ago, stated, &dquo;We have faithfully described municipal aid in disaster as falling under the category of service rather than direction.&dquo; The next section suggests that officials’ inhibitions to leadership during &dquo;normal&dquo; times (Pressman, 1972) may very well have established an approach that extended to the disaster. _

A COMPARISON OF CITIZENS’ AND OFFICIALS’ DEFINITIONS OF THE EVERYDAY ROLE

One indication of officials’ definitions of the everyday role was their ranking of the four policy orientations researched by Williams and Adrian (1963): (1) promoting economic growth; (2) providing life’s amenities; (3) maintaining traditional services; (4) arbitrating conflicting interest. Municipal governments often deal with each of these but can emphasize one or another depending upon local values, dominant interests, and organizational and individual capabilities. When asked to rank the four according to how they expected to perform their everyday roles, officials gave, &dquo;maintaining traditional services&dquo; the highest mean rank (Table 6). This indicates Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

494

TABLE 6

Local Officials’

a.

Ranking

of Local Government

Policy Orientations

Adapted from Williams and Adrian (1953).

b. N = 29.

everyday definition of role along custodial lines was the data, coupled with their aforementioned disaster task priorities, show that officials in all probability fostered a pervasive custodial orientation to local governance. Whether this orientation existed prior to the disaster, we cannot say. But it certainly was in evidence during and shortly after the crisis. The results for citizens was surprisingly similar on everyday rankings. When they ranked the four policy orientations according to how they expected officials to perform an everyday role, that

an

norm.

These

members of both citizen groups ranked the custodial orientation first (Table 7). When asked to rank the items a second time as to how they thought officials actually had fulfilled their roles, again the custodial orientation was first (Table 8). Therefore, not only did citizens define the custodial role as the highest everyday priority but officials were envisioned as fulfilling this expectation.

CONSISTENCIES AND CONFLICTS

Officials’ everyday ranking most likely represented an enduring role orientation and this may explain the continuity between everyday and disaster definitions. Such continuity finds strong research support (Taylor et al., 1970; Quarantelli and Dynes 1977). The consistency between everyday and disaster definitions are depicted in Table 9 as &dquo;X&dquo; horizontal, congruent definitions. Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

495

TABLE 7

Citizens’ Rankings of Local Government

a.

From Williams and Adrian

Policy

Orientations

(1963).

Since both citizens and officials favored the custodial orientation, there was most likely little demand stress in local government’s everyday operation. The consistency between officials’ and citizens’ everyday definitions are depicted as &dquo;X&dquo; vertical, congruent definitions in Table 9. But there was a clear conflict between citizens’ disaster and everyday definitions. Although citizens preferred a custodial, incremental role (Braybrooke and Lindbloom, 1970: 79) during normal times, they did not during the emergency. These relationships are depicted as &dquo;Y&dquo; or conflicting definitions in Table 9, both horizontal and vertical. That citizens expected protection of valued interests regardless of how the everyday role had been defined may have been due to their view that officials, as the legally constituted representatives of the community, were obliged to provide active leadership whatever the constraints. But active leadership was not forthcoming given the manner in which both officials and significant citizen publics had defined the official role. It was clear that both formal and informal leaders desired an everyday custodial government. Citizens therefore received from local officials what they might have expected. While citizens held different definitions for handling a disaster, officials did not and probably could not alter their own role concepts. It would have been difficult to switch orientations given a structure of custodial governance coupled with individuals who had run for, and been elected to, office with the idea of being custodial leaders. Downloaded from http://uar.sagepub.com at UNIV OF ILLINOIS URBANA on December 16, 2008

496

TABLE 8

Citizens’

Ranking

From Williams and Adrian

a.

.

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~.