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Local Political Institutions and Smart Growth : An Empirical Study of the Politics of Compact Development Edgar E. Ramírez de la Cruz Urban Affairs Review 2009 45: 218 originally published online 10 April 2009 DOI: 10.1177/1078087409334309 The online version of this article can be found at: http://uar.sagepub.com/content/45/2/218

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Local Political Institutions and Smart Growth

Urban Affairs Review Volume 45 Number 2 November 2009 218-246 © 2009 The Author(s) 10.1177/1078087409334309 http://uar.sagepub.com

An Empirical Study of the Politics of Compact Development Edgar E. Ramírez de la Cruz Arizona State University, Phoenix

Using Florida survey data from 2002 and 2007, this article seeks to determine the characteristics of local governments that make them more or less inclined to engage in smart growth-related land-use regulations. The study draws on a range of theoretical traditions to motivate an empirical model of policy adoption, emphasizing the interaction between interest group politics and local political institutions as the primary explanatory factors. In addition, the article differentiates between types of smart growth regulations designed to promote a key smart growth principle—compact development—in terms of their redistributive consequences. The study finds some support for the notion that the adoption of smart growth practices is affected by the activism of interest groups and their interaction with local political institutions. Keywords: smart growth; land-use regulations; political institutions; sustainability; interest groups

U

rban sprawl means different things to different people, but in general terms, it can be defined as the excessive spatial growth of urban areas (Brueckner 2000). Traditional land-use regulations practices have been blamed for contributing to increasing urban sprawl and other undesirable effects of growth. For example, these practices have been criticized for promoting low-density development that leads to the loss of agriculturally

Author’s Note: An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. I wish to thank Richard C. Feiock and three anonymous reviewers for their input and comments. This article is based on work partially supported by the DeVoe Moore Center Program in Local Governance at Florida State University. Please address correspondence to Edgar E. Ramírez de la Cruz, School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, Mail Code 3720, 411 N. Central Ave., Suite 480, Phoenix, AZ 85004-5555; e-mail: [email protected]. 218 Downloaded from uar.sagepub.com at CIDE BIBLIOTECA on September 5, 2011

Ramírez de la Cruz / The Politics of Compact Development 219

and environmentally sensitive land (Healy and Rosenberg 1979; Callies 1992; DeGrove 1984; Frech and Lafferty 1984), the deterioration of central cities and social inequality (Downs 1999; Ewing 1994; Squires 2002; Nguyen 2007), and drastic housing price increases (Dowall 1984; Landis 1986; Malpezzi 1998). More recently, the discussion on the formation of sustainable communities has framed the costs of sprawl in terms of the inefficient use of energy caused by this phenomenon (Holden and Norland 2005; Ewing and Rong 2008). In this sense, most planners and policy makers notice that consumption of energy by households in urban areas is strongly connected to landuse characteristics and the urban form (Holden and Norland 2005). In addition, compact developments have the potential to generate other benefits such as economies for service provision, improved accessibility to retail and other services, and development of a sense of community (Nelson 1999). As a reaction to the problems of urban sprawl and its undesirable effects, the concept of smart growth has been used to describe efforts by local governments to adopt and implement good practices of land-use regulation (Talen and Knaap 2003; Burchell, Listokin, and Galley 2000). Smart growth incorporates several elements, policies, and regulatory instruments that affect land use and is commonly grouped with principles related to planning practices intended to deal with urban sprawl. When describing smart growth, some researchers have highlighted policies and instruments that address the spatial separation of development and the lack of mobility in urban areas (Talen and Knaap 2003). Others have included in their definition of smart growth regulations that promote compact developments as well as regulations that attempt to address public issues such as traffic congestion, transportation, loss of farmland, urban disinvestment, the costs of public infrastructure, affordable housing, and economic and community development, among many other problems (Ewing and Rong 2008; Burchell, Listokin, and Galley 2000). All these regulations result from the variety of definitions of urban sprawl and the problems associated with it. Despite the potential impact that smart growth practices can have on urban sprawl as well as other goals pursued by local governments, only some communities have adopted these policies. In addition, there have been few efforts to explain why some communities are more likely to adopt land-use regulations and policies linked to a smart growth strategy (Downs and Costa 2005; Lewis 2002). In general, the literature on smart growth assumes that the adoption of land-use policies is either a mechanical response to problems of rapid growth and urban sprawl or the result of the

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220 Urban Affairs Review

mobilization of groups in the community that either oppose or support growth (Burchell, Listokin, and Galley 2000; Talen and Knaap 2003; Downs and Costa 2005). The first explanation is essentially a property rights model, and the second an interest groups model. These explanations of land-use regulation adoption take into account either the political or economic forces affecting the smart growth agenda. Current explanations of the adoption of smart growth practices can benefit from the study of local political institutions that interact with political and economic forces. Smart growth regulations involve redistributing the benefits and costs associated with land development and urban growth (Downs and Costa 2005). Smart growth practices have substantial redistributive effects for various interest groups in the community, particularly for the welfare of developers, environmentalists, and homeowners. These effects can occur in several forms. For instance, developers’ interests are likely to be harmed by any regulation that limits the land available for new projects or increases building costs. Most policies that protect environmentally sensitive lands, reduce consumption of energy, or reduce emissions harmful to the natural environment advance the interests of environmentalist groups. Homeowners advance their interests with the adoption of regulations that protect the quality of life in the community as well as property rights. Often, these goals present clear trade-offs, as in cases where conservation policies limit land available for development. However, in some cases, these goals can be mutually pursued by regulation, as in the case of density bonuses that can enhance the livability in the community at the same time that they reduce building costs. Redistributive consequences are crucial outcomes of the adoption of any land-use regulation and can explain why some cities adopt regulations that promote compact development and others do not. Groups affected by changes produced by smart growth are expected to resist its adoption unless it is clear to them that the benefits of such changes are greater than their costs. To explain the adoption of smart growth practices, the analysis in this article differentiates between policies and regulations that promote compact development in base to their redistributive consequences for interest groups. The redistributive consequences of smart growth underscore the role of political institutions because they affect the power of interest groups to influence policy decisions. To integrate the impact of political institutions in the adoption of smart growth practices, this article builds on previous efforts that have analyzed the effect of institutions on the adoption of local policies and regulations (Lubell et al. 2002; Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez 2005). For instance, previous studies suggest that local political institutions can create



political markets in which local officials supply the preferred policies of groups that have the ability to provide political support. Depending upon the type of “political market,” the voices of some interest groups may be amplified while deadening the voices of others. This article extends this political market model by investigating how political institutions mediate between the various groups affected by compact development. The following section discusses briefly three theoretical frameworks that are used in explaining the adoption of land-use regulations: property rights, interest groups, and political institutions. In the next section, I introduce three categories of smart growth regulations that promote compact development; the typology is based on their redistributive effects for major interest groups in the community. After that, I discuss a number of propositions to explain the adoption of the various categories of smart growth instruments grounded on the three theoretical frameworks. The following section presents the methodology used for testing the propositions presented previously as well as the results of the analysis. Finally, I discuss the implications of the results in terms of the frameworks tested and present some final considerations.

Explaining the Adoption of Smart Growth Regulations Existing literature provides limited guidance for understanding why communities develop land-use regulations that promote compact developments. According to Glickfeld and Levine (1992), in general, three factors explain the boom in the adoption of land-use regulations: (1) sheer population growth, (2) changing patterns of growth toward the edges of cities, and (3) the popular identification of growth as the cause of traffic, congestion, and a decline in quality of life. The notion that growth and its effects trigger regulation of land use is known as the property rights model, because it assumes that such regulations are primarily intended to protect property values from the harm of urban sprawl and fast growth. For instance, based on their 1988 survey findings on California land-use practice, Glickfeld and Levine (1992) argue that regulatory adoption occurs after notable increases in building permit activity. Although the property rights model is an appealing explanation for the adoption of land-use regulations, the interest groups and the political institutions models can complement this perspective. Next, I introduce these frameworks.



The Property Rights Model The property rights framework is the most popular explanation for the adoption of land-use regulations because it presents a parsimonious and strong argument. It points out that land-use regulations are a rational response by communities to the emergent issues related to urban sprawl. This framework argues that the structure of land-use regulations will emerge to protect communities from the overconsumption of public goods (Glickfeld and Levine 1992) because residents want to mitigate the consequences of growth (Gottdiener and Neiman 1981; Connerly and Frank 1986; Chapin and Connerly 2004; and Wassmer and Lascher 2006). Existing research on local economic development and growth management typically refers to these types of theories as “need-based” explanations for the adoption of policies in local governments because they assume that policies are instrumental responses to problems in the community (Donovan, Neiman, and Brumbaugh 1994; Steinacker 1998; Lewis and Neiman 2002). The property rights model is linked to Tiebout’s (1956) model, which argues that local communities have an optimum size for delivery of local public goods. In general terms, the framework indicates that cities offer a bundle of goods at a competitive tax-price based on supply/demand characteristics of the marketplace. In this sense, the property rights model suggests that, other things being equal, when a city experiences deterioration in the quality of the proffered goods as a result of sprawl, a city is induced to respond by adopting regulations that curb the decline in the quality of those goods.

The Interest Groups Model The interest groups framework provides another explanation of land-use regulation adoption. Interest groups are groups that participate in political decision making and make efforts to secure favorable outcomes in the political arena (Eggertsson 1990; Oliver 2000). The theoretical underpinning of this framework is derived from the pluralist perspective of the interest groups model, which assumes that policy change is the result of interest groups competition (Dahl 1961). The interest groups model predicts that groups that are able to overcome collective action problems are more likely to receive their preferred policies. Therefore, the model predicts that smart growth regulations are more likely to be adopted in cities where there is substantial support from politically strong groups. Existing studies of local economic development and growth management conclude that pro-growth interests dominate the local agenda for land-use regulations and are capable of building coalitions to overcome opposition to



profitable developments (Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976). The “growth machines” hypothesis assumes that the arena of local politics is dominated by political alliances between local government officials and development interests. Development interests are expected to have the upper hand in local politics because they receive concentrated benefits from pro-development policies and are better organized than other public interests. Nevertheless, other public interest groups can also be formed because aggressive entrepreneurs form them (Nownes and Neeley 1996) or because the urban context affects civic involvement (Oliver 2000).

Political Institutions In both the property rights and interest groups models, economic or political forces driving land-use policy are unaffected by political institutions. This is a serious oversight because political institutions are crucial mediators of political and economic forces, and they will influence policy dynamics that shape land-use regulations. To remedy this situation, Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez (2005) offer a “political market” framework of policy change that combines political economy theories of property rights (Alston 1996; Eggertsson 1990; Libecap 1989; Ruhil 2003; Schneider 1989) with the interest groups framework. The political market framework argues that political institutions affect the ability of interest groups to articulate their demands in the political market as well as the willingness of local officials to supply preferred policies. These frameworks offer alternative explanations to the adoption of smart growth practices. However, testing propositions derived from the interest groups and the political institutions frameworks to explain the adoption of smart growth practices presents challenges. Before discussing testable propositions derived from these models, I introduce a classification of land-use regulations designed to promote compact development, a key smart growth principle. This classification is intended to address problems associated with the empirical study of the adoption of smart growth practices.

Three Categories of Smart Growth Regulations The study of smart growth presents two challenges common to studies of land-use regulation. First, the ambiguity of the concept permits the inclusion of a wide variety of policies, regulations, codes, and mandates that can fall



within the principles of smart growth. To deal with this difficulty, most studies concentrate on explaining the adoption of isolated instruments such as growth controls, rather than on a more comprehensive set of programs and policies (Glickfeld and Levine 1992). The second challenge is that smart growth is frequently presented as a series of principles rather than in the form of specific regulatory instruments. For that reason, studies on smart growth often concentrate on the adoption of general programs or policies rather than on land-use regulations that specifically affect growth patterns. This research addresses these problems in two forms. First, the study concentrates on smart growth regulations that, as a common denominator, are used to facilitate and promote compact developments. This definition is pertinent for several reasons. Although there are a wide variety of principles included in smart growth, a predominant component is the use of practices that facilitate compact cities and developments because smart growth is the antithesis of sprawl. In addition, compact development is a shared characteristic of smart growth practices because it contributes to several goals and objectives at the same time (Burchell, Listokin, and Galley 2000; Talen and Knaap 2003). Smart growth practices are primarily intended to promote compact development and high density because density generates economies for service provision, improves accessibility to retail and other services, and improves the sense of community (Nelson 1999). Second, the analysis concentrates on empirical practices in the form of land-use regulations that are classified into three categories: growth boundaries, density bonuses, and smart growth zoning. Empirical practices of land-use regulations are appropriate because they integrate the use of comprehensive plans with other regulatory practices in a deliberate use of the planning, regulatory, and fiscal authority of local governments (Nelson 2000), which is in line with smart growth principles. In addition, these practices allow projected development to achieve broad public goals, not just to limit growth, as in the case of growth controls (Nelson and Duncan 1995). Next, I introduce these categories and the form in which they attempt to promote and facilitate compact development.

Urban Containment Smart growth promotes the formation of compact developments by defining the limits of urban areas, which constrains the supply of land available for new developments. The instruments in this category encourage infill development and redevelopment. Urban containment encourages the construction of compact developments at the same time that it pursues other public goals such



as preserving agriculturally or environmentally rich open spaces (Nelson 2000). For instance, regulatory instruments such as greenbelts and rural protection lines attempt to protect the integrity of rural land, while promoting the formation of communities that offer high quality of life to curb urban sprawl. Urban services and urban growth boundaries are two other forms of urban containment that limit the geographic scope of service infrastructures. For instance, urban service boundaries may limit the construction of water and sewer facilities beyond a given geographic area. Although these regulations do not limit the land available for development, they increase the price of new developments out of the urban area. These regulations increase construction costs and encourage redevelopment and infill construction in urban areas. The regulatory instruments considered in this category are greenbelts, rural protection lines, urban services areas/boundaries, and urban growth boundaries.

Density Bonuses The second category is formed by density bonuses, which are regulatory instruments that permit developers to increase the number of units allowed on a property if they agree to provide some sort of public good or amenity. Cities use density bonuses to promote affordable housing, child care facilities, open spaces, or the preservation of environmental and historic goods, while at the same time, promoting the construction of compact developments. Density bonuses are based on a multidimensional perspective of land-use regulation because their adoption is based on the assumption that facilitating development and economic growth needs to be in balance with other social goals. The social goals pursued by density bonuses often benefit poor and moderate-income residents as well as minorities (Brueckner and Fansler 1993; Nelson 2000; Anthony 2004), which makes them strong instruments for redistributing resources in the community. Among the public goods that are often exchanged for density bonuses, this analysis identifies the following: parks/recreation facilities, affordable housing units, public land dedication, design amenities, transfer of development rights, retail activity at street level, historic preservation, open space or common areas, day care centers, and mass transit centers.

Smart Growth Zoning Traditional zoning attempts to order land development and manage the positive and negative effects of externalities by physically separating land



uses. Zoning is the most common form of land-use regulation (Fleischmann 1989), frequently differentiating between land used for agriculture, residential, commercial, and industrial uses. For analytical purposes, these uses are often arranged in a hierarchy based on the intensity of use, with agriculture being a less intense land use and industrial the most intense. One of the most intense uses associated with compact development is multifamily housing. Smart growth zoning tackles the spatial separation of land uses with a different approach. Based on smart growth zoning instruments, cities remove the traditional focus from the specific land uses allowed in an area to the intensity with which the land is used in that area. This change of the focus allows more flexibility in the types of land uses permitted to increase density. In addition, smart growth zoning is intended to encourage particular types of development in certain locations. For example, new developments are often channeled into areas that are already developed (Talen and Knaap 2003). These elements make smart growth zoning suitable for redevelopment efforts and economic revitalization of central urban areas. Moreover, smart growth zoning is intended to facilitate compact developments by creating clusters of buildings for several uses, thus facilitating the construction of “walkable” neighborhoods with open spaces that increase the sense of place. In addition, they allow flexibility for mixing compatible land uses. Communities define the ratios between types of land use in the city by means of zoning, and smart growth zoning facilitates the alteration of those ratios. Within the smart growth zoning category, this research includes mixeduse zoning, incentive zoning, historic district zoning, open space zoning, performance zoning, form-based zoning, and cluster development zoning. Despite the fact that density bonuses, smart growth zoning, and city boundaries may be used for the same purpose—promoting compact development— they define property rights in favor of different groups in the community. Therefore, these policies have substantially different redistributive consequences in the community. These redistributive consequences are identified in detail in the next section as the basis for discussing some propositions derived by the explanatory frameworks.

Analysis Hypotheses Although pro-development interests are often outspoken opponents to regulations that increase their production costs, they may benefit from regulations that enhance the production of public goods such as open space



that can be capitalized into housing prices and passed on to homebuyers. On one hand, developers are likely to oppose any measure that imposes urban containment because it increases development costs by limiting developable land. On the other hand, developers may promote smart growth zoning because it gives them more flexibility for developing urban land as well as density bonuses that offer them the option of increasing the intensity of the land use and generating public goods that may increase the value and profitability of new developments. Based on the interest groups model, I predict that the activism of developers will be inversely associated with the adoption of growth boundaries in a city but positively associated with the adoption of smart growth zoning. For developers, whether or not to support the adoption of density bonuses presents a dilemma. On one hand, they would oppose the requirement of paying for public goods in exchange for obtaining the right to build their projects. On the other hand, if developments tend to be frequently jeopardized by ambiguous regulations, they would prefer the certainty of increasing the intensity of the use of land in exchange for paying additional costs in the form of public goods. Development interest groups are not the only groups capable of influencing the adoption of land-use regulations because public entrepreneurs can often organize other interests to effectively participate in local political decisions (Elkins 1995; Nownes and Neeley 1996; Feiock 2002; Goetz 1990, 1994). First, environmental groups are openly associated with the protection of open space, farmland, and environmentally sensitive land. In addition, environmentalists promote the adoption of regulations that facilitate compact development because they champion the efficient use of energy for activities such as transportation. Based on the interest groups model, I predict that the activism of environmental groups is positively associated with the adoption of density bonuses, growth boundaries, and smart growth zoning. Homeowners are mainly considered territorial groups linked to specific geographic preferences that support “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) politics and are mainly interested in preventing local unwanted uses (Clarke and Gaile 1989). These groups are often well organized, and they work to protect property values and livability in the community (Sharp 2003). Based on the interest groups model, I predict that the activism of these groups is positively associated with the adoption of urban containment and smart growth zoning because these regulations contribute to the production of more livable environments and high property values. Homeowners have mixed incentives for supporting density bonuses. On one hand, density bonuses can provide public goods such as open spaces Downloaded from uar.sagepub.com at CIDE BIBLIOTECA on September 5, 2011


and site amenities that increase the quality of life and property values. Such goods are paid for by new residents and homebuyers. On the other hand, some public goods produced by density bonuses have significant redistributive consequences and create commonly unwanted land uses. For instance, density bonuses generate public services clearly targeted for lowincome families and disadvantaged groups, such as day care centers, affordable housing, and public transportation infrastructure. Although current residents may benefit from those public goods too, their level of benefit may be marginal and not enough to offset the costs caused by living in a denser community. These costs are presented in the form of traffic congestion and crowded schools and parks, among other characteristics that affect quality of life. In summary, although the benefits of some public goods are concentrated in some social groups, such as low-income families and minorities, the costs of providing them is shared by current residents, which makes these policies clearly redistributive. Based on the interest groups model, I cannot define a clear expectation of the association between the activism of homeowners and the adoption of density bonuses in a city. Based on the political market framework, the structure of the executive branch is expected to play a fundamental role in explaining the adoption of smart growth regulations. The form of government is generally defined in the city charter and typically classified as council–manager, commission only, and mayor–council forms. Although this classification may not reflect the complexity of local political institutions (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2003) it is useful for identifying the role that a political market plays in land-use decisions. Despite the progressive reform efforts in local governments, the mayor–council form of government remains the typical form of city government in America Mayor–council governments are expected to significantly affect land-use regulations for two reasons. First, the mayor–council form of government creates a political market in which mayors supply land-use regulations in exchange for political support (Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez 2005), and second, this form of government is frequently observed as less professional and more politically driven than reformed governments. The characteristics of the mayor–council form of government suggest two working hypotheses. The first hypothesis is the most simple and can be called the “lack of professionalization” hypothesis. During the progressive reform, municipal reformers attempted to weaken mayoral power within city politics by giving authority to professional executives. These professional executives



run the daily city administration and policy implementation; emphasizing professional values, norms, and standards in the administration. In addition, these reformed governments emphasize significantly the role of professional planning and land-use regulations (Renner 2001). Since smart growth practices are commonly associated with good planning practices, it is expected that cities with mayor–council forms of government are relatively less likely to adopt any of the three types of smart growth regulations studied here. The second working hypothesis is the “lack of political insulation” hypothesis. Based on this hypothesis, mayors are less driven by professional values and more interested in their political future. Since mayors are responsible for implementing local policies and regulations, they become highly visible political entrepreneurs who can champion policies and regulations and can use this entrepreneurial power for championing policies that help them to advance in their political careers. As a result of the lack of insulation, there are two alternative hypotheses. The first assumes that mayors are part of the growth machine and more receptive to interest groups associated with the development industry. Therefore, they deliver only smart growth instruments that facilitate growth, such as smart growth zoning and density bonuses, but they are not associated with the adoption of any type of growth boundaries. The second alternative assumes that mayors are subject to political pressures and demands of every interest group, not just pro-development interests (Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Marando and Thomas 1977). This alternative hypothesis suggests that the mayor–council form of government will simply amplify the voice of any interest group that delivers strong political support. The idea that a mayor will amplify the power of any strong political group can be better modeled with a series of interactive terms that capture the interaction of the mayor–council form of government with the level of activism of three interest groups. The three interest groups that interact with this form of government are the groups introduced in the previous section: developers, environmentalists, and homeowners. The political institutions framework also calls for the differentiation between weak and strong mayors. In the strong mayor form, political institutions vest more power in the mayor’s position than in the council, making the mayor a true chief executive with almost complete control over the administration and the adoption of public policies. In this institutional arrangement, the mayor becomes the prime actor in the formulation and initiation of public policies, including those that require city council approval. One of the common provisions used to identify strong mayors is the veto power. Based on this idea, I expect that strong mayors are more



effective in amplifying the voice of powerful interest groups in the community than weak mayors. The form of representation, by district-based or at-large elections, also mediates between interest groups affected by land-use decisions. At-large elections increase the costs for representation of territorial interests, particularly NIMBY-type interests, because representatives elected at large do not depend upon support from geographical interests and constituencies (Clingermayer and Feiock 1993). In addition, representatives elected at large serve a citywide constituency and are more likely to think in aggregated terms and respond to a broader set of political interests than those found in a single district. For this reason, they are more likely to pursue a broader definition of public good. The expectation is that the higher the percentage of at-large seats in the council, the more likely it is that the city will adopt smart growth regulations of any type. Although district-based elections are more likely to amplify responsiveness to territorial interests, thus reducing the adoption of density bonuses, at-large-based elections are more likely to result in the adoption of policies such as growth boundaries, density bonuses, and smart growth zoning that overlook territorial interests. The legislative structure of local governments and, in particular, the existence of standing committees and boards are also expected to influence the adoption of smart growth regulations. Committees and boards provide a forum for discussion and detailed analysis of new policies and land-use regulations. Standing committees are expected to promote discussion about public issues and to explore new policies and solutions. In addition, they also study legislation, hear testimonies, and make recommendations to the city council (Pelissero and Krebs 1997). In the same way, boards are believed to increase the number of participants and points of view as well as the resources available to explore new policies to deal with current issues. Members of committees and boards are frequently appointed by mayors and confirmed by the entire council. Since boards and committees enhance participation, it is expected that they influence the adoption of smart growth regulations. Particularly, it is expected that boards and committees are positively associated with the adoption of any smart growth regulation that promotes compact developments and curbs urban sprawl. Other types of institutions expected to influence the adoption of smart growth practices are those that facilitate direct democracy. Previous work revealed that when the adoption of local policies is subject to direct democracy institutions, anti-growth interests such as those of NIMBY and environmentalist groups receive an advantage (Gerber and Phillips 2004a, 2004b). The rationale is that dispersed interests such as environmental and



territorial groups will be able to influence the protection of their interests by using these mechanisms. One of the most common mechanisms used to encourage decision making by direct democracy is the provision for citizens’ initiative. A hypothesis that emerges from this theory is that in cities with the initiative provision, the community is more likely to adopt growth boundaries and smart growth zoning. However, since mechanisms of direct democracy are also used by territorial groups such as homeowners, initiative provision is not expected to advance redistributive policies such as density bonuses. In addition to variables derived from the property rights, interest groups, and political institutions models, other variables may affect the adoption of smart growth regulations that promote compact development. The model that is tested in the next section includes several control variables to account for those effects. Two variables—the percentage of residents below poverty level and median income—measure the socioeconomic status of the community. Other variables capture the geographic position of the city in terms of its proximity to a metropolitan area. The next variable measures whether there is a separate development office in the city, and a final variable measures population size. Although these control variables could be interesting for discussion and analysis, they are not central to the three theoretical models tested here. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, the effects of control variables are omitted from the discussion in the following sections since they are not of primary interest.1

Data Collection Florida is an outstanding laboratory to study the interaction between political institutions and smart growth policies. In 1985, the Florida legislature passed the State Comprehensive Plan (Chapter 187, Fla. Stat.) and the Omnibus Growth Management Act (GMA) to manage growth (DeGrove 1989). The GMA identified the desire to balance the needs for development with the protection of natural resources such as land, air, and water. GMA requires adopting Local Government Comprehensive Plans that guide future growth and development. These plans provide a unique opportunity for local governments to introduce innovative planning and smart growth instruments. In addition to local comprehensive plans, since cities in Florida have a uniform grant of home rule, they can create and update development codes and ordinances for managing growth with the frequent use of good planning practices.



The variety of ordinances, mandates, and plans in which smart growth practices are identified generates a challenge for this study. To deal with this problem, the data for the analysis were collected from several sources. Appendixes A and B offer a detailed explanation of data sources. Data on land-use regulations were collected from a survey conducted between November 2006 and April 2007 among all 405 municipalities by the DeVoe Moore Center at Florida State.2 The response rate of this survey was approximately 56%. The survey asked a series of questions regarding landuse regulation practices in the state. A number of independent variables were collected from the International City Management Association’s 2001 Municipal Form of Government Survey and are complemented with information from various cities’ Web sites as well as a telephone survey. Various control variables as well as others that test the property rights hypotheses were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau (Census 2000 data for the state of Florida). Finally, variables of the level of activism of interest groups in the community were collected from a survey conducted in 2002, also by the DeVoe Moore Center, with a response rate of 82.2%. These surveys provided unique information not available in archival sources regarding the perceptions of planning directors of issues in the community related to growth as well as the activism of interest groups. By merging surveys from 2002 and 2007, the number of usable cases for analysis was reduced to 147 cases, approximately 37% of cities in Florida. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in this analysis are presented in Table 1.

Method The analyses performed in this study used three dependent variables in the form of count outcomes. Table 2 presents the description of these dependent variables. The dependent variables for the analysis of growth boundaries, density bonuses, and smart growth zoning were generated by the count of instruments adopted for each type. Count outcomes typically take on values that represent the number of times some event occurred during a given interval of time, in this case the number of regulations of a given category adopted by the city. Count data are not well estimated by ordinary least squares regressions, given their nonnormal distribution and the common large number of zeros. For that reason, dependent variables were analyzed using Poisson regression analysis. This analysis is adequate for a unit of analysis that represents counts that are nonnegative integer-valued random variables that also have a large number of zeros (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). This model



Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables Variable

Mean

Urban sprawl Population change, 1990–2000 Density Developers Environmental groups Homeowner associations Mayor–council government Mayor and developers Mayor and environmentalists Mayor and homeowners Mayor veto At-large seats Standing committees Citizens’ boards Initiative provision Metro area Separate development office Population (2000) Percentage below poverty Median income Percentage of homeownership

2.08 22.44 2,370.18 2.82 3.45 3.46 0.27 0.61 0.69 0.61 0.13 0.86 0.51 0.84 0.66 1.57 0.07 21.21 14.33 $39,361 58.4

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

1.23 74.87 2,641.17 1.02 0.95 0.86 0.45 1.25 1.42 1.32 0.34 0.32 0.50 0.37 0.47 0.81 0.25 54.20 8.76 $21,530 13.6

1 –99.1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 $0 0

5 1300 20,267.1 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 735.6 55.6 $200,001 90.6

expresses the natural logarithm of the number of instruments adopted of each type as a linear function of the set of dependent variables presented in the model. Therefore, as the number of counts increases, the proportion of predicted zeros decreases, and the distribution around the expected value becomes approximately normal (Long 1997). Although a negative binomial model can also be used for analyzing count data, the small level of overdispersion proved the Poisson model to be the most adequate. The lack of overdispersion in the data was confirmed by the dispersion factor, lambda, generated in estimations of these models using the negative binomial model.

Results The results of the Poisson regressions are presented in Table 3.3 The table includes one column for each type of regulation, including standard errors in parentheses. Since the dependent variable is the log of the expected count



Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Boundaries Density bonuses Smart growth zoning

0.28 1.18 1.93

0.69 2.03 1.57

Min.

Max.

0 4 0 11 0 7

as a function of the independent variables, the coefficients do not have a simple interpretation as in a linear model. For that reason, the table also provides the incident rate ratios for each model in a separate column, which help to provide more intuitive interpretations of the coefficients. I will use these ratios to interpret the effect of selected variables in the model. The coefficients produced from the property rights model provided support only for the association between the perception of urban sprawl as a problem and the adoption of density bonuses and smart growth zoning. However, the association between this perception and the adoption of growth boundaries is not significant. Also, an increase of population between 1990 and 2000 appeared to have a negative effect on the count of smart growth zoning instruments. Population density is also significantly associated with a decrease in the count of adopted growth boundaries. These results suggest that cities in Florida already densely populated or experiencing high rates of growth do not promote the adoption of compact developments using growth boundaries or flexible zoning. Considering the variables that capture the interest groups model, the analysis provides various significant results. First, the activism of environmental groups is significantly associated with the adoption of density bonuses in the expected direction. The results indicate that if two cities have equal values in terms of all variables in the model, but in one of them the environmental groups are more active by one unit of the perceptual scale, the city in which environmentalists are more active has a predicted count of density bonuses 1.65 times that of the city with lower environmental activism. In addition, the activism of developers is significantly associated to a limited adoption in the number of density bonuses, which may be an unexpected result.4 Finally, the perception of homeowner activism alone is not significantly associated with any category of smart growth regulations. The results offer mixed evidence on the effect of political institutions. The mayor–council form of government is associated with a limited use of density bonuses, which provides support for the lack of professionalism



Table 3 Poisson Analysis and Incidence Rate Ratios (standard errors in parentheses) Incidence Rate Boundaries Ratio Urban sprawl Population change, 1990–2000 Density

Developers

–0.212 (0.223) –0.201 (0.234) 0.235 (0.348)

Environmental groups Homeowner associations Mayor–council government Mayor and developers Mayor and environmentalists Mayor and homeowners Mayor veto At-large seats Standing committees Citizens’ boards Initiative provision

Metro area Separate development office

0.144 (0.165) 0.0007 (0.006) –0.0002* (0.0001)

–5.752 (3.795) –1.925* (1.131) –2.387 (1.733) 4.259* (2.293) 0.415 (0.579) 1.831** (0.907) –0.357 (0.433) 15.087 (852) –0.483 (0.403) –0.685* (0.391) 0.079 (0.492)

Density Bonuses

Incidence Rate Ratio

Smart Growth Zoning

Property Rights 1.155 0.207*** 1.229 0.143*** (0.066) (0.049) 1.001 0.003 1.003 –0.004* (0.002) (0.002) 0.999 0.00007 1.00007 –0.0003 (0.00004) (0.00003) Interest Groups 0.809 –0.245*** 0.783 –0.0008 (0.092) (0.067) 0.818 0.503*** 1.654 0.054 (0.115) (0.083) 1.265 –0.140 0.869 0.112 (0.146) (0.107) Political Institutions 0.003 –3.495*** 0.030 0.537 (1.414) (0.909) 0.146 0.985 2.679 0.028 (0.203) (0.148) 0.092 –0.288 0.750 0.034 (0.297) (0.234) 70.771 0.445* 1.560 –0.257 (0.241) (0.197) 1.514 –0.109 0.897 –0.192 (0.280) (0.207) 6.243 0.424 1.528 0.115 (0.259) (0.191) 0.700 0.427** 1.533 –0.167 (0.178) (0.132) 3567331 0.951** 2.587 0.734** (0.435) (0.327) 0.617 –0.200 0.819 –0.120 (0.172) (0.136) Control Variables 0.504 0.297** 1.346 –0.347*** (0.126) (0.110) 1.082 –0.594** 0.552 –0.254 (0.251) (0.179)

Incidence Rate Ratio 1.154 0.996 0.999

0.999 1.055 1.119

1.712 1.028 1.035 0.774 0.825 1.122 0.846 2.083 0.887

0.707 0.776

(continued)



Table 3 (continued) Incidence Rate Boundaries Ratio Population (2000) Percentage below poverty Median income Percentage of homeownership Constant N Prob χ2 Pseudo R2 Log likelihood (full model)

0.006 (0.006) 0.034 (0.037) 0.0029 (0.000) –0.016 (0.019) –15.796 (852) 146 0.0013 .30 –71.36

1.006 1.034 1.003 0.984

Density Bonuses 0.007*** (0.002) –0.035** (0.016) –0.019** (0.000) –0.018*** (0.007) –0.619 (1.013) 146 0.0367 0.17 –244.49


Smart Growth Zoning


1.007

0.003** (0.002) –0.023* (0.012) –0.013** (0.00001) –0.012* (0.005) 1.435 (0.798) 146 0.000 0.13 –242.78

1.003

0.965 0.981 0.982

0.977 0.987 0.988 0.707

***p ≤ .01. **p ≤ .05. *p ≤ .10.

hypothesis. The findings indicate that if two cities have the same values for all variables in the model, but the form of government in only one of them is mayor–council, the city with this form of government has a predicted count of density bonuses of 0.03 times that of the other city with a council– manager form of government. This finding provides significant support to the lack of professionalization hypothesis, which suggests that the mayor– council form of government tends to be less professionalized and therefore less likely to adopt innovative instruments for delivering public services such as density bonuses. The interaction terms that measure the effect of political markets offer mixed results. First, homeowners’ activism interacting with the activism of the mayor–council form of government is associated with an increase in the count of boundaries as well as an increase in density bonuses. An increase in the perception of homeowners’ activism in one unit of the perceptual scale in a city where the form of government is mayor–council results in the expected count of density bonuses to increase by a factor of 0.445, and in the expected count of growth boundaries, to increase by a factor of 4.259, holding all other variables in the model constant. The effect on boundaries was expected because boundaries are desirable for homeowners



in that they preserve the quality of life in the community, encourage compact development, and protect property values. The effect of the interactive term on density bonuses did not support the idea that owners do not desire them because they are redistributive policies. It does, however, support the alternative hypothesis that density bonuses can allow the city to provide public services to the community without making current residents pay for them. From the perspective of homeowners, this result upholds the proposition that the benefits of public services outweigh the costs of living in more densely populated areas. As hypothesized, the interaction between developers’ activism and the mayor–council form of government is inversely associated with the count of growth boundaries adopted in a city. In a city with a mayor–council form of government, an increase in the perception of the activism of developers by one unit of the perceptual scale results in the expected count of growth boundaries to decrease by a factor of 1.925, holding all other variables in the model constant. This result significantly supports the expectation that the mayor–council form of government creates a political market in which developers receive their preferred regulations. The percentage of at-large seats on the council is significantly associated with the count of the boundaries adopted. An increase of 10% will result in the expected count of boundaries to increase in the city by a factor of 1.831, holding all other variables in the model constant. In other words, if two cities have the same values for all variables in the model, but the percentage of seats on the council elected at large differs by 10%, the city with a larger percentage of seats elected at large has a predicted count of growth boundaries of 1.83 times the count of the city with a smaller percentage. This finding supports the notion that council members elected at large have a more comprehensive perspective of the public good and are less responsive to territorial groups. Therefore, at-large members of the council will be more receptive to the idea of creating growth boundaries that may improve the quality of life in the entire municipality. The political institutions in the legislative process have a significant and strong effect on the expected count of density bonuses and smart growth zoning instruments. Both associations are in the predicted direction. The results indicate that if two cities have the same values for all variables in the model but in one of them the council forms standing committees, the city with committees has a predicted count of density bonuses 1.53 times that of the city without committees. In addition, one can be affirm that if two cities are equal in terms of all variables in the model, except for the existence of citizens’ boards, the city with citizens’ boards has a predicted count of density bonuses 2.58 times that of the city without citizens’ boards. Downloaded from uar.sagepub.com at CIDE BIBLIOTECA on September 5, 2011


Neither committees nor boards are significantly associated with a high count of growth boundaries. The results indicate that three political institutions are not significantly associated with the count of any of the categories of land-use regulations analyzed. The results do not provide any support to the idea that initiative provision is associated with the count of any of the land-use regulations that promote compact development. Also, the results do not support the expectation that veto power is associated with the adoption of any types of landuse regulations that promote compact development. Finally, the effect of the interaction between the activism of environmentalist groups with a mayor–council form of government does not appear to have an effect on the count of any of the instruments analyzed here.

Discussion Despite its strong intellectual and emotional appeal, smart growth has become a practice that according to some is “much more talked about than actually carried out in practice” (Downs and Costa 2005, 367). This article has provided a first approach to the elements that contribute to the slow adoption of smart growth practices. In terms of the expectations generated by the property rights model, the case of Florida provides support to the notion that the identification of growth as the cause of traffic congestion and declines in quality of life can trigger the adoption of land-use regulations to curb the effects of urban sprawl (Glickfeld and Levine 1992). However, the results indicate also that the negative perceptions of growth are likely to trigger the adoption of density bonuses and smart growth zoning but not the adoption of growth boundaries. This finding suggests that regulatory instruments that tackle the same issue may have different chances to be adopted, depending upon their redistributive consequences for interest groups in the community. This result indicates that classifying smart growth instruments based on their redistributive consequences is appropriate for and advantageous to their analysis. In this sense, the results presented here complement previous studies that point out that municipalities are more responsive to demands from powerful interest groups that can contribute to a city’s economic growth (Mladenka 1981). This common belief has created the expectation that in local politics, political and economic incentives triumph over public interests (Fleischmann 1989). Development interests are highly concerned with land-use decisions, because land-use policies directly affect the risks and profitability of their activities. Like other business interests, development Downloaded from uar.sagepub.com at CIDE BIBLIOTECA on September 5, 2011


interest groups are often organized and well financed, making them strong candidates to become powerful articulators of political demand. However, the case of Florida shows that this expectation needs to take into consideration the institutions for collective decision making in the community, particularly the local political institutions, because political institutions may significantly affect the capacity of planners, local officials, environmentalists, and even developers who want to promote smart growth or any other approach to land-use regulations. Political institutions alone and in combination with the activism of interest groups explain some level of variation in the adoption of boundaries and density bonuses in Florida. The adoption of growth boundaries seems to be associated with the interaction between political institutions and interest groups. For instance, the activism of homeowners and developers appears to have an effect on the adoption of growth boundaries only when it takes place in the context of a mayor–council form of government. Also, the election at large of council members seems to be associated with the adoption of boundaries. These results point toward the need for further exploration of the effects of political markets on the adoption of smart growth policies. Moreover, the study provides some support for the lack of insulation hypothesis by showing the level of responsiveness that mayors have to political groups. The lack of political insulation appears to enhance the adoption of smart growth instruments but only if those instruments have positive redistributive consequences for a strong coalition of interests in the municipality. In general terms, the analysis suggests that unreformed governments in Florida seem less likely to deliver land-use regulations that promote compact development, particularly in the form of density bonuses. The findings indicate that density bonuses are the only smart growth practice that appears to be directly affected by the activism of developers and environmentalists regardless of the political institutions and growth pressures. This result confirms that the interest groups hypotheses perform adequately, explaining the adoption of smart growth instruments with a strong redistributive effect. However, an unexpected result in the analysis is the negative effect that developers’ activism has on the adoption of density bonuses. This finding provides reason to believe that developers prefer other forms of land-use regulations that provide opportunities for more intense use of the land without requiring them to deliver costly public goods in exchange, which calls for further research that explores in detail the context of the adoption of density bonuses. Smart growth zoning is a regulation that has limited redistributive effects because it concentrates on making the development process flexible. Often, the majority of residents benefit from their adoption because they tend to be Downloaded from uar.sagepub.com at CIDE BIBLIOTECA on September 5, 2011


linked to redevelopment and economic development strategies that often benefit most of the community. In the case of Florida, neither interest groups alone nor interacting with the form of government seems to affect the adoption of such zoning instruments. This finding suggests that smart growth zoning is a type of smart growth regulation with relatively neutral redistributive effects. Future research is needed to find the extent to which these seemingly neutral instruments are more likely to become automatic responses to the problems caused by sprawl and more easily adopted, as they do not directly affect the interests of powerful groups in the community. The existence of boards seems to be connected with the implementation of smart growth practices in Florida. More precisely, the results indicate that the direct participation of residents in boards is significantly associated with an increase in the count of density bonuses and smart growth zoning instruments. The findings presented here also show that the existence of committees seems to be significantly associated with an increase in the use of density bonuses. These findings suggest that cities where decision making is participatory and there are more resources for exploring new policies are more likely to adopt smart growth practices, particularly density bonuses and smart growth zoning. The analysis discussed here has limitations that need to be taken into consideration before considering any generalization. First, although the data set did not show any evident form of bias, the analysis relies on a restricted group of cities, given that data collected from statewide surveys often produce small response rates. Second, the model has been tested here in a rapidly growing state with a strong vocation for managing growth, which is not representative of most states in the United States. In addition, the data were collected after several years of strong growth and high property values in the state of Florida. It is plausible that cities that have experienced slow growth rates or that are located in states with weak vocation for regulating land markets may offer different insights. These limitations present an opportunity for future research to expand our understanding of the adoption of smart growth practices in America.

Conclusion This study has examined the adoption of smart growth practices as well as other land-use regulations practices in Florida, concentrating on the analysis of regulatory instruments and not on the adoption of general principles. The article introduced the idea that redistributive impacts vary across specific regulatory instruments of smart growth and that these redistributive Downloaded from uar.sagepub.com at CIDE BIBLIOTECA on September 5, 2011


effects mobilize different interests. In addition, the study integrated the rules for collective decision making in local governments as well as the interaction between these institutions and the activism of interest groups. In other words, the article provided an initial exploration of the extent to which different local political institutions provide political access to different types of interests involved in local land-use politics. Finally, the study has illustrated how and why specific smart growth regulations impact specific interests. The results presented here suggest that many existing studies lack explanatory power because they tend to treat smart growth policies as a vague package of undifferentiated policies or principles. However, the analysis also has limitations that should be addressed by future studies. In addition to the limitations imposed by the data and the particularities of the case discussed above, the model tested here calls for additional research that explores the effects of regional competition on the adoption of smart growth practices. Regional competition and cooperation are likely to affect the adoption of land-use regulations that promote compact development because they add a new layer of incentives for cities to adopt smart growth practices. For instance, local governments compete to improve their economic well-being by attracting residents who pay higher taxes and firms that can promote their interests by moving to another city. In this context, land-use regulations that promote compact developments tend to be unpopular because these regulations may reduce the competitiveness of cities to attract new businesses. These effects are beyond the scope of this article and suggest new lines to extend the model in future studies. Appendix A Dependent Variables Variable

Description

Boundaries*

Density bonuses*

Smart growth zoning*

Count of the following regulations adopted: Greenbelts, rural protection lines, urban services areas/boundaries, and urban growth boundary Count of the following density bonuses adopted: parks/recreation facilities, affordable housing, public land dedication, design amenities (on-site or off-site), transfer of development rights, retail activity at street level, mixed-use development, historic preservation, open space or common areas, day care centers, and mass transit centers Count of the following regulations adopted: mixed-use development zoning, incentive zoning, historic district zoning, open space zoning, performance zoning, form-based zoning, and cluster developments

Note: *2007 survey.



Appendix B Independent Variables Variable

Description

Population density (2000)* Population change, 1990–2000* Sprawl** Developers**

Inhabitants per square mile Population change from 1990 to 2000 To what extent urban sprawl is an issue in the community Extent to which developers are active in supporting economic development in the city Environmental groups** Extent to which environmental groups are active in supporting economic development in the city Homeowner associations** Extent to which homeowner associations are active in supporting growth management in the city Percentage of homeownership* Percentage of homeownership in the city Initiative provision* Provision for initiative in the city Mayor veto* Mayor’s veto power At-large seats* Percentage of seats elected at large in the council Mayor–council government* Mayor–council form of government Mayor and developers* Interaction term mayor–council form of government and active developers Mayor and homeowners* Interaction term mayor–council form of government and active homeowners Mayor and environmentalists* Interaction term mayor–council form of government and active environmentalists Standing committees* Provision for standing committees in the city Citizens’ boards* Provision for participation of citizens’ boards in the city Metro area* Metro area code: • 1 = city is in the largest 9 metros • 1.5 = city is in the next 4 largest (includes Pensacola and Tallahassee in the panhandle) • 2 = cities in remaining smaller metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) • 3 = cities not in an MSA Separate development office** Existence of a separate development office in the city Median income* Median income in the city Population (2000)* Population in 2000 Poverty level* Percentage of residents below poverty level Note: *U.S. Census Bureau. **2002 survey.

Notes 1. Also, the effects of the property rights model on the adoption of smart growth practices will only be discussed briefly. The reasons for compacting this discussion are mainly the limitation of space and the desire of the author to focus the discussion on the redistributive effects of smart growth practices. 2. The 2007 survey included a questionnaire sent to the directors of the planning or growth management departments. In the case of small cities, the mail was sent to the mayor or the city


Ramírez de la Cruz / The Politics of Compact Development 243 manager. The first stage of the survey included a mail survey and a reminder sent by mail. In the second stage, the survey conducted telephone follow-up calls to nonrespondents. The 2002 survey was also conducted among planning or growth management directors and included a questionnaire sent by mail with follow-up calls to nonrespondents. Two factors may explain the differences in the response rate of these surveys. First, in comparison to the 2007 survey, the 2002 survey was more limited in terms of the length and number of questions. Second, while the 2002 survey included questions mostly regarding growth management practices, the 2007 survey included questions also regarding the permitting process for land development. In some cities, answering this questionnaire required the participation of respondents in separate departments, which may have discouraged some respondents. 3. To test the robustness of the estimates of the Poisson models, I performed various sensitivity tests. I also tested the models with a logistic regression, creating a dichotomous variable for each type of regulation (0 = no regulations of a specific type, and 1 = one or more regulations). In general terms, the estimates show high levels of robustness. Almost all variables resulted significant and in the same direction in the logistic model. Three exceptions came from variables that in the Poisson regression resulted significant at only 10% and not significant in the logistic regression. However, even not significant estimates resulted in the same direction in both models. 4. An alternative explanation of these hypotheses is that developer-friendly cities might be allowing developers to build densely without requiring any concessions from them. In this case, developers might prefer to be able to build the project they want without being required to pay for public goods.

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Edgar E. Ramírez de la Cruz is an assistant professor in the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University. His primary interest is urban governance. He is also interested in land-use regulation, growth management, political institutions, and networks and public management.

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