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Authority Structures and Service Reform in Multilevel Urban Governance: The Case of Wastewater Recycling in California and Australia Sara Hughes Urban Affairs Review published online 5 September 2012 DOI: 10.1177/1078087412458762 The online version of this article can be found at: http://uar.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/04/1078087412458762

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Authority Structures and Service Reform in Multilevel Urban Governance: The Case of Wastewater Recycling in California and Australia

Urban Affairs Review XX(X) 1­–27 © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1078087412458762 http://uar.sagepub.com

Sara Hughes1,2

Abstract Research on urban service delivery strategies lacks a multilevel approach able to account for the influence of authority structures on effective reform. A comparative analysis of efforts to increase recycled wastewater production in the United States (specifically California) and Australia is used to evaluate the effectiveness of centralized and or decentralized urban governance systems in reform efforts and, more importantly, the institutional and political mechanisms underlying these differences. The results show that Australia, with a more centralized system, has more effectively set and implemented an urban water governance agenda that includes recycled urban wastewater. However, in both places local resistance has been a barrier to effective change. These findings demonstrate that reform capacity and policy success may differ between governance systems while common barriers and political dynamics persist.

1

University of California, Santa Barbara National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO, USA

2

Corresponding Author: Sara Hughes, National Center for Atmospheric Research, 3090 Center Green Drive, Boulder, CO 80305 Email: [email protected]

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Keywords multilevel governance, recycled water, service delivery, urban governance The service delivery decisions made by cities have significant consequences for progress in policy issues that stretch beyond city boundaries such as land conservation, water conservation, and climate change adaptation and mitigation (Maciocco et al. 2009; Ernston et al. 2010; Gustavsson, Elander, and Lundmark 2009). In many cases, because of increasing resource scarcity and conflicts among users, cities are being asked or encouraged to change the way they provide services in order to produce broader benefits. Research in this area has led to progress in understanding how local institutional arrangements shape and constrain the decisions cities make about resource management and service strategies (Brody et al. 2008; Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez 2005; Marks and Zadoroznyj 2005; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011; Zahran et al. 2008; Sager 2004). However, the production of urban service delivery strategies is not confined to local political processes, nor are they shaped exclusively by local institutional structures. A full understanding of the origins, effectiveness, and politics of urban service delivery strategies requires a multilevel governance approach that is currently lacking (DiGaetano and Strom 2003; Sellers and Lidstrom 2007). This study approaches urban governance as a multilevel process in order to examine the role institutionalized authority structures play in efforts to reform urban services. The aim is to evaluate whether centralized or decentralized urban governance systems are more effective in their reform efforts and what institutional and political mechanisms underlie these differences. The study does not seek to identify an ideal authority structure but to evaluate the reform pathways and dynamics generated by different urban governance structures. A better understanding of how differences in the distribution of authority are engaged by and through the policy process can provide needed insights into multilevel urban governance and opportunities for more effective policy design (Pierre 2005; Brenner 2009; Sellers 2002). A comparison of efforts to increase the production of recycled urban wastewater for purposeful reuse in the United States (specifically California) and Australia is used to examine the effects of authority allocation on effectiveness in urban service reform. Urban wastewater recycling is a useful case because it can decrease the amount of water a city must draw from rivers and reservoirs to meet the needs of its residents, industry, and businesses but local governments are often unable to overcome the high capital requirements, transaction costs, and political resistance associated with wastewater recycling

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on their own. The United States and Australia are two of the leading countries in recycled wastewater development, and in both places targets have been developed in the wake of multiyear droughts. Urban water governance in the United States is highly decentralized, and therefore California is used as a useful window into the U.S. case because it shares a similar environmental management context with Australia—a dry climate, overallocated water systems, and high urban population densities and income levels—but differs in the allocation of authority for urban water services. This case selection thus allows for a comparative analysis of efforts to change urban service delivery strategies in a multilevel governance context. The next section of the article provides a review of existing research on multilevel urban governance in decentralized and centralized contexts and the scale politics of urban governance reform. The second section describes the case selection, data, and methods used in the comparative analysis. Interviews with key informants, policy documents, meetings, agency records, and newspaper accounts are used to analyze the policy efforts of California and Australia to increase the production of recycled urban wastewater. The analysis shows that while Australia has been more successful in setting an urban water governance agenda that includes recycled urban wastewater, in both places local resistance has been a barrier to effective change. These findings demonstrate that reform capacity and policy success may differ between governance systems while common barriers and political dynamics persist.

Multilevel Governance and Urban Service Delivery Strategies The incentives and opportunities generated at multiple sites and scales of governance can shape the decisions cities make about service strategies and, subsequently, the consequences for broader policy goals (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Sellers 2002; Gustavsson, Elander, and Lundmark 2009). A key source of institutional variation between urban governance systems is the level of authority given to local governments, which can help determine the participants, objectives, instruments, and outcomes of urban governance (Rothstein 1996; Pierre 1999). There is a long history of debate in the political and administrative sciences surrounding the ideal allocation of authority for effective policy making (Ostrom and Ostrom 1971; Howell-Moroney 2008; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981). Empirical and meta-analytic research have failed to link one particular mode of multilevel governance with effective policy delivery (Newig and Fritsch 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2003). Rather than determining whether one mode

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of governance is superior to another, the aim of this article is to link policy pathways and barriers that exist in decentralized and centralized systems to the politics and effectiveness of reform efforts. The degree to which authority in a multilevel governance system is centralized or decentralized will have consequences for the policy pursued at higher levels to promote urban service delivery reform and the capacity of different levels of government to implement change. In decentralized systems, the lack of authority at higher levels means that they are unlikely to have the necessary constitutional or political means with which to explicitly steer the course of action cities will take, but they could provide leadership, set goals, and provide incentives in ways that initiate action at the local level. Decentralized systems are likely to have a greater number of veto players, or actors with the ability to prevent progress in reform efforts (Tsebelis 2002), and as governance complexity increases so can competition for resources and votes (Mullin 2009; Berry 2008). Higher levels of government can act as enablers that support local governments to take on activities that contribute to broader goals (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2003). Even if there is not the authority to mandate change from above, motivating strategies such as incentives and targets can be used to help steer urban governance toward desired outcomes. In highly centralized multilevel governance systems, higher levels of government are in a better position to dictate the course of urban decision making because of their ability to structure the opportunities and responsibilities of local decision makers and potentially greater implementation capacity. If authority is concentrated in a central government, they could develop planning strategies that align local actions and decision making with central priorities. When central governments have more authority, they may be more likely to provide funding to local governments, to create opportunities for coordination among the necessary parties, and to provide political cover or legitimacy for local politicians and decision makers who need to support the changes. In decentralized systems of governance, higher levels of government can provide incentives for actions at the local level and provide space for local innovation, processes that can result in more effective policy making through creativity and specificity. Decentralized governance can lead to more successful reform efforts because of its reliance on local knowledge and capacity and its ability to provide greater flexibility in policy design. Local governments are often more closely tied to the local context, which can reduce transaction costs and improve implementation.

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There are also reasons decentralized governance can be less effective. Citizens can face greater transaction costs when expressing preferences or concerns in decentralized contexts because of the need to interact with multiple decision-making bodies. The administrative costs of multiple jurisdictions in an area may drive up the price of government as many urban reforms require investment, coordination, and political support for success. Some studies have shown greater levels of regulatory capture at the local level (Ashworth, Boyne, and Walker 2002). Others have found that local autonomy can actually inhibit innovation, particularly when local governments are given responsibility without flexible and available funding mechanisms (Basolo and Scally 2008). Finally, local governments are likely to engage in policy making that has interjurisdictional spillover effects, such as environmental and natural resource management, and in the aggregate these local decisions may lead to irrational or undesirable outcomes and can undermine national or state-level policy goals (Azfar et al. 2004). The success of decentralized systems may ultimately hinge on the particular institutions and capacities of local governments (Krane, Ebdon, and Bartle 2004). In decentralized systems, the central government can act as an enabler that supports local governments to take on activities that contribute to environmental policy goals even if it does not have the authority to mandate using incentives and targets (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2003). In centralized systems central governments can more directly structure opportunities and incentives for local decision makers and develop planning strategies that align local actions and decision making with central priorities (Sellers 2002). As a result, there is no clear expectation for whether more or less local control in urban governance will result in more effective policy efforts to change urban service delivery strategies. However, in either case, central governments can play an important role, and unique pathways to urban service reform and implementation are likely. The analysis that follows examines whether urban governance systems with more or less local control are able to more effectively change urban service delivery strategy and the policy pathways and barriers underlying these differences.

Case Selection, Methods, and Data The development of urban recycled wastewater is used as the policy case with which to examine the multilevel governance dynamics of urban service delivery reform. Cities everywhere are being encouraged to find ways to

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minimize their impact on surrounding watersheds and reduce the need for further investment in water sourcing (Gleick 2003; Novotny and Brown 2007). Recycling urban wastewater for productive reuse is an increasingly attractive option for managers and decision makers because of its potential to increase supply, reduce environmental pressures, and treat wastewater at the same time (Thomas and Durham 2003; Anderson 2003). However, developing recycled water can also generate political conflicts and governance challenges. The facilities to purposefully treat and distribute recycled water require significant upfront capital investment that local water agencies are often not able or willing to invest on their own. Developing recycled water also means existing governance units are interacting in new, and at times conflicting, ways that can create high transaction costs (Asano 2002; Angelakis, Bontoux, and Lazarova 2003; Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering 2004). Recycled water can also be politically contentious because some perceive its use as a public health risk (Marks and Zadoroznyj 2005). Developing policies that balance the benefits and challenges of developing recycled water is a difficult task and the outcomes are likely to depend on the political structures of decision making. The United States and Australia have been leaders in developing recycled water, being two of only four governments worldwide that have recycled water projects and regulations in place (Angelakis, Bontoux, and Lazarova 2003), and are used as case studies of policy pathways and scale politics in urban service reform. Urban water management in Australia has become increasingly centralized, with the Commonwealth government initiating a series of reforms for the water sector tied to national competitiveness and efficiency. Despite constitutional authority lying with the states, the federal government (the Commonwealth) has significant control over water management (Halligan and Power 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; McKay 2005). This accumulation of centralized power in Australia is not confined to water (Wiltshire 1992) and has resulted in federal–state conflicts and local government being relegated to a subordinate role (Stilwell and Troy 2000). In most states, the water supply and wastewater services of the capital city are managed jointly through single full-service, state-owned corporations. Urban water management in the United States, however, is highly decentralized. To gain traction on the governance of urban service reform, the experiences in California are used as a window into the U.S. experience. California has been the target of national water management legislation in the United States and has made explicit commitments to prioritize recycled water

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for the long-term sustainability of their water resources. California has a decentralized governance system for urban water decision making and planning: authority is allocated to nearly 300 local water departments, special district governments, and private water suppliers within the state. These agencies set water prices, ensure their supplies meet demand, monitor water quality, develop new water sources, and implement conservation and best management practices. As state and federal investment in large water projects have declined during the past 20 years, local responsibility for ensuring water supplies meet water needs has further increased (Milkovich 2003). Australia and California share geographic and demographic features (Table 1) that provide conditions for comparing the effects of authority allocation through a most similar system design (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Both California and Australia are subject to recurring droughts, which have played a role in shaping urban water management policies and strategies (Hundley 2001; Smith 1998; Cody, Folger, and Brougher 2009). California experienced drought conditions from 1987 to 1992 and again from 2007 to 2011, with then-Governor Schwarzenegger declaring a state of emergency in February 2009. Australia experienced drought conditions from 1991 to 1995, 2001 to 2003, and again from 2006 to 2011. In both cases, drought, population growth, and environmental uncertainties have put water scarcity on the political agenda and prompted action on recycled water at higher levels of government. Data were collected through a targeted identification and analysis of government reports, policy documents, newspaper articles, and agency records based on recommendations from policy actors, academics, and Internet searches. Observational methods were also used at public forums and meetings that took place in both California and Australia between 2007 and 2010 and that centered on discussions of urban water management or wastewater recycling. Semistructured interviews with key informants were used to validate and refine the conclusions. Interview participants were chosen using a snowball sampling method (Bernard 2000), beginning with central actors in urban water management. Participants were asked a series of questions regarding their role in urban water management, the policies and programs surrounding wastewater recycling, and the obstacles and achievements they perceive. These three sources of data are used together in the following sections to examine the degree to which California and Australia have been successful in increasing recycled wastewater production and how institutional differences have influenced the effectiveness and political dynamics of their efforts.

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Table 1. Comparison of Geographic and Political Features of Water Recycling in California and Australia California Population

Water management system

Per capita urban water use Motivations to recycle water

Urban governance structure

Australia

36.5 million people 95% in cities 2/3 in southern arid region Highly managed infrastructure network Increasing restrictions on diversions Consistent drought periods 878 liters per person per day

21.7 million people 88% in cities 2/3 in 5 large, coastal cities Highly managed infrastructure network Increasing restrictions on diversions Consistent drought periods 320 liters per person per day Provide reliable water supplies Provide reliable water to mitigate risks from supplies to mitigate risks drought and climate change from drought and climate change Meet environmental targets Meet environmental targets Reduce need for imported Improve efficiency water supplies Decentralized Centralized

Sources: Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering (2004); Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006a, 2006b); Hanak (2005); Landis and Reilly (2004); United States Census Bureau (2007).

Reform Efforts and Effectiveness in California and Australia California In 1991, in the midst of a major drought, California’s state legislature passed the Water Recycling Act (WRA). Recognizing that because of “periodic drought conditions” and that “the development of traditional water resources in California has not kept pace with the state’s population,” the WRA declared that recycled water should be developed as a new, reliable water source that would help meet the state’s water needs. The WRA identified recycled water development as a safe and economical way to reduce water demand for the sensitive Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta and aimed to generate statewide water supply benefits by motivating local water agencies to

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reach a volumetric recycled water development goal. At the time, local recycled water projects were generating around 350,000 acre-feet (432 gigaliters [GL]) of recycled water each year (California Recycled Water Task Force 2003). The WRA set a goal of doubling production to 700,000 acre-feet (864 GL) per year by 2000, and 1 million acre-feet (1233 GL) per year by 2010. To achieve the water recycling targets set in the WRA, the state established guidelines for contracts between recycled water suppliers and retail water suppliers; it required that recycled water be priced by both public and private agencies at a level comparable to or less than potable water in order to provide economic incentives; and it required the California Department of Water Resources to report to the Legislature on the opportunities and constraints that exist for recycled water project construction. Subsequent to the passing of the WRA, California voters approved Proposition 13 in 2000 and Proposition 50 in 2002, both of which were intended to provide millions of dollars in bond money to develop water quality, conservation, and recycling projects throughout the state. Today, California recycles approximately 500,000 acre-feet of treated municipal wastewater, which is about 10% of available treated wastewater, falling short of its 700,000 acre-feet by the year 2000 goal and its 1 million acre-feet by 2010 goal (California Department of Water Resources 2009). The production of recycled water is highly concentrated in southern California, with Orange, San Diego, and Los Angeles counties producing around half of the state’s recycled water supplies. However, more than half (54%) of this recycled municipal wastewater is used for urban water supply, industry, and landscaping purposes, with the remaining 46% of it used for agricultural irrigation (California Department of Water Resources 2009).

Australia Australia has also been driven by drought and increased competition for scarce water resources to take action on urban water service reform. In 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) undertook water sector reforms that culminated in the National Water Reform Framework (the Framework). The Framework signaled the Commonwealth’s intent to steer water management goals for the country through jointly developed principles and programs. The reforms positioned changes in water management as part of the country’s broader efforts to facilitate economic development and revitalization through efficiency (Australian Academy of Technological Science

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and Engineering 2004). However, subsequent state and local efforts to implement these changes did not keep pace with demographic and environmental shifts in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 2004). In 2002 the Australian Senate conducted an inquiry into urban water management motivated by growing water demand, declining environmental health and climate change, as well as the fact that the country was in the midst of a serious drought. One result of the Senate inquiry of 2002 was an assessment of the economic and institutional barriers to greater use of recycled water. The Senate committee proposed a greater role for the Commonwealth as a way to overcome these barriers and recommended initiating a national research initiative on water recycling, including its socioeconomic, technology, environmental, and health-related dimensions. The committee ultimately recommended the establishment of a National Water Partnership that would simplify the institutional arrangements around urban water management and encourage state and local-level targets for water recycling projects (Allison et al. 2002). In 2004 this call was taken up by COAG with the establishment of the 2004 National Water Initiative (NWI). The NWI is an intergovernmental agreement that establishes a national vision and “blueprint for water reform”; by 2006 every state government had agreed to implement the NWI (National Water Commission 2009a; Byrnes, Crase, and Dollery 2006). There are three requirements of the NWI related to urban recycled water development. First, the parties also agreed to jointly set national health and environmental guidelines for priority elements of water-sensitive urban designs, initially recycled waste and storm water, by 2005 (Commonwealth of Australia 2004). Second it requires that the states and territories apply national health and environmental guidelines for recycled water to their individual projects in ways that are “congruent with pricing policies for potable water, and stimulate efficient water use no matter what the source” and deliver plans to the Commonwealth to this effect by 2006 (Commonwealth of Australia 2004). The plans should promote recycled water whenever economically efficient. The third component of the plan is a Commonwealth commitment of AU$1 billion for water projects administered though the Water Smart Australia program. Today Australia is using about 19.4% of its treated wastewater in planned recycled water projects (Table 2). Wastewater recycling in cities increased but the Commonwealth has never set volumetric goals for wastewater recycling. Cities and states are setting targets for themselves as a way to meet the Commonwealth’s overall planning goals. The states have also made their own investments in developing the scientific knowledge and regulatory

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Hughes Table 2. Comparison of Outcomes from Efforts to Increase the Use and Production of Recycled Wastewater in California and Australia California Current level of planned wastewater recycling

647 gigaliters per year 10% of treated wastewater 234 suppliers 0   207.2 gigaliters per year

Recycled wastewater for indoor residential use Recycled wastewater for indirect and outdoor direct use Wastewater recycling target 1233 gigaliters per year by 2010

Projected investment

23% of treated wastewater US$11 billion

Australia 425 gigaliters per year 19.4% of effluent >500 suppliers 1.8 gigaliters per year 16% of households receiving 38.5 gigaliters per year Individual city targets range from 10% to 33% recycling of effluent   AU$1 billion

Sources: California Department of Water Resources (2004); California Recycled Water Task Force (2003); Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and Arts (2009); Hanak (2005); National Water Commission (2008); Radcliffe (2006); State Water Resources Control Board (2002).

frameworks to manage health and safety risks, prompted in part by community concerns regarding water quality (National Water Commission 2009b). Wastewater recycling by urban utilities has risen by 117% since 1999-2000 (National Water Commission 2009b). Sydney produces 33 billion liters of recycled water up from about 20 in 2006, a 65% increase (Sydney Water 2010). Melbourne’s recycled water has increased from 2% of its wastewater in 1999 to 14% today with a goal of 100 GL per year by 2012 (Melbourne Water 2005). Adelaide currently has the highest proportion of wastewater reuse of Australian cities at 30% (National Water Commission 2009b). The national health and environmental guidelines for water recycling were set through the leadership and efforts of the Commonwealth and endorsed by each of the jurisdictions in 2006 (National Water Commission 2009a). Unlike California, Australia has developed policy mechanisms for the recycled water it produces to be used for indoor municipal purposes. The guidelines take a risk management approach based on human health and environmental quality. The water reforms in Australia initiated a rush of water planning in every state and territory—plans that ultimately reflected

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the new shared principles (Hussey and Dovers 2007). The Commonwealth has now accredited all nine state plans as being congruent with national priorities (National Water Commission 2009b). Program funding has been awarded to projects that seek to provide better management or use of water resources. Unlike California, which has been facing unprecedented budget shortfalls, the Commonwealth has consistently had large budget surpluses in the past decade and has distributed more than AU$1 billion to water recycling and desalination projects to the states. However, only 18% of committed program funding (AU$270 million) was awarded competitively through two open funding rounds. The remaining funds have been awarded based on election commitments made in 2004 and 2007, and to National Icon or “Other” projects, where the assessed merit of proposals was not always the key criterion in determining funding.

The Challenges of Decentralized Reform California has consistently fallen short of its goals for the development and use of recycled wastewater. In 2001, the state established the Recycled Water Task Force for the purpose of reviewing and reporting on the opportunities and constraints for recycled water projects in California. The task force was composed of 40 representatives from federal, state, and local government; public health professionals; the private sector; environmental organizations; academia; and public interest groups. In 2003 their report, “Water Recycling 2030: Recommendations of California’s Recycled Water Task Force,” concluded that there is the potential in the state to recycle up to 1.5 million acre-feet of municipal wastewater by 2030, which would require an investment of $11 billion. The major obstacles they identified to further developing recycled water were lackluster support from the public, a lack of coordinated funding for infrastructure and research, and fragmented responsibilities among state agencies (California Recycled Water Task Force 2003). Not everyone has been supportive of the state’s goals, and there have been conflicts at the local level when water agencies and local governments attempt to meet the goals. Efforts to develop recycled water have been labeled “toilet to tap” projects, and various campaigns led by citizens groups, newspapers, and bloggers have labeled recycled water as the equivalent of sewage. In addition to perceptions of the palatability of recycled water, there is an element of distrust in local resistance. Some see the state government as incapable of adequately protecting residents’ health, either through incompetence or industry capture. For example, a retired California soil scientist wrote an article in 2007

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Hughes Table 3. Source and Distribution of State Bond Money Associated with Urban Water Reform in California Year Funding Source Initiated Proposition 13 2000 Proposition 50 2002

Funding Amount

Amount Dedicated to Recycled Water

$763.9 million Unclear, distributed primarily as loans to municipalities and water districts $3.4 billion $60 million

Sources: California State Water Resources Control Board (http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/water_ issues/programs/grants_loans/propositions/prop13.shtml) and California Department of Public Health (http://www.cdph.ca.gov/services/funding/Pages/Prop50.aspx).

discrediting the 2002 Recycled Water Task Force for having too many recycled water industry representatives (Pecarich 2007). The state’s requirement that recycled water be priced by both public and private agencies at a level comparable to or less than potable water has largely been met by those agencies that do serve recycled water (California Recycled Water Task Force 2003). However, high capital costs continue to be a barrier to competitive pricing of recycled water (California Department of Water Resources 2009). The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), the primary regulatory body for water resources in the state, was not involved in recycled water development until Proposition 13 and Proposition 50 passed and they were tasked with distributing the funds (Table 3). Voters in California approved $763.9 million in bond funds for Proposition 13, which in part provides loans and grants for the construction of water recycling facilities. It is not clear how much money has been dedicated to this program but it is ongoing and the majority of funds have been distributed as loans rather than grants; the SWRCB has stated that very limited grant funding is available. Proposition 50 provided $3.4 billion for a range of water supply and treatment purposes throughout the state. Of these funds, $180 million were dedicated to urban and agricultural water conservation, recycling, and other water use efficiency projects. According to the state’s fiscal year 2003-2004 budget, only $60 million was dedicated to water recycling, which is 1.8% of Proposition 50 funds. The funds are distributed based on a priority ranking scheme and are contingent on agencies being in compliance with other state water planning requirements. The political consequences of the state’s efforts to increase the planned production and use of recycled wastewater also include the generation of entirely new arenas for urban governance within the multilevel system. The

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introduction of water recycling targets in California, and the federal funds available to support them, encouraged and empowered local recycled water producers, retail water suppliers, and entities responsible for groundwater replenishment to initiate contracts among themselves to facilitate recycled water distribution and help secure markets for their services. Regional coalitions of local water agencies have emerged, the most prominent example being the Bay Area Recycled Water Coalition (BARWC). The aim of the BARWC is to bring agencies together so that rather than compete individually for federal partnerships, they can support each other’s projects and adopt a regional focus on recycled water development projects that are “highly leveraged and locally managed” (BARWC 2010). The BARWC currently has 14 member agencies from the San Francisco Bay Area and 17 recycled water projects; when fully implemented, the projects will provide 104,000 acre-feet per year of recycled water supplies. Another example of an emerging regional coalition is the South Bay Water Recycling project that involves a regional effort by seven water utilities near San Jose whose aim is to initially construct 100 km (60 miles) of reclaimed water distribution pipelines to serve San Jose, Santa Clara, and Milpitas (Okun 2000). The impetus for the project was to restrict wastewater discharges into South San Francisco Bay but, as it developed, the benefits in making customers "drought-proof" has become the key selling point for bringing customers on line (Okun 2000).

A National Agenda’s Local Implementation There have been challenges to implementing the Commonwealth’s National Water Initiative. State-level water planners had to learn a new language: the language of central government agencies (National Water Commission 2009b). As a result, states were slow in delivering their NWI-consistent state plans. Implementation experiences have also shown that the national guidelines do not support small-scale projects well as they focus on “large-scale systems that have significant resources directed toward their establishment and operation” (National Water Commission 2009b). The institutional complexity surrounding water recycling projects has also presented coordination challenges among the responsible agencies. Despite the strength of federal water planning efforts in Australia, public opinion is still able to prevent the agenda moving forward. Local resistance to recycled water development has been a major barrier to implementation in some places. Opposition arises largely from a perceived health risk and, with rains returning to some areas of Australia, a lack of support to fund new water projects (Hunter and Wahquist 2009). Anti-recycled water development has

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been an opposition party platform in many areas, drawing heavily on public perceptions of health risks in particular. The head of the Environment and Natural Resources Committee (Labor Party) said in December 2009 that “the politics will always be complicated. We need it to get a lot drier and have a much more informed public. . . . We need to move beyond the knee-jerk ‘yuck factor’ response” (Hunter and Wahquist 2009). Local policy bans remain within the authority of local governments and in some places have been effective in limiting the uses of recycled water, even where cost-effective. For example, in 2006 residents in Toowoomba, New South Wales, voted against a proposal to introduce recycled water into the drinking water system despite support for the project from local political leaders (AAP 2006a). With the Commonwealth taking on such a central role in water planning, the roles of other actors have shifted as the system adapts. States have a new and more important planning role than in the past as they hold primary responsibility for translating national priorities into more localized planning actions and strategies. State water planners are responsible for meeting the performance standards set by the Commonwealth and in turn setting targets for local water agencies (Marks and Zadoroznyj 2005). The lack of federal guidance on small-scale recycling projects has also created a vacuum for state governments to fill. South Australia has developed a comprehensive plan for its capital city, Adelaide, in which water recycling projects are funded by encouraging consumers to voluntarily contribute to a scheme that funds projects that reuse water (Department of Water, Land, and Biodiversity Conservation 2004). Sydney Water is making efforts to promote localized water recycling schemes, including changing regulations to make it easier to recycle water locally and even in people’s homes (Sydney Water 2010). As in California, these political processes have generated new spaces within the urban governance system, specifically experimental suburbs that have emerged within cities. Cities are encouraging new, recycled water– centered suburban neighborhoods, particularly in Melbourne, Adelaide, and Sydney. For example, the Western Sydney Recycled Water Initiative is a largely private endeavor whose production of recycled water has allowed for further growth in the northwest part of the city. Melbourne has passed an ordinance that makes recycled water mandatory for 40,000 new homes in the eastern part of the city. The Mawson Lakes planned community in Adelaide, which includes a dual-pipe recycled water system, has been developed as an environmentally progressive suburb. The presence of these recycled water development schemes is becoming a critical factor in meeting water demands, particularly in new or growing areas of cities, and there are early signs of potential conflicts over these resources (Hopkins 2007). These very localized

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projects with high levels of private sector involvement actively seek to alter growth, development, and land-use patterns in cities and could be the source of new urban water governance arenas.

Reforming Urban Water Service Strategies in a Multilevel Context The preceding analysis evaluated the efforts of California and Australia to increase the production of recycled urban wastewater given their unique structures of multilevel urban governance. The results show that Australia, with its more centralized system, has more effectively set and implemented an urban water governance agenda that includes recycled wastewater. The Commonwealth government in Australia has been successful in setting and funding a shared urban water governance agenda that includes regulating and developing recycled wastewater. California, on the other hand, has struggled to harmonize its regulatory framework and reduce the transaction costs encountered by local agencies when developing recycled wastewater but is consistently developing and updating its volumetric targets. The results also reveal the pathways and barriers to urban water management reform generated by institutionalized allocations of authority. In both places local resistance appears as a barrier to reform regardless of authority structure and efforts to reform urban water management authority are helping to create new spaces for urban governance to occur (Figure 1).

Policy Pathways in the Multilevel Governance of Urban Services The results of this comparative study reveal unique reform strategies, differences in effectiveness in achieving policy aims, and common barriers in Australia’s and California’s attempts to reform urban water management, and specifically to increase the production of recycled urban wastewater. Australia’s success comes in part from its ability to lay a coordinated foundation when developing urban recycled water. The Commonwealth first established a coordinated and common framework for managing water resources and then required state-level water managers translate this framework into actionable and locally relevant plans. This allowed questions of governance and financing to be addressed at the beginning stages of the change process, before water managers were asked to accomplish specific tasks. Cities and states have adopted their own targets and are implementing them according to the shared framework with substantial support from the Commonwealth. However, this also means that the continued success of the Commonwealth’s

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Figure 1. Summary of major findings on urban governance structure and urban service reform. Australia, the more centralized governance system, has been more successful in developing and implementing urban water service reform. However, in both places local resistance was a barrier to change and the political dynamics of implementation helped to generate new spaces for urban governance.

reforms depends on the ability of state water plans to be implemented (Hussey and Dovers 2007). An additional challenge Australia faces is adapting its framework and planning process to the scale needs of water users, as illustrated by the states’ request that small-scale recycled water projects be included when developing guidelines. Local innovations and regulatory needs are shaping the national strategy through feedback mechanisms between the state and federal governments. California, on the other hand, lacks the capacity to establish a common framework and instead set targets first. As a result the state has been continually addressing issues of governance and financing during the past 20 years

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through legislation and state ballots but fragmented authority over recycled urban wastewater and severe underfunding remain. A minimum of 28 additional pieces of state legislation have been passed since 1991 related to the production, use, and regulation of recycled water in California. The California Recycled Water Task Force estimates that $11 billion is required for the state to meet its recycled water potential while current investments as a result of the Water Recycling Act are about $240 million. The state has not fully resolved the issues of high capital costs and secure markets in recycled water development, or how best to leverage federal funds. Local resistance to recycled water development was a common barrier to meeting policy aims. In both cases, political pressures stemming from health concerns of residents and water users were able to successfully prevent some projects from moving forward. For example, despite Australia’s more centralized governance system, residents in Towoomba were able to influence local politicians’ decisions to fund and build recycled water facilities despite their contribution to the overarching goals of water reform. In California, the local resistance was one of the major impediments preventing water agencies from moving forward with recycled water projects (California Recycled Water Task Force 2003). This is likely because local resistance in California was coupled with a lack of financial incentives for local agencies to take action.

Urban Governance Structure and Urban Governance Spaces In both California and Australia, the politics involved in implementing changes to urban service delivery strategies created new spaces for urban governance to occur. In California, the creation of new space was driven in part by institutional fragmentation, as cities “widened their space of engagement” (Lundqvist and von Borgstede 2008) in order to leverage federal funding and overcome transaction costs. In the example of BARWC, agencies have decided to engage in a regional effort to leverage funds and develop projects with broad benefits. While coordination and cooperation has also been a part of developing recycled wastewater in southern California, the coalitions of agencies that are forming in northern California are unique in that they have created an entirely new “level” in the urban water governance system—the regional coalition. This difference in coalition building between northern and southern California may be due to the fact that water agencies in southern California have historically been recipients of state and federal

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investment; agencies in northern California may see coalition building as a strategy to compete with the large, experienced agencies in the south for state and federal dollars. In Australia, new spaces were also created but of a different kind. As cities implement the Commonwealth reforms, new areas of engagement are emerging in the form of experimental suburbs. These suburbs are an important new governance space that is particularly attractive to the private sector. This experimentation is a consequence of Australia’s top–down approach to urban water reform that has left room for local planning and implementation and is likely contributing to the effectiveness of the Commonwealth’s new policies and framework (van Roon 2007). The involvement of the private sector and other informal networks in the development of these experimental suburbs is an important area for future research as it may have significant consequences either for achieving or blocking change (Graham and Marvin 2001; Partzsch 2009; Olsson et al. 2006; Huitema and Meijerink 2009). While it is clear that the distribution of authority in urban governance helps shape reform outcomes and dynamics, there are also other factors at play. For example, both California and Australia have experienced periodic but severe drought conditions over the past 30 years. However, the most recent drought in Australia has been described as a one in 1,000 year event, particularly from 2006 to 2007 (AAP 2006b). The severity of these conditions could help to explain Australia’s success in wastewater recycling, as this was also the time when guidelines were being set and funds were being distributed. In addition, the cost of wastewater recycling will vary between cities depending on existing infrastructure and topography. For example, retrofitting water delivery systems and buildings to include recycled wastewater is more expensive than including the additional pipes in new construction. Cities also have different supply augmentation options beyond recycled wastewater. For example, some cities may be able to engage in water trading with nearby agricultural users while others may not, and some cities may face stricter dam operating requirements than others. These intercity differences may aggregate in ways that reinforce or undermine higher-level policy goals.

The Allocation of Authority and Multilevel Governance of Urban Service Reform This study has examined how differences in the allocation of authority within multilevel urban governance systems influence the policy pathways and scale politics of efforts to reform urban service delivery strategies. The

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United States and Australia were used as comparative cases. California served as the window to the U.S. experience based on its shared demographic and geographic features with Australia, but differences in the level of local control over urban water planning and management: high levels of local control in California and relatively low levels of local control in Australia. Questions of how and where to scale the governance of public services, and particularly water management, are increasingly important as authorities and policy problems continue to shift (Moss and Newig 2010; Batterbury and Fernando 2006). This study has shown that reform capacity and policy success can differ between types of governance systems while common barriers and political dynamics persist. Differences in the institutionalized allocation of authority in multilevel urban governance may have the greatest effect on the capacity for, and implementation of, successful urban service delivery strategy reforms from above. The Commonwealth government in Australia was more successful in implementing an urban water reform strategy due to its greater institutional and financial capabilities. It uses a greater percentage of its treated wastewater in planned water recycling projects (19% vs. 10% in California), has policy mechanisms through which recycled water can be incorporated into municipal drinking water supplies, and has successfully set and implemented a national urban water governance agenda. However, as Dahl (1994) points out, the gains in effectiveness made through institutional features—centralized or decentralized decision making—may come at the expense of democratic criteria such as fairness or legitimacy. In both places, local resistance has acted as a barrier to effective reform, and reconfigurations of authority through implementation has generated new spaces in which urban governance can now occur. This local resistance—and other political and institutional differences within and between cities—may aggregate in ways that shape multilevel urban governance and is an important area for further research. The findings demonstrate the critical role of political action and resistance in both centralized and decentralized urban governance systems and support previous research showing that local autonomy can be an obstacle to innovation when coordinated state and local action is required for success (Basolo and Scally 2008). If reforming urban service delivery strategies remains on the political agenda, one may expect to increasingly observe these dynamics in multilevel urban governance systems. Future research should examine these spaces further: Who governs in new spaces and with what consequences for equity and efficiency? How do they relate to the existing governance system? How long do they last? Furthermore, while setting central targets

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with local implementation flexibility is an attractive policy option, the findings in this study suggest that this strategy is not effective without appropriate incentives, coordination, and oversight. The premise of this study was that there is not one ideal form of urban governance able to promote reform without contention or inefficiency. Rather, each mode of urban governance—decentralized and centralized—has unique and dynamic barriers and opportunities to effective policy making that are shaped by institutions and actors operating at multiple scales. The analysis broadens our understanding of institutional dynamics in urban service reform by evaluating policy pathways in unique urban governance contexts and the political reconfigurations of urban governance that occur as a result of reform. The findings demonstrate the value of a comparative study and represent an additional step toward a more robust understanding of multilevel urban governance and effective urban service reform. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their very useful suggestions and Oran Young, Sarah Anderson, Patricia Romero-Lankao, Sander Meijerink, Harriet Bulkeley, Karen Seto, and Hua Qin for comments on earlier drafts.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was carried out with support from the Australian-American Fulbright Commission, the CALFED pre-doctoral fellows program, and the University of California, Santa Barbara.

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Bio Sara Hughes is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. Her research focuses on the institutional structures and political processes of urban governance, particularly as they affect the alignment of urban service strategies with environmental and sustainability goals. Sara’s recent publications include a forthcoming article in the Policy Studies Journal: “Voluntary Environmental Programs in the Public Sector: Evaluation of an Urban Water Conservation Program in California.”

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