Vol 11 No 2, April 2013

LEX LOCALIS - JOURNAL OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 177 - 192, April 2013

The Dutch Anomaly: Appointed Mayors Can Appointed Mayors Cope with Role Changes and Societal Demands? NIELS KARSTEN, LEX CACHET & LINZE SCHAAP 6 ABSTRACT In many European countries mayors are local political leaders. Dutch mayors, however, are neither local nor political, as national government appoints them. Their office is subject to serious changes. While it still carries a lot of ‘natural’ authority, its content has changed rather drastically. In this article we first of all give an overview of the mayoral office in Western Europe and sketch the Dutch mayorship. The next step is to discuss recent developments: councils gaining influence on the actual mayoral selection, mayors getting more legal capacities and responsibilities, and society demanding stronger (mayoral) leadership. We will explore the ways present mayors cope with the emerging tensions between these developments, and between the responses to them. The focus is on tensions between the various developments and the risks the mayorship runs. KEYWORDS: • local leadership • legitimate leadership • mayors • leadership strategies • The Netherlands

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Niels Karsten, MSc., Researcher, Tilburg University, Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, [email protected]. Lex Cachet, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of Public Administration, PO Box 1738, 30000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, [email protected]. Linze Schaap, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Tilburg University, Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, [email protected]. DOI 10.4335/11.2.177-192(2013) ISSN 1581-5374 Print/1855-363X Online © 2013 Lex localis (Maribor, Graz, Trieste, Split) Available online at http://journal.lex-localis.info.

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LEX LOCALIS - JOURNAL OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT N. Karsten, L. Cachet & L. Schaap: The Dutch Anomaly: Appointed Mayors Can Appointed Mayors Cope with Role Changes and Societal Demands?

Introduction

The direct popular election of mayors over the years has become more and more common throughout Western Europe. In many countries, the traditional election by the council has been replaced by direct mayoral election (Borraz & John, 2004; Bäck, Heinelt & Magnier, 2006; Schaap, Daemen et al, 2009). Dutch mayors constitute a deviant case in this respect, as central government appoints them. This has been the same ever since the mid-nineteenth century. This might give one the impression there has been little dynamism in the role and position of Dutch mayors and that the personalisation of leadership selection has not yet caught on. That, however, turns out to be a serious misunderstanding. Both the role and the position of Dutch mayors have changed considerably, especially in the last two decades or so, as a consequence of both institutional change and new ways of working. Even the selection procedure has undergone substantial change, although this is much more the result of unintended effects than of deliberate planning. Recent studies suggest that mayoral leadership in the Netherlands is indeed strengthening, especially when it comes to the policy field of public safety where Dutch mayors have rapidly acquired a great number of new legal capacities (Muller, Rogier et al, 2007; Sackers 2010a, 2010b). At the same time, however, the position of the Dutch mayor has weakened, due to increased influence of the municipal council on their staying in office. This effect is magnified by the politicisation of the mayoral office. Role conflicts seem to rise within the mayoral office and the inherent conflict between different sources of authority that becomes manifest as mayors attain more formal powers. In the experience of some mayors, formal, legal authority comes at the cost of traditional and informal, charismatic, authority, which hampers their effectiveness. The authors argue that mayoral leadership in the Netherlands has become full of contradictions up to the point that fundamental change in the mayoral office has become virtually inevitable and that a thorough reconsideration of the role and position of the mayor in Dutch local government is necessary. Questions then are, (a) whether tensions arise between the various developments in the mayoral office and if so, which tensions; (b) which mechanisms exist to cope with those tensions; (c) how the way mayors get their job (appointment with strong local influence) affects the coping mechanisms, and (d) what risks the mayorship runs. The structure of the article is as follows. In the second section we will sketch the Dutch mayorship - its history as well as the selection procedures. The next step, in section three, is to discuss recent developments. Three developments are particularly relevant. First of all changes in the selection procedures, as a result of which the local councils have gained an almost decisive influence on the actual selection of their mayor. The second development is the significant increase of the


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mayors’ legal capacities and responsibilities. Thirdly, society seems to demand stronger leadership and to focus on the mayors in this quest. Tensions between these developments, and between the responses to them, are likely to emerge. In section four we will explore the ways today’s mayors cope with those tensions. Section five discusses the risks the mayorship runs, especially from a democratic angle. The final section, six, contains some conclusions. 2.

Mayor in the Netherlands

Dutch mayors are key players in both local government and local society. They have formal powers as chairman of both the city council and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen. Since long they also have formal powers to keep the local public order and to maintain public safety. But they also informally act as ‘first citizen’, as symbol of the unity of the local community and as the only administrator that is supposed to stand ‘above’ local politics. Many citizens wrongly see the mayor as the powerful head of local administration, while the city council is the constitutional formal head of local government and, in fact, the board is far more powerful than the mayor on its own. The mayoral office leaves considerable room for a personal interpretation of a mayor’s role and function. Further, the role and function of Dutch mayors have changed considerably over the course of time. Whereas Dutch mayors in the 1960s on the whole, for example, were mostly administrators but no civil servants in the traditional sense, the mayoral office politicized considerably from 1970 onwards. Nevertheless, it is possible to point out some general patterns in the Dutch mayoral office and its development (Cachet, Karsten et al, 2009). Dutch mayors are indeed administrators, but they are administrators of a special kind. As an executive the mayor operates within the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, of which he is a full member with voting rights. This Board, by law, is a collegial body; the mayor has to cooperate with his fellow executives. In the Netherlands powers that in other countries usually rest with elected mayors individually are vested in the Board of Mayor and Aldermen collectively. Further, for the execution of most of his tasks, the mayor depends on the support of the municipal council. In that sense there are strong parallels between the position of the mayor and that of the aldermen. As such, Dutch mayors are rather weak, especially when compared to their European colleagues (Reynaert, Steyvers, Delwit & Pilet, 2009; Bäck et al., 2006; see also Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; John & Cole, 1999). On the other hand, the position of the mayor is special. He chairs both the municipal council and the municipal executive board, and has a number of independent state functions that bring serious legal powers, especially being responsible for the police and public order. Further, the mayor traditionally is supposed to have a role outside of day-to-day party politics (Schaap, 2009), watching over the long term stability of the municipal government and the

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consistency of municipal policies, supported by a term of office that is two years longer than that of the councillors and the aldermen. Dutch mayors are traditionally expected to play a neutral, non-partisan and non-political role (Schaap, 2009). The present authority of Dutch mayors to a large extent still rests on these roles (Schaap, Cachet et al, 2009). This position is mirrored by the fact that Dutch mayors are not political figures running in local elections (Schaap, 2009). Central government appoints them (Derksen and Schaap, 2010: 75ff; Hendriks & Schaap, 2010: 105). According to the Constitution (Section 131), (…) ‘Mayors shall be appointed by Royal Decree’. This hasn’t changed since the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the selection procedure for Dutch mayors has been discussed for quite a long time. Slowly but steadily, it has undergone considerable change. Until the late 1960s, the mayoral appointment was the prerogative of national government; local councils had no influence whatsoever. Since then, central government began allowing for local influence in the appointment procedure. 3

Developments in the Dutch Mayorship, Causing Tensions

Several of these changes find their origin in the so-called dualisation process, which brought a further separation of legislative and executive powers to Dutch local government in 2002 (Denters, Klok & van der Kolk, 2005; de Groot, Denters & Klok, 2010). The mayoral selection procedure did not change, but the dualisation process did bring a minor strengthening of the mayor’s office. More important, it provided a new impetus for long-running debates on the possible introduction of the directly elected mayor in the Netherlands. Some even regarded the dualisation process as a prelude to the directly elected mayor. In 2005, however, an attempt to introduce the directly elected mayor failed because the Senate (in Dutch: Eerste Kamer) rejected a constitutional amendment that was necessary to enable mayoral elections. As a result central government still appoints the mayors. Nevertheless, the mayoral selection procedure over the course of time has changed considerably. Most notably, local councils have gained significant influence on the mayoral appointment (Cachet, Karsten et al, 2009). Already since the nineteenseventies, local councils draft a ‘profile’ of the mayor, and may (and do) install a confidential committee that, in effect, functions as an additional selection mechanism. This committee prepares a council recommendation, which the council debates confidentially.1 Recently, however, after having decided, councils make their recommendation public. The Government (‘Crown’) then may reject the advice and appoint a different mayor, but this is highly unlikely. This means that de facto the local council elects the mayor, although formally central government still appoints the mayor. In addition the local council has gained considerable influence on the staying in office of the mayor, because it can give a


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formal advice on the reappointment of the mayor (at the end of his term) and can effectively dismiss (that is to say, formally: recommend central government to dismiss) the mayor in case of ‘strained relations’. In practice, this means that the mayor nowadays depends on the council’s trust ((Korsten & Aardema, 2006). Most of these developments are not the result of a reform but have emerged incrementally, some even without formal backing, but they nevertheless strongly influence the role and function of Dutch mayors. In fact, collectively, these incremental changes have had more affect on the mayoral office than any of the attempts to drastically change it in one go, which illustrates consensus democracies’ potential to gradually implement democratic reform (see Lijphart, 1968; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). One of the most important implications for the Dutch mayors is that they have become more vulnerable, being heavily dependent on the council’s consent. In the dualisation process, the council’s scrutiny role has strengthened, not only in theory, but also in practice: “councillors consider their scrutiny activities substantially more important than before the reforms”, De Groot, Denters and Klok conclude (2010: 418). This has a profound effect on the mayoral office, because it constantly operates under a watchful eye. As a consequence, Dutch mayors have become more likely to be sent off (Korsten & Aardema, 2006). This development is accelerated by the rise of populism (see Akkerman, 2003; Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; Zaslove, 2008). Local populist parties take a critical stance towards traditional, institutional authority and the political establishment which the Dutch, appointed mayors are part of (Andeweg, 2001; Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; de Vries, 2008). Combined with a persistent fragmentation of local councils (Korsten & Tops, 1998; Fransman, 2009), these developments have considerably weakened the political position of Dutch mayors. At the same time, the legal, institutional position of Dutch mayors has strengthened considerably over the last two decades independent of the dualisation process, especially with regard to the mayor’s independent responsibilities for public safety. National government has granted mayors a considerable number of new and relatively autonomous powers in this policy area (BZK, 2009; Sackers, 2010b: 13-33)2. Examples of these are Local Government Act powers to close buildings (section 174a), to hold groups of people in custody in order to prevent disruption (sections 154a and 176a), to have CCTV installed in public areas (section 151c), just to name a few. Mayors may also ask the city council to indicate certain public areas in which preventive searches are allowed. On their own they can temporarily forbid some people to enter their houses (for examples when accused of molesting family members) or close buildings if these have been used for drugs trafficking. Consequently, the legal position of the mayor in this policy field has gotten considerably stronger (Korsten, 2010). The origin thereof lies in the fact that the social and political saliency of public safety issues has

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increased and that more social issues are perceived in terms of public safety (van den Brink, 2002, p. 42; Wood & Shearing, 2007). These developments have led to an attribution of additional responsibilities of public safety to local government. Traditionally and legally, the responsibility for public safety in Dutch local government is entrusted to the mayor since public safety has long be regarded as a non-political issue, that should therefore be held outside of day-to-day party politics. In the eyes of national government the mayor, therefore, was and is the most obvious person to attribute public safety responsibilities and matching legal powers to. In fact, the mayor’s independent responsibility for public safety has long been a motive for establishing as well as maintaining the unique position of the appointed mayor in Dutch local government. It provided one of the main arguments against the introduction of the directly elected, and therefore political, mayor. The nature and role of public safety issues, however, has changed. The increased social and political saliency of public safety issues has led to politicisation thereof. Government’s conduct, in casu the mayor’s conduct, forms no exception (Muller et al., 2007). Several of the new powers that have been attributed to Dutch mayors, or rather their execution, are controversial in a political sense. This means that decisions over whether or not to exercise the newly obtained powers have become inherently political. In turn, this means that the mayoral office increasingly becomes the subject of political debate. Not only has public safety become more political, it has also become more salient. Consequently, the mayoral office politicises (Karsten, Schaap et al, 2010). This has had profound consequences for the role and function of Dutch mayors, because they become more likely to be (seen as) safety bosses and as strong local political leaders (Sackers, 2010a). Over the course of time the formal, political accountability of the mayor in relation to his public safety responsibilities has increased as well. At first the mayor, as an independent authority that executed state functions in the public safety area, was not accountable to the municipal council for his conduct in maintaining public order. This, however, has changed; with regard to most public safety responsibilities the council nowadays can hold the mayor to account, be it ex post. This means that the accountability relationship between the mayor and the council has strengthened also with regard to the state functions of the mayor, which makes the mayor more vulnerable politically (Korsten, 2010: 27; A-1). The strengthening of the mayor’s office through the attribution of new powers to the mayor is thus accompanied by a simultaneous weakening of his independence (A1; Sackers, 2010a, 2010b). The fact that the strengthening of Dutch mayor’s position is matched by a simultaneous weakening may be explained by the fact that strong leadership is on rather bad terms with the laws, institutions, and culture that characterise Dutch


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government. Consensus democracies, such as the Netherlands, are characterized by consultation, compromise and consensus seeking (Lijphart, 1968; Andeweg, 2000; Hendriks, 2010). Checks and balances are institutionalised throughout the political system. As such, the Netherlands provides an “unfavourable biotope” for strong political leadership ('t Hart, 2005: 234; see also Hendriks & Tops, 2000). Dutch local government is no exception (Daalder, 1964; van Ostaaijen, 2010). The weakening of the Dutch mayoral office can be considered to be an attempt to balance its institutional strengthening through the establishment of accountability mechanisms. In theory, this does not necessarily cause too many problems. The strengthening of an office in the legal sense does not necessarily conflict with the weakening of the same office in the political sense. In practice, however, the coexistence of these trends has problematic effects for Dutch mayors, although mayors of smaller municipalities are less affected (Korsten, 2010: 26). Mayors are expected to fulfil different roles (Leach & Wilson, 2000, 2002; Goldsmith & Larsen, 2004; Karsten, Schaap et al, 2010; Verheul & Schaap, 2010), but that is not the main issue. The point is that they are expected to fulfil those roles at the same time, whereas there is an almost inherent tension between them (Sackers, 2010b). Dutch mayoral leadership has become even more full of contradictions, to paraphrase Bergström, Magnusson and Ramberg (2008: 203. Dutch mayors are confronted with a multitude of demands that are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile. The politicisation of the office makes it virtually impossible for mayors to maintain their non-partisan and non-political role (Sackers, 2010b; see also Korsten & Tops, 1998: 27), even though some mayors may live under the impression that the two roles can be combined with relative ease (see A-1). A mayor that stands accountable to a political body (the council) and that has salient political tasks, will have great difficulty to appeal to his independent non-political role. This is because the formal role and position of the mayoral office to a large extent determine the nature of mayoral leadership when the corresponding powers are at the centre of local politics. Even though mayors have considerable room to give a personal interpretation of a mayor’s role and function, sometimes even beyond institutional borders, they operate within a political and institutional context that guides their conduct. The steady extension of Dutch mayor’s public safety powers, combined with increasing social and political saliency of those powers, for example, has given the mayoral office the character of a kind of enforcement office, which conflicts with the traditional mayoral role of the non-political herdsman (Sackers, 2010b). Although the institutional position of mayors can be strengthened and weakened at the same time, mayors cannot be strong and weak leaders concurrently. Nor can they indefinitely cope with the conflicting trends and expectations they are confronted with. In the next section we will see how mayors cope with these tensions in their day-to-day conduct.

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Mayoral Coping Mechanisms Regarding Tensions

Dutch mayors are expected to be strong and inspiring local leaders. But, they also have to cooperate very closely with the aldermen, being more primus inter pares then a strong (directly elected) local political leader. And, over the past decade, they also have become much more dependent on the city council. How do they cope? How do they succeed in avoiding serious role conflict between the many different and sometimes conflicting expectations and claims their office simultaneously is faced with? Mayors and others involved in selecting and appointing mayors first of all emphasize the increasing importance of a careful and deliberate selection procedure. The mayoral ‘profile’ drawn by the council has gained importance for deciding on both sides whether a candidate mayor and a council match sufficiently (A-1). The ‘profile’ tells a candidate what the council expects above all from its new mayor. A candidate then can ask himself whether he will sufficiently meet these expectations. Later on, the ‘profile’ can be used again in evaluating the functioning of the then appointed mayor. Does the mayor indeed meet the expectations? This selection procedure makes room for ‘desired mayors’; that is mayors that fit in the context and political-administrative culture of the municipality they apply for, and their respective ambitions, more than the traditional selection procedure did. The Dutch mayor is not a locally elected political leader, but usually does have a political past elsewhere, mostly as an alderman or mayor (in a smaller municipality) (van Bennekom, 2010). After being appointed most Dutch mayors however try to avoid a clear party political profile. In their own words: they try to ‘stand above local politics’ (A-1). Above all, this attitude is meant to emphasize the special position of the mayor. Although he is one of the key players in the administration, he is not a player within the local party-political scene. This seems to be a mechanism meant to reduce the vulnerability of the mayor in his roles as both chairman of the council and of the board of mayor and aldermen. Keeping some distance from day-to-day politics offers an opportunity for the mayor to gain support from both the governing coalition as well as the local opposition. By doing so, mayors also help to bridge the gap between both camps. In a rather subtle way mayors try to combine the best of both worlds: their special and relatively autonomous position on the one hand and their strong links with both the council and the board on the other. A third coping mechanism used by mayors is the careful selection of tasks to take care of, or rather not. Dutch mayors have a certain amount of legally laid down responsibilities as chairman of the council and board and as keeper of the local public order. Almost all other functions of local government are distributed during the politically steered process of forming a local coalition and a board of (mayor


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and) aldermen. In that process, however, mayors sometimes are asked to take the responsibility of portfolios beyond their legal tasks, such as personnel or city marketing or a specific project, for example a redevelopment of the city centre. A sensible mayor carefully takes into consideration the political context of such a request. Is it politically sensitive or even controversial? Or is there sufficient political consensus about what has to be done? Mayors reduce their vulnerability by accepting such a request only in the latter case and by reconsidering their willingness again as soon as their project becomes the subject of too much political controversy. Strong mayorship is still one of the possible outcomes, but only if it is accepted in advance by a wide range of political and social actors. A fourth coping mechanism is policy formation. As we mentioned before, mayors’ legal responsibilities for local public safety have increased rather drastically during the past decade. At the same time, public safety became societal and politically one of the most sensitive fields of local government, hence increasing the political profile of the mayor and his vulnerability. More and more, mayors also need to commit many other parties in order to maintain public order and safety effectively (Prins & Cachet, 2011). Both goals, decreasing mayors’ political vulnerabilities and strengthening the commitments of other parties, can be served by making local safety policies in a systematic way. In a local safety plan mayor, board of mayor and aldermen, city council, public prosecutor, police and many other parties choose their priorities for the near future and agree upon concerted actions to realize the stated goals. Joint actions like these offer the mayor more and wider support for his own actions within the context of the agreed upon local safety plan. By given-up part of the freedom of his office the mayor is considerably diminishing his vulnerability. A fifth coping mechanism could be labelled ‘be there if you need to be’. Mayors play important symbolic roles as the representative both of local government and of the local community. These symbolic roles are extremely important during periods of crisis and disaster. These episodes are not without risks for mayors as they are the first and most important administrator for local public safety. Serious mistakes during crises make mayors extremely vulnerable. Nevertheless these kinds of incidents can also offer ample opportunities for mayors to acquire personal authority and legitimacy. Crises and disasters offer mayors opportunities to rise above the daily turmoil of local politics. Effective crisis management – even of a more symbolic kind –supposedly strengthens the position of a mayor for a long(er) period of time (Dohmen & Steenbeeke, 2001). Thus, when it comes to dealing with the tensions that have arisen in the mayoral office ‘people matter’ (see also 't Hart, 2000). The way in which individual mayors cope with the tensions that are sometimes almost inherent to their profession, makes substantial difference in their ability to meet the diversity of demands they are confronted with (see also Verheul & Schaap, 2010). In addition, coping mechanisms operate at an institutional level too. One of the most important

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ones is the fundamental, but gradual and unintended change in the mayoral selection procedure. While keeping the formal national appointment upright, the de facto appointment by the council has enabled both mayors and councils to strengthen their respective roles within the dualised regime. The incremental changes in the mayoral selection procedure have strengthened the fit between current Dutch mayorship and its social and political context, without changing the system. Rather, the system has been played in such a way that the mayoral office has so far been able to largely cope with the demands placed upon it. 5

Dutch Mayors and Democratic Requirements?

In the previous sections we discussed that (a) mayors have become more vulnerable as a result of the hybrid selection procedures (in which national government officially appoints, but in fact appoints the candidate the council selected), and (b) mayors have gained stronger powers regarding public safety and have become more vulnerable in that respect too as ‘safety’ is high on the public agenda nowadays, and (c) mayors and other actors involved have created some ‘coping mechanisms’ in order to deal with the various and contradicting trends and developments in the mayoral office. What, then, is the problem? Looking at it from a pragmatic and functional point of view, we simply observe that mayors seem to rise to the challenge (the number of mayors that are sent off is rising, but not dramatically). Some risks exist, undoubtedly. Some mayors may fail, the Constitutional order may become rather vague and the system may become even less transparent than it already was, thus negatively affecting many peoples’ ability to understand it. As we mentioned before many people see the mayor as the ultimate local ‘boss’ and as such expect him to solve their problems fast and effectively, which he often can not. The resilience of the mayoral office, however, is substantial and as of yet no severe problems have arisen. Political discussions mostly concern more practical issues, such as concrete mayoral powers, mayors’ salaries and the like. Few people give voice to more fundamental debates, for example from a democratic point of view. One may, and should, nevertheless question the Dutch system, the Dutch anomaly, from that angle. Does it meet democratic standards? The answer depends on what exactly we mean by ‘democratic standards’. In this section we will explore different arguments based on three models of democracy, representative, direct, and participatory democracy respectively. In the representation model (groups of) citizens give a mandate to a smaller group of citizens to represent them in public matters. There are many variations in which this form of democracy has institutionalised, and according to some this form of decision-making is a vital part of all democracies (e.g. Dahl, 2000). While there is no common agreement on the best ratio between represented and representatives,


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there are several ways in which the representatives can reach decisions on behalf of the represented. Within the frame of representative democracy, Hendriks distinguishes between two forms (which are based on Lijphart’s more general distinction). In his pendulum model (Lijphart’s majoritarian model), a majority of the people makes decisions, and in the consensus model (based on Lijphart’s consensus model) the majority rule is accepted as a minimal requirement and as many people as possible make the decisions (Hendriks, 2010; Lijphart, 1999). If we assess the present situation of the Dutch mayors, a number of problems arise. The local council is the sole representative of the citizenry, and, constitutionally, the final decision-making body of the local authority. As we argued previously, the council nowadays heavily influences the appointment of the mayor. It may also hold the mayor accountable for his policies in matters of local safety, but it does not decide on those; in this policy field the mayor has independent powers, derived from national Laws. In affect, in local safety policies a democratic deficit exists, as the mayor lacks a democratic mandate for those policies. That might cause problems in due time, considering the increasing importance and sensitiveness of local safety. Institutionalised direct democracy differs in character from in institutionalised representative democracy (Dahl, 2000). The essential difference between the two models of democracy is who, in the end, decides what will be done (Hendriks, 2006). In direct democratic arrangements the constituents of a territory ultimately decide what will be done. Legitimacy is thus derived directly from these constituents by their vote. In representative democracy not the constituents, but the representatives of these constituents in the end decide what will happen. Legitimacy of specific decisions and policies is thus derived indirectly from the constituents of a territory through their representatives. Several arrangements are counted as direct democratic arrangements. Cronin (1989: 2), for instance, mentions three direct democratic arrangements: the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. Here too, the assessment of the present situation of the Dutch mayors, leads to a troublesome picture. In matters of local safety (the mayors’ prerogative), no legal provisions exist for either the popular initiative or the referendum. Some municipalities do have their own ‘referendum’ bylaws granting the citizenry the right to have referendums, but they are consultative in nature; often safety issues are excluded as allowed-for referendum topics. A recall is, of course, not possible as the public does not elect the mayor in the first place. Participatory democrats regard citizen participation as being vital to democracy (e.g. Heinelt, 2010). Political scientists heavily discussed the concept of participatory democracy in the 1960s and 1970s (Macpherson, 1977; Milbrath, 1966; Pateman, 1970). It is a relatively modern notion of democracy, but it is based on classic democratic principles (Held, 2006). In the academic debate, it is

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often argued that participatory democracy gains support and legitimises decisions and policy. Engaging citizens in policy making allows governments to tap into wider sources of information, perspectives and potential solutions, and improves the quality of the decisions reached. It also contributes to building public trust in government, raising the quality of democracy and strengthening civic capacity (Lowndes, Pratchett & Stoker, 2006; Durose, Greasly & Richardson, 2009). In short, participatory policy making is expected to increase democratic legitimacy, narrow the gap between citizens and government, enlarge the problem- solving capacity, increase the support for policy, and improve the quality of policy (Edelenbos, 2000). A remarkable variety of participative instruments exists, such as citizens’ juries, citizens’ panels, district budgets, but also partnerships and so on. An assessment of the present situation of the Dutch mayors would give us a difficult picture. In a limited number of municipalities the council tries to involve people in the appointment procedure, as they invite citizens to discuss the ‘profile’ for the new mayor. The public has the opportunity to express their opinions on the kind of mayor needed. This consultation is merely an advice to the council, no more. Another way to assess the participatory quality of the mayoral office is to see whether citizens are entitled and able to participate in the mayor’s policies, local safety policies in particular. That does not seem to be the case. All-in-all, we must conclude this section with the observation that both the selection procedures for the mayoral office as well as the ways mayors make their policies strongly lack democratic quality. 6

Conclusions

In this article we presented the developments in the Dutch mayoral office, first of all focussing on the changes in the selection procedures which lead to a de facto council appointment. Secondly, we discussed the increasing powers of the mayors. We thirdly explored the way mayors and other actors involved cope with contradicting trends. We concluded that (a) mayors have become more vulnerable as a result of the somewhat hybrid selection procedures (in which national government officially appoints, and the local council influences that decisions with such strength that de facto the council is the appointing body); (b) mayors have gained stronger powers regarding public safety and have become more vulnerable in that respect too as ‘safety’ is high on the public agenda nowadays; (c) mayors and other actors involved have created some ‘coping mechanisms’ in order to deal with the various and contradicting trends and developments in the mayoral office. Huge problems do not emerge; Dutch local institutions have shown a remarkable level of resilience. The vulnerability of the mayoral office, however, remains manifest. In addition, we questioned the democratic quality of the mayoral office. Applying three different kinds of democracy, representative,


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direct, and participatory democracy, we argued that the Dutch mayor as an institution is not very democratic. This predicament may call for a thorough reconsideration of the role and position of the mayor in Dutch local government. Basically, mayoral leadership may develop along two main pathways along. Either, the Dutch mayor returns to his traditional position of independent and non-political actor, or the Dutch mayor becomes a much stronger, individual and political leader. The former strategy requires a de-politicisation of the mayoral office; this would mean that it is no longer desirable that the Dutch mayor has strong powers at his disposal that are of a political nature. Amongst others, such a development would necessitate a strong reduction of the mayor’s current powers in the area of public safety, because it is unlikely that these will depoliticise in the near future. In case of the second pathway, the mayor as strong political leader, such a reduction is not necessary, because in this scenario the mayor gradually becomes the pivot of local government, which requires substantial powers and mayoral control over municipal policies and financial means (cf. Greasley & Stoker, 2008). The question of mayor’s democratic legitimacy will then, once again, be a very significant one. Notes 1

The committees’ recommendations remain confidential. One may assume, that the council decides accordingly, considering the confidential committee usually consists of leaders of the political council groups. 2 ‘Relatively’ autonomous while in some cases the mayor needs the city council to draw a local statute first before he can exercise his powers. Examples are the use of CCTV and the preventive holding of large groups of people to avoid order problems (in Dutch:’ bestuurlijke ophouding’). In some cases even the prior consent of the public prosecutor is needed.

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