You Say Snakes Aren’t Slimy? I Don’t Believe You
Samantha R. Fowler Assistant Professor, Department of Education and Interdisciplinary Studies, Florida Institute of Technology
[email protected]
You Say Snakes Aren’t Slimy? I Don’t Believe You
Are we there yet? Are we there yet? Are we there yet? It might sound like a torturous car ride with young children, but the question is, where are we, and where are we going with science education? Interestingly, our goals and accomplishments have paralleled the ever evolving definition of scientific literacy as we move away from route learning of a collection of scientific facts to ‘thinking like a scientist’ toward using scientific concepts during decision-making (functional scientific literacy: Zeidler & Sadler, 2011). We’ve come a long way since Sputnik. From scientifically accurate children’s television programming to science fairs and beyond, our students are immersed in science. Our students know science; they understand the nature of science as well as the process of science. However, it is that more recent iteration of scientific literacy, the functional scientific literacy, which still escapes us and will continue to escape us until we gain additional understanding of people’s beliefs. Un-informed Decision-Making: Another policy decision made on incomplete science Examples of dysfunctional scientific literacy abound. It is particularly distressing when an authority makes policy decisions without careful consideration of all the facts. For example, a study from the United States Geological Survey (USGS: Rodda, Jarnevich, & Reed, 2008) used comparisons of climate patterns (climate matching) between the United States and the native Asian habitat of the Burmese python (Python molurus) to claim that they are capable of spreading as far north as Washington and possibly even New York. Results from this study were used to form the USGS 2009 report (Reed & Rodda, 2009), which urged federal regulators to ban the importation of several large species of snakes. As a direct result of this report, the
Burmese python as well as three other species, northern and southern African pythons (Python sebae and python natalensis), and the yellow anaconda (Eunectes notaeus) were listed as injurious wildlife under the Lacey Act of 1900, banning their importation and transfer between states. However, the premise that prompted this action – that these snakes are capable or even likely to spread from south Florida – is not supported by evidence. Pyron, Burbrink, and Guiher (2008) discredited the Rodda, Jarnevich, and Reed (2008) study by using ecological niche models to include more variables, such as climatic extreme. Their results showed that the ability of the Burmese python to spread further than their current location in the Florida Everglades is severely limited. Furthermore, prediction models of global warming show that the size of suitable habitats in the U.S. will actually become smaller in the future rather than larger as the USGS claims. The unusual cold weather in Florida in January 2010 supported Pyron, Burbrink, and Guiher (2008). Avery et al. (2010) reported that the cold snap was fatal for seven of their nine captive Burmese pythons held in outdoor enclosures in north Florida. Dorcas, Willson, and Gibbons (2011) described a similar experience in South Carolina. They monitored the body temperatures, behavior, and habitat use of ten Burmese pythons that were captured in the wild and placed in an outdoor enclosure. While the snakes acclimated to the enclosure itself, they died during the January 2010 cold weather after failing to seek appropriate refugia. Mazzotti et al. (2011) also reported similar behavior–related deaths of Burmese pythons in the Everglades National Park from the same winter. Those that survived were found seeking refugia in drier, more elevated areas. Those that died were instead basking in the sun. Another study by Jacobson et al. (2012) examined temperature data from 2005 – 2011 with projected temperatures that are needed for digestion, activity, and survival in parts of Florida and South Carolina. Results
showed that digestion was impaired or inhibited for two months the south Florida and up to five months in South Carolina. This along with the fact that Burmese pythons lack the behavior to seek refuge from and the physiology to withstand cooler temperatures make it clear that they aren’t going to successfully migrate beyond southern Florida. In short, there is ample evidence opposing the USGS’s claim that Burmese pythons are likely to spread from their current location in the Florida Everglades. Therefore, their inclusion on the list of injurious species list of the Lacey Act was made under false pretenses. Yet the general public does not seem to mind that policy-makers make decisions based on misleading evidence – at least not in this case. This is likely because the general public tends to have a low opinion of snakes, exotic or not. Outcry from the reptile community (e.g. the United States Association of Reptile Keepers) largely goes unheard and/or ignored. Instead, when the big four were banned from importation and interstate travel, much of the public applauded. Subsequently, whenever the media portrays a rare event involving a snake, the event is viewed as affirmation that these snakes are inherently dangerous, and people continue to support the government’s very expensive efforts to ban them. On the surface, banning these snakes appears to help conservation efforts in Florida or at least not harm things. After all, banning a Burmese python in Chicago is not going to effect the Florida Everglades one way or the other. However, the unintended consequences have a strong potential to do more harm than good. These include economic damage to the reptile pet industry and taking the focus away from other, far more damaging species. Moreover, there is the very real possibility that current owners of these snakes, being unable to comply with new federal regulations, will release them into the wild. That will surely harm conservation efforts rather than help them.
This is just one example of the public allowing, perhaps even encouraging, our policymakers to avoid the use of sound evidence when making policy decisions. Countless other examples exist, which would take this paper far beyond the page limitation. The question is, why does a presumably otherwise rational person willfully ignore evidence when making a decision? Could it be because many people have an irrational fear of snakes and perhaps even view them as “evil” without having had any direct interaction with them? The Need to Believe It is human nature to feel apprehension when faced with the unknown, and the apprehension is compounded when the popular media portrays unfamiliar animals, such as snakes, to be inherit evildoers. The motion picture industry makes billions of dollars from such horror films (e.g. Anaconda, Snakes on a Plane, Python). When a rare but real incident occurs with a snake, it serves as confirmation that they are indeed the evildoers that Hollywood portrays them to be. Thus, many people are afraid of snakes, and when it comes to decision-making they often base their decisions on affective factors such as fear rather than the scientific evidence itself. By the way, this does not just apply to snakes. It can apply to any socioscientific issue, such as genetically modified foods and stem cell research, for examples. How then, do we convince people to consider scientific evidence when making decisions related to socioscientific issues? It seems intuitive to believe that if people are informed with knowledge that they will take it into consideration when making decisions. Anyone who has served on a jury knows that they are told to consider the evidence and base their verdict on that. The jury’s interpretation of the evidence presented in court deems a person guilty or innocent, yet there are instances of juries that cannot come to a decision even though they were presented with the same evidence in
court. This is because prior knowledge and beliefs affect how a person interprets evidence laid before them. It is not sufficient to merely show someone evidence; a person must be shown how to incorporate that evidence into his or her preexisting knowledge base so that it can be applied to present and future situations (Hogan, 2002; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). Yet it goes far beyond that. Not only do we need to show students how to fit information into a preexisting knowledge base, we need to show them how to fit it in to their belief base. We Aren’t There…. Yet Are we there yet? At this point the answer is, “Not yet.” However, there is good reason to be optimistic that we can get there, if only we had a better understanding of how students fit knowledge into their belief base. Chinn and Samarapungavan (2001) assert that students’ understandings (demonstrated content knowledge) often diverge from their beliefs. This is no surprise for most researchers and teachers in the context of controversial topics such as evolution and the big bang theory. However, many fail to realize that less controversial topics such as molecules and or the structure of the cell are also subject to a lack of belief on the students’ part. Furthermore, this disparity often goes unnoticed, since most students will answer questions according to what he or she thinks the teacher wants to hear (i.e. what was taught during class). People make decisions based on their beliefs, which sometimes isn’t supported by science. Therefore, once outside the classroom, a person may not even think to consider using that scientific knowledge when making decisions, because she or he never believed it to begin with. This is how we wind up with a general public that allows, perhaps even encourages, our policy makers to make poorly informed decisions. Said another way, if a student believes the science that he or she is taught, it is more likely to become part of his or her internal knowledge and belief system and be considered when
making decisions. That is how we will approach functional scientific literacy for our populace. After all, people often base their decisions on affective factors such as fear rather than scientific evidence, and they will continue to do so until we gain a better understanding of the important role beliefs play in functional scientific literacy.
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