Youth unemployment and Dis-empowerment in ...

"Youth unemployment and Dis-empowerment in Kenya: Socioeconomic and Political Implications on Development” (Agatha Makhanu & John Maraigua) Generational gap in terms of economic wealth and political leadership in Kenya and Africa in general cannot be overemphasized. The generational question has dominated the entire history of this continent where age is a deciding factor when considering or discussing leadership positions or economic wealth. Youth unemployment and underemployment, which is a growing concern in Kenya has contributed significantly to their marginalization and thus exacerbates this generational gap. The older generation’s continued hold on political and economic power has left the youth disillusioned, highly dependent and inactive in the political and socioeconomic affairs of the country. Notably, these youth, who are in the prime of their life, comprise the largest proportion of the entire population. This is a clear indication that young people will live with the effects of unemployment and underemployment that will eventually affect generational posterity. Directly linked to this scenario is increased poverty and disempowerment among the youth population. This phenomenon works against the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) number 1, 8 and 10 which takes into concern inclusivity, poverty reduction and equity. This paper will use secondary sources that will help understand the challenge of youth bulge and unemployment in Kenya. The paper will also suggest various approaches and strategies that will ensure empowerment among the young population. Key Words: empowerment; unemployment; dependency; bulge; youth

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Introduction The youthful period has conventionally been defined as the period of transition from childhood to adulthood. The United Nations (UN) (2012) defines the youth population as those aged between 15 to 24 years. Even though this age group has been recognized internationally, its implementation is problematic since various countries use different definitions to define their youth population. However, for the purposes of this paper, we shall use the age bracket of between 18 and 34 years as per Article 260 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

The census report (2009) indicates that the youth in Kenya constitute the largest proportion, at 34.945% out of the estimated 40 million. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) (2017) projects that the Kenyan population will reach 45.8 million by 2016 and the youth will be the majority. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report (2010) and Hope Sr., (2012) observe that this phenomenon presents a ‘youth bulge’, where the population of a country is skewed towards the young. This heralds a significant challenge for the government and other stakeholders in ensuring economic growth, job creation and hence poverty alleviation. Balwanz (2012) further notes that about 40% of youth (aged 15-34) in Kenya are neither in education nor employment. The Business Daily of 11th September 2017 put Kenyan youth unemployment rate at 22.2%, which makes it the highest in the region.

The World Development Report (2007) and The International Labour Organization (ILO) (2012) however argue that the dynamic and energetic youth have the potential in the

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realization of a country’s political and socioeconomic development but only if policies and programs are in place to enhance their employment opportunities. The youth’s potential is also critical in the actualization of Kenya Vision (KV) 2030, which aims at transforming the country into a middle income economy. Further, the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) critically depend on the degree of inclusion of the youth in the development agenda. The question is: how can this be achieved when a significant proportion of youth are unable to pursue independent or sustainable livelihoods?

Kenya, like other UN affiliated countries ratified the SDGs in September 2015, achievable by 2030 (UNDP, 2017). The SDG goals 1, 8 and 10 address issues directly affecting youth. SDG number 1 focuses on access of resources and basic services for all. Number 8 emphasizes employment for all, with equal pay for work of equal value, while number 10 targets empowerment and socioeconomic and political inclusion of all. The Strategic Policy Advisory Unit (SPAU), UNDP (2017) and the World Bank Group (2018) Economic Update however observe that Kenya’s effort in localizing and intergrading SDGs with KV 2030 still remains unclear. The Ministry of Devolution and Planning (MODP) charged with this responsibility has indeed outlined measures towards this realization. Nevertheless, some proposed strategies such as National Youth Service (NYS) which involves engagement of youth in public works as undertaken by the current Jubilee administration appears unsustainable.

Youth Unemployment and Socioeconomic Development Numerous factors exist for lack of employment opportunities among the youth. However, one of the main obstacles has been poor economic growth over the years (ILO 2012, 2013 3

and Kim and O’Brien, 2015). Kenya like most African countries experienced significant economic growth soon after independence. However, from the late 1970s economic progress stalled partly due to the world market conditions and the oil crisis but also due to economic mismanagement and corruption. Consequently, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and political and economic reforms were introduced by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the 1980s and 1990s (Alex (2000) and Hornsby, 2012). The SAPS failed to achieve their intended purpose of rapid economic growth but instead led to high income inequalities, retrenchment, widespread poverty and unemployment among the masses. These effects continue to be felt in Kenya and especially among the youth (Kwabena, G. and Mwangi, K. (2013).

Various intervention measures have been undertaken by successive governments to ensure economic growth and thus to strengthen the labour market since independence. Tangible economic growth however began in 2003 under President Kibaki’s administration. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased to 7 percent from 0.3 percent on annual basis. Even though there was GDP decrease in 2008 following the Post-Election Violence (PEV), recovery in 2010 increased GDP to 7.3 percent. However, from 2012 the country has recorded an unstable economic growth to date. For instance in 2012 GDP dropped to around 5.7 percent (ILO 2013), 5.9 GDP in 2016 and 4.9 GDP in 2017 (Daily Nation, 26th April, 2018 P. 4). This unstable economic growth pattern has greatly affected the labour market.

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The Kibaki administration undertook commendable measures to address youth challenges from 2002. These include the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC) for the period between 2003-2007 and KV 2030 noted above for the period between 2008 and 2030. In 2005, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports was established. In 2007, the Kenya National Youth Policy, a legislative framework to enhance youth participation in national development was developed. In 2008, the Ministry of Youth affairs and Sports launched the Youth Employment Marshal Plan to address the long term challenges of youth employment. In 2009 the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) and Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) (work for youth) Programmes were launched. The KKV programme aimed at employing young people in the rural and urban areas in labour intensive public works projects implemented by different government ministries (Kenya Vision 2030, 2009). In 2010, the Kenya Empowerment Program was launched in collaboration with the World Bank (ILO, 2013). These efforts though have not been fruitful especially in regard to formal job creation for the youth.

It is worth noting that the significant economic growth noted above indeed resulted in the creation of jobs from 2003 to 2011. However, the employment growth mostly favored the working age population. Further, growth in formal employment grew by 7 per cent but 87 per cent in casual employment (ILO 2013). Omolo (2012) also observes that the proportion of casual workers in wage employment increased from 17.9 per cent in 2000 to 21.2 per cent in 2005. He further notes that the proportion of employees on casual basis increased to 32.2 per cent in 2008 but declined slightly to 30.1 per cent in 2010. The Kibaki administration also changed the retirement age from 55 to 60. This implies that there are

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limited employment opportunities in the formal sector and that the youth continue to compete with an aging workforce that has postponed retirement.

According to Gunderson, M. (2014), youth are the most disadvantaged in the labour market. They experience long periods of unemployment due to a prolonged job search due to inexperience and limited job opportunities, and during periods of economic recession they are the first to be retrenched. Yet according to ILO (2012) Report, employment opportunities for the youth creates social and personal gains to the young people and society at large. ILO (2012) Report illustrates that persistent periods of unemployment means lack of regular income and therefore dependency on their families. The consequences of this problem is a prolonged youthful stage and lack of savings and investments (Gunderson, M. (2014). This leads to poverty increase and marginalization, buttressing a vicious cycle that inhibits development prospects of a country (Kenya Vision 2030, 2009). According to ILO 2012 and 2013 and Gunderson, M. (2014) exclusion may also lead to antisocial behavior such as drug abuse, petty crime and single parent families and exposure to sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV and AIDS.

Education and training are essential for young people to be absorbed in the labour market effectively. Education increases their potential and productivity thus opening up new opportunities in different sectors and professions. To this end, the Kenyan government continues to invest heavily in the education sector. In regard to the achievement of KV 2030, Omolo (2012) illustrates that the realization of this vision will depend on the creation of a skillful, productive and competitive human resource base that is in sync with a rapidly

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industrializing economy. However, millions of youth are churned out of university into the job market every year at a pace that is faster than the fewer jobs available. Thus, many of these graduates fail to get decent jobs and decline menial and hard labour jobs while others venture oversees in search of ‘greener pastures’. Muna, Stanton, & Mwau (2014) point out that this leads to brain drain of vital skills that are critically needed for economic development.

ILO Report (2013) illustrates that excluding the educated from the main economic activity is a loss to the government as well as wastage of valuable financial and human resources. Additionally, prolonged youth unemployment jeopardizes a country’s’ economic growth and development. This is because inactive youth are unable to contribute to the economic wellbeing of their country but instead increase government’s spending in the provision of various basic social services in order to sustain demands of the entire population. The government’s ability to improve the quality of life of citizens is driven by the revenue obtained from various sources.

A prolonged job search experienced during early adulthood years may affect future employment prospects for the youth as well as lifetime earnings, whose effects may be felt up to decades later (ILO (2012), ILO 2013, Gunderson, M. (2014) and Kwabena, G. and Mwangi, K. (2013. ILO (2012) and ILO (2013) further note that such consequences may result from declining of skills but also from prospective employers’ negative perception of youth who have been out of work for prolonged periods and without the habit and discipline

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of work. These scenario is more adverse for youth who have low level education. All this is a threat to the growth of potential of economies.

Youth underemployment and the underutilization of the existing labour force is another problem in the Kenyan economy. This phenomenon is very pronounced in the rural areas and among hawkers and those doing menial jobs in the city. These underemployed city dwellers may either be skilled or unskilled and sometimes rural urban migrants who move to the cities in the hope of finding formal jobs. Inadequate opportunities in the formal sector therefore means that there is a large number of youth entering the informal sector annually (jua kali) (Gichuki, 2014). Infact, ILO (2013) Report indicates that the improved standard of living in Kenya between 2003 and 2011 was mainly due to increase in informal sector workers where in 2011 the informal sector enterprises constituted 64 per cent of the total employment and 85 per cent when agricultural self employed workers are considered. The informal sector however as Odhiambo, et al., (2013) have observed is much fragmented and ill regularized and the youth work in deplorable conditions. Thus, the government cannot collect revenue as it should but instead focuses on salaried individuals and business, yet the bulk of workers are in the informal sector. This has repucussions on the economy.

ILO (2013) Report further observes that the informal sector workers in Kenya earn one fifth of what workers in the public sector earn and less than the established international and national set standards on minimum wage earninings. Therefore, the low earnings of the youth are not adequate enough to raise them out of poverty that remains a challenge to development efforts (Odhiambo, et al., (2013). The result of this is the existence of glaring

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socioeconomic inequalities between the youth and the adult population. According to KNBS (2008) Kenya is among countries with highest levels of inequalities in terms of wealth. The net effect is the widening of the generational gap between the youth and the adult popuation and the youth inability to actively participation in the socioeconomic realm. Youth involvement in political participation The previous section has discussed how weak economic power of the youth affects their participation in socioeconomic development. Youth political inclusion is equally crucial to a country’s prosperity. This section highlights political effects of youth exclusion.

Democratic rights in Kenya have been expanded since the re-introduction of multiparty politics. The 2010 constitution emphasizes citizen participation in government as a right in all aspects of public life. Youth participation should equally be promoted as it promotes responsible citizenship. According to (IEA, 2017) political participation by all citizens promotes inclusivity and good governance. The World Development Report 2007 (WDR) (2006) demonstrates that the willingness and ability to exercise rights and obligations of citizenship formed during the youthful stage impact later political participation in adulthood.

The WDR 2007 (2006) further illustrates that responsible citizenship involves individuals holding public officials to account for their actions, demanding justice, tolerating people from different religious and ethnic groups and voting after the attainment of the official age. Hence, for the youth to exercise responsible citizenship they should be given

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opportunities in public participation. The question is: how can this be achieved in a society where patriarchy is entrenched and the youth like children are to be seen and not to be heard? This question is significant because the youth need to be empowered to influence the decisions and decision makers who affect their lives. Most importantly, their role in government’s plans and policies for them should be clear for them to own the processes as beneficiaries.

The World Bank (2006) notes that in most African countries, the age factor embodied in the political culture has meant that there are limited opportunities for youth to express themselves and to meaningfully participate in national political discourse. In this respect, the voice of the youth and their ability to hold their leaders to account, which is strongly related to political participation is weak. IEA, 2017 Report indicates that despite much public debate about civic participation, human rights and equality in Kenya, the absence of the youth voice in terms of their opinions, needs and concerns is very pronounced. This demonstrates that the right for youth participation has been sidelined rendering them vulnerable and hence their inability to influence reform even in matters that directly affect them.

Political exclusion of the youth has lifelong consequences. According to Mc Evoy-Levy (2001) structural exclusion that delineate youth from the national agenda leads to feelings of marginalization and frustration. This may lead to rebellion against authority. It also reinforces their vulnerability as they become easy targets to parties that seek to recruit them into gangs for various reasons. This vulnerability of the youth and the need to include them

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in national agenda as a means to curtail youth involvement in violence, has been stressed by the UN Security council (2001). Kagwanja (2009) argues that social movements such as Mungiki sect in Central Kenya that emerged in the late 1980s and other illegal gangs such as Chinkoro in Nyanza, Kamjeshi in Nairobi and the Sabaot Land Defense force (SLDF) of Mt. Elgon District in Western Kenya among others is due to youth exclusion. The Waki Report (2008) and Kenya Human Rights Report (2007-2008) established that youth exclusion from the political process was one of the reasons for youth involvement in PEV of 2007/2008. This violence that manifested at a magnitude never witnessed before originated from disputed presidential poll results between President Kibaki and Raila Odinga (Mungai, 2007). According to OECD (2009), 70 percent of participants in PEV 2007/2008 were youth. This demonstrates how youth are at the center of the violence and used as instruments in fighting wars that they have little understanding about and probably nothing to gain.

Recurrent cycles of political violence have been witnessed during almost every electioneering period except for 1963 and 2002. Political violence however intensified from 1992 and the negative role of the youth has been noticeable. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) argue that the youth are featured in political struggles because of their ideals for change, their disposition to act and more importantly their increasing availability to be mobilized for political activities. According to Waki Report (2008) and Kagwanja (2009) the political and economic elite use ethnicity as a means around which to mobilize political support and the struggle for scarce resources. This is especially in regard to the

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presidency which is seen as the ultimate. The unemployed youth and illegal gangs therefore get ‘jobs’ mostly during the electioneering period.

The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) confirms in their report (Daily Nation 2nd April, 2018 Pg. 1, 10 & 11,) the existence of over 100 organized criminal gangs in spite of their ban. The NCIC report based on a study carried out between November, 2016 and June, 2017 in 47 counties illustrates that the illegal gangs are funded by politicians, their relatives, business men and even some government officials. The Waki Report (2008) on PEV 2007/2008 affirmed this role by some politicians. The NCIC Report noted a number of negative roles played by the youth. These include acting as security agents to candidates and political parties, bribery of voters, bolstering political zoning which polarizes communities and heightens ethnic conflicts and promotion of hate speech and provocation to violence. NCIC Report contends that these activities eventually influence voter preference and final election results. These derails democracy and is also a clear indication of youth who cannot question their leaders who seek to misuse them to illegally acquire or maintain power. Kagwanja (2009) further notes that some youth have been denied access to civil rights by being denied identification cards. These leads to harassment by authorities but significantly denies the youth a chance to exercise judiciously their democratic rights and yet they are voters in their own right.

The NCIC argues that unemployment is not a major cause of gang presence because 81 per cent of gang members are employed in the informal sector as boda boda (motorbike) riders, touts, taxi drivers, hawkers and jua kali traders. However this paper emphasizes that this

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are underemployed youth who earn less than a dollar a day as a set measure for poverty alleviation and will engage in activities for additional income. Unemployment and resultant poverty has also been acknowledged as a root cause for youth engagement in violence in Kenya (Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation) following PEV 2007/2008 and in countries that have experienced politically instability. Human Rights Watch (2008) has estimated that more than 50 percent of the youth who joined rebel groups or engaged in violence cited unemployment as the main reason. Therefore, unemployment and poverty predisposes youth to negative influence by politicians.

Political violence as seen in electioneering times demonstrates that violence remains a prevalent means of contesting socioeconomic and political grievances in Kenya. Political violence however has consequences on a country. Most deaths experienced during this period are among the youth. This is loss of valuable human capital. Violence impacts negatively on democracy and threatens the stability of government. It impedes a country’s economic growth as shown due to tension and uncertainty of elections as well as undermines investor confidence. The sum effect is low job creation and the retrenchment and youth are the most affected because unemployment is driven by economic conditions.

The weak economic base of the youth has tremendous effect on their political leadership. It implies that the older generation will continue to systematically sideline the young generation from public governance and economic life. Ogola (2006) notes that a high premium has been put on titles related to gender and age in Kenya, which have been used in the political realm to authentic supremacy of the adult generation. Age is thus a condition

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for leadership. Bringing this into the political scene one would easily see how for a long time the older members of the society have wielded political power at the expense of the youth. Even when the young get into leadership positions, their numbers have been fewer and their impact less felt due to the fact that they are a minority. This affects vocalization of interest of the youth and their impact becomes limited by the fact that majority of decision makers and leaders are of the older generation.

According to Muna, Stanton, & Mwau (2014) the older generation has had control of the most prestigious and powerful roles over decades and this has had an attitude that has created risks for the youth in Kenya for a long time. The youth have been viewed as immature and irresponsible individuals who are not capable of charting their own course by the older generations. Lack of mentorship among the younger generations will lead to a leadership gap in virtually every sector of the political and socioeconomic, which will negatively affect continuity and eventually productivity. In this situation there will be loss and underutilization of talents that could otherwise benefit the society. The net effect will be a society with huge young dependent population. Conclusion This paper acknowledges that challenges of youth unemployment and underemployment are immense and need strategies that are both capital and time intensive. There have been a number of policy initiatives in this regard as noted above. The persistence of the problem however implies that they still need to be re-emphasized and therefore revamped. In this section we shall limit ourselves to a few recommendations that stress on employmentpromoting growth strategies which include, Non-Farm Activities (NFA), industrialization,

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entrepreneurship and self-employment of the youth, Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) and strengthening the voice of the youth. Recommendations Industrialization A forward looking industrial policy will spur economic growth, generate revenue for the government and create significant jobs on large scale. It is also the best opportunity in the actualization of KV 2030 and the right direction in the attainment SGDs. In this regard, the government should provide an enabling environment for local and foreign companies by lowering the cost of doing business. For instance, the lowering of corporate tax and Value Added Tax (VAT) for industries will be prudent. The government could also focus on small scale industries that are labour intensive which could help solve the problem of youth unemployment. These include local products such as palm oil and coconut production, pyrethrum, fish farming and local paint industries. The government could also improve cotton growing and the sugar industry. In addition, the ongoing mineral production of oil, titanium and coal should drive the countries industrialization prospects. The foreign firms that are undertaking this initiatives should be linked to local communities for them to reap maximum benefit in terms of employment thus poverty reduction. Entrepreneurship and self-employment Promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurship among youth will lead to youth economic empowerment initiatives that will generate jobs and a youth generation that could create employment opportunities for other unemployed youth as well. In this context, the government should provide funds for business start-up as well as training opportunities of how to maintain a business through mentorship programs with more experienced and

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successful adult business people. This will instill discipline and a good enterprise culture among aspiring youth entrepreneurs. Formalization of the informal sector The government should encourage the formalization of the informal sector by creating an enabling environment. This includes a legal and regulatory framework that involves favorable taxation and promotion of business rights among others. Non-farm activities Non-Farm Activities (NFA) are non-agricultural activities carried in rural areas. They are significant in cushioning rural areas against bad weather and in supplementing rural income. The government can develop strategies and policies that pay attention to NFA. This could include use of a certain percentage of the aforementioned YEDF that as noted is ineffective in the rural areas. Youth Voice The youth should be given an opportunity to articulate their views which should inform government’s plans and policies when addressing their challenges. In this regard, youth consultative forums should be devolved to the lowest county levels. Creation of Partnerships The government should create a multi-stakeholder approach and creation of partnerships with county governments, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), employers’ organizations, trade unions and researchers in order to set the right priorities for sustainable solutions. The government could also adopt policy considerations such as affirmative action to ensure that a significant majority of the youth with requisite labour skills are absorbed into the labour market annually.

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Monitoring and Evaluation The government should pay adequate attention to learning from periodic M&E data for timely sustainable solutions. This will help in assessment of policies that have worked, can inform future policies or can be replicated in future. There is also urgent need to fast track localization of SGDs and their harmonization with KV 2030. In addition, an institutional framework for operation at national and county levels should be established to monitor implementation and progress.

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